Mozambique – The Tortuous Road to Democracy



Título: Mozambique – The Tortuous Road to Democracy

Autor: João M. Cabrita

Editora: Palgrave Macmillan, Londres; St. Martin’s Press, Nova Iorque, 2000. |Título: Nyerere and Africa: end of an era

Autor: Godfrey Mwakikagile

Editora: New Africa Press, Pretória/Dar es Salam, 2007 | |

| |

|Capítulo 1 |Capítulo 7 |

| | |

|Marriage of Convenience |The Struggle for Mozambique: |

| |The Founding of FRELIMO in Tanzania * |

| | |

|The formation of Frelimo was announced for the first time in |It is interesting that although FRELIMO was formed in Dar es |

|Accra on 29 May 1962 by the União Democrática Nacional de |Salaam, its formation was announced for the first time in Accra, |

|Moçambique (Udenamo), and the Mozambique African National Union |Ghana, on May 29, 1962 by UDENAMO and MANU leaders. |

|(MANU). | |

| | |

|For several months, the two organizations of exiled Mozambicans |The two organizations had been negotiating for months in Dar es |

|had been holding unity talks in their Tanzania base. |Salaam… |

| | |

|It was more a marriage of convenience imposed on the Mozambicans |Although the three organizations were united by a common desire to|

|than a genuine united front against Portuguese colonialism, |end colonial rule, the compromise they reached to establish |

|ultimately contributing to divisions within the colony’s |FRELIMO was more a marriage of convenience, clearly demonstrated |

|independence movement. |by the continuing ideological differences within the nationalist |

| |movement… |

| | |

|Interference by African governments with different agendas for |Compounding the problem for the Mozambican nationalists was |

|continental issues had been a determining factor in the marriage.|interference by a number of African governments, each with its own|

| |agenda on how to address continental issues including liberation |

| |of colonies. Such interference played a critical role in the |

| |consummation of this marriage between UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI. |

| | |

| | |

| | |

| | |

|Formed in Rhodesia in November 1960, Udenamo was the first of the|The first organization to advocate armed struggle as the only |

|three Mozambican independence movements to advocate violence to |viable means to end Portuguese rule was UDENAMO, formed in |

|bring about independence. |Southern Rhodesia in November 1960 |

| | |

|Udenamo was influenced by Zimbabwean politics, and its members |The nationalist struggle by in Southern Rhodesia had a major |

|had a history of involvement with Joshua Nkomo’s National |impact on UDENAMO whose members had a working relationship with |

|Democratic Party. |the National Democratic Party led by Joshua Nkomo… |

| | |

|Adelino Gwambe, a 20-year-old Mozambican from Inhambane, led the |UDENAMO was led by Adelino Gwambe, a 20-year-old from Inhambane, |

|organization. |Mozambique. |

| | |

|As a campaign for the independence of Mozambique could not be |But he and his colleagues knew that they could not effectively if |

|waged from white-ruled Rhodesia, Gwambe and his followers left |at all wage an armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in |

|for Tanzania, where, in view of its forthcoming independence, |Mozambique from another white-rule, territory, Southern Rhodesia. |

|Udenamo would be better positioned to wage an armed campaign |They therefore decided to move to Tanzania where they felt they |

|against the Portuguese. |would be welcomed and allowed to establish bases once the country |

| |became independent in only a few months. |

| | |

|Once based in Dar es Salaam, Udenamo continued to attract |After it established itself in Dar es Salaam, UDENAMO continued to|

|Mozambicans. In April 1961, Udenamo’s vice-president, Fanuel |attract more members and supporters… In April 1961, Udenamo’s |

|Mahluza, wrote to Eduardo Mondlane, an U.S. educated Mozambican |vice-president, Fanuel Mahluza, wrote to Eduardo Mondlane in New |

|anthropologist working for the UN Trusteeship Council in New |York where he worked for the UN Trusteeship Council and invited |

|York, inviting him to join the organization. |him to join the organization. |

| | |

| | |

|Mondlane did not accept the invitation. He had his own agenda, |But Dr. Mondlane did not join the group. He refused to join |

|which did not conform to Udenamo's. |UDENAMO or any other nationalist organization because he had his |

| |own plans for Mozambique. |

| | |

|Mondlane… had just completed a tour of Mozambique, where he saw |He had recently visited Mozambique on behalf of the United Nations|

|that nationalist sentiment was strong… he now wanted the United |and saw that nationalist feelings were widespread, but preferred a|

|States to give him funds to operate a nationalist organization |non-violent approach towards independence, as opposed to UDENAMO |

|that would seek a non-violent solution in Mozambique. | |

| | |

|Mondlane was concerned over the possibility of a war being waged |Mondlane was concerned over the possibility of a war being waged |

|from Tanzania because, as he put it in a report on his Mozambique|from Tanganyika because, as he put it in a report on his |

|tour given to U.S. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, "one |Mozambique tour given to United States Undersecretary of State |

|shudders at the consequences of such an eventuality, judging by |Chester Bowles, "one shudders at the consequences of such an |

|Portugal's reaction to a similar situation in Angola." (a) |eventuality, judging by Portugal's reaction to a similar situation|

| |in Angola."3 |

|____________ | |

|No livro de João Cabrita, esta citação continua na frase seguinte|__________ |

|e cuja fonte o autor identifica na nota 5 do Capítulo 1 (Marriage|3. Eduardo Mondlane in his report to Chester Bowles |

|of Convenience). |  / pdfs/0333920015.pdf |

| | |

|Mondlane suggested in his report that the |Mondlane went on to say in his report: |

| | |

|"United States should be in a position to encourage Portugal to |"United States should be in a position to encourage Portugal to |

|accept the principle of self-determination for the African |accept the principle of self-determination for the African peoples|

|peoples under her control; set target dates and take steps |under her control; set target dates and take steps towards |

|towards self-government and independence by 1965; and help |self-government and independence by 1965; and help formulate and |

|formulate and finance policies of economic, educational, and |finance policies of economic, educational, and political |

|political development for the people of Portuguese Africa and to |development for the people of Portuguese Africa and to prepare |

|prepare them for an independence with responsibility."5 |them for an independence with responsibility."4 |

| | |

|________________ | |

|5. Eduardo Mondlane, ‘Present Conditions in Mozambique’ 1 May |____________ |

|1961, pp. 10a, 12 from the Immanuel Wallerstein Collection of |4. Ibid. |

|Political Ephemera, Real Number 4, Sterling Memorial Library, | |

|Yale University. | |

| | |

| | |

| | |

|Marcelino dos Santos…. moved to Morocco, becoming involved in the|When the conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the |

|preparations for the founding of CONCP. In that capacity, he |Portuguese Territories was held in Casablanca in April 1961, |

|invited Gwambe to represent Udenamo at the CONCP's founding |Marcelino dos Santos was already living there and became involved |

|conference. |in organizing the conference. It was in that capacity that he |

| |invited UDENAMO’s president, Adelino Gwambe to attend the |

| |conference and represent the organization. |

| | |

|Gwambe's decision to appoint Marcelino dos Santos there and then |Gwambe made a momentous decision and appointed Marcelino dos |

|as Udenamo's deputy secretary general, undoubtedly provided the |Santos as UDENAMO's secretary general when Dos Santos invited him |

|organization with its most capable intellectual and organizer, |to attend the Casablanca conference, providing the organization |

|but also a dedicated Stalinist. |with its most capable and articulate intellectual and organizer. |

| | |

|It was Marcelino dos Santos who drafted Udenamo's constitution, |It was Marcelino dos Santos who drafted UDENAMO's constitution |

|structuring it under the principles of "democratic centralism". |based on democratic centralism. |

| | |

|As Udenamo expanded its links further afield, its leaders saw |As UDENAMO continue to grow and establish international ties with |

|signs of uneasiness on the part of their hosts. |an increasing number of groups and individuals, including some |

| |governments, strains began to show in its relationship with |

| |Tanganyikan leaders, its hosts. |

| | |

|Tanzanian’s Julius Nyerere government was concerned over the |Tanganyikan officials were concerned over UDENAMO’s ties to Ghana,|

|organization’s links with Ghana, established through the Ghanaian|established through the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs when |

|Bureau of African Affairs when Udenamo operated from Rhodesia. |Udenamo was based in Southern Rhodesia. |

| | |

|Ghana, the first country to financially assist Udenamo, extended |Ghana, the first African country to win independence in 1957, was |

|regular invitations for the organization’s senior officials to |also the first country to provide financial assistance and invited|

|visit Accra. It funded Gwambe's visits to Conakry and Helsinki, |UDENAMO’s main leaders to visit Accra, Ghana’s capital, on a |

|and provided an office for the Udenamo representative in Accra. |regular basis. The Ghanaian government also paid for Adelino |

| |Gwambe's visits to Conakry, Guinea, and to Helsinki, Finland, and |

| |provided an office for Udenamo representatives in Accra. |

| | |

|The Tanzanians viewed Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah as too radical a |But the idea that Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah was trying to |

|leader for their taste. They resented what they believed to be |set the agenda for Mozambique and dominate – not just help – the |

|Nkrumah's blatant effort to bring the Mozambican nationalists |nationalist organizations fighting for independence in that |

|under his sphere of influence. Fearing that he could in fact pose|colony was unsettling to government officials in what was then |

|a threat to Nyerere's desire to become the champion of southern |Tanganyika. “Fearing that he could in fact pose a threat to |

|Africa's nationalist cause, the Tanzanians took action. |Nyerere's desire to become the champion of southern Africa's |

| |nationalist cause, the Tanzanians took action.” 5 |

| |____________ |

| |5. / pdfs/0333920015.pdf |

| | |

| |Esta é a única citação que Godfrey Mwakikagile extraiu do texto de|

| |João Cabrita que se encontra entre aspas. |

| | |

|The Nyerere government opted for MANU, essentially an |Tanganyika threw its weight behind MANU as a counter-weight to |

|organization of Makonde tribesmen with roots in Mozambique’s Cabo|Ghana’s support of UDENAMO. […] Geographically, MANU was a |

|Delgado province, bordering Tanzania. Some of its members had |northern organization drawing its largest membership from the |

|been born and reared in Tanzania. Others in Zanzibar and Kenya. |Makonde tribe found in both Tanganyika and Mozambique. And many of|

|In the early 1960s, there were an estimated 250 000 Mozambicans, |its members, including some of its leaders , were born and |

|notably Makonde, living in Tanzania. They worked primarily in |brought up in Tanganyika. In fact, in the early sixties, about |

|plantations, but were also involved in trade union and political |250,000 Mozambicans, mainly Makonde, were living in Tanganyika |

|activities. |which united with Zanzibar in 1964 to form Tanzania. And many of |

| |them were involved in trade union and political activities. |

| | |

|In January 1961, the MAA branches in Dar es Salaam, Mombassa and |In January 1961, the Makonde African Association (MAA) branches in|

|Zanzibar, led respectively by Matthew Mmole, Samuly Diankali and |Dar es Salaam (Tanganyika), Mombasa (Kenya) and Zanzibar merged to|

|Ali Madebe, merged as MANU. The presidency and vice-presidency of|form MANU. The Tanganyikan branch was led by Matthew Mmole; the |

|the new party were given to Mmole and Lawrence Malinga Millinga, |Kenyan and Zanzibari branches by Samuly Diankali and Ali Madebe, |

|both born in Tanzania. The similarities between MANU and TANU |respectively. Matthew Mmole became MANU’s president, and Lawrence |

|were not only in the name. Some in MANU aimed at the unification |Malinga Millinga its vice-president. Both were born in Tanganyika.|

|of Cabo Delgado with Tanzania for a greater Makonde homeland. |Many MANU members, if not the majority, also wanted to unite Cabo |

| |Delgado Province with Tanganyika in order to establish a Greater |

| |Makonde homeland. |

| | |

|Udenamo felt that the prospects of an armed struggle looked grim.|UDENAMO, one of the other two Mozambican nationalist |

|The Tanzanian government discontinued food supplies and other |organizations, was still committed to armed struggle to free |

|assistance that it had been giving Udenamo. Tanzania declared |Mozambique, but felt that prospects for such a campaign were not |

|Adelino Gwambe persona non grata for stating in a news conference|good. The government of Tanzania cut off all assistance to Udenamo|

|on the eve of that country’s independence that arrangements had |and declared Adelino Gwambe, UDENAMO’s president, persona non |

|been made for Udenamo to start the armed struggle in Mozambique. |grata for announcing at a news conference just before Tanganyika |

|He had to leave for Accra, but was allowed to return to Tanzania |won independence that arrangements had been made for Udenamo to |

|soon afterwards. When Ghana invited Udenamo to attend the |launch a guerrilla campaign in Mozambique. Because of his status |

|May-June 1962 African Freedom Fighters Conference in Accra, the |as an undesirable alien in Tanganyika, he had to leave for Accra, |

|Tanzanians refused to issue travel documents to the Udenamo |Ghana, but was allowed to return to Tanganyika soon. But when |

|delegation. These had to be organized by the Ghanaian High |Ghana invited UDENAMO to attend the African Freedom Fighters |

|Commission in Dar es Salaam. |Conference in Accra in May-June 1962, the government of Tanganyika|

| |refused to issue travel documents to UDENAMO delegates for them to|

| |go to Ghana. Instead, the Ghanaian High Commission in Dar es |

| |Salaam had to make the necessary provisions to enable its |

| |delegates to travel to Ghana and attend the conference. |

| | |

|It was not only the Tanzanian government that had grown |Tanganyika leaders were not the only ones who were suspicious of |

|distrustful of Nkrumah. Marcelino dos Santos was not at all |Nkrumah’s intentions in supporting UDENAMO and for trying to |

|impressed with Nkrumah for not regarding him as truly |intervene in Mozambique and southern Africa in general. Marcelino |

|representative of the black people of Mozambique since he was a |dos Santos […] was deeply offended by Nkrumah who did not see him |

|mulatto. |as truly representative of the black people of Mozambique because |

| |he was a mulatto. |

| | |

| | |

| | |

|To prevent a worsening of relations with Tanzania, and bearing in|And being aware of Tanganyika’s strategic position as a rear base |

|mind the strategic importance of that country for the attainment |critical to the liberation of Mozambique, he advised his |

|of Mozambique's independence, Marcelino dos Santos advised his |colleagues in UDENAMO to unite with MANU and form a single |

|fellow leaders to merge with MANU. Gwambe outrightly rejected the|organization. UDENAMO’s president, Adelino Gwambe, dismissed the |

|idea, to which Marcelino dos Santos reacted by threatening to |idea and refused to compromise. Marcelino dos Santos responded by |

|leave Udenamo and join MANU. |threatening to leave UDENAMO and join MANU. |

| | |

|But at several meetings of Udenamo's Executive Committee held |So, throughout October 1961, UDENAMO's Executive Committee held |

|throughout October 1961, it was decided that in order to overcome|several meetings to evaluate the entire situation and agreed to |

|the prevailing situation, Udenamo and MANU should unite. In order|unite with MANU. |

|to gain MANU's sympathy, Udenamo officials made use of their |But they also used money to achieve this goal. In order to get |

|financial resources to virtually bribe members of the Makonde |MANU’s support for the merger, UDENAMO leaders used their |

|organization to join them. In another move, Udenamo included MANU|financial resources to virtually bribe members of the Makonde |

|leaders in its delegation to the African Freedom Fighters |organization to join them and form one nationalist organization |

|Conference in Accra. |embracing all Mozambicans. To entice them even more, UDENAMO also |

| |include MANU leaders in its delegation to the African Freedom |

| |Fighters Conference in Accra. |

| | |

|At a ceremony held under the auspices of the Tanzanian government|On 24 May, 1962, at a ceremony held in Dar es Salaam under the |

|in Dar es Salaam on 24 May 1962, Udenamo and MANU finally |auspices of the Tanganyikan government in Dar es Salaam, UDENAMO |

|"decided to bring unity of all patriotic forces of Mozambique by |and MANU announced that they had decided to bring unity of all |

|means of forming a common front," pending the return of the |patriotic forces of Mozambique by means of forming a common |

|respective leaders from.11 Much to the irritation of the |front”, pending the return of the respective leaders from Accra. |

|Tanzanians, Gwambe told a news conference in Accra five days |[…] Adelino Gwambe – in a move that amounted to a slap in the face|

|later that the decision to merge was in response to Nkrumah's |of the Tanganyikan leaders – announced at a news conference in |

|call for the closing of ranks for the liberation of Africa.12 As |Accra five days after the merger that the decision to unite the |

|proposed by Mahluza, the front was to be known as the Frente de |two organizations was in response to Nkrumah’s call for the |

|Libertação de Moçambique. |closing of ranks for the liberation of Africa. […] As proposed by |

| |Fanhuel [sic] Mahluza, the new organization came to be known |

|_____________ |Frente de Libertação de Moçambique. |

| | |

|11. Udenamo and MANU statement, Dar es Salaam, 25 May 1962. | |

| | |

|12. Evening News,. Op. cit. Esta nota do livro de João Cabrita | |

|deve ser conjugada com a nota 3 do Capítulo 1: ‘Mozambique | |

|Parties Answer Osagyefo’s “Close Ranks Call”’ , Evening News, | |

|Accra, 6 June 1962, pp. 1,2. | |

| | |

|With unity talks between Udenamo and MANU under way, José |While negotiations were going on between UDENAMO and MANU to unite|

|Baltazar da Costa Chagonga, the leader of Unami, arrived in Dar |the two organizations, Josea [sic] Baltazar da Costa Chagonga |

|es Salaam. In 1959, Chagonga had founded the Associação Nacional |arrived in Dar es Salaam where the talks were being held. In 1959,|

|Africana de Moatize, ostensibly a cultural association of Moatize|Chagonga formed the Associaceao [sic] Nacional Africana de |

|coal mineworkers as well as Mozambican migrants in Zambia, Malawi|Moatize, ostensibly a cultural association of Moatize coal mine |

|and Rhodesia. In reality, the association promoted nationalist |workers and Mozambican migrants in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia),|

|ideals among its members. An advocate of peaceful change, |Nyasaland Malawi and Southern Rhodesia Rhodesia (renamed |

|Chagonga had been petitioning the Portuguese to review unsavoury |Zimbabwe). But the organization was really nothing but an |

|labour practices in the colony. This resulted in his detention. |incubator of nationalism and propaganda nationalist ideals among |

|Upon his release, Chagonga fled to Malawi where in May 1960 he |its members who now had a medium through which to articulate their|

|renamed his organization Unami. |nationalist aspirations. |

| | |

| |Chagonga advocated peaceful change and tried to ask the Portuguese|

| |colonial authorities in Mozambique to improve the working |

| |conditions which were becoming increasingly intolerable to African|

| |miners, labourers and other workers. He was detained for that and,|

| |after he was released, fled to Nyasaland where in May 1961 he |

| |renamed his organization UNAMI… |

| | |

|To counter Gwambe's financial clout, on his way to Syracuse |In an attempt to neutralize Gwambe’s financial control over |

|Mondlane planned to stop over in Cairo, Tunis, Geneva and London |UDENAMO and MANU members, Dr. Mondlane on his way back to Syracuse|

|and raise funds. "As soon as he reaches the United States," |University from Dar es Salaam planned to visit Cairo, Tunis, |

|reported Byrne, "Mr. Mondlane plans to get in touch with Deputy |Geneva and London to get financial support through fund raising. |

|Assistant Secretary [of State for African Affairs] Wayne |The Senior American diplomat in Tanganyika during that time, |

|Fredericks." 15 |Thomas Byrne, stated, "Mr. Mondlane plans to get in touch with |

| |Deputy Assistant Secretary [of State for African Affairs] Wayne |

| |Fredericks."6 |

| | |

| |_______________ |

| |6. Thomas Byrne, ibid. |

|______________ | |

|15. Ibid. [Esta nota do Capítulo 1 do livro de Cabrita deve ser | |

|conjugada com a nota no. “14. FOIA: Foreign Dispatch, American | |

|Embassy, Dar es Salaam, 19 June 1962.” | |

| | |

|FOIA significa Freedom of Information Act, ou Lei da Liberdade da| |

|Informação. Foi ao abrigo desta Lei que Cabrita obteve | |

|documentação avulsa do Departamento de Estado e da CIA, | |

|reveladora das relações entre o Dr. Eduardo Mondlane e os Estados| |

|Unidos. De acordo com o livro de Cabrita, Thomas Byrne era na | |

|altura o encarregado de negócios, em exercício, da Embaixada dos | |

|Estados em Dar es Salaam. | |

| | |

|"Dr. Mondlane's position as leader of the Mozambique Liberation |As Byrne commented in a cable to the US State Department in |

|Front," commented Byrne in a cable to the Department of State, |Washington, DC: |

| | |

|“appears at the moment to be strong. His future prospects will | |

|depend to a great extent upon how successful he is in obtaining |"Dr. Mondlane's position as leader of the Mozambique Liberation |

|money to carry on the party's activities here. Another as yet |Front, appears at the moment to be strong. His future prospects |

|unclear factor is the sincerity of Kambona's assurance of |will depend to a great extent upon how successful he is in |

|support. If Ghana is now shifting its support from Gwambe to |obtaining money to carry on the party's activities here. Another |

|Mondlane, the latter's position should be secure." 19 |as yet unclear factor is the sincerity of Kambona's assurance of |

| |support. If Ghana is now shifting its support from Gwambe to |

|________________ |Mondlane, the latter's position should be secure."7 |

|19. Ibid. | |

|Tal como na nota anterior, a nota 19 deve ser conjugada com a | |

|nota 18. FOIA: Confidential Airgram, American Embassy, Dar es |______________ |

|Salaam, 10 July 1962.” |7. Thomas Byrne, ibid. |

* Foram apenas extraídos alguns trechos do livro de Godfrey Mwakikagile, havendo ainda outras partes, do mesmo capítulo, em que o autor se serviu do livro de João Cabrita.

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