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EMMA MCBRIDE

FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS:

A POSITIVE RESULT OR A NEGATIVE OVER RELIANCE?

LLB LAW HONOURS

FRIDAY 13TH APRIL 2012

I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own work entire, that no part of it consists of the work of others, except where this is acknowledged, and that no part of it has been published.

Signed: Emma McBride Dated: 12.04.2012

ABSTRACT

The focus of this research is in the area of forensic DNA analysis and whether there exists, in the criminal justice system, too heavy or simplistic a reliance on the results of DNA profiling, which could lead to miscarriages of justice. The first chapter examines the reliability of DNA evidence. The second chapter examines the scientific interpretation of the results of DNA evidence. The third chapter examines the lay person interpretation of DNA results. The main conclusions drawn from this thesis are that reform is required in the field of forensic DNA evidence and caution is required at all stages of the criminal justice system, to ensure that DNA profiling is not relied upon in an overly-simplistic manner which could lead to miscarriages of justice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of this dissertation has been one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever had to face. I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Rhonda Wheate, whose encouragement, supervision and support from the preliminary to concluding level of this thesis has enabled me to develop a greater understanding of the subject.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 2

THE SCIENCE OF DNA 2

FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 2

THE ADVANTAGES OF DNA PROFILING 2

THE FIRST DNA EXONERATION CASE 2

INNOCENCE PROJECTS 2

CONCLUSION 2

CHAPTER 1: THE RELIABILITY & ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE 2

THE RISKS OF LCN DNA 2

LCN DNA RESULTS: THE DIFFICULTY OF INTERPRETATION 2

LCN DNA: PUBLIC CONCERNS 2

THE LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE 2

CONCLUSION 2

CHAPTER 2: THE SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION OF DNA EVIDENCE 2

DIFFERENT MODES OF PRESENTING RESULTS 2

UNIVERSAL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICE 2

CONCLUSION 2

CHAPTER 3: THE LAY INTERPRETATION OF DNA EVIDENCE 2

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE & THE JURY 2

‘WHITE COAT SYNDROME’ 2

THE ‘CSI EFFECT’ 2

CONCLUSION 2

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 2

REFERENCE LIST………………………………………………………..………………….42

INTRODUCTION

The introduction of DNA analysis into the legal realm in the mid 1980’s “revolutionised forensic science”.[1] The technique has made possible both apprehension of criminals and exoneration of those wrongly convicted.[2] Forensic analysis of DNA excites a great deal of public interest and has been described as “the most powerful investigative tool since the advent of fingerprint analysis…”[3] To begin with, this thesis will discuss the advantages of DNA analysis and the positive effects which it has been seen to have on a number of cases which have been revisited since its introduction, and where DNA analysis has proved crucial in the exoneration of those wrongly convicted. In doing so, this thesis will also consider the impact of Innocence Projects and their role in utilising DNA to rectify miscarriages of justice.

In the decades since its introduction, DNA analysis has proved itself to be a valuable and beneficial tool.[4] However as the technique expands and develops, so too do the dangers associated with it. One such danger is ‘the CSI effect’ which has been described as “… the perceptions of the near-infallibility of forensic science in response to the TV show”.[5] The remainder of this thesis will consider the dangers of DNA analysis in order to determine whether there is too much of a heavy or simplistic reliance on the results of DNA which could lead to new miscarriages of justice.

THE SCIENCE OF DNA

DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is the genetic blueprint for all living things.[6] Almost every cell in the human body contains DNA, which encompasses the biological instructions that render each species unique.[7] DNA is made up of four bases: A, T, C & G which are put into a combination to form a gene.[8] Genes are protected by a chromosome which wraps the gene up in a protective layer of protein.[9] Each human contains on average 3 million bases, 20,000 genes and 46 chromosomes.[10] Each person inherits half of their chromosomes from their mother, and the other half from their father.[11] The human Y chromosome is the sex determining chromosome (an XX chromosome indicates a female and an XY chromosome indicates a male).[12] There are two types of DNA; DNA which can be found in the nucleus (Nuclear DNA) and DNA which can be found in the mitochondria (Mitochondrial DNA).[13] Testing of the latter can establish immigration patterns because it is a clear record of maternal inheritance; however it is the former that is most commonly used for forensic testing.[14]

FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS

DNA analysis or ‘DNA fingerprinting’ was first described in 1985 by Dr. Alec Jeffreys, an English geneticist.[15] Jeffreys discovered that DNA contained a number of sequences that were repeated again and again.[16] He then established that the number of repeated sections varied in each individual, rendering their genetic make-up completely unique, with the exception of identical twins.[17] Jeffreys developed a technique which could examine the variation of length in each of these DNA sequences which created the ability to discern one person from another.[18] The concept of testing DNA for the purpose of human identification was then established.

DNA can be extracted from a variety of places such as blood, semen, bones and teeth.[19] DNA analysis does not mean testing every single base of the DNA as this would be an impossible feat.[20] Instead scientists test a location in the DNA known as a locus.[21] The number of loci which will be tested varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.[22]

Since its first use in 1985, DNA analysis has developed scientifically following the introduction of a number of sensitive and accurate scientific tools and techniques.[23] One such technique is Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA which has led to attempts to analyse more difficult and challenging samples such as those containing DNA from only a few cells.[24] Today, the sensitivity and discriminating power of forensic DNA analysis has resulted in the science behind this important investigative technique becoming even more sensitive (scientifically)[25] and the public perception of it even more powerful.[26]

THE ADVANTAGES OF DNA PROFILING

Forensic DNA analysis has many advantages. Firstly, DNA evidence can be said to be a more reliable form of evidence which is now widely accepted by the scientific community.[27] Prior to the use of DNA evidence in courts, eye witness testimony was more heavily relied upon and this brought along with it inherent dangers.[28] The Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project revealed that mistaken eyewitness identifications were a factor in more than 70% of the initial 239 DNA exoneration cases.[29] This is a huge percentage which highlights the difficulties with relying on eyewitness identification as a reliable source of evidence.

DNA analysis sought to relieve some of the problems which existed in the criminal justice system at that time.[30] An authoritative study on the forensic use of DNA noted that; “...the reliability of DNA evidence will permit it to exonerate some people who would have been wrongfully accused or convicted without it.”[31]

Secondly, DNA analysis can also be seen to be valid as it provides a scientific basis which allows for a physical link to be made between a criminal and a crime scene in order to secure a conviction.[32] At the same time it also works to exclude suspects who without it may be charged for a crime they did not commit.[33] The validity of DNA analysis is particularly clear in cases where DNA has been used to exonerate those wrongly convicted.[34]

THE FIRST DNA EXONERATION CASE

Forensic use of DNA technology was first used to exclude a suspect in 1986 in the English case of Colin Pitchfork[35] which arose when two young girls were raped and murdered in Leicestershire, in 1983 and 1986. The first murder was that of a 15 year old school girl, Lynda Mann. Blood discovered at the scene was found to be blood type A (which at that time amounted to a 10% match of the adult male population).[36] Due to no further leads and a lack of forensic evidence the police had no other option but to wind down the investigation into the murder. Three years later in 1986 however, another 15 year old girl, Dawn Ashworth, was found raped and murdered in the same town.[37] The police were convinced that both murders had been committed by the same person.[38] Semen samples from the second murder also confirmed a match to the blood type of the first.[39] A local man then confessed to the murder of Dawn Ashworth, yet denied any involvement in the first murder.[40] Police consulted Jeffreys, who (as discussed above) had developed a technique that could examine DNA profiles, in an attempt to verify that the suspect was responsible for both of the murders.

In 1985, Jeffreys along with Dr Peter Gill and Dr Dave Werrett had been the first to demonstrate that DNA could be lifted from stains left at a crime scene, a point which proved vital in the case of Colin Pitchfork.[41] DNA tests were conducted and were able to establish that the suspect was not responsible for the murders. The police then conducted a mass operation to obtain blood samples from 4,000 men in the area. Initially, no matches were found, however, it was then discovered that Pitchfork had made his friend give DNA on his behalf. His friend was later overheard discussing this and Colin Pitchfork was arrested. His DNA was then found to be a match to the crime scenes. This case was the first in the world to exonerate a suspect through the use of DNA evidence. Jeffreys later said “I have no doubt whatsoever that he [the man who had falsely confessed] would have been found guilty had it not been for DNA evidence. That was a remarkable occurrence.” [42] Had it not been for the introduction of forensic DNA profiling the real criminal, Colin Pitchfork, may never have been found and an innocent person could have been wrongfully imprisoned.

INNOCENCE PROJECTS

Following the introduction of forensic DNA profiling, many non-profit legal organisations known as Innocence Projects were set up, dedicated to using the new technique to help exonerate those who had been wrongly convicted. Since their introduction Innocence Projects have had a significant impact using DNA profiling to rectify miscarriages of justice around the world.[43] In the US alone there have been 275 post-conviction DNA exoneration cases since the first in 1989. 208 of these exoneration cases have been since the year 2000. Out of the 275 exoneration cases, 17 of the people served time on death row. Had it not been for DNA proving their innocence they may not be alive today. The average prison sentence served by exonerates is 13 years and in total the number of years served over all exoneration cases is approximately 3,564.[44] The impact of Innocence Projects in utilising forensic DNA profiling in rectifying miscarriages of justice speaks for itself upon reading the above statistics.

Yet another advantage of DNA analysis is that it is objective,[45] in that the results are completely factual.[46] Unlike eyewitness testimony, there are no issues of personal feelings or opinions involved in obtaining a result; instead it is based on scientific processes which are able to produce profiles which can then be interpreted to determine the likelihood of a match between a DNA sample found at the crime scene and the DNA of a suspect.[47]

CONCLUSION

DNA analysis has proved itself time and again to be an extremely powerful scientific tool which carries with it a great deal of general acceptance by both the scientific and legal communities.[48] At first instance forensic DNA profiling appears to be reliable, valid and objective. This raises questions however: Just how heavy or simplistic a reliance should there be on the results of DNA analysis, when so much is at stake depending on the interpretation of the results given by the forensic scientist? Is there a perception that DNA is almost infallible and conclusive in all respects? Should there be a greater awareness of the dangers of over reliance or over-simplification of the interpretation of DNA results, which could almost prove as dangerous and as unlawful as a misidentification by an eyewitness? The remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to addressing these issues in order to examine the dangers of an over reliance and over-simplification of forensic DNA profiling results.

CHAPTER 1: THE RELIABILITY & ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE

The remarkable success of forensic DNA profiling has led to attempts to analyse more difficult and challenging samples such as those containing DNA from only a few cells.[49] This approach, known as Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA typing; ‘facilitates the examination of a whole new range of evidence types that previously could not be analysed because of the very low amounts of DNA recoverable from the sample’.[50] In general, LCN DNA testing refers to testing a sample which contains less than 100pg of DNA. Laboratories employ a number of techniques to do so such as increasing the number of Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) cycles to improve the amplification field from samples containing low levels of DNA. With increased cycles of PCR, samples that were originally very small can then be copied so many times that they become able to be analysed. The impact of LCN on the criminal justice system is significant and likely only to increase in the future.

In recent years, a number of high profile cases have allowed the courts to express their opinion as to the reliability, admissibility and evidential value of DNA evidence obtained using the LCN process.[51] The validity of LCN DNA has been a controversial matter[52] at least since R v Hoey[53] in 2007 and more recently in R v Reed.[54] This chapter discusses the special considerations which are required to interpret the results of LCN DNA given that it is impossible to tell where such a minute sample came from. In particular, it is important to consider the implications of allele dropout and the possibility of laboratory-based contamination.[55] The remainder of this chapter will consider the legal admissibility of expert opinion evidence and what is required for it to be deemed admissible by the courts.

THE RISKS OF LCN DNA

The sensitive nature of the LCN DNA process is accompanied by a range of risks which may lead to possible wrongful convictions and may also have the potential to mislead criminal investigations.[56] One such risk comes from the number of PCR cycles which have to be considerably increased to obtain an LCN DNA profile.[57] PCR is a common technique to amplify a number of copies of a piece of DNA generating thousands to millions of a particular DNA sequence.[58] Increasing PCR cycles inevitably leads to a magnified risk of contamination and inaccurate results caused from ‘stochastic effects’.[59] Stochastic effects occur predominantly when only a very small amount of DNA is available to begin with,[60] and materialise when random loci or alleles are sampled more than others, leading to peak height imbalance and causing alleles to drop out completely.[61] The trouble is that it is difficult to tell which if any peaks are missing or falsely present, and even if the sample was to be run through the machine a number of times, the same result may not necessarily be produced each time - which can clearly lead to unreliable test results.[62] This is a major problem with LCN, because the cornerstone of good scientific method requires that results are reproducible.[63] What this means for a criminal case is that it may produce a result that is a whole or partial profile that does or does not match the accused, but if the results cannot be produced reliably – how reliable is it all?

Another risk accompanied with the LCN process is contamination. If the starting amount of DNA is very small and there is also some contamination in it, if PCR is used to multiply the sample – the contaminant is also multiplied.[64] As the amount of crime sample DNA decreases, the chance of contamination by other sources increases; the DNA contamination will then be multiplied along with the suspects DNA.[65] This then becomes difficult (and sometimes) impossible to determine what DNA is from the offender and what is contamination.[66] Whereas if you had a large amount of DNA to begin with, big peaks are evident in the DNA results and tiny contaminant peaks are conspicuous and easily identifiable. The trouble with LCN is, all the peaks are tiny and it becomes difficult to tell (scientifically) which are contaminants and which are real.[67]

LCN DNA RESULTS: THE DIFFICULTY OF INTERPRETATION

As a result of above risks, there are a number of difficulties associated with the interpretations that can be drawn from LCN DNA results even if a DNA profile is accurately yielded.[68] A phenomenon termed ‘adventitious transference’ can occur due to the fact that an LCN profile can stem from the cells of a single touch which may have originated from innocent interactions by individuals unrelated to the crime.[69] This is another significant pitfall due to the advances in technology that make it possible to detect and test increasingly minute DNA samples.[70] Thomson et al. (2003) highlight, “Whereas the original DNA tests required a fairly large amount of biological material to get a result (e.g. a blood stain the size of a dime), current DNA tests are so sensitive that they can type the DNA found in samples containing only a few cells.”[71]

Although adventitious transfer cannot be strictly controlled, there are a number of ways to minimise and account for such contamination including: improve sample collection and if possible obtain a DNA sample from the normal user of an exhibit of interest or the person who may have come into contact with the exhibit prior to the offence.[72] This is very difficult in major crime scenes or scenes which are busy public places as there are a number of ways to contaminate a crime scene. Contamination can take place if someone sneezes, coughs or touches a part of their body and then touches the area containing the sample to be tested.[73] DNA left at a crime scene can also be subject to environmental contamination such as exposure to heat, light and moisture which can speed up degradation of DNA.[74] As a result, not all DNA evidence may yield a usable profile.

Overall, Gill (2001) noted three specific consequences of amplifying LCN DNA which can lead to inaccurate DNA profiles; (a) allele drop-out may occur because one allele can be preferentially amplified; (b) stutters in the profile may be preferentially analysed – sometimes referred to as false alleles; and (c) the method is prone to sporadic contamination which occurs when alleles that are not associated with the crime stain or sample are amplified.[75] This could lead to complex or incomplete profiles, and inaccurate interpretation of these profiles could lead to wrongful convictions. Even worse, the extreme sensitivity of LCN increases the possibility of false forensic inferences.[76]

LCN DNA: PUBLIC CONCERNS

The scientific controversy surrounding LCN DNA analysis rose to public attention[77] in the case of Sean Hoey.[78] In August 1998, a car bomb exploded in a busy shopping centre in the Northern Ireland town of Omagh, killing 29 people and injuring over 200 others.[79] The bombing was described by the media as “the worst terrorist atrocity in Northern Ireland’s history”.[80] A key part of the trial involved LCN DNA analysis by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) on pieces of the bomb timer and explosive wiring.[81] Court Records state: “The evidence establishes that the arrangements within the police in 1998 and 1999 for the recording and storage of items were thoroughly disorganised.”[82] The property store was described as “a complete mess.”[83] There was no universal system of logging items received, no proper recording in police stations so no inventory of what was in a store room at a particular time – all of which significantly increased the risk of contamination.

The trial lasted 56 days and was hinged on LCN DNA evidence[84] on the basis of an apparent LCN DNA link between Hoey and a number of exhibits recovered from crime scenes.[85] When the trial concluded in December 2007, Mr Hoey was found not guilty of all 58 charges brought against him.[86] Even more significantly the judge - Justice Weir - strongly rejected the evidence, raising significant concerns about the validity of the LCN technique[87] and also highlighting the careless handling of DNA throughout the trial.[88] Fundamentally, the DNA evidence was found not to have the necessary integrity to be reliable due to the risk of it having been contaminated or interfered with.[89] In his concluding observation Weir J emphasised the cardinal principle of criminal law established in R v Steenson[90]; “Justice ‘according to law’ demands proper evidence… “evidence which is so convincing in truth and manifestly reliable that it reaches the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”[91] The evidence in Hoey failed to meet such an immutable standard and accordingly Mr Hoey was found not guilty.

This judgement raised considerable questions over the merits of LCN DNA testing and led to a review of the technique.[92] An interim suspension was placed on the use of LCN DNA in criminal investigations in England and Wales[93] while an internal review of on-going cases involving the FSS and the LCN DNA technique was conducted by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).[94] The CPS concluded “that LCN DNA analysis provided by the FSS should remain available as potentially admissible evidence”[95] The press release went on to state that “At present, there is no reason to believe that there is any inherent unreliability in the LCN DNA analysis process provided that it is carried out according to the prescribed processes, and that the results are properly interpreted. In its work so far, the review has found nothing that would indicate any serious flaw in the scientific principles.”[96] The nature of the samples makes reproducibility a significant problem for obtaining a consistent profile and for giving a reasoned interpretation of what the results mean.

Following the judgement in Hoey, a review (known as the ‘The Caddy Review’) was conducted into the low template DNA profiling techniques.[97] The authors of the Caddy Review state that “it is our opinion that LCN and LTD [NA] are extensions of the internationally accepted process of standard DNA profiling”.[98] The authors further concluded that “reservations (with regard to the LCN technique) have been allayed from a study of the raw data produced by the FSS, recent experimental work conducted by the FSS and also from detail information submitted by the other (UK) forensic science providers which clearly demonstrate the soundness of LTDNA analysis (including LCN) providing all the appropriate conditions are met”[99] Emphasis was once again placed on the importance of satisfying all the appropriate conditions and ensuring that the LCN DNA analysis is carried out according to the prescribed processes.[100]

The Caddy Review also chose to emphasise that “any LTDNA profile should always be reported to the jury with the caveats: that the nature of the original starting material is unknown that; the time at which the DNA was transferred cannot be inferred; and that the opportunity for secondary transfer is increased in comparison to standard DNA profiling”.[101] The juror’s interpretation of DNA evidence is an issue which will be discussed in more depth in subsequent chapters however; it is important to note the emphasis placed on presenting an LTDNA profile to the jury in comparison to a standard DNA profile. LTN DNA results must be interpreted cautiously and all factors regarding the extreme sensitivity of the technique must be taken into consideration. The Caddy Review gave the LCN DNA technique an apparent clean bill of health[102] however the conclusions set out in the review have since attracted a great deal of criticism[103] and it would appear that there still exists a great deal of ambiguity with regards to the general uses of the LCN DNA technique.[104] There is a significant risk that the Crown can read more into results of LCN than they should (i.e. to inculpate an accused person), given that they cannot specifically determine the source of the sample, the extent of the contamination and transfer.

The English Court of Appeal has expressed its opinion as to the reliability, admissibility and evidential value of low template DNA primarily that obtained using the LCN process in the case of R v Reed.[105] The judgement in this case deals with two main issues. The first is the admissibility of LCN DNA as evidence.[106] The second is whether an expert witness should be permitted to provide an opinion on the LCN DNA evidence on matters such as the likelihood and means by which the DNA may have been transferred to the place of discovery.[107] Overall, the judgement concluded that: “… a challenge to the validity of the method of analysing Low Template DNA by the LCN process should no longer be permitted at trials where the quantity of DNA analysed is above the stochastic threshold of 100–200 picograms [with a picogram being one trillionth of a gram] in the absence of new scientific evidence.”[108] The judgement thus sets a minimum standard for LCN DNA evidence as to what is required for the court to deem it as a reliable form of scientific evidence.[109]

THE LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE

Given everything discussed about the scientific reliability of LCN, it is now imperative to discuss the legal admissibility of this technique. The admissibility of scientific evidence is an issue which has plagued the courts for a number of years,[110] and one which The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia addressed in Frye v United States.[111] The Court in Frye stated that “Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define… the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”[112] The Frye test stated that any new evidence should be approved by the people who use it,[113] however many questions remained unanswered after Frye: What types of evidence shall be accepted? If accepted, what shall the purpose of it be? Who shall accept it? How many experts constitute general acceptance?[114] Despite the ambiguities in the exact meaning of Frye, it was utilised by many courts in the 70 years after, in determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.[115] The first case to question Frye and the idea that general acceptance in itself was sufficient for scientific evidence to be admissible, arose in Daubert v Merrell Dow.[116] In this case, the US Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge was the “gatekeeper” to prevent “junk science” from entering the courtroom.[117] This gate keeping function of the court could be interpreted to suggest that the court will be wary of sciences in order to prevent evidence with no scientific basis from even entering the court. The US Supreme court in Daubert recognised “general acceptance” as an important, rather than exclusive, factor in determining the reliability of scientific evidence.[118] The implication of this would be a higher standard of test for determining what types of evidence are scientific which may be another step in the right direction to prevent so-called “junk science” from entering the court room. The court suggested that there are four factors to consider, now known as the “Daubert factors”, they are; testing and validation, peer review, error rates, and lastly, the traditional factor set out in Frye of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.[119] In order to be deemed admissible, scientific evidence would need to satisfy all of the above criteria. Daubert also placed increased emphasis on the overall reliability of scientific evidence.[120]

In April 2009, the Law Commission published Consultation Paper 190, 'The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability'.[121] The Consultation was elicited by a growing dissatisfaction with the state of the law relating to the admission of expert evidence.[122] The Commission were concerned that there exists a "pressing danger" of wrongful convictions and acquittals[123] and that the most recent miscarriages of justice may be 'the tip of a larger iceberg'.[124] The Commission identified their proposal as the progeny of Daubert.[125] The Commission, however, unlike Daubert, proposed two sets of guidelines: one set of guidelines relate to scientific evidence and the second to experience based testimony.[126] The Commission proposed that expert evidence would be admissible in criminal proceedings only if certain tests were met: firstly the court must be satisfied that it would provide information which is likely to be outside a judge or jury’s experience or knowledge, and which would give them help they need in arriving at their conclusions; secondly the witnesses must be qualified; thirdly the evidence is not made inadmissible as a result of clause 3 (Impartiality).[127] The Commission also proposed a new statutory provision that expert opinion evidence is admissible only if the court is satisfied that it is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.[128] The distinctive feature of this proposal lay in the Commission's clear articulation of the methodology required to establish reliability.[129]

The Commission concluded that the present law common law approach to the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales is unsatisfactory and should be replaced with a new statutory test.[130] The Commission suggested that a Daubert-style reliability test in tandem with appropriate training for the judiciary and practitioners, offers the best mechanism for excluding unreliable expert evidence.[131] The Commission set out four proposals aimed at ensuring expert evidence will be submitted only if it is sufficiently reliable and ultimately acted out upon by the jury.[132] The key proposal was that there should be an explicit “gate-keeping” role for the trial judge with a clearly-defined test for determining whether proffered expert evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.[133] The Commission also proposed that there should exist the onus of persuasion - if a party proposes to rely on expert evidence, any party against whom the evidence would be adduced should be entitled to raise the question of its evidentiary reliability.[134] In addition the Committee also noted that the judge should be permitted to call upon an independent assessor to provide him or her with assistance and guidance in cases where the evidence of field is particularly difficult.[135] The Commission also noted that judges (and criminal practitioners) should receive practical training on the methodology of science, the standards for determining the statistical significance of research findings and how to determine the reliability of experience-based expertise.[136]

The Law Commission's proposal on expert opinion evidence has since been criticised, with one article claiming that whilst the criteria set out in the paper are clearly articulated applying them to forensic disciplines is 'fraught with difficulty.'[137] The article also suggests that the proposal places an onerous demand upon judges, who have the difficulty of interpreting the criteria.[138] If interpreted too strictly it could lead to the exclusion of forensic testimony becoming widespread.[139] On the other hand, if interpreted too liberally, the criteria will not provide adequate safeguards against admission of unfounded evidence.[140]The article rejects the criteria based approach towards admission, suggesting instead, that forensic science should be evaluated by carefully constituted working parties outside the courtroom.

CONCLUSION

DNA profiling technology has improved greatly since the days when a visible blood drop or reasonable sized stain was required to obtain a profile.[141] New techniques such as LCN now allow for the analysis of more difficult and challenging samples which may contain DNA from only a few cells.[142] These new techniques are undoubtedly of tremendous value in criminal investigations, however, failure to interpret DNA profiles using standard scientific principles will almost certainly result in significant damage, although unintentional, that could threaten it’s more restricted but beneficial use.[143] The sensitive nature of the LCN technique is accompanied by a number of risks which can lead to the results failing to be reproducible or accurate. If results cannot be reproduced reliably or it becomes impossible to scientifically determine the source of the DNA then how can the results of this technique be reliable?

The risks of the LCN technique also mean that there are a number of difficulties associated with the interpretation of the results even if a DNA profile is accurately yielded.[144] The consequences of amplifying LCN DNA may lead to complex or incomplete profiles which coupled with inaccurate interpretation could then lead to wrongful convictions. Despite the inherent dangers of such a technique reviews have concluded that there is no reason to believe there is any “inherent unreliability” in the LCN analysis if it is carried out in accordance with prescribed processes and if the results are properly interpreted.[145] The onus is then on the judge to scrupulously protect the jury from unreliable scientific evidence.[146]

The following chapters intend to look at the dangers which exist if the results of forensic DNA analysis are incorrectly interpreted and just how essential it is to correctly analyse the reliability, validity and accuracy of the results to prevent future miscarriages of justice. In doing so, it will look at the difficulties facing the forensic science community who must scientifically interpret the results and the jury who must reach a verdict based on the results.

CHAPTER 2: THE SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION OF DNA EVIDENCE

Scientific evidence can be problematic for courts: the subject matter is often complex, the experts can be biased and the judge and juries may be unsure of how to interpret the evidence once it has been presented in court.[147] At an even more fundamental level, miscarriage of justice will arise if the science underlying the expert evidence presented in Court is not sound. Interpretation of forensic evidence often has to be performed within a framework appropriate for both scientific analysis and presentation in court.[148] Forensic DNA analysts often testify to their findings using statistical probabilities rather than statements of certainty which can turn out to be arbitrary and unsupported.[149] The field of DNA analysis still requires a great deal of analysis as the apparent certainty of this powerful investigative tool can be deceptive and this can lead to it being misused and misapplied.[150] There are many ways to introduce results to the jury and it is important for DNA results and results from a number of other disciplines to be accurately presented to the jury. One discipline which will be discussed is the field of shoe mark analysis.

DIFFERENT MODES OF PRESENTING RESULTS

In the case of R v T, shoe marks were recovered from the crime scene by the forensic footwear expert, Mr Ryder, which he compared to shoes which had been recovered from the defendant’s property.[151] Mr Ryder concluded that “… it is somewhat unlikely that the observed correspondence would have been obtained as a result of mere coincidence had the recovered footwear not made the mark in question… there is at this stage a moderate degree of scientific evidence to support the view that the shoes recovered had made the footwear marks.”[152] The question before the court was therefore whether the Bayesian approach of using likelihood ratios had been applied in this case, an approach which the court had ‘…robustly rejected for non DNA evidence in a number of cases’.[153] The Court of Appeal allowed T’s appeal against conviction because it became apparent that ‘the Bayesian approach” of using likelihood ratios’ had been applied and this ‘had not been explored in the course of the trial.[154]

Many leading scientists are of the opinion that the likelihood-ratio framework is the most logically correct framework for the evaluation of forensic science evidence and should be applied irrespective of the structure of the data extracted from the objects.[155] The idea that the likelihood-ratio framework is the most logical approach to evaluating forensic science evidence dates back to the early 1900s[156] and it became standard practice in forensic DNA comparison in the mid-1990’s.[157] It has since been adopted by the Forensic Science Service (FSS)[158] and the Netherlands Forensic Institute.[159]

Throughout R v T the Court of Appeal heard from a number of expert witnesses, including the principal scientist at the Forensic Science Service (FSS) responsible for marks and setting standards, and chair of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes’ expert working group on marks, the principal scientist at the FSS responsible for Care Assessment and Interpretation and from the UK’s Forensic Science Regulator.[160] The likelihood ratio was strongly recommended by the above experts and also by a growing number of forensic scientists within the United Kingdom.[161]

The Forensic Science Regulator has gone on to suggest that it was illogical to say the Bayesian or likelihood ratio approach could be used in some areas of scientific evidence, but not in others.[162] The Appeal Court adopted a different position stating that ‘we do not agree with the observations of the Regulator that a similar approach is justified in all areas of expertise’.[163] In response to the ruling in R v T, many forensic scientists have voiced their opinion that the Likelihood-ratio framework remains the most appropriate framework for the evaluation of forensic science evidence, [164] even signing a statement to this effect.[165]

UNIVERSAL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICE

In 2009, The National Academy of Science published a report ‘Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward’ which outlined the challenges facing the forensic science community, and made recommendations which aim for universal standard and best practice.[166] In 2005, the Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 came into force.[167] Under this Act, Congress authorised the National Academies of Sciences to conduct a study on forensic science, stating “While a great deal of analysis exists of the requirements in the discipline of DNA, there exists little to no analysis of the remaining needs of the community outside of the area of DNA”[168] Although in theory the Committee was not given the task of specifically studying DNA evidence, the very essence of it is entwined throughout the report.[169] The Committee were instructed to focus ‘outside of the area of DNA’[170] and instead focused their attention on alternative forensic science techniques such as fingerprint examination. Although DNA may not be at the forefront of the NAS Report, the role which forensic DNA analysis has played in the history of forensic science is evident throughout.[171] The long anticipated report largely states what academics and scientists have noted for some time – that the state of the science used in forensic science and thus in the criminal justice system is extremely poor.[172]

The overriding message of the NAS Report was that forensic science has failed to meet the demands of science.[173] Essentially, the Committee called for an overhaul of the practice and procedures of many forensic science disciplines, including fingerprint analysis, hair and fibre evidence and the identification of shoe prints.[174] The NAS Committee proposed 13 recommendations. One of the main recommendations of the NAS Report was that Congress establish an independent federal entity, the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), to oversee and establish standards, research, forensic practices, education, certification, accreditation and development of technology.[175] Other recommendations included establishing standard terminology and reporting procedures and to conduct research to address issues of accuracy, reliability and validity.[176] Congress has not yet acted upon the recommendations of the NAS Report, but the findings of the report have echoed throughout the forensic science community and parts of the legal community.[177] Formally, the scientific organisations have supported the general recommendations of the report whilst maintaining the belief that future scientific research will validate most of the bases of forensic science discipline.[178] In the aftermath of the NAS report, it is clear that cases that rest wholly or partly on forensic evidence must be carefully scrutinised.

CONCLUSION

Complex scientific evidence increasingly plays a role in many of today’s court rooms.[179] Testimony from forensic DNA analysts can overwhelm jurors who often have limited knowledge of the concepts of biology, genetics and technology used to generate DNA profiles.[180] This then raises the question: If jurors do not understand the science underpinning the evidence, how can they then correctly interpret the evidence once it has been presented in court? New Zealand scientists John Buckleton and James Curran have said: “There is a considerable aura to DNA evidence. Because of this aura it is vital that weak evidence is correctly represented as weak or not represented at all.”[181] Where there is uncertainty in the data (e.g. with complex DNA mixtures, partial profiles or low level DNA templates) this should be emphasised so that the jurors may appropriately evaluate the weight that should be given to the evidence which has been presented.[182] It is apparent that there is still a great deal of confusion regarding the presentation of statistical evidence to juries and in particular the field of DNA still requires a great deal of analysis.[183] The inherent danger of this forensic science technique arises if the scientific data underlying the DNA results has been inaccurately presented to the jury. More importantly what influence can these potentially incorrect perceptions regarding scientific data have on a juror’s decision making ability?

CHAPTER 3: THE LAY INTERPRETATION OF DNA EVIDENCE

Given the scientific admissibility and reliability of this technique, DNA is frequently used in Court therefore this thesis would not be complete without discussing the lay person interpretation of DNA evidence. Over the past 30 to 40 years, jurors have been criticised for their interpretation of complex scientific evidence.[184] Many critics have questioned whether a jury of inexperienced and untrained people can reach the correct decision in trials which require comprehension of substantial qualities of complex scientific evidence.[185] The presence of forensic science evidence, particularly DNA evidence, predicts convictions.[186] Furthermore, much of the critical attention is focused on so called “first generation techniques” – methods such as handwriting analysis, ballistics and tool or bite mark analysis.[187] Forensic DNA analysis is often excluded from critiques of forensic methods[188] as it is assumed to exemplify the kind of scientific rigor that first generation techniques have not been subjected to. [189] A lay person who is only slightly acquainted with forensic techniques may suspect that “first generation” techniques are not as scientific or objective as forensic DNA analysis and this could prove dangerous when interpreting DNA evidence. The jury’s interpretation of this complex scientific and technical evidence is key in ensuring justice is done. As the admissibility of certain DNA profiling techniques has become less controversial, an important question remains: Are jurors able to understand the complex scientific and inherently probabilistic testimony that accompanies a DNA match report? [190]

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE & THE JURY [191]

DNA evidence is a crucial predictor of guilty verdicts in jury trials.[192] Juror difficulties in understanding and applying the scientific and statistical information conveyed by forensic experts about a DNA match have been documented in a number of studies.[193] Post-trial interviews of jurors in six criminal trials revealed that jurors who admitted to difficulty in understanding DNA expert evidence presented convicted despite the lack of understanding.[194] Jurors often have high expectations of scientific evidence with a study held in 2008 stating that 46% of jurors “expected to see some kind of scientific evidence in every criminal case.”[195] The research also found that 22% expected to see DNA evidence in every case.[196] One Court described this troubling aspect of scientific evidence as its ability to assume “a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of the jury.”[197] The very fact that the judge has admitted DNA evidence into the courtroom often leads to juror assumption that the evidence must be reliable and therefore jurors tend to rely on the results without thoroughly questioning it and this is where the danger lies.[198]

‘WHITE COAT SYNDROME’

A juror can appear to be susceptible to ‘White Coat Syndrome’ if when faced with DNA evidence in a criminal trial, they are inclined to believe ‘science does not lie’.[199] This belief generates confidence and leads to DNA evidence being regarded as infallible.[200] According to new reports from The Australian Institute of Criminology Research jurors are often not confident enough in their knowledge of DNA evidence which may often go against the accused when a guilty verdict is returned.[201] Professor Jane-Goodman Delahunty says “They tend to regard it as infallible and so once it comes in, the very fact that the judge has admitted the evidence is often construed as an indication that it must be reliable, and therefore rely on it without questioning it very thoroughly.”[202] Without questioning the science underpinning the evidence, it is difficult to correctly interpret the evidence taking into consideration the fragilities of the technique.

Professor Delahuntly conducted a study of around 400 people to find out what their response would be to DNA evidence in mock murder trials.[203] The study found that people with a low understanding of DNA convicted at a rate of 75%, while those with a better knowledge had 42% conviction rate.[204] She noted; "The conviction rate is far higher than the scholars think it ought to be, if you look at the weight that the evidence might warrant."[205]

It has been questioned whether jury innovation trials could improve juror understanding of DNA evidence. The National Institute of Justice conducted a study on the impact of jury trial innovations upon mock jurors.[206] Although this particular study was focused on mitochondrial DNA this would have broader application to nuclear DNA. The research showed that jurors used three of the innovations the most—the multipurpose notebook, note taking, and the mtDNA checklist.[207] The multipurpose notebook was the most popular innovation: 92% of the jurors said that the notebooks—in particular, the expert’s slides—helped them to remember and understand the case.[208] The second most used innovation was juror note taking with 88% of jurors who took notes. Two-thirds said their notes helped them remember the evidence.[209] The third most used innovation was the mtDNA checklist: 85% of jurors allowed to use the checklist said they reviewed it during deliberations. Most found that the checklist increased their understanding and recall of the evidence.[210] The least used innovation was jury questioning: only 22% of the jurors allowed to ask questions actually did.[211] Based on the study, researchers believe that the use of certain jury innovations has the potential to improve jurors’ comprehension of mtDNA and other scientific evidence. [212] Methods that provided direct guidance or additional expert information—such as the mtDNA checklist and the juror notebook—best improved juror understanding.[213] This suggests that other jury innovations that provide a better understanding of expert evidence such as juror tutorials in complex subjects and court-appointed experts to discuss the parties’ often conflicting scientific evidence are ripe for evaluation.[214] The results of the study showed that most juries are capable of comprehending and using different forms of DNA evidence at trial. Nonetheless, researchers acknowledged that some jurors are likely to have trouble with complex DNA evidence.[215]

THE ‘CSI EFFECT’

A more modern interpretation of white coat syndrome is ‘the CSI effect’ which has been described as “… the perceptions of the near-infallibility of forensic science in response to the TV show”.[216] There are a number of differences between the fact and fiction of forensic science evidence and this has been seen to have a variety of effects on American Society.[217] One forensic scientist, Thomas Mauriello, estimates that only 40% of the so called “science” on CSI does not exist and the rest is an unrealistic portrayal of what actually happens in crime labs.[218] There are a number of theories surrounding the effect of CSI style programmes however; the one that is heard most often is that CSI has raised the expectations of the public as to what type of evidence may be offered at trial to such a level that jurors are disappointed by the real evidence presented.[219] As a result, jurors are more likely to acquit an accused on the basis that there is not enough forensic science provided in court to persuade them of guilt.[220] Most recently, the “Tech-Effect” theory has replaced the “CSI-Effect” theory as a means to explain the potential impact of technology on jurors.[221] This theory argues that crime dramas do not influence jurors; rather, jurors have heightened expectations for technical and scientific evidence simply because technology is so advanced in today’s society.[222]

CONCLUSION

It is difficult for jurors to comprehend the complex scientific and inherently probabilistic testimony accompanying a DNA match report.[223] The perception that DNA is almost infallible and conclusive in all respects has a significant impact on a juror’s ability to correctly interpret the results of forensic DNA analysis. Phenomena’s such as the ‘White Coat Syndrome’ and the ‘CSI Effect’ have been found to have a significant effect on whether a jury will choose to convict or not. Jury innovation trials appear to suggest that improving the clarity of the evidence and allowing aids can improve juror understanding with regards to complex scientific evidence.[224] It would appear that the natural progression to improve juror understanding should come in the form of jury innovation trials which allow for a better understanding of expert evidence such as juror tutorials in complex subjects and court-appointed experts to discuss the parties’ often conflicting scientific evidence.[225] There should exist a greater awareness of forensic DNA analysis as suggested in the Caddy Review when it stated that the results of LCN DNA should be “reported to the jury with caveats” and that the results of LCN must be interpreted cautiously and all factors regarding the extreme sensitivity of the technique to be taken into consideration by the jury.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

DNA analysis is an extremely powerful scientific tool which has proved to be invaluable to both the forensic science and legal communities.[226] Forensic DNA analysis for identification purposes affords several advantages to law enforcement and legal systems[227] which make possible both apprehension of criminals and exoneration of those wrongly convicted.[228] There are many advantages of this technique: it can be said to be a more reliable form of evidence than eyewitness testimony which was previously used and it provides a scientific basis which allows for a physical link to be made between a criminal and a crime scene in order to secure a conviction. The availability of such a technique has also allowed for the introduction of Innocence Projects which have used forensic DNA analysis to help exonerate those who have been wrongly convicted. The magnitude of Innocence Projects worldwide success is a reminder of the significant benefits which DNA profiling has brought to the criminal justice system, however, the expansion of new techniques has increased the sensitivity of forensic DNA analysis and as a result the dangers of incorrect interpretation are now more significant than ever before.

The process of forensic DNA analysis is very important and if the results are not reliable, accurate, valid and reproducible then how is it then possible to interpret the results correctly? The validity of one such new technique, LCN DNA, has been a controversial matter.[229] There are a number of risks which accompany the LCN technique and it is clear that special consideration must be given when interpreting LCN DNA results. A number of factors such as contamination and stochastic effects make the interpretation of LCN DNA results very difficult. In the case of Hoey, Weir J emphasised the cardinal principle of criminal law; “Justice ‘according to law’ demands proper evidence… “evidence which is so convincing in truth and manifestly reliable that it reaches the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”[230] The evidence in Hoey, which based primarily on LCN DNA evidence, failed to meet such an immutable standard. If the dangers of LCN DNA are such that it becomes impossible to tell where such a minute sample came from then how can it be deemed a reliable and valid scientific technique?

The judgement in Hoey led to a review of the LCN technique and a review by the Crown Prosecution concluded that LCN DNA analysis should remain as “potentially admissible evidence.”[231] It went on to state that at that time there was no reason to believe to that there is any “inherent unreliability” in the LCN process provided that it is carried out according to the prescribed processed and that the results are properly interpreted. However, the nature of LCN DNA samples make reproducibility a significant problem for obtaining consistent profiles – if the results are inconsistent how then is it possible to give a reasoned interpretation of them? The Caddy Review also concluded that the LCN technique is sound again emphasising that all the appropriate conditions are met. The Caddy Review also empahsised that the LCN DNA profiles should be “reported to the jury with caveats.” It is clear that in order to be accurate, the results of LCN must be interpreted cautiously and all factors given the extreme sensitivity must be taken into consideration. Despite both reviews giving LCN a clean bill of health, there still exists a great deal of scientific ambiguity with regards to the general uses of the technique. In the mind of a juror, however, there does not exist a great deal of difference between standard DNA analysis and the more sensitive techniques such as LCN – DNA continues to predict convictions and this is where the problem lies.

The Law Commission Consultation Paper 190, ‘The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability’[232] reiterated that there is a growing dissatisfaction with the law relating to the admission of expert evidence. The Paper suggested that there should be an explicit “gate-keeping” role and that the onus is on judges to protect the jury from unreliable scientific evidence. The Law Commission’s proposal on expert opinion evidence has since been criticised in that it places an onerous demand upon judges, who have the difficulty of interpreting the criteria. If interpreted too strictly, this could lead to the exclusion of forensic testimony becoming widespread. On the other hand, if interpreted too liberally, the criteria will not provide adequate safeguards against admission of unfounded evidence. A major issue with this proposal is that the scientific nature of forensic DNA analysis has the potential to confuse not only the jury but also the trial judge which could lead to the judge admitting scientific evidence which is unfounded.

It is essential for the forensic science community to correctly analyse and interpret the results and to present truthfully to the jury in a language which they understand. There are many difficulties which face the forensic science community when it comes to the interpretation of DNA results. It is essential that the science underlying the expert evidence is sound. In 2009, The National Academy of Science published a report ‘Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward’[233] which outlined the challenges facing the forensic science community. Although this report placed DNA evidence on a pedestal, it identified that the state science in forensic science and the criminal justice system is very poor. If the science underlying the results is not sound then how can it be viewed as reliable?

Complex scientific evidence can be difficult for jurors to comprehend which makes their task of interpretation more difficult. If jurors do not understand the science underpinning the results, how can they correctly interpret the evidence once it has been presented in court? The jurors have the final say in the interpretation of the results of DNA evidence and accurate interpretation of this complex scientific and technical evidence by the jury is key in ensuring justice is done. A number of studies have documented that jurors have difficulty in understanding and applying the scientific and statistical information and jurors have admitted to convicting despite the lack of understanding of the evidence. It has been questioned whether jury innovation trials could improve juror understanding of DNA evidence and results show that innovation trials do have the potential to improve jurors comprehension of complex scientific evidence which would allow jurors to take more consideration before placing too heavy a reliance on the results.

Although the dangers of forensic DNA analysis are routinely recognised, little seems to have been done to improve the reliability of the technique. To ensure justice is done, it is important for correct interpretation at every stage of the process – from the forensic scientists who analyse it, to the judges who make a decision on the admissibility of it, to finally the jurors who make a final decision based on the results. At present, it is clear that there exists too heavy or simplistic reliance on the results. Forensic DNA analysis is a technique which, although widely accepted by the scientific and legal communities, still requires a great deal of analysis.

There are a number of recommendations which could improve the reliability of DNA evidence. Firstly, more research into LCN and its scientific reliability, reproducibility and validity could improve the use of the technique and ensure that its limitations are clear. Secondly, more research into juries could be conducted to see how they respond to current DNA evidence and how presentation of the evidence can be improved to increase comprehension and to reduce the CSI effect. Jury innovation trials have already been seen to improve juror understanding of this complex scientific evidence. More public education on the topic could also work to improve awareness of the limitations of scientific evidence, especially DNA evidence. Thirdly, more training for lawyers and the judiciary to ensure all scientific evidence is properly scrutinised in court, in line with the Daubert-style gate-keeping role and the recommendations of the Law Commission.

The above recommendations, if implemented correctly, have the potential to improve the reliability of DNA evidence and to prevent future miscarriages of justice.

REFERENCE LIST

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CASES

• Andrews v State of Florida 533. So.2d 841.

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• Frye v United States (1923) 54 App DC 46, 293 F 1013, 34 ALR 1.

• R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49.

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• R v Steenson and others [1986] NIJB 17.

• R v T [2010] EWCA 2349.

• United States v Addison 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C Circ 1974)

JOURNAL ARTICLES

• Adam Wilson, 'The Law Commission's proposal on expert opinion evidence: an onerous demand upon judges' (2010) 1 Web JCLI Accessed 29 November 2011.

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• Coast, G. & Genetics, I., 2009. Extracting evidence from forensic DNA analyses : future molecular biology directions. ‘Review Literature and Arts of the Americas’, 46(iii).

• C. E. H. Berger, ‘Criminalistiek is terugredeneren’ [Criminalistics is reasoning backwards] (2010) Nederlands Juristenblad 784.

• David S. Caudill, ‘Expert Scientific Testimony in Courts: The Ideal and Illusion of Value-Free Science’, The Panteneto Forum, Issue 39, July 2010.

• Don Mathias, ‘Observations on LCN DNA Analysis’ (2010) Accessed 16 Feb 2012.

• Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 754–56 & nn.149–56 (2007) at 728-31.

• Erin Murphy, ‘What “Strengthening Forensic Science” today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report’, L.P. & R. 2010, 9(1), 7-24.

• Esther Van Zimmeren et al, ‘A paper tiger? Compulsory license regimes for public health in Europe’ IIC 2011, 42(1), 4-40.

• Gary Edmond, et al, 'The Law Commission's report on expert evidence in criminal proceedings' [2011] Crim. L.R.844-862.

• Gary Alan Davis et al., ‘The New Tech Effect: Analysing Juror Credibility in Cases Involving Digital Evidence’ (2011) at 1. Accessed 16 Feb 2012.

• Geoffrey S. Morrison, ‘The likelihood-ratio framework and forensic evidence in court: a response to R v T’, E. & P. 2012, 16(1).

• G.T Munsterman, Jury Trial Innovations (National Center for State Courts (Jan 1997).

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• Jane Delahuntly, ‘Improving Jury Understanding and the use of DNA Expert Evidence’ (Criminology Research Council, July 2009) Accessed 01 March 2012.

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• Michael Dann, et al., ‘Can Jury Trial Innovations Improve Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence?’ (National Institute of Justice Journal, Issue no 255).

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LAW COMMISSION REPORTS

• Law Commission, 'The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability' LCCP No.190 (2009).

• Law Commission, ‘Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA revisited’ (CLW 2010, Issue No. 23 at 1) Available Accessed 10.12.2011.

REPORTS

• Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, National Academies Press (1 Dec 2009).

• Science and Technology Committee Publications, Science and Technology: Seventh Report (16 March 2005) Accessed 08 Feb 2012.

• Senate Report No. 109‑88, at 46 (2005).

STATUTE

• Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006 [H.R.2862.ENR]

WEBSITE ARTICLES

• Allan Jamieson, ‘Mixed Results’, The Guardian (28 February 2008). Available Accessed 08 January 2012

• Ananya Mandal, ‘DNA evidence often overwhelms jurors to wrongly says research’ (News Medical, 29 March 2010) Accessed 23 Feb 2012.

• CPS Press Release ‘Review of the use of Low Copy Number DNA analysis in current cases: CPS Statement’, 14 January 2008, Available Accessed 02 December 2011.

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• Innocence Projects Inc. ‘Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations’ Accessed 25 November 2011.

• James Randerson, ‘We’ve now pushed the technology to the absolute limit’ (The Guardian, 16 Jan 2008) Accessed 05 Feb 2012.

• Karen Lotter, ‘Setback for LCN DNA’ (Forensic Science @ Suite 101, 22 Dec 2007) Accessed 20 Feb 2012.

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• Lincoln Bates, et al., ‘DNA Fingerprinting and Society’ (27 Aug 2008) Accessed 10 November 2011.

• Lindy Kerin ‘Jurors overwhelmed by DNA evidence: Study’ (The World Today, March 29 2010) Accessed 18 February 2012.

• Professor Gary Wells ‘Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications’ (Mid Atlantic Innocence Project, 2011) Accessed 03 November 2011.

• Susanne Elvidge (BSc Hons) ‘Forensic Cases: Colin Pitchfork, First Exoneration Through DNA’ (Explore Forensics, 2011) Accessed 04 November 2011.

• Susan Petricevic (ESR) ‘DNA Profiling in forensic science’ Accessed 31 October 2011.

• Todd W Bille, DNA analysis: A Powerful Investigative Tool’, Indiana State Police Laboratory (1999) Accessed 23 October 2011.

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[1] John M. Butler, Forensic DNA Typing: Biology, Technology and Genetics of STR Markers (Academic Press: 2nd edition, 8 Feb 2005) at 2.

[2] David R. Keller et al., Ethics in Action: A Case Based Approach (Wiley-Blackwell, 19 Dec 2008) 454.

[3] Todd W Bille, DNA analysis: A Powerful Investigative Tool’, Indiana State Police Laboratory (1999) Accessed 23 October 2011.

[4] Jonathan M. Finn, Capturing the Criminal Image: From Mug Shot to Surveillance Society (University of Minnesota Press, 21 Oct 2009) 68.

[5] Kelly Pyre, Forensic Science under Siege: The Challenges of Forensic Laboratories and the Medico-Legal Investigation System (Academic Press; 1 edition, 12 April 2007) 306.

[6] Martin Egli et al., Nucleic Acids in Chemistry and Biology (Royal Society of Chemistry; 3rd Revised edition, 31 Aug 2005) 210.

[7] Russell P J, et al., Biology Volume 1: The Dynamic Science (Brooks/Cole; 2nd edition (1 Oct 2010) 3.

[8] Gennaro F. Vito, et al., Criminology: Theory, Research and Policy (Jones and Bartlett; 3rd Revised Edition (6 May 2011) 91.

[9] Mollie F Hayes, et al., DNA and Biotechnology (Academic Press; 3rd Edition (6 Nov 2009) 197.

[10] Dorling Kindersley, The Concise Human Body Book: An Illustrated Guide to its Structure, Function and Disorders (Dorling Kindersley (1 Jun 2009) 34.

[11] Helen Kreuzer, et al,. Molecular Biology and Biotechnology: A Guide for Teachers (American Society for Microbiology; 3rd Edition (11 April 2008) 410.

[12] Karthikeyan et al., ‘A database for Human Y chromosome protein data’ Bioinformation 4(5): 184-186 (2009) 184.

[13] Lucian Gorgan ‘DNA – Source of Forensic Evidence’, International Journal of Criminal Investigation, Volume 1, Issue 2 at 103.

[14] John M. Butler, Fundamentals of Forensic DNA Typing (Academic Press; 1 edition, 13 Oct 2009) 383.

[15] Ibid at 4.

[16] John M. Butler, Forensic DNA Typing: Biology, Technology and Genetics of STR Markers (Academic Press: 2nd Edition, 8 Feb 2005) 2.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Salem Press, The Twentieth Century: Great Scientific Achievements (Salem Press Inc. (31 Dec 1994) 1062.

[19] Brenda W. Lerner, World of Forensic Science: A-L (Thomson/Gale, 2006) 220.

[20] Susan Petricevic (ESR) ‘DNA Profiling in forensic science’ Accessed 31 October 2011.

[21] Kelly Pyrek, Forensic Science under Siege: The Challenges of Forensic Laboratories and the Medico-Legal Investigation System (Academic Press; 1 edition, 12 April 2007) 306.

[22] Keith Inman, et al., Principles and Practice of Criminalistics: The Profession of Forensic Science (Protocols in Forensic Science) (CRC Press; 1 Edition (29 Aug 2000) 280.

[23] Ajay Kumar, et al., Ethics and Policy of Biometrics: Third International Conference on Ethics and Policy of Biometrics and International Data Sharing (Springer; 1st Edition. edition (23 April 2010) 27.

[24] Coast, G. & Genetics, I., 2009. Extracting evidence from forensic DNA analyses : future molecular biology directions. ‘Review Literature and Arts of the Americas’, 46(iii), p.339-40, 342-50.

[25] William J Tilstone, Forensic Science: An Encyclopedia of History, Methods and Techniques (ABC_CLIO Ltd (15 May 2006) 256.

[26] John M. Butler., Forensic DNA Typing: Biology, Technology and Genetics of STR Markers (Academic Press: 2nd edition, 8 Feb 2005) at x.

[27] Shelton, Donald. Forensic science in court challenges in the twenty-first century, (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011) 28.

[28] Michael Bromby, et al. ‘An Examination of Criminal Jury Directions in Relation to Eyewitness Identification in Commonwealth Jurisdictions’ Common Law World Review Vol. 36 (4), 303-336, 2007, Accessed 02 November 2011.

[29] Professor Gary Wells ‘Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications’ (Mid Atlantic Innocence Project, 2011) Accessed 03 November 2011.

[30] Ibid.

[31] National Institute of Justice, ‘Convicted by juries, exonerated by science: Case studies in the use of DNA Evidence to establish innocence after trial’ (1996) Accessed 03 November 2011.

[32] U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, V. 149, PT.1, Jan 07 2003 – Jan 17 2003 (United States Congress (2006) 503.

[33] Robert Bertino, Forensic Science: Fundamentals and Investigation (SWEP; 1 edition (7 Feb 2008) 160.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Susanne Elvidge (BSc Hons) ‘Forensic Cases: Colin Pitchfork, First Exoneration Through DNA’ (Explore Forensics, 2011) Accessed 04 November 2011.

[36] Robert Bertino, Forensic Science: Fundamentals and Investigation (SWEP; 1 edition (7 Feb 2008) 160.

[37] Alan Gunn, Essential Forensic Biology (Wiley-Blackwell; 2nd Edition (23 Jan 2009) 92.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Forensic Science Service ‘Colin Pitchfork Case Study’ Accessed 04 November 2011.

[41] Barry A J. Fisher, et al., Introduction to Criminalistics: The Foundation of Forensic Science (Academic Press (17 Feb 2009) 267.

[42] Lincoln Bates, et al., ‘DNA Fingerprinting and Society’ (27 Aug 2008) Accessed 10 November 2011.

[43] Michael Naughton, ‘Wrongful Convictions and Innocence Projects in the UK: Help, Hope and Education’ (2006) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues Accessed 10 November 2011.

[44] Innocence Projects Inc. ‘Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations’ Accessed 25 November 2011.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Shelton, Donald. Forensic science in court challenges in the twenty-first century, (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011) 28.

[49] Coast, G. & Genetics, I., 2009. Extracting evidence from forensic DNA analyses : future molecular biology directions. ‘Review Literature and Arts of the Americas’, 46(iii), p.339-40, 342-50.

[50] J. Buckleton and P. Gill, ‘Low Copy Number’ in J. Buckleton, C. Triggs and S. Walsh (eds), Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation (CRC Press: Florida, 2005) 276.

[51] See R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 and R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49.

[52] Law Commission, ‘Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA revisited’ (CLW 2010, Issue No. 23 at 1) Available Accessed 10.12.2011.

[53] R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49.

[54] R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698.

[55] Peter Gill ‘Application of Low Copy DNA Profiling’ Croatian Medical Journal (CMJ) (2001) 42(3):229-232 at 229.

[56] Michael Naughton et al, ‘The need for caution in the use of DNA evidence to avoid convicting the innocent’ E. & P. 2011, 15(3), 245-257.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Esther Van Zimmeren et al, ‘A paper tiger? Compulsory license regimes for public health in Europe’ IIC 2011, 42(1), 4-40.

[59] Michael Naughton et al, ‘The need for caution in the use of DNA evidence to avoid convicting the innocent’ E. & P. 2011, 15(3), 245-257.

[60] John M. Butler, Fundamentals of Forensic DNA Typing (Academic Press 2010) 331.

[61] Andrei Semikhodskii, Dealing with DNA Evidence: A Legal Guide (Routledge-Cavendish; 1 Edition (25 Jan 2007) 34.

[62] John M. Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: Methodology (Academic Press; 3rd Edition (27 July 2011) 328.

[63] Robert A. Day, How to Write and Publish a Scientific Paper, (Greenwood Press; 7th Revised edition (16 Jun 2011) 63.

[64] James E. Girard, Criminalistics: Forensic Science and Crime (Criminal Justice Illuminated) (Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Inc.; 1 edition (1 Aug 2006) 387.

[65] Ibid.

[66] William C. Thompson, ‘The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (and how that complicates the uses of DNA Databases for Criminal Identification’ (Aug 12, 2008) Accessed 12.12.2011

[67] Lawrence Kobilinsky, Forensic Chemistry Handbook (Wiley-Blackwell (3 Jan 2012) 308.)

[68] Michael Naughton et al, ‘The need for caution in the use of DNA evidence to avoid convicting the innocent’ E. & P. 2011, 15(3), 245-257.

[69] P. Gill, ‘Application of Low Copy Number DNA Profiling’ (2001) 42(3) Croatian Medical Journal 230 n.12 at 231.

[70] Kelly Pyrek, Forensic Science under Siege: The Challenges of Forensic Laboratories and the Medico-Legal Investigation System (Academic Press; 1 edition, 12 April 2007) 96.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Van Oorschot et al. Investigative Genetics 2010, 1:14 at 11, available from Accessed 28 November 2011.

[73] Aric W. Dutelle, An Introduction to Crime Scene Investigation (Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Inc (8 Mar 2010) 225.

[74] Ibid.

[75] P. Gill, ‘Application of Low Copy Number DNA Profiling’ (2001) 42(3) Croatian Medical Journal 230.

[76] James Randerson, ‘We’ve now pushed the technology to the absolute limit’ (The Guardian, 16 Jan 2008) Accessed 05 Feb 2012.

[77] S Krimsky and T Simoncelli, ‘Genetic Justice: DNA Data Banks, Criminal Investigations, and Civil Liberties’ Columbia University Press (25 Jan 2011) at 176.

[78] R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49.

[79] John. M Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing Methodology (Academic Press, 2011) at 315

[80] Lesley Anne Henry, ‘Omagh bomb legal victory: The men behind worst atrocity of the Troubles’ Belfast Telegraph (Belfast, 9 June 2009) Available from Accessed 01 December 2011.

[81] John M. Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: Methodology (Academic Press; 3rd Edition (27 July 2011) 315.

[82] R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49 at 51.

[83] Ibid at 52.

[84] John. M Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing Methodology (Academic Press, 2011) at 315

[85] R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49.

[86] John. M Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing Methodology (Academic Press, 2011) at 315

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Don Mathias, ‘Observations on LCN DNA Analysis’ (2010) Accessed 16 Feb 2012.

[90] R v Steenson and others [1986] NIJB 17 at 36 per Lord Lowry CJ.

[91] R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49 at 65.

[92] Karen Lotter, ‘Setback for LCN DNA’ (Forensic Science @ Suite 101, 22 Dec 2007) Accessed 20 Feb 2012.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid.

[95] CPS Press Release ‘Review of the use of Low Copy Number DNA analysis in current cases: CPS Statement’, 14 January 2008, Available Accessed 02 December 2011.

[96] Ibid.

[97] B. Caddy, G. R. Taylor and A. M. T. Linacre, A Review of the Science of Low Template DNA Analysis (2008), available at < >, accessed 03 December 2011.

[98] Ibid. at Section 7.2

[99] Ibid at Section 7.2

[100] John. M Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing Methodology (Academic Press, 2011) at 315

[101] John. M Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing Methodology (Academic Press, 2011) at 316 (Caddy et al, 2008 at Section 7.4)

[102] Allan Jamieson, ‘LCN DNA Analysis: R. v Reed and Reed’ The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, E. & P. 2011, 15(2), at 161.

[103] J. Gilder, R. Koppl, I. Kornfield, D. Krane, L. Mueller and W. Thompson, ‘Comments on the Review of Low Copy Number Testing. Letter to the Editor’ (2008) 23 Int J Legal Med 535.

[104] Allan Jamieson, ‘LCN DNA Analysis: R. v Reed and Reed’ The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, E. & P. 2011, 15(2), at 161.

[105] R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698

[106] Allan Jamieson, ‘LCN DNA Analysis: R. v Reed and Reed’ The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, E. & P. 2011, 15(2), at 161.

[107] Ibid..

[108] R v Reed and Reed; R v Garmson [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 at [74], per Thomas LJ.

[109] Michael Naughton et al, ‘The need for caution in the use of DNA evidence to avoid convicting the innocent’ E. & P. 2011, 15(3), at 250.

[110] Kaushal B. Majmudar (J.D., Harvard Law School, Class of 1994), ‘Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible approach to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence’ Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 7, Number 1 Fall 1993 at 187.

[111] Frye v United States (1923) 54 App DC 46, 293 F 1013, 34 ALR 1.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Stephen M. Patton, ‘DNA Fingerprinting: The Castro Case’ The Harvard Journal of Law and Technology’, Volume 3, Spring Issue, 1990.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Kaushal B. Majmudar (J.D., Harvard Law School, Class of 1994), ‘Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible approach to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence’ Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 7, Number 1 Fall 1993 at 187.

[116] Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 509 US. 579.

[117] Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 509 US. 579.

[118] David S. Caudill, ‘Expert Scientific Testimony in Courts: The Ideal and Illusion of Value-Free Science’, The Panteneto Forum, Issue 39, July 2010.

[119] Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 509 US. 579.

[120] Jessica M. Sombat, Latent Justice: Daubert's Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2819 (2002), Accessed 10 December 2011.

[121] Law Commission, 'The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability' LCCP No.190 (2009).

[122] Gary Edmond, et al, 'The Law Commission's report on expert evidence in criminal proceedings' [2011] Crim. L.R.844-862

[123] Law Commission No.190: 2.12.

[124] Law Commission No. 190: 2.12.

[125]Adam Wilson, 'The Law Commission's proposal on expert opinion evidence: an onerous demand upon judges' (2010) 1 Web JCLI Accessed 29 November 2011.

[126] Ibid.

[127] ‘Expert Evidence Reliability to be tested by judges – Law Commission Report’ (22 March 2011) < > Accessed 10 February 2012.

[128] Law Commission No. 190: 2.23.

[129] Adam Wilson, 'The Law Commission's proposal on expert opinion evidence: an onerous demand upon judges' (2010) 1 Web JCLI Accessed 29 November 2011.

[130] Law Commission No. 190: 5.1.

[131] Law Commission No. 190: 5.1.

[132] Law Commission No. 190: 6.1.

[133] Law Commission No. 190: 6.4.

[134] Law Commission No. 190: 6.53.

[135] Law Commission No. 190: 6.65.

[136] Law Commission No. 190: 6.72.

[137] Adam Wilson, 'The Law Commission's proposal on expert opinion evidence: an onerous demand upon judges' (2010) 1 Web JCLI Accessed 18 December 2011.

[138] Ibid.

[139] Adam Wilson, 'The Law Commission's proposal on expert opinion evidence: an onerous demand upon judges' (2010) 1 Web JCLI Accessed 19 December 2011.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Allan Jamieson, ‘Mixed Results’, The Guardian (28 February 2008). Available from Accessed 08 January 2012.

[142] Coast, G.& Genetics, I., 2009. Extracting evidence from forensic DNA analyses : future molecular biology directions. ‘Review Literature and Arts of the Americas’, 46(iii), p.339-40, 342-50.

[143] Allan Jamieson, ‘Mixed Results’, The Guardian (28 February 2008).

[144] Michael Naughton et al, ‘The need for caution in the use of DNA evidence to avoid convicting the innocent’ E. & P. 2011, 15(3), 245-257.

[145] CPS Press Release ‘Review of the use of Low Copy NumberDNA analysis in current cases: CPS Statement’, 14 January 2008, Available Accessed 02 December 2011.

[146] Robert D. Myers, et al., “Complex Scientific Evidence and the Jury” (American Judicature Society, November-December 1999) Vol 83(3).

[147] John Danaher, ‘Blind expertise and the problem of scientific evidence’, The International Journal of Evidence and Proof, E. & P. 2011, 15(3), at 207.

[148] Andrei Semikhodskii, ‘Dealing with DNA Evidence: a Legal Guide’ (Routledge-Cavendish; 1 edition (25 Jan 2007) at 51.

[149] Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 Science 892, 893 (2005).

[150] Ibid.

[151] R v T [2010] EWCA 2349.

[152] R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439, [2011] 1 Cr App R 9 at [24].

[153] Ibid. at [46].

[154] Ibid. at [45].

[155] Geoffrey S. Morrison, ‘The likelihood-ratio framework and forensic evidence in court: a response to R v T’, E. & P. 2012, 16(1), at 2.

[156] J. G. Darboux, P. E. Appell and J. J. Poincaré, ‘Affaire Dreyfus: Rapport de MM. les Experts Darboux, Appell, Poincaré’ (1904), available at , accessed 05 January 2011.

[157] L. A. Foreman, C. Champod, I. W. Evett, J. A. Lambert and S. Pope, ‘Interpreting DNA Evidence: A Review’ (2003) 71 International Statistics Journal 473.

[158] R. Cook, I. W. Evett, G. Jackson, P. J. Jones and J. A. Lambert, ‘A Hierarchy of Propositions: Deciding Which Level to Address in Casework’ (1998) 38 Science & Justice 231.

[159] C. E. H. Berger, ‘Criminalistiek is terugredeneren’ [Criminalistics is reasoning backwards] (2010) Nederlands Juristenblad 784.

[160] R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439, [2011] 1 Cr App R 9 at [47].

[161] Geoffrey S. Morrison, ‘The likelihood-ratio framework and forensic evidence in court: a response to R v T’, E. & P. 2012, 16(1), at 1.

[162] R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439, [2011] 1 Cr App R 9 at [61].

[163] R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439, [2011] 1 Cr App R 9 at [76].

[164] Geoffrey S. Morrison, ‘The likelihood-ratio framework and forensic evidence in court: a response to R v T’, E. & P. 2012, 16(1), at 3.

[165] I. W. Evett and other signatories, ‘Expressing Evaluative Opinions: A Position Statement’ (2011) 51 Science & Justice 1.

[166] Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, National Academies Press (1 Dec 2009).

[167] Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006 [H.R.2862.ENR]

[168] Senate Report No. 109 88, at 46 (2005).

[169] Erin Murphy, What Strengthening Forensic Science today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report , L.P. & R. 2010, 9(1), 7-24 at 7.

[170] Senate Report NO.109-088, at 46 (2005).

[171] Eri‑88, at 46 (2005).

[172] Erin Murphy, ‘What “Strengthening Forensic Science” today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report’, L.P. & R. 2010, 9(1), 7-24 at 7.

[173] Senate Report NO.109-088, at 46 (2005).

[174] Erin Murphy, ‘What “Strengthening Forensic Science” today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report’, L.P. & R. 2010, 9(1), 7-24 at 1.3.

[175] Erin Murphy, ‘What “Strengthening Forensic Science” today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report’, L.P. & R. 2010, 9(1), 7-24 at 7.

[176] Jacqueline T. Fish Dr., ‘Crime Scene Investigation’ (Anderson; 2 edition (13 Dec 2010) 13.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ibid.

[179] Jacqueline T. Fish Dr., ‘Crime Scene Investigation’ (Anderson; 2 edition (13 Dec 2010) 13.

[180] Donald Shelton, Forensic Science in Court: Challenges in the Twenty First Century (Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2011) 131.

[181] Ibid at 132.

[182] Stephanie Albertson, The influence of jurors race on perceptions of complex scientific evidence (University of Delaware, 2009) 1.

[183] John M. Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: Methodology (Academic Press; 3rd Edition (27 July 2011) 542.

[184] J. Buckleton,J. Curran, A discussion of the merits of random man not excluded and likelihood ratios, Forensic Sci Int Genet. 2 (2008) 343-8.

[185] John M. Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: Methodology (Academic Press; 3rd Edition (27 July 2011) 542.

[186] Science and Technology Committee Publications, Science and Technology: Seventh Report (16 March 2005) Accessed 08 Feb 2012.

[187] Robert D. Myers, et al., ‘Complex Scientific Evidence and the jury’ (1999) Vol 83 (3) American Judicature Society Accessed 06 Feb 2012.

[188] Ibid.

[189] Jane G. Delahunty, ‘DNA, Jury Trials and the White Coat Effect’, available Accessed 20 November 2011.

[190] Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 754–56 & nn.149–56 (2007) at 726-31.

[191]

[192]Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 754–56 & nn.149–56 (2007) at 728-31.

[193] Jason Schklar, et al., ‘Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies’ Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 2. (April 1999) P159 -184 at 159

[194] It is interesting to note beyond the scope of this thesis that the jury system in Japan was abolished in 1943 and as a result the legal process was strictly for professionals. The jury system was then brought back in and judges in Japan now assist the jury. It is not a direct copy of the system in the UK but it is interesting to note a number of similarities and the difference in the success of both.

[195] Robert J Goodwin, Criminal and Scientific Evidence Cases, Materials and Problems (Lexis Law Pub (April 1997) 51.

[196] Jane Delahuntly, ‘Improving Jury Understanding and the use of DNA Expert Evidence’ (Criminology Research Council, July 2009) Accessed 01 March 2012.

[197] Ibid.

[198] Larry J Siegel, Introduction to Criminal Justice (Wadsworth Publishing Co Inc; 12th edition (5 Jan 2009) 475.

[199] Ibid.

[200] United States v Addison 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C Circ 1974)

[201] Lindy Kerin ‘Jurors overwhelmed by DNA evidence: Study’ (The World Today, March 29 2010) < Accessed 18 February 2012.

[202] Benjamin R. Newell, et al., Straight Choices: The Psychology of Decision Making (Psychology Press; 1 edition (14 Jun 2007) 7.

[203] Ibid.

[204] Ananya Mandal, ‘DNA evidence often overwhelms jurors to wrongly says research’ (News Medical, 29 March 2010) Accessed 23 Feb 2012.

[205] Ibid.

[206] Lindy Kerin, ‘Jurors overwhelmed by DNA evidence: Study’ (ABC News, March 2010) Accessed 23 Feb 2012.

[207] Ibid.

[208] Ananya Mandal, ‘DNA evidence often overwhelms jurors to wrongly says research’ (News Medical, 29 March 2010) Accessed 23 Feb 2012.

[209] Michael Dann, et al., ‘Can Jury Trial Innovations Improve Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence?’ (National Institute of Justice Journal, Issue no 255) 4.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid

[212] Ibid.

[213] Ibid at 5

[214] Ibid at 5

[215] Ibid at 5.

[216] Michael Dann, et al., ‘Can Jury Trial Innovations Improve Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence?’ (National Institute of Justice Journal, Issue no 255) 4.

[217] Ibid.

[218] Ibid.

[219] J. Heinrick, ‘Everyone’s an Expert: The CSI Effect’s Negative Impact on Juries’ (2006) Accessed 15 November 2011.

[220] Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 Fordham Intell.. Prop. Media & Entertainment L.J. 429 (2006).

[221] Simon Cole & Rachel Dioso, Law and the Lab: Do TV Shows Really Affect How Juries Vote? Let’s Look at the Evidence, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at W13.

[222] N.J. Schweitzer and Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 Jurimetrics J. 357–364 (2007).

[223] N.J. Schweitzer and Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 Jurimetrics J. 357–364 (2007).

[224] Gary Alan Davis et al., ‘The New Tech Effect: Analysing Juror Credibility in Cases Involving Digital Evidence’ (2011) at 1. Accessed 16 Feb 2012.

[225] Ibid

[226] Jason Schklar, et al., ‘Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies’ Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 2. (April 1999) P159 -184 at 159

[227] G.T Munsterman, Jury Trial Innovations (National Center for State Courts (Jan 1997) 2.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Shelton, Donald. Forensic science in court challenges in the twenty-first century, (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011) 28.

[230] U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Witness: Forensic uses of DNA tests, OTA-BA-438 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1990) 17.

[231] David R. Keller et al., Ethics in Action: A Case Based Approach (Wiley-Blackwell, 19 Dec 2008) 454.

[232] Law Commission, ‘Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA revisited’ (CLW 2010, Issue No. 23 at 1) Available Accessed 10.12.2011.

[233] R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49 at 65.

[234] CPS Press Release ‘Review of the use of Low Copy Number DNA analysis in current cases: CPS Statement’, 14 January 2008, Available Accessed 02 December 2011.

[235] Law Commission, 'The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability' LCCP No.190 (2009).

[236] Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, National Academies Press (1 Dec 2009).

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