Docx - Obie Evans MBA ePortfolio



Final Project Case Briefs Obie EvansMGMT 525- Business LawSouthwestern CollegeMay 10, 2013Case Citation: CAPRIO v. HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP LLC 25 Statement of Facts:The plaintiff files suit against the defendant alleging HRRG did not follow the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when they sent him a collections letter because wording in the letter caused the Validation Notice to be overshadowed and contradicted. The plaintiff also alleged that HRRG also providing language in the letter that misrepresents to the consumer the process for disputing the debt. The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to state a case. Case History: After filing its answer, HRRG moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The District Court of New Jersey then granted HRRG's motion. The case was appealed by the plaintiff to the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Issues: There were two issues presented in this case. The first issue is if the defendant sent a letter with incorrect instruction for the consumer to dispute a debt. The second issue was if the defendant provided wording in the letter with language that misrepresents the debt dispute process. Holdings: The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit concluded that the HRRG Collection Letter was deceptive because it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate and the Validation Notice was overshadowed and contradicted because the “least sophisticated debtor” would be uncertain as to her rights. Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered whether language in a collection letter contradicts or overshadows the validation notice is a question of law. Result: As a result of the court’s holdings, the District’s court order granting HRRG’s motion for judgment of the pleadings was vacated and was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. Case Citation: SAMS v. YAHOO INC No. 11–16938. 2013Statement of Facts:The plaintiff files suit against the defendant alleging Yahoo! violated the Stored Communications Act when it disclosed some of Sams' noncontent subscriber information to the government pursuant to allegedly invalid subpoenas even if the subpoenas were valid, Yahoo! failed to comply with their terms when it produced the requested documents prior to the deadline set in the subpoenas. The defendant argued that they were protected under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) from such suits. Case History: The lower court dismissed the Plaintiff’s class claims. The case was appealed the plaintiff to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.Issues: There were two issues presented in this case. The first issue was if the subpoena Yahoo! acted upon was valid and the second issue was if Yahoo! failed comply with their SCA terms when it produced the requested documents prior to the deadline set in the subpoenasHoldings: The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit affirmed the district’s court’s order dismissing Sam’s claim. Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered that nothing about the subpoenas would place a reasonable person or Yahoo! on notice that they might be invalid. The Circuit Court stated that there is simply no reason to suspect that Yahoo! acted in bad faith here, where the subpoenas displayed no indication of irregularity sufficient to put Yahoo! on notice the subpoenas were phony. The Circuit court also considered that nothing in the record indicates that Yahoo! did not feel itself legally bound to produce the subpoenaed documents regardless of when they provided the documents. Result: The district court’s judgment is affirmed. Case Citation: MATTEL INC v. MGA ENTERTAINMENT No. 11–56357.2013Statement of Facts:In late 2006, Mattel sought leave to amend its complaint by adding a claim that MGA had stolen its trade secrets. The district court allowed Mattel to plead the claim, but only as a counterclaim. Then, in 2010, after it had been decided the first appeal, MGA filed a new claim against Mattel for misappropriating its trade secrets. The defendant argued that the statute of limitations had run because the events at issue happened more than three years earlier.Case History: The jury found for MGA, and awarded more than $80 million in damages. The district court then awarded MGA an equal amount in exemplary damages. Mattel appeals both the district court's decision that MGA's trade-secret counterclaim was compulsory and the award of fees under the Copyright Act to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth CircuitIssues: There were two issues presented in this case. The first issue is MGA’s trade secret claim and the second issue is the awarding of the copyright attorney’s fees.Holdings: The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict along with the related damages, fees and costs. On remand, the district court shall dismiss MGA's trade-secret claim without prejudice. They also decided that the district court properly exercised its discretion in awarding and calculating attorneys' fees and costs.Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered that both Mattel and MGA claimed they stole each other's trade secrets isn't enough to render MGA's counterclaim compulsory. Mattel's remaining arguments about apportionment and calculation about attorney’s fees are equally unconvincing.Result: As a result of the court’s holdings, we therefore reverse the district court's holding that MGA's counterclaim-in-reply was compulsory. Award of attorney’s fees was affirmed.Case Citation: R?OS PI?EIRO v. UNITED STATES No. 12–1618. 2013Statement of Facts:The plaintiff (Rios) files suit against the defendant for events relating to job contract termination. The defendant (US) argued that Rios had stolen mail containing money. Ríos initiated an administrative appeal to the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals (PSBCA), which convened a two-day evidentiary hearing to determine whether the USPS breached Ríos's contract. At the same time the plaintiff initiated a FTCA suit against the United States for the actions of USPS employees, alleging six torts.Case History: On the government's motion, a magistrate judge recommended dismissing three of the six claims and the district court adopted the magistrate's reasoning without any objection from Ríos. The government then sought summary judgment on the remaining claims, which were for negligent supervision, invasion of privacy, and malicious. In response, Ríos requested that the court strike the PSBCA's factual findings from the record. Declining to do so, the district court instead incorporated those findings, and granted judgment to the government. In his appeal, Ríos pays particular attention to the district court's decision to give the PSBCA findings preclusive effect over factual matters.Issues: There were two issues presented in this case. The first issue is issue preclusion and the review of summary judgment.Holdings: The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit decided to affirm the lower court’s judgments.Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered that the postal inspectors had probable cause to initiate a prosecution, Rios made no developed argument for negligent supervision, and that Rios did not challenge the search. Result: As a result of the court’s holdings, they affirmed the district court as to all claims.Case Citation: SPAULDING v. WELLS FARGO BANK No. 12–1973. 2013Statement of Facts:Faced with financial hardship and a monthly mortgage payment they could not afford, Appellants Josephine Spaulding and Dale Haylett applied for a mortgage modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Their mortgage servicer, Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., denied their application. Feeling aggrieved by Wells Fargo's actions, Spaulding and Haylett filed suit, alleging five state law claims. Case History: The district court concluded that Appellants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and therefore granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss.Issues: Spaulding and Haylett alleged five counts, breach of implied-in-fact contract (Count I),negligence (Count II), violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) (CountIII), negligent misrepresentation (Count IV), and common law fraud (Count V).Holdings: The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit holds that the district court correctly granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss all five counts.Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered that the plaintiff’s did not state a breach of contract claim sufficient to survive, the bank owned no duty to the plaintiffs, there is no plausible claim that plaintiffs justifiably took action in reliance on the alleged false statements or suffered damages proximately caused by those statements, and plaintiffs have not stated their claim with the required particularity for common law fraud.Result: As a result of the court’s holdings that the District Court correctly granted motion to dismiss all five counts, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Case Citation: CENTRAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA LLC v. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY OF VIRGINIA INC. No. 12–1322. 2013Statement of Facts:The plaintiff files suit against the defendant alleging one count of breach of contract. The defendant argued that CenturyLink was overcharging Sprint for VOIP call traffic and interconnection agreement (ICA) did not apply to VIOP calls made over Feature Group D (FGD) trunks by billing Sprint for local traffic not subject to access charges. Sprint also moved to dismiss the complaint, to stay the case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.Case History: The lower court denied Sprint's motion to dismiss. It concluded that it had federal question jurisdiction under Supreme Court and circuit precedent interpreting the 1996 Act. The district court conducted a bench trial on CenturyLink's breach of contract claim and entered judgment in favor of CenturyLink. The district court judge also discovered that his IRA owned shares in CenturyLink. The case was appealed by Sprint to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.Issues: There were two issues presented in this case. The first issue is the district court had no authority under the 1996 Act. The second issue the district court judge should have excused himself and vacated all orders and judgments issued in the case.Holdings: United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit stated that the 1996 Act does not require a State commission to interpret and enforce an ICA in the first instance and that neither the text of the 1996 Act nor prudential considerations compel federal deference to State commissions in the first instance. The court also determined the district court judge did not participate in management of his shares and did not violate the recusal statute.Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered that the State commissions do not have exclusive authority to interpret and enforce ICAs. Result: As a result of the court’s holdings, the lower court’s judgment is affirmed.Case Citation: UNITED STEEL PAPER AND FORESTRY RUBBER MANUFACTURING ENERGYALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION AFL CIO CLC v. COOKSON AMERICA, INC. USA. Docket No. 12–1032–cv. 2013Statement of Facts:The plaintiff files suit against the defendant seeking a declaration that the Facility closing Agreement (FCA) obligated the companies to pay Retiree Medical Allowance RMAs to the thirty-six potentially eligible retirees from the Hamburg plant who had yet to reach the age of sixty-five. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment.Case History: The district court granted the Union's motion for summary judgment and denied the companies' cross-motion. The case was appealed by the companies to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.Issues: There were three issues presented in this case. The first issue was that the district court misinterpreted the FCA, that the FCA did not unambiguously indicate that any right to receive a RMA survived the parties' collective bargaining agreement and that the Union, which no longer represents the retirees, lacks standing to assert the relevant claim.Holdings: United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit holds that the Union has constitutional standing to sue to enforce the FCA and that the FCA imposed a requirement for the defendants to pay a FCA. Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered the future retirement benefits of active workers are part and parcel of their overall compensation and hence a well-established statutory subject of bargaining and given that the plant's closure has capped the number of eligible retirees at thirty-six, we need not worry about the possibility of future suits by individual retirees who lack notice of the present case. Result: As a result of the court’s holdings, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Case Citation: KRAMER v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION DBA No. 12–55050. 2013Statement of Facts: The plaintiff alleges that they experienced defects in their antilock brake systems (ABS), resulting in increased stopping distances. Plaintiffs further allege that Toyota had notice of the defect as early as July 2009 but failed to disclose the defect and continued to manufacture and sell vehicles with defective ABS. Plaintiffs assert claims for violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, unfair competition, false advertising, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and common law breach of contract. The defendant wanted to compel plaintiffs to arbitration. Toyota first argues that the district court erred by deciding whether Toyota had a right to compel arbitration, contending that the Purchase Agreements commit that question to an arbitrator. Toyota also argues that it may compel arbitration even though it is a nonsignatory to the Purchase Agreements because Plaintiffs are equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration.Case History: The district court found that Toyota had waived any right to compel arbitration by vigorously litigating this action in district court for nearly two years. The case was appealed by Toyota to seek review of the district court's denial of their motion to compel arbitrationIssues: Whether Toyota could compel a plaintiff into arbitration after it had entered into litigation. Holdings: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit concluded that Toyota couldn’t compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. The district court had the authority to decide whether Toyota, a nonsignatory to the Purchase Agreements, may compel arbitration. Further they discerned no reason that the Plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration in this case.Reasoning: In making its holdings, the court considered… In the absence of a disagreement between Plaintiffs and the Dealerships, the agreement to arbitrate arbitrability does not apply. Therefore, a disagreement between Plaintiffs and Toyota is simply not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.Result: As a result of the court’s holdings, the lower courts judgment was affirmed ................
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