Scope of Automobile Consent Searches in Nevada



Supreme Court of Nevada

Scope of Automobile Consent Searches in Nevada

On August 2, 2007 the Nevada Supreme Court decided a case which brings Nevada back in line with the United States Supreme Court when determining how far an officer can go when conducting a consent search.[i]

State v. Ruscetta involved a stop conducted by the Las Vegas Metro Police Department for motor vehicle violations. During the stop, it was determined that Ruscetta had a suspended license, two minor warrants and a criminal history which included a 1995 conviction for possession of marijuana. It is important to note, that because of restrictions Nevada on search incident to arrest in a motor vehicle, the officers could not conduct a search incident to arrest.[ii]

After getting Ruscetta out of the vehicle, the officers asked Ruscetta for consent to search the vehicle. Ruscetta consented to the search and has not challenged the consent itself. While the officer was searching the car he leaned on the center console and the console unit moved toward the driver’s seat. The officer recognized that the console was detached and decided to move the console. Upon moving the console, the officer found 2 baggies of marijuana and a gun. Ruscetta challenged the discovery of the gun and the marijuana relying on an earlier case,[iii] which concluded “that a reasonable person would not have understood his general consent to search a car as authorizing an officer to remove screws and pry a panel from the vehicle.” The language from Johnson was interpreted by the trial court as restricting officers from, in any way “dismantling” an automobile during a consent search.

In overturning the trial court’s suppression, the court cited to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jimeno[iv] as providing the proper analysis for determining whether an officer has gone too far in conducting a consent search of a vehicle. In doing so, the court rejected the idea that every time an officer in some way dismantles the vehicle he or she has exceeded the scope of a consent search. Instead a court must look at the “totality of circumstances” and determine if an objectively reasonable officer would believe that the subject’s consent would allow the officer to take the action, including dismantling, that the officer has decided to take. The court asserted: “To the extent that it is possible to read the lead and concurring opinions in Johnson as supporting the proposition that ‘dismantling’ a car based on general consent is per se unreasonable, we retreat from that position. We take this opportunity to clarify that the proper analysis in cases involving consensual vehicular searches is the traditional ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach enunciated in Jimeno. When applying this ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, courts must address whether an objectively reasonable officer would have believed that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted the action in question, not whether there has been a ‘dismantling’ of the vehicle.”

It is important to note that the court did not say that the movement of the center console was proper. Instead they sent the case back to the trial court for a determination, based upon an evidentiary hearing into the officer’s conduct at the stop to determine whether an objectively reasonable officer would believe that Ruscetta’s consent would extend to a movement of the console based upon the totality of circumstances approach. The Nevada Supreme Court noted that they did not have enough information to make this determination since the lower court did not have a hearing but instead had suppressed the evidence relying on the police report and the “dismantling” argument.

Key Points:

• Dismantling a vehicle during a consent search does not automatically invalidate evidence that is found as a result of the dismantling

• The scope of a consent search (where you can look or how far you can go) will be determined by a totality of circumstances approach addressing the question: Would an objectively reasonable officer believe that the consent granted by the subject extended to the area searched by the officer? If an objectively reasonable officer would believe that the consent extended to that area, based on the totality of circumstances, then the search has not exceeded proper scope.

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[i] State v. Ruscetta 2007 Nev. LEXIS 39 (Nev. Supreme Ct.August 2, 2007).

[ii] See:State v. Harnisch, 931 P.2d 1359 (Nev. Supreme Ct. 1997); State v. Harnisch, (Harnisch2), 954 P.2d. 1180 (1998).

[iii] State v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 78 (Nev. Supreme Ct. 2000).

[iv] Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).

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