Security Aboard Commercial Aircraft
Security Aboard Commercial Aircraft
Airline Security Analysts
Rebecca Neal
Beth Schuetz
Brad Steinfeldt
Andrzej Stewart
Department of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics
The University of Texas at Austin
Austin, Texas 78712
December 7, 2003
Executive Summary
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States of America scrutinized the security of the commercial airline industry. Major security breaches allowed terrorists to board four commercial flights, which eventually led to the aircrafts’ hijacking and demise. In response to these flaws in the nation’s security, the United States Congress passed House Resolution 5005, The Homeland Security Act of 2002. Included in the number of initiatives set forth in this act was a program allowing pilots to carry firearms while in the cockpit following their certification as Federal flight deck officers.
Pilots carrying guns in the cockpit pose many problems. Firearms that have lead-core bullets have the potential to cause destruction to an aircraft’s systems and structure. Furthermore, firearms may fall under terrorist control because they are not bound to a single person. Another concern is the ability for guns to distract pilots from their primary purpose—to fly the aircraft.
When the government selected guns as the primary defense in the cockpit, they failed to undertake a comprehensive analysis of alternatives. Pilots and airlines have access to numerous alternatives, ranging from pre-fragmented bullets to total cockpit isolation, which provide the same or better protection when compared to guns. Hence, the Airline Security Analysts recommend new legislation that supercedes the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The new legislation would eventually phase out guns in the cockpit, temporarily replacing them with one or more of the available alternatives, and fund further research into aircraft security.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
Table of Contents ii
List of Figures iii
List of Acronyms iv
Legislation Abbreviations v
1.0 Introduction 1
2.0 Discussion 4
2.1 Background: Regulations and Legislation 4
2.1.1 Preexisting Federal Regulations as Legal Basis for Arming Pilots 5
2.1.2 Congressional Resolutions 6
2.1.3 Modification of Federal Regulations 8
2.1.4 Federal Regulations as Legal Basis for Alternatives to Arming Pilots 8
2.1.5 Summary of Regulations 10
2.2 Problems 10
2.3 Alternatives 16
3.0 Conclusions 25
4.0 Recommendations 26
5.0 References 27
Appendix A: Relevant Sections of the Code of Federal Regulations 29
A.1 Code of Federal Regulations 29
A.1.1 14 CFR 121.538 29
A.1.2 49 CFR 1544.201(d) 29
A.1.3 49 CFR 1544.219 29
A.1.4 49 CFR 1544.223 31
A.2 United States Code 31
A.2.1 49 USC 44912 31
A.2.2 49 USC 44918 33
A.3 Note on Currency of Regulations 34
Appendix B: 107th Congress, House Resolution 5005, Title XIV 35
Appendix C: 107th Congress, Senate Bill 1444 43
List of Figures
Figure 1—Types of Rubber Bullets 17
Figure 2—Construction of a Frangible Bullet 18
Figure 3—SmartLock Magnetic Firearm Lock 20
Figure 4—Schematic of a Stun Gun 21
List of Acronyms
ASA—Airline Security Analysts
CFR—Code of Federal Regulations
FAA—Federal Aviation Administration
HR—House Resolution
S—Senate Bill
USC—United States Code
Legislation Abbreviations
The legislation presented throughout this report is abbreviated in the following manner:
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1.0 Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have inspired a national debate regarding how best to heighten security at U.S. airports and on commercial flights. In this critical time, the Airline Security Analysts (ASA) understand the fears of airline pilots, passengers, and crew following the horrific hijackings, and support finding reasonable solutions to increase aircraft and airport security. In addition to the dramatic increase of security at airports occurring after September 11 (for instance, intensified passenger and luggage screening [1]), alteration of existing acts and regulations would make our homeland safer.
Congress has proposed many legislative bills geared toward augmenting security on commercial flights. A specific focus of this report will be Title XIV of House Resolution 5005 (HR 5005), the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act. The resolution lays the groundwork for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. Under the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, pilots of commercial passenger aircraft become eligible for deputizing as Federal flight deck officers following training. Once deputized, Federal flight deck officers are able to carry traditional firearms to defend the aircraft, including firearms employing lead-core bullets and lacking a mechanism to prevent an unauthorized person from firing a weapon. The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act omits pilots aboard air cargo, commuter, and on demand flights, which are outside the scope of this report.
A number of issues need to be addressed before any security programs can proceed. Guns cannot be guaranteed to stay within a pilot’s control. Also, firing a gun within an aircraft could compromise the integrity of its systems or structure. Pilots carrying guns could be distracted from their primary task of flying. Furthermore, alternatives exist that provide better protection with less of a risk to aircraft and passengers.
The current Federal Air Marshal Program provides an additional response to stopping terrorism in the air. Air Marshals are law enforcement officers who continually receive training in firearm safety, appropriate use of force, psychology of terrorists, and worst case scenarios. Trained Air Marshals have one purpose, which is to monitor the airplane and protect the passengers and crew. However, they are currently only deployed to a small fraction of the flights in the United States.
The Antihijacking Act and Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 provided the outline for screening used by American carriers prior to the September 11 tragedy [2]. These acts amended the already existing Federal Aviation Act of 1958 in order to put into practice the “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.” Interestingly, these amendments sled to a sharp decline in the number of occurrences of hijackings on American carriers, including a complete lack of hijackings from 1991 until September 11, 2001 [3].
Models presently exist for preventing terrorism on aircraft without arming pilots. One such example is El Al, the Israeli airlines. Only one successful hijacking of an El Al aircraft has occurred since its inception in 1948. Additionally, they have had none since its current passenger screening system has been in place [4]. While exact parallels cannot be drawn between El Al and the entire U.S. airline industry, such models should be closely examined, as lessons can be learned from their experience.
Please note that this report is intended to apply only to the issue of pilots of commercial airliners. While some discussions in this report may be misconstrued to argue against Marshals carrying traditional firearms, it should be noted that the arguments presented within are not intended to apply to the Federal Air Marshal Program. Pilots and Federal Air Marshals experience different roles and responsibilities aboard an aircraft, and the discussion of Marshals would require an analysis separate to the one presented hereafter. Scrutiny of the Federal Air Marshal Program is outside the scope of this report and may therefore be considered a viable alternative to the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program for the purposes of this report. Similarly, cargo, commuter, and on-demand operations differ substantially from commercial flights, and therefore also require separate analysis.
2.0 Discussion
2.1 Background: Regulations and Legislation
Although the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is the most recent legislation concerning the issue of arming individuals aboard commercial aircraft, the issue of air piracy is not new, and many regulations concerning aviation security existed at the time of the passage of the act. Many of these regulations are relevant to the discussion of arming airline pilots, and therefore provide a preexisting legal basis for the implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program set forth in Title XIV of the Homeland Security Act. Examination of these various regulations reveals not only the rules governing the program, but also gives insight into the implementation of the program. Any attempt to discontinue the carrying of traditional firearms by pilots must invariably include modification of these laws. In addition, the laws also provide for various alternative security methods, which would be necessary if pilots were not allowed to carry traditional firearms.
With the exception of 14 CFR 135, 28 USC 570, and 49 USC 44921, Appendix A contains all of the laws discussed in this section. 28 USC 570 and 49 USC 44921 were recently passed in Congress and were not available at the time of the creation of this report. Appendix B contains 107th Cong. HR 5005 Title XIV, the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act, which sets forth the text of 49 USC 44921, the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. Appendix C contains 107th Cong. S.1444, the Federal Air Marshals and Safe Sky Act of 2001, which sets forth the text of 28 USC 570.
2.1.1 Preexisting Federal Regulations as Legal Basis for Arming Pilots
|Federal Regulations Relevant to Arming Pilots |
|Regulation |Name |
|14 CFR 121.538 |Aircraft Security |
|49 CFR 1544.201 |Prohibitions on Carrying a Weapon, Explosive, or Incendiary |
|49 CFR 1544.219 |Carriage of Accessible Weapons |
|49 USC 44921 |Federal Flight Deck Officer Program |
| | |
The Federal Aviation Regulations that make up Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations are a logical starting point for the analysis of any topic concerning aviation. ASA’s report is concerned with the arming of pilots aboard commercial airliners, and the part pertaining to this issue is 14 CFR 121, which dictates the operating requirements of commercial airline operations. 14 CFR 121.538 reveals that the security requirements for Part 121 operations are dictated entirely by regulations within Chapter XII of Title 49, the transportation regulations.
Chapter XII of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations discusses a wide array of issues and procedures applicable to the Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Transportation. In particular, 49 CFR 1544 deals with the security of commercial aviation operations. Several specific sections within this part lay the foundation for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. 49 CFR 1544.201 is the most important of these. It prohibits individuals from carrying weapons or explosive devices on board aircraft, but it also lists sections that provide exceptions to this rule: 14 CFR 1544.219, which exempts Federal law enforcement officers (excluding Federal Air Marshals); 14 CFR 1544.221, which exempts law enforcement officers escorting prisoners; and 14 CFR 1544.223, which exempts Federal Air Marshals.
14 CFR 1544.219 is particularly important because it lays the precedent for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. It begins by reinforcing that Federal law enforcement officers are exempt from the prohibition of carrying weapons aboard commercial aircraft. Next, it lists the requirements that an individual must meet in order to be considered a law enforcement officer under this section. Additionally, it sets forth the requirement that the officer must identify himself to the aircraft operator, and it discusses the requirements that constitute proper identification. Finally, the section sets forth requirements for carrying and concealing weapons and prohibits officers from consuming alcohol while armed. Because of this regulation, 107th Cong. HR 5005 (the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act) did not need to create any new exception to 49 CFR 1544.201. Instead, it focused on the procedures of deputizing pilots to Federal law enforcement officer status and of analyzing the potential dangers resulting from arming pilots.
2.1.2 Congressional Resolutions
The regulations discussed previously set the basis for 49 USC 44921, the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, which was set forth in 107th Cong. HR 5005, Title XIV. As stated in the earlier discussion of 49 CFR 1544.201, HR 5005 did not need to create any new exemptions to the prohibition of weapons aboard aircraft prescribed in 49 CFR 1544.201. Rather, it described the manner in which flight crew may be deputized in order to become Federal law enforcement officers and conform to existing regulations.
HR 5005 began by providing the text of 49 USC 44921. The section mandates that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall establish a program to deputize flight crewmembers. It establishes a timeline for commencement of the training program, and it presents the topics that the program must address. The section suggests that the training be based on the program already in place for Federal Air Marshals, with minor differences made to take into account the differing roles and responsibilities of Federal Air Marshals and flight crew. However, it allows the Under Secretary to make decisions regarding specific training, qualification, and requalification requirements. The section grants the participants of the program the authority to purchase and carry a firearm for use in their role as a Federal flight deck officer, as well as the authority to use lethal force to defend an aircraft’s flight deck. Finally, the section defends aircraft operators and Federal flight deck officers from liability in damages resulting in the defense of a flight deck, and it outlines the procedure to be followed in the event that an accidental discharge of a firearm occurs.
After presenting 49 USC 44921, HR 5005 excluded operations under 14 CFR 135, which concerns commuter and on-demand flight operations, from the application of 49 USC 44921, as officials and crewmembers involved in these operations are already authorized to carry firearms by 14 CFR 135.119. The resolution also defined which individuals are considered pilots for the purpose of the resolution. It acknowledged the importance of Federal Air Marshals, and assured that the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program would not interfere with the Federal Air Marshal Program. Next, the resolution amended 49 USC 44918, which concerns the training of flight crews to handle threatening situations, in order to clearly define the requirements expected of flight crews to deal with air piracy. It also outlined plans for various studies to examine the issues concerning the deployment of Federal law enforcement officers aboard aircraft and the feasibility and effects of arming other crewmembers, such as flight attendants, with non-lethal weapons. Finally, it closed with technical amendments changing the designation of various regulation subsections for the purpose of clarification.
2.1.3 Modification of Federal Regulations
In order to end the carrying of traditional firearms by commercial pilots, simply analyzing risks and proposing alternatives is not sufficient. To completely enforce the removal of traditional firearms from flight decks, the laws authorizing their presence would need to change. Changing 49 USC 44921 would be the most important modification. As the regulation that sets forth the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, it is the primary regulation allowing pilots to be armed with traditional firearms.
In addition to changing 49 USC 44921, some other modification to the regulations would have to be made in order to explicitly prevent pilots from being included in one of the exemptions of 49 CFR 1544.201. This could be accomplished in two ways. Creating an addition to 49 CFR 1544.201 barring pilots from carrying traditional firearms regardless of whatever exemption regulations might apply to them is one possible solution. Placing an exemption in 49 CFR 1544.219 barring individuals from serving as Federal law enforcement officers while serving as pilot in command of a commercial aircraft is another solution, as it is highly unlikely that a pilot would fall into any of the other exemption categories (prisoner escort or Federal Air Marshal) while in command of an aircraft.
2.1.4 Federal Regulations as Legal Basis for Alternatives to Arming Pilots
|Federal Regulations Relevant to Alternatives |
|Regulation |Name |
|28 USC 570 |Federal Air Marshals Program |
|49 USC 44912 |Research and Development |
|49 USC 44918 |Crew Training |
| | |
The Federal Flight Deck Officer Program was instituted as a measure to combat the threat of terrorism and air piracy. While this report argues that arming pilots creates an unacceptable risk to flight crew and passengers, the threat of aircraft hijacking remains. If the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program were changed, other security plans would need to be implemented to supplement it. Fortunately, just as laws exist that created a foundation for the program to be built upon, laws also exist that form the basis for the creation of alternatives of security and defense aboard commercial aircraft.
The Federal Air Marshals Program is possibly one of the most publicly well-known alternatives to arming pilots. The current program, which was recently passed in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is set forth in 28 USC 570. The regulation was introduced in 107th Cong. S.1444, the Federal Air Marshals and Safe Sky Act of 2001. Federal Air Marshals fall under the regulation of the United States Attorney General, and they serve to enforce Federal laws at airports and on board commercial aircraft. As stated earlier, 49 CFR 1544.223 authorizes Federal Air Marshals to carry weapons aboard aircraft.
Federal regulations encourage research and development of new aviation security technologies. Specifically, 49 USC 44912 mandates the existence of a research, development, and implementation program for aviation security technology to be established by the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. The law requires the creation of yearly reports on the program’s progress and periodic reassessments of threats to aviation security. The law allows the Under Secretary to give research grants to institutes of higher learning and to make agreements with other government agencies to achieve the objectives of the program. The law also creates a Scientific Advisory Panel to review the program and to offer recommendations to modify the program if necessary.
Finally, 49 USC 44918 sets forth a requirement for a training program to prepare cabin crewmembers to deal with terrorism. The training program is required to instruct crewmembers on terrorist psychology and how to evaluate and respond to hostile situations.
2.1.5 Summary of Regulations
|Regulation |Name |Purpose |
|14 CFR 121.538 |Aircraft Security |States that security regulations for commercial flight |
| | |operations are contained in 49 CFR Chapter XII |
|49 CFR 1544.201 |Prohibitions on Carrying a Weapon, |Prohibits possession of weapons aboard commercial aircraft |
| |Explosive, or Incendiary | |
|49 CFR 1544.219 |Carriage of Accessible Weapons |Exception to 49 CFR 1544.201 for Federal law enforcement |
| | |officers |
|49 USC 44921 |Federal Flight Deck Officer Program |Allows pilots to be deputized to become Federal law |
| | |enforcement officers |
|28 USC 570 |Federal Air Marshals Program |Sets forth the system of Federal Air Marshals |
|49 USC 44912 |Research and Development |Mandates research and development of new security |
| | |technology for commercial aircraft |
|49 USC 44918 |Crew Training |Mandates threat situation training for all aircraft flight |
| | |crew |
2.2 Problems
Traditional firearms do not provide a sufficient resource of safety and only increase the risk to an aircraft and people aboard it. Occasionally, Federal Air Marshals dressed in civilian clothes protect an aircraft. The government enacts laws to provide safety in all possible situations, but in the instance of traditional guns, it attempts to ensure the security of an aircraft at the potential expense of the safety of the passengers, making it counterproductive. As Dorey mentions, since 1958 all efforts to remove these conventional weapons were dispelled and a movement to protect aircraft began [2]. Each pilot must be deputized as a Federal flight deck officer by the Federal government, a procedure consisting of written and physical tests, before being equipped with a gun. The major motivation for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program is preventing attackers from taking over an aircraft if they attack the aircraft’s flight deck. However, in unpredictable situations, traditional weapons can lose effectiveness, penetrate the cabin and harm passengers, distract pilots, and be removed from a pilot’s possession.
For example, the November 2003 issue of Airways contains an article on a pilot that experienced flight before the 1970’s wave of deregulation [5]. Although the article maintains a favorable view of guns, each point taken by the ex-pilot is arguable. H ‘Dix’ Dixon, the co-pilot, mentions, “Guns in the cockpit. Dangerous? For an intruder, you had better believe it. For the rest of us not at all, if the gun is in the right hands of someone thoroughly trained.” Dixon’s captain was interrupted from flying the aircraft by a young marine with a knife demanding to go to Oakland, CA, on a flight to Hawaii. Considering the aircraft was at a point of no return (not enough fuel to return to Oakland), the pilot grabbed the gun stored in his bag and threatened the hijacker. Dixon’s captain caught the attacker off guard and subdued him. In this situation, it seems that a traditional firearm completely solved the problem, but sixty years later it would not have the same effectiveness. Three clear arguments stem from this experience. First, after catching the man off guard by presenting the gun, the pilot disabled the assailant and disarmed him. In not shooting the weapon, the pilot did not cause any problems to the aircraft because no bullets were discharged. Second, Dixon makes a point that his captain had military experience and was fully prepared for hostile situations. Third, the reason that a worse situation did not transpire is that the hijacker felt threatened after the gun surprised him. Dixon’s captain did not announce that he had a gun in advance. If information was released to the nation previous to the attack that pilots had guns, then the man could have planned his attack accordingly. The intruder did not even know if the gun had bullets.
In the early 1940’s, few knew that pilots could or even did carry weapons. Because of large amounts of controversy over traditional weapons in the cockpit, anyone can simply search the internet and find out what to expect on an airliner. Although there are many benefits to this, a possible hijacker is now aware of what to expect, and this diminishes the element of surprise. Also, not a single form of media relayed the hijacking Dixon experienced, which would not be the case today. The attacker was more startled by the presence of the gun than by its potential threat. Today, the startled reaction is no longer a possibility because of the amount of information available to the public. The traditional firearm has lost effectiveness because terrorists can now expect a pilot to have one.
An issue that needs to be addressed when discussing a conventional weapon aboard an aircraft is the effect of lead-core bullets on the systems and structures. In general, an aircraft must have ways to maintain the pressure at a specific altitude. There are minute holes around the doors and two regulation pressurization valves. Two automatically controlled outflow valves are located at the front of an aircraft and on the aft belly [6]. If a bullet were to perturb the material on the walls, a change in pressure would occur, but it would not be a strong enough force to cause an aircraft to crash. Causing this hole, the bullet would only alter the cabin pressure, which could then be stabilized by the outflow valves [6]. However, with much more to disturb than just the wall, a traditional firearm still places the cabin in great risk. If electrical wires were struck, avionics could be disabled. Also, windows could be broken, which would cause depressurization, and the aircraft would be forced to descend. If a gun is fired aboard an aircraft, all of these instances could occur. The wall, window, and avionics should all be of equal concern. Practically speaking, one bullet hole would probably not cause an airplane to crash. However, a single bullet hitting an aircraft would not likely be the case. As a hijacking occurs, multiple shots would probably be fired in the ensuing struggle.
The main concern of ASA is the safety of people aboard airliners. With possible depressurization from a traditional firearm, a gun might also harm innocent passengers. An argument commonly responding to this line of reasoning is that three thousand people died as a result of the hijacking on September 11. ASA takes a different approach: no lives should be lost from hijacking. The government should assume the responsibility to fix the process as it stands and not place a gun in the cockpit. A weapon such as a traditional gun increases the risk of every single life on an aircraft. America was not prepared for the causalities of September 11, and nothing can be shown as to what would have happened if pilots were armed.
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, a pilot has one primary goal: the safe operation of their aircraft. Pilots must protect passengers by flying aircraft, not defending them. Air Marshals are found on some aircraft, but in other situations the complete responsibility of protecting the passengers from a hijacker currently rests on pilots. Distraction from the duties could cause a worse incident. Pilots should be trained to handle themselves only as a last resort. In the minds of terrorists, they must have the upper hand by taking a hostage or fighting the members of the cockpit for full control. If a pilot has no way to defend an aircraft then there is no hope, but there are much safer alternatives. A traditional firearm might cause terrorists to alter their methods to include more dangerous forms of hijacking, such as liquid explosives [7]. Pushing a terrorist to the limit is undesirable and certainly is not something the United States wants.
Pilots have their entire aircraft’s trust in their hands. They deal with a stressful environment and decisions that can sometimes affect hundreds of lives. The Airline Pilot Security Alliance believes that pilots can handle these situations with ease. In their latest report, they compare the gun in the cockpit to a police officer in a car. “We note, hundreds of thousands of police officers routinely drive on patrol without being “distracted” by carrying a weapon.” [8] Clearly, these are not parallel situations; a police officer does not transport hundreds of people and is usually not targeted by terrorists. Pilots currently have too much responsibility, which is why they have such extreme training procedures and testing. A traditional firearm is another element requiring additional training. If a pilot does have protection, it should not be a gun with traditional bullets because they require too much responsibility. The pressure of the job and the security of the cabin are just too much for someone to handle, even for well-trained commercial pilots.
Traditional firearms are difficult enough to handle on ground, but now guns are being placed in an inescapable environment of an aircraft. A judgment by the national government must be made: risk more lives with guns and all the possibilities of human nature or take the firearms out of the situation and be replaced by something that is less deadly. A potential model for United States airline security is Israel’s El Al Airlines, which is most known for their tight security and once had guns in the cockpit [4]. They have now decided to remove firearms from their aircraft. Beni Tal, who is head of a security consulting firm in Tel Aviv and has worked on government security, makes a clear and succinct statement: "I hear the American pilots want to have arms now, which I think is a bad idea. They could go outside the cockpit and hurt people. You cannot fly a plane and carry arms." [4] The El Al system has not experienced a successful hijacking since 1968 [7]. As mentioned by Tal, traditional weapons are not user specific. Once in the wrong hands, no one can protect the aircraft. Clearly, there are a few hypothetical circumstances that can illustrate the harm of a gun with conventional bullets in the cockpit: a pilot could become a terrorist and would have easy access to a gun; a pilot could have suffered an emotional ordeal, like a divorce, and feel obligated to attend work, where he may be forced to additionally deal with a highly stressful experience involving a hijacker; or a terrorist could take control of an aircraft so swiftly that he would now have possession of a deadly weapon because a pilot is distracted by flying. Each of these situations demonstrates why the airline security department of El Al decided to remove the weapons from the cockpit. Of course, innovative technology replaced the old method for security [4].
Clearly, through the reasons of effectiveness, cabin depressurization and harm to passengers, pilot distraction, and wrongful use, a traditional firearm is not a practical weapon. With knowledge of the gun by the attacker, pilots have lost effectiveness due to a lack of the element of surprise. For most situations, some structure of the cabin could be struck, causing the entire aircraft to crash. In turn, this would cause the worst possible situation by killing everyone onboard. As seen by El Al, the weapon is not user specific, and it can be taken from its intended possessor. All of the above mentioned reasons succinctly make an argument of why traditional firearms should be removed. ASA believes that alternate forms of protection are available.
2.3 Alternatives
Although the conventional firearm is not the preferred defensive measure in the cockpit, pilots should have access to safer alternatives to defend themselves and their passengers while onboard aircraft because pilots are a primary target. After September 11, the number of security products available to the government increased. The increase comes from the public’s need to feel safe while traveling.
When selecting a security system, the effectiveness of the system plays a large role in the decision-making process. While some devices or methods may be completely safe to the traveling public, they fail to provide any substantial increase in the security aboard aircraft. Therefore, when analyzing the alternatives to conventional weapons, discussion centers on products or methods that are at least moderately effective in reducing the terrorist threat.
Although pilots must not utilize the traditional firearm on commercial flights, the technical feasibility of the elimination of firearms in the cockpit in the immediate future is small. A vast majority of security products on the market still depends on guns for success. Various arising technologies allow pilots to safeguard their weapon by using devices such as non-traditional ammunition and locking devices.
Alternative types of ammunition offer most of the debilitating benefits of traditional bullets, while posing less of a threat to an aircraft’s structure. Large numbers of mass protests and rebellions in Northern Ireland and Israel spurred on the development of less-lethal, less-destructive bullet technology [9]. A need existed for bullets that posed less of a threat to life, yet were still capable of incapacitating the attacker. In response to this need, the governments began development of less-lethal bullets with the goal to reduce the impulsive force imparted on the target. The relative success in quelling disturbances in these two unstable regions using this new technology prompted militaries around the world to adopt less-lethal alternative projectiles to help maintain order in riot situations.
One of the types of less-lethal bullets developed is the rubber bullet. The size (caliber) and shape of rubber bullets can vary greatly, as Figure 1 shows; however, their general construction is consistent—a metal core with a thin coating of plastic or rubber surrounding the core. Rubber bullets that are currently on the market aim to incapacitate the deviant through extreme discomfort. Their exterior coating of rubber or plastic increases the impact time with the target, thus reducing the force and energy imparted on the target when compared with traditional bullets.
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Figure 1—Types of Rubber Bullets [10]
The disadvantages of normal rubber bullets are their high energy and inaccuracy. Even though energy transfer is less than that of lead-core bullets, they are still capable of penetrating an aircraft’s fuselage. However, Pine Tree Law Enforcement, in conjunction with The University of Western Ontario, have developed a rubber bullet that has a dynamic structure designed to further reduce the transmitted energy during impact and increase the accuracy of the bullet. The new gun-bullet combination in hand gun form, sold by Pine Tree Law Enforcement as the Defender 1, reduces the amount of energy transferred on impact by ten percent and increases the accuracy of the projectile over twelve times when compared to a nominal rubber bullet. Both of these improvements allow for safer operation onboard aircraft [11].
Pre-fragmented bullets also reduce the risk to the aircraft while still providing the incapacitating and probable lethal effects of traditional bullets. The design of pre-fragmented bullets, also called frangible bullets, is such that, upon impact with a hard body, the bullet disintegrates into many smaller pieces. As Figure 2 shows, a frangible bullet’s exterior looks identical to the exterior of a conventional bullet. The bullet’s exterior commonality proves beneficial because conventional firearms can use the bullets without any modifications. However, numerous metal spheres, instead of a solid core, compose the interiors of frangible bullets, allowing the bullet to disintegrate on impact.
[pic]
Figure 2—Construction of a Frangible Bullet [12]
The Federal Air Marshal Program was among the first to utilize the original frangible bullet to alleviate the risk of damage to the structure and systems of the aircraft [12]. By having a multitude of spheres inside the core, dispersion of the energy of impact occurs. The dispersed energy causes the bullet to remain lodged within the terrorist instead of continuing through and penetrating additional objects. Additionally, when the bullets hit a solid object, a lower amount of pressure exerted than that of conventional bullets is generated because of the dispersed energy. In the case of an aircraft, the reduction in pressure reduces the stress exerted on the skin, windows, or avionics of the aircraft. Reduced stress on the aircraft diminishes the likelihood that the skin will exceed its material stress. Hence, an aircraft’s structure or systems will have a greater chance of remaining intact.
A different way to reduce the threat to passengers and an aircraft’s structure is “smart gun” technology. A smart gun allows only the owner, or a person recognized by the weapon, to fire the gun. There are several ways to make guns “smart.” One of these utilizes biometric technology. Biometrics use a unique biological characteristic of a person, such as eye characteristics, to produce a positive identity. In the case of a smart gun, a person’s fingerprint is the most feasible biometric attribute to use because of the contact between the fingers and the weapon. However, fingerprint biometrics has several challenges inherent to its use, such as how the fingerprint changes over time and the cost. These factors mitigate the advantages of biometric recognition as a security tool for guns [13].
There is a simpler device that can create a smart gun: a magnetic field emanating from a ring worn by a pilot. These devices make the gun a user-proprietary device, and, in order to fire the weapon, the ring must be in contact with the weapon, thus unlocking the firearm. Without the ring worn on the pilot’s hand, even if a terrorist gained access to the weapon, he could not fire it. Thus, the use of the weapon limits itself to pilots, who, by certification as Federal flight deck officers, have training in the proper use of the weapon. An example of this system is Smart Lock Technology Inc.’s MAGLOC [14]. Figure 3 shows a picture of MAGLOC. MAGLOC is easy to install and, at less than $100, is relatively inexpensive. While MAGLOC limits its installation to the 1911 series pistols, similar devices are available to retrofit any firearm.
[pic]
Figure 3—SmartLock Magnetic Firearm Lock [14]
.
Another option for aircraft security, one that completely removes firearms from the cockpit, is the electrical defense provided by stun guns. Stun guns provide a defensive measure for pilots by generating a large electrical potential over two probes, and, in turn, use the body to transmit the generated current. The devices immobilize the assailant by interrupting the nervous system’s communication with the brain [15]. In theory, lethal results from stun guns are possible; however, in practice, stun guns use low amperages of current that do not result in death. Police forces and militaries from around the globe utilize stun guns and their variants as part of their defense arsenal, thus attesting to their effectiveness. Figure 4 shows a schematic of a stun gun.
[pic]
Figure 4—Schematic of a Stun Gun [15]
Tasers are a variation of stun guns in which a compressed gas cartridge inside the device is used to detach the two electrodes from the main device. However, an electrical connection between the hand unit and the electrodes remains. The primary advantage of Tasers is the increase in distance between pilots and their attackers, usually fifteen to twenty feet, over normal stun guns [15]. This distance gives pilots greater time to react if the device fails to render the attacker immobile. Recently, development began on liquid stun guns, which, instead of detaching electrodes from the hand unit, propagates a conductive stream of liquid through the air to the assailant. Liquid stun guns offer several advantages over Tasers, namely the ability to fire multiple times, which allows pilots to fend off multiple aggressors.
All of these electrical defense mechanisms minimize the risk of harm to an aircraft’s systems and passengers. Because the devices are not lethal, passengers in the line of fire face less risk, which is certainly a benefit. Additionally, a high enough voltage can incapacitate the terrorist for a sufficiently long time to implement other, longer-lasting protection systems. Another benefit of the electrical defense mechanism is the benign effect of the mechanism’s electrical current on an aircraft. All of an aircraft’s wiring is insulated. Insulated wire can guard against outside jolts of electricity, and, therefore, a Taser’s current would not affect the aircraft’s systems.
Other, more conventional alternatives that provide adequate protection to aircraft and passengers are on the market. Knives and clubs are two examples of these conventional alternatives. Federal flight deck officers, when properly trained, can effectively transmit a significant blow to an opponent using either one of these devices. Either one of these objects can have lethal effects on the aggressor. Several benefits come from using these devices. First, unless combat using hand weapons takes place near a window, an aircraft’s risk of depressurization is minimal. A person must generate significant amount of force in order to cut through the fuselage of the aircraft, more force than a normal person can produce using either a knife or club. Additionally, these weapons pose a minimal threat to passengers aboard an aircraft because the pilot and the terrorist are in close proximity to one another during combat. Therefore, a minimization of the risk of not hitting the intended target, the terrorist, occurs. However, when a pilot is close to the terrorist, the terrorist’s modus operandi can include more options. This, in turn, places the pilot in a more vulnerable position. However, with proper training that emphasizes how to predict the actions of a terrorist and how to counteract his assaults with effective close-end combat techniques, a significant alleviation of the risk to pilots can happen.
Ideally, it is possible to defend aircraft without adding any weapons. If Federal flight deck officers received training in the ancient practice of martial arts, carrying of weapons aboard aircraft would no longer be necessary. Martial arts have proven effective since their inception and emphasize control in their practice. Utilizing specific techniques from martial arts, such as jiu-jitsu and tae-kwon-do, pilots could place the attacker in a position where he would not pose a further threat to the aircraft. There are however several downsides to utilizing martial arts. Effective training in the martial arts typically requires several years. Thus, a long time lapses before a sufficient number of qualified pilots are available. Additionally, the problem of close combat arises again. Reduction of the problems posed by close-end combat can effectively be handled using training, which would take time. Both of these problems diminish the effectiveness of martial arts as a primary source of defense in the near term. However, as a secondary or tertiary line of defense, martial arts are effective.
The use of any one of these alternatives on its own would not provide a broad enough range of defense to adequately prevent terrorist actions. However, any one or combination of alternatives, coupled with existing measures such as video cameras monitoring the cabin and reinforced cockpit doors, increases the chances of a Federal flight deck officer foiling an assailant’s scheme. For example, if a terrorist on board an aircraft tried to attack the cockpit to gain control, the pilots would first see the assailant on a video monitor, affording them the opportunity to verify the cockpit door is locked. While the assailant attempted to take down the door through brute force or other means, then the pilot could prepare by arming himself with a Taser. Then, if the assailant managed to break into the cockpit, the pilot could fire upon the aggressor, rendering him ineffective. It is important to note that success relies on proper training. This training, already part of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, would need modification to include whatever new defensive measures are incorporated.
In the long run, a possible and very effective alternative is the separation of the cockpit from the rest of the aircraft. Adding an impenetrable bulkhead between the cabin and the cockpit eliminates all risk that a hijacker could enter the cockpit and threaten the primary flight control systems of an aircraft. Several technical challenges prevent this from happening in the immediate future. An aircraft’s structure would have to undergo significant modifications, such as adding access doors and the bulkhead. FAA regulations require that a speedy evacuation must occur in an emergency. The expedience of the evacuation dictates to the aircraft manufacturers how many exits to include on a new aircraft. This mandate prevents the blocking of an exit on current aircraft. Additionally, relocation of the pilot rest facilities and restrooms to in front of the bulkhead would need to happen. On all but a handful of aircraft, this task is difficult. Therefore, in order to permanently separate the cockpit from the rest of the cabin, a new aircraft design would certainly be needed.
3.0 Conclusions
The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act raises many issues regarding arming pilots with traditional firearms as a primary line of defense in the battle to suppress terrorism. The presence of firearms within the confines of an aircraft is itself questionable because conventional bullets pose a risk to the operational hardware of an aircraft. Pilots trained in hand-to-hand combat and the use of blades or non-lethal weapons are fully capable of incapacitating an attacker onboard an aircraft, without posing a substantial risk to passengers. Any of these would mitigate the risk of an attacker gaining control of the firearm and turning it against the pilot, as most individuals are capable of using them. The most fundamental flaw of the Act, however, is the premise that pilots, the individuals responsible for the control and operation of aircraft, should also be charged with the primary task of fighting off a potential attacker while still operating aircraft. Regardless of which alternative form of defense pilots use, these two activities would prove mutually detrimental to each other, to the extent of potentially rendering pilots incapable of one of these responsibilities.
The passage of the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act established a program giving lethal weapons to pilots of commercial airliners. However, with a well-trained cabin crew, the burden of defending the flight deck does not need to rest solely upon flight deck crews, whose primary responsibility is the safe operation of an aircraft. This legislation purports to increase airliner security, but ASA feels that it would not sufficiently increase security. Indeed, it will likely reduce the safety of airline passengers.
4.0 Recommendations
Arming pilots with guns that fire solid, lead-core bullets without additional safety measures on the weapon causes numerous safety problems. Due to these problems, ASA endorses the removal of traditional firearms as soon as it is logistically possible from the flight deck of commercial aircraft in the United States of America. In order to facilitate this notion, Congress needs to pass new legislation that supercedes the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and, in particular, Title XIV of the Act, the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act. The new legislation should prohibit pilots from carrying traditional firearms onboard aircraft through clarification of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. Additionally, the legislation should set forth new standards for research of viable alternatives to improve aircraft security that could eliminate the need for anyone carrying weapons aboard aircraft.
Clearly, pilots should not be put in the forefront of the defense of their aircraft; however, due to their position, they must have some sort of protection to guard against terrorism onboard aircraft. ASA does not advocate guns in the cockpit; nevertheless, ASA recognizes that removing traditional firearms cannot happen immediately while maintaining a reasonable sense of security. With this in mind, implementation of alternatives that adequately secure the cockpit, such as stun guns, should occur as an interim measure. In the future, aircraft designers should completely isolate the flight deck from the cabin of the aircraft, allowing no possible penetration of the cockpit by terrorists.
5.0 References
1. Kauvar G., Rostker B., and Shaver R., “Safer Skies: Baggage Screening and Beyond
with Supporting Analysis,” RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2002.
2. Dorey, F. C., “Aviation Security,” Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1983.
3. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, “Transportation Statistics Annual Report 2001,”
U.S. Department of Transportation, BTS02-07, Washington, DC, 2002.
4. Walt, Vivienne, “Unfriendly Skies are No Match for El Al,” USA Today, 1 Oct. 2001.
(21 Nov. 2003).
5. Dixon, H., "Pistol-Packin' Pilots," Airways, Vol. 10, No. 93, Nov. 2003, pp. 11-12.
6. Ritter, D., “ Real Security, Not Eye-Wash,” Equipped to Survive, 27 Sept. 2001.
(29 Nov. 2003)
7. Black, Jane, “El Al's Security vs. the U.S. Approach,” Business Week Online, 25 Aug.
2003. (21 Nov. 2003).
8. Airline Pilots’ Security Alliance. APSA-Arming Pilots. 15 Nov. 2003.
9. Henley, Jon, “French Police Get Rubber Bullets,” The Guardian, 5 May 2002,
(1
Dec. 2003).
10. Palestine Red Crescent Society. Bullet Types Images. 30 Oct. 2003
11. Ebied, Amer. Development of Less Lethal Ammunition for Peace Keeping. 30 Oct.
2003 < >
12. Glaser Safety. Glaser Safety Home. 29 Oct. 2003
13. Ackerman, Linda. Biometrics and Airport Security. 7 Sep. 2003
14. Smart Lock Technology, Inc. MAGLOC ® Smart Lock Technology, Inc. 7 Sep.
2003 .
15. Harris, Tom. How Stun Guns Work. 7 Sep. 2003
Citations for the Legislation
Code of Federal Regulations Title 14, Pt. 121.538, October 1, 2002
Code of Federal Regulations Title 49, Pt. 1544, October 1, 2002
United States Code Title 49, Chapter 449, January 22, 2002
U.S. House. 2002. Homeland Security Act of 2002. 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. 5005.
U.S. House. 2003. Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act. 108th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 1049
U.S. Senate. 2001. Federal Air Marshals and Safe Sky Act of 2001. 107th Cong., 1st Sess., S
1444.
Appendix A: Relevant Sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
A.1 Code of Federal Regulations
A.1.1 14 CFR 121.538 Aircraft Security
Certificate holders conducting operations under this part must comply with the applicable security requirements in 49 CFR chapter XII[1]
A.1.2 49 CFR 1544.201(d) Acceptance and Screening of Individuals and Accessible Property
(d) Prohibitions on carrying a weapon, explosive, or incendiary.
Except as provided in Secs. 1544.219, 1544.221[2], and 1544.223, no aircraft operator may permit any individual to have a weapon, explosive, or incendiary, on or about the individual's person or accessible property when onboard an aircraft.
A.1.3 49 CFR 1544.219 Carriage of Accessible Weapons
(a) Flights for which screening is conducted. The provisions of
Sec. 1544.201(d), with respect to accessible weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is required if the requirements of this section are met. Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to a Federal Air Marshal on duty status under Sec. 1544.223.
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by TSA, the armed LEO must meet the following requirements:
(i) Be a Federal law enforcement officer or a full-time municipal, county, or state law enforcement officer who is a direct employee of a government agency.
(ii) Be sworn and commissioned to enforce criminal statutes or immigration statutes.
(iii) Be authorized by the employing agency to have the weapon in connection with assigned duties.
(iv) Has completed the training program ``Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed.''
(2) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the armed LEO must have a need to have the weapon accessible from the time he or she would otherwise check the weapon until the time it would be claimed after deplaning. The need to have the weapon accessible must be determined by the employing agency, department, or service and be based on one of the following:
(i) The provision of protective duty, for instance, assigned to a principal or advance team, or on travel required to be prepared to engage in a protective function.
(ii) The conduct of a hazardous surveillance operation.
(iii) On official travel required to report to another location, armed and prepared for duty.
(iv) Employed as a Federal LEO, whether or not on official travel, and armed in accordance with an agency-wide policy governing that type of travel established by the employing agency by directive or policy statement.
(v) Control of a prisoner, in accordance with Sec. 1544.221, or an armed LEO on a round trip ticket returning from escorting, or traveling to pick up, a prisoner.
(vi) TSA Federal Air Marshal on duty status.
(3) The armed LEO must comply with the following notification requirements:
(i) All armed LEOs must notify the aircraft operator of the flight(s) on which he or she needs to have the weapon accessible at least 1 hour, or in an emergency as soon as practicable, before departure.
(ii) Identify himself or herself to the aircraft operator by presenting credentials that include a clear full-face picture, the signature of the armed LEO, and the signature of the authorizing official of the agency, service, or department or the official seal of the agency, service, or department. A badge, shield, or similar device may not be used, or accepted, as the sole means of identification.
(iii) If the armed LEO is a State, county, or municipal law enforcement officer, he or she must present an original letter of authority, signed by an authorizing official from his or her employing agency, service or department, confirming the need to travel armed and detailing the itinerary of the travel while armed.
(iv) If the armed LEO is an escort for a foreign official then this paragraph (a)(3) may be satisfied by a State Department notification.
(4) The aircraft operator must do the following:
(i) Obtain information or documentation required in paragraphs (a)(3)(ii), (iii), and (iv) of this section.
(ii) Advise the armed LEO, before boarding, of the aircraft operator's procedures for carrying out this section.
(iii) Have the LEO confirm he/she has completed the training program ``Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed'' as required by TSA, unless otherwise authorized by TSA.
(iv) Ensure that the identity of the armed LEO is known to the appropriate personnel who are responsible for security during the boarding of the aircraft.
(v) Notify the pilot in command and other appropriate crewmembers, of the location of each armed LEO aboard the aircraft. Notify any other armed LEO of the location of each armed LEO, including FAM's. Under circumstances described in the security program, the aircraft operator must not close the doors until the notification is complete.
(vi) Ensure that the information required in paragraphs (a)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section is furnished to the flight crew of each additional connecting flight by the Ground Security Coordinator or other designated agent at each location.
(b) Flights for which screening is not conducted. The provisions of Sec. 1544.201(d), with respect to accessible weapons, do not apply to a LEO aboard a flight for which screening is not required if the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(1), (3), and (4) of this section are met.
(c) Alcohol.
(1) No aircraft operator may serve any alcoholic
beverage to an armed LEO.
(2) No armed LEO may:
(i) Consume any alcoholic beverage while aboard an aircraft operated by an aircraft operator.
(ii) Board an aircraft armed if they have consumed an alcoholic beverage within the previous 8 hours.
(d) Location of weapon.
(1) Any individual traveling aboard an aircraft while armed must at all times keep their weapon:
(i) Concealed and out of view, either on their person or in immediate reach, if the armed LEO is not in uniform.
(ii) On their person, if the armed LEO is in uniform.
(2) No individual may place a weapon in an overhead storage bin.
A.1.4 49 CFR 1544.223 Transportation of Federal Air Marshals
(a) A Federal Air Marshal on duty status may have a weapon accessible while aboard an aircraft for which screening is required.
(b) Each aircraft operator must carry Federal Air Marshals, in the number and manner specified by TSA, on each scheduled passenger operation, and public charter passenger operation designated by TSA.
(c) Each Federal Air Marshal must be carried on a first priority basis and without charge while on duty, including positioning and repositioning flights. When a Federal Air Marshal is assigned to a scheduled flight that is canceled for any reason, the aircraft operator must carry that Federal Air Marshal without charge on another flight as designated by TSA.
(d) Each aircraft operator must assign the specific seat requested by a Federal Air Marshal who is on duty status. If another LEO is assigned to that seat or requests that seat, the aircraft operator must inform the Federal Air Marshal. The Federal Air Marshal will coordinate seat assignments with the other LEO.
(e) The Federal Air Marshal identifies himself or herself to the aircraft operator by presenting credentials that include a clear, full-face picture, the signature of the Federal Air Marshal, and the signature of the FAA Administrator. A badge, shield, or similar device may not be used or accepted as the sole means of identification.
(f) The requirements of Sec. 1544.219(a) do not apply for a Federal Air Marshal on duty status.
(g) Each aircraft operator must restrict any information concerning the presence, seating, names, and purpose of Federal Air Marshals at any station or on any flight to those persons with an operational need to know.
(h) Law enforcement officers authorized to carry a weapon during a flight will be contacted directly by a Federal Air Marshal who is on that same flight.
A.2 United States Code
A.2.1 49 USC 44912 Research and Development
(a) Program Requirement. –
(1) The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall establish and carry out a program to accelerate and expand the research, development, and implementation of technologies and procedures to counteract terrorist acts against civil aviation. The program shall provide for developing and having in place, not later than November 16, 1993, new equipment and procedures necessary to meet the technological challenges presented by terrorism. The program shall include research on, and development of, technological improvements and ways to enhance human performance.
(2) In designing and carrying out the program established under this subsection, the Under Secretary shall -
(A) consult and coordinate activities with other departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States Government doing similar research;
(B) identify departments, agencies, and instrumentalities that would benefit from that research; and
(C) seek cost-sharing agreements with those departments, agencies, and instrumentalities.
(3) In carrying out the program established under this subsection, the Under Secretary shall review and consider the annual reports the Secretary of Transportation submits to Congress on transportation security and intelligence.
(4)
(A) In carrying out the program established under this subsection, the Administrator shall designate an individual to be responsible for engineering, research, and development with respect to security technology under the program.
(B) The individual designated under subparagraph (A) shall use appropriate systems engineering and risk management models in making decisions regarding the allocation of funds for engineering, research, and development with respect to security technology under the program.
(C) The individual designated under subparagraph (A) shall, on an annual basis, submit to the Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee a report on activities under this paragraph during the preceding year. Each report shall include, for the year covered by such report, information on -
(i) progress made in engineering, research, and development with respect to security technology;
(ii) the allocation of funds for engineering, research, and development with respect to security technology; and
(iii) engineering, research, and development with respect to any technologies drawn from other agencies, including the rationale for engineering, research, and development with respect to such technologies.
(5) The Under Secretary may –
(A) make grants to institutions of higher learning and other appropriate research facilities with demonstrated ability to carry out research described in paragraph (1) of this subsection, and fix the amounts and terms of the grants; and
(B) make cooperative agreements with governmental authorities the Under Secretary decides are appropriate.
(b) Review of Threats. –
(1) The Under Secretary shall periodically review threats to civil aviation, with particular focus on –
(A) a comprehensive systems analysis (employing vulnerability analysis, threat attribute definition, and technology roadmaps) of the civil aviation system, including -
(i) the destruction, commandeering, or diversion of civil aircraft or the use of civil aircraft as a weapon; and
(ii) the disruption of civil aviation service, including by cyber attack;
(B) explosive material that presents the most significant threat to civil aircraft;
(C) the minimum amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material that can cause, or would reasonably be expected to cause, catastrophic damage to aircraft in air transportation;
(D) the amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material that can be detected reliably by existing, or reasonably anticipated, near-term explosive detection technologies;
(E) the potential release of chemical, biological, or similar weapons or devices either within an aircraft or within an airport;
(F) the feasibility of using various ways to minimize damage caused by explosive material that cannot be detected reliably by existing, or reasonably anticipated, near-term explosive detection technologies;
(G) the ability to screen passengers, carry-on baggage, checked baggage, and cargo; and
(H) the technologies that might be used in the future to attempt to destroy or otherwise threaten commercial aircraft and the way in which those technologies can be countered effectively.
(2) The Under Secretary shall use the results of the review under this subsection to develop the focus and priorities of the program established under subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Scientific Advisory Panel. –
(1) The Administrator shall establish a scientific advisory panel, as a subcommittee of the Research, Engineering, and Development Advisory Committee, to review, comment on, advise the progress of, and recommend modifications in, the program established under subsection (a) of this section, including the need for long-range research programs to detect and prevent catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft, commercial aviation facilities, commercial aviation personnel and passengers, and other components of the commercial aviation system by the next generation of terrorist weapons.
(2)
(A) The advisory panel shall consist of individuals who have scientific and technical expertise in –
(i) the development and testing of effective explosive detection systems;
(ii) aircraft structure and experimentation to decide on the type and minimum weights of explosives that an effective explosive detection technology must be capable of detecting;
(iii) technologies involved in minimizing airframe damage to aircraft from explosives; and
(iv) other scientific and technical areas the Administrator considers appropriate.
(B) In appointing individuals to the advisory panel, the Administrator should consider individuals from academia and the national laboratories, as appropriate.
(3) The Administrator shall organize the advisory panel into teams capable of undertaking the review of policies and technologies upon request.
(4) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and every two years thereafter, the Administrator shall review the composition of the advisory panel in order to ensure that the expertise of the individuals on the panel is suited to the current and anticipated duties of the panel.
A.2.2 49 USC 44918 Crew Training
(a) In General. - Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, appropriate law enforcement, security, and terrorism experts, representatives of air carriers and labor organizations representing individuals employed in commercial aviation, shall develop detailed guidance for a scheduled passenger air carrier flight and cabin crew training program to prepare crew members for potential threat conditions.
(b) Program Elements. - The guidance shall require such a program to include, at a minimum, elements that address the following:
(1) Determination of the seriousness of any occurrence.
(2) Crew communication and coordination.
(3) Appropriate responses to defend oneself.
(4) Use of protective devices assigned to crew members (to the extent such devices are required by the Administrator or Under Secretary).
(5) Psychology of terrorists to cope with hijacker behavior and passenger responses.
(6) Live situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions.
(7) Flight deck procedures or aircraft maneuvers to defend the aircraft.
(8) Any other subject matter deemed appropriate by the Administrator.
(c) Air Carrier Programs. - Within 60 days after the Administrator issues the guidance under subsection (a) in final form, each air carrier shall develop a flight and cabin crew training program in accordance with that guidance and submit it to the Administrator for approval. Within 30 days after receiving an air carrier's program under this subsection, the Administrator shall review the program and approve it or require the air carrier to make any revisions deemed necessary by the Administrator for the program to meet the guidance requirements.
(d) Training. - Within 180 days after the Administrator approves the training program developed by an air carrier under this section, the air carrier shall complete the training of all flight and cabin crews in accordance with that program.
(e) Updates. - The Administrator shall update the training guidance issued under subsection (a) from time to time to reflect new or different security threats and require air carriers to revise their programs accordingly and provide additional training to their flight and cabin crews.
A.3 Note on Currency of Regulations
14 CFR 121.538 and all sections of 49 CFR 1544 quoted here are current as of October 1, 2002. All sections of 49 USC 449 quoted here are current as of January 22, 2002.
Appendix B: 107th Congress, House Resolution 5005, Title XIV
H.R. 5005
One Hundred Seventh Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
the twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two
An Act
To establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE XIV--ARMING PILOTS AGAINST TERRORISM
SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the `Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act'.
SEC. 1402. FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER PROGRAM.
(a) IN GENERAL- Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
`Sec. 44921. Federal flight deck officer program
`(a) ESTABLISHMENT- The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
shall establish a program to deputize volunteer pilots of air carriers
providing passenger air transportation or intrastate passenger air
transportation as Federal law enforcement officers to defend the
flight decks of aircraft of such air carriers against acts of criminal
violence or air piracy. Such officers shall be known as `Federal
flight deck officers'.
`(b) PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS-
`(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 3 months after the date of
enactment of this section, the Under Secretary shall establish
procedural requirements to carry out the program under this
section.
`(2) COMMENCEMENT OF PROGRAM- Beginning 3 months after the date
of enactment of this section, the Under Secretary shall begin the
process of training and deputizing pilots who are qualified to be
Federal flight deck officers as Federal flight deck officers
under the program.
`(3) ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED- The procedural requirements
established under paragraph (1) shall address the following
issues:
`(A) The type of firearm to be used by a Federal flight deck
officer.
`(B) The type of ammunition to be used by a Federal flight
deck officer.
`(C) The standards and training needed to qualify and
requalify as a Federal flight deck officer.
`(D) The placement of the firearm of a Federal flight deck
officer on board the aircraft to ensure both its security
and its ease of retrieval in an emergency.
`(E) An analysis of the risk of catastrophic failure of an
aircraft as a result of the discharge (including an
accidental discharge) of a firearm to be used in the program
into the avionics, electrical systems, or other sensitive
areas of the aircraft.
`(F) The division of responsibility between pilots in the
event of an act of criminal violence or air piracy if only 1
pilot is a Federal flight deck officer and if both pilots
are Federal flight deck officers.
`(G) Procedures for ensuring that the firearm of a Federal
flight deck officer does not leave the cockpit if there is a
disturbance in the passenger cabin of the aircraft or if the
pilot leaves the cockpit for personal reasons.
`(H) Interaction between a Federal flight deck officer and a
Federal air marshal on board the aircraft.
`(I) The process for selection of pilots to participate in
the program based on their fitness to participate in the
program, including whether an additional background check
should be required beyond that required by section
44936(a)(1).
`(J) Storage and transportation of firearms between flights,
including international flights, to ensure the security of
the firearms, focusing particularly on whether such security
would be enhanced by requiring storage of the firearm at the
airport when the pilot leaves the airport to remain
overnight away from the pilot's base airport.
`(K) Methods for ensuring that security personnel will be
able to identify whether a pilot is authorized to carry a
firearm under the program.
`(L) Methods for ensuring that pilots (including Federal
flight deck officers) will be able to identify whether a
passenger is a law enforcement officer who is authorized to
carry a firearm aboard the aircraft.
`(M) Any other issues that the Under Secretary considers
necessary.
`(N) The Under Secretary's decisions regarding the methods
for implementing each of the foregoing procedural
requirements shall be subject to review only for abuse of
discretion.
`(4) PREFERENCE- In selecting pilots to participate in the
program, the Under Secretary shall give preference to pilots who
are former military or law enforcement personnel.
`(5) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION- Notwithstanding section 552 of title
5 but subject to section 40119 of this title, information
developed under paragraph (3)(E) shall not be disclosed.
`(6) NOTICE TO CONGRESS- The Under Secretary shall provide notice
to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate after completing the analysis
required by paragraph (3)(E).
`(7) MINIMIZATION OF RISK- If the Under Secretary determines as a
result of the analysis under paragraph (3)(E) that there is a
significant risk of the catastrophic failure of an aircraft as a
result of the discharge of a firearm, the Under Secretary shall
take such actions as may be necessary to minimize that risk.
`(c) TRAINING, SUPERVISION, AND EQUIPMENT-
`(1) IN GENERAL- The Under Secretary shall only be obligated to
provide the training, supervision, and equipment necessary for a
pilot to be a Federal flight deck officer under this section at
no expense to the pilot or the air carrier employing the pilot.
`(2) TRAINING-
`(A) IN GENERAL- The Under Secretary shall base the
requirements for the training of Federal flight deck
officers under subsection (b) on the training standards
applicable to Federal air marshals; except that the Under
Secretary shall take into account the differing roles and
responsibilities of Federal flight deck officers and Federal
air marshals.
`(B) ELEMENTS- The training of a Federal flight deck officer
shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:
`(i) Training to ensure that the officer achieves the
level of proficiency with a firearm required under
subparagraph (C)(i).
`(ii) Training to ensure that the officer maintains
exclusive control over the officer's firearm at all
times, including training in defensive maneuvers.
`(iii) Training to assist the officer in determining
when it is appropriate to use the officer's firearm and
when it is appropriate to use less than lethal force.
`(C) TRAINING IN USE OF FIREARMS-
`(i) STANDARD- In order to be deputized as a Federal
flight deck officer, a pilot must achieve a level of
proficiency with a firearm that is required by the
Under Secretary. Such level shall be comparable to the
level of proficiency required of Federal air marshals.
`(ii) CONDUCT OF TRAINING- The training of a Federal
flight deck officer in the use of a firearm may be
conducted by the Under Secretary or by a firearms
training facility approved by the Under Secretary.
`(iii) REQUALIFICATION- The Under Secretary shall
require a Federal flight deck officer to requalify to
carry a firearm under the program. Such requalification
shall occur at an interval required by the Under
Secretary.
`(d) DEPUTIZATION-
`(1) IN GENERAL- The Under Secretary may deputize, as a Federal
flight deck officer under this section, a pilot who submits to
the Under Secretary a request to be such an officer and whom the
Under Secretary determines is qualified to be such an officer.
`(2) QUALIFICATION- A pilot is qualified to be a Federal flight
deck officer under this section if--
`(A) the pilot is employed by an air carrier;
`(B) the Under Secretary determines (in the Under
Secretary's discretion) that the pilot meets the standards
established by the Under Secretary for being such an
officer; and
`(C) the Under Secretary determines that the pilot has
completed the training required by the Under Secretary.
`(3) DEPUTIZATION BY OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES- The Under Secretary
may request another Federal agency to deputize, as Federal flight
deck officers under this section, those pilots that the Under
Secretary determines are qualified to be such officers.
`(4) REVOCATION- The Under Secretary may, (in the Under
Secretary's discretion) revoke the deputization of a pilot as a
Federal flight deck officer if the Under Secretary finds that the
pilot is no longer qualified to be such an officer.
`(e) COMPENSATION- Pilots participating in the program under this
section shall not be eligible for compensation from the Federal
Government for services provided as a Federal flight deck officer. The
Federal Government and air carriers shall not be obligated to
compensate a pilot for participating in the program or for the pilot's
training or qualification and requalification to carry firearms under
the program.
`(f) AUTHORITY TO CARRY FIREARMS-
`(1) IN GENERAL- The Under Secretary shall authorize a Federal
flight deck officer to carry a firearm while engaged in providing
air transportation or intrastate air transportation.
Notwithstanding subsection (c)(1), the officer may purchase a
firearm and carry that firearm aboard an aircraft of which the
officer is the pilot in accordance with this section if the
firearm is of a type that may be used under the program.
`(2) PREEMPTION- Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal
or State law, a Federal flight deck officer, whenever necessary
to participate in the program, may carry a firearm in any State
and from 1 State to another State.
`(3) CARRYING FIREARMS OUTSIDE UNITED STATES- In consultation
with the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary may take such
action as may be necessary to ensure that a Federal flight deck
officer may carry a firearm in a foreign country whenever
necessary to participate in the program.
`(g) AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE- Notwithstanding section 44903(d), the
Under Secretary shall prescribe the standards and circumstances under
which a Federal flight deck officer may use, while the program under
this section is in effect, force (including lethal force) against an
individual in the defense of the flight deck of an aircraft in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation.
`(h) LIMITATION ON LIABILITY-
`(1) LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS- An air carrier shall not be
liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State
court arising out of a Federal flight deck officer's use of or
failure to use a firearm.
`(2) LIABILITY OF FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICERS- A Federal flight
deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action
brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or
omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an
aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless
the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
`(3) LIABILITY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT- For purposes of an action
against the United States with respect to an act or omission of a
Federal flight deck officer in defending the flight deck of an
aircraft, the officer shall be treated as an employee of the
Federal Government under chapter 171 of title 28, relating to
tort claims procedure.
`(i) PROCEDURES FOLLOWING ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES- If an accidental
discharge of a firearm under the pilot program results in the injury
or death of a passenger or crew member on an aircraft, the Under
Secretary--
`(1) shall revoke the deputization of the Federal flight deck
officer responsible for that firearm if the Under Secretary
determines that the discharge was attributable to the negligence
of the officer; and
`(2) if the Under Secretary determines that a shortcoming in
standards, training, or procedures was responsible for the
accidental discharge, the Under Secretary may temporarily suspend
the program until the shortcoming is corrected.
`(j) LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY OF AIR CARRIERS- No air carrier shall
prohibit or threaten any retaliatory action against a pilot employed
by the air carrier from becoming a Federal flight deck officer under
this section. No air carrier shall--
`(1) prohibit a Federal flight deck officer from piloting an
aircraft operated by the air carrier; or
`(2) terminate the employment of a Federal flight deck officer,
solely on the basis of his or her volunteering for or
participating in the program under this section.
`(k) APPLICABILITY-
`(1) EXEMPTION- This section shall not apply to air carriers
operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, and to pilots employed by such carriers to the
extent that such carriers and pilots are covered by section
135.119 of such title or any successor to such section.
`(2) PILOT DEFINED- The term `pilot' means an individual who has
final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety
of the flight or, if more than 1 pilot is required for the
operation of the aircraft or by the regulations under which the
flight is being conducted, the individual designated as second in
command.'.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS-
(1) CHAPTER ANALYSIS- The analysis for such chapter is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 44920 the following:
`44921. Federal flight deck officer program.'.
(2) FLIGHT DECK SECURITY- Section 128 of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71) is repealed.
(c) FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL PROGRAM-
(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that the
Federal air marshal program is critical to aviation security.
(2) LIMITATION ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- Nothing in this Act,
including any amendment made by this Act, shall be construed as
preventing the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
from implementing and training Federal air marshals.
SEC. 1403. CREW TRAINING.
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 44918(e) of title 49, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking `The Administrator' and inserting the following:
`(1) IN GENERAL- The Under Secretary';
(2) by adding at the end the following:
`(2) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS- In updating the training guidance,
the Under Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator,
shall issue a rule to--
`(A) require both classroom and effective hands-on
situational training in the following elements of self
defense:
`(i) recognizing suspicious activities and determining
the seriousness of an occurrence;
`(ii) deterring a passenger who might present a
problem;
`(iii) crew communication and coordination;
`(iv) the proper commands to give to passengers and
attackers;
`(v) methods to subdue and restrain an attacker;
`(vi) use of available items aboard the aircraft for
self-defense;
`(vii) appropriate and effective responses to defend
oneself, including the use of force against an
attacker;
`(viii) use of protective devices assigned to crew
members (to the extent such devices are approved by the
Administrator or Under Secretary);
`(ix) the psychology of terrorists to cope with their
behavior and passenger responses to that behavior; and
`(x) how to respond to aircraft maneuvers that may be
authorized to defend against an act of criminal
violence or air piracy;
`(B) require training in the proper conduct of a cabin
search, including the duty time required to conduct the
search;
`(C) establish the required number of hours of training and
the qualifications for the training instructors;
`(D) establish the intervals, number of hours, and elements
of recurrent training;
`(E) ensure that air carriers provide the initial training
required by this paragraph within 24 months of the date of
enactment of this subparagraph; and
`(F) ensure that no person is required to participate in any
hands-on training activity that that person believes will
have an adverse impact on his or her health or safety.
`(3) RESPONSIBILITY OF UNDER SECRETARY- (A) CONSULTATION- In
developing the rule under paragraph (2), the Under Secretary
shall consult with law enforcement personnel and security experts
who have expertise in self-defense training, terrorism experts,
and representatives of air carriers, the provider of self-defense
training for Federal air marshals, flight attendants, labor
organizations representing flight attendants, and educational
institutions offering law enforcement training programs.
`(B) DESIGNATION OF OFFICIAL- The Under Secretary shall designate
an official in the Transportation Security Administration to be
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the training
program under this subsection.
`(C) NECESSARY RESOURCES AND KNOWLEDGE- The Under Secretary shall
ensure that employees of the Administration responsible for
monitoring the training program have the necessary resources and
knowledge.'; and
(3) by aligning the remainder of the text of paragraph (1) (as
designated by paragraph (1) of this section) with paragraphs (2)
and (3) (as added by paragraph (2) of this section).
(b) ENHANCE SECURITY MEASURES- Section 109(a) of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 114 note; 115 Stat. 613-614) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
`(9) Require that air carriers provide flight attendants with a
discreet, hands-free, wireless method of communicating with the
pilots.'.
(c) BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PROVIDING FLIGHT ATTENDANTS WITH NONLETHAL
WEAPONS-
(1) STUDY- The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
shall conduct a study to evaluate the benefits and risks of
providing flight attendants with nonlethal weapons to aide in
combating air piracy and criminal violence on commercial
airlines.
(2) REPORT- Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Under Secretary shall transmit to Congress a
report on the results of the study.
SEC. 1404. COMMERCIAL AIRLINE SECURITY STUDY.
(a) STUDY- The Secretary of Transportation shall conduct a study of
the following:
(1) The number of armed Federal law enforcement officers (other
than Federal air marshals), who travel on commercial airliners
annually and the frequency of their travel.
(2) The cost and resources necessary to provide such officers
with supplemental training in aircraft anti-terrorism training
that is comparable to the training that Federal air marshals are
provided.
(3) The cost of establishing a program at a Federal law
enforcement training center for the purpose of providing new
Federal law enforcement recruits with standardized training
comparable to the training that Federal air marshals are
provided.
(4) The feasibility of implementing a certification program
designed for the purpose of ensuring Federal law enforcement
officers have completed the training described in paragraph (2)
and track their travel over a 6-month period.
(5) The feasibility of staggering the flights of such officers to
ensure the maximum amount of flights have a certified trained
Federal officer on board.
(b) REPORT- Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Secretary shall transmit to Congress a report on the
results of the study. The report may be submitted in classified and
redacted form.
SEC. 1405. AUTHORITY TO ARM FLIGHT DECK CREW WITH LESS-THAN-LETHAL WEAPONS.
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 44903(i) of title 49, United States Code (as
redesignated by section 6 of this Act) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
`(3) REQUEST OF AIR CARRIERS TO USE LESS-THAN-LETHAL WEAPONS- If,
after the date of enactment of this paragraph, the Under
Secretary receives a request from an air carrier for
authorization to allow pilots of the air carrier to carry
less-than-lethal weapons, the Under Secretary shall respond to
that request within 90 days.'.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Such section is further amended--
(1) in paragraph (1) by striking `Secretary' the first and third
places it appears and inserting `Under Secretary'; and
(2) in paragraph (2) by striking `Secretary' each place it
appears and inserting `Under Secretary'.
SEC. 1406. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
Section 44903 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (i) (relating to short-term
assessment and deployment of emerging security technologies and
procedures) as subsection (j);
(2) by redesignating the second subsection (h) (relating to
authority to arm flight deck crew with less-than-lethal weapons)
as subsection (i); and
(3) by redesignating the third subsection (h) (relating to
limitation on liability for acts to thwart criminal violence for
aircraft piracy) as subsection (k).
Appendix C: 107th Congress, Senate Bill 1444
107th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1444
To establish a Federal air marshals program under the Attorney General.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 21, 2001
Mr. McConnell introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish a Federal air marshals program under the Attorney General.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Air Marshals and Safe Sky
Act of 2001''.
SEC. 2. PROGRAM ESTABLISHED.
(a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 570. Federal air marshals program
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Aircraft.--The term `aircraft' has the meaning given
that term in section 40102 of title 49.
``(2) Air transportation.--The term `air transportation'
has the meaning given that term in section 40102 of title 49.
``(3) Program.--The term `program' means the program
established under subsection (c).
``(4) Units of local government.--The term `units of local
government' includes an airport authority.
``(b) Responsibility for Airport and Aircraft Safety.--This section
shall govern the security at airports and on board commercial aircraft.
``(c) Federal Air Marshals Program.--
``(1) Goal.--The goal of the program is to provide maximum
security at airports and on board commercial aircraft by having
the Federal Government be responsible for all phases of
security for air passengers.
``(2) Establishment of federal air marshals program.--
``(A) Establishment.--The Attorney General shall
establish a Federal Air Marshals program consisting of
Federal Air Marshals, including the Federal Air
Marshals participating in the Federal Air Marshals
Program being administered by the Federal Aviation
Administration before the effective date of this
section, and Deputy Federal Air Marshals in order to
provide maximum security at airports and on board
commercial aircraft.
``(B) Federal air marshals.--Federal Air Marshals
shall serve for the purpose of enforcing Federal laws
that regulate security at airports and on board
commercial aircraft, including laws relating to acts of
terrorism, hijacking, or aircraft piracy and laws
relating to violent, abusive, or disruptive behavior by
passengers in air transportation.
``(C) Deputy federal air marshals.--
``(i) In general.--The Attorney General
shall deputize individuals described in clause
(ii) as Deputy Federal Air Marshals for the
purpose of augmenting and assisting Federal Air
Marshals.
``(ii) Personnel.--The Attorney General
shall utilize retired military personnel,
retired Federal, State, and local law
enforcement personnel, and active-duty Federal,
State, and local law enforcement personnel from
other government departments and agencies as
Deputy Federal Air Marshals.
``(iii) Compensation.--The Attorney General
may employ personnel described in clause (ii)--
``(I) as volunteers;
``(II) by paying a reasonable per
diem;
``(III) by employing a fee-for-
service or contract arrangement; or
``(IV) using any other method
authorized by law.
``(3) Consultation.--In establishing the program, the
Attorney General shall consult with appropriate officials of--
``(A) the United States Government (including the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration or
his designated representative); and
``(B) State and local governments in any geographic
area in which the program may operate.
``(4) Certification, training and examination of air
marshals; prior approval of employer to serve as deputy air
marshal.--
``(A) In general.--Under the program, the Attorney
General shall provide appropriate training and
supervision of all air marshals, as well as appropriate
background and fitness examination of eligible
candidates as part of their certification.
``(B) Employer approval.--Active Federal, State, or
local law enforcement officers who serve as Deputy
Federal Air Marshals shall receive approval to
participate in the program from their employer.
``(d) Powers and Status of Federal Air Marshals and Deputy Air
Marshals.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), Federal Air
Marshals and Deputy Federal Air Marshals may arrest and
apprehend an individual suspected of violating any Federal law
relating to security at airports or on board aircraft,
including any individual who violates a provision subject to a
civil penalty under section 46301, 46302, 46303, 46314, 46318,
46502, 46504, 46505, or 46507 of title 49, or who commits an
act described in section 46506 of title 49, or who violates a
provision subject to a criminal penalty under sections 32 and
37 of title 18.
``(2) Limitation.--The powers granted to a Deputy Federal
Air Marshal shall be limited to enforcing Federal laws relating
to security at airports or on board aircraft.
``(e) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section may be
construed to--
``(1) grant any Federal Air Marshal or Deputy Federal Air
Marshal the power to enforce any Federal law that is not
described in subsection (d); or
``(2) limit the authority that a Federal, State, or local
law enforcement officer may otherwise exercise in the officer's
capacity under any other applicable law.
``(f) Regulations.--The Attorney General shall promulgate such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
``(g) Cost Sharing.--The costs of the program shall be paid by--
``(1) the airlines in an amount not less than the amount
(as adjusted for inflation after the effective date of this
section) the airlines were paying for airport security on the
date before the effective date of this section;
``(2) State and units of local government in an amount not
less than the amount (as adjusted for inflation after the
effective date of this section) the States and units of local
government were paying for airport security on the date before
the effective date of this section; and
``(3) the Federal Government.
``(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), there are
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section such
sums as may be necessary.
``(2) Limitation.--The Federal share of carrying out this
section shall be limited to the cost of the program after
payments by airlines and States and units of local government
pursuant to subsection (g).''.
SEC. 3. REPEAL.
Section 44903 of title 49, United States Code, is repealed.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect 90
days after the date of enactment of this Act.
-----------------------
[1]49 CFR Chapter XII deals with the Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Transportation. The sections from 49 CFR 1544 appearing in this appendix are included within Chapter XII.
[2]49 CFR 1544.221 deals with the carriage of prisoners under the control of armed law enforcement officers. This subject is beyond the scope of this report; therefore, the text of 49 CFR 1544.221 has been omitted from this appendix.
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