The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: An ...



The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: An Investigative Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Nuclear Issues on the Korean Peninsula

by

Neil Davis

Justin Romaniuk

Robert Smitson

Ethics of a Developing Global Environment

Professor Bruce Lusignan

12th March, 2003

Part I: History of North Korea and Nuclear Weapons

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North Korean Missile Sites

It is thought that North Korea began its research in nuclear technology before North Korea even existed as its own state. Supposedly, Japan wanted make nuclear weapons in an area that they thought would eventually become part of the Soviet Union. Why? North Korea’s land had the resources to do so. For example, North Korea has over twenty-six million tons of uranium, which can be made into an explosive weapon of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union and the United States split Korea into two along the thirty eighth parallel. This eventually led to the separation of the Korea into the two states that exist today. When this move was made, because of the resources that North Korea had, it began to export uranium to the Soviet Union. Almost ten thousand tons were exported to the Soviets between the time period of 1947 to 1950.

In 1950, the North Korean military started attacking the south, eventually leading to a three year war. During this time, the U.S. strongly considered attacking North Korea with an atomic bomb. North Korea’s government also started developing atomic energy under Kim II Sung’s government.

When the war ended, the development of nuclear arms in North Korea persisted. They sent scientists to the Soviet Union where they studied in an international nuclear research lab for communist states. By 1962, North Korea had its own research center in Yongbyon and a plutonium reactor was on its way to being built within a year. However, it would be until the year 1986 before a reactor would actually be finished. The reactor is a five electrical megawatt reactor. A fifty megawatt reactor was also begun, but to this day is still incomplete. The smaller reactor supposedly could produce enough plutonium to make one nuclear weapon per year, the larger if completed could produce up to thirty. “This larger plant is based on the declassified blueprints of the Calder Hall power reactors used to produce plutonium for the UK nuclear weapons program” (Wikipedia). Yongbyon also contains a large building for plutonium processing and supposedly contains the machinery needed to take uranium rods and make “weapons-grade” plutonium.

North Korea claims that the site’s sole purpose is to generate electricity. However, whether fairly or unfairly, the United States has suspected differently this is not the case. For example, it has been reported that satellite photographs show no attached power lines to the reactors, which would obviously be needed for electrical purposes.3

More political controversy was started when the North Korean government shut down the reactors in Yongbyon. According to intelligence agencies in South Korea, Russia and America, North Koreans removed plutonium from the core of the reactor during this time: enough to make a couple atomic bombs. The KGB reported in 1990 that the first nuclear device had been completed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Yongbyon, but would not test the device.

This disturbed the United States and the George Bush Sr. administration. North Korea was bending the articles of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty that was made in 1970, and that North Korea agreed to under the leadership of Kim II Sung in 1985. In attempt to stop North Korea from making nuclear weapons the Bush Administration removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea. “In late 1991 North and South Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (Nuclear Weapons Program). The agreements states that North and South Korea "shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and that they "shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities" (Nuclear Weapons Program).

North Korea also agreed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), forcing DPRK to report all nuclear programs to the agency and allow inspections of its facilities. When the inspections started, of officials of the IAEA found that the nuclear waste had not been fully accounted for. The UN hoped to have “special inspections” of the two unreported facilities with the nuclear wastes. North Korea ignored the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization and didn’t allow them to inspect, making North Korea further suspect to the rest of the world for holding nuclear arms. On March 12, 1993, North Korea removed itself from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This lack of progress angered the U.S. and the Clinton Administration. Recently, President Clinton even admitted that there was consideration of bombing the Yongbyon. However, negotiations continued without war.

North Korea suspended its withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty due to the negotiations. However, thanks to a visit by Jimmy Carter to North Korea, the North and South talks began again. However, the death of then DPRK leader Kim II Sung heightened the tension between the North and the South, thus halting the negotiations. On October 21, 1994, the “Agreed Framework” deal took place. The framework had four major points. First, “Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor

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Figure 1The Development of a LWR

(LWR) powerplants” (Agreed Framework).

The United States agreed that it would supply North Korea with two light water reactors (making it much more difficult to make weapons grade plutonium as described later in the paper) to generate electricity. One must be completed by the year 2003 and supply 2,000 MW of electricity. The U.S. also agreed to supply North Korea with cheap oil while the light water reactors are being built, due to the freeze of the graphite-moderated reactors. This would include 500,000 tons annually to the nation. The freeze of all graphite-moderated reactors must be implemented within one month.

The second major point of the Agreed Framework was that “The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations” (Agreed Framework). This includes a reductions in investment and trade barriers, which include telecommunication services. Also, this meant that each country had to open a liaison office in the other country.

The third major point of the Agreed Framework was to “work together for peace and security on a nuclear free Korean peninsula” (Agreed Framework). This was said to be done by the U.S. assuring North Korea that there is no threat of attack. The DPRK must work on implementing the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK must also engage in dialogue with South Korea.

Last, “both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.” (Agreed Framework). This means that the DPRK must remain a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Also, the DPRK must allow the IAEA to inspect its facilities that are not a part of the freeze.

The oil deliveries began in 1995, but there was concern involving the development of the light water reactors. The U.S., South Korea, Japan and several other countries came together to form the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to build the reactors. KEDO soon pushed back the deadline for completing the reactors from 2003 to 2007. North countered with a demand that the U.S. cover the costs associated with the delayed reactors, which the U.S. has refused to do.

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Figure 2 Light Water Reactor

The United States lack of commitment to the Agreed Framework obviously infuriated North Korea. Reportedly, North Korea had started an uranium enrichment program (the Agreed Framework only such programs involving plutonium) with the help of Pakistan.

In 1998, the Clinton Administration discovered a report that involved a “secret” uranium facility in Mount Chonma, near the China border. However, it was later confirmed by congress that "North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium" (Banville).

 

North Korea and LWRs

On December 15, 1995, KEDO and the DPRK signed the Light Water Reactor Supply Agreement. Some highlight of the agreement include “KEDO shall provide the LWR project, consisting of two pressurized light-water reactor (LWR) units with two coolant loops and a generating capacity of approximately 1,000 MW(e) each, to the DPRK on a turnkey basis. The reactor model, selected by KEDO, will be the advanced version of U.S.-origin design and technology currently under production” (LWR Supply Agreement) in article I, and the scope of supply, training, terms of repayment (where the DPRK would pay KEDO interest free), delivery schedule and warranties of the devices (LWR Supply Agreement). It also reads that KEDO is responsible for making the LWRs in compliance with safety codes. Also under the agreement, KEDO, is in charge of supplying DPRK with alternate sources of energy, including heavy oil and light water reactors. Under the current supply contract, if KEDO were to request the removal of spent fuel from the LWRs, DPRK must relinquish ownership and transfer it out.

 The reason for the LWRs and the graphite nuclear freeze is that the light water reactors that are being built do not pose a significant nuclear threat, as long as inspections take place. Plutonium can be reprocessed from spent fuel, but it is of less than ideal quality (though still could be used in bombs) and is extremely difficult to reprocess. It is so hard because the plutonium is mixed with highly radioactive materials. Britain and France, even with years of reprocessing experience with gas-graphite reactors (like those N.K. currently has), had a great deal of difficulty reprocessing plutonium from LWRs (Martin).

It would take a large facility, or extensive modifications to current facility, to reprocess LWR spent fuel. With intrusive inspections, this would be easy to detect (through inspections of plants and the bookkeeping on the amount of spent fuel produced to keep it from being siphoned off to clandestine facilities).

North Korea and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty- pre 2000

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was put into action in March of 1970. The purpose of this treaty was to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. The one hundred and eighty eight nations involved in the treaty were split into two groups: those that could possess nuclear weapons and those that could not. The Nuclear-Weapons States consisted of the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom. The rest, including North Korea, fall under the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. In the treaty, under articles one and two, it discusses the rules that each nation must abide by. Nuclear Weapons States are free to help Non Nuclear Weapons States develop nuclear weapons. Obviously, they are also not able to help the Non Nuclear Weapons States in obtaining these weapons. The Non Nuclear Weapons States must promise not to pursue any such weapons under these articles.

Article three holds the Non Nuclear Weapons States to be held accountable by allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect these states periodically. Article three also disallows the transfer of materials that could possibly be made into nuclear weapons between Nuclear Weapons States and Non Nuclear Weapons States.

Article four, however, allows Non Nuclear Weapons States to research nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes.

Article five states that Nuclear Weapons States "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."(NPT)

Article ten establishes the terms by which a state may withdraw from the treaty, requiring three month's advance notice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supreme national interests. (NPT)

In 1993, North Korea shocked the world by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The U.S. then began negotiations with North Korea in order to suspend this withdraw. However, talks eventually stalled. This led to North Korea’s leader, Pyongyang to remove fuel from a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, fuel that they could possibly use as a weapon.

 

North Korea’s Missile Program

  The ballistic missile program of the DPRK remains a concern for many nations. In fact, some believe that North Korea possesses an antiballistic missile that is capable of reaching Alaska or Hawaii. There are also reports from non-governmental sources that they have another missile capable or reaching the continental United States.3 However, [pic]many of these concerns are unfounded. In 1998, North Korea test launched a missile that flew over Japan, while flying a total of 1,320 km. The United States tracked the missile

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Figure 3 DPRK Missile

and saw it as a threat. However, the missile might need to travel just a bit further than 1,320 km to reach the U.S.

Even though initial reports in the U.S. described the launch as a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile, it was later clarified that the launch was for a satellite. The United States confirmed this, saying that it was a failed attempt. However, it went to show that the U.S. overreacted in the first place, believing that the launch was a missile.

However, the fear is that this rocket shows that technological breakthroughs that could allow the DPRK to develop ballistic missiles with much longer range that could travel continents. In 1998, the DPRK admitted to developing ballistic missile technology, so it needed to sell this technology in a faltering economy. North Korea offered to halt its ballistic program if the U.S. compensated them five hundred million dollars a year and lifted the economic embargo. Many believe this was the reason that North Korea made the launch in the first place, so that it could scare the U.S. into giving the country needed economic aid.

The launch came a few weeks after it was reported that the DPRK was making an underground cavern just north of the frozen nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. This led the belief that North Korea may have been launching the rocket was to bring international attention to the 1994 Agreed Framework that was under fire (Kampani).

Doug Bandow of Cato echoes these opinions. He believes that the North Koreans are struggling to survive and that the weapons research is just to keep up with the South and not to wage war. He quotes, “North Korea has suffered famine, near economic collapse and, if reports are accurate, political infighting. The only card Pyongyang has had to play to gain international attention and assistance is the threat to misbehave” (Bandow).

 

North-South Joint Declaration

In the efforts the were agreed upon in the “Agreed Framework,” the DPRK has taken steps in the North-South Joint Declaration. A historic meeting happened on June 13 through the 15 of 2000. Leaders Kim Jong-il of the DPRK and Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea met in Pyongyang for these talks. This was the first meeting of its kind since the breakup of nations (BBC News). In the talks, the North and South agreed on five major points.

The first point was that the reunification would be solved “independently” by the Korea nation. The second point was that the two sides have elements in common and will work toward this goal. Third, the two sides would exchange groups of separated families and long-term prisoners. Fourth, they agreed to “to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchanges in all fields” (BBC News). Fifth, the two sides agreed to hold dialogues in the future, and President Kim Dae-jung invited Kim Jong-il to South Korea for a visit.

 

Stephen Bosworth Options

Former U.S. Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth (1997-2000) has little optimism in the situation involving relations with North Korea. He gives three solutions to the problem, but refutes each of these. First he says that we should just leave North Korea alone until they collapse, and that this has been what many in the Clinton and Bush Administrations would prefer to do. However, they still have not collapsed. He says, “They are still poor, still repressive and still a threat” (Bosworth). He also says that South Korea does not want to handle the economic burden of North Korea collapsing anyway, and since the South Korean’s are U.S. allies, this solution does not make sense. He goes on to say that South Koreans view North Korea as “less a threat than an object of charity” (Bosworth).

If the U.S. leaves North Korea alone, we might as well assume it as nuclear weapon state (assuming other countries don’t intervene without the United States). This doesn’t they have them now, but that they definitely have the capability and possibly could have a couple nuclear weapons based on their rate of plutonium production. Bosworth says if something doesn’t happen that they could end up selling the “fissile material.” (Bosworth)

The second option he says is the military option. However, Bosworth wonders why this is even a consideration. While he admits that’s it’s a “last resort,” he still believes this idea is ludicrous. Bosworth statements make logical sense, because North Korea would obviously not take an attack in stride. This could, according to Bosworth, lead to “full-fledged actions along the de-militarization zone.” This attack, he said, would probably include a first round of chemical attacks.

Bosworth’s third option is something that the Bush Administration won’t consider. And that is “talk.” He says if we do this, we can figure out whether the DPRK actually wants to be a nuclear state, or whether they are using the weapons as a bargaining point 8. This won’t be easy for the U.S. to handle. However, it could be the only way that the U.S. can solve the crisis (this doesn’t mean that other countries can’t solve the crisis without the United States).

Part II. The Present- Recent DPRK Policy

The problems and progress of the past are now behind us and one must focus his attention more clearly on the current situation with North Korea. The previous administration, headed by President Clinton, made some large strides in moving North Korea away from the brink of nuclear war, and back toward the negotiating table. The regime of Kim Jung-Il seemed to respond well to the Clinton Administration’s efforts. With the help of then-Secretary of Defense William Perry, currently on the Stanford faculty, the Agreed Framework was negotiated. However, after the progress of the 1990s, the turn of the century would find America and North Korea once again butting heads over the nuclear issue. One of the most obvious reasons for the current problems with North Korea is the simple fact America held elections in 2000.

President Bush and his administration have sought to demonize Kim Jung-Il as a deluded man who would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons. Early in his presidency, Condoleezza Rice, his National Security Advisor, declared that discussions with North Korea were over. President Bush was quick to place the DPRK in the Axis of Evil, with Iran and Iraq. Bush first coined the term “Axis of Evil” during his State of the Union address in January 2002. Coming only a few months after the 9/11 attacks, he likely felt the need to threaten any country he thought may harm the United States. The problem is that while all three nations may or may not have sought nuclear weapons, the three are not the same, and should not be lumped together for means of propaganda. Former Secretary of State (under Clinton) Madeline Albright called the move “a big mistake,” continuing that “they’re all very different” (“Bush’s”). The statements set the United States down a slippery slope, as quickly allies and the “axis” countries alike expressed harsh criticisms. While Russia expressed concern over use of the term, and of grouping the three together, the North Korean foreign ministry called the President’s address, “a little short of declaration of war” (“Bush’s”). Rice, stated, much like a school-yard bully, that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea had been “put on notice” (“Bush’s”).

If it is true that Kim Jung-Il is dangerous, and a threat to the United States, why would the administration want to provoke him? Some deeper thought must be given to the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. The United States cannot simply hope to bully North Korea to give-in to its demands. The current American leadership may fear that it will lose its place as a dominant power in the world, especially after 9/11, if they do not go after “evil-doers” everywhere. However, the United States will likely not remain a world hegemon for ever, so it would be best if they followed the lead of those currently making steps toward a peaceful Korean Peninsula.

One nation looking to find peaceful solutions to the situation with North Korea is South Korea, a close ally of the United States. In addition, other nations including China, Russia, and Japan have also joined the talks. The talks between North and South have given birth to the possibility of reuniting the two Koreas to form a strong, singular Korea. The rationale for reunification is supported by many, for both political and economic reasons. Symbolically the two have already joined hands, as they have come together at sporting events including the Olympic Games. While the two may be able to put away their differences in sports, the Korean Peninsula is currently occupied by two very different nations and the road to reunification may be a long one, filled with roadblocks, such as the United States’ foreign policy and fears of nuclear proliferation.

When looking at the possibility or reunification it is important for one to consider why the two nations would want to become one again. One possible reason may be that they still feel united as one people, living with two separate governments. This may be especially true for the South Koreans who seem eager to work out differences with the North. Obviously, they would want to avoid a nuclear war with their neighbors, but they could work toward diffusing the threat, even aiding DPRK, without seeking reunification. Perhaps, the two countries seek unification because it would increase each nation’s power both economically and politically on a world stage (Kim). This view was recently espoused by Lawrence R. Klein, a Nobel Prize Laureate. A former professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Klein feels that a united Korea would help Asia become a very powerful place in international relations (Kim). Already, China and India hold powerful positions within the world community. A united Korea would be beneficial to the region, because it would bring peace and stability if the nuclear problem was solved, and the two were able to find enough common ground to do away with the current divide (Kim). Surely, the communist North and pro-Western South have governments that are quite different, but leaders, such as former ROK President Kim Dae-jung, have made huge strides in breaking through the divide.

The South Korea Administration, led by Kim Dae-jung, developed a policy in which to “peacefully manage the Korean divide through engagement (“Sunshine Policy”). The policy is known as the “Sunshine Policy.” The ROK feels that by aiding the North, with economic assistance and diplomatic favors, they will be able to ease the tensions between the two nations (“Sunshine Policy”). The policy has three main guidelines to it, namely, to reject any armed provocation of the North, that the South is not aiming to absorb the North, and that ROK will actively seek reconciliation and cooperation from the DPRK. Furthermore, the Sunshine Policy states that economic ties between the North and Japan and the United States should be normalized (“Sunshine Policy”).

Each of the main guidelines has enormous potential. The ROK obviously feels that military action is not the right answer, and this should hopefully deter its allies, like the United States, from attacking the North and leading to a second Korean War. The last Korean War set-up a strong divide within a nation, and has caused international relations problems for the past half-century. Secondly, many North Koreans, or at least their officials, probably fear that South Korea is simply looking to takeover or colonize their nation and due away with its sovereignty. This fear may not be entirely unfounded, as it would likely be very difficult for the two to work as one, with the differing governmental structures they currently have in place. However, it is an important step to inform the DPRK that they will not simply be overrun. Furthermore, stating that the two neighboring countries should work together to reconcile differences and cooperate is a crucial reminder to officials in both Seoul and Pyongyang that it is time to put aside differences.

The most intriguing aspect of the Sunshine Policy is the part which says trade between DPRK, Japan, and the United States should be normalized. This facet of the policy could by itself ease many tensions. If North Korea was able to jumpstart its economy, and was able to provide enough food to feed its people, instead of relying on food aid, it likely would not be as set on developing nuclear weapons and threatening to use them. The Americans and the Japanese alike should not harm the Korean people because their country is led by a man some say is mad. Kim Jung-Il and his father, Kim Il-Sung have been in power through good times and bad for the past 50 years. Economic sanctions only hurt the common people, not the regime leaders.

Despite the effect outside nations may have on the North and South, actions which will take place intra-peninsula are essential. The Sunshine Policy directs that inter-Korean dialogue should take place through the use of high-level envoys. The South will pay $3.2 Billion dollars, or 75% of the total cost, of building two light-water reactors in the North (“Sunshine Policy”). Also, the policy aims to separate politics from business, and work to remove restrictions on South Korean companies operating within the DPRK. South Korea will also send food aid to the North to help it pass through food crises. The most powerful element may be one that seems outwardly simple. This is the encouragement of family reunions. Many Koreans have family members who live on the opposite side of the DMZ, and many have not seen each other since the time of the Korean War.

President Kim Dae-jung and his administration were internationally commended for the Sunshine Policy. In fact, Kim won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. The guidelines it promotes and the simple steps it encourages could go a long way in reuniting the Koreas. It is also important that on a world stage, ROK has shown that it is capable of dealing with the North on its own accord. Stressing that they will not tolerate any armed provocation of the North seems like a direct shot at the United States, and possibly to Russia and even China. Clearly, leaders in Seoul still feel that this situation can be handled without a (nuclear) war. If anyone is going to be able to talk Kim Jung-Il out of any thoughts he has about furthering a nuclear program, one must believe that it would be his neighbors, many of whom have familial ties with the North. So, while the nations may seem so very different, they may in fact be quite similar. This fact has been witnessed by efforts to work together as one in sporting events, such as the Olympics.

Despite the fact the current Bush Administration is seemingly seeking to vilify North Korea to the rest of the world, the DPRK and the ROK have illustrated their interest in reuniting the Korean Peninsula. This fact has been witnessed on numerous occasions, mostly through sports, where the two nations marched and/or competed as one. The most prominent display of their efforts at reunification came at the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney. During the opening ceremonies, the two nations marched together, with equal numbers of marchers, 90 on each side, behind a unified flag, carried by one member from each nation (Wilson). The flag, which displays the Korean Peninsula in blue on a white background, has been used on other occasions as well. It was used at the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships, and has been used at youth soccer events as well (Wilson). At the 2000 Olympics, though both nations marched together, they did remain separate entities during the competition. They wore their own colors and used their respective anthems during the games (Wilson).

It will be interesting to note just how much of an effect sport can have on the world’s perception of a united Korea. The idea of reunification is again in the forefront in 2004, an Olympic year. The two teams will likely march together as one, but compete separately as they did in 2000 (“One”). Officials had pushed toward fielding a wholly united team for the Athens games, but were not able to see their plan come to fruition. The setback may partially be accounted for by the fact that each nation would have to receive approval from the international governing bodies of all of the sports being contested (“One”). However, both sides have resolved to set the 2008 Beijing games as the event where Korea will truly have one team (“One”). The ability of a united Korean Olympic team to make a strong political statement may even be heightened while the games are in Beijing, due to the fact China is a neighboring nation, and a frequent participant in multi-nation talks aimed at how far advanced or not of North Korea’s nuclear program is.

The question of whether North Korea really had the ability to produce nuclear warheads arose in the fall of 2002. In October of 2002 US officials reported that DPRK had reportedly admitted to a covert program in which to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons (Weisman). While the North Koreans deny trying to develop uranium, they do, however, admit to developing plutonium-based programs (“US Seeks”). This public admission included information that they had reprocessed spent fuel from all 8000 fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor (“Divided Attention”). Officials estimated that the DPRK plutonium-based program would be able to yield as many as six nuclear warheads. American officials state that the North Koreans deny the uranium program because it can be hidden, unlike the reactor-based plutonium program (“US Seeks”). However, whether the North Koreans actually said they were developing uranium or nuclear weapons in the first place is up for debate. Many state that the North Koreans were actually misinterpreted, saying that they had the right to develop nuclear weapons if they so chose, but not that they already had programs underway. Another quote about unity of the Korean people was misinterpreted as the development of superbombs. The International Atomic Energy Agency, who had been monitoring activities at the Yongbyon reactor, was pushed out of the country in December 2002 after the allegations of a uranium program had arisen. At that time, aid, specifically in the form of fuel oil exports, to the nation was halted. The DPRK had been receiving around 500,000 tons of oil per year (Weisman).

The DPRK again raised fears by announcing in January 2003 that it would be backing out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In April of the same year, Kim Jung-Il made good on his word and backed out of the NPT (“Divided Attention”). This move made DPRK the first country to back of out the NPT. However, they are not the only ones who feel that they should be able to, justifiably so, to build nuclear weapons if they feel the need to. Other nations of the world, such as India and Pakistan, never signed the NPT because they felt it was of their nations’ utmost concern to reserve the right to build nuclear weapons, without fears of retaliation while backing out of a treaty. In May of 2003, leaders in the DPRK repudiated the 1991 join-declaration that they had signed with South Korea stating that they would keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear free (Carpenter). Obviously, Kim Jung-Il is a man who knows just how persuasive nuclear weapons can be. However, bullying an authoritarian dictator into giving up something he feels is important may be a lot easier said than done. Also, negotiations are very difficult when there are mistranslations and misunderstandings between two countries that culturally differ greatly from each other. It is also important that one grasp how far advanced the DPRK nuclear program is.

The Stanford community has close ties to the current situation in North Korea involving their nuclear program. John Lewis has been actively involved and recently visited the DPRK in January. His experience led to some surprising discoveries. The discoveries were both that North Korea did indeed have weapons-grade plutonium, but also that what he was shown was little more than a small metallic cone, about 1.5 inches tall (Schoenberger). Lewis’ trip, his 17th in the last 10 years, was an unofficial delegation that he put together. Other members of the delegation included the former director of the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory, Siegfried Hecker.

Part of the problem with dealing with North Korea, may be that Americans simply have the wrong view of the DPRK. Lewis for one is tired of this view Americans hold of the DPRK. Many Americans, it would seem, feel that North Korea is a desolate place, depraved of the luxuries of the Western world, including the ability to provide enough electricity to the nation. In an interview with the San Jose Mercury News, Lewis said, “There’s this famous satellite picture showing what North Korea’s all about,” referring to an image showing a pitch-black North Korea, compared to a glowing South Korea. “It isn’t all dark. But at night, if the satellite goes over after midnight, yeah, they shut off the lights” (Schoenberger).

Turning off the lights after midnight may be an effective way for a struggling country, cutoff from the world, to help keep its energy reserves practically high enough. The country has proven to be rather resilient while under sanctions. Lewis tells of the fact that government reforms in North Korea have seen their economy begin to turn back around, and says the markets in Pyongyang are bustling once again. Even if the countryside is yet to witness revitalization, it’s still a start. Another important point, Lewis states, is that during his last trip he saw young children and babies all over (Schoenberger). He contends that this is a sign that times are getting better, as from 1994 to 1997 times were tough and “no one wanted [children]” (Schoenberger).

Lewis said that he now believes that Kim Jung-Il is ready to comply with international requests, specifically from the United States, that he disband his nuclear program. However, this would have to be in exchange for economic and security guarantees for the DPRK. Getting both sides to agree on the issue will obviously be easier said than done. The Six-Nation talks which have been held grant some hope that a resolution may one day come about.

The United States and North Korea, along with Russia, Japan, China and South Korea have met for multilateral talks to discuss the nuclear issue. The talks were held for the first time in August 2003, and again most recently in February. The talks found the United States and DPRK to continue to have sharply different positions in the talks. The United States is calling for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program (Kahn). The United States is quick to pressure other nations into dismantling their nuclear weapons, even while the United States maintains the importance that the arms have its arsenal. This is almost certainly because the United States has a lot of pride in how strong its military is, and that it gives the United States clout on the world stage. More practically, the United States must be able to have some way to back up its threats, especially now with a president who seems to feel that unilateral, pre-emptive attacks are a good idea. The United States may feel that at least by holding on to nuclear weapons less powerful nations can be deterred from fighting its will.

For many reasons, Pyongyang is likely wary of how credible the United States’ claims of security assurances are. After all, the Bush administration was quick to label the DPRK as a member of the Axis of Evil. Iraq, which was also part of the Axis of Evil, was invaded due to promoted fears of the possibility that Saddam Hussein had WMD. These threats have since proved to be rather credit-less, as still no weapons of mass destruction have surfaced within Iraq. However, the Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, stated once again during the talks that “the United States has no intention to invade or attack the DPRK” (“US Seeks”). Even a non-aggression pact may be suspect to leaders in Pyongyang, as the United States has broken peace agreements in the past, and may likely do so in the future.

Some have stated that the Bush Administration in fact wanted the talks in Beijing to fail. Those who oppose the Bush Administration state that their theory is backed by the fact that officials have refused to draw up a detailed negotiating plan (Khan). This poses a dangerous possibility if the United States believes isolating North Korea and Kim Jung-Il will force him to give up his nuclear program. Likely, this action will lead to war and not peace. It may set a very dangerous precedent to start sending aid to DPRK because they threaten to build nuclear weapons. However, something likely should have been done much earlier to help the ailing nation before it reached a point of famine and desperation that led it to develop nuclear programs.

Providing aid to North Korea is another topic which is currently debated by nations participating in the talks. Some nations, like South Korea and China believe that coaxing their neighbor along and not forcing it to completely acknowledge all of its nuclear activity is the best way to proceed (Weisman). This system gives the DPRK a “get out of jail free card” in some ways. It allows other nations to say, “We know you may have weapons, but that’s not the point. Let’s get the ball rolling and deal with details later on.” In contrast, Secretary of State Colin Powell has made it clear that the United States would offer no economic aid to the country until it was sure of a complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantling of all weapons (Weisman). However, South Korea will probably take the lead and begin to send some fuel aid to its northern counterpart for the first time in two years.

In whatever direction the parties involved with the talks decide to continue in, one can question whether this most recent set of talks was actually successful. After all, the six sides left their hexagonal table agreeing simply to more talks. There are many different roads which can be taken in the future, and hopefully, the right one will be chosen.

 

Part III. What Happens Next? The Continuing Saga in the North Korea Nuclear Dilemma

I. A fundamental difference in attitudes

In the proceeding pages, the background of the nuclear dilemma has been established. Thus, with the background information already in place, and current events explored in the preceding section, the future of the North Korea nuclear will be explored. This section of the paper will offer four remedies to the dilemma, will discuss future US and DPRK policy options, and will finally conclude with what this offer believes might happen next.

Most recently, 6-way talks involving Russia, Japan, the United States (USA), China, North Korea (DPRK), and South Korea (ROK) ended in yet another stalemate. Emerging from the conference, two groups of nations established themselves on differing sides of the nuclear issue. On one side is the United States, and its’ main ally Japan who demand a complete verifiable, and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program. Seemingly diametrically opposed to the United States and Japan are China, Russia, and the two Korean nations who, while agreeing in principle to the idea of a nuclear free Korean peninsula, want incremental steps towards achieving that goal. Here is the official statement coming out of the conference: the six parties "expressed their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, and to resolving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect and consultations on an equal basis” (Xinhua News Agency).

Two significantly different views emerged from the conference. Foremost, the US and Japan remained positive about the results of the recent six-party talks. According to the United States delegation, the US and other countries “were able to reap more progress than expected on defusing nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula” (Digital Chosun).

In stark contrast, the DPRK delegation offered this statement regarding the conference:

"We had expected that a frank discussion on ways of seeking a solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the United States (in the second round of six-party talks) would open a certain prospect of settling the issue, so we showed the willingness in the talks to scrap our nuclear program according to a proposal for a simultaneous package solution aiming to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula," said the spokesman.

"But the United States again insisted on its old stand (in the talks) that unless the DPRK first abandons the nuclear program completely, verifiably and irreversibly should the Untied States discuss the issues concerned by the DPRK," he added.

He said the head of US delegation "only read the prepared script, showing no sincerity and giving no answers even to the questions raised. (People’s Daily)"

-Spokesman DPRK

Moreover, Russia and China offered a similarily negative response to the conference. In a veiled criticism of Washington, Chinese and Russian diplomats say its “unrealistic for North Korea to give up all of its nuclear programmes without first addressing Pyongyang's security concerns” (ChannelNewsAsia). Clearly, with such differing opinions on the success of the conference, it is easy to understand why reaching an agreement would cause so many difficulties.

Interestingly, before the conference began, the DPRK had reportedly offered to scrap its nuclear weapons program if it got its way at the six-party talks. However, the DPRK goals of economic aid, and a security guarantee by the US were nixed by US policy makers. According to Ambassador Kim Kye-gwan, the US delegation “did not have an attitude to resolve the nuclear issue through peaceful negotiations” (Taipei Times). Hopes had been raised earlier last week by a North Korean offer to halt its nuclear activities. North Korea offered to first freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities in return for simultaneous economic assistance and security assurances from its neighbors and the US. But Washington insisted it would not provide concessions until after dismantlement was under way. According to one analyst, “America's fears and North Korea's fears collide; if either side makes concessions, it believes its worst nightmares would be realized and the other side would launch aggression. Total lack of trust only worsens the chances of resolution” (Asia Times).

And, in light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US, Washington's ultimate fear is that Pyongyang could even sell nukes to al-Qaeda, thereby posing "an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in US cities", in the words of former US defense secretary William Perry (Asia Times).

At the heart of the relationship between the DPRK and the USA is a sense of deep mistrust. It appears as if the US will only accept actions by the DPRK, if and only if, the DPRK acts first. Thus, an attempt at simultaneous action, such as the one that the DPRK proposed prior to the recent meetings in Beijing have been quickly denied. According to reports, the “truth of the matter is that neither side trusts the other, making it virtually impossible to conduct sincere and productive negotiations” (Asia Times). Pyongyang's fears are fueled by US attacks on countries without nuclear weapons: Iraq, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. Moreover, in the case of Iraq, the US invasion was a largely unilateral action, taken without the support of the international community. Thus, in the DPRK’s view, possessing nuclear capabilities, and thus the possibility of developing nuclear weapons is the ultimate guarantee against US military invasion.

Obviously, the attacks of September 11, 2001 play a large role in both the US actions towards the DPRK, and subsequently the DPRK’s responses to US attitudes. In President Bush’s State of the Union in Early 2002, Bush grouped Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil”. This grouping of so-called “evil” countries was a significant step for US foreign policy- Bush declared that all of the aforementioned nations either had a nuclear weapons capacity, or were developing one. However, there was one slight problem- Iraq possessed no such weapon’s of mass destruction, and North Korea had not been developing one. Thus, with Bush’s move into Iraq, and subsequent finding that Iraq possessed no such weapons, relations between the DPRK and US turned hostile. According to a DPRK spokesman the DPRK has “recurring fear of being targeted continuously” (North Korea Zone).

Representatives from the DPRK and China painted a picture of a hard US stance at the recent conference. According to one, "there is a fundamental difference in the attitude between the US delegation and the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] delegation (Taipei Times)" Additionally, hot nation China agreed with that statement, although it refrained from criticism, merely noting, "The road is long, and there will be a few bumps in the road (Asia Times)"

II. What the Two Sides Want

US Wants:

Key to resolving the issue for the US, is that the DPRK meets a set of demands. Foremost, the US continues to demand a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear programs.

Next, the US demands that the DPRK reveal its’ nuclear capacity and stop with both plutonium and uranium enrichment capabilities.

A. Plutonium (frozen under 1994 agreed framework)

B. Uranium (not acknowledged by DPRK)

DPRK Wants:

With recent US activity in Iraq, Pyongyang needs some type of guarantee that the US will not invade. Therefore, Pyongyang wants the United States to sign a

1, Formal non-aggression treaty guaranteeing the safety of the regime,

2. Establish full bilateral diplomatic relations, and

3. Provide energy and billions of dollars' worth of economic assistance

However, as established above, neither side wants to act first. Thus, a stalemate has occurred with both sides placing the blame towards the other nation.

III. Solutions

As with the region’s other recent problems (the bird flu and the currency crisis), five potential remedies have been established. These remedies, which often overlap are containment, money, close-knit regional teamwork, direct talks between the USA and the DPRK, and finally a unilateral coalition of nations including Japan, ROK, Russia, and China. Important to consider when investigating any of these options is that the end goal is “not simply the denuclearization of the North Korea, as desirable as this would be, but the political and economic integration of semi-isolated North Korea into the East Asian region” (Asia Media).

Option 1: Containment

The process of containment would likely return to the 1994 Agreed Framework and place a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program. However, as evidenced by the original 1994 Agreed Framework, this is not the best solution and others should be pursued before this one. Previous parts of the paper have described why this has failed. However, summarily, international legal accords are hard to establish, and even tougher to enforce. The world is a dynamic place, and an option such as the Agreed Framework doesn’t account for such change in the world.

Option 2: Money

As the old saying goes, “money talks”, and in the North Korea nuclear dilemma this old adage definitely holds true. Currently, the DPRK faces approximately a $12bil debt (1996 est), and according to 2001 estimates imports about $500mil more than it exports (CIA World Factbook). The defunct economy of the DPRK plays directly into the current nuclear situation. They know that without changes in the US policy towards the DPRK, “they cannot recover economically as investors and financial institutions will shy away” (Hayes). On the US side of the equation, the lifting of economic sanctions will not begin until a complete verifiable, and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear programs begins. Currently, the United States lists the DPRK on a list of terrorist states and thus limits the trade between the DPRK and allies of the US. The DPRK seeks for the US to stop obstructing their economy by removing them from the US list of terrorist states. This would allow other countries as well as institutions such as the World Bank to resume full trade with the DPRK without fear of repercussions by the United States.

However, while some experts agree that the US must be involved in the economic aid package to the DPRK, others argue that aid, without the support of the US would rejuvenate the economy. This rejuvenation of the economy could be attempted in two manners. Foremost, the possibility of receiving aid from a non-US source remains one option. According to one source, South Korea, China and Russia would provide North Korea with economic aid if “Pyongyang freezes its nuclear weapons programmes as a step toward completely scrapping them” (EI News). As previously mentioned, the US would not contribute to any type of aid packages until the complete dismantling of the nuclear program begins.

Moreover, the possibility of a complete transformation of the economy exists. However, even with the transformation of the economy, foreign aid and economic assistance is essential. Thus, as discussed directly above, countries such as Russia and South Korea must continue their economic assistance. This transformation would “parallel Taiwan and South Korea in the 1970s and the newly industrialized countries in Latin America [who] successfully managed political control and development of a market economy at the same time” (Yoon Young-Kwan). Additionally, China's gradual reform and liberalization policy shows that the gradual transformation of the economy is possible.

Recent attempts at transforming the economy have occurred. For example, the introduction of a market based price system in July 2002 shows how North Korea is willing to modernize their economy. The North Korean government allowed groceries and cooking materials to be exchanged at market prices instead of government-set prices (Yoon Young-Kwan). Moreover, the opening of new markets for exports would help the DPRK economy. According to recent CIA numbers, China and Japan make up 23.5% and 19.9% of the DPRK’s $800mil exports (CIA). However, as evidenced by the recent economic actions of the ROK and Russia, there is a possibility to open new markets in different countries without the help of the United States. The bottom line is that a healthy economy ties directly to the political tension in the Korean peninsula, and offers a good means to help alleviate the problem.

Option 3: Regional teamwork

Option 3 represents the current policy of the Bush administration- an effort to tie the US policy actions to the policy of other foreign countries through multilateral talks. Through means such as six-party talks, and the Korean Peninusla Energy Development Organization (KEDO) a multilateral agreement might possibly be reached. The crux of this argument revolves around the idea that proliferation is a regional (if not global) problem that not only affects North Korea, but also the entirety of the Korean peninsula. Thus, through forums such as the six-nation talks, and KEDO, the viewpoints of all of the actors in the situation can be considered. Robert Carlin, KEDO Assistant Director for Policy Planning and North Korea Affairs, said it would be wasteful to cast aside the fruits of eight years of tough negotiations with the North. "It has already a legal framework with North Korea. If that's junked, it's all going to have to be negotiated again," he said. (Planet Ark). Moreover, as Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated recently, “I hope the talks will serve as a step for North Korea to become accepted in the international community” (Asahi).

However, while the idea of a multilateral forum sounds like the perfect solution, there are better solutions than the six-party talks. Ultimately, the problem of coordination comes to the forefront. With 6 nations involved, setting the agenda, and listening to the opinions of all of the nations leads to conflict. Moreover, with the US as the hegemonic power in the world, it enjoys flexing its’ muscle. Thus, as previously discussed, this leads to further stalemate as the US refuses to concede points in a forum such as the six-nations talks. The idea of regional teamwork, while a good idea in principle, is not a great idea in reality.

Option 4: Direct talks

Option 4 is an interesting option as it creates a severe split in policy directives between the DPRK and USA. While direct talks were a central tenet of the Clinton administration, and led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, they have been largely ignored by the current Bush administration. Under the Clinton administration, “both sides expressed support for the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (“Joint Statement”). Both sides expressed a desire to fundamentally improve the relationship between the USA and the DPRK.

However, upon Bush’s inauguration in 2001, US policy has largely moved away from direct talks, towards favoring regional teamwork such as the 6-party talks. According to Todd S. Purdum in A Time of Our Choosing the DPRK “pressed Washington for one-on-one talks”, which the Bush administration steadfastly refused. (270). According to the DPRK delegation after the conference, “the United States did not show any stand to co-exist with the DPRK but persistently pursue its policy of isolating and stifling the DPRK," a spokesman of the DPRK's Foreign Ministry told the official Korean Central News Agency (People’s Daily). Thus, direct talks, which would only involve the United States and the DPRK are one of the best possible solutions. According to a North Korean foreign policy ministry, “the six-nation talks could be meaningless to international efforts to resolve the nuclear issue if the US does not change its policies toward us" (People’s Times). As the name announces, direct talks puts the two principle actors in direct contact with each other- thus, no distracting or dissenting opinions from regional nations. Instead of listening to the opinions of six-nations, direct talks forces the two nations together, and will most likely lead to bargaining.

But American policy makers know that the situation calls for “more delicate handling” and can be solved with the help of allies like Japan and strategic cooperation from China and Russia. According to Purdum, “going it alone was the last thing the Bush administration wanted to do with North Korea” (Purdum, 270). However, due to the lack of successful multilateral talks, going at it alone is exactly what the Bush administration should be doing. In the Summer of 2003: “no issue is of greater urgency to the U.S. than North Korea’s nuclear weapons program” and that he and the President were seeking broader Asian and international support for isolating the country (Purdum). However, if it was such a great priority, why has no progress been made? The unwilling attitude, and hawkish nature of the US foreign policy explains the lack of progress.

Option 5: “Unilateral” Coalition

The idea of a “unilateral” pre-emptive peace initiative was first offered by Professor Bruce Lusignan in EDGE section, March 9, 2004. While option number 3 skirts at this issue, the main premise of this proposed solution is that the US is not necessary in securing peace on the Korean peninsula. Thus, instead of escalating the tensions between the DPRK and the US to a point of no return, this solution would exclude the US entirely from the bargaining table.

Instead of moving towards a military strike, a preemptive peace initiative would likely move away from further escalations in the conflict. Thus, Russia, China, Japan, the ROK and the DPRK would work together to integrate the DPRK into the Korean peninsula. Here is a possible scenario- Russia would provide the Light Water Reactors as discussed in part one of this paper. All countries would work to integrate the DPRK into the Korean peninsula economy, and would benefit by gaining new markets in Korea. Finally, pending further US aggression, a security coalition between the aforementioned nations could emerge.

IV. Worst Case Scenario

In the worst case scenario, the lack of expediency in bargaining would allow North Korea the time to develop nuclear weapons, and declare it a nuclear state.

American air strikes would begin, and the prospects of a full-scale American invasion and potential nuclear war remain a distinct possibility should successful bargaining not begin soon. Presently, there are thousands of American troops still stationed on the Korean peninsula, which could be called into action by President Bush. Military intervention could become a possibility if no movement towards an agreement appears.

In March, before the war in Iraq began, Bush warned North Korean leader, King Jong Il, that if the options “don’t work diplomatically, they’ll have to work militarily. (Purdum, 270)”

However, not only would this strike increase tensions between the DPRK and the United States, the likelihood of the US locating the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program is unlikely. According to one estimate, the uranium enrichment program is “likely in hardened or underground sites that are difficult to destroy”, and thus military strikes would be “unable to prevent North Korea from producing fissile material via uranium enrichment” (Saunders). In addition to being unable to destroy the uranium, political consequences might be even more significant. Both the ROK and Japan strongly oppose military attacks against North Korean nuclear facilities, largely due to their vulnerability to North Korean retaliatory strikes.

A real solution to the dispute appears to be as distant as ever. Should North Korea decide that once and for all that possession of nuclear weapons is the country's surest form of defense - namely against Washington - and that negotiations are merely aimed at buying time for building up its stockpile. However, this stockpile would be worthless against the fortune of weapons that the US has assumed. According to estimates, as one of the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States maintains a sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapons, including approximately 10,600 intact warheads, 7.650 of which are considered active or operational (). Thus, even if the DPRK begins to build nuclear weapons (which takes time), the US enjoys a substantial advantage in that area.

V. Future US Election

Future US actions largely depend on who’s in charge of the oval office next year. If Bush remains as a President, the nuclear standoff will likely continue, and multilateral discussion will be used as the primary option for negotiation by the administration. Thus, the six-party talks will next resume in June, and further bickering between the countries is likely to occur.

However, assuming the election of John Kerry, direct talks will be resumed, and the likelihood of diplomatic relations between the United States (similar to the Clinton era) is likely. Kerry recently critiqued that “because the Bush administration did not pay continuous attention to North Korea from the beginning, it has resulted in them still avoiding the North Korean nuclear issue (Donga)” Moreover, Kerry knocked Bush for only dealing through multilateral means, when he sees direct talks as a better option. In the same discussion, Kerry also said that “President Bush does not try to get involved in serious negotiations” (Donga). North Korea would happily agree to a regime change, and would welcome Kerry into the Presidency. According to a recent Financial Times headline, "North Korea Warms to Kerry Presidency Bid".

Clearly North Korea desires any change from the Current Bush administration, who they see as the head of a US policy which desires stalemate. With an upcoming election, Democrats view this as a potential issue on which they can capitalize and point towards the worsening of diplomatic relations under the Bush administration.

VI. Conclusion

According to some experts, North Korea, “economically weak and still relatively isolated, is not the main destabilizing threat to the region- serial proliferation is” (Asia Media). However, key to any of the proposed remedies offered above is a)expediency, b)diplomatic efforts at establishing trust, and c)cooperation by both sides. As evidenced by the diplomatic success of the Clinton administration, direct talks are welcomed by the North Korean delegation, which views them as a sign that the US is serious about resolving the issue.

Additionally, economics play a key role in resolving the issue. But this almost misses the point: once again, “the end goal is not simply the denuclearization of North Korea, as desirable as this would be, but the political and economic integration of semi-isolated North Korea into the East Asian region” (Asia Media). Actors on the Korean peninsula want an expedient solution to the problem. For example, China which supplies 40 percent of the food and 90 percent of the oil North Korea needs regards the current dilemma as a headache, and desires a solution. Essentially, the more time it takes to reach an accord, the more time to escalate tensions.

Works Cited

Part I.

“AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.” Oct 21. 1994.

“AGREEMENT ON SUPPLY OF A LIGHT-WATER REACTOR PROJECT TOTHE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA BETWEEN THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION AND The GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.” June 13, 1995.

Bandow, Doug. “Leave Korea to the Koreas.” May 27 2000.

Banville, Lee. “North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” March 10 2004.

Bosworth, Stephen. “A Conversation with the Dean.”

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Kampani, Gaurav. “Overview of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Program.”

Martin, Russ. Personal Interview. Email. March 8 2004.

“Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a Glance.” May 2003.

“Nuclear Weapons Program.” 24 April 2004.

“Nuclear Weapons Program.” 24 April 2004.

Part II

“Bush’s ‘Evil Axis’ Comment Stirs Critics.” . 12 March 2004.

Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Washington’s Continuing Illusions about North Korea’s Nukes.”

. 12 March 2004.

“Divided Attention.” .

12 March 2004.

Kahn, Joseph. “North Korea Candor to be Central to New Nuclear Talks.” The New

Times. 24 February 2004.

Kim Sung-jin. “One Korea to Boost Economic Power.” The Korean Times.

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“One Korea for the Olympics.” . 12 March 2004.

Schoenberger, Karl. “Stanford’s John Lewis Describes North Korea Trip.” San Jose

Mercury News. 22 January 2004.

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“U.S. Seeks Dismantling of N. Korea Weapons.” The New York Times.

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Weisman, Steven R. and David E. Sanger. “North Korea May Get Aid if it Pledges

Nuclear Curb.” The New York Times. 24 February 2004.

Wilson, Steven. “Koreas to March Together in Olympics.” . 10 September 2000.

Part III.

Asia Media. . Feb 6, 2004.

Asahi. . Feb 4, 2004.

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Channel News Asia. view/73177/1/.html. 28th Feb, 2004.

CIA World Factbook. North Korea. factbook/geos/kn.html.

Digital Chosun. “Participants Tell Different Stories of Six-nation Talks”.

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Hayes, Peter. Enemy to Friend: Providing Security Assurances to North Korea. 11th Feb, 2004. /PHEnemytoFriendhtml

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America”. Packet.

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North Korea Zone. Blog by Journalist Rebecca Mackinnon. Feb 18, 2004.



NTI Country Overviews. /USA/index.html#2760. US Nuclear Stockpile.

People’s Daily. March 1, 2004. . cn/200403/01/eng20040301_136155.shtml

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Purdum, Todd S. A Time of Our Choosing. New York, 2003.

Saunders, Phillip C. .

“Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program”

Space War. . March 2, 2004.

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Xinhua News Agency. February 28, 2004. “Six Countries Committed to 'Nuclear-Weapon-Free' Peninsula. .

Young-Kwan, Yoon .

The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Settlement of

Peace in and around the Korean Peninsula. 26 Mar 2003.

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