The Future of Religion and Domestic Conflict
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Netherlands Chapter
The Future of Religion and Domestic Conflict
by
Jonathan Fox
Department of Political Studies
Bar Ilan University
foxjon@mail.biu.ac.il
26 june, 2006
VU Auditorium
Society for International Development
Abstract: The purpose of this study is threefold. First, it examines the nature of domestic conflict in the post World War 2 era and what role religion plays in this conflict. This is done based on the results produced by the quantitative branch of the social science study of conflict. Second, the results of these studies are distilled into seven trends that are relevant to religion and conflict. Third, these trends are used to make predictions regarding the future of religion and conflict.
The eight trends in religion and conflict are as follows: (1) religious conflict is becoming more common, (2) religion is rarely the sole cause of conflict and is the primary cause in at most a minority of cases, (3) discrimination against religious minorities is higher than discrimination against other minorities, (4) Islam is becoming increasingly associated with violence but most of that violence is against other Muslims, (5) there is no clash of civilizations, (6) religion influences international intervention, (7) religion can also promote peace (8) there exist macro-patterns in terrorism.
Predicting long-term trends using this methodology is not an exact science. However, based on the results presented here it is most likely that religious conflict will be a significant proportion of world conflict for at least the short to medium-term future.
For much of the twentieth century social science paradigms like secularization and modernization theory predicted an end of the era in which religion would be a source of conflict.[1] However, a series of events over the last few decades have made it increasingly apparent that religion is a potential source of conflict in the modern era. This began in the late 1970s with the Iranian revolution and the Islamic opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 1980s and 1990s saw an increase in militant Muslim fundamentalist opposition movements across the Muslim world as well as an increase in the number of other ethno-religious conflicts–ethnic conflicts between groups that belonged to different religions. The fall of the USSR unleashed a number of ethno-religious conflicts than had been thought to have been permanently dormant and new militant Muslim opposition movements in the Muslim majority former Soviet republics began to develop by the late 1990s. In 1993 the events of Waco Texas showed that religious violence was a possibility even in the West. Finally, for many of those who had not yet come to the conclusion that religious conflict remains prominent in the modern era, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent mass terror attacks by Muslim groups against the West drove the point home.
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, it examines the nature of domestic conflict in the post World War 2 era and what role religion plays in this conflict. This is done based on the results produced by the quantitative branch of the social science study of conflict. Second, the results of these studies are distilled into seven trends that are relevant to religion and conflict. Third, these trends are used to make predictions regarding the future of religion and conflict.
Some Definitions and Assumptions
Before discussing the empirical results regarding religion and conflict, it is important to discuss some of the bases for such a discussion. This includes the assumptions upon which all such studies rest, a social science definition of religion, and the nature of the data used to perform the analyses. It is also important to emphasize that this study focuses on domestic conflict within a state and accordingly does not include international conflicts.
Induction
Predicting the future is a difficult endeavor at best. The methodology used here is to identify past trends and to extrapolate those trends into the future. In other words, the entire thesis of this study rests upon induction. Induction is a flawed methodology because it rests on the assumption that what was true yesterday will continue to be true today. This assumption is usually correct, but in a small percentage of cases it is not. Even worse, when dealing with social and political factors over long periods of time there tend to be shifts in trends. Thus, when studying the phenomenon of religion and conflict, induction can be very accurate in the short term or even the medium term but it loses a significant portion of its accuracy in the long term. Some of the trends described below prove this very point. Over the past few decades there have been some dramatic shifts in the dynamics of religion and conflict
That the behavioralist branch of the social sciences has considerable difficulty in predicting such shifts is a well known weakness. Yet, behavioralists persist in using the scientific method and data collection to try and predict the future. The major justification for this is that this methodology is better than the alternative. Predictions of the future based on intuition are not uncommon. The difficulty is that nearly everything that can be predicted to happen in the future is predicted by someone. For example Fukayama (1989) and Huntington (1993; 1996) predicted very different futures in the wake of the Cold War. Despite the popularity of both of these sets of predictions, the passage of time has shown that neither was exactly correct.
Induction based on past trends as measured by social science empirical methodology has several advantages. First, it is based on empirically verifiable facts. Second, these facts tend to include all of the facts and cases can not be ignored when they are inconvenient. Third, these facts are fit into a rigid framework for coding information which is set up before the data is collected and leaves little room for spinning those facts to fit into one’s preconceived notions. Fourth, while some changes in some trends and relationships can occur over time, phenomena like religion and conflict are complicated and associated with or influenced by multiple factors. Thus, even if the dynamics related with one or a few of these factors change, it is most likely that many of the relationships that held true in the past will continue to do so. Thus, predictions that reach decades into the future will likely be less accurate than predications that reach only into the next few years but the long-term predictions are still likely to have some validity. Given this, the likelihood of a reasonable amount of accuracy is arguably better than trying to guess which of multiple non-behavioralist prophets is correct.
A Social Science Definition of Religion
Be that as it may, it is not advisable to discuss a complicated concept like religion without some sort of framework for understanding what is being discussed. Religion is one of those topics that few stop to define beyond an ad-hoc definition that was in the past applied to a notably un-religious topic–I can’t define it “but I know it when I see it.”[2] Yet, in order to accurately discuss religion’s role in politics, society, and conflict a more specific framework in necessary.
There are numerous philosophical and social science definitions of religion.[3] Philosophical concepts of the nature of God and the supernatural are not the most efficient approach to understanding religion’s role in society because they tend to focus on theological distinctions rather than social ones. Accordingly, the social science definitions of religion tend to focus on defining the social role of religion rather than its theological manifestations. In this tradition, I define below five ways religion influences conflict:
First, religion is a source of many people’s worldviews. These worldviews are not just philosophical or intellectual constructs. Rather, they are the tools human beings used to understand and interpret reality. They define the nature of the world and our place in it. They define the community to which we belong and who are our enemies. They are intertwined with our identities, self-images, egos, and unconscious minds. As such, they reside, at least in part, in the irrational parts of the human psyche. Thus, a perceived threat or challenge to one’s religion is a threat to the core of one’s being. Such threats provoke a defensive reaction which can often be violent.
For example, the recent publication of political cartoons in a Danish newspaper which were subsequently reprinted by other European newspapers which lampooned Islam’s perceived intolerance provoked exactly such a reaction among many Muslims. That these cartoons touch upon issues with a basis in fact, as there is a considerable amount of intolerance among at least some Muslims and that the majority of the world’s current terrorists are Muslims, is not relevant to this reaction because the cartoons are perceived by many as a challenge to Islam. In fact these cartoons touched upon a sacred cow of Islam–an absolute prohibition against deriding Mohammed. Similarly, rational arguments like support for the Western tradition of freedom of speech and freedom of the press are also not relevant because the perceived challenge touches upon the elements of the individual and collective beliefs of many Muslims which are not subject to debate within those populations. Put differently, it is the one who feels that their religion is challenged who defines what is a challenge to their religion. Arguments based on other worldviews are not pertinent to this process.
Second, religions tend to have rules and standards of behavior. That is, they generally contain instructions for how believers are expected to behave both in general and in specific situations. This can lead to conflict in two ways. The first is that religions often have rules which mandate then use of violence in certain circumstances. This includes traditions of holy war–the concept that in certain circumstances a religious war is allowed, desirable, or required. The second path between religious laws and violence is a bit more complicated. Often believers are expected to follow laws which are not in and of themselves violent but which can be seen as a provocation or threat by members of another religion. For instance, many religions include an obligation to spread the religion. Yet members of the target audience of these efforts at proselytization see this as a direct attach upon their religion. In 2002 at least 77 countries somehow restricted missionary work by minority religions.[4]
Third, religion is a source of legitimacy. It can legitimate the actions of both governments and opposition movements, including the most violent of activities.
Fourth, religions are often associated with institutions. As is discussed below these institutions can have a dual role in conflict. On one hand, based on classic mobilization theory existing institutions which organize people facilitate the process of political mobilization.[5] For example, if one wants to organize a demonstration in Washington DC in support of Israel, a particularly efficient way to do so is to contact the country’s Synagogues and have the Rabbis announce demonstration from the pulpit and perhaps contact members through those institutions normal channels of communication. A list of fax numbers and e-mails of these institutions is much more efficient than trying to contact all of the Jews in the US individually. On the other hand, religious institutions tend to be conservative and support the status quo. Angering a government has consequences including the loss of benefits that many religious institutions receive from the government as well as potential retaliation against the institution itself or the religion’s adherents. In the case of the United States these considerations are not particularly relevant due to the protections for freedom of religion, the right to protest, and the lack of government funding for religion that exist in the US. However, a study of 175 states shows that in 2002 134 (76.6%) somehow fund religion or religious institutions and 131 (75.1%) place at least some minor restrictions on minority religions.[6] Thus, the threat of restrictions or rescinding of funding is a real consideration in the overwhelming majority of states.
Finally, religion is a source of identity. While this concept overlaps with the concept of worldviews described above it is worth noting separately because the social sciences have developed a large literature linking identity with conflict.[7]
It is also important to single out identity because the majority of quantitative studies of religion and conflict focus on identity. That is, they measure whether conflicts between groups which belong to different religions are more common or violent than conflicts between groups which belong to the same religion or they measure whether the extent of religious diversity or religious polarization in a state is linked to conflict. A minority of studies look at whether specific religious factors like religious discrimination, religious institutions, religious legitimacy, or the presence of religious issues in a conflict influence the dynamics of conflict.
This focus on religious identity in quantitative studies is likely because this type of variable is much easier to design and collect than variables like the extent of religious discrimination in a state. The results based on identity can be viewed in two ways. On one hand, there is a theoretical basis for arguing that differences in identity create an in-group vs. out-group dynamic which leads to conflict. On the other hand, if one finds that differences in religious identity lead to conflict it is likely because other specific factors like religious discrimination, legitimacy, or institutions are in play. Thus, the studies based on more specific variables give us a better understanding of the dynamics of religion and conflict. Nevertheless, the religious identity-based studies still have considerable explanatory value.
The data
The major basis for the findings presented here is previous analyses performed by the author based on three datasets: the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, the State Failure (SF) dataset, and the Religion and State (RAS) dataset.
The MAR dataset contains information on 337 ethnic minorities who were politically active at some point between 1945 and 2003,[8] many of which are ethno-religious minorities. Ethno-religious minorities are defined here as minorities which are both ethnically and religiously distinct from the majority group in the state in which they live. The unit of analysis in the MAR data is an ethnic minority within a state. Thus the same minority may be coded in several states, as is the case with the Hutus and Tutsis, both of which are coded for Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also the same state may contain several minorities as is the case with India. However, each dyad of minority and majority group in the dataset in unique.
Studies based on this dataset are particularly useful in understanding the causes ethno-religious conflict for two reasons. First it is the most comprehensive database on ethnic conflict and contains all groups which meet the projects criteria of either being politically active and/or suffering from high levels of discrimination. Second, supplemental data collected separately for use with the MAR dataset provides the most detailed data on religion and conflict available in any empirical format at the time of this writing.[9]
The SF dataset includes major episodes of “state failure” which “encompasses a range of severe political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by macro-societal events such as those that occurred in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) in the 1990s.”[10] The data used here comes from the ethnic conflict, revolutionary war, and mass killing sections of the dataset. Thus, unlike the MAR dataset, the SF dataset includes all forms of violent domestic conflict. However the violence threshold for inclusion ion the SF dataset is considerably higher than the threshold for inclusion in the MAR dataset. The unit of analysis in the SF dataset is a year of conflict. The dataset contains 733 years of ethnic conflict, 268 years of mass killings, and 473 years of revolutionary wars between 1948 and 2004. As some of the cases in the three categories overlap, the total number of years of conflict covered by the dataset is 1184.[11]
The SF and MAR datasets compliment each other well because each dataset’s strengths counter the other’s weaknesses. The MAR contains hundreds of variables which allows for testing causality and controlling for the influence of a number of factors but is limited only to ethnic conflict. The SF dataset covers all types of major violent domestic conflict but is not suitable for multi-variate causal analyses.
The RAS dataset does not focus on conflict but rather on the extent of government involvement in religion for 175 governments between 1990 and 2002. It includes data on religious demographics, government support for religion (including whether or not a state has an official religion), restrictions on the practices of religious minorities, regulation of the majority religion, and the extent to which a government legislates religion. 62 individual variables which fall in these categories are coded so the information is quite detailed.[12]
Most of the detailed analyses upon which this study is based are presented elsewhere but tables and figures are presented throughout the study in order to illustrate major points or provide more detail. Also, when relevant, studies by other scholars are referenced.
Trends in Religion and Conflict
This study identifies eight trends in religion and conflict. As noted above, the best available prediction of future trends is the assumption that these trends will continue. However, there is a strong likelihood that some of these trends will change over time.
Trend #1: Religious Conflict is Becoming More Common
Religious conflict was less common among domestic conflicts than non-religious conflict for the entire second half of the twentieth century and through the end of 2001. Beginning in 2002, based on results from the SF dataset presented in figure 1, religious conflict became more common than non-religious conflict. However religious conflict did not overtake non-religious conflict overnight. The rise of religious conflict relative to non-religious conflict is a trend that has been present for decades.
[Figure 1 about here]
Before continuing with this discussion it is important to note that for the purposes of this analysis religious conflict includes two types of conflict. The first is religious-identity conflict which includes any conflict between two groups which belong to different religions or different denominations of the same religion. The second is religious wars which includes cases where the issue in the conflict includes religious ones. This usually refers to cases where fundamentalist groups are challenging a state which they consider to be too secular. Several of the religious-identity conflicts included in the SF dataset are not in particular over religious issues. This includes several of the various civil wars in the former Yugoslav republics and the conflict in Cyprus, among others. These conflicts are mostly about separatism and who rules. Thus, this definition of religious conflict is a very broad one. However, in recent times even conflicts like these are beginning to have more of a religious nature. For instance, any conflict which involves Muslims tends to attract militant Muslim fundamentalists who can often change the nature of the conflict.
Returning to figure 1, the results show a long-term trend of a rise in religious conflict as a proportion of all conflict. Conflict in general rose steadily in the post World War 2 era until the early 1990s when it began to drop. In general religious conflict followed this pattern though the specifics differ. The amount of religious conflict was stable until the late 1970s when the first religious wars since the early 1960s took place. (The post-World War 2 religious wars included in the SF dataset which took place before the 1970s all took place in Indonesia.) The first one to start was the religious revolution in Iran, followed shortly by religious conflicts in Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. These conflicts accounted for the initial rise in religious conflicts and, interestingly, all involved militant Muslim fundamentalists challenging secular rulers. Between 1987 and 1990 a number of religious identity conflicts started, many but not all of which involved Muslims. These include the Palestinian uprising against Israel, the ethnic war in Sri Lanka, the civil war in Liberia, violence in the Kashmir province of India, and violent protests by Muslims in the Xinjiang province of China.
In 1991 and 1992 a number of religious conflicts started which resulted in religious conflicts being nearly as common as non-religious ones. This included militant Muslim fundamentalist uprisings in Egypt and Algeria, the civil war in Afghanistan which started after the Soviet forces were ejected and eventually resulted in the Taliban rule, and a number of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Bloc. Beginning in 1993 the number of both religious and non-religious conflicts began to drop dramatically at approximately the same rate. Beginning in 2002 the number of non-religious conflicts continued to drop but religious conflicts stabilized and even increased slightly.
Thus, the fact that religious conflicts in 2002 became a majority of all religious conflict was not due to a dramatic rise in religious conflicts at that time but because religious conflicts were decreasing less swiftly than non-religious conflicts. The dramatic rise in religious conflicts occurred much earlier in two waves, the first in the late 1970s to the early 1980s and the second in the late 1980s to the early 1990s. In 2004 the number of religious conflicts was similar to the number in the early 1980s. In contrast the last time the level of non-religious conflict was as low as it was in 2004 was the early 1960s.
Conclusion for trend #1: The major shifts in religious conflict occurred between the late 1970s and early 1990s. Since the early 1990s, religious conflicts have been either almost as common as non-religious conflicts or slightly more common than them. Assuming that this trend continues, we can expect religious conflicts to be about as common, perhaps slightly more common than non-religious ones.
Trend # 2: Religion is Rarely the Sole Cause of Conflict and is the Primary Cause in at Most a Minority of Cases
It is arguable that religion is never the sole cause of a conflict because most conflicts have complex origins. For example the numerous militant Muslim fundamentalist uprisings in Muslim states, which on their face would seem to be conflicts that are solely about religion, upon closer examination tend to also involve secular causes. Most of these uprisings tend to take place in authoritarian states where political expression is limited and the opportunities for meaningful participation in government decision-making is even more limited. Often the only viable forum for alternative elites to engage in political expression are religious institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that it is religious groups which are often the venue for opposition movements in these states.
Algeria is case in point. Algeria has been for all of its history ruled by a single party. During the 1970s and 1980s Algeria experienced a number of economic, political, and social crises including unemployment, underemployment–especially among those with university degrees–, a severe housing shortage, population growth, insufficient agricultural production, a failed industrialization program, and foreign debt. From about 1980 to 1988 the economic crisis helped Islamic fundamentalists to transform economic discontent into support for their cause. In 1988 a new constitution allowed effective political opposition which allowed Muslim fundamentalists to use mostly peaceful and democratic means to further their cause. The FIS, Algeria’s most prominent Islamic political party, won surprising victories in local elections in 1990 and had considerable success in the first round of national elections in December 1991 and were expected to have enough seats in the national assembly after the second round in January 1992. However, before this could happen, a military coup in January 1992 canceled the second round of the national elections. Only then did the violent Islamic revolution against the Algerian government begin. (Fox, 2002: 129-136) Thus, the violent religious conflict in Algeria includes major economic crises as one of the basic causes and the closure of the democratic process among its more proximate causes.
Based on results from the MAR dataset, presented in figure 2, it is arguable that violence in all ethnic conflicts (which include the vast majority of religious identity conflicts which are coded in the SF dataset) is not primarily caused by religion. These results show the combined influence of religion and separatism on the level of ethnic rebellion[13] and show that nationalism is the primary cause of conflict with religion as an intervening variable which exacerbates ethnic conflict. This is because throughout the 1945-2003 period separatist conflicts, whether they are religious ones or not, are consistently more violent than non-separatist conflicts. Beginning in the 1980, among separatist conflicts, religious conflicts are more violent. However, among non-separatist conflicts, the levels of violence between religious and non-religious conflicts are similar and when there is a difference, the religious conflicts tend to be less violent.
[Figure 2 about here]
Put simply, separatism without religion is associated with ethnic violence, religion without separatism is associated with low ethnic violence, and religion and separatism combined, at least since 1980, is associated with the highest levels of violence. The logical conclusion based on this finding is that ethnic conflicts are rarely very violent unless there is an element of separatism to the conflict. If a conflict has a separatist element, religion can exacerbate the level of violence but ethno-religious minorities are unlikely to engage in high levels of violence if they make no separatist demands. Thus, the primary cause of ethnic violence is separatism. Religion is not a primary cause and, rather, is an important intervening factor. Again, it is important to emphasize that this particular finding is specific to ethnic conflicts.
That being said, this finding can also be applied to the more international modes of religious terrorism exemplified by groups like Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is not strictly a separatist group or even a nationalist one. Yet its ideology can be called one of pan-Islamic nationalism. One of the organization’s goals is to set up a pan-Islamic state ruled by Sharia (Islamic) law and in doing so they must fight those they see as an obstacle to that goal. Thus in a sense they are nationalist but their nationalism refers to a state larger than any which exists today. Also they are similar to separatists in that they wish to take parts of existing states, in most cases entire states, and build from them a new sovereign political entity. Thus, the violence perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups can be said to fit into this pattern where the most violent conflicts are those that combine religion and nationalism.
This combined with the argument above that most religious fundamentalist challenges to the state involve a number of worldly factors lead to the major conclusion for trend #2: Few, if any, conflicts are solely about religion and a minority of conflicts are primarily about religion. However, a good number of conflicts which have other primary causes are influenced by religion.
Thus, the findings in trend #1 that religious conflict has been increasing and since 2002 a majority of the world’s most violent conflict can be classified as religious, while accurate can be misleading unless taken in context. The findings in trend # 1 show that there are an increasing number of conflicts with an easily identifiable religious element but the findings in trend #2 show that most of these conflicts which can be classified as religious are more complex and also include many worldly elements. Thus, more properly, the religious influence in conflict has been increasing since the late 1970s but this is not to the exclusion of the many worldly political, social, and economic factors that cause conflict.
There are no shortage of quantitative studies which show that some aspect of religion increases the level of violence in a state. Roeder (2003) found religious differences to be among the important predictors of conflict . Collier & Hoeffler (2002), Rummel (1997), Reynal-Querol (2002), Sambanis (2001), and Vanhanen (1999) found that religious diversity is correlated with various forms of domestic conflict but also found that other factors were important, often more important.
Trend # 3: Discrimination against Religious Minorities is Higher than Discrimination against Other Minorities
Conflicts generally have at least two sides and conflicts that occur within states usually, though not always, are between the state government, or in some cases the majority group which controls that government, and a minority group. Despite the fact that the state government is generally a party to most domestic conflicts, most studies of domestic conflict focus on the behavior of the minority group which challenges the state. This oversight is a major weakness of the literature on conflict. Many studies do account for regime-based factors like the extent of democracy or the power of the state when predicting minority behavior but few use state behavior as a dependent variable. This is unfortunate as most studies agree that state treatment of minority groups is a major potential instigator of domestic conflict, though clearly not the only one.
An analysis of the levels of cultural and political discrimination[14] against religious and non-religious minorities using the MAR dataset, presented in figure 3, shows that discrimination against religious minorities is consistently higher between 1990 and 2002, the years for which data are available. The MAR dataset does not include detailed data on religious discrimination but the RAS dataset contains a variable for religious discrimination based on 16 different types of restrictions on religious activities by minority religions, each of which is rated for the severity of the restriction. The change in the mean level of discrimination against religious minorities, presented in Figure 4, shows that on average religious discrimination rose significantly between 1990 and 2002.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
Conclusion for trend #3: Discrimination against religious minorities is higher than against non-religious minorities and religious discrimination against religious minorities is increasing. This will likely reinforce trend # 1–that religious conflict has been increasing and has reached the point where it is more common than non-religious conflict–as well as trend #2–that religion is becoming an increasingly important factor in conflict.
Trend #4: Islam Is Becoming Increasingly Associated with Violence but Most of That Violence Is Against Other Muslims
Figure 5 shows the yearly percentage of religious conflicts in which at least one Muslim group participated. With the exception of 1973 when 50% of all religious conflicts involved at least one Muslim group, Muslims participated in a majority of all religious conflicts throughout the period analyzed. Nevertheless there has been a measurable increase in Muslim participation in religious conflict over the 1965 to 2004 period. Before the 1990s, Muslims never participated in more than 82% of all religious conflicts except in 1980 when they participated in about 86% of all religious conflict. From 1994 onward they participated in at least 88% of all religious conflicts every year and in 2003 and 2004 all religious conflicts involved at least one Muslim group. In contrast, Muslim participation in non-religious conflict was considerably lower in the 1965 to 2004 period never reaching more than one-third of all non-religious conflicts.
[Figure 5 about here]
Perhaps the clearest evidence of increasing Muslim participation in conflict is Muslim participation in all conflicts (the results for religious and non-religious conflicts combined.) Until 1980 no more than 39% of all conflicts involved Muslim groups in any given year. Between 1980 and 1991 between 43% and 49% of all conflicts involved Muslims. From 1992 onward a majority of all conflicts involved at least one Muslim group. This rise in Muslim participation in all conflict mirrors the rise in religious conflict documented in trend #1. As most religious conflicts involve Muslims this is not surprising.
However, as will be recalled, religious conflicts include both religious-identity conflicts between groups which belong to different religions and religious wars among members of the same religion. Thus, that Muslims participate in a large number of religious conflicts does not mean that most of the conflicts in which they participate are inter-religious. As presented in table 1, this is the case. Muslim groups are most likely to be fighting other Muslim groups. The results show that this trend of intra-religious conflict being more common than inter-religious conflict is also true of Christian groups. As the “other” category contains numerous religions for which sufficiently specific information was not coded it is not possible to tell whether non-Abrahamic religions also follow this pattern.
[Table 1 about here]
Another important aspect of this trend is that studies which focus on terrorism show that most new terror groups since 1980 are Muslim groups and most, but by no means all, terrorism since 1980 has been perpetrated by Muslim groups. (Weinberg & Eubanks, 1998; Weinberg et. al., 2002)
Conclusion for trend #4: Muslim participation in conflict, and especially religious conflict, has increased to the point where in recent years all religious domestic conflicts involve at least one Muslim group. However, as many of these conflicts are Muslim vs. Muslim religious conflicts, most Muslim groups involved in domestic conflict are fighting other Muslim groups.
Trend #5: There is No Clash of Civilizations
The above results suggest that Huntington’s (1993; 1996) notorious prediction of a future clash of civilizations is incorrect. He predicted that in the post-Cold War era that the world would be divided into several civilizations, which were based to a large extent on religion, and that most of the post-Cold War conflict would be between these civilizations. The fact that most conflicts are within the same religion contradicts this. It is also important to note that from the time the theory was first put forward, it has been controversial.[15]
It is possible to categorize the various participants in the conflicts in the SF dataset into Huntington’s civilizations and examine how many conflicts in a given year are between civilizations. This test is presented in figure 6. The results show that at no time between 1960 and 2004 were civilizational conflicts more than 45% of all conflicts. This is far less than one would expect if Huntington’s paradigmatic claims that most posr-Cold War conflict will be civilizational was correct.
[Figure 6 about here]
There was a rise in civilizational conflict which coincides with the rise in religious conflict documented in trend # 1. This is not surprising as there is considerable overlap between Huntington’s concept of civilization and religious identity. It is arguable that this overlap makes civilization no more than an inferior surrogate variable for religion for a number of reasons. First, the results presented here show stronger results for religion than civilization–with religious conflicts becoming a majority of state failures in 2002 even though civilizational conflicts never become a majority of all state failures. Second, the empirical studies of religion noted above find that religion has an impact on conflict but most quantitative studies of domestic conflict which focus on Huntington’s theory tend to disprove the theory.[16] Third, in the few causal studies which compare the impact of religion and civilization on conflict, the religion variables tend to have a stronger influence. (Fox, 2004; Roeder, 2003) Fourth, religion is a concept that is more tangible than civilization. For instance religious discrimination can be defined as restrictions on the religious practices of a group. There is no similar form of “civilizational discrimination” that is distinct from other types of discrimination that can be placed on any minority whether it is a “civilizational” minority or not.
Conclusion for trend #5: Civilizational conflicts were never a majority of all conflicts and Huntington’s concept of civilizations is likely an inferior surrogate for religion.
Trend #6: Religion Influences International Intervention
An analysis of interventions in ethnic conflicts between 1990 and 1995 (the only years for which data are currently available) in the MAR shows that religion influences international intervention. As presented in figure 6, inter-religious conflicts are much more likely to attract intervention by foreign governments than are intra-religious conflicts. Also, as presented in figure 7, the vast majority of interventions by foreign governments in ethnic conflicts are cases where the foreign government and the minority on whose behalf they intervene belong to the same religion.
[Figures 6 and 7 about here]
This set of results is particularly important in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, international intervention in order to protect the human rights of minority groups has become increasingly common and acceptable. These results show that religious minorities tend to benefit from this more often than other ethnic minorities and that this is likely because they are more likely to attract support from their co-religionists on other states. This dynamic underscores the increasing importance of religion in all aspects of domestic conflict in recent decades.
Conclusion for trend #6: Religious conflicts attract more international intervention and religious affinities with minority groups significantly influence the decision to intervene.
Trend # 7: Religion Can Also Promote Peace
There is a growing literature which argues that religion can be used as a tool to promote conflict resolution and peace.[17] The basic argument is that religious traditions often have multiple and complex theologies which allow room for interpretation and selective emphasis. Appleby (2000) calls this “the ambivalence of the sacred.” Accordingly, it is possible to find elements of religious traditions, dogmas, and ideologies which support peace and encourage religious leaders to convince their followers to place the emphasis on these aspects of their traditions rather than the violent ones.
Case studies show that this is possible in fact. Fawcett (2000) in a study of the role of religious institutions in the conflict in Northern Ireland and in support for the Apartheid regime in South Africa found that in some situations these religious institutions supported conflict and in others supported conflict resolution. In the case of South Africa the Dutch Reformed Church supported Apartheid until it became clear that their members were beginning to oppose Apartheid, at which point the Church began to actively oppose Apartheid. Similarly religious institutions in Northern Ireland at first supported conflict but as the conflict became less popular supported power-sharing arrangements. Fawcett argues that these institutions changes their stands on these issues in order to remain in line with the opinions of their congregants and to do otherwise would have risked losing congregants. Thus both sets of religious institutions found doctrinal justifications for both conflict and peace and the key to determining which aspects of their doctrines would be emphasized were based on worldly factors rather than religious ones. Gill (1998) similarly argues that the decision by the Catholic Church in various Latin American states to oppose or support a regime is based on the extent to which that regime is popular among its congregants.
Empirical results in Fox (2002; 2004) also show that the decision by religious institutions to support or oppose violence is based at least in part on worldly concerns. In most cases of ethnic conflict, the religious institutions of the minority group tend to support the status-quo. However, there are two situations where they support conflict–when the religion itself is at issue in the conflict and when the conflict involves issues of separatism. The first situation represents a threat to the religion itself and the second represents a situation where a cause is too popular for religious institutions to ignore.
Conclusion for trend #7: Religious institutions and leaders are capable of encouraging both peace and war. Encouraging them to support the latter is a potential tool for conflict resolution.
Trend # 8: There Exist Macro-Patterns in Terrorism
David Rapoport[18] argues that modern terrorism follows a pattern of waves which last for about a generation. He describes four overlapping waves. The first was anarchist terror which dates back to the 1880s, followed by the anti-colonial wave which began in the 1920s and lasted about 40 years. The third wave, the new left wave began in the 1960s and diminished with the end of the 20th century. Finally, the religious wave began in 1979 and, according to Rapoport, if it follows the pattern of its predecessors will end around 2025. Islam is at the heart of this wave, but it also involves groups from other religions.
Rapoport defines this type of wave as “a cycle of activity in a given time period, a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in many countries driven by a common predominant energy shaping participating groups and their mutual relationships.” These waves of terror are made up of organizations. The organizations tend to have a life-span shorter than the wave with which they are associated but tend to spawn splinter or successor groups which continue their ideology and terror campaigns. When a wave’s energy is no longer able to inspire the formation of new organizations, the wave dissipates. These waves follow a generational life-cycle “which is suggestive of a human life cycle where dreams inspiring parents lose their attractiveness for children.”
Based on this theory, we are currently near the apex of the religious wave–about half way between its formation and eventual ebb. Accordingly, if Rapoport’s predictions are correct, we would expect it to start ebbing within 10 to 15 years and dissipate within 20 or 25 years. However, before this wave finishes dissipating, a fifth wave with a new ideology will likely emerge, perhaps one based on the new anarchist groups which currently protest globalization. This is because of two factors. First, there will always be those who are dissatisfied with aspects of the international system. Second, terrorism is an extremely effective tactic for groups who wish to oppose modern states.
Others, like Enders & Sandler (2002) focus on shorter-term cycles which occur within the waves described by Rapoport. These cycles are based around the tactics used by terrorists and counter-tactics used by governments to stop the terrorists. In brief, terrorists develop a new tactic for which governments are not prepared resulting in a rise in successful terror attacks. Governments develop counter-tactics which reduce the effectiveness of these attacks forcing the terrorists to develop new tactics. Similarly, new terrorist groups or cells emerge and perpetrate terror attacks. Governments become aware of these groups or cells and, through various means, harass them in order to reduce their effectiveness. This results in the formation of new groups or cells of which the government is less aware and are, thereby, more free to perpetrate attacks. Because international terror groups have links with each other, sometimes train together, and certainly are influenced by demonstration effect–the effect where one group’s successful tactics are adopted by others–it is possible to examine these cycles not only with respect to individual terror groups but also all terror groups as a whole.
Thus, within a wave of terror there are cycles in which the number of deaths caused by terror rises and falls. The length of the cycle increases with the logistical complexity of the terror tactic involved. Furthermore, these cycles are not influenced by the number of attacks or failed attacks. Rather it is the number of deaths caused. In other words, terror groups wish to inflict a certain amount of damage and tend to be willing to do what it takes to accomplish that goal. Yet government actions do influence their ability to do so which results in cycles of about two years. (Enders & Sandler, 2002)
Conclusion for trend #7: Terrorism follows cycles which play out both on the generational scale and shorter-term time-scales.
Conclusions
Overall this review shows that religion is becoming an increasingly important element of intra-state conflict. It also shows that Islam is playing a significant role in this rise in religious conflict. In 2002 religious conflicts became the majority of all intra-state conflicts listed in the State Failure dataset. Beginning in 2003 all of the religious conflicts in the SF dataset involved Muslims. While this it seems to have reached its high point thus far in the post-911 era, this trend, as well as several other documented in this study, date back to the late 1970s with the occurrence of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This initial rise in religious conflict also coincides with the beginning of the religious wave of terror described by David Rapoport. Thus, the trends that have become increasingly apparent in recent years can be traced back to events nearly three decades ago.
Based on this, these trends are not a temporary phenomenon. If David Rapoport is correct they are generational and will likely continue for another two decades, though they will likely begin to ebb sooner. However, it is arguable that this religious wave of conflict may have more staying power than previous waves for a number of reasons. Religious conflicts tend to be more intractable than others. Most forms of political conflict are over issues that in theory can be open to negotiation, no mater how reluctant one or both sides may be to enter such negotiations. Religious conflicts are often over matters of principle which are not open to negotiation. That is the motivation behind the conflict are generally of a non-bargainable nature. Wentz (1987) calls this phenomenon the “walls of religion.” People build psychological, communal, and cultural walls around their belief systems and defend them at all costs. Laustsen and Waever (2000: 719) similarly argue that “religion deals with the constitution of being as such. Hence, one can not be pragmatic on concerns challenging this being.” Thus, when a conflict includes people guided by faith and not power gains, there is little room for compromise as faith is not something that is easily compromised. This is exponentially true if both sides are guided by faith.
Thus, in many ways this is an ideological conflict between two world-views. The first is a more secular western world-view that allows for religious freedom but generally does not seek to impose religion upon those that do not want it. However, the West arguably does seek to spread elements of liberalism including free trade, human rights, and democracy across the world and, thereby, can be said to be seeking a form of ideological hegemony. The second world-view is a set of religious ideologies whose advocates seek ideological hegemony. This attitude is most readily apparent among militant Muslim fundamentalists but can be found among fundamentalists of other religions.[19]
This clash of worldviews seems more analogous to the former East-West clash between liberalism and communism which began in the early twentieth century and lasted at least until 1990. As there are still several communist states in the world it is arguable that the liberalism-communism conflict has not fully ended, but it has certainly ebbed considerably. Given this type of time-scale, the prominence of religious conflict could easily last another fifty years.
As noted earlier, predicting long-term trends using this methodology is not an exact science. However, based on the results presented here it is most likely that religious conflict will be a significant proportion of world conflict for at least the short to medium-term. This means that the next ten to twenty years will continue to see a significant amount of religious conflict and religious influence on conflict. Beyond that it is more difficult to tell but there remains a real possibility of this trend of the prominence of religion in domestic conflict will continue for several decades.
Biliography
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Appleby, R. Scott, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
Collier, Paul and Anne Hoeffler “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1), 2002, 13-28.
Dobratz, Betty A. “The Role of Religion in the Collective Identity of the White Racist Movement” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40 (2), 2001, 287-302.
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[1] For a full discussion of this body of theory and its critics see Fox (2002) and Fox & Sandler (2004).
[2] This quote is attributed to Justice Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme Court when addressing the topic of obscenity and hard-core pornography.
[3] See Turner (1991: 252-246) and Fox (2002:11-30) for a discussion of these definitions.
[4] This result is based on an analysis of the Religion (RAS) and State datset which includes information on the extent of government involvement in religion for 175 governments. For more on the dataset see Fox and Sandler (2003; 2005).
[5] See, for example, Johnston and Figa (1988), Tarrow (1989: 7), McAdam (1982: 43047), and McArthy and Zald (1976: 1217-1218)
[6] These results are based on the Religion and State dataset. For more on this dateset see the description in the Data section of this stude.
[7] See, for example, Anderson (1986), Dobratz (2001), Fox (2003), Isaacs (1975), Romanucci-Ross and DeVois (1995), and Seul (1999).
[8] Some of the studies are based on earlier versions of the MAR data which contained fewer cases.
[9] Details on the MAR dataset and the variables contained in it, as well as a copy of the dataset itself, are available at the project’s website at cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar. The supplemental data on religion and details on the variables contained in it are also available at the MAR website at cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/links under the heading of Jonathan Fox, “Ethnoreligious Conflict Dataset for Use with the Minorities at Risk Dataset”.
[10] PITF Website: . Downloaded February 1, 2006.
[11] Details on the SF dataset as well as a copy of the dataset are available at the project’s website at . A copy of the supplimental religion data fr use with the SF dataset is available from Jonathan Fox at foxjon@mail.biu.ac.il.
[12] For a basic description and analysis of this dataset with regard to non-conflict issues, see Fox (2006). A copy of this dataset is available from the author at foxjon@mail.biu.ac.il.
[13] For the purposes of this study separatist groups are those which are actively making demands for some form of independence or regional autonomy. Rebellion is measured by the MAR dataset on the following scale: 0–none.; 1–political banditry, sporadic terrorism; 2–campaigns of terrorism; 3–local rebellions; 4–small-scale guerrilla activity; 5–intermediate-scale guerrilla activity; 6–large-scale guerrilla activity; 7–protracted civil war, fought by rebel military with base areas.
[14] Each of these variables is based on a list of specific types of discrimination. For a full listing of the components of these variables see the Minorities at Risk codebook at cidcm.umd.edu/mar.
[15] For a full discussion of the clash of civilizations theory and its critics see Fox (2004) and Fox & Sandler (2004).
[16] See, for example, Tusicisny (2004), Fox (2004), and Henderson and Singer (2000).
[17] Error! Main Document Only. See, for example, Abu-Nimer (2001), Appleby (2000), and Gopin (2000; 2002).
[18] This discussion of David Rapoport’s theory is based on an unpublished updated version of David Rapoport “Modern Terror: The Four Waves” Current History, 2001: 419-425.
[19] See Appleby (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the issue of militant fundamentalism.
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