***Japan Assurances DA***



***Japan Assurances DA***ShellsProlif---1NC<Insert link>Nuclear warTanter ’17 [Richard; Senior Research Associate at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability and Director of the Nautilus Institute at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology; “Donald Trump’s Japanese and South Korean Nuclear Threat to China: A tipping point in East Asia?,” , #NCC2020A nuclear-armed Japan may come about through reluctant U.S. acceptance of a nationalist Japanese government mimicking De Gaulle’s removal of France from NATO in the 1960s, while still remaining generally aligned with ‘the West’. Or it may be the result, as Tillerson seems to envisage, of Japan being encouraged by the United States to become, as Richard Armitage advocated, ‘the Great Britain of East Asia’ – presumably in part thinking of Britain as a hyper-loyal client nuclear state, dependent on the U.S. for its missiles. This would envisage Japan as a loyal and still subordinate partner, a second tier, or at least third tier nuclear- armed state – presumably with a high level of ‘conventional weapons militarization’. This is not a thought much welcomed in Seoul, and Japanese and South Korean nuclearization will be separated only by an historical nanosecond, with Taiwan equally facing a future-defining choice about nuclear weapons development. In this fantasy of U.S. East Asian nuclear hegemony reborn, all this would be accompanied by a U.S.-led East Asian version of NATO, linked in the south to Australia, and in the wilder shores of late imperial dreaming of an ‘alliance of democracies’, to a U.S.-aligned India. What could possibly go wrong? But in the longer run, apart from the direct risks of such an event for the U.S. itself, its East Asian alliance network, now in its seventh decade, founded on Japanese and Korean acceptance of U.S. nuclear primacy and a U.S. nuclear umbrella, would change dramatically, bringing with it, for better or worse, the end of U.S. hegemony in East and Southeast Asia. Whether occurring on a Gaullist or British model, the foundations of Korean and Japanese relations with the United States would be irrevocably altered. Even leaving aside the obvious questions about the DPRK, in the event of a nuclearized Japan and South Korea, clearly the mathematical risks of nuclear war initiated in East Asia would be very much greater than even the current risks of India-Pakistan nuclear conflict. Regional nuclear security planning would be woven with multiple valences of possible perceived nuclear threats. The calculus of China-U.S. nuclear relations immediately becomes much more complex, with China facing two new potential threats, nominally at least coordinating with the U.S., in addition to the older concerns about India and Russia. For the United States, a nuclear-armed, fully ‘normalized’ Japan would never be the undoubted loyal lapdog of by then likely post-United Kingdom Little England. And the calculations of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan about each other would start and finish in historically-conditioned suspicion. At a global level, the U.S. opening the door to Japanese and Korean nuclear weapons could not fail to encourage a cascade of regional races to nuclear weapons, not only in the Western Pacific but in the Middle East, in Latin America, and quite possibly in Africa. The risks of regional nuclear war with all its now thoroughly documented catastrophic environmental and climate consequences would be both manifold and far higher than at present.**UniquenessJapan AllianceBrink---2NCThe alliance is strong now but vulnerable to missteps on key security issues.Akimoto 20, writer for the Japan Times (Satohiro, January 19th, “The Japan-U.S. alliance is stronger than ever, but that doesn't mean it's on autopilot,” The Japan Times, , #NCC2020WASHINGTON – When the Japan-U.S. security treaty was revised 60 years ago, nobody expected that it would become one of the most remarkable security alliances in history.The treaty, which is the centerpiece of the two nations’ alliance, has continuously provided a strong security architecture to protect the strategic interests — stability, peace and prosperity — of the two countries for more than half a century.The alliance evolved organically over the years and adapted to the geopolitical challenges of the times thanks to the stewardship of alliance managers in both countries. What was largely an alliance designed to guard against communism during the Cold War has now evolved into a regional and global security infrastructure that covers new domains like cyber and space.As Defense Minister Taro Kono said in Washington last week, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stronger than ever.Yet that does not mean the security relationship can run on autopilot, and it is not just because of U.S. President Donald Trump’s ungrounded criticism of Japan as a “free rider” of security.Ryozo Kato, during his time as Japanese ambassador in Washington, often remarked that the relationship between Japan and the U.S. was like “gardening.” It is one of the most beautiful gardens in the world for everybody to enjoy, but the garden requires constant, thoughtful and skillful care with a grand plan in mind. The same could be said of the security treaty, which deserves the best care possible.Being on the same pageAs we face a new set of challenges in the age of great geopolitical shift, the anniversary also presents a timely and much-needed opportunity for both countries to calibrate the alliance’s future. As it has been skillfully done in the past by statesmen from both countries, the Japan-U.S. security cooperation needs to continue to evolve in order to adapt to the ever-changing environment.Here are some of the major issues the U.S. and Japan would do well to address together:Even as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Trump’s “bromance” appears rock-solid, both countries need to be on the same page regarding major geopolitical issues, especially where the interests may not perfectly align in reality.Indeed, there was a time when Tokyo and Washington saw security threats differently.While the Japanese public has perceived China as a major security concern since the late 1990s, the U.S. saw China more as an economic opportunity rather than a security challenge, until that perception began to change in the latter years of the administration of President Barack Obama.China, which Kono last week in Washington essentially described as a threat, is one — if not the biggest — issue.The alliance is strong but vulnerable John Wright 20 U.S. Air Force officer, pilot, and a Mike and Maureen Mansfield Fellow. He is a Foreign Area Officer who specializes in Japan, and recent author of the book “Deep Space Warfare: Military Strategy Beyond Orbit.” The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government, Mansfield Foundation, or any other government or government entity. “Where No Alliance Has Gone Before: US-Japan Military Cooperation in Space”, #NCC2020With the United States’ December 21, 2019 creation of a separate and sovereign branch of its military completely devoted to space, the U.S. Space Force, the global race to emancipate a portion of national military power from terrestrial shackles and place it firmly into orbit is on.The announcement also unleashed a somewhat unexpected cascading effect: the increased attention paid to military space activities by U.S. allies and partners, who have no choice but to follow where the U.S. military moves its gravitational pull. In particular, Japan has made announcements in recent days that indicate its intention to remain in lockstep with the United States, at least in terms of defense. On January 5, 2020, scarcely two weeks following the U.S. Space Force announcement, the Japanese government indicated it plans to rename the Japan Air Self Defense Force to the Japan Aerospace Defense Force. Not coincidentally, on January 21, during a speech given on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to make the alliance “a pillar for safeguarding peace and security in both outer space and cyberspace.”While words are good, actions are better. In a less-noticed but more consequential move, the Ministry of Defense is finalizing a bill to be placed before the Diet that asks to craft a space operations-exclusive military unit staffed with 20 personnel. While this paltry number of people can barely be expected to efficiently run their task of monitoring space debris and “suspicious satellites,” the move is a significant step for a nation that often struggles with global defense developments due to Japan’s unique domestic restrictions and legal concerns. In many ways, it is surprising to see Japan, a nation that still sorties 1960s-era F-4 aircraft (though there are plans to replace them with F-35s), and is fielding their very first military Remote Piloted Aircraft (a model the United States has been flying for nearly 20 years) in 2021, take its defense posture in space seriously.These initiatives have several implications. First, the Japanese government’s attitude toward space and its place in the U.S.-Japan alliance reflects what’s at stake during the next major conflict, which will surely involve space. As an increasing number of government and commercial systems depend on space assets and space support, space can no longer be ignored as a future theater; the time is now to incorporate space into alliance strategy. This strategy, however, needs to catch up. Currently, Japan refers to space as a “new domain” in the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and briefly discusses space defense in the annual 2019 Defense of Japan white paper. Space is completely left out of the now-outdated 2015 Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation. Second, Japan’s emphasis is a good move for the alliance as a whole, and enhances its survivability. If Japan takes measurable steps to join its ally and if Japan meaningfully contributes to space security, space is less likely to become another seam where the alliance could come undone.Further, there is a strategic advantage to taking a stance on both position and form when it comes to space. While other nations will struggle to “get serious” about space, and will need to decide between size, scope, and capability of their forces, Japan has confirmed its political and defensive outlook toward space, which means it has also acknowledged space’s effect on combined alliance defense. This is good, since the political dangers posed in space are very real. Despite the existence of the well-intentioned but toothless Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits use of force activities in space, the obvious future is that space will act as yet another stage upon which the political games of earthbound nation-states will play out.Nation-state competition will not disappear as states found and fund forces to travel, explore, and exploit the inky blackness of space; rather, competition will intensify, as discoveries with both economic and defense applications are made, and as states better understand how vulnerable they are without proper space defense and deterrence. This is the political reality of space, and the fact that both members of the U.S.-Japan alliance understand this means the alliance has much less danger of breaking apart upon first contact with space-centric competition. If anything, mutual interest in the same environment will lead to cooperative efforts and a strengthened alliance here on Earth.Notably, the odds of military confrontation in space have also increased. By funneling U.S. military space power into the highest echelon of military independence and funding (an independent service), escalation and competition is not far behind. It will not be surprising if we see several other competitors forming their own service-level forces by year’s end, though their actual forms will likely vary greatly. The fact that the United States has “jumped” to a service-sized solution to military space competition, and not a smaller organization like a corps or geographic command, means other nations have no real strategic options but to match the U.S. precedent as close as they can in size and capability. The U.S.-Japan alliance must prepare for this eventuality.Japanese government decisions to strengthen its space defense capabilities thus come from a mix of terrestrial strategy, political realities, and prudent alliance management. However, significant challenges remain. For one thing, today’s nation-states (including the United States) are understandably gun-shy about sharing space defense capabilities and space-centric technology, which means alliance military space activity will naturally move at the speed of the slowest member. For another, we do not yet know just what space-on-space conflict will look like between combatants who possess similar space-based strength, which makes warfare difficult to plan for and will present an immediate challenge to alliance coordination should such a conflict occur.Despite these doubts, recent Japanese government announces are positive and will help usher both the alliance and U.S.-Japan relations through its current comparatively rocky period of trade spats and quibbles over military basing. Without a doubt, the political impact of allied space defense could easily result in the U.S.-Japan alliance extending its prerogatives beyond Earth’s territorial confines.Assurances Now---2NCAssurances do work now – the alliance is strong, but there’s latent fear of U.S. disengagementDr. Matteo Dian 19, Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the University of Bologna, Ph.D. (cum laude) in Political Science from the Scuola Normale Superiore--Italian Institute of Human and Social Sciences, “Tokyo's Strategy, Between China and the U.S.”, About Energy, 7/10/2019, #NCC2020Abe, Trump and the U.S.-Japan allianceDuring the last decade, and particularly since Shinzo Abe’s second term as prime minister, Japan has pursued different strategies to respond to China’s ascent. These strategies have focused on efforts at bolstering its alliance with the United States, which culminated in the approval of new guidelines for defense cooperation between the two countries in 2015, the building of bilateral and multilateral relations with other Asian partners such as through the “Quad” with Australia and India and the development of trans-Pacific forms of economic governance such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States has put this multidimensional strategy under serious strain. Both as a presidential candidate and as U.S. president, Trump has repeatedly expressed his skepticism about alliances and has openly accused America’s leading European and Asian partners of exploiting alliances to avoid “paying the bill” in terms of military expenditure. Trump has also voiced his opposition to renewing America’s unconditional commitment to defending its allies, arguing that alliances should be made conditional on possible economic and trade concessions.On the economic front, Trump immediately announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the TPP, a move widely interpreted in the region as benefiting Chinese state capitalism insofar as it brought to an end the attempt to shape the rules of regional economic integration in a way that would foster a form of free market capitalism. The Trump administration, moreover, has imposed tariffs against its allies, including Japan, hitting sectors like steel and aluminum.Abe’s response has been very clear, with security as his top priority along with the preservation of Japan’s alliance with Washington. Following the November 2016 elections Abe immediately set about establishing a privileged personal relationship with Trump and separating the management of the alliance from the various political and economic problems created by the new American administration.For the time being, Abe’s strategy has been successful in avoiding a deeper crisis in bilateral relations and has allayed Japanese fears of American disengagement. Also, developments that would be detrimental to Japan, such as a bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea in the absence of denuclearization, seem less likely today than in the recent past.This, however, has not completely dissipated the climate of uncertainty characterizing the alliance under President Trump’s Administration. On the one hand, Tokyo fears the danger of “entanglement” if the trade war with China were to lead to increased tension between the two global powers, including in the military sphere, on the other hand, Japan is concerned about the possibility of being “abandoned” if Trump were prepared to enter into agreements with Beijing that have the potential to damage Japanese interests and security.A2: Resilient---2NCThe U.S.-Japan alliance is solid but a rift breaks it down---that spikes Japan’s threat perceptions of China and North Korea Weston S. Konishi 19, senior fellow at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 5/23/19, “Trump and Abe: The odd couple,” #NCC2020At the invitation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, U.S. President Donald Trump will travel to Tokyo on Saturday as the first foreign leader to meet newly enthroned Emperor Naruhito. This unique honor caps off Abe’s campaign to develop a close personal rapport with his famously mercurial counterpart — including nominating Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize and presenting a set of gold-plated golf clubs to the bling-happy leader of the free world. Such largesse is not without its reasons. Japan relies on its alliance with the United States for its national security and, although China has become its largest overall trade partner, the U.S. is Japan’s largest export market. This is a bilateral relationship that Japan cannot afford to lose. Yet the Trump administration presents unique challenges for Tokyo. Not only did the administration impose steel and aluminum tariffs on Japan last year, but it forced Tokyo into bilateral trade talks to avoid even more damaging tariffs on autos and other goods. A more alarming concern is Trump’s uncertain appreciation for the strategic importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance. His statements on NATO and other alliance partners suggest a purely transactional world view, largely oblivious to the delicate nature of alliance diplomacy. An ugly trade war or a rift between the two leaders could jeopardize an alliance that Japan depends on to deter serious threats like China and North Korea. Suddenly those golden golf clubs make a whole lot of sense. It is anyone’s guess how genuine the Abe-Trump relationship really is. The political blueblood — the son of a former foreign minister and grandson of a former prime minister — and the casino man from Queens make for a very odd couple. Trump appears to have few loyalties outside his immediate family and Abe’s charm offensive, reasonable people can assume, seems more calculated than authentic. Yet those reasonable people may be wrong — the affinity between Abe and Trump may run deeper than skeptics wish to believe. Japanese who are in the know assure me with a straight face that Abe’s rapport with Trump is real, and there are not too many other world leaders who Trump calls for advice on a regular basis. There are even signs that Abe’s overtures have paid off, as seen by the Trump administration’s adoption of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” — a strategic vision first outlined by the prime minister. Ironically, Abe may find the current disrupter in chief in the White House a more kindred spirit than his cool-headed predecessor, Barack Obama. Indeed, despite all the Sturm und Drang surrounding the Trump administration, the Japanese foreign policy establishment does not pine longingly for the days of the “no drama Obama” administration. On the contrary, the open secret that Japanese foreign policy elites — who tend to be politically right of center — prefer Republican over Democratic presidents has never been more glaringly obvious than now.A2: Aegis ThumpsCancelling Aegis was a financial and political decision---the security relationship remains Tom Le 20 [Tom Le, Assistant Professor of Politics at Pomona College, specializing in Japanese security policy, war memory and reconciliation, East Asia regionalism, and militarism norms "Does Japan’s Suspended Missile System Signal a Retreating Defense Sector?," Tokyo Review, 6-23-2020, , #NCC2020The Aegis Ashore program was a risky venture from the onset due to high costs and local resistance. Akita Governor Satake Norihisa agreed that the suspension was “sensible”. Even proponents of the program, such as Defense Minister Kono, could not escape the reality that “pursuing the plan is not logical.” Some may conclude that suspension of the program is a strategic recalibration and Japan is no longer lockstep with the United States concerning regional security. Japanese interests have not changed, but sober assessments of its ability to shoulder the costs will ensure that Japan will not make promises it cannot keep. A well-functioning alliance requires more than aligned interests but aligned expectations as well.Zero negative effect on the alliance---just realigned goalsHornung 19 [Jeffrey W. Hornung, Jeffrey Hornung is a political scientist that specializes in Japanese security and foreign policies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Indo-Pacific region, including its alliances, he has Ph.D. in political science, George Washington University; M.A. in international relations (Japan studies), "Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System," Foreign Policy, 5-25-2019, , #NCC2020As important as it is to understand the factors driving Japan’s decision, it is also important to clarify what Tokyo’s cancellation does not represent. Critics of Abe will likely argue that the cancellation of the project indicates a divergence in strategic objectives between the United States and Japan, but the cancellation is better characterized as simply a different approach toward a shared objective. Even if Japan seeks to acquire a different weapons system for its defensive needs, it has maintained a highly consistent North Korea policy, even as the United States’ own policy has changed. Similarly, Tokyo’s suspension is not a repudiation of U.S. President Donald Trump. Although it is true that Tokyo decided on the system in 2017, Japan did not do so to accommodate Trump, as some have argued; rather, the idea had been percolating in Tokyo long before Trump became president early that year. Japan’s 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines, in reference to the country’s ballistic missile defense system, spoke of the need to “enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.” This “sustainable response capability” referred to a ground-based tier of missile defense. In turn, the Ministry of Defense began to research the Aegis Ashore and THAAD systems. Japan has been interested in Aegis Ashore since 2014, after the United States began developing the capability for two sites in Europe. By the time of Trump’s call to buy more American-made products and weapons, Japan had already decidedA2: Trump Thumps---2NCTrump has continued Obama’s pivot to Asia----high-level security meetings prove.Je?rey W. Hornung 19. Political scientist at the RAND Corporation, specializing in Japanese security and foreign policies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Asia-Pacific region, including its alliances; associate professor for the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; PhD, political science, George Washington University. Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship. 2nd ed. 12-17-2019. #NCC2020Recent changes on both sides of the Pacic Ocean have helped make the U.S.-Japan alliance the strongest it has ever been. In the United States, President Barack Obama pursued a rebalancing strategy to the Asia-Pacic that signicantly elevated Japan’s strategic value. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe passed a set of security laws on September 19, 2015, to ensure Japan will be able to play a more proactive contribution to peace.1 And on April 27, 2015, the allies released new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Much like the heightened expectations of a more proactive Japan that followed the revised National Defense Program Guidelines in 2004 and the completion of the Defense Policy Review Initiative with the United States in 2006, the passage of the security legislation and revision of the Defense Guidelines has once again raised expectations that the alliance will be more e?ective and proactive in addressing security issues throughout the Asia-Pacic region and beyond.This is unlikely to change, even under the Donald Trump administration. Visits by Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Japan and Prime Minister Abe to the United States in President Trump’s first month served to reinforce the positive trajectory of security ties by reiterating past commitments to the alliance. What is more, even if the Obama administration’s ‘rebalance’ strategy to the Asia-Pacific is eliminated, or drastically changed, the Asia-Pacic will remain of crucial consequence to U.S. national security. is is a function of the region’s economic and security importance. Central to successful U.S. engagement will be Japan.The alliance has weathered Trump’s rhetoricJapan Times 20. "Trump touts U.S.-Japan alliance as treaty turns 60, but urges Tokyo to do more". Japan Times. 1-19-2020. #NCC2020Trump said in the statement that the alliance is “rock-solid” and acknowledged that it has been “essential to peace, security, and prosperity” for both countries and the region over the past six decades. On Sunday, Japan and the United States marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of their security treaty, an alliance they call the “cornerstone” of peace and stability in the region. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and members of his Cabinet participated in a commemorative reception in Tokyo on Sunday afternoon, which was also attended by Joseph Young, charge d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, and Lt. Gen. Kevin B. Schneider, commander of U.S. forces stationed in the country. “Today, more than ever, the Japan-U.S. security treaty is a pillar that is indestructible, a pillar immovable, safeguarding peace in Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and in the world, while assuring prosperity therein,” Abe said in his speech. Abe said the alliance should become even more robust to “safeguard freedom, liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, one that sustains the whole world, 60 years and 100 years down the road.” The treaty is the basis for the U.S. military’s stationing of troops in Japan. Along with U.S. bases, Japan also hosts the Ronald Reagan, the only American aircraft carrier to be home-ported abroad. In June last year, Trump complained that under the treaty, even if the United States were attacked, Japan would not be required to help and could “watch it on a Sony television.” The alliance has faced domestic criticism, too. Some point to Japan’s position under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” as being at odds with the country’s efforts to abolish nuclear weapons as the world’s only target of an atomic bombing. There is also persistent local opposition against hosting U.S. forces in Okinawa, which is home to about 70 percent of the total area of land exclusively used by U.S. military facilities in Japan, amid repeated accidents and cases of assault and rape by American troops. Still, the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States said Friday in a joint statement that the alliance “has played and will continue to play an integral role in ensuring the peace and security of our two countries, while realizing our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” “Our alliance is stronger, broader, and more essential today than ever,” Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Defense Minister Taro Kono said along with their U.S. counterparts, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper. Signed in 1960 by the governments of then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi — Abe’s grandfather — and then-President Dwight Eisenhower, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States replaced a 1951 agreement that helped form the basis of relations between the countries following the end of World War II. The revised treaty removed a clause in the earlier version that allowed the United States to intervene to quell insurgencies within Japan, and made explicit Washington’s obligation to defend Japan from an armed attack. Abe has worked to boost Japan’s role in the alliance, in 2014 removing an outright ban on exporting weapons and reinterpreting the pacifist Constitution to allow the Self-Defense Forces to protect allies in certain situations under collective self-defense.**LinkJapanFraming---2NCJapanese perceptions are the only relevant factor---they might be totally false, but they think the DA is true and will act on itEmily Cura Saunders 16, PhD Candidate at the Claremont Graduate University and Graduate Research Associate at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Bryan L. Fearey, Director of the National Security Office at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “To Pursue an Independent Nuclear Deterrent or Not? Japan’s and South Korea’s Nuclear Decision Making Models”, in Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges, Ed. Apikyan and Diamond, p. 39-40 #NCC2020A major security concern for Japan is a rising China, both in its military strength and economic policies. The Japanese worry that their economic edge of the 1980s has been in decline due to competition with China, and as a result, China is becoming competitive vis-a?-vis regional economic dominance. The Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a Third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue forum in which they note, “Japan is seriously studying the American strategic posture in this region. Will the US choose Japan or China as a strategic partner? Will it choose neither? Unless the US chooses to promote the Japan-US relationship to a level like that of the Anglo-American special relationship, Japan may withdraw from the alliance and the US may find itself an isolated power in the Pacific.”58 This relationship needs to be carefully considered when thinking about Japan’s potential nuclear.Similarly, Japan watches how the United States deals with North Korea. Japanese officials want to know how the United States will stem the tide of proliferation in the region. The United States has a long history of assurances when it comes to Japanese anxieties over nuclear posture. A more recent development is that Japan has asked to be more involved in the process of nuclear posture planning. The Japan Times noted that “Two days after the latest nuclear test by the North, U.S. President Barack Obama told Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a telephone meeting that there would be no change whatsoever in America’s commitment to defend Japan, including nuclear deterrence through its nuclear umbrella over Japan.”59 The United States needs to continually express its intent to provide Japan with security in both words and deeds. It is important that the United States continually involves Japan in discussions concerning the nuclear umbrella. Japan finds itself on the same tightrope the United States finds itself on, specifically how to applaud/pursue reductions of and emphasis on nuclear weapons while simultaneously maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Japan was apparently sufficiently satisfied with the final draft of the 2010 NPR and their consultations beforehand. However, Japan was insistent on further discussions addressing more willing to talk of their specific concerns, holding high-level meetings to discuss the details and implications of the 2010 NPR. There were, however, still a few points of contention. One of the largest issues between Japan and the United States on the NPR is the different threat priorities. While Japan is not impervious or ignorant towards terrorism, they see state actors as their main threats, whereas the NPR identified nuclear terrorism as the highest priority, specifically “preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.”60 Japan, on the other hand, sees China and North Korea as its biggest threats, not terrorism. In the Pacific Forum dialogue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Japanese participants have warned of a potential problem should the United States not pay sufficient attention to traditional state-based nuclear security threats.”61 Another point of contention was how the 2010 NPR dealt with China. The NPR stated, The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats, such as WMD proliferation and terrorism, are growing. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in supporting international rules, norms, and institutions.62 This is in stark contrast to the stance as articulated in from Japan’s White Papers (vide supra). This less-than-confrontational language in the 2010 NPR further increases Japan’s anxieties about the U.S.-Sino relationship. While the fear of abandonment may not be analytically founded, the fear remains that perhaps the United States will look for different allies in the region. Should Japan believe that the United States and China were becoming closer, would they be inclined to either look for security guarantees elsewhere, or move toward an independent deterrent? While these sources of tension exist, Japan is nevertheless very proud of its partnership with the United States, and vice-a-versa. The aforementioned 2013 White Paper highlighted the US-Japan partnership. It explained the “peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.”63 Japan, like South Korea, has never actually pursued a nuclear weapons program. They have, however, like South Korea had major security threats and tensions. The security model does not hold true in this case. Japan is surrounded by two nuclear weapons states, each of which has continually provoked Japan, and yet, while some of these threats are quite provocative, Japan has yet to respond with direct proliferation activities. Japan does, however, closely monitor its relationship with the United States, and when regional threats are coupled with a perceived wavering of U.S. support and commitment, Japan is more likely to hint at an independent deterrent.U.S. reassurance is key to restrain and moderate the trajectory of Japanese defense modernization---the plan causes it to rapidly escalate Joseph Karam 15, foreign policy and national security observer, Norwich University MA in Diplomacy Studies concentrating on International Terrorism, 5/15/15, “Rising Sun: The Case for Japan’s Military Normalization,” #NCC2020In the decades since the end of World War II, the U.S., recognizing the shifting interests within the geopolitical landscape of South East Asia, encouraged Japan to increase its defense posture – working over time to slowly move them toward military normalization. Historically, Japan has resisted contributing to regional defense initiatives, choosing instead to rely more on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, between the U.S. and itself (an agreement that guaranteed the U.S. would protect Japan from military aggression); however, this position began to shift in the 1990s following the rise in Chinese military power, and in the recent decade has caused Japan to alter course from its pacifist doctrine. Japan is not only witnessing the emergence of a more assertive China, which is looking to exert its dominance over the region, but also a belligerent and unpredictable North Korea that is experimenting with new and more advanced weapons systems (i.e., nuclear weapons, medium and long range ballistic missile). Even though Japan’s pacifist constitution restricts its ability to maintain a standing military, its constitution allows for the creation of a self-defense force. While the acquisition of military hardware and the build up of troops began as a humble undertaking, it has since blossomed into a highly advanced and formidable military force. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, arguably its most important “military” branch, consists of an amalgam of highly sophisticated naval weapon systems. The Soryu-class submarine is among the worlds most advanced non-nuclear attack submarines, it is able to displace 4,100 tons submerged, allowing it to achieve 20 knots under water and 13 knots on the surface. The Soryu-class is equipped with a full compliment of 20 type 89 high-speed homing torpedoes, as well as American-made anti-ship Harpoon missiles. The Soryu-class is also capable of utilizing advanced cruise missiles, which, should the need arise; will provide Japan a preemptive strike capability. The Atago-class destroyer, as well as its predecessor the Kongo-class, offers the Japanese a versatile surface combat platform, capable of engaging multiple threat environments. The Atago-class destroyer is outfitted with the MK-45 lightweight artillery gun, two MK-141 missile launchers, that provide up to eight ship-to-ship missiles, and a MK-15 Phalanx Close-In-Weapon-System – capable of defending against anti-ship missiles, aircraft, and littoral warfare threats. Japan’s naval capabilities have the potential to help stifle an increasingly aggressive Chinese military posture, as well as ensure the protection of its territorial sovereignty. The deployment of these naval weapon systems can profoundly complicate Chinese, or North Korean military calculations in the region, causing them to stop and consider the ramifications of pushing for the establishment of a hegemony in South East Asia, or even, in the case of North Korea, pursuing provocative military action against Japan. Not to be out done, Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force is at the cutting edge of aviation technology. The “tip of the spear” in Japan’s air combat arsenal is the Mitsubishi F-15J – a homemade redesigned version of the American F-15 Eagle, this veteran fighter jet comes equipped with numerous air-to-air missiles, and has been in a perpetual state of evolution during its 30+ years of deployment – enjoying numerous retrofits and upgrades to its radar and electronic guidance systems. While the F-15J is an excellent fighter aircraft, combat aviation technology has advanced beyond F-15Js current capabilities – Japan is already beginning to plan for its replacement. The Japanese, at one point, expressed interest in purchasing the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, however, the U.S., for a variety of reasons, were not keen on selling it. Japan is set to join the American Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment Program (ALGS), which is an eight nation logistical partnership created to sustain the manufacturing and operation of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, commonly referred to as the Joint Strike Fighter. In joining the ALGS, Japan has said that it is interested in manufacturing components for the F-35, which would mean relaxing its long established ban on the export of military hardware. The potential inclusion of Japan in the ALGS is a major shift in Japan’s military posture, and represents a watershed moment in the transfer of military technology from the U.S. to Japan. If this agreement goes through, any doubts about the direction of Japan’s military normalization will be laid to rest. Japan possesses the third largest economy in the world, coupled with advanced manufacturing capabilities, and a massive population – Japan has the potential to reemerge as a major player on the global stage. Japanese recognize the threat environment in which it exists, and as Prime Minister Abe moves Japan toward military normalization, he has sent a clear signal to Japan’s neighbors that it will not acquiesce to a Chinese predetermined status quo and it will not tolerate military posturing from North Korea. Over the years, China has been working toward developing the military capability that would allow it to establish an anti-access/area denial (A2-AD) zone in the western pacific (A2-AD is a strategy that focuses on preventing an enemy from conducting military operations in, near, or within a specific region). In the event that a military confrontation was to occur, the Chinese, utilizing A2-AD stratagem, want to neutralize U.S. power projection in the western pacific. This would limit the ability for the U.S. to respond to, for example, a military annexation of Taiwan, or one of the many territorial disputes currently playing out in the South China Sea. From a U.S. perspective, the emergence of a robust and formidable Japanese military will be indispensible in acting as a countermeasure to the Chinese implementing an effective A2-AD strategy. There are many factors to consider when discussing Japan’s military normalization, however, none are more important than ensuring Sino-Japanese relations remain on an even keel. Sino-Japanese relations have a long and checkered past, mostly due to the fact that China, as well as the Korean Peninsula suffered tremendous hardship and cruelty under the yoke of Japanese imperialism. Japan’s push toward military normalization has the potential to awaken the deep seeded mistrust that has always plagued Sino-Japanese relations. Prime Minister Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party are firmly in control of Japanese Parliament, and are unlikely to face any meaningful political challenge for several years. Recognizing this opportunity, Prime Minister Abe has taken the necessary steps to fundamentally alter the geopolitical outlook of Japan – the U.S. will play a critical role in ensuring that this shift in Japan’s military posture does not occur at a pace that would unwittingly escalate Sino-Japanese tensions. There is a delicate balancing act playing out, on the one hand the U.S. wants to bolster Japanese military capabilities, in the hopes of deterring Chinese military ambitions, but at the same time, the U.S. must maintain positive relations with Beijing – needless to say, the coming decades will require some deft diplomatic maneuvering to maintain regional stability. If the U.S. is able to keep Japan on its course toward military normalization, without exacerbating tensions with Beijing, then the U.S., in Japan, will discover a robust and formidable partnership that can help maintain U.S. influence in the Western Pacific and South East Asia for the foreseeable future.Alliance distrust ruins umbrella credibility – the credibility of the umbrella hinges on political ties not the other way around, so only we control whether Japan prolifs Oliveira 19 [Dr. Henrique Altemani de Oliveira is a professor of International Relations at the University of Brazil. MA and PhD in Sociology from the University of Sao Paulo. Japan: A Nuclear State? May 23, 2019. scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292019000100207] #NCC2020The Japanese security architecture is nurtured by a tripe composed by the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and by the nuclear protection from its cover by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its commitment to extended deterrence. On the one hand, the role of the JSDF is at present much more compatible with armed forces than with a self-defense mechanism. With advanced military capacities, it participates in collective self-defense actions, - with or without the U.S. presence, - as a way to contribute to the maintenance of regional and international security (Smith 2016; Paris 2016; Oros 2017; Samuels and Wallace 2018). Confronted with the insecurities related to the Japanese militarization, the maintenance of the Constitution’s Article 9 tends to be viewed as a demonstration of Japan’s pacifist character, which is reinforced by the continuity of the Japan-U.S. alliance. It should be noted that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty gradually has been transformed into an alliance that is characterized by a variety of lines of security cooperation directives between these two actors, with relatively symmetrical roles, with the nuclear capacity as the main asymmetry.As it is strongly dependent upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence, Japan has become confronted with a dilemma of whether or not to believe in a U.S. response to a real threat. Faced with such doubts, the pragmatic response from the Japanese leadership has been to seek to acquire nuclear technology as well as the plutonium resources that would allow it to develop its own deterrence capacity. Yet, Japan still makes it clear that its position is to reinforce the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and to stay below the U.S. nuclear protection. In this regard, the nuclear option aimed at the acquisition of such weapons will only be chosen if the Alliance and/or the nuclear protection would be discontinued. On the other hand, the U.S. distrust in relation to the Japanese nuclear potential, or the consolidation of a military partnership, has been relatively minimized, with the U.S. assuming a more tolerant - if not outright encouraging - posture.For Japan there is still a significant issue, which often is not directly addressed, but which in practice relates to a belief that the mastering of nuclear knowledge and the consequent possession of nuclear weaponry confers a differentiated status to a state, thus permitting it to obtain a special locus amongst international powers. In a normal situation, Japan would be conscious of the importance which its cooperation with the U.S. holds in relation to the American interests within the region. In other terms, Japan needs the U.S., in much the same way that the U.S. needs Japan in order to continue its international policy with focus on East Asia. To this can be added the considerations related to the potential financial, economic, political, and diplomatic costs which Japan would have to assume in order to contain reactions, especially from China, The Korean Peninsula, South East Asia, and even Russia. Even so, with a possible rupture, the response from the Japanese leadership might well be immediate, as the population, - in spite of its pacifism and systematic nuclear opposition, - seems to be conscious of the vulnerabilities and total insecurity in a regional context marked by threat and insecurity.Link Wall---2NCThey closely watch for signs of reduction and read into them as weakening credibility---spurs offensive prolifJustin V. Anderson 13, Senior National Security Policy Analyst with SAIC and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Director of Research at the NATO Defense College, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER, September, #NCC2020Responding to allied concerns regarding the ability of the United States to field conventional forces sufficient to their defense is also important for the purposes of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sophisticated conventional weapons. In the late 1960s, for example, the removal of a division of U.S. ground forces from the ROK – part of the Nixon administration’s broader efforts to reduce the U.S. military presence in East Asia – led Seoul to quietly explore the possible development of its own nuclear weapons program. U.S. diplomatic pressure, together with assurances it would maintain a significant military footprint on the Korean Peninsula, ultimately convinced the ROK to drop these efforts. Its actions, however, revealed a connection between the size and strength of in-country or regional U.S. military forces backing extended deterrence guarantees and an ally’s interest in pursuing its own independent nuclear deterrent as an insurance policy against potential future adversary attacks. U.S. allies that fear U.S. security guarantees are weak or fading may seek other means to ensure they are protected from their adversaries – to include nuclear weapons, if they feel nuclear deterrence is critical to their security.A mix of conventional and nuclear U.S. military forces, and deployments of these forces in sufficient strength to counter adversary threats, have provided a protective umbrella over U.S. allies from a range of threats for decades. For many allies, however, their heavy reliance on this umbrella leads them to closely observe U.S. decisions to shift, drawdown, or otherwise change the numbers or posture of U.S. military forces assigned to, or associated with, extended deterrence and assurance missions. They are deeply concerned by any move that may imply the United States is less able to defend them. As demonstrated by the U.S. experience with the ROK during the Cold War, it is important for the United States to rapidly respond to these concerns to prevent an ally from making a decision that will complicate or abrogate U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies and/or destabilize regional security.Overall posture in Asia is carefully tailored to include a mix of capabilities that is perceived as highly credible---even small changes throw off the balanceJustin V. Anderson 13, Senior National Security Policy Analyst with SAIC and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Director of Research at the NATO Defense College, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER, September, #NCC2020Tailoring Extended Deterrence and Assurance StrategiesThe framework presented in Figure 1.1 is intended to communicate the critically important concept that assuring allies, and extending deterrence against their potential adversaries, requires the United States to carefully tailor policies, strategies, and plans combining effective military capabilities with clear demonstrations of political resolve. This requires national leaders, policy makers, diplomats, intelligence analysts, defense strategists, and military planners to work together to ensure the seamless integration of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies and policies – despite their differing requirements. Moreover, it also requires all of these U.S. actors to understand that any changes to these strategies and policies – to include perceived changes – can have a ripple effect affecting the cost-benefit calculations of numerous U.S. allies and/or their potential adversaries. This reflects the central importance of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies to the security of allies and the strategizing of their opponents. It also throws into sharp relief the degree of difficulty associated with tailoring these strategies for individual actors within a complex, dynamic geopolitical environment.Alliance---2NCDefense pact is key to the US-Japan alliance---that solves regional stability and growth Reynolds 19 Isabel Reynolds, Bloomberg News. Everything You Need to Know About the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty Irking Trump June 25, 2019, 2:58 AM EDT #NCC2020A longstanding defense treaty between the U.S. and Japan is the latest international agreement to attract the ire of President Donald Trump. He is said to have mused about withdrawing from the treaty because he sees it as one-sided, since it promises U.S aid if Japan is ever attacked but doesn’t oblige Japan’s military to come to America’s defense. A U.S. withdrawal would represent a fundamental shift in an alliance that has helped guarantee security in Asia, laying the foundation for the region’s economic rise.1. What is the treaty?It was first signed in 1951 along with the Treaty of San Francisco that officially ended World War Two. Revised in 1960, the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan” grants the U.S. the right to base military forces in Japan in exchange for the promise that America will defend the nation if it’s ever attacked. Under some circumstances, the treaty would include the U.S. defending Japan from cyberattacks. During the U.S. occupation after World War II, the Americans imposed a pacifist constitution that prohibited Japan from maintaining land, sea or air forces.2. What does the U.S. get out of it?The U.S. was initially anxious to maintain a bulwark against the communist bloc in Asia; Russian military planes still regularly fly around the Japanese coast in what experts say is an effort to monitor U.S. activity in Japan. U.S. bases in Japan, which are concentrated in the southern prefecture of Okinawa, formed a launchpad for the U.S. wars in Korea in the 1950s and later in Vietnam. The U.S. Seventh Fleet -- based in the central Japan port of Yokosuka -- has helped maintain the security and stability that’s been essential to the economic and trade growth of the region, benefiting U.S. exporters.Reverse Causal---Prolif---2NCEnding the defense pact cause Japanese prolif---causes arms racing and collapses other alliances Reynolds 19 Isabel Reynolds, Bloomberg News. Everything You Need to Know About the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty Irking Trump June 25, 2019, 2:58 AM EDT #NCC20204. What would an end to the treaty mean?It would risk ceding security of the Western Pacific to China and potentially spurring a fresh nuclear arms race. Shelter from the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella has allowed Japan to avoid developing its own arsenal -- a move that would raise tensions in China and the Korean Peninsula, where memories of past Japanese aggression run deep. To get around the constitutional ban, Japan has gradually built up a military it refers to as the Self-Defense Forces and has introduced modern weaponry, much of it purchased from the U.S., with an annual defense budget of 5 trillion yen. The loss of U.S. protection, combined with the proximity of nuclear-armed North Korea and a rapidly burgeoning Chinese military, might be enough to push Japan down the nuclear route. It would also call into question the U.S.’s military commitments to Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and a host of other allies around the world.Ending the defense pact causes arms racing Hannon 19 Elliot Hannon, Slate staff writer. Trump Reportedly Has Mused to Aides About Ending U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty Because It’s Too “One-Sided” #NCC2020Bloomberg’s reporting acknowledges that there’s no indication the Trump White House has made any moves on altering the treaty with Japan, but this is how harebrained Trump ideas become harebrained Trump policies. What are the consequences of Trump’s 24-hour cable news strategic goals? Well, for starters, “scrapping the treaty would risk ceding security of the Western Pacific to China and potentially spurring a fresh nuclear arms race, if Japan decided it needed to protect itself from nuclear-armed neighbors,” Bloomberg notes. “It would also call into question the U.S.’s military commitments to Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and a host of other allies around the world.” Senkakus---1NCThe flipside of entrapment concern is abandonment---protection of ECS is key to restrain JapanBasu 20 [Dr. Titli Basu is Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre in Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. “In an uncertain East Asia, Japan's security choices face balancing act between U.S. and neighbors,” 1-22, , #NCC2020Alliance security dilemmaPursuing Japan’s national interests within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework demands undoing the critique of asymmetrical reciprocity. For this 70-plus-year-old alliance to serve as an effective regional stabilizer, its scope needs to be normalized, equalized and enlarged. The “ironclad” defense pledges in the alliance exist alongside the security dilemma of abandonment and entrapment dynamics. On one hand, as the secondary power who is more dependent on the U.S. for its security, abandonment apprehension is prevalent in Japanese discourse. On the other hand, U.S. entrapment concerns regarding the East China Sea are a reality given the high costs of a military confrontation with China.As Washington demands mutuality in alliance arrangements, Japan has stepped up in coordinating with the United States within its Defense Guidelines, which anchor the division of roles between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. forces and outline how militaries will interact in peacetime and during contingencies, through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the U.S. forces enjoy high interoperability, and a majority of the big-ticket items acquired by Japan are being procured or coproduced under license from America.The challenge of alliance management and hedging against U.S. abandonment under U.S. President Donald Trump’s insular “America First” approach while managing geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges is testing Tokyo’s options. Japan will certainly continue to incrementally step up its contribution toward the alliance as the top priority with the intention of averting abandonment and shaping a regional order favorable to Japan’s national interests. Nevertheless, the gradual erosion of U.S. primacy and fluidity in the regional security architecture is making Japan weigh the depth of American commitment to Japan’s security. In some quarters, this is also leading to arguments in favor of Japan becoming more self-reliant in terms of security.A ‘normal’ JapanThe normalization proposition remains at the heart of the security debate. The concept of normalization does not imply militarization. It is rather situated in the context of enabling Japan to contribute to international peacekeeping activities and constitutional change. Ichiro Ozawa’s seminal work “Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation” is a valuable account on this line of thinking.The conversation on a “normal” Japan gained momentum during the Gulf War, following Japan’s failed effort to send out the SDF in support of the U.S.-led, U.N.-authorized coalition, and the subsequent criticism of Japan for checkbook diplomacy after Tokyo’s contribution of $13 billion. The normalists contest the notion of Japan’s exceptionalism, drawn from its World War II experience and the subsequent constitutional constraint limiting Japan’s normal participation in international affairs. They support constitutional revision of Article 9 and support progressively increasing Japan’s responsibilities within the alliance frame in order to assist the United States in managing the global order.But Tokyo’s normalization discourse has raised alarm among regional neighbors as they envisage what Japan aims to accomplish under the rubric of normalization. Beijing and Pyongyang have often accused Tokyo of engineering an external threat argument to realize the objective of re-militarization.Maximizing autonomyUndoing the postwar political order imposed by American Occupation is often pushed by the far-right, who lack trust in the U.S. commitment to protect Japan under Article 5 of the security treaty. They support rearming Japan, commensurate with its economic status, since it is irrational for a resource-deficient Japan to rely on other nations for secured passage of its critical supplies in the maritime space.Nevertheless, in the current strategic environment, given the costs and challenges of attaining security by means of maximizing autonomy or multilateralism, Tokyo’s best option remains bolstering its alliance with the United States. Japan’s pursuit of autonomy outside the alliance framework would erode U.S. protection. In addition, it will also deepen the trust deficit among regional stakeholders.Japan opposes the rise of a Sino-centric regional order. Being a “beneficiary” of the U.S.-led international order, Japan’s resolve is to buttress that order, even as the balance of power shifts in East Asia. Going forward, Japan will continue to build its deterrence and incrementally expand the role of the SDF within the framework of the U.S. alliance.While Washington waits for Tokyo to assume greater responsibilities in managing regional security, the challenge for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is to articulate in certain terms what entails a “proactive contribution to peace.” Abe must solve the puzzle of demonstrating to its most valued strategic partner that Tokyo is ready to share the load of safeguarding regional security, while factoring in the sensitivities of regional stakeholders.Senkakus---2NCDefense of islands is key to shore up alliancesTeo 19 [Victor Teo, Assistant Professor in the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Hong Kong and is concurrently Affiliated Faculty with the China Studies Program and Korean Studies Program at the university, “Japan’s Rejuvenation and the US-China Divide,” Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power, pp 107-132, 4-9, , #NCC2020Assistant Professor in the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Hong Kong and is concurrently Affiliated Faculty with the China Studies Program and Korean Studies Program at the universityThe handling of the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands was regarded as rightful in some quarters in Japan, while there were contrarian views that Japan was risking war to save the US-Japan alliance, as most constituents in Japan’s political entity did not expect this kind of response from China—even though the country’s ambassador to China, Uichiro Niwa, had warned in June 2011, after communications with the Chinese, that a move to “nationalize” the islands would trigger an “extremely grave crisis” and “decades of past efforts would be brought to nothing” (Financial Times, June 6, 2012; Straits Times, January 28, 2018). There is a view that Japan’s almost “reckless” behavior in attempting to “purchase” the islands was not an administrative blunder caused by the DPJ’s inexperience in foreign policy in general or with China in particular, but rather an all-out attempt by conservative elements within Japan to forestall the realization of a greater threat—that the US and China might have been moving toward a new East Asian shared paradigm by which they would adopt a shared security architecture (Harner 2012; White 2013). This is the classic “abandonment” dilemma of alliance theory.Shinzo Abe’s victory came on the heels of the US “pivot” to Asia after Secretary Clinton announced President Obama’s new initiative to focus on Asia. While Japan was contesting China in the East China Sea, the Philippines and Vietnam confronted China in the South China Sea. The US pivot rested nicely on these fulcrum points. What was happening in the East China Sea must be contextualized against a larger hegemonic struggle that was going on in the South China Sea. This happy coincidence of the rise of the Abe 2.0 administration, coupled with the refocusing of US policy, meant that the alliance became even more important in taking down China, by now widely perceived as an irredentist systemic challenger.The argument against overreliance on the US-Japan security alliance is well rehearsed and often heard: is it too much for Japan to trust the US to go to war for them against China in order to defend Japanese interests? Apart from its military strength, today’s China is stronger in almost every way than the USSR was. China believes that time is on its side; if anything, the aggressive diplomatic maneuvers on the part of the US in response to China’s emerging Ocean strategy is a reaffirmation of this view. As the quote from former Tokyo Governor Ishihara shows, a real but unspoken thought in Japanese minds is how far would the US go to defend Japanese interests against China. Despite the promises of senior US officials and successive presidents, Japanese officials wonder privately if Washington’s actions would match up to its rhetoric, especially if the conflict was over something that Washington considered non-essential. Beyond that, being chain-ganged into a conflict with China is something that Tokyo should not take lightly, given the Trump presidency. The treaty binds Japan to US military action that is decided primarily in Washington D.C. Not all issues that crop up in a US-China confrontation would necessarily involve Japan, and even if they did, Japanese domestic circumstances or national consensus might not allow Tokyo to intervene. In order to enhance the military aspects of Japan’s normalization, the Japanese government has over the course of the last 15 years striven to beef up its military strength, even though it is confined by the US-Japan alliance. Regardless of what the official position is, from a theoretical perspective, tightening the alliance under the guise of “normalization,” even though convenient, is likely to make Japan more dependent rather than less.It is this overt dependency that should be reconsidered. The inhibiting constraints of the US-Japan security alliance is well known and well understood by most Japanese commentators and US officials. One need not look far—the literature on technological cooperation between the US and Japan in the field of high-tech defense, such as in space cooperation or the Joint Strike fighter, is replete with these references. Officially, the treaty puts the US and Japan on equal footing as allies. Unofficially, even though the treaty has appeared from different angles to treat the US and Japan on unfair terms, what is surprising is how officials in both countries have consistently managed and interpreted the alliance to their advantage, and persuaded domestic audiences and third parties of its worth.From the Japanese perspective, there are three important reasons for doing so. First, Japanese officials are of the view that this partnership, despite its imperfections and issues, provides Japan with the easiest, best and cheapest security insurance for them to hedge militarily against China. This is a neighborhood security concern, and backyard fires triumph security concerns elsewhere. The second reason is tactical. Given Japan’s penchant for a political low profile and relative inexperience in global affairs, partnering with the US might offer them relatively low barriers of entry into the affairs of regions afar. With decades of experience under their belt, riding alongside the superpower through the alliance is a great way to sell the alliance both at home and reassure Japanese neighbors abroad. Third, it socializes China to the fact that Japan can and will act in concert with the US to defend itself, and that China has little or no chance of prying this alliance apart. Most importantly, the tightening of embrace prevents China from usurping Japan’s role in the alliance. This fear of abandonment is as real as the fear of entrapment into a war caused by excessive American adventurism.Senkakus are a major area of interest for Japan---removing security guarantee collapses security relationship French 18 (Erik David Ph.D. in Political Science, Syracuse University, August 2018, “The US-Japan Alliance and China 's Rise: Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence,” 5-22-20, , #NCC2020Each of the three great powers has a stake in the future of the Senkaku Islands and the ECS more broadly. The US’ takes no side in disputes over the sovereignty of the Senkakus or the validity of each states’ EEZ claims. The US does, however, have a reputational interest at stake given Japan’s current administrative control over the Senkakus. If the US were to allow Japan to be coerced into relinquishing the islands to China, it would likely damage Japan’s confidence in the US commitment to Japanese security more generally. The Senkakus also form part of the first island chain, a series of islands running from Japan to the Malay archipelago which curtail the Chinese Navy’s (PLAN) ability to access the West Pacific, and therefore have strategic significance for US efforts to keep Chinese maritime power in check. 7 Japan and China each have significant interests in the Senkakus and ECS. Japan worries that Chinese control over the Senkakus could better allow the PLAN to threaten Japanese sealanes.8 China aspires to expand its maritime influence and break out of the first island chain. Japan and China both have an interest in accessing the potential untapped (albeit limited) seabed resources in the ECS, including modest oil and gas fields.9 There are also potentially lucrative fishing grounds in the ECS that both states would prefer to control.10Senkakus---A2: Alliance Remains---2NCSenkaku is key---removal of security guarantee ruins the alliance Chellaney 17 [Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, “Japan's Senkaku challenge,” 2-27, , #NCC2020The Feb. 12 Trump-Abe joint statement came out strongly for the Senkakus’ defense: “The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. … The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force.”This unambiguous commitment should be seen as an important success of Abe’s proactive diplomacy in seeking to build a personal connection with the new U.S. president. Abe was the first foreign leader Trump hosted at Mar-a-Lago, which he calls “the southern White House.” Earlier, just after Trump’s unexpected election victory, Abe met face to face with him by making a special stop in New York en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru.Let’s be clear: The Senkaku issue is not just about a 7-sq.-km piece of real estate or the potential oil and gas reserves that lie around it. The strategically located Senkakus, despite their small size, are critical to maritime security and the larger contest for influence in the East China Sea and beyond.China is seeking to wage a campaign of attrition against Japan over the Senkakus by gradually increasing the frequency and duration of its intrusions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters. In doing so, it has made the rest of the world recognize the existence of a dispute and the risks of armed conflict.Japan Link UniquenessDefense Cooperation---2NCThe alliance will remain strong because we are maintaining defense cooperation.Vernuccio 19, Frank Vernuccio serves as editor-in-chief of the New York Analysis of Policy and Government (Frank, May 12th, “Vernuccio’s View: U.S.-Japan Coordinate Pacific Defense Vs. China,” , #NCC2020The U.S. – Japan Security Consultative Committee, with the participation of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Kono, and Minister of Defense Iwaya met in Washington on April 19. The two nations agreed to continue to play an “indispensable role in upholding a rules-based international order and promoting their shared values, noting that their strategic defense policies aligned with each other.” The United States reiterated its commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional and nuclear.The participants “affirmed their strong commitment to realize a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific,’ a shared vision for a region in which all nations are sovereign, strong and prosperous. The U.S.-Japan Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and remains iron-clad amid an increasingly complex security environment…[they] reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining readiness to face threats in the Indo-Pacific region, and discussed tangible ways to implement the National Defense Strategy and Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines. Both parties agreed to enhance alliance capabilities and interoperability across the conventional, cyber, and space domains. Secretary Shanahan expressed appreciation for Minister Iwaya’s leadership, which has further strengthened the alliance and helped to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”In a thinly veiled reference to China, both Washington and Tokyo expressed concern about “geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” In return, they stressed the need to deepen regional cooperation, led by the U.S. and Japan. They also noted the rapidly evolving challenges in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. In response, they pledged to deepen their joint endeavors to counter the threats.Senkakus---2NCStatus quo is solid---carefully balancing China and Japan to prevent escalationFrench 18 (Erik David Ph.D. in Political Science, Syracuse University, August 2018, “The US-Japan Alliance and China 's Rise: Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence,” 5-22-20, , #NCC2020In the context of the ECS dispute, the US has attempted to balance reassurance and deterrence toward China. On the one hand, the US seeks to reassure China that the US and its Japan will not fundamentally alter the status quo in the ECS by developing or militarizing the Senkaku Islands. On the other hand, the US seeks to deter China from challenging Japan’s administrative control of the Senkaku Islands through military coercion. The logic of strategic coordination suggests that US alliance strategy will play a critical role in its attempts to influence China. When the US distances itself from the dispute, it will cause acute fears of abandonment in Japan. If Japan fears abandonment too intensely, it may hedge by either adopting a confrontational or accommodative stance toward China. This behavior will undercut US reassurance and deterrence toward China.**ImpactAlliancesAlliances Solve War---2NCAlliances solve global stability Murphy 16 Martin N. Murphy, PhD is a Visiting Fellow at Corbett Centre for Maritime Studies at King’s College London. He has held similar positions with CSBA and the Atlantic Council in the U.S “The Importance of Alliances for U.S. Security” Oct 7, 2016 34 min read : America’s Great Strategic AdvantageSince 1941, “alliances have proven to be a crucial and enduring source of advantage for the United States.”55How so?Alliances prevent war. Not every war, of course, but by driving up the cost of aggression, defensive alliances have an effective record of deterring revanchist states from using violence as a means of settling disputes or gambling on a quick military thrust to achieve relatively risk-free advantage. History suggests strongly that states with allies are less at risk of attack than those without them, an observation borne out by the success of U.S. alliances during the Cold War.This does not mean that aggressors will refrain from using other means to achieve their objectives; in fact, they already are doing so, and campaigns designed deliberately to remain below the level of violent confrontation are likely to become more common. General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, has observed that in recent conflicts, non-violent measures occurred at a rate of four to one over military operations and that objectives previously viewed as attainable by direct military action alone could now be achieved by combining organized military violence with a greater emphasis on economic, political, and diplomatic activity.56Defensive alliances will therefore need to extend the breadth of their activities to avoid being outflanked by opponents that use unconventional means to acquire political advantage.Alliances control rivals. The United States is first and foremost an air and naval power. It wins its wars by retaining control of its own movement and access to supply and denying similar freedom to its adversary. To do that successfully requires a global network of bases and the ability to control the world’s key chokepoints. Geography and the current U.S. basing structure mean that China, Iran, and Russia are likely to be bottled up in any future conflict—although China’s recent island-building activity in the South China Sea reveals a determination to secure its trade routes to the south and west and overcome what has been termed its “Malacca dilemma,”57 and using non-military means has enabled it to confuse and blunt an effective U.S. and allied response to this expansion.Alliances control allies. Entrapment is a concern for any dominant alliance partner. Germany failed to restrain Austria–Hungary in 1914—indeed, encouraged it to act quickly to win what it expected would be a short war. This risk makes management of alliance relations essential, something at which the U.S. has proved to be remarkably adept. Conversely, the U.S. has felt constrained on occasion by its alliance partners, but mostly when they were being asked to operate in ways that were removed from the alliance’s primary task.Alliances enable balancing. When regional states attempt to disrupt the status quo, smaller regional states will either balance against it in an effort to retain their independence or join it (“bandwagon”) in an attempt to curry favor and, by being seen as friends, retain sufficient influence over its actions to limit damage to their own interests. A core of U.S. allies in each region can act as a center of attraction around which balancing can be built, as is occurring now in East Asia. Without them, the sole option for regional powers may be to bandwagon with the regional aggressor.Alliances prevent alliance formation by others. Most of the world’s military powers are members of U.S. alliances. If these alliances did not exist or were abandoned, states would almost inevitably be drawn closer to China, Russia, and Iran and possibly into alliances in active opposition to the United States.Alliances control the bulk of the world’s military power. The nations that are allied with the U.S. spend around $1 trillion on defense (about 62 percent of global military expenditure) and have 6 million people (31 percent of their populations) under arms. China, Iran, and Russia collectively spend roughly 17 percent of global defense expenditure and are able to draw upon around 19 percent of global military manpower (roughly 3.7 million people under arms).58Alliances can hold the line. In a multipolar world in which a reduced U.S. defense establishment might have to face multiple threats, strong and confident allies can hold the line even if they may not be able to roll back the aggression by themselves. This allows the U.S. time to prioritize threats and respond when it is able to do so.Alliances facilitate global power projection. The United States is isolated geographically behind two great oceans. To be able to exert power in Asia, the homeland of revanchist power, it requires bases in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. From these bases, it can exert influence and power where and when it needs to do so and in small packets early on to deter and prevent challenges from arising that later could be defeated only by the application of overwhelming force. The notion that the United States could mount a campaign using long-range U.S.-based air power or the concept of prompt global strike alone is based on a misunderstanding of what both capabilities are designed to achieve.59Alliances are the cost-effective option. Preserving peace and sustaining the global political and economic system’s current U.S. orientation can be achieved most cost-effectively with allied support. The alternatives would call for either the maintenance of a huge U.S. military presence overseas far in excess of what is being maintained now or the holding of substantial forces in readiness at home in case the need arose to fight their way back into Europe or Asia to confront trouble in support of what is called “offshore balancing.”60Alliances enhance international legitimacy. They mean that the United States never has to walk alone. When it resists aggression, it is able to do so with the moral authority of the free world.The U.S., Allies, and a Free WorldThe free world: a phrase that unfortunately has dropped out of fashion since the end of the Cold War yet is as relevant as ever. China, Iran, and Russia are revanchist powers. All three aim to revise the existing order in their respective regions unilaterally and at the least possible political and military cost to themselves. America is the leader of the free world, and revanchist powers know that if they are to succeed, they must diminish U.S. power globally and undermine the tenets of the current, American-led global order.Each successful step they take along that path diminishes U.S. security and the security of U.S. partners and allies who accept the current global order as one that serves their own political and economic interests as much as it serves those of the U.S. To achieve their aims, the leaders of China, Iran, and Russia are suppressing individual liberty in their own countries, isolating their populations from information that undermines their control, and concentrating power in their own hands. America has seen the world darken this way before and knows that a darker world is one in which conflict is more likely. Japan Nuclear ProlifO/V---2NCGoes nuclear---turns every hotspotChanlett-Avery 9 [Emma Chanlett-Avery is a CRS Asian Affairs Specialist, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, #NCC2020Any reconsideration of Japan’s policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, Japan’s withdrawal from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) could damage the most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set off a nuclear arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel compelled to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate Tokyo’s lack of trust in the American commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could indicate a further strengthening of China’s position as an emerging hegemonic power. These ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond. Timeframe---2NCTimeframe – the impact is quick – Japan has rapid capabilities Windrem 14 (Robert Windrem, MA in American Studies @ Seton Hall University, research fellow at the Center on Law and National Security at NYU, Fellow at the Fordham School of Law’s Center on National Security, “Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy,” 11 March 2014, , #NCC2020But government officials and proliferation experts say Japan is happy to let neighbors like China and North Korea believe it is part of the nuclear club, because it has a “bomb in the basement” -– the material and the means to produce nuclear weapons within six months, according to some estimates. And with tensions rising in the region, China’s belief in the “bomb in the basement” is strong enough that it has demanded Japan get rid of its massive stockpile of plutonium and drop plans to open a new breeder reactor this fall. Japan signed the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans it from developing nuclear weapons, more than 40 years ago. But according to a senior Japanese government official deeply involved in the country’s nuclear energy program, Japan has been able to build nuclear weapons ever since it launched a plutonium breeder reactor and a uranium enrichment plant 30 years ago. “Japan already has the technical capability, and has had it since the 1980s,” said the official. He said that once Japan had more than five to 10 kilograms of plutonium, the amount needed for a single weapon, it had “already gone over the threshold,” and had a nuclear deterrent. Japan now has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled at several locations in Japan and another 35 tons stored in France and the U.K. The material is enough to create 5,000 nuclear bombs. The country also has 1.2 tons of enriched uranium. Technical ability doesn’t equate to a bomb, but experts suggest getting from raw plutonium to a nuclear weapon could take as little as six months after the political decision to go forward. A senior U.S. official familiar with Japanese nuclear strategy said the six-month figure for a country with Japan’s advanced nuclear engineering infrastructure was not out of the ballpark, and no expert gave an estimate of more than two years. In fact, many of Japan’s conservative politicians have long supported Japan’s nuclear power program because of its military potential. “The hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power program as the best they can do,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. “They don’t want to give up the idea they have, to use it as a deterrent.” Many experts now see statements by Japanese politicians about the potential military use of the nation’s nuclear stores as part of the “bomb in the basement” strategy, at least as much about celebrating Japan’s abilities and keeping its neighbors guessing as actually building weapons. But pressure has been growing on Japan to dump some of the trappings of its deterrent regardless. The U.S. wants Japan to return 331 kilos of weapons grade plutonium – enough for between 40 and 50 weapons – that it supplied during the Cold War. Japan and the U.S. are expected to sign a deal for the return at a nuclear security summit next week in the Netherlands. Yet Japan is sending mixed signals. It also has plans to open a new fast-breeder plutonium reactor in Rokkasho in October. The reactor would be able to produce 8 tons of plutonium a year, or enough for 1,000 Nagasaki-sized weapons.Perception---2NCEven the perception of allied prolif causes widespread instabilitySteve Fetter, 2013, Associate Provost for Academic Affairs University of Maryland School of Public Policy, “The impact of Japan’s reprocessing program on the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism,” 9-12-15, , #NCC2020But others have doubts, and a key reason is that Japan has amassed an enormous stockpile of plutonium as a result of reprocessing spent fuel from power reactors. This plutonium can be used to build nuclear weapons. In preparing for this talk I found a passage on the JNFL web page that states, “This plutonium is useable only as a reactor fuel. It is not suitable for nuclear weapons.” That is absolutely false.i ! There are now 10 tons of separated plutonium in Japan—enough for 1500 nuclear weapons.ii An additional 34 tons of plutonium—enough for 5000 nuclear weapons—is stored in France and the United Kingdom. ! These stockpiles were in excess of civilian needs even before the Fukushima disaster. The Rokkasho plant can produce an additional 8 tons of plutonium per year—enough for more than 1000 nuclear weapons per year. Because Japan has no realistic plan to use 8 tons of plutonium per year, the stockpile would continue to grow if Rokkasho operates. ! If Japan continues to accumulate plutonium without any economic rationale, and without firm plans for its immediate use in power generation, this can sow doubts about Japan’s intentions. Countries often make worst-case assumptions about the intentions of their neighbors. They assume the worst, and base their assessments and defense planning solely on capabilities. ! I have attended meetings elsewhere in East Asia where participants questioned the nature of Japan’s plutonium program. They suggested that it was a type of nuclear deterrent—a signal that Japan could quickly build large numbers of nuclear weapons if it chose to do so. They find it difficult to believe that Japan’s huge stockpile of plutonium is the by-product of flawed policies and delayed programs. ! So that is one concern with Japan’s reprocessing program: that neighboring countries might believe that Japan has accumulated a large stockpile of plutonium in part to provide a nuclear weapon option. If other countries perceive a growing Japanese plutonium stockpile as a latent nuclear weapon capability, this will contribute to instability in East Asia, and it will undermine Japan’s international reputation. ! But I am more concerned about the example that Japan’s reprocessing program sets for other countries. Japan is the only country without nuclear weapons that produces separated plutonium. If Japan claims that plutonium separation is a vital part of its civilian nuclear power program, this makes it more difficult to prevent the spread of plutonium separation to other countries, especially countries for which there is much greater concern about nuclear weapons. This is particularly true if Japan stockpiles plutonium for which it has identified no near-term use. ! Japan views its plutonium program as an indication of its special status, but other countries resent this. Double-standards can exist for a time, but they cannot endure for long. Other countries, such as South Korea, legitimately question why are not permitted to do something that Japan is permitted to do. Japan may argue that it is unique among non-weapon states because it has a large and sophisticated nuclear power program. But South Korea is not far behind Japan. ! South Korea’s desire to revise its agreement for cooperation with the United States to permit reprocessing is an example of how Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle programs undermine nonproliferation norms. Like Japan, South Korea argues that reprocessing provides important waste-management benefits. ! But there are good reasons to believe that South Korea is interested in reprocessing for other reasons. South Korea had a nuclear weapon program in the 1970s, and South Korea remains in a technical state of war with a nuclear-armed North Korea. If South Korea begins reprocessing and stockpiling plutonium, it is easy to see how this would be portrayed by other countries as a security threat. ! If Japan claims that reprocessing is essential, then any country with spent fuel—which means any country with a nuclear reactor—can say that they, too, need reprocessing to manage their nuclear wastes—that reprocessing is one their “inalienable rights” under the NPT. If Japan continues reprocessing, particularly without any economic rationale or any firm plans for the use of the plutonium that is produced, this will undermine negotiations with countries of proliferation concern, such as Iran. Indeed, Iran has cited Japan as a model of its fuel cycle development. ! This was the reason that the United States decided to abandon reprocessing 35 years ago: to help persuade other countries to forego reprocessing. Any country with reprocessing, any country with stocks of separated plutonium, is a virtual nuclear weapon state, able to build nuclear weapons very quickly, with almost zero warning. The existence of such a situation is destabilizing, because it can prompt rivals to take similar steps to hedge against a rapid move to go nuclear, and so on in a cascade of proliferation of nuclear capabilities.Turns Terrorism---2NCJapan prolif increases the risk of terrorism- theft likelySteve Fetter, 2013, “The impact of Japan’s reprocessing program on the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism,” 9-12-15, , #NCC2020A third type of concern is about the theft and misuse of nuclear materials by terrorists. The very highest standards of protection and accounting must be applied to plutonium—as high as one would apply to nuclear weapons. Because of the nature of the reprocessing and MOX fuel production processes, it is impossible to account precisely for all the plutonium in these facilities. In the smaller Tokai reprocessing plant, at times enough plutonium was unaccounted for to build several nuclear weapons. This can undermine international confidence that no plutonium has been diverted or stolen. ! I am even more concerned about the physical security of MOX fuel in transit and in storage at reactors in Japan. If terrorists could intercept a shipment or break into a storage site, they could steal a fuel assembly. A single MOX fuel assembly for a boiling water reactor contains enough plutonium for two nuclear weapons; the assemblies for pressurized water reactors contain more than twice.Turns ECS Conflict---2NCWeakened alliance causes Japan prolif and East Asian war – they think China’s an existential threatKaplan 19 [Robert D. Kaplan, managing director for global macro at Eurasia Group. Japan Grows Nervous About the U.S. February 28, 2019. ]The U.S. and China have begun a protracted struggle that could shape global geopolitics for decades. That makes the U.S.-Japan treaty alliance more important than ever for anchoring Asia's stability. President Trump should recognize that any development that undermines the American presence on the Korean Peninsula will also undermine Japan, and with it the whole region. Japan towers above America's other Asian allies. South Korea, compromised by its fear of North Korea, is unduly susceptible to Chinese pressure. The Philippines is a badly governed, weakly institutionalized archipelago. Australia is in the Anglosphere but has a population of only 25 million and consequently lacks military and economic heft. Vietnam isn't democratic and lacks Japan's historical bond with the U.S. Opinion Live Event Join us on March 4 as WSJ Opinion's Paul Gigot leads a "State of TV News" panel discussion including Fox Business's Maria Bartiromo, CBS's Christy Tanner and "Network" actor Tony Goldwyn. Included in your admission to the event is a ticket to see "Network" on Broadway at a subsequent date. With a population of 127 million, Japan is the world's third-largest economy and boasts one of the world's more high-tech and deployable militaries. Its navy, twice the size of Britain's, is critical to maintaining the balance of power in Asia. And don't forget that the U.S. has 50,000 troops based in Japan as well as its only forward-deployed aircraft-carrier strike group. Japan compares favorably with America's Western allies. Its internal politics are dependable in a way that Britain's and France's no longer are, while Germany is compromised by its energy dealings with Russia. Japan has rediscovered nationalism, but not the nasty, populist form familiar to some European countries. Most important, Japan is a very lonely country. This works to America's advantage. Only Israel, another dependable U.S. ally, is similarly isolated in its region. Japan has no real friends in East Asia. The wounds of Japanese aggression in World War II have not completely healed. Japan's crimes against humanity—mass cruelty and murder, but not genocide—weren't as bad as Nazi Germany's. This inhibited the country from fully reckoning with its war guilt. Until it does, Japan can never be fully forgiven by its Asian neighbors. China increasingly looms as an existential danger to Japan, threatening to dominate the island nation's nearby seas and trade routes. The Korean Peninsula worries Japan, too. Japan would be dramatically weakened by the collapse of North Korea, Korean reunification or both. The 35-year Japanese rule over the peninsula (1910-45) is remembered mainly for its extreme harshness. Koreans, North and South, are united in their distrust of the Japanese; a reunified Korea would inevitably be anti-Japanese to a significant extent. Japan knows the 28,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea cannot stay forever. Along with the threat from China, fear of major political change on the Korean Peninsula is the key factor fueling Japanese remilitarization. In a contest between China and Japan for influence in any future Greater Korea, China would have the edge. It shares a contiguous land border with the North and is already the South's biggest trading partner. Japanese strategists have no choice but to consider a future in which China dominates the peninsula. Nobody has made the Japanese more nervous than Mr. Trump. He has spoken cavalierly about Japan needing to defend itself, while setting in motion a sometimes chaotic process of negotiation with North Korea that has brought the two Koreas closer together. The U.S. decision in October to cancel military exercises with South Korea has to make the Japanese doubly worried, even though Japan has its own disputes with South Korea over the sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks islets and "comfort women" abused during World War II. If the U.S. weakens its military ties with one ally, Japan recognizes, it may do so with another. And since Mr. Trump abruptly abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Japan has been within its rights to question the future of American leadership. Then there's Taiwan. Because the nearby island was under Japanese occupation for 50 years (1895-1945), and was its first overseas colony, Tokyo has always taken a keen interest in the fate of Taipei. If the day comes—and Japan fears it's approaching—when the U.S. can no longer credibly defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack, Japan will only feel more besieged and insecure. Survey the region. Developments in China, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan mean that Japan has no one else to turn to but the U.S. The specter of a weaker or more unpredictable America could make Japan feel cornered—and become dangerous. There is little likelihood that Japan will develop nuclear bombs. But with its cutting-edge scientific base and a civilian nuclear-power program, the country could do so easily and quickly if it felt it had to. That experts are talking above a whisper about a nuclear Japan indicates that the situation in East Asia might be grave. Neoisolationists believe Japan, like other U.S. allies, should stand on its own two feet. But thanks to its deepening military insecurity, the Japanese are already toughening their armed forces. Unlike the Europeans, the Japanese don't need lectures. Japan's leadership wants to escape the shackles of its pacifist constitution, get its various armed services to work better together, and acquire amphibious assault vehicles, tanker aircraft and much more. That should be troubling. A Japan unbounded by a dependable U.S. alliance system is a danger to itself and the region. Japan is the universal joint of American power in Asia; any weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance would signal the final eclipse of the American-led world. That's why any concessions to Kim Jong Un would come with a steep price—and the failure of the summit with North Korea may be a blessing in disguise.A2: No Japan Prolif---2NCAnti-prolif args are culturally outdated and ignore internal politics – Japan is shifting towards militarization, has the capacity, and are bypassing legal restraintsHunt 15 [Jonathan Hunt (Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Stanton Nuclear Security Program, fellow @ Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Visiting Professor @ Emory University), “Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow”, Foreign Policy, 8/5/15, ] #NCC2020- Defense doesn’t assume the link---political barriers go awayWith the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for Japan’s commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread, especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the global nuclear watchdog — on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEA’s voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs’ enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki — in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities’ populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel — the Lucky Dragon — one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies — Godzilla. One year later, Japan’s parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet Japanese leaders’ renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japan’s prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their country’s national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw “no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”) After China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson “that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them.” He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were “nonsense.” Why then did Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after China’s nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, “if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.” These reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons,” he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japan’s nuclear posture. When Sato’s former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japan’s acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Ford’s reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida — who hails from Hiroshima — renewed calls to “accelerate nuclear disarmament” at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to “witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings.” And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function “more proactively” in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal “would not necessarily violate” the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyang’s provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea — trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the generational changes facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear options. With some experts promoting “tailored” proliferation to U.S. allies to counter China’s rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them. With Japan’s nuclear restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear pacts struck decades ago will become ever more consequential.Public will shift opinion in response to perceived threats – best analysis Machida 14 (Satoshi Machida, Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations @ University of Nebraska Kearney, “Who Supports Nuclear Armament in Japan? Threat Perceptions and Japan's Nuclear Armament”. Asian Journal of Political Science, 2014 Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 128–146)In a quickly changing environment in East Asia, it has been reported that Japan has been going through important changes. Surrounded by increasing levels of threat from its neighboring states, Japan has begun to adopt a more aggressive security policy with the growing capability of the SDF. Along with this tendency, the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament has become a focus of the debate involving both policy-makers and academics. The goal of this study has been to examine the prospect of Japan’s nuclearization. I investigated this question by paying particular attention to public perceptions of nuclear armament. The statistical analysis relying on the survey data in Japan has found that people’s threat perceptions powerfully determine their attitudes toward nuclear armament. Specifically, the results indicate that it is people’s perceptions of China as a military threat that significantly boost their support for nuclear armament. Consistent with the security model of nuclear proliferation, this study has verified that threat perceptions powerfully shape the content of public opinion regarding nuclear weapons (Beckman, 1992: 14). These findings have important implications for the prospect of nuclear proliferation involving Japan. As of now, most scholars dismiss the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament. Hughes (2007) suggests that a variety of domestic constraints that are deeply embedded in Japan will continue to prevent Japan from pursuing the option of nuclear armament. Similarly, Yoshihara and Holmes (2009) maintain that Japan will try to secure its survival in strengthening its ties with the United States rather than attempting to develop nuclear weapons (Hughes, 2006). Under the assumption that Japan is protected by the US security guarantee, Japan’s nuclear armament is unlikely. However, this does not mean that Japan will never consider the option of nuclear armament. Based on the findings from this study, we can predict that people’s support for Japan’s nuclear armament will grow along with increasing levels of military threat from China. As China becomes more aggressive with its growing military capability, the Japanese will be increasingly concerned about the situation. As a consequence, it is possible that Japan will eventually embrace the option of nuclear armament to counter the threat from China. As Japanese history shows, a state’s path can change drastically. A state that was dictated by the fascist ideology was transformed into a ‘peaceful’ country after the end of World War II in 1945. Facing external threat, one cannot deny the possibility that Japan may turn its course once again to become a more aggressive state in the international system. Indeed, one can observe a number of changes in Japan that could drive the country toward the option of nuclear armament (Tanter, 2005). The recent debate concerning the possible revision of the Japanese constitution should be understood in this context (Japan Times, 2013). The constitution allows it if it’s “self-defense” Yamaguchi 15 (Noboru Yamaguchi, Lieutenant General (Ret.) in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and Professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan, "The Utility of Nuclear and Conventional Forces in the Second Nuclear Age: A Japanese Military Perspective”, Asia Policy, Number 19, January 2015, pp. 21-27 (Article))Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons, however, is not necessarily restrained by its constitution. While designed to make the nation as peaceful as possible, the constitution does not exclude outright Japan’s pursuit of nuclear options. The government’s basic interpretation is that Article 9.2 of the constitution does not prohibit the possession of force that is within the minimum range necessary for self-defense.2 Therefore, if the weapon in question, whether conventional or nuclear, is within these bounds, it is not constitutionally banned. If thus confined to the minimum necessary level for self-defense, the possession of nuclear weapons is considered constitutional for Japan. Here it should be noted that the minimum necessary level applies to the limit of individual self-defense and does not include collective self-defense in the government’s interpretation of the constitution.The link flips Japan’s calculus---reverses their defenseMachida 14 [Satoshi Machida (Professor of Political Science @ University of Nebraska Kearney, Ph.D., University of Kentucky), “Who Supports Nuclear Armament in Japan? Threat Perceptions and Japan's Nuclear Armament”, Asian Journal of Political Science, Volume 22, Issue 2, May 2014, ]In a quickly changing environment in East Asia, it has been reported that Japan has been going through important changes. Surrounded by increasing levels of threat from its neighboring states, Japan has begun to adopt a more aggressive security policy with the growing capability of the SDF. Along with this tendency, the possibility of Japan's nuclear armament has become a focus of the debate involving both policy-makers and academics. The goal of this study has been to examine the prospect of Japan's nuclearization. I investigated this question by paying particular attention to public perceptions of nuclear armament. The statistical analysis relying on the survey data in Japan has found that people's threat perceptions powerfully determine their attitudes toward nuclear armament. Specifically, the results indicate that it is people's perceptions of China as a military threat that significantly boost their support for nuclear armament. Consistent with the security model of nuclear proliferation, this study has verified that threat perceptions powerfully shape the content of public opinion regarding nuclear weapons (Beckman, 1992: 14). These findings have important implications for the prospect of nuclear proliferation involving Japan. As of now, most scholars dismiss the possibility of Japan's nuclear armament. Hughes (2007) suggests that a variety of domestic constraints that are deeply embedded in Japan will continue to prevent Japan from pursuing the option of nuclear armament. Similarly, Yoshihara and Holmes (2009) maintain that Japan will try to secure its survival in strengthening its ties with the United States rather than attempting to develop nuclear weapons (Hughes, 2006). Under the assumption that Japan is protected by the US security guarantee, Japan's nuclear armament is unlikely. However, this does not mean that Japan will never consider the option of nuclear armament. Based on the findings from this study, we can predict that people's support for Japan's nuclear armament will grow along with increasing levels of military threat from China. As China becomes more aggressive with its growing military capability, the Japanese will be increasingly concerned about the situation. As a consequence, it is possible that Japan will eventually embrace the option of nuclear armament to counter the threat from China. As Japanese history shows, a state's path can change drastically. A state that was dictated by the fascist ideology was transformed into a ‘peaceful’ country after the end of World War II in 1945. Facing external threat, one cannot deny the possibility that Japan may turn its course once again to become a more aggressive state in the international system. Indeed, one can observe a number of changes in Japan that could drive the country toward the option of nuclear armament (Tanter, 2005). The recent debate concerning the possible revision of the Japanese constitution should be understood in this context (Japan Times, 2013).Generational support and far-right make it possible. No tech barriers and it happens in monthsWinn 19 [Winn, corresponded for PRI, formerly a senior correspondent for the GlobalPostt. He Received the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award as well as a prestigious National Press Club award. Also a two-time winner of Amnesty International’s Human Rights Press Awards. Japan has plutonium, rockets and rivals. Will it ever build a nuke? March 14, 2019. ]Japan’s citizens now face a huge question: Do they really want to remain pacifists forever — especially in a century defined by Chinese power?And American, imperial decline?And nukes spreading into the clutches of regimes such as North Korea?While mainstream voices go squeamish at talk of war, the far-right is working overtime to articulate a new, Japanese destiny — one that taps into a militancy that was tamed after America’s nuclear attacks.There are still red lines, Nakano says. Go to a dinner party in Tokyo, suggest that Japan build a nuke and “you will get strong, angry reactions,” he says. “From people who are left or right. A big chunk of people think going nuclear is not even an option.” He recalls Trump’s suggestion in 2016 that Japan acquire its own nukes to “protect itself against this maniac [Kim Jong-un].” Nakano says that comment totally “offended and confused the mainstream in Japan.”But putting nukes aside, suggesting that Japan build a more potent military, one unshackled by its US-imposed constitution, is no longer all that taboo. In fact, Japan’s conservative prime minister hopes to do just that.Shinzō Abe has said that the Japanese public will soon be able to vote on scrapping that constitutional ban against building an offensive military and going to war. He hopes to lock this down before the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo.As he labors toward that goal, there are multiple forces working to revive a feisty Japanese militancy.Some are quite innocent, such as a comic franchise that depicts Japan’s Self-Defense Forces fighting alien invaders. Then, there are the online revisionists, seeking to scrub the shame from the old, imperial army’s atrocities — namely systematic rape in China and Korea.“People with direct experience of World War II are becoming fewer in number,” Nakano says. “Imagination is taking over. People find it easier to learn about their history on the internet rather than opening a thick, erudite book written by an actual historian.”“There’s a very serious tug-of-war coming,” Nakano says, “and it’s hard to predict which way it will tilt.”In late February, during the run-up to Trump’s backslapping summit with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean government sounded an alarm: According to the Kim regime, “catastrophic consequences” loom as Japan goes soft on its “non-nuclear principles” — and Japan has the power to “go nuclear anytime.”This might be written off as hypocrisy spewing from a hyperbolic rogue state. Ultranationalists such as Igarashi spout the same line: If Japan only had the will, it could assemble nukes in short order.But this also happens to be true.Take it from Steve Fetter, a nuclear expert who served in Barack Obama’s White House for five years.Given Japan’s “technological and scientific expertise,” he says, the government could probably build a bomb “within a matter of months.”“Japan has 45,000 kilograms of plutonium,” says Fetter, who worked in the Office of Science and Technology Policy. “And it only takes 8 kilograms to build a nuclear weapon.”But how would a nation forbidden to own attack weaponry even deliver a warhead to its target? “Japan doesn’t have long-range missiles,” Fetter says, “but it does have space-launch capabilities. If they choose, they could certainly build and deploy longer-range missiles armed with nuclear weapons.”Japan has one of the world's largest stockpiles of plutoniumNorth Korea also isn’t the only nation fretting over this. During Fetter’s time with the White House, Chinese officials told him that Beijing views Japan’s plutonium stockpile with suspicion.“Japan maintains — and I believe they’re entirely correct — that the plutonium stockpile was accumulated for civilian purposes,” Fetter says. Much of it would probably be fueling nuclear energy plants right now if it weren’t for the Fukushima disaster in 2011. Almost all of Japan’s nuclear energy sector was shut down in the ensuing panic.But Fetter suspects some Japanese officials like keeping that stockpile of plutonium around to send a message to their neighbors. It works, he says, as a “symbol of their abilities to produce nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.”The most important bulwark against Japan going nuclear, he says, is the public’s strong aversion to nuclear weapons — and a feeling that the US, no matter what, will never abandon them in a time of crisis. But that can be eroded, Fetter says, by Trump’s “talk of ‘America first’ and his suggestions that they should rely on themselves … which is very unhelpful.”Japan fears we’ll back down on maritime disputes to build support for the plan’s deal---suddenness, Trump’s penchant for deal-making, and non-consultation each magnify the linkHarding 17, [Director for East and Southeast Asia for the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, 3/17/17, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.-China Relations,” ]The U.S.-Japan alliance has been an extraordinary public good for more than half a century. Since the beginning of the Cold War, it has provided stability in a potentially volatile region and enabled Japan and its neighbors to forge the most dynamic regional economy in the world. Today, the alliance remains rooted in shared values and interests and continues to make the region and the world more secure and prosperous, with cooperation ranging from countering North Korean missile threats to development coordination in Africa.1But the U.S.-Japan alliance is now far from the only relationship of substance for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Most notably, relations with China have become an enormous focus for U.S. policymakers in recent years and will continue to be a high priority for the foreseeable future.2 While fundamentally different from the U.S.-Japan relationship, the elevation of U.S.-China relations as a major focal point for U.S. foreign policy raises a critical question: How can policymakers ensure that the rise of U.S.-China relations does not come at the expense of the U.S.-Japan relationship?Throughout the past six decades, the U.S.-Japan alliance has explicitly been the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in Asia, with overall U.S. policy in the region running through Tokyo.3 This has been prudent, as without a strong and functioning U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States would be in a much weaker position to meet challenges and opportunities in the broader region. And as the region becomes more important to U.S. interests, as well as more complex, it will be critical to keep the alliance at the core of U.S. policy in the region.If the primary goal of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region was to hedge against China’s rise, the challenge for U.S.-Japan relations would be easily manageable. However, the reality is that over the coming decades, U.S. leaders—both Republican and Democratic—are likely to continue to pursue engagement instead of containment, and U.S.-China relations will continue to move along two tracks: managing differences and maximizing cooperation. U.S.-China relations will take extraordinary amounts of time and attention from leaders in both countries. Already, the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue brings together more U.S. government officials than any other bilateral engagement on the diplomatic calendar.4On the cooperative side of the ledger, as an agenda for U.S.-China cooperation on shared challenges expands, concerns will inevitably rise in Tokyo that Japan’s interests will be sacrificed in Washington for the sake of U.S.-China relations. This dynamic cannot become zero-sum. It is urgent that the United States and Japan develop strategic principles to maintain and adapt the U.S.-Japan alliance as power dynamics shift in the Asia-Pacific.Report overviewIn 2016, the Center for American Progress endeavored to examine the challenges outlined above and to chart a course for the next U.S. presidential administration to build and deepen U.S.-Japan ties. We partnered with the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation to organize workshops in Tokyo and Washington with leading voices on U.S.-Japan, U.S.-China, and Japan-China relations to build understanding of how each leg of this trilateral relationship has developed in recent years and how these developments have been perceived by others. At the Tokyo workshop, we also partnered with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR, to bring leading Chinese voices to the table and to begin to rebuild mutual understanding between the three parties. Each event was a two-day, closed-door dialogue among approximately 20 nongovernment experts who have deep knowledge and experience shaping their respective countries’ foreign policies.This report presents key findings from these two workshops and ideas they generated. It begins with assessments of how the three legs of the U.S.-Japan-China relationship have evolved since 2009, when new administrations took power in Washington and Tokyo. It concludes with recommended principles that the authors of this report believe the Trump administration should follow to ensure that the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to thrive in coming years—not just in a vacuum but also alongside a constructive working relationship with Beijing.Key findingsU.S.-China relationsOur workshops revealed similar assessments among U.S. and Japanese experts regarding U.S.-China relations from 2009 to 2016. On the political side, we found wide agreement that Washington and Beijing had been able to make significant progress working together on key global priorities, such as climate change and Iran’s nuclear program, but that tensions have been rife on difficult issues in Asia, such as North Korea and the South China Sea.5Stark challenges in U.S.-China economic relations were also observed, which cast shadows on broader policymaking. Underlying these debates is a growing consensus among U.S. experts about the need to change Washington’s approach to China. When the Clinton administration welcomed China into the world economy, many in Washington assumed that economic engagement would boost positive trends in Chinese governance.6 Now, despite China’s increasing standards of living domestically and robust economic interdependence internationally,7 U.S. experts see negative trends in Chinese governance and have concluded that the original logic of engagement with China was flawed.8 At the same time as this reason for engagement has lost its persuasive power, Beijing has implemented drastic restrictions on U.S. businesses and civil society organizations.9 Moving forward, these severed ties will make it more difficult for the United States and China to connect in a productive way.In contrast, Chinese experts at our Tokyo workshop argued that only three issues detract from an overall positive U.S.-China bilateral relationship: the South China Sea; negative media coverage; and so-called third-party hijackers of the bilateral relationship—namely, the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, North Korea, and Russia.10 Chinese experts emphasized the need for a new regional order and better crisis management. From the perspective of one Chinese expert at the workshop, the U.S.-China economic relationship is becoming balanced, though U.S. “politicization” of Chinese investment via national security review mechanisms remains a point of complaint.11Our workshops made clear that the Obama administration’s approach to U.S.-China relations created anxiety in Tokyo that Japan’s interests would be sidelined in efforts to keep U.S.-China relations on course. For instance, several Japanese experts argued that former national security adviser Susan Rice’s embrace of President Xi Jinping’s “New Model of Great Power Relations” rang alarm bells in Tokyo, which saw this concept as Beijing’s attempt to create a U.S.-China G2 order in Asia.12 As several workshop participants stated, these concerns were realized in the process in which the 2014 U.S.-China climate agreement came to pass and the sense that the United States would concede to China on certain regional security issues to make progress on global issues.13U.S.-Japan relationsU.S. and Japanese experts largely agreed that U.S.-Japan relations were managed well following a trough from 2009 to 2011 during the early days of the Democratic Party of Japan’s leadership in Tokyo. However, ties were seen to have rebounded to an all-time high under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership in Tokyo, with revisions to bilateral defense guidelines and bilateral agreement on trade issues that were necessary to finalize the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, negotiations as major demonstrations of progress. Experts also noted that government-government relations have been undergirded by strong support for the alliance in both the United States and Japan.14However, participants agreed that difficult bilateral issues remain present, including in the way ahead on defense realignment in Okinawa and the issue of U.S. reliability if the TPP does not come into force. Furthermore, it was clear that the 2016 U.S. presidential election caused concern in Tokyo, with U.S. domestic opposition to trade and to the foreign policy establishment more generally being particularly problematic. President Donald Trump’s comments casting Japan as an economic competitor and questioning the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance were also deeply unsettling.15While many agreed that strictly bilateral matters were managed well by the Obama, Noda, and Abe administrations, it was clear that the U.S. approach to broader regional security issues has at times created friction and confusion in bilateral U.S.-Japan relations. Much of this has had to do with the China factor in the relationship. Japanese experts in our workshops often cited a threat perception gap, given Japan’s proximity to China’s rapid military modernization and the fact that Japanese and Chinese maritime vessels operate in close proximity every day in the East China Sea.16 Furthermore, there was concern that the United States and Japan have not reached agreement on how to handle gray zone coercion, or coercion below the threshold requiring a conventional military response, in the East China Sea, particularly if it escalates beyond the capacity of Japan’s Coast Guard to handle. Perceived U.S. reticence to challenge Chinese sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas also clearly worries Japanese experts.17Many experts in our workshops also noted that China saw these developments in similar ways, often assessing U.S.-Japan relations as even smoother than did Tokyo and Washington.18 It was also clear that China felt threatened by the strength of U.S.-Japan relations and that there was a need for a modus vivendi with China to minimize friction. Several U.S. and Japanese participants also noted the paradox that closer U.S.-Japan relations have the ability to create the exact kind of Chinese policies that both the United States and Japan seek to avoid.19China-Japan relationsOur workshop discussions also reached the clear conclusion that China-Japan relations are by far the weakest side of the U.S.-China-Japan trilateral relationship. Participants agreed that China-Japan relations began to deteriorate acutely in 2012 after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands.20 However, our discussions also revealed sharp disagreements concerning the facts of certain events surrounding the nationalization—whether the government of Japan sought to diffuse tensions by nationalizing the islands and whether China truly imposed an export ban on rare-earth metals in retaliation.21Japanese experts reflected that developments in China-Japan relations demonstrate that long-held confidence that economic interdependence would ensure political relations stay on track, or at least mitigate the effects of political tension, have proved to be misplaced. As Chinese, American, and Japanese participants described, the relationship is increasingly characterized by “cold economics, cold politics” as China’s economy slows, labor costs increase, and political conflict intrudes into the economic sphere.22Participants observed that China has five concerns for China-Japan relations: a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance, which China sees as a mutual deterrence against China; Japan’s more proactive stance in the South China Sea, especially with U.S. support; Japan’s relationship with Taiwan; Japan’s maritime rule of law campaign; and historical problems and a lack of trust among the public.23 Chinese experts are pessimistic about the bilateral relationship’s prospects because of structural problems arising from the U.S.-Japan relationship, which China perceives as intended to deter China.24American participants argued that unstable Japan-China relations are a major concern for Washington, as this dynamic makes the entire region less stable. Most acutely, tensions surrounding the Senkaku Islands are a concern, as U.S. alliance commitments could draw the United States into direct conflict with China in the East China Sea.25 More broadly, weak Japan-China relations reduce the likelihood that the two can come together to address issues of common concern, including adapting to the impacts of climate change, building greater regional connectivity, and deepening economic integration.Recommendations5 principles for managing the U.S.-Japan alliance in an era of elevated U.S.-China relationsDevelopments in trilateral relations in recent years offer lessons for how the Trump administration should approach its relations with both Japan and China and how to manage the interplay between those two relationships. While collateral damage is inevitable as one relationship affects the other, U.S. policymakers should do everything they can to manage this dynamic. To do so effectively, lessons should be learned from instances when close U.S.-China coordination weakened confidence in the alliance in Tokyo and when developments in U.S.-Japan relations drove Chinese policy in negative directions in recent years.Below this strategic level, the agenda for the incoming corps of U.S.-Japan alliance managers is substantial, which makes having strategic principles in mind all the more important. In particular, three critical issues are likely to consume the attention of these policymakers: 1) deeper defense integration in the face of North Korea’s increasingly capable missile and nuclear forces; 2) reinforcing deterrence against China in gray-zone situations in Japanese-administered waters in the East China Sea; and 3) managing issues surrounding U.S. military presence in Japan, particularly in Okinawa.Given this full agenda, having a straightforward, strategic framework is critical. But this framework should also not be based on solely reinforcing U.S.-Japan cooperation that inadvertently drives undesirable Chinese behavior.Washington and Tokyo should follow the following five guiding principles as they forge the next steps in the alliance, each keeping in mind the impact on one another’s relations with China.1. No surprisesThe 2014 U.S.-China climate deal was a landmark achievement for the Obama administration and for U.S.-China relations26—but it came as a major surprise to many, including Japan. As such, despite its obvious public good, it sowed fears in Japan that the United States seeks G-2 solutions on key priorities, even if it means bypassing the traditional cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia—the U.S.-Japan alliance.27 Even more importantly, many Japanese workshop participants argued that the United States acted in a conciliatory way with China on issues of acute interest to Japan, including maritime issues in the East and South China Seas, in the name of getting a deal with China.28 Likewise, U.S.-China consultations in the U.N. Security Council on North Korea have been perceived to be a means—even if inadvertent—to bypass the U.S.-Japan alliance, despite U.S. insistence that it is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia.29U.S.-China surprises fundamentally undermine the premise that U.S. policy in Asia begins with the U.S.-Japan alliance, which ultimately weakens broader U.S. policy in the region. While the United States and China should continue to pursue game-changing cooperation on issues of common concern, these developments should never come as a surprise to Tokyo.President Trump’s stated penchant for the value of being unpredictable30 will need to be amended to manage this dynamic. Even before he assumed office, President-elect Trump displayed this tendency with his decision to speak directly with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen.31 While not necessarily objectionable to Japanese policymakers, this seemingly rash decision was unsettling. Coupled with President Trump’s tendency to be a “deal maker,”32 the possibility for major U.S.-China developments without consultation with Tokyo is real.33 Early in the new U.S. administration, President Trump and Prime Minister Abe should agree to consult closely on all developments in Asia policymaking.A2: No Japan Capabilities---2NCGenerational support and far-right make it possible. No tech barriers and it happens in monthsWinn 19 [Winn, corresponded for PRI, formerly a senior correspondent for the GlobalPostt. He Received the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award as well as a prestigious National Press Club award. Also a two-time winner of Amnesty International’s Human Rights Press Awards. Japan has plutonium, rockets and rivals. Will it ever build a nuke? March 14, 2019. ] #NCC2020Japan’s citizens now face a huge question: Do they really want to remain pacifists forever — especially in a century defined by Chinese power?And American, imperial decline?And nukes spreading into the clutches of regimes such as North Korea?While mainstream voices go squeamish at talk of war, the far-right is working overtime to articulate a new, Japanese destiny — one that taps into a militancy that was tamed after America’s nuclear attacks.There are still red lines, Nakano says. Go to a dinner party in Tokyo, suggest that Japan build a nuke and “you will get strong, angry reactions,” he says. “From people who are left or right. A big chunk of people think going nuclear is not even an option.” He recalls Trump’s suggestion in 2016 that Japan acquire its own nukes to “protect itself against this maniac [Kim Jong-un].” Nakano says that comment totally “offended and confused the mainstream in Japan.”But putting nukes aside, suggesting that Japan build a more potent military, one unshackled by its US-imposed constitution, is no longer all that taboo. In fact, Japan’s conservative prime minister hopes to do just that.Shinzō Abe has said that the Japanese public will soon be able to vote on scrapping that constitutional ban against building an offensive military and going to war. He hopes to lock this down before the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo.As he labors toward that goal, there are multiple forces working to revive a feisty Japanese militancy.Some are quite innocent, such as a comic franchise that depicts Japan’s Self-Defense Forces fighting alien invaders. Then, there are the online revisionists, seeking to scrub the shame from the old, imperial army’s atrocities — namely systematic rape in China and Korea.“People with direct experience of World War II are becoming fewer in number,” Nakano says. “Imagination is taking over. People find it easier to learn about their history on the internet rather than opening a thick, erudite book written by an actual historian.”“There’s a very serious tug-of-war coming,” Nakano says, “and it’s hard to predict which way it will tilt.”In late February, during the run-up to Trump’s backslapping summit with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean government sounded an alarm: According to the Kim regime, “catastrophic consequences” loom as Japan goes soft on its “non-nuclear principles” — and Japan has the power to “go nuclear anytime.”This might be written off as hypocrisy spewing from a hyperbolic rogue state. Ultranationalists such as Igarashi spout the same line: If Japan only had the will, it could assemble nukes in short order.But this also happens to be true.Take it from Steve Fetter, a nuclear expert who served in Barack Obama’s White House for five years.Given Japan’s “technological and scientific expertise,” he says, the government could probably build a bomb “within a matter of months.”“Japan has 45,000 kilograms of plutonium,” says Fetter, who worked in the Office of Science and Technology Policy. “And it only takes 8 kilograms to build a nuclear weapon.”But how would a nation forbidden to own attack weaponry even deliver a warhead to its target? “Japan doesn’t have long-range missiles,” Fetter says, “but it does have space-launch capabilities. If they choose, they could certainly build and deploy longer-range missiles armed with nuclear weapons.”Japan has one of the world's largest stockpiles of plutoniumNorth Korea also isn’t the only nation fretting over this. During Fetter’s time with the White House, Chinese officials told him that Beijing views Japan’s plutonium stockpile with suspicion.“Japan maintains — and I believe they’re entirely correct — that the plutonium stockpile was accumulated for civilian purposes,” Fetter says. Much of it would probably be fueling nuclear energy plants right now if it weren’t for the Fukushima disaster in 2011. Almost all of Japan’s nuclear energy sector was shut down in the ensuing panic.But Fetter suspects some Japanese officials like keeping that stockpile of plutonium around to send a message to their neighbors. It works, he says, as a “symbol of their abilities to produce nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.”The most important bulwark against Japan going nuclear, he says, is the public’s strong aversion to nuclear weapons — and a feeling that the US, no matter what, will never abandon them in a time of crisis. But that can be eroded, Fetter says, by Trump’s “talk of ‘America first’ and his suggestions that they should rely on themselves … which is very unhelpful.”A2: Conventional Weapons Good---2NCJapan already developing conventional weapons---only a question of nuclear capabilitiesFoster 2/11 [Scott Foster is a partner and analyst with JA Research, Tokyo; and a graduate of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he specialized in Japanese politics, economics and language. “On Trump’s demand that Japan pay more for security,” Asia Times, Accessed 2/15/20] #NCC2020Now let’s go back to the Newsham list – naval, air, missile, space and nuclear capabilities – and see how Japan stacks up and how integrated it is with US forces. A catalog Despite its Peace Constitution, Japan’s military is ranked fifth in Global Firepower’s 2020 Military Strength Ranking, after the United States, Russia, China and India. South Korea ranks sixth, followed by France and the U.K. Japan has two Izumo-class aircraft carriers that can accommodate both helicopters and F-35B short take-off and vertical landing fighter jets, and two other helicopter carriers. China currently has two aircraft carriers in service (one a refurbished vessel purchased from Ukraine) and a third under construction. Japan is the largest overseas buyer of F-35 aircraft, with orders placed for 105 F-35A and 42 F-35B models. In total, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force operates 155 vessels, also including 40 destroyers and 20 submarines. These supplement some 200 vessels in the US Pacific Fleet, including the Seventh Fleet and Carrier Strike Group Five based in Yokosuka. In addition to Aegis Ashore batteries equipped with Lockheed Martin solid state radar, Japan has a ballistic missile defense system combining Aegis destroyers and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 mobile systems. Japan’s own ballistic missiles make North Korea’s look like toys, and are SLMB (submarine-launched ballistic missile) convertible. Do not forget that Japan’s HTV unmanned cargo spacecraft, lifted by launch vehicles made by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, regularly deliver supplies to the International Space Station. And that Japan’s Hayabusa 2 spacecraft, powered by NEC’s ion engine, landed on an asteroid, collected samples and brought them back to earth. Japan has also developed advanced ground-to-space communications; space robotics capable of satellite assembly, capture and disassembly; and the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System that surveys the western Pacific and Asian mainland with greater accuracy than the American GPS system. Japan’s re-entry technology is adaptable to multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) applications, which allow multiple nuclear warheads launched on one missile to be delivered to separate targets.The status quo is goldilocks---Japan won’t build nukes---all depends on how they view credibility of the US commitmentWest 1-21 [John West, Executive Director of the Asian Century Institute; “The China-Japan Economic Relationship Is Getting Stronger” The Brink News, #NCC2020 with the progressive rise of a more open and dynamic China over the past few decades, it was only natural that the historical pattern of close Sino-Japanese economic relations would re-emerge. And the recent disdain of the U.S. in regional free trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership will only further marginalize the U.S. as a trading partner for Japan and other Asian countries. More generally, as economic relations are drawing Japan and China closer together, so too is the erratic behavior of the U.S., especially in the trade wars. With the U.S. perceived as an unreliable political and economic partner, it is only natural that Japan and China seek cooperation together. While Japan followed America’s lead in not signing up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it is now seeking to cooperate with the project. And both Japanese and Chinese leaders now speak positively of the new era of Sino-Japan relations. Moving Past Historic Rifts We cannot say that Japan is moving away from the U.S. and toward China — the U.S. has long been Japan’s security guarantor, and Japan still feels more comfortable being aligned with another democracy. The Japan-China relationship still has many deep historical scars, too, and Japan is concerned at China’s military buildup and assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas. But we do seem to be witnessing a slow drift of Japan to a more independent role in the Indo-Pacific and in its global relations, and as part of this, its relationship with China has become more important and will likely continue to increase in importance in the decades to come. It’s even possible that closer people-to-people contacts between Japan and China will eventually soothe some of the wounds of history in tandem with generational change and thereby improve each country’s low public opinion of the other. Indeed, evidence is now appearing of Chinese public attitudes to Japan starting to warm. ................
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