Mathematical Logic - Department Mathematik

Mathematical Logic

Helmut Schwichtenberg

Mathematisches Institut der Universit?at Mu?nchen Wintersemester 2003/2004

Contents

Chapter 1. Logic

1

1. Formal Languages

2

2. Natural Deduction

4

3. Normalization

11

4. Normalization including Permutative Conversions

20

5. Notes

31

Chapter 2. Models

33

1. Structures for Classical Logic

33

2. Beth-Structures for Minimal Logic

35

3. Completeness of Minimal and Intuitionistic Logic

39

4. Completeness of Classical Logic

42

5. Uncountable Languages

44

6. Basics of Model Theory

48

7. Notes

54

Chapter 3. Computability

55

1. Register Machines

55

2. Elementary Functions

58

3. The Normal Form Theorem

64

4. Recursive Definitions

69

Chapter 4. G?odel's Theorems

73

1. G?odel Numbers

73

2. Undefinability of the Notion of Truth

77

3. The Notion of Truth in Formal Theories

79

4. Undecidability and Incompleteness

81

5. Representability

83

6. Unprovability of Consistency

87

7. Notes

90

Chapter 5. Set Theory

91

1. Cumulative Type Structures

91

2. Axiomatic Set Theory

92

3. Recursion, Induction, Ordinals

96

4. Cardinals

116

5. The Axiom of Choice

120

6. Ordinal Arithmetic

126

7. Normal Functions

133

8. Notes

138

Chapter 6. Proof Theory

139

i

ii

CONTENTS

1. Ordinals Below 0

139

2. Provability of Initial Cases of TI

141

3. Normalization with the Omega Rule

145

4. Unprovable Initial Cases of Transfinite Induction

149

Bibliography

157

Index

159

CHAPTER 1

Logic

The main subject of Mathematical Logic is mathematical proof. In this introductory chapter we deal with the basics of formalizing such proofs. The system we pick for the representation of proofs is Gentzen's natural deduction, from [8]. Our reasons for this choice are twofold. First, as the name says this is a natural notion of formal proof, which means that the way proofs are represented corresponds very much to the way a careful mathematician writing out all details of an argument would go anyway. Second, formal proofs in natural deduction are closely related (via the so-called CurryHoward correspondence) to terms in typed lambda calculus. This provides us not only with a compact notation for logical derivations (which otherwise tend to become somewhat unmanagable tree-like structures), but also opens up a route to applying the computational techniques which underpin lambda calculus.

Apart from classical logic we will also deal with more constructive logics: minimal and intuitionistic logic. This will reveal some interesting aspects of proofs, e.g. that it is possible und useful to distinguish beween existential proofs that actually construct witnessing objects, and others that don't. As an example, consider the following proposition.

There are irrational numbers a, b such that ab is rational.

This can Case

be 2pro2viesdraastifoonlalolw. sC, bhyoocsaeseas.=

2

and

b

=

2.

Then a, b are

irrational Case

an2db2yisasisruramtpiotnioanl.

ab is rational. Choose a =

22

and

b

=

2.

Then by

assumption a, b are irrational and

ab =

22

2

=

2 2 =2

is

rational. As long

as

we

have

not

decided

whether

22

is

rational,

we

do

not

know which numbers a, b we must take. Hence we have an example of an

existence proof which does not provide an instance.

An essential point for Mathematical Logic is to fix a formal language to

be used. We take implication and the universal quantifier as basic. Then

the logic rules correspond to lambda calculus. The additional connectives ,

, and are defined via axiom schemes. These axiom schemes will later

be seen as special cases of introduction and elimination rules for inductive

definitions.

1

2

1. LOGIC

1. Formal Languages

1.1. Terms and Formulas. Let a countable infinite set { vi | i N } of variables be given; they will be denoted by x, y, z. A first order language L then is determined by its signature, which is to mean the following.

? For every natural number n 0 a (possible empty) set of n-ary relation symbols (also called predicate symbols). 0-ary relation symbols are called propositional symbols. (read "falsum") is required as a fixed propositional symbol. The language will not, unless stated otherwise, contain = as a primitive.

? For every natural number n 0 a (possible empty) set of n-ary function symbols. 0-ary function symbols are called constants.

We assume that all these sets of variables, relation and function symbols are disjoint.

For instance the language LG of group theory is determined by the signature consisting of the following relation and function symbols: the group operation (a binary function symbol), the unit e (a constant), the inverse operation -1 (a unary function symbol) and finally equality = (a binary relation symbol).

L-terms are inductively defined as follows.

? Every variable is an L-term. ? Every constant of L is an L-term. ? If t1, . . . , tn are L-terms and f is an n-ary function symbol of L

with n 1, then f (t1, . . . , tn) is an L-term.

From L-terms one constructs L-prime formulas, also called atomic formulas of L: If t1, . . . , tn are terms and R is an n-ary relation symbol of L, then R(t1, . . . , tn) is an L-prime formula.

L-formulas are inductively defined from L-prime formulas by

? Every L-prime formula is an L-formula. ? If A and B are L-formulas, then so are (A B) ("if A, then B"),

(A B) ("A and B") and (A B) ("A or B"). ? If A is an L-formula and x is a variable, then xA ("for all x, A

holds") and xA ("there is an x such that A") are L-formulas.

Negation, classical disjunction, and the classical existential quantifier are defined by

?A := A , A cl B := ?A ?B , clxA := ?x?A.

Usually we fix a language L, and speak of terms and formulas instead of L-terms and L-formulas. We use

r, s, t

for terms,

x, y, z c

for variables, for constants,

P, Q, R for relation symbols,

f, g, h

for function symbols,

A, B, C, D for formulas.

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