THE MAN -MACHINE CONFLICT IN HIGH PERFORMANCE TAC AIRCRAFT

I80

THE SOCIETY OF EXPERIMENTAL TEST PILOTS

exact characteristics f o r another a i r c r a f t f o r t h e t a c t i c a l f i g h t e r and a t t a c k i n ventory. W e believe t h a t t h e basic F - I I I A a n d F-4 inventory o f t h e f u t u r e must

have other aircraft. The views o f t h e characteristics which t h i s a i r c r a f t o r these

a i r c r a f t should have vary widely. By study, b y w a r g a m i n g a n d b y tests a t our

f i g h t e r centers a t Nellis a n d Eglin A i r Force Bases, we are seeking to f i n d these

hest characteristics end t h e best c o m b i r a t i o n o f a i r c r a f t f o r our t a c t i c a l f i g h t e r

f o r c e mix.

M y b e l i e f i s t h a t a smaller a i r c r a f t t h a n t h e F-I I I a n d possibly t h e F-4 i s

needed now.

It can b e smaller because we will p l a n t o use it f o r air superiority

a n d close air s u p p o r t a n d can a c c e p t less range a n d p a y l o a d i n o r d e r t o g e t

superior a g i l i t y i n a i r c r a f t performance.

I f e e l t h a t we can a c c e p t less range b e -

cause t h e m a j o r i t y c f t h e close air s u p p o r t t a r g e t s we expect are w i t h i n 250

miles o f t h e f o r w a r d e d g e of t h e b a t t l e areas, less p a y l o a d because of i m p r o v e d

ordnance a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r more accurate delivery. It must b e a b l e t o

win t h e air superiority air f i g h t over t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . It should b e a m e d i u m

cost a i r c r a f t because we will need many o f them.

I believe t h a t we must have an a i r c r a f t which c a n f i n d a n d destroy t a r g e t s

a t n i g h t and i n b a d weather.

I believe also t h a t we need a l i g h t a t t a c k and u t i l i t y a i r c r a f t i n our t a c t i cal f o r c e mix t o e m p l o y i n counterinsurgency a n d low scale l i m i t e d wars.

Looking t o w a r d 1975 a n d t h e changes we can expect, t h e c h a n g i n g i n f l u ences o f i m p r o v e d enemy defenses using g r o u n d t o a i r missiles a n d a n t i - a i r c r a f t

guns, plus i m p r o v e d a i r c r a f t w i t h missiles a n d guns, challenges us t o come u p

w i t h b e t t e r B i r t r a f t , b e t t e r avionics a n d b e t t e r ordnance t o win air superiority,

n a v i g a t e accurately, f i n d targets, hit a n d destroy them. They challenge us t o

higher p e r f o r m a n c e i n all areas, especially i n p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r systems which

are reliab!e, superior t o t h e enemy a n d which are no more costly o r complex

t h a n they must b e t o d o t h e i o b . They challenge us t o take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e

i u l l spectrum of warfare f r a m counterinsurgency t o general war, for as a nation

we have accepted t h e challenge o f m e e t i n g a r m e d aggression a t whatever level

i t i s used t o d e n y peoples t h e i r freedom.

THE M A N -MACHINE CONFLICT IN HIGH

PERFORMANCE TAC AIRCRAFT

by

MAJOR G E N E R A L GORDON M. G R A H A M , USAF

D e p u t y for Operations, T a c t i c a l A i r C o m m a n d

I r e g a r d it a s r a t h e r a privilege i o have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o discuss with

you a subject which

I am certain i s very close t o all o f you i n your a c t i v i t i e s

and pursuit of a i r c r a f t development.

It i s m y understanding t h a t t h e discussion o f t h e man-machine c o n f l i c t

i5

g e n e r a t e d b y the d i l e m m a constantly c o n f r o n t i n g t h e a i r c r a f t designers o n .+he

one hand, and pilots a n d aircrews o n t h e o t h e r .

Conflict i s defined

as mufual i n t e r f e r e n c e o f

o p p o s i n g or

incompatible

forces or qualities.

For t h e purposes o f this discussion, l e t u s c o n f i n e t h e man p o r t i o n t o +he

t a c t i c a l f i g h t e r p i l o t , a l t h o u g h i n generdl t h e same situation prevails with o t h e r

a i r c r a f t and crews, and since t h e c o n f l i c t i s more a c u t e w i t h increasingly de-

The M a n - M a c h i n e C o n f l i c t i n H i g h Performance TAC A i r c r a f t

181

m a n d i n g a i r c r a f t , perhaps we should think o f performance characteristics reachi n g i n t o m a c h numbers o f 2.0 t o 2.5,

high tolerances such as characteristic of

f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t a n d rather chort take-off and l a n d i n g distances, b u t most p a r ticularly a machine e q u i p p e d with a f i r e control system enabling r a p i d , accurate

delivery o f t h e spectrum o f weapons f r o m conventional t o nuclear i n b o t h +he

air-to-air a n d a i r - t o - g r o u n d roles.

W e started our activities over f i f t y years a g o and ever since then t h e

folks a t t h e bicycle f a c t o r y have been i n a q u a n d a r y a t t e m p t i n g t o guess how

much assistance i n t h e way o f a u t o m a t i o n will

fit t h e pilot's needs. With very

l i t t l e research, one can be convinced t h a t since t h e days o f t h e L a f a y e t t e escadrille and those renowned pilots with t h e i r inventiveness, i n i t i a t i v e and courage,

we have g o n e inexorably f r o m t h e simple t o the complex. Periodically, e f f o r t s

t o h o l d t h e line a n d prevent -further increases i n complexity of t h e air machine

are made.

The safe haven of t h e w o m b o f simplicity i s very appealing. Every f i g h t e r

p i l o t desires t o r e t u r n t o it. H e i s riven, however, with the knowledge t h a t our

technical p e o p l e can and will p r o v i d e him with c a p a b i l i t i e s which will enable

h i m t o o u t s t r i p his contemporaries, f o r e i g n o r domestic.

Very b r i e f l y , l e t us trace t h e h i g h l i g h t o f c o m b a t f i g h t e r d e v e l o p m e n t a n d

sophistication and I believe t h a t you will i m m e d i a t e l y associate these a n d o t h e r

changes w i t h t h e intensification o f t h e man-machine conflict. Advances i n air-

. craft

performance, increased

c a p a b i l i t i e s in weapons, m u l t i p l i c i t y o f

missions

and tasks, day, n i g h t a n d all-weather use, altered tactics have i n e v i t a b l y l e d to

more complex duties f o r t h e f i g h t e r p i l o t .

There i s no need t o g o over t h e missions o f close air support, interdiction,

air superiority, reconnaissance and a i r l i f t . You are all completely f a m i l i a r with

these.

Beginning with t h e fixed sight svnchronized machine gun of W o r l d W a r

I,

and d i v e b o m b i n g which r e q u i r e d a sight or an aiming device, the i n t r o d u c t i o n

o f so-called " b l i n d f l y i n g " i n t h e m i d d l e twenties as pioneered by J i m m y Dool i t t l e b r o u g h t us t o t h e b e g i n n i n g of W o r l d W a r II, w i t h t h e f i g h t e r p i l o t cont e n t t o deliver

his

ordnance visudlly i n d a y l i g h t w i t h what we look back o n a i

rather p r i m i t i v e methods. Parentheticdlly, I m i g h t a d d , almost i n t h e same fashion

we are d o i n g i n Southeast Asia t o d a y . Later an elite l e a d c o m p u t i n g g u n sight

was furnished, rockets were i n t r o d u c e d and things b e g a n t o g e t more and more

complicated.

~

The involvement i n t h e nuclear strike role with i t s inherent instrumentation

or a u t o m a t i o n procedures appeared. A u t o - p i l o t s d p p e a r e d i n f i g h t e r aircraft.

I

A n d some genius invented the LABS maneuver.

L o n g range deployments

became necessary,

generating

requirements f o r

m o r e s o p h i s t k a t e d n a v i g a t i o n systems. The air defense f i g h t e r p r o c e e d e d o n a

p a r a l l e l course i n constantly increasing complexity. I ' m sure all of you are aware

o f these things a n d

I c o u l d g o o n in much more d e t a i l a n d a t g r e a t e r length.

The u l t i m a t e now f o u n d i t s expression i n t h e F-I I I. The f i g h t e r aircraft h a d t o

b e able t o d o all things a t all times f o r all p e o p l e under all circumstances everywhere i n t h e w o r l d a n d a f i g h t e r p i l o t must b e t r a i n e d t o d o this.

Let's look a t this t a c t i c a l f i g h t e r p i l o t who i s supposed t o d o these things.

H e i s 27 years old. H e averages t w o years of college, t w o thousand hours i n a

f l y i n g machine a n d t o d a y he's been o n deployments almost everywhere o n +he

globe.

T H E SOCIETY OF EXPERIMENTAL TEST PILOTS

I82

H e i s a p r e t t y c a p a b l e individual.

A n d he won't t u r n d o w n assistance.

Since we have a b o u t a m i l l i o n dollars invested i n him, perhaps we should

t r y t o h e l p h i m o u t , a n d hence p r o v i d e h i m w i t h some a u t o m a t i o n , mechanical

AID IN MAKING A DE-

assistance, p i l o t r e l i e f o r a i d i n making a decision.

CISION.

H e r e i s t h e crux o f our discussion.

This i n d i v i d u a l c a n b e h e l p e d i n a m y r i a d o f ways

- mechanically, e l e c t r o n -

ically, b y a d v i c e f r o m t h e g r o u n d , b y g r o u n d based aids, b y a i r b o r n e aids, b y

d r i l l a n d p r e p a r a t i o n , etc. But he still has to make t h e decision. There i s n o t h i n g

t h a t we c a n p r o v i d e h i m w i t h which w i l l make t h e decision f o r h i m 100% o f

the time and infallibly.

Unlike a b o m b e r pilot's decision which can b e m a d e almost hours i n a d vance, except f o r minor refinements, o r a t r o o p carrier a i r c r a f t commander's

decision, which similarly c a n b e m a d e almost b e f o r e he leaves t h e g r o u n d , o r

a n a i r defense i n t e r c e p t o r p i l o t ' s decision, which i s o f t i m e s m a d e f o r h i m i r o m

t h e g e o m e t r y o f t h e attack b y g r o u n d based environment. The t a c t i c a l f i g h t e r

p i l o t , on a d i v e - b o m b i n g , strafing,

rocketry, bull-pup, shrike,

napalm or

any

o t h e r conventional o r d n a n c e delivery, o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r , nuclear delivery, c a n not can

his attack program. M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , however, t h e decision m a k i n g

processes which he must u n d e r g o i n a i r - t o - a i r c o m b a t d e f y automation.

W e have t r i e d t o make this decision making process simpler. W e have p u t

t w o p i l o t s i n a n aircraft. H o w e v e r , t h e r e comes a t i m e when one m a n has .io

make a decision. H e c a n b e assisted b y t h e second p i l o t b u t t h e p i l o t i n c o m mand

s t i l l has t o make t h e decision.

The ups a n d downs o f assisting t h e p i l o t c a n b e seen i n t h e narrow sphere

of an i n t e r c e p t o r decision. W e have seen t h e F-86D, single p i l o t , F-89, a n d

F-94,

p i l o t a n d r a d a r observer. Back t o t h e

102 w i t h a single p i l o t , thence t o t h e

1016 w i t h a p i l o t a n d r a d a r observer, and b a c k t o t h e 106 w i t h a single pilot.

W e know t h e mission

did

n o t change, t h e p i l o t s

did

n o t suddenly b e c o m e d r a -

m a t i c a l l y more c a p a b l e o r less q u a l i f i e d so o t h e r f a c t o r s must have caused t h e

c h a n g i n g new composition.

I would like t o digress f o r a moment a n d talk a b o u t t h e i n d i v i d u a l fighten.

pilot.

H e learns a n d accumulates experience, a n d t h e more t h i s takes place, a n d

i n some cases t h e more f r e q u e n t l y it takes place, t h e more he improves. You

can teach h i m w i t h simulators a n d b u i l d u p

his experience, b u i l d u p his learning

process a n d c o m p l i c a t e t h e problems which we present h i m u n t i l he becomes

l i t e r a l l y a n expert.

Incidentally. this poses one of our g r e a t e s t problems,

because when we

present a n expert professional f i g h t e r p i l o t w i t h t e n years experience t o someone

,

who has n o t undergone this t r a i n i n g a n d a c c u m u l a t e d similar experience, unle5s

1

he can l u c i d l y explain i t , we a r e literally t o n g u e - t i e d a n d some peculiar c o n clusions a r e drawn.

W e have f o u n d , also, t h a t t h e p i l o t can transfer t o a l a r g e d e g r e e t h i s

t r a i n i n g and experience f r o m one machine t o another machine. H e n c e our conversion f r o m one f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t t o another i s usually simplified.

This m a n makes mistakes. I recall once, b r i e f i n g G e n e r a l Lemay, as was t h e

SAC t o b r i e f any a c c i d e n t t o t h e commander. I was l a n d i n g a f l i g h t o f four a t Eglin 6 a f t e r a n a i r -

custom i n those days f o r f i g h t e r wing commanders a t

I

I

183

The M a n - M a c h i n e C o n f l i c t i n H i g h Performance T A C A i r c r a f t

~

to-air gunnery mission i n F-84F's. M y number four m a n l a n d e d s i x inches short.

There was no over-run. H e

hit t h e l i p , bounced sideways on t h e runway, w i p e d

out t h e gear, d u g and destroyed t h e aircraft. G e n e r a l L e M a y ' s c o m m e n t , u p o n

my d e s c r i b i n g this, was, I c o u l d b u i l d a runway c o m p l e t e l y surrounding or c i r c u m - n a v i g a t i n g t h e g l a b e and one o f your best f i g h t e r p i l o t s would l a n d short.

These f i g h t e r pilots are error prone.

Moreover, errors are unpredictable.

N o t l o n g ago, when I c o m m a n d e d the 4 t h Fighter W i n g of

105'5, I had

a p i l o t who was r e t u r n i n g t o M a c D i l l and on l a n d i n g p i c k e d u p t h e gear handle

instead o f a c t i v a t i n g t h e drag-chute. H e realized

war a n i m b l e a c t

-

his mistake i n t i m e a n d

- this

slammed i n t o burner a n d m a n a g e d t o g e t t h e a i r c r a f t o f f ,

having g r o u n d o f f t h e e d g e o f t h e l e f t gear joining t h e l e f t p y l o n tank a n d t h e

ventral fin. Thirty days ! d e r , t h e same p i l o t p e r f o r m e d t h e same maneuver, o n l y

this t i m e he d i d n ' t g e t i n t o burner i n time. A n d he w i p e d o u t t h e aircraft. I

d o n ' t know how t h i s c o u l d have been p r e d i c t e d even t h o u g h it was a d i r e c t

repeat b y a highly qualified pilot.

The f i g h t e r p i l o t has some intense motivation.

I n t h e f i r s t place, he wants t o excel. If he doesn't, t h i s soon becomes very

a p p a r e n t and he disappears.

Secondly, a n d associated w i t h

his desire t o excel, i s his desire t o progress.

H e has t o b e a b l e t o sense responses i n the a i r c r a f t , learn, and then p r e d i c t .

his desire t o live. A n d so he i s

his life.

A d d i t i o n a l l y , a n d n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y minor, i s

m o t i v a t e d t o make decisions which p r o l o n g

H e f i n d s himself i n a d i f f e r e n t situation a t least once every f l i g h t .

The

more c o m p l i c a t e d t h e f l i g h t environment, t h e more decisions he i s c o n f r o n t e d

with.

A n d then we t r y t o h e l p him.

W e t r y t o remove t h e indecisiveness b y c o n f r o n t i n g h i m w i t h instruments

which

enable h i m t o make a positive decision;

we t r y t o

provide him with

assistance which will relieve his f a t i g u e , such as an a u t o - p i l o t : we t r y t o p r o v i d e

him with all the i n f o r m a t i o n we can assemble f r o m t h e g r o u n d a n d t r a n s m i t t o

h i m t o assist h i m verbally so t h a t h e can make an i n t e l l i g e n t decision, a n d t h e n

we, i n our cosmic wisdom, present h i m w i t h an a i r c r a f t and say, have a t it.

N o w !e?'s talk a b o u t some specifics of t h e so-called man-machine c o n f l i c t .

I think all o f you will remember an a p p a r e n t l y u n c o m p l i c a t e d system for

e n g a g i n g t h e nose-wheel steering on t h e F-100. The o r i g i n a l version allowed t h e

p i l o t t o h o l d down a b u t t o n on t h e c o n t r o l stick a n d steer b y m o v i n g t h e r u d ders. Then someone d e c i d e d t h a t it was an e f f o r t t o h o l d t h e b u t t o n over any

p r o l o n g e d p e r i o d o f t i m e and i n c o r p o r a t e d a h o l d i n g relay. Then all we h a d .+o

1

d o was press and release t o engage o r disengage.

As you m i g h t guess, t h e

i n e v i t a b l e h a p p e n e d since we h a d b o t h systems a n d a p i l o t , i n an emergency,

h e l d t h e b u t t o n , c u t o f f t h e h o l d i n g relay and smartly r a n o f f t h e runway. Then

,

,

t h e safety p e o p l e came i n t o the p i c t u r e and further c o m p l i c a t e d it b y i n i t i a t i n g

t h e t h i r d m o d i f i c a t i o n , which i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e h o l d i n g relay plus an o v e r - r i d e

,

circuit. A n d , i n f a c t , t h i s was a g o o d m o d , b u t several more accidents o c c u r r e d b e f o r e all t h e a i r c r a f t c o u l d b e c o m p l e t e d t o one particular c o n f i g u r a tion. A n d I m i g h t a d d one a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t

- the

F-100 nose wheel steering

h a d c o m m i n junction points a t t h e brake anti-skid, t a i l skid r e t r a c t a n d l a n d i n g

lights. It needs very l i t t l e i m a g i n a t i o n t o visualize what an exciting n i g h t a p i l o t

h a d when one m a l f u n c t i o n l e f t

his a i r c r a f t w i t h o u t lights. brakes o r steering.

THE SOCIETY OF EXPERIMENTAL TEST PILOTS

I84

The

culmination of

a u t o m a t i c weapons

delivery

occurred

i n the

F-105.

Pressure a l t i t u d e a n d c a l i b r a t e d airspeed f r o m a c e n t r a l air d a t a c o m p u t e r

g - o u n d speed a n d d r i f t f r o m a d o p p l e r radar. Vertical reference f r o m a g y r o

p l a t f o r m a n d angle o f attack inputs are f e d t o a toss b o m b computer.

The

computer, i n turn, gives an a u t o m a t i c solution f o r weapon delivery a n d release.

All

t h e p i l o t has t o d o i s m o n i t o r t h e operation.

A n accumulation o f small solution errors places t h e a i r c r a f t outside t h e

p r o g r a m m e d release envelope where other p r o g r a m safety inputs p r e v e n t t h o

release o f t h e bomb.

This e f f e c t i v e l y eliminates t h e p i l o t f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l d e -

livery calculation, and hence t h e decision. It f u r t h e r adds t h e i n d i g n i t y o f p r e e m p t i n g his r i g h t t o d e c i d e on an alternate release. A n o t h e r example.

The p o p u l a r i t y i h a t a i r - t o - a i r missiles enjoyed f o r t h e past d e c a d e resulted

i n t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e g u n c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r t h e a i r - t o - a i r role. A i r defense

f i g h t e r s o p e r a t i n g i n a h i g h l y a u t o m a t e d environment,

r a d a r a n d missiles, obviously enjoy a h i g h

kill

utilizing

sophisticated

potential.

A l m o s t n o consideration i s given t o effectiveness

o f such missile a r m e d

f i g h t e r s i n an austere control environment.

N o r was a d e q u a t e consideration given t o t h e p r o b l e m o f sorting o u t a

mix o f enemy or f r i e n d l y aircraft.

The F-4C, e q u i p p e d with a h i g h q u a l i t y , complex f i r e c o n t r o l system, ou!standing

performance, is, vnfortunately, missing i n one v i t a l i t e m , t h e a b i l i t y

t o positively i d e n t i f y f r i e n d or f o e a t r a d a r range.

W i t h o u t this t h e p i l o t i s s t i l l r e d u c e d t o visual i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the enemy.

A t t h i s r a n g e , t h a t i s visual ranges, guns are very likely t h e best weapon

if t h e t a r g e t i s moving. A n d where d o we .find ourselves?

With a p o d d e d g u n a n d a g u n sight w i t h less c a p a b i l i t y t h a n .that of l a t e

f o r attack, p a r t i c u l a r l y

World W a r

II.

W e l l , let's take an inventory on t h e c o n f l i c t situation again.

C o m p u t e r s a n d sensors have far surpassed t h e expectations of most o f us

n o t only i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n , b u t also i n t h e i r reliability. H o w e v e r , t h e i r decision

making c a p a b i l i t y cannot substitute for t h e human mind.

Le? me see

if I can d e f i n e where perhaps t h e a u t o m a t i o n begins

t o iake

over.

The u n a i d e d a b i l i t y o f a p i l o t limits his c a p a b i l i t y . Functions b e y o n d t h e

u n a i d e d a b i l i t y o f t h e p i l o t , either in an all-weather a i r - t o - a i r o r a i r - t o - g r o u n d

situation must, of necessity d e p e n d u p o n a u t o m a t i o n t o some degree.

W h e n such a u t o m a t i o n occurs, a manual over-ride a b i l i t y must exist

,!o

p r o v i d e f o r t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f disaster i f n o t h i n g else.

O n e o f t h e u n f o r t u n a t e b u t Nholly natural characteristics of a f i g h t e r p i l o t

i s t h a t he i s f a n a t i c a l l y o p p o s c d t o removal of t h e decision f r o m

his

hands t o

survive.

H e insists on decision making prerogati./es which either preclude his

loss

o f l i f e o r enable him t o complete his mission.

I d o u b t t h a t any o f

us would argue, f o r example, t h a t an a u t o m a t i c launch

o f an i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l ballistic missile based on an a u t o m a i i c t h r e a t level analyzer a n d o t h e r such devices should occur. Yet, when we consider

a similar

t h r e a t c o n c e r n i n g t h e welfare o f an i n d i v i d u a l f i g h t e r p i l o t , should we b e surprised t o f i n d t h 3 t

h e indicates a similar lac4 o f enthusiasm f o r an a u t o m a t e d

response. W h e n you trust a h i g h l y t r a i n e d a n d skilled p i l o t w i t h expensive e q u i p m e n t a n d a mission i m p o r t a n t enough t o r i s k t h e loss o f t h e e q u i p m e n t a n d

possibly t h e l i f e o f t h e o p e r a t o r , then should you question o r i n d i c t h i m f o r n o t

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