The Origins of Modern Management Consulting

[Pages:6]The Origins of Modern Management Consulting

ChristopherD. McKenna? TheJohnsHopkins University

In 1993, AT&T spentmoreon managemenctonsultingservicesthanon corporateresearchanddevelopmenat,ndAT&T isnotalone[8, p. 60]. Wall Street analystsexpectbillingsfor consultingservicesto advanceat twice the rate of corporaterevenuesover the next decade. Yet, despitethe size, growth,and influenceof consultinfgirms,busineshsistorianhsaveremaineduncharacteristically silentaboutthe origins,developmenta, ndimpactof managemenctonsultingo, r

"managementgineerinags"it wasknownbeforetheSeconWd orldWar2. In this

paper,I will describetheprofessionaolriginsof managemenctonsultingfirmsatthe turnof thecenturyanddiscusswhy, afterslow,gradualgrowththroughthe 1920s, thesefirms took off duringthe 1930s. I argue(1) thathistorianshavewrongly assumedthat managemenctonsultingarosedirectlyout of Taylorism,(2) that engineers,accountantsa, nd lawyers,often supervisedby merchantbankers, provided counselthat later becamethe primary repertoireof management consultantasn, d(3) thatthelegalseparatioonf investmenatndcommerciablanking in 1933drovetherapidprofessionalizatioandgrowthof managemenctonsulting duringtheGreatDepression.

Recent historiansof scientificmanagementi,ncludingDaniel Nelson, StephenWaring, and JudithMerkle, have tracedthe impactof Taylorismon contemporarinystitutionassdiverseasbusinesesducationp,ublicadministration, andBritishindustrylongaftertheProgressive-ecrraazefor "efficiencye" nded[29, 36, 26]. Theproponentosf scientificmanagemenFt,rederickTaylor,HenryGantt, MorrisCooke,FrankandLillian Gilbreth,andHarringtonEmersonc, onsultedwith nearly200businesseosnwaystosystematizteheactivitiesof theirworkersthrough theapplicatioonf wageincentivest,ime-motionstudiesa,ndindustriapl sychology [29,p. 11]. Naturallythen,historianosf Taylorismhaveassumedthattheycould describecontemporarypractitionersof "industrialengineering,""production

Thisarticleisdrawnfrommydissertatio"nT,heHistoryof ManagemeCntonsulting1,880-

980."

2TheAssociatioonfManagemeCnot nsultan(tAsCME)definesmanagemecnotnsultinags a serviceprovidedfor a fee by objectiveoutsiderswho help executivesimprovethe management,operations,and economic performanceof institutions.Since the institutionalizatioandprofessionalizatioofnmanagemecnot nsultinogccurredwithinfirms, notamongsolopractitionerst,hispaperfocuseson managemenctonsultingfirms.

BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Volume twenty-four,no. 1, Fall 1995. Copyright?1995 by the BusinessHistoryConference.ISSN 0849-6825.

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engineering,""consultingengineering,"and "efficiencyengineering,"as early managemenctonsultantsS. imilarly,managemenctonsultantsli,ke ThomasCody, tryingto tracethehistoryof managemenctonsultinghaveassumedthat:

undoubtedlythe mostinfluentialfactor in the growthof modern managemenct onsultingwas the developmentof the conceptof 'scientificmanagementb' y FrederickTaylor.... The concept combinedthe practiceof engineeringwith the principlesof economicsa, ndit wasoutof thiscouplingthattoday'sprofession wasborn[11, p. 24].

ButTayloristsandmanagemenctonsultantasctuallyhadverydifferentprofessional andideologicalorigins.

As Hugh Aitken pointedout in ScientificManagementin Action,those executivesandtheir advisorsin largescalebusinesswho were "concernedwith problemsof formalorganizatioanndcontrolattheadministrativleevel,"cameout of a differentintellectuatlraditionthantheshopmanagemenmt ovemenftromwhich Taylormadehisreputation[1, pp. 17-18]. Tayloristswerelargelyconcernedwith industrialrelationswhile early managemenct onsultantsfocusedon problemsof bureaucraticorganization. While Harrington Emerson'sfirm of "efficiency engineers"did surviveasa very smallconsultingfirm throughthe 1980s,andthe British "managementconsultancies"foundedin the 1930s were undoubtedly Taylorist,noneof thelargemodernAmericanmanagemenctonsultingfirmshave Tayloristorigins[31,35]. Ratherp, rofessionally-trainaecdcountanatsndengineers, often with backgroundsin law or banking,foundedthe early "management engineering"firms to offer adviceto executiveson the organizationof their boardroomsn,otontheefficiencyof theirshopfloors.

The growthandcomplexityof the largestindustrialorganizationsin the UnitedStatescreateda marketattheturn-of-the-centurfyor theprofessionaflirms of engineersa,ccountantasn, dlawyerswhichofferedindependenctorporatecounsel [9, pp.464-468]. By the1890s,executiveosf largemanufacturincgompanieswho neededengineerinagdvice,butdidnotwanta full-timeengineeor nstaff,couldturn toconsultingchemicael ngineerlsikeArthurD. Littleorelectricael ngineerinfgirms likeStone& Websterfortechnicakl nowledge[20; 19,pp. 386-391]. Similarly,in the 1890s,corporatemanagersemployedAmericansubsidiariesof the British accountingfirms,like PriceWaterhouset,o provideexternalauditsandfinancial controlsfortheirgrowingcompanies[ 9, p. 464]. By the 1900s,American-based accountingfirms like Arthur Anderson,Haskins& Sells, Ernst & Ernst, and Seidman& Seidmanwereexpandintghroughoutht ecountry[23,pp. 1-3]. In law, largeNew York corporatelaw firmslike CravathSwaine,DavisPolk, andSullivan & Cromwellprovidedlegaladviceto businessehseadquartereidn New York. At thesametimegrowingregionalfirmslike JonesDay in ClevelandandBakerand Bottsin Houstonservedlocaldivisionsof nationalcompanies[24, p. 22]. The threeprofessionse,ngineeringa,ccountinga,ndlaw,all enjoyedstronggrowthin firmnumberasndsizefromthe1890sonwardbecausoef thespecializedskillsthat largerpartnershipcsouldoffertheirexpandingcorporateclients.

This expandingcorporateclienteleenabledyoungerpartnersto build practiceosf "managemenetngineeringw" ithinolder,largerfirmsorto foundnew specialtyfirms. Theseyoungerprofessionalisntentionallyborrowedskillsand

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credentialfsromfieldsoutsidetheirprofessiontarlainingastheystruggletdo attract clients.Forexamplet,heelectricaelngineerincgonsultinfgirmof Stone& Webster workedfor J.P. Morgan& Co. afterthe 1893recessiona,ppraisingthevalueof electricalutility companiesownedby GeneralElectric[21, pp. 21-24]. Their appraisalcsombinedengineerinegxpertiseandaccountinsgkillsastheytradedon their Wall Streetcontacts?While engineerswere performingaccounting, accountantms arketedthemselveassengineers.In 1927,JamesMcKinsey,an accountanat nd lawyerfrom Chicago,put "accountantasnd engineers"on his letterheada, sdidMiller, Franklin,Basset& Companya, naccountinfgirmbased inNewYork[28]. Thisblurringof professionabloundariewsassometimejsusta responseto demandbutfrequentlyit wastheresultof trainingin morethanone profession.JamesMcKinseywasnot alonein combininglegaltrainingwith managemenctonsultingh; isformerboss,GeorgeFrazer,andhisprotegeM, arvin Bower,werebothtrainedaslawyers[17,p. 7; 6, p. 1]. Managemenetngineersli,ke othersstrugglingfor professionasltatusu, sedmultipleprofessionaclredentialsto supportheirclaimsto specializedknowledgeandprofessionaalpprovalin their effortsto marketa newandpoorlyunderstoosdervice[7].

These engineers,accountantsa,nd lawyersoften workedfor merchant bankerswho,in turn,coordinateda widearrayof serviceswhichwere,at theturn of the century,the closestfunctionalequivalentin the Americansettingto

managemecnotnsultin4gS.incemerchanbtankerpsrovidebdothcommerciaanl d

investmenbt ankingservicesb, ankersactedbothasinternaladvisorsto helptheir clientcompaniesandasexternalregulatorsto safeguardinvestorsi'nterestsF. or exampleb, ankershiredcountlesesngineersa,ccountantasn, dlawyersto assisthem in reorganizingthe thirteenlargerailroadswhichfailed between1893 and 1898 [14, p. 5]. Bankersfrequentlyneededto evaluatethe worth,organizationa, nd prospectosf companiefsor projectsasdiverseasthevaluationof aninitialpublic offeringt,hereorganizatioonf a bankrupctompanyo, rtheadministrativientegration of twomergingcorporationsD. uringthe1920s,NationalCityBank(nowCitibank) performedmanagemenetngineeringstudiesto evaluatethe initial financingof UnitedAircraft,troubledloansatAnacondCa oppera, ndthemergerof sixseparate businessmachinecompanietso formRemingtonRand.[2]. To gaina thorough understandingof increasinglycomplexcorporationsb, ankerscalled uponand coordinatedtheworkof bothinternalandexternalprofessionalsIn. vestmenht ouses employedengineersfor valuationsand organizationasl urveys,accountantfsor auditsand the installationof financialcostcontrols,and lawyersto serveon reorganizationand bond-holdercommittees. In the 1920s, Arthur Andersen& Companybecamenationallyknownfor its investigationosf "plants,products, marketso, rganizationa,ndfutureprospectso"f companiesthatinvestmenbt anksin

3EdwinWebstewr asthesonofa partneartKidderP, eabod&y CompaniynBostonH. is

father,FrankG. Websterbecameheadof Kidder,Peabodyin 1905. In 1930,followingthe stockmarkectrash,EdwinWebsterpurchasetdhebankrupKt idder,Peabodyandinstalled hisson.EdwinG. Webster,Jr.,asKidder,Peabody'snewPresident[21, p. 3, 156].

4 While thispaperis notcomparativeb,ankersappearto haveservedasthesourceof organizationaaldvicein NorthernEuropeandJapanthroughoutthisperiod?

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New York andChicagowereunderwriting[ 3, p. 13-14]. By drawingon a range of professionasl ervicesas they advisedcorporatemanagemenotn planning, organizationa, ndexecutivecontrol,bankersprovideda rangeof organizational advice,backedbya blue-bloodedreputationw, hichonlymanagemenctonsultants would later equal.

Whilemanagemenctonsultingserviceswereavailablefromtheturnof the centuryonward,the rapid growth,bothin numbersandin size,of independent managemenctonsultingfirmsdid notbeginuntiltheGreatDepressionIt. wasn't until the 1930sthat managemenctonsultingfirmsgrew beyonda few founding partnersandestablishedbranchesin newcities. In 1926,aftertwelveyearsin businessE,dwinBoozemployedonlyoneothermanagemenetngineerb; y 1936, Booz-Allen & Hamiltonhadelevenconsultantosn staff[5, pp.7, vi]. Similarly, JamesO. McKinseyandCompanyw, hichMcKinseyfoundedin Chicagoin 1926, had,by 1936,expandedto morethan25 employeeasndhada secondofficein New York [30,p. 11]. Thegrowthinthenumbeor f firmsmirroredtheexpansioonf the firmsthemselvesB.etween1930and1940,thenumberof managemenctonsulting firms grew, on average,15% a yearfrom an estimated100 firms in 1930 to 400 firms by 1940 [4, Table 2]. It wasno coincidencethattheeconomisJt oelDean wrote in 1938 that "unheralded,almostunnoticed,professionalmanagement counsehl asbecomean importantinstitutionin our businessworld"[15, p. 451]. Duringthe 1930stheservicesthatmanagemenctonsultingfirmsprovidedbeganto increasein importance.In the 1920s,acquaintanceins local companieshired managemenetngineersto analyzelimited,technicapl roblems.But, by the 1930s, hundredosf largecorporationisncludingArmour,UnionCarbide,Kroger,Carrier, Sunbeam,U.P.S., Borden, Upjohn, JohnsonWax, and Searsroutinelyhired managemenetngineersto improvetheirorganization'soverallstrategys, tructure, andfinancialperformanceC. onsultantlsaterassumedthatthisgrowthduringthe depressionwas a countercyclicarleactionas troubledfirms usedmanagement engineersto cut costsand improveoperationalefficiency. Yet, management consultantssufferedbadly duringthe 1920-21 recessionand, fifty yearslater, followingthe 1973oil embargo- in bothcasesc, lientssimplyputoff expensive studiesastheirplantssatidle [27, 13]. The growthof managemenctonsultingin the 1930swasnotsimplya "natural"marketresponseto theeconomicdownturn. It was,insteada, ninstitutionarlesponseto newgovernmenrtegulation.

New Deal bankingand securitiesregulationpropelledthe growth of managemenct onsultingin the mid-1930s. Firms of managemenct onsultants prosperedas companiesturned from bankersto managemenet ngineersfor organizationaaldvice.In thislastsectionof thepaper,I will illustratethisprocess of institutionalizatiobny describing(1) thereorganizationof U.S. Steelby Ford, Bacon& Davisbetween1935and1938,(2) thecareerof managemenetngineer GeorgeArmstrong,and (3) the developmenot f the "generalsurveyoutline"at JamesO. McKinseyandCompanyin the 1930s.

Congresspassedthe Glass-SteagalBl ankingAct of 1933 to correctthe apparensttructuraplroblemsandindustrymistaketshatcontemporariebselievedled to thestockmarkectrashin October1929andthebankfailuresof theearly 1930s. Glass-Steagadllividedtheinvestmenatnddeposit-takinfgunctionswithinbanks likeJ.P. MorganandNationalCityBankintotwoseparateindustriesc: ommercial bankingandinvestmenbtanking.J.P. Morgan& Companyf,or example,choseto remaina commerciabl ank,butseverapl artnersleftto formtheinvestmenbt anking

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firm of Morgan,Stanley& Company. SimultaneouslyC,ongresscreatedthe SecuritiesandExchangeCommissionto regulatefinancialmarketsandenforcea more opensystemof corporatedisclosure[25, pp. 169-171]. Theselegislative changews hichreconfigurebdankingandpromotedtherapidgrowthof independent accountingauditsalsoshapedtheinstitutionalizatioonf managemenctonsulting. SinceGlass-Steagapllrohibitedcommerciabl anksfromengagingin "non-banking activities,"like managemenetngineeringc,ommerciabl ankscouldno longeractas managemenctonsultant[s32, p. 23]. Federalregulatorsforcedcommerciabl anks to ceasetheir non-bankingactivitieslike insurancer,eal estatedevelopmento, r managemenct onsulting.And, while Glass-Steagaldlid not restrictinvestment banksfrom actingas managemenctonsultantsS,.E.C. regulationsrequiredthat underwritersperformexternalduediligenceon securitiesissuesandcorporate reorganizationsso investmentbankscould not use their internal management engineersto certify new issues. Federal regulationforced investmentand commerciabl anksfrom 1934onwardto hireoutsideconsultanttso renderopinions on the organizationof a bankruptcompanyor theprospectsof a newly-formed public company. Commercialbankerssimultaneouslyencouragedbusiness executivesto hiremanagemenctonsultantssinceofficersinsidethebankscouldno longer coordinateinternalorganizationalstudiesof their clients. The new institutionalarrangementisn bankingopenedup a vacuuminto whichfirms of managemenctonsultantrsushed.

The contrast between the old and new institutional order was evident in

Ford, Bacon& Davis' reorganizationof U.S. Steelbetween1935 and 1938. In 1901,J.PierponMt organhadpersonallysupervisetdheinitialorganizationof U.S. Steel,butin 1935,U.S.Steel'sChairman,MyronTaylor,askedhiscollegefriend, GeorgeBacon,to overseethereorganizationof the largestindustriaflirm in the country[22]. As Taylorreportedto thestockholderosf U.S. Steelin 1938,

In 1935weretainedthefirm of Messrs.Ford,Bacon& Davisto go throughall of ourpropertiesm, ethodsp, ersonneal ndmarketsand, in collaborationwith our engineersand executivesto formulate definiterecommendations[citedin 18,p. 619].

Ford, Bacon& Davis' studytook threeyears,cost 3.2 million dollars,and eventuallyincluded203 separatereportsproducedin collaborationwith five differenst ub-contractincgonsultingfirms,includingMcKinsey,Wellington& Co [16]. It was the largeststudyever doneby managemenetngineersa, nd the recommendationwshichFord,Bacon,& Davismadeontheorganizations,trategy, and operationsof U.S. Steelinfluencedthe company'sinvestmentla, bor,and administrativpeoliciesthroughthe1950s.In laborrelationsf,or instancet,he 1937 accordreachedwithworkersoverturneda long-standinagntagonistircelationship endorsebdytheMorganBankwhichwouldhaveimmobilizedU.S.Steelinthetight labormarketsof theSecondWorldWar [34, pp. 15-17].

GeorgeArmstronga, Vice-Presidenitn chargeof industriailnvestigationast NationaCl ityBankbetween1921and1932,personifietdhechangescausedbythe Glass-SteagaAllct. Duringthe1920sN, ationalCityBankhadArmstrongconduct studiesof theirtroubledloanstotheSaco-LoweSll hopso, f theproposedmergerof Palmolive, Kraft, and Hersey, and (at J. C. Penney'spersonalrequest)a comparativsetudyof thePenneychainstoresandtheirrelativeexpenseratios[2]?

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In 1932, however, with insideassurancesfrom his unclethat Franklin D. Roosevelt intendedto breakapartcommercialandinvestmenbt anking,Armstrongresigned fromNationalCity Banktofoundhisownconsultingfirm. His timingwasshrewd sincelawyerswhoexaminedthenewstatuesagreedi,n Armstrong'swords,

thatanyfinancingbeprecededbytheexerciseof duediligence.This wasinterpretetdo meantheinvestigationof thesubjectby a firm of competenetngineerincgonsultantasndthereviewof theRegistration Statementby suchconsultants[2, p. 69].

Armstrong'snewfirm, GeorgeS. Armstrong& Companywassuccessfufrlomits foundingin 1933. The firm workedfor a successioonf investmentbankingfirms during the 1930s investigatingsuchcorporategiants as Jones& Laughlin, SeagramsB,irdseyeFrozenFoodsa, ndPhilipMorris. GeorgeArmstrongprofited fromthetransitionfrombankersupervisionof managemenetngineeringstudiesto theinstitutionalizatioonf managemenctonsultingeventhoughthetypesof studies that Armstrongperformeddid not change. GeorgeS. Armstrong& Co. grew rapidly not becauseit offereda newform of organizationaaldvicebut because Armstronghadfoundedan independenfitrm.

The history of James O. McKinsey & Company illustrates the institutionalizatiofnmanagemecnot nsultinagftertheGlass-SteagaAllct. During the 1930s,JamesMcKinseyworkedto systematizethe complicatedprocessof solicitingnewclientsandconductinga managemenetngineeringsurvey.In order to securenewclients,McKinsey methodicallycultivatedcontactsthroughouthe financiacl ommunityH. e claimedtohavetakeneveryimportanbtankerin Chicago orNew York to lunchand,in return,"'nearlyeveryoneat onetime or anotherhas given me somework....'" [37, p. 42]. PerhapsJamesMcKinsey's greatest contributionto theinstitutionalizatioonf hisfirm wasthe"generalsurveyoutline," whichhe draftedin December1931,to giveyoung,inexperiencedconsultantas model to follow when,as McKinsey specified,they were askedto preparea completestudyof a companythatwasin financialdifficulties[30, p. 11]. Marvin Bower,whojoinedthefirmin 1933,haswrittenthatthegenerasl urveyresembled the corporatereorganizationfsor bondholdersc'ommitteeswhichBower had previouslyoverseenasa younglawyeratJonesD, ay [6, p. 17]. Indeed,because consultantfsrequentlypreparedthesegeneralsurveysfor investmenftirmsduring the1930s,thepartnersatJamesO. McKinseyandCompanycameto referto them as"banker'ssurveys."The generalsurveyoutlinesurvivedin modifiedform in McKinseyandCompany'strainingmanualuntil 1962[30, p. 12]. As earlyasthe 1930s, JamesO. McKinsey and Companywas profitingfrom the external impositionof bankingandfinanceregulationa, transitionit waswell equippedto exploit. The firm alsoprofitedfromitsinternalsystematizatioonf clientcontact andreportwriting.TheseinternalarrangementasllowedMcKinseyandCompany

to overcome the limitations of novice consultants and variable economic conditions

asthefirm's organizationgrewbeyonditsfounderandexpandedthroughoutthe

world.

The originsof modernmanagemenctonsultingarein the 1930s. Contrary to popularassumptionsT,aylorismwas not the predominantinfluenceon the developmentof consultingfirms. Rather,managemenetngineersdrew on the practicesof accountantse,ngineersa, nd lawyersto offer CEO-level studiesof

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organizations, trategya, ndoperations.The majorchangein thisemergingquasiprofessiontook place in the 1930s and was primarily a productof political developmentsB. eforethe 1930s,merchanbt ankerscoordinatedthesestudies.But, the Glass-SteagalAl ct andS.E.C. disclosureregulationsforcedcommercialand investmenbt ankersto abandoninternalmanagemenctonsultingactivitiesevenas regulatorsmandatedthattheycommissionoutsidestudies.Theserequiredstudies, combinedwiththeincreasingacceptancoef managemenetngineersby corporate executivesp,ropelledtherapidgrowthof consultinfgirmsfromthe1930sonward. NewDeallegislationandfirm-levelsystemizatiocnatalyzedthedevelopmenotf this particularlyAmericanform of professionalizecdorporatecounsel.

Sincethe 1930s,managemenct onsultantshavereorganizedthe largestand mostimportantorganizationsin the world. During the SecondWorld War, the Federal Governmenthired large numbersof consultantsto streamlinecivilian productionr,eorganizethemilitary,andoverseetherapidexpansionof theFederal Administration. By 1949, Cresap.McCormick & Paget was working for the Hoover Commissionrestructuringthe ExecutiveBranch [12]. As consultants worked for the government,they carriedideasbetweenthe public and private bureaucracies,acceleratingthe processof organizationalinnovation and disseminationS.inceothercountriedsidnotlegislatetheseparatioonf commercial andinvestmenbt anking,theinstitutionalizatioonf managemenctonsultingnever happenedoutsideof theUnitedStates.WhenAmericanmanagemenctonsultants expandedintoEuropein theearly1960s,theysoldAmericanmanagemen"tknowhow"to Europeanmanageresagerto employtheorganizationasltructuretshatJ. J.

Servan-Schreiblaebr eled"TheAmericanChalleng"e?. Bythe1970sM, cKinsey andCompanyhaddecentralizedone-quarteor f thehundredlargestcompaniesin Great Britain [10, p. 239]. Whetherreorganizingthe Bank of England,Royal DutchShell,the Governmentof Tanzania,or eventheWorld Bank,management consultantdsisseminateAdmericanmanagementtechniquetshroughouttheworld. But,it wastheinstitutionaalndprofessionaglrowthof consultantdsuringthe 1930s that wasthe necessaryprecursotro thepredominancoef Americanmanagement consultantsthroughoutheworldand,throughthem,theascendancoyf American modelsof corporateorganizationaftertheSecondWorld War.

References

1. HughG. J. Aitken,ScientifiMc anagemenint Action:Tayh?rismat WatertownArsenal,] 908-1915 (Princeton, 1960).

2. GeorgeS. ArmstrongA, n Engineerin WallStreet(New York, 1962). 3. ArthurAndersen& Co., TheFirst SixtyYears,1913- 1973(Chicago,1974).

-?Indeed,Servan-Schreibeirn, hisbestsellefrrom 1968,notedthathandin handwiththe growthof Americanindustriasl ubsidiarieins Europe,"thethreeAmericanconsultanftirms withEuropeabnranche(sBooz-Allena, ndHamiltonA, rthurD. Little,Inc.,andMcKinsey andCo.)havedoubledtheirstaffseveryyearforthepastfiveyears"[33,p. 8, emphasiisn original].

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