The Russian heartland is the area occupied by Muscovy in ...



The Russian heartland is the area occupied by Muscovy in the early 16th century. It occupied the northern European plain east of Lithuania and Northeast of Kiev, where its southern boundary ended at the Pripet Marshes, a region that formed a natural boundary between what is today Ukraine and Russia. Its western frontier began on the Barents Sea at the Kola Peninsula and ran south through St. Petersburg, Pskov to just north of Kiev. Muscovy’s eastern border was the northern Urals. Its southern border ran north of Tartarstan and then ran southwest toward Kiev.

(Insert Map of Muscovy)

It is perhaps easier to visualize Muscovy by what it didn’t include. The Baltics, Ukraine, the Volga and Don Basins, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia were all outside this core area.

Another way to visualize this is that pre-Muscovy (known as Kievian Rus) occupied the forested regions of today’s Russia, while the steppes to the east remained out of its control. This in turn allowed this territory to resist the Mongolian invasions. The Mongols were horsemen who dominated the grasslands with their rapidly moving cavalry force. Their power, although substantial, diminished when they entered the forests, and the value of their horses, their force multipliers, declined. There they had to fight infantry forces where the advantage was on the defenders side. In fact, the Mongols formed alliances with the descendents of Aleksander Nevsky who ruled Moscow in the 1200s. In due course the Mongols disintegrated, leaving a vacuum that in turn allowed for the consolidation and formation of Muscovy-- the dominant power on the northern, forested plains. The Mongol tide broke on the Russian forests, but there was also a threat to Russia from the west. Aleksander Nevsky defeated the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights in the 13th century.

This defined Muscovy geopolitical problem. On the one hand, there was a constant threat from the steppes. Second, the northern European plain allowed for few natural defenses. Therefore Muscovy faced a constant threat from the West, which was more populous and therefore could both deploy substantial infantry and—as the Swedes did—use naval power to land forces against the Muscovites. The forests provided a degree of protection, as did the size of the Muscovy holding and climate, but in the end they faced a threat from at least two directions. They handled the Mongols through skillful diplomacy and controlled Western threats with military force, but they were caught in a perpetual juggling act.

The first pressing business of the was to create a buffer on the steppes so that another invasion from the east would not hit Muscovy directly. In 1533, Ivan the Terrible drove south to conquer Kazan and Astrakhan, extending Muscovy rule through the entire length of the Urals, and reaching the northern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. This anchored Moscow’s rule firmly on two mountain ranges and made it much more difficult for attacks from Asia or the south to threaten Moscow. In addition, Ivan pressed eastward across the Urals into Siberia, beginning its systematic conquest that concluded in the 17th century. Ivan the Terrible established the geopolitical principle of buffers for Moscow, beginning in the area where the greatest danger lurked. Asia was blocked allowing Moscow to concentrate on its Western flank.

The search for buffers extended to the west. In the 18th century under Peter and Catherine the Great, Russian power pushed westward, conquering Ukraine to the southwest, and pushing Russian power to the Carpathian mountains. It also moved the Russian border to the West, incorporating the Baltic countries and securing the Russian right flank on the Baltic Sea.

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The geography of the Russian empire bequeathed it certain characteristics. Most, important, Russia is lightly settled. Even today, vast areas of Russia are unpopulated while in the rest of Russia, population is far less concentrated in cities than in other countries. The European part is most densely populated, but so is Central Asia. The center of gravity of population was tilted toward the old Muscovy region but not decisively so.

Moreover, population is not concentrated in a few large urban areas, but distributed widely in smaller cities and towns, as well as a substantial rural population.

This is a traditional condition within the Russian empire, driven primarily by size and transport. The Russian empire, even excluding Siberia, is an enormous landmass. It is located far to the north. Moscow is at the same latitude as Newfoundland, while the Russian and Ukrainian breadbaskets at the latitude of Maine. That means that there is an extremely short growing season. Apart from limiting the size of the crop, the climate limits the efficiency of transport. Given size and whether conditions, getting the crop from farm to distant markets is a difficult matter. Therefore, the ability to support large urban populations at great distances from farms is difficult. The population therefore tends to distribute itself nearer growing areas and in smaller towns, so as not to tax the transport system. This is the root problem of the Russian economy. Russia can grow enough to feed itself, but it cannot efficiently transport what it grows within the time frame available. Crops rotting on farms while cities starve is therefore an old story in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

This distribution of population also creates a political problem. The nature of the Muscovy expansion created a distributed population and diverse nationalities. The distributed population made the transport of goods to markets a premium, but it did not always respond to market conditions. The cost of transport frequently made it impossible to ship food to cities at prices that could be afforded. The alternative was either to accept urban starvation or force the sale of crops at below market prices. This was, of course, the model that Stalinism adopted in attempt to support an urban, industrialized population. In order to do that, the Russian empire had to be tightly controlled by a security apparatus that could impose Moscow’s will effectively. The most effective leaders—tsar, Soviet leader or Russian President—have all understood this. It had to be a security apparatus that was absolutely loyal to Moscow, and therefore had to be itself subjected to terror periodically. It had to be an apparatus that could deal ruthlessly with the rural population in particular. In addition, and this was critical, the security apparatus had to deal with non-Russian nationalities assuring their quiescence if not loyalty.

The Russian geography, therefore, meant that either Russia would have a centralized government, or it would fly apart, torn by nationalist movements and peasant risings. Urbanization and industrialization would have been impossible. Indeed, the Russian Empire or Soviet Union would have been impossible. The natural tendency of the Empire and Russia itself is to disintegrate. Therefore, to remain united it had to have a centralized bureaucracy responsive to autocratic rule in the capital, and a vast security apparatus that compelled the country and empire to remain united. Russia is the history of controlling the inherently powerful centrifugal forces tearing at the countries fabric.

Russia therefore has two sets of geopolitical problems. The first is holding the empire together. The empire was created in order to protect the Muscovy heartland from foreign threats. The empire also poses a problem of internal security that challenges the state. It must hold together the empire and defend it at the same time.

Geopolitical Imperatives of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union

By the 18th Century, Russia had created the empire and was faced with dealing with the dual problem, a problem that continued to the fall of the Soviet Union. During the next century, it was extended to include central Asia and the Caucasus until Turkey. But its fundamental structure existed.

1. There was the Russian core, the old Muscovy.

2. There were the southern buffers, from the Carpathians to the Urals, including Ukraine and the Tatar regions—and later extending to Central Asia

3. Western buffers extending as far as possible, ranging from no buffer to all eastern Europe. Ukraine served a strategic function in this as well.

4. Siberia, blocking any advance from China and Mongolia.

Given the geography of the Russian heartland, we can see why the Russians would attempt to expand as they did. Vulnerable to attack on north European plain and from the Central Asian an European steppes simultaneously, Russia could not withstand a combined war on its periphery. Apart from the military problem the ability of the state to retain control of the country under such pressure was dubious, as was the ability to feed the country under those circumstances. No matter how far west the Russians moved on the European plain, there was no point at which they could anchor themselves (as done by a river or mountain). Given the narrow gap between the Baltic and Carpathians, this is where the Soviets could attempt to fight a defensive battle. But fighting a defensive battle along their southern and southwestern frontiers would have been hopeless. In this area the Russians could choose to expand and dominate the regions, or wait for an attack. They chose expansion, and the first step in expansion assumed the second, and so, until they reached natural barriers on which to defend themselves.

Russia was anchored on the Carpathians, the Black Sea, the Caucasus to the Urals, protecting its southern flank as well as the south west. Siberia protected its eastern frontier with vast emptiness. Further to the east, they were anchored on the Himalayas. The Russians had defensible frontiers everywhere, except the northern European plain, and that is where Russia’s primary threat originated from—from the Swedes and Teutonic Knights, to Napoleon, to Hitler and to NATO.

Strategy of the Russian Empire

At first glance, it would appear that Russia’s primary strategic problem rests with Siberia. There is only one rail line connecting Siberia to the rest of the Empire and positioning a military force is difficult or impossible. In fact, risk in the far east is illusory. The Trans-Siberian Railroad runs east west, with the Baikal Amur Mainline creating a loop. It is the main lifeline to Siberia and is to some extent vulnerable. But an attack against Siberia is difficult because not only is there not much to attack, but the weather and sheer size make it difficult to hold; and an attack beyond it is impossible because of the Urals.

East of Kazakhstan, the Russian frontier is mountainous to hilly, and there are almost no north south roads running deep into Russia and these can be easily defended. The period without mud or snow last less than three months. After that time, overland resupply of an Army is impossible. It is impossible for an Asian power to attack Siberia. That is the prime reason that the Japanese chose to attack the U.S. rather than the Soviet Union in 1941. The only way to attack Russia in this region is its maritime region by sea, as the Japanese did in 1905. It might then be possible to achieve a lodgement in the maritime provinces (such as Primorsky Krai or Vladivostok). But exploiting the resources of deep Siberia given infrastructure costs, is prohibitive to the point of being almost impossible. The defense of Siberia is therefore primary a naval issue.

We begin with Siberia in order to dispose of it. The defense of the Russian Empire involved a smaller set of issues:

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The mature Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were anchored on a series of linked mountain ranges, deserts and bodies of water which gave it a superb defensive position. Beginning on the northwestern Mongolain border and moving southwest on a line through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the empire was guarded by the northwestern extension of the Himalayas. Swinging west along the Afghan and Iranian borders to the Caspian sea, the empire occupied the lowlands along a mountainous border. But the lowlands, accept for a region on the frontier with Afghanistan, was harsh desert, impassable for large military forces. A section along the Afghan border was more permeable, leading to a long term Russian unease with the threat in Afghanistan, foreign or indigenous. The Caspian sea protected the border, with Iran, and on its western shore, the Caucasus begin, which it shared with Iran and Turkey, but which were hard to pass through in either direction. The Caucuses terminated in the Black Sea totally protecting the southern border of the Empire.

The western frontier ran from west of Odessa north to the Baltic. This European frontier was the vulnerable point. Geographically, the southern portion of the border varied from time to time, and where the border was drawn was critical. The Carpathian Mountains form an arc from Romania, through western Ukraine into Slovakia. Russia controlled the center of the arc in Ukraine. However, its frontier did not extend as far as the Carpathians in Romania, where a plain separated Russia from the mountains. This region is called Moldava or Bessarabia, and when the region belongs to Romania, it represents a threat to Russian national security. When it is in Russian hands, it allows the Russians to anchor in the Carpathians. And when it is independent, as it is today, then it can serve either as a buffer or a flash point. During the alliance with the Germans in 1939-1941, the Russians specifically seized this region as they did again after World War II. But there is always a danger of an attack out of Romania.

This is not Russia’s greatest danger point. That occurs in the north, between the northern edge of the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea. This gap, at its narrowest point, is just under 300 miles, running west of Warsaw from the city of Elbag to Cracow in Poland. This is roughly the location of the Russian Imperial border prior to World War I, as it is the narrowest point in the north European plain. Behind this, the Russians controlled eastern Poland and the three Baltic countries.

INSERT MAP OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN POLAND

The danger to Russia is that the north German plain expands like a triangle east of this point. As it widens, Russian forces get stretched thinner and thinner. So a force attacking from the west through the plain, faces an expanding force of Russians that things out. If they concentrate their force, they can break through to Moscow. That is the traditional Russian fear—that lacking natural barriers, the farther east they move, the broader the front and the greater the advantage for the attacker. The Russians faced three attackers along this axis—Napoleon, Wilhelm II and Hitler. Wilhelm was focused on France so he did not drive hard into Russia, but Napoleon and Hitler did, each almost toppling the regime in the process.

Any Russian entity, no matter how secure to the south, faces its major threat from the west. Russia therefore has as one of its strategic goals anchoring its southern flank in the Carpathians in Romania by controlling Moldavia/Bessarabia. It is in the north, in Poland, that Russia’s fate is settled. Here, Russia has three strategic options.

1: Use Russia’s geographical depth and climate to suck in an enemy force and then defeat it, as it did with Napoleon and Hitler. After the fact this appears the solution, save that it is always a close run, the attackers devastate the country side, and in the case of Hitler, a second front in the south was opened. It would be interesting to speculate what would have happened in 1942 if Hitler had resumed his drive on the north European plain toward Moscow, rather than shift to a southern attack toward Stalingrad.

2; Face an attacking force with large, immobile infantry forces at the frontier and bleed them to death, as they tried to do in 1914. On the surface an attractive choice because of greater manpower reserves that European enemies. In practice dangerous, because of the volatile social conditions of the empire, where the weakening of the security apparatus could cause the collapse of the regime in a soldiers revolt as happened in 1917.

3: Push the Russian/Soviet border as far west as possible to create another buffer against attack, as they did during the Cold war. An obviously attractive choice, since it creates both strategic depth and increases economic opportunities, save that it diffuses Russian resources by extending security states into Central Europe and massively increasing defense costs, which ultimately broke the Soviet Union in 1992.

Contemporary Russia

The greatest expansion of the Russian Empire took place under the Soviets in 1945-1989. Paradoxically, this expansion preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union and the contraction of Russia to its current borders. When we look at the Russian Federation today, it is important to understand that today’s Russian Federation has essentially retreated to the borders it had in the 17th Century. It holds old Muscovy, plus the Tatar lands to the southwest. It holds Siberia It has lost its western buffers in Ukraine and Baltics, it has lost its strong foothold in the Caucasus, as well as Central Asia.

Insert map of Soviet Union including members of the Warsaw Pact

To understand this spectacular expansion and contraction, we need to focus on Soviet strategy. The Soviet Union was a landlocked country, dominating the Eurasian heartland, but without free access to the sea. Because the British got to Denmark before they did, the Russians were trapped behind the Skagerrak in the Baltic, St. Petersburg effectively blockaded. Turkey was part of NATO, so their Odessa was blockaded.

There were many causes to the Soviet collapse. Some were:

1. Over extension of forces into central Europe taxing the ability of the Soviet Union to control the region while economically exploiting it. It became a net loss. The extension created costly logistical problems on top of the cost of the military establishment.

2. Creating an apparent threat to the rest of Europe that compelled the United States to deploy major forces and arm Germany. This in turn force the Russians into a massive military buildup that undermined its economy, less productive than the American because it lacked American maritime trading capabilities, and because of its inherent agricultural problem.

3. Extension of the traditional Russian administrative structure both diffused Russia’s own administrative structure, while turning a profitable empire into a massive economic burden.

4. Forcing Russia into an arms race with much richer countries where it could compete only by diverting resources from the civilian economy, material and intellectual. The best minds went into the military-industrial complex, leaving the administrative and economic structure of Russia to crumble.

In 1989 it lost control of eastern Europe and in 1992 it collapsed itself.

What must be understood is that Russia after the collapse has retreated to essentially its 17th century borders—save that it has retained control of Siberia, which as we have argued, is geopolitically irrelevant or a liability.

INSERT MAP OF MUSCOVY IN 17TH CENTURY AND MAP OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA EXCLUDING SIBERIA

Russia has lost all of Central Asia. Its position in the Caucasus has become tenuous. Had it lost Chechnya,Russia’s eastern flank would have been driven out of the Caucasus completely, leaving it without geopolitical anchor:

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As it is, the gap between Kazhakhstan in the east the Ukraine in the west is only three hundred miles wide and contains Russia’s industrial heartland. Russia has lost Ukraine of course and Moldova. But its most grievous geopolitical contraction has been on the north European plain, where it has retreated from the Elbe River in German to a point less than 100 miles from St. Petersburg, and where the distance from an independent Belorussian border to Moscow is about 250.

To understand the Russian situation, it is essential to understand that it has in many ways returned to the strategic position of Muscovy. Its flank to the southeast is relatively secure, since China shows no inclination to adventures into the steppes and no power is in a position to challenge otherwise. But in the west, in Ukraine and in the Caucusus, the Russian retreat has been stunning.

We need to remember why Muscovy expanded in the first place. Having dealt with the Mongols, the Russians had two strategic interests. Most immediate was to secure its western borders by absorbing Lithuania and anchoring itself as far west on the European plain as possible. Second, secure its southeastern frontier against potential threats from the steps by absorbing central Asia as well as Ukraine. Without that, Muscovy cannot withstand a thrust from either direction, let alone one from both directions at once.

It can be said that no one intends to invade Russia. From the Russian point of view their history is filled with dramatic changes of intention, particularly in the West. The unthinkable occurs to Russia once or twice a century. In its current configuration, Russia cannot hope to survive whatever surprises are coming in the 21st century. Muscovy was offensive because it didn’t have a good defensive option. The same is true of Russia. The fact that a Western alliance, NATO, is speaking seriously of establishing a dominant presence in Ukraine and in the Caucasus-- , and has already established a presence in the Baltics, forcing Russia far back into the widening triangle, with its southern flank potentially exposed to Ukraine as a NATO member, the Russians must view their position as dire in this sense. As with Napoleon, Wilhelm and Hitler, the initiative is the hands of others. For the Russians, the strategic imperative to eliminate that initiative or if impossible, to anchor Russia firmly on geographical barriers as possible, concentrating all available force on the north European plain as possible, without overextension.

Unlike countries like China, Iran or the United States, Russia is a country that has not achieved its strategic geopolitical imperatives. On the contrary, it has retreated from them:

1. Anchoring the southeastern border on the Himalayas.

2. Having a deep penetration of the Caucasus, preferably including Georgia and Armenia.

3. Anchoring the Southwestern border on the Carpathians by controlling Ukraine and Moldavia.

4. Eliminating the Baltic salient and at least holding a line on the Polish border.

Broader issues, like having a port that is not blocked by straits controlled by other countries was a goal the Soviets could pursue. This is now far out of Russian reach. But from the Russian point of view, creating a sphere of influence were Russian power returns to what—for it—are the natural imperial boundaries, is imperative.

Obviously, forces in the peripheral countries as well as great powers outside the region will resist. For them, a weak and vulnerable Russia is preferable, since a strong and secure one develops other appetites, the example of the Skageraak, Bosporus and La Perouse Straits being among them.

This points to the essential Russian geopolitical problem. Russia is essentially unstable geopolitically. The Russian Empire and Soviet Union were never genuinely secure. One problem was the north European plain. But another problem, very real and hard to solve, was access to the global trading system via oceans. And behind this was the essential economic weakness of Russia, its infrastructure and its interaction with agriculture. No matter how much energy it has, its infrastructure constantly weakens it s internal cohesion.

Russia must dominate the Eurasian heartland. When it does, it must want more. The more it wants the more it must face its internal economic weakness, which can’t support its ambitions and thus the Russian federation contracts. None of this has to do with Russian ideology or character. It has to do with geography, which in turn generates ideologies and shapes character. Russia is Russia and must face its permanent struggle.

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