2 (1 is intro)
2 (1 is intro)
INTRO. TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS LECTURE NOTES I
νNOTE: ALL IN-CLASS MATERIAL PRECEDED BY A DOUBLE-HYPHEN (--) IS PRESENTED IN ADDITION TO MATERIAL IN THE COURSE NOTEBOOK.
3
CH. 2: THE STRUCTURE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
νnorm =df either (1) standard of behavior actually accepted within a group, as descriptively studied by psych. and sociology, or (2) standard of what behavior of a group should be, regardless of what it is, as prescriptively proposed by phil. and relig.
ν--these have no logical connection; i.e., neither entails the other;
ν--(2) is the evaluative use of ‘norm’ as a justifiable criterion of behavior in general or in a specific group;
ν--the text immediately adopts the second use, but is that the only possible approach? How do professionals actually conduct themselves? --history may be relevant.
4
Types of norms
νuniversal norm =df evaluative norm that applies to everyone within a general social/legal context, possibly the context of all humanity;
νe.g.: --keep promises, don't murder, lie, cheat, steal etc.;
νvs.
νrole-related norm =df evaluative norm that applies to individuals by virtue of their particular roles in social relations;
νe.g.: --doctor/patient confidentiality, professional candor/independence, etc.;
5
Prior Question
νQ: Are there any nonprofessional role-related norms (as there must be for the account to be non-question-begging)?
A: --yes, in family relations, e.g., parent to child, spouse to spouse;
6
Some main questions
ν(1) How are professional norms justified?
ν
ν(2) What is the connection between universal and professional role-related norms?
ν= manner of justification; i.e., derivation? unrelated? is this a question of logical relation, a conceptual matter? it must be, if the norm is not descriptively based; so:
ν
ν(3) What kinds of norms are there?
7
Specific questions
νTaking (1) first: must there be prescriptive norms? if people accept norms, does that mean the norms are correct? or justified?
ν--these are questions in:
8
Meta-ethics
νMeta-ethics =df philosophy of ethics; i.e., study of the methodologies applied in the investigation of ethical standards and conduct and determination of the proper subject domain of such investigation.
ν--not studies in ethics (proposing specific standards) but about (the very possibility) of ethics (as to whether or in what sense it is possible);
ν--since, contrary to common upbringing, ethics/morality is not to be presupposed, being an abstract, non-tangible concept;
9
Vs. Religious Ethics
ν--this shows why religious ethics is a non-starter or ‘red herring’, since presupposing morality and unconcerned with methods of justification; Schmoses e.g.
10 picture
11
4 meta-ethical positions
ν1. Ethical Skepticism =df the view that no ethical standards can be known to be correct, because no opinion is more reasonable than all the others and consequently, no ethical standard is justifiable as the correct one;
ν--supported by inductive evidence showing that no ethical standard has ever been adequately justified;
Reply: --commits the informal fallacy of argument from ignorance (=df arguing from a lack of evidence to a contrary conclusion), which is wrong since "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence;"
12
Conclusion on Ethical Skepticism
νSo: reserve judgment until all the evidence is in, since intuitions favor possible justification for some ethical standard.
13
4 meta-ethical positions
ν2. Ethical Nihilism =df the view that there is nothing morally right and nothing morally wrong, so nothing is morally forbidden or obligated; i.e., everything is permitted, and there are no correct ethical standards (since if there were then some actions would be obligatory and others prohibited).
ν--a stronger claim than skepticism since not just holding that we cannot come to know whether a standard is correct but rather that in fact no standard is;
14
Evaluation of Ethical Nihilism
ν--E. N. is concerned primarily with evaluation of general standards rather particular actions: if some standard is supportable then nihilism must fail, but if no standard is correct then there is some reason to doubt any actions are right or wrong and to support nihilism, as in:
νMain premise of the nihilist argument: If all ethical standards are unjustified, then no ethical standards are correct.
ν--seems true since if no standard can possibly be justified, then plausibly no standard can be correct; appears sound but with intuitively undesirable conclusion;
15
Evaluation of Ethical Nihilism
ν1) 1st Response: --argument from ignorance is committed;
νReply: --the view only holds that lack of correctness is based on the impossibility of justification, in principle, not just on the lack of evidence to date;
16
Evaluation of Ethical Nihilism
ν2) Rebuttal: --equivocation (=df appeal to ambiguity of a crucial term) on the word ‘unjustified’, meaning either ‘not yet justified’ or ‘unable to be justified’; so separate premise into two claims:
νa) If all ethical standards are not yet justified, then all ethical standards are unable to be justified.
νb) If all ethical standards are unable to be justified, then no ethical standards can be correct.
17
Evaluation of Ethical Nihilism
ν--main question: why should ethical standards be unjustifiable, in principle?
ν2 further Nihilist replies: --(see Addendum 2)
ν--based on problems with the use of ethical language;
ν(i) Logical Positivism: --since conditions of verification for the truth of ethical standards cannot be given, they are non-sensical;
ν(ii) Emotive Theory: --since ethical standards express only commands or emotions, they can never be justified as true or false, correct or incorrect;
18
Conclusion on Ethical Nihilism
νEval.: --(a) clearly commits argument from ignorance, while (b) cannot be supported by reinterpretations of ordinary language, as in (i) and (ii), that deny that people do understand ethical standards and do distinguish them from ethical commands.
19 picture
20
4 meta-ethical positions
ν3. Ethical Relativism: often claimed to be adopted, but how defined?
21
Non-Relativist claims
ν3 possible relativist-sounding but NON-relativist claims:
ν1st claim: The right action for you in a given situation is not always the right action for me in that same situation.
νe.g.: --child is drowning; I can=t swim, you can; so I should go for help or call 911, while you should jump in and attempt rescue;
Response: --distinguish between (i) action relativism =df the same actions are sometimes right, sometimes wrong for different people in the same situations; vs. (ii) relativism about standards =df the same standards are sometimes right, sometimes wrong for different people in the same situations;
22
Non-Relativist claims
νso: 1st claim is action relativist, allowing for a single correct standard, such as AAlways act to render emergency assistance to those in need of it according to your own best abilities.@
ν--so: rejection of action absolutism (=df forbidding or obligating an action under all circumstances) does not imply ethical relativism;
ν--also relates to specifying one action for a professional and another for a non-professional in the same circumstances; i.e., E. R. is not entailed;
ν--see p. 22: holding that the same norms justify different actions by people in different social roles or situations is not relativism;
23
Non-Relativist claims
ν2nd claim: What you think is right is not always what I think is right.
νResponse: --clearly compatible with standard absolutism, since even if we disagree, one standard may still be absolutely correct, so no implication of E. R.;
24
Non-Relativist claims
ν3rd claim: The standard you are justified in accepting as correct is not always the standard I am justified in accepting.
ν--the most relativist sounding, but still NOT E.R.;
νResponse: --someone can be justified in accepting something as correct even though it is not correct;
ν--parallel to response to nihilism: correctness and justification are not equivalent;
νe.g.: --Newtonian physicist justifed in accepting the view that velocity can be increased indefinitely, before Einstein showed it to be incorrect;
ν--i.e., justification does not imply correctness, so absolutism is still possible and relativism is not implied;
ν--what is required is an objective claim about relativity of standards, not relying on individual perspective;
25
Ethical Relativism
νSo:
νethical relativism =df the view that different ethical standards really are correct for different times or groups of people.
ν--allows for various kinds of relativism: cultural, as with anthropologists and sociologists; class, as with Marx; and historical, as with Hegel; none better justified than e.r. in general;
ν--Q: which might professional ethics be?
26
Professional Relativism
ν--A: too diverse for a class, so cultural; i.e.,
νprofessional relativism =df the view holding that one ethical standard really is correct for professionals, while a different ethical standard really is correct for all others in society.
νCentral feature of ethical relativism: norms always refer to a particular group or society;
νbut: --this is not a sufficient condition since (i) common, e.g. family, norms do this without being relativist and (ii) professions would be made relativistic by definition;
27
Professional Relativism
νMajor question: Is professional ethics a form of ethical relativism?
ν--not just a question of whether professionals behave as if a different standard were correct for them;
νA: --It cannot be, if the First Principle of Professional Norms is accepted, since it necessitates a connection with social values and universal norms, as in the Tank and Bubble Model;
ν--further Q: why would such relativism be a problem, anyway?
28
Evaluation of Ethical Relativism
ν3 Major Criticisms of Ethical Relativism: (18)
ν1) it makes meaningful disagreement impossible: since different groups can all be right about the correctness of conflicting modes of conduct;
ν--so it undermines all discourse about ethics, as with Logical Positivism;
29
Evaluation of Ethical Relativism
ν3 Major Criticisms of Ethical Relativism: (18)
ν2) it makes justification of a standard impossible: since only the fact of acceptance within a group can be appealed to, but that is only a description and cannot motivate a prescription;
ν--i.e., ‘is’ does not entail ‘ought’, contrary to sociological theories;
ν--other reasons are possible but not against other views (i.e., internal reasons only);
30
Evaluation of Ethical Relativism
ν3 Major Criticisms of Ethical Relativism: (18)
ν3) the Relativist Dilemma: problem of who determines the relative standard; if the majority then injustice may be moral; if a minority then which one cannot be determined; there must be a majority or a minority, so either injustice or nondetermination results;
νresponse: --presupposes judgment of what is ‘injustice’;
νrebuttal: --some acts are undeniably immoral; nothing prevents the slide of relativist ‘standards’ to egoistic self-interest or nihilism;
31
Conclusion on Ethical Relativism
νSo: the practicality of the matter is that moral standards are commonly treated as absolute in all societies, and where the individual adopts ethical relativism, no standard need be maintained for long; i.e., since no argument for relativism justifies it and intuitions do support absolute standards, there is reason to reject relativism and accept:
32
4 meta-ethical positions
ν4. Ethical Absolutism =df the view that there is a single ethical standard that really is correct for all people at all times.
νSO: Tree of Normative General Ethics (partial): See Addendum 2(ix).
33
Pause Question 4
νYou will have one minute to answer by yourself on the “First Try” and then two minutes to discuss your answer with those seated directly around you.
νBe sure to put your name on the slip.
νPut your final answer after “Second Try:” that is the only graded response.
34
[pic]
35, 36 cartoons
37
Normative general ethics
νNewer middle branch: Contractarianism =df --the ethical theory holding that justice is fairness established under a social contract among original equals, but allowing for inequity of outcome under equality of opportunity; cf. John Rawls, so ‘Rawlsian Contractarianism’.
38
Universal norms
νbut: what is the purpose of identifying the single ethical standard?
νanswer: --providing justification for past actions and determining course of future actions;
39
Universal norms
νbut: how does an ethical theory, e.g., Rawlsian Contractarianism, provide such justification?
νanswer: --through three steps of justification;
40
Justification of universal norms
ν3 Steps (4 Levels) of Justification:
ν1) the ethical theory justifies certain social values; e.g., holding the value of self-determination is justified under the terms of the social contract in contractarianism;
νNote: --if this step is missing, then professional conduct in accordance with the First Principle is still not justified; e.g., Nazi doctor preserving unjustified Nazi social values;
41
Justification of universal norms
ν3 Steps (4 Levels) of Justification:
ν2) the social values justify various norms; e.g., the norm about keeping promises is justified according to the values of self-determination (since self-determination is impossible without promises being kept) and equality of opportunity; also, privacy --> confidentiality and equality of opportunity --> availability of services;
42
Justification of universal norms
ν3 Steps (4 Levels) of Justification:
ν3) the norms justify various actions; e.g., the norm about keeping promises justifies taking action against someone for violation of contractual agreement, such as a professor voiding a syllabus;
43
Justification of universal norms
νSo: actions and norms are justified by their relations to interests and justifiable social values of the different groups involved, and in the case of professional norms, by effects on the clients, employers, the general public, and the profession, itself.
ν--professionals mediate between individuals and society, so their norms must produce a reasonably acceptable balance of interests and values;
44
Pause Question 5
νYou will have one minute to answer by yourself on the “First Try” and then two minutes to discuss your answer with those seated directly around you.
νBe sure to put your name on the slip.
νPut your final answer after “Second Try:” that is the only graded response.
45
{Nu} vs. {Np}
νRelationships between universal norms {Nu} and professional norms {Np}:
ν--so as to determine the justification of the latter;
ν--the First Principle has set the stage for justification, but the exact way a professional role in relation to society is established remains unclear; which connection between ordinary and professional norms is the justifying one? how is the professional role determined?
46
Types of Np
ν2 types of norms determining professional roles:
ν1) role-defining professional norms =df those establishing the qualifications and defining activities of the profession;
νe.g.: --statutes and licensing regulations; tenure requirements; non-ethical norms;
ν2) role-related professional norms =df those establishing other commonly accepted limits upon professional activities, often unwritten, not definitive.
νe.g.: --advertising practices, professional courtesies, as well as more obvious ethical limits, such as no black-lists, client stealing tactics, etc., and all constraints of ethical codes;
47
Logical form
νLogical form of a norm: person P with characteristics C, in situation S, may or should do action A in manner M; so, in S may or should do or:
ν
νProblems: --what determines an action will come out of action theory; what will fill the value of >M= must be some psychological or sociological notion, so descriptive; also, characteristics and situations will be hard to specify clearly;
48
Relationships between Nu & Np
ν4 possible relationships between role-related professional norms and universal norms:
ν1) logical independence: Nu & Np; holding all values of variables to be independent so that no application or justification of professional norms introduces considerations of universal norms;
νe.g.: --religion, some lodges, militias, etc.
ν--so distinct ethical systems result, possibly prioritized, but if so then might reduce to (4) below;
ν--example shows again why theological ethics is a non-starter, since such independence is the usual result;
ν--closely linked to relativist independence of norms;
49
Logical independence relation
νArgument against Professional Relativism:
ν1. If professional norms are relativistic, then they are justified only by (tacit) social contract among professionals. ν2. If they are justified by social contract, then there is a further nonrelativist norm that contracts should be adhered to. ν3. If the social contract is only among professionals, then norms of professional conduct towards clients and third parties are unjustified. ν4. ˆ It's not the case that professional norms are justified only by social contract among professionals.
ν5. ˆ It's not the case that professional norms are relativistic.
50
Conclusion on logical independence
νResponse: --(although clearly deductive, valid--given enthymematic form)
ν(1) may be F, but what else would justify them?
ν(2) assumes absolutism for contracts;
ν(3) implies that the norms either do not apply to others or are unjustifiably paternalistic;
ν--Bayles is not really interested in full-scale rebuttal of relativism anyway, since assuming traditional liberal social values based upon social contract absolutism;
51
Strict identity relation
ν--further possible relations between prof. and univ. norms:
ν2) strict identity: Np = Nu; if so, then all variables are the same and no special study of professional ethics is required;
νResponse: --professional situations require more than just ordinary norms to control their specialized effects on social interests and values, so professional norms must have more detailed content than universal norms;
ν--e.g.: ‘Do not steal’ ( ‘Do not embezzle’;
52
Specification relation
ν3) specification: a justifying derivation relation, Nu ( Np; applying a universal norm to the special situations encountered by a professional, i.e., varying ‘S’ only; no unique norm is required by ‘P’ and ‘C’, just the usual made more concrete;
νe.g.: -- ‘one ought not to steal’ can be specified as implying and justifying ‘an accountant ought not to embezzle’; ‘one ought not to infringe others’ right to self-determination’ implies/justifies ‘a psychiatrist ought not to have sex with a client’;
53
Conclusion on specification
νResponse: --(3) is anti-relativist, but
ν(i) unable to meet the challenge of justifying all acceptable actions of professionals by specifying a unique universal norm in every case;
ν(ii) contrary to the notion of ‘ethical privilege’ of professionals; and
ν(iii) inadequate as a guarantee of the fulfillment of professional obligations in the face of conflict with arbitrary personal convictions;
ν--note that only thoroughgoing specificationism fails; specification is often possible;
54
Functional role relation
ν4) functional role: {Nu} ( ({Np} ( Nf ); since if the professional functional norm is accepted, then some set of professional norms and some set of universal norms must be accepted;
νderiving the professional norm from both the unique situations (S) and the unique characteristics (C) of the professional, so that the norm is justified by the role of the profession in relation to the moral worth of the society (as represented by the set of its universal norms);
55
Conclusion on functional role
ν--breaks the one-to-one relationship between Nu and Np in (3);
ν--supports the First Principle of prof. norms by tying the profession to all social values;
ν--provides an adequate basis for strict adherence to professional standards;
ν--explains the common experience of conflict between personal and professional ethics;
ν--requires a distinct meta-ethical justification since setting aside absolutist foundations in the case of professional domains, as in:
56
Ethical Separatism
νFinal sub-branch of meta-ethics:
ν5. ethical separatism =df the meta-ethical view that there is a single, pragmatically correct normative professional ethics for all societies at all times.
ν--required as a result of the failure to resolve meta-ethical disputes among traditional theories and society=s practical need for ethically controlling professional conduct;
νTree of Moral Philosophy: See Addendum.
ν--showing separatist sub-branch and meta-ethical justification relations to ethics;
57 cartoon
58
Functional norms {Nf}
ν3 features of functional norms:
ν--i.e., those that are justified independently of specification justifications;
ν(1) functional role justification: --the justification of professional conduct by reference to professional functional norms;
ν(2) separatist justification:--the justification of professional functional norms by deferring to the value of the professional role in relation to a morally worthy society;
ν(3) professional integrity: --the adherence to functional norms of the profession, as required by strong role differentiation of its members’ ethical status;
ν--so, social alteration of professions cannot violate the limits of professional integrity;
59
{Nu} vs. {Np}
ν3 possible areas of conflicts between Nu and Np:
ν1) univ. norm permits the act, but prof. norm requires or prohibits it;
νe.g.: --rendering medical assistance to someone urgently in need as prohibited for the professional, unless protected by Good Samaritan laws;
ν2) univ. norm requires the act, but prof. norm permits or prohibits it;
νe.g.: testifying as to private discussions concerning possible commission of a crime;
60
{Nu} vs. {Np}
ν3 possible areas of conflicts between Nu and Np:
ν3) univ. norm prohibits the act, but prof. norm permits or requires it;
νe.g.: --removing another’s sole source of well-being other than in self-defense, as in firing someone or flunking them;
ν--(3) is the major issue and the central consequence of separatist justification;
61
Remaining questions
νMajor questions: What will justify the norms of a professional role that conflict with universal norms? Why establish a profession?
ν--intuitively, because it is in the interests of society, due to preservation or enhancement of some social value;
νe.g.: --medical = health and healing (welfare); legal = governance by law (self-determination); accounting = fair business (equality of opportunity); engineering = public safety (protection from injury); so:
62
Proposal
νProposal: all professional norms are justified by deriving them from the fundamental ideal or value of the profession to the society;
νe.g.: --deriving professional-client confidentiality from ideals of preserving privacy or equality of opportunity;
63
Response
ν2 major objections (23):
ν(i) the fundamental ideal or value is generally imprecise;
ν--e.g., engineering not only protects from injury but also assures self-determination; law also preserves freedom; medical also aids protection from injury;
ν(ii) this ignores the general responsibility of the professions for preserving all values of the society, not just those related to the specific profession, since professional conduct affects other groups: their clients, employers, and the general public;
64
Conclusion on the proposal
νSo: looking to the independent value of a profession cannot adequately justify its norms in relation to all the ordinary norms of the society, which is generally affected by the activities of any profession.
65
More on Norms (25)
ν2 kinds of professional norms:
ν1) obligations =df norms prescribing or proscribing specific activities;
ν2) permissions =df norms allowing activities at the discretion of the professional; in general, whatever is not prohibited is permitted;
ν--either kind may be role-related or role-defining;
66
Kinds of obligations
ν3 kinds of specific obligations:
ν--distinction here seems largely stipulative, but is useful;
ν1) standards =df characteristics prescribed by a norm which a professional is obligated to try to attain;
ν--personality or character traits that are not norms themselves, but prescribed by norms;
νe.g.: --emotional stability, compassion, professional demeanor; (not competence)
ν--also, virtues like generosity and avoidance of vices like gambling, alcoholism;
ν--if definitive or central for the profession, may be elevated to:
67
Kinds of obligations
ν3 kinds of specific obligations:
ν2) principles =df norms prescribing general responsibilities of members of the profession deriving from its functional role in society;
νe.g.: --engineer's responsibility for safety; accounting accuracy in records;
ν--fulfillment is largely open to the discretion or judgment of the professional;
ν--particular actions are not specified, so different principles may have to be weighed in determining a course of action;
68
Kinds of obligations
ν3 kinds of specific obligations:
ν3) rules =df norms prescribing specific duties constraining conduct in given situations;
νe.g.: --attorney must inform on future commission of a crime; accountant cannot make false claims on return; engineer cannot sign off without other signatures;
ν--does not allow for discretion as to how fulfilled;
ν--no weighing of rules against each other since 2 rules never apply to exactly the same situation;
69
Summary
νSummary on Interrelations of Professional Obligations:
νa) standards provide the basis for principles: e.g., engineer=s competence as the basis for responsibility to assure safety;
ν--but: competence is better viewed as a principle; cooperativeness is better e.g.
νb) principles provide justification for rules: e.g., accountant=s responsibility to provide accurate financial records justifies a rule requiring standard bookkeeping methods;
ν--so, not open to discretion;
70
Summary
νc) principles provide guidance in situations not covered by rules: not all specific situations can be addressed, e.g., choice of depreciation method for client is guided by responsibility to further interests not by any rule; also, number of clients accepted, range of services, etc.
ν--since indefinitely many rules would be required to cover all situations;
νd) rules provide the basis for disciplinary action: but persistent violation of general responsibilities is also grounds;
ν--note that many professions have specific codes of ethics presenting norms but the force of such codes varies greatly and may not have effect on licensing, etc. (28);
71
[pic]
72
Final points
νFinal points on professions and professionals:
νMost professional ethical codes are vague and incomplete, stating some obligations of individual professionals while often ignoring obligations to 3rd parties and to the profession as a whole.
ν--Bayles’s final point returns to the functional role of a profession as the basis for justification of its privileged ethical status;
ν--the problem is that obligations of the profession, such as providing services equally to all, cannot be reduced to obligations of individual professionals;
ν--therefore, such codes are not complete statements of professional ethics and do not provide the basis for complete justification.
73
Pause Question 6
νYou will have one minute to answer by yourself on the “First Try” and then two minutes to discuss your answer with those seated directly around you.
νBe sure to put your name on the slip.
νPut your final answer after “Second Try:” that is the only graded response.
74
Study Questions
νNumbers 5 and 7, pp. 30 – 31.
-----------------------
ν2) role-related professional norms =df those establishing other commonly accepted limits upon professional activities, often unwritten, not definitive.
νe.g.: --advertising practices, professional courtesies, as well as more obvious ethical limits, such as no black-lists, client stealing tactics, etc., and all constraints of ethical codes;
νA: --yes, in family relations, e.g., parent to child, spouse to spouse;
ν--further Q: why would such relativism be a problem, anyway?
νanswer: --providing justification for past actions and determining course of future actions;
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.