FILE NO. 3-0001 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

[Pages:31]FILE NO. 3-0001

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

USAF CONVAIR VT-29D [CV-340) AND CESSNA 150H, N50430

NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA JANUARY 9, 1975

AWPTED: JUNE 18, 1975

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOAR0

Washington, D. C. PO594

REPORT NUMBER: NTSE-AAR-75-10

I

TECHNII - REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

I. Report No.

ernment Accession No. 3.Recipient's Catalog No.

- NTSB-MR-75-10

4. Title and Subtitle Aircraft Accident Report USAF

5.Report Date

TT-29D, Serial No. 52-5826 and Cavalier Flyers, Inc., June 18,' 1975

:essna 150H, N50430, Newport News, Virginia, January 9, 6.Perforrning Organization

1975.

Code

7 . Author(s)

B.Performing Organization

Report No.

3 . Performing Organization Name and Address

National Transportation Safety Board Bureau of Aviation Safety Washington, D. C. 20594

12.Sponsorlng Agency Name and Address

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Washington, D. C. 20594

10.Work Unit No. 1504-A

1 1 .Contract or Grant No.

I3.Type of Report and Period Covered

Aircraft Accident Report, January 9 , 1975

14.Sponsoring Agency Code

15.Supplementary Notes

I6.Abstract

About 1836 e.s.t., on January 9, 1975, a United States Air Force Convair VT-29 (CV-340) and a Cessna 150H collidedinflight overtheJames River nearNewport News, Virginia, at an altitude of1,500feet. Thefive cramembers and two passengers aboard the Convair and the pilot and passenger aboard the Cessna were killed. Both aircraft were destroyed by the collision and subsequent impact with the water.

The Comair was executing a precision radar approach to Langley Air Force Base and was under the control of the Langley Ground Control Approach final controller. The Cessna was on a local pleasure flight; it was operating in accordance with visual flight rules, and was not on a flight plan.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the human limitation inherent in the see-and-avoid concept, which can be critical in a terminal area with a combination of controlled and uncontrolle( traffic. A possible contributing factor was the reduced nighttime conspicuity of the Cessna against a background of city lights.

As a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board m d e four reconrmendations.

1T.b' Words In-flight collision, anticollision lights, 18,Distribution Statement

nighttime conspicuity, see-and-avoid concept.

This document is available

to the public through the

National Technical Inform-

tion Service, Springfield,

Virginia 22151

I9.Security Classification 20.Security Classification

(of this report)

UNCLASSIFIED

(of this page)

UNCLASSIFIED

NTSB Form 1765.2 (Rev. 9/74)

ii

21.No. of Pages 122.Price

29

I

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 .

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.12.1 1.12.2 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.16.1 1.16.2 1.16.3 1.16.4 1.17 1.17.1

.1.17.2

2 2.1 2.2

3 .

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1 1 1 4 4 4 4 5 5 5

6 6 6 6 7' 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 10

10

11 11 11 15 15 16 16

Appendixes

. . . . . . . . . Appendix A Investigation and Hearing . . . . . . Appendix B Crew and Controller Information . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . Appendix C Aircraft Information

Appendix D Accident Area Chart

.. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . Appendix E Cockpit Visibility T-29

Appendix F Cockpit V i s i b i l i t y C-150

. . . Appendix G Reconstruction of Probable Flightpaths

. . . . . . . . . . . Appendix H Safety Reconmendations

17 18

20 21 22 23 24 25

iii

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D. C . 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: June 18, 1975

F i l e No. 3-0001

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE CONVAIR VT-29D (CV-340) AND

CESSNA 150H, N50430 NEWPORT NEWS, V I R G I N I A

January 9 , 1975

SYNOPSIS

About 1836 e.s.t., on January 9, 1975, a United S t a t e s A i r Force Conv a i r VT-29D (CV-340) and a Cessna 150H c o l l i d e d i n f l i g h t over t h e James River near Newport News, Virginia, a t an a l t i t u d e of 1,500 f e e t . The f i v e crewmembers and two passengers aboard t h e Convair and t h e p i l o t and passenger aboard t h e Cessna were k i l l e d . Both a i r c r a f t were destroyed by the c o l l i s i o n and subsequent impact with t h e water.

The Convair was executing a p r e c i s i o n radar approach t o Langley A i r Force Base and was under t h e c o n t r o l of t h e Langley Ground Control Approach f i n a l c o n t r o l l e r . The Cessna was on a l o c a l pleasure f l i g h t ; i t was operating i n accordance with v i s u a l f l i g h t r u l e s , and was not on a flight plan.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines t h a t t h e probable cause of t h i s accident was the human l i m i t a t i o n inherent i n t h e seeand-avoid concept, which can be c r i t i c a l i n a terminal a r e a with a combination of controlled and uncontrolled t r a f f i c . A p o s s i b l e contributing f a c t o r was the reduced nighttime conspicuity of t h e Cessna against a background of c i t y l i g h t s .

A s a r e s u l t of t h i s accident, t h e National Transportation Safety Board made four recommendations.

1. INVESTIGATION

1.1 History of t h e F l i g h t

United S t a t e s Air Force (USAF) Convair VT-29D, (CV-340) S e r i a l No. 52-5826, c a l l s i g n Motel-32 (M-32), departed from Langley A i r Force Base

(AFB), Hampton, Virginia, a t 0955 ?/ on January 9 , 1975. It was operating

as an administrative f l i g h t t o transport military personnel from Langley t o Shaw AFB, Sumter, South Carolina, and Key F i e l d , Meridian, Mississippi.

-1/ A l l times used herein a r e e a s t e r n standard, based on t h e 24-hour clock.

-2-

A t 1520, the f l i g h t departed from Key Field on an instrument f l i g h t r u l e s (WR) f l i g h t plan t o r e t u r n t o Langley AFB. The flightcrew cons i s t e d of a p i l o t , a c o p i l o t , a f l i g h t mechanic, and two f l i g h t a t t e n d a n t s . There were two passengers aboard.

The en route portion of the f l i g h t was handled r o u t i n e l y by t h e Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) A i r T r a f f i c Control (AX) f a c i l i t i e s .

About 5 nmi southwest of Cofield, Virginia, VORTAC, 21 Washington A i r

Route T r a f f i c Control Center handed M-32 off t o Norfolk, Virginia, approach c o n t r o l . The Norfolk c o n t r o l l e r s i n s t r u c t e d M-32 t o descend t o 1,500 f t . m.s.l., and vectored i t toward Langley f o r a handoff t o t h e Langley Ground Control Approach (GCA) u n i t i n preparation f o r a p r e c i s i o n radar approach and landing on runway 7 .

The handoff from Norfolk approach c o n t r o l t o t h e Langley GCA was delayed because t h e GCA c o n t r o l l e r was receiving only an i n t e r m i t t e n t r e t u r n from t h e a i r c r a f t ' s transponder. However, t h e handoff was completed about 1832 when M-32 was approximately 12 t o 14 nmi west of Langley. The GCA c o n t r o l l e r s s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e had been no problems receiving transponder r e t u r n s from other a i r c r a f t on t h e day of t h e accident.

The GCA approach c o n t r o l l e r ' s handling of M-32 was r o u t i n e and a t 1834 the a i r c r a f t was handed o f t o the GCA f i n a l c o n t r o l l e r . A t t h i s time, according t o established USAF approach procedures, t h e crew should have completed the descent c h e c k l i s t , and the a i r c r a f t should have been s t a b i l i z e d a t abo-lt 120 t o 130 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The Conv a i r ' s landing gear and landing l i g h t s would normally have remained retracted u n t i l g l i d e slope i n t e r c e p t i o n a t about 5 nmi from the runway.

The f i n a l c o n t r o l l e r established contact with M-32 when t h e a i r c r a f t was about 10 nmi from Langley. A t 1834:20, he informed the flightcrew t h a t f u r t h e r comunication from them was no longer required, and he continued to vector the a i r c r a f t t o intercept the f i n a l approach course. . A t 1835:09 and j u s t p r i o r t o t h e 8 n m l . range c a l l , t h e f i n a l c o n t r o l l e r advised M-32, " Traffic a t one o'clock, two miles, northwest bound." There was a response from M-32 about 5 seconds l a t e r , which, t o t h e c o n t r o l l e r , sounded l i k e the word "Roger."

The c o n t r o l l e r l a t e r s t a t e d that he f i r s t observed t h i s t r a f f i c on h i s search radarscope. A t t h e time he advised M-32 of i t s presence t h e t r a f f i c had not y e t appeared on h i s p r e c i s i o n scope. After advising M-32 of the t r a f f i c , he rotated t h e e l e v a t i o n antenna f u l l r i g h t towards t h e unknown t r a f f i c and t h e t a r g e t appeared on t h e elevation display of h i s precision scope. H e estimated t h a t t h e unknown t r a f f i c was a t a range of about 5.5 mi, moving away from t h e antenna, about 500 t o 700 f e e t above the glidepath, and f l y i n g i n a northwesterly d i r e c t i o n . H e then r o t a t e d

-2 1 A collocated very high frequency omnirange and u l t r a h i g h frequency

tactical air navigational aid.

-3-

t h e elevation antenna back t o the published inbound course and t o M-32's radar return.

According t o the c o n t r o l l e r , when M-32 reached 8 nmi, the unidentified t r a f f i c appeared on h i s elevation display and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r on h i s azimuth display. A t 1835:25, he told M-32 that the t r a f f i c appeared " s l i g h t l y higher than you on precision radar." M-32 acknowledged with "Roger." This was t h e l a s t known r a d i o transmission from t h e f l i g h t .

The f i n a l c o n t r o l l e r said t h a t he suffered a s l i g h t coughing s p e l l a f t e r the 7-mile c a l l , therefore, he repeated the c a l l . Immediately a f t e r the second 7-mile c a l l the two radar t a r g e t s merged on h i s prec i s i o n scope and then disappeared. The c o n t r o l l e r informed t h e tower t h a t he had l o s t contact with M-32.

The c o n t r o l l e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e t a r g e t t h a t had merged with M-32's t a r g e t was t h e same one he had observed on h i s search radarscope and had called to M-32's a t t e n t i o n . H e believed t h a t t h e crew of M-32 had had t h e t r a f f i c i n s i g h t . After the other t r a f f i c had appeared on h i s prec i s i o n scope, he had had both t a r g e t s i n view continuously u n t i l they merged. He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t M-32 had not intercepted t h e g l i d e p a t h before the accident, and he believed t h a t i t s radar r e t u r n was a t a normal p o s i t i o n on h i s mope f o r 1,500 f t . m . s . l .

Cessna 150H, N50430, was a rented a i r c r a f t belonging t o Cavalier Flyers Incorporated which is a business involving f l i g h t i n s t r u c t i o n , c h a r t e r f l i g h t s , and a i r c r a f t s a l e s and r e n t a l s . Cavalier Flyers i s located a t Norfolk Regional Airport, a terminal-area airport located about 20 nmi southeast of Langley AFB.

According t o the owner of Cavalier F l y e r s , t h e p i l o t of N50430 had rented t h e a i r c r a f t from him on s e v e r a l previous occasions. The owner s t a t e d t h a t on the night of January 9 , l?75, t h e p i l o t had planned a local f l i g h t of about 1 hour. He also said t h a t t h e a i r c r a f t was not equipped with a transponder.

After performing a r o u t i n e p r e f l i g h t inspection of N50430, the p i l o t and h i s passenger boarded t h e a i r c r a f t and prepared t o depart. The p i l o t d i d not, nor was he r e q u i r e d t o , f i l e a f l i g h t plan.

A t 1802, N50430 departed from runway 5 a t Norfolk Regional Airport on a l o c a l v i s u a l f l i g h t r u l e s (VFR) f l i g h t . A t 1803:22, N50430 requested, and was cleared f o r , a downwind departure from the a i r p o r t t r a f f i c a r e a .

This was the l a s t known contact with the a i r c r a f t .

The tower c o n t r o l l e r s t a t e d t h a t N50430's navigation l i g h t s were on; however, he could'not r e c a l l having seen i t s a n t i c o l l i s i o n l i g h t .

-4-

The c o l l i s i o n occurred a t approximately 1836, during hours of darkness, a t an a l t i t u d e of 1,500 f e e t m.s.1. and a t a point about 7 miles west of the threshold of runway 7 a t Langley AFB. Both a i r c r a f t f e l l i n t o t h e shallow waters of the James River t i d a l f l a t j u s t west of Newport

News, Virginia. The Convair wreckage was located a t 37O 02' 15" l a t i t u d e and 76O 29' 41" longitude. The main portion of t h e recovered Cessna wreckage was a t 37O 02' 14" l a t i t u d e and 760 29' 54" longitude.

The probable f l i g h t p a t h s of both a i r c r a f t a s established by radar tracks a r e shown i n Appendix D.

There was only one known witness who saw both a i r c r a f t imnediately p r i o r t o t h e c o l l i s i o n . This witness was aboard a f i s h i n g c r a f t on t h e e a s t s i d e of the main channel of the James River. He said he saw an a i r c r a f t t h a t was d i r e c t l y abeam of h i s boat and a t an elevation of about 15' above the horizon. A t the time he d i d not r e a l i z e t h a t he saw mre than one a i r c r a f t ; he believed t h a t he was looking a t a h e l i c o p t e r performing a t r a i n i n g mission. He observed more than the normal number of a i r c r a f t l i g h t s , which were clustered i n a small group. He described the l i g h t s a s two flashing red beacons, one appearing above t h e o t h e r , with what appeared to be a row of cabin l i g h t s betweeen them. He saw what he thought was a f l a r e which extinguished before reaching t h e water. Imed i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r , the a i r c r a f t descended v e r t i c a l l y i n t o t h e r i v e r and b u r s t i n t o flames. The witness d i d not hear any explosion e i t h e r before o r a f t e r impact with the water. He proceeded t o the wreckage a r e a and searched f o r survivors u n t i l relieved by a Coast Guard v e s s e l .

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries

- C r e w

Passengers

Fatal

"6

x-3

Nonfatal

0

0

None

0

0

* Includes persons on both a i r c r a f t .

Others

0 0

1.3 Damage t o A i r c r a f t

Both a i r c r a f t were destroyed a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e i n - f l i g h t coll i s i o n and impact i n t o the water.

1.4 Other Damage

None. 1.5 C r e w and Controller Information

The p i l o t s of both a i r c r a f t and the GCA f i n a l c o n t r o l l e r were q u a l i f i e d f o r the operations involved. The Cessna p i l o t was ProDerly

r -5-

c e r t i f i c a t e d by t h e FAA, and t h e m i l i t a r y crewmembers and the GCA f i n a l controller possessed the necessary military ratings.

The Cessna p i l o t had about 12 hours of night- flying experience. Both

Convair p i l o t s had exceeded t h e i r semiannual night- flying requirement of 5 hours; t h e A i r c r a f t Connnander's night- flying time during t h e l a s t 6 months p r i o r t o t h e accident amounted t o 6.3 hours and t h a t of the First P i l o t amounted t o 6.0 hours. (See Appendix B.)

1.6 A i r c r a f t Information

Both a i r c r a f t were w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e weight and balance limits.

Both a i r c r a f t were maintained i n accordance with a p p l i c a b l e regulations. The Cessna was properly c e r t i f i c a t e d and the Convair was i n compliance with the appropriate m i l i t a r y s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . (See Appendix C.)

1.7 Meteorological Information

A c l e a r sky and u n r e s t r i c t e d v i s i b i l i t y prevailed a t t h e time and place of the accident. There was no moon.

Pertinent surface weather observations f o r t h e Newport N e w s a r e a a t

the time of the accident were a s follows:

4!.

--- 1800 Clear, v i s i b i l i t y 10 miles, tenmerature 5 4 9 . , dewpoint

39*., wind calm, a l t i m e t e r s e t t i n g 30.06 inches.

--- 1900 Clear, v i s i b i l i t y 10 miles, temperature 50%. , dRvpoint

40??., wind calm, a l t i m e t e r s e t t i n g 30.10 inches.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

A i r c r a f t proceeding t o Langley AFB from the southwest on an i n s t r u ment approach u t i l i z e the Cofield VORTAC, which i s located about 39 nmi from Langley. Runway 7 i s a primary instrument landing runway, w i t h an inbound magnetic heading of 073'. This runway i s provided with a TACAN 3/ approach c a p a b i l i t y , a f u l l instrument landing system (ILS), and a Mobile Ground Control Approach Unit.

The only navigational a i d involved i n t h e accident was t h e GCA radar. The o f f i c i a l nomenclature f o r t h e equipment a t Langley i s AN/NPN 13 Mobile GCA. The equipment and associated t r a i l e r s a r e s i t u a t e d on the north side of runway 7-25.

-- A l l c o n t r o l l e r s t a t i o n s i n the GCA t r a i l e r s a r e equipped s i m i l a r l y .

Each has two radarscopes

a search scope and a p r e c i s i o n scope. The

- - 3/ TACAN Ultrahigh frequency t a c t i c a l a i r navigational a i d .

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