MECHANISM FOR FOLLOW-UP ON THE - OAS - Organization …
MECHANISM FOR FOLLOW-UP ON THE OEA/Ser.L.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SG/MESICIC/doc.226/08
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION September 11, 2008
Fourteenth Meeting of the Committee of Experts Original: English
December 8 to 13, 2008
Washington, DC.
BELIZE
DRAFT PRELIMINARY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION PROVISIONS SELECTED FOR REVIEW IN THE SECOND ROUND, AND ON FOLLOW-UP TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED TO THAT COUNTRY IN THE FIRST ROUND
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO’S COMMENTS
(To facilitate easy reference, Trinidad and Tobago’s comments are interspersed in blue font, at the relevant points, within the text of the Report).
Comments by GUYANA
(For ease of reference, the comments of Guyana (represented in red text in the relevant sections of the Report), have been incorporated in this Report.).
Response of BELIZE
to the comments by Trinidad and Tobago
(For ease of reference, Belize’s response is represented in green text in the relevant sections of the Report).
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS OF THE MECHANISM FOR FOLLOW-UP ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
DRAFT PRELIMINARY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION IN BELIZE OF THE CONVENTION PROVISIONS SELECTED FOR REVIEW IN THE SECOND ROUND, AND ON FOLLOW-UP TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED TO THAT COUNTRY IN THE FIRST ROUND[?]
Document prepared by the Technical Secretariat
(Department of Legal Cooperation, Secretariat for Legal Affairs,
General Secretariat of the OAS)
INTRODUCTION
1. Contents of the Report
This report presents, first, a review of implementation in Belize of the provisions of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption selected by the Committee of Experts of the Follow-up Mechanism (MESICIC) for review in the Second Round: Article III, paragraphs 5 and 8, and Article VI.
Second, the report will examine follow-up to the recommendations that were formulated to the Belize by the MESICIC Committee of Experts in the First Round, which are contained in the report on that country adopted by the Committee at its Ninth Meeting, and published at the following web page:
2. Ratification of the Convention and adherence to the Mechanism
According to the official registry of the OAS General Secretariat, Belize ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACC) on August 2, 2002 and deposited the respective instrument of ratification on September 6, 2002.
Similarly, Belize signed the Declaration on the Mechanism for Follow-Up of Implementation of the IACC on June 9, 2003.
I. SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED
1. Response of Belize
The Committee wishes to acknowledge the cooperation that it received throughout the review process from Belize, which was evidenced, inter-alia, in the response to the Questionnaire and in the constant willingness to clarify or complete its contents. Together with its response, Belize sent the provisions and documents it considered pertinent, available at:
. In addition, Belize informed that the vast majority of its laws are available at .
For its review, the Committee took into account the information provided by Belize up to May 22, 2008, and that requested by the Secretariat and the members of the review subgroup, to carry out its functions in keeping with its Rules of Procedure and Other Provisions.
II. REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION BY THE STATE PARTY OF THE CONVENTION PROVISIONS SELECTED FOR THE SECOND ROUND
1. SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT HIRING AND PROCUREMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES (ARTICLE III (5) OF THE CONVENTION)
. SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT HIRING
1.1.1. Existence of provisions in the legal framework and/or other measures
Belize has a set of provisions related to the hiring of public servants, among which the following provisions related to the principal systems should be noted:
- Constitutional provisions, such as those which establish the Public Services Commission (Section 105); and the Judicial and Legal Services Commission (Section 110.E); and which also provide that in the performance of their functions, the Commissions shall not be subject to the control of any other person or authority (Sections 105(12) and 115.E.(12), respectively).
Pursuant to Section 106(1) of the Constitution, the Public Services Commission has the power to appoint individuals to hold or act in offices in the public service, with the exception of those offices within the judicial and legal service[?] and the security service.[?] Section 106(3)(c) authorizes the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Minister or Ministers, and following public consultation, to make regulations on the formation of schemes for recruitment to the public service;[?] Section 107 grants the Public Services Commission the power to appoint high ranking public officers;[?] and Section 106(5) authorizes the Public Service Commission to delegate its powers, (Belize: add here “on the conditions it deems fit”) to any one or more of its members, or with the consent of the Prime Minister, to any public officer.
(Trinidad and Tobago would like to enquire of the State Party Belize- Under what circumstances would the Public Service Commission delegate its powers and further, is there a stipulated procedure for such delegation? These circumstances may possibly suggest to the sub-group and the Committee whether or not there exists possible opportunities for influence or unfairness. Is the delegation a matter of public record? If there are safeguards related to the delegation of powers, perhaps these safeguards can be included in the body of the text).
NOTE to the Secretariat and to the Review Sub-group:
The following information (on delegation of powers) reflects the position, as existed until February 15, 2008 when the delegation of powers was suspended with immediate effect.
Circumstances for Delegation by PSC
As provided for in s. 106(5) of the Constitution, the Public Service Commission (“the PSC”) may delegate its powers to:
• on the conditions it deems fit; to any of its Members OR
• with the consent of the Prime Minister, to any public officer.
On February 4, 2002, by means of Circular 6 of 2002, which is attached hereto, the PSC delegated its powers to Chief Executive Officers (“CEO’s”) in respect of officers on pay scales 1 through 8 (the junior ranks) - except for the fixing of salaries and privileges. Such delegation was to take effect on April 1, 2002. The delegation was with respect to their appointment (and confirmation of appointment), promotions, transfers, discipline and removal from office – either by termination, dismissal or retirement.
The aim of this delegation was, among other things, to create greater efficiency within the public service.
This delegation also established the relevant support mechanisms to ensure successful application by:
1. outlining the responsibilities of CEOs to ensure proper management of the human resources;
2. authorizing the establishment of support human resource teams within ministries;
3. clarifying the role of the Ministry of the Public Service with respect to such delegation to
(a) include guidance to the CEOs on issues of recruitment and selection, on conduct[?], on job specifications and training; and
(b) to provide that the Ministry of the Public Service also delegated its authority to CEOs with respect to the same category of officers;
4. clarifying the role of the Services Commission to include the monitoring of the effectiveness of the new mechanisms and establishing mechanism for sanctioning mismanagement of powers;
5. establishing an appeals mechanism for public officers with respect to decisions of CEOs and with respect to their management responsibilities;
6. requiring that all vacancies that occur in the junior ranks are advertised within the service;
7. establishment of standard operating procedures; and
8. emphasizing the need and responsibility for keeping proper records/files.
Circular 37 of 2002, dated October 10th, clarified that “concurrent with the delegation of powers by the Public Services Commission to the Chief Executive Officers , is the Delegation of Authority by the Minister of the Public Service to Chief Executive Officers as it pertains to [ ]:
• All leave matters (except study leave)
• Resignations
• Temporary Employment
• Inter-Ministerial Transfers”
It also reminded CEOs that replacement of officers in the clerical/secretarial grades was the CEOs’ responsibility.
Procedure for Delegation:
No specific procedure is stipulated by the Constitution, although it provides that it must be done by directions in writing. The delegation by the PSC in 2002 was done by Circular.
The delegation is considered a matter of public record as it is sent to all CEOs, copied to relevant entities and individuals, including trade unions, and is circulated to all public officers. Additionally, the practice is to place copies in conspicuous places in the various governmental offices, which is accessible by the public at large.
Safeguards:
The Public Service Regulations derives directly from the Constitution of Belize, the supreme law of the land. As such, any delegation or instruction made thereunder must be performed in accordance with the safeguards established by the Constitution. More specifically, s. 111 of the Constitution specify that appeals lie to the Belize Advisory Council (“the BAC”) from decisions made pursuant to delegation of powers. In that regard, the BAC may confirm or set aside the decision of the CEO, or may make any other decision it deems just.
Additionally, Circular 6 of 2002 reemphasized this as the appeals mechanism governing the delegation of powers. This was reiterated in the Disciplinary Procedures Manual for the Public Service.
Note further that Regulation 4 (7) of the Services Commissions Regulations reiterates that the delegation of powers does not abrogate the rights of an officer aggrieved by a decision made pursuant to the delegated authority to appeal to the relevant Services Commission or to the Belize Advisory Council.
With respect to the Judicial and Legal Services Commission, Section 110.F(1) of the Constitution grants the Commission the power, inter-alia, to review the suitability of applicants, as well as appoint individuals to hold or act in offices in the judicial and legal services, including the power to make appointments, promotions, transfers, and to confirm appointments.
(Does the Judicial and Legal Services Commission have the power to delegate its functions, as does the Public Services Commission? If it does, perhaps this may be included.)
Power of the JLSC to delegate its functions:
The Judicial and Legal Services Commission (“the JLSC”) is authorized by s. 110F (4) of the Constitution to delegate its powers. Note that this delegation is also subject to the appeals procedure established under s. 111 of the Constitution.
By Circular 1 of 2003, dated February 3rd (to take effect from February 1, 2003), the JLSC delegated the following powers to the Chief Justice and Solicitor General, respectively:
• to the Chief Justice – the intra-ministerial transfers and the conditions of service of Magistrates only;
• to the Solicitor General – the intra-ministerial transfer and conditions of service of all judicial and legal officers (except magistrates).
The JLSC retained full powers to appoint and confirm appointments, to promote, discipline and remove judicial and legal officers from office.
Suspension of Delegation of Powers:
By Circular 1 of 2008 of February 13th, instant, the following Delegations of Power were suspended, with immediate effect, from:
• the Chief Justice – the conditions of service of Magistrates and their inter-ministerial transfers;
• the Solicitor General – the conditions of service of judicial and legal officers (except Magistrates) and their inter-ministerial transfers;
• the CEOs – with respect to officers on Payscales 1 to 8: powers to appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the Public Service, other than the offices in the Judicial and Legal Services and the Security Services, including the power to transfer or to confirm appointments, the power to remove such persons from office; and the intra-ministerial transfer of all public officers within the Ministry below the grade of Head of Department.
- Statutory provisions, such as the Public Service Regulations, which contain provisions related to the government hiring system, and which apply to all of the above-referenced Service Commissions, pursuant to Regulations 2 and 3 thereof, and to all public officers and offices,[?],[?] subject to the following exceptions specified in Regulation 2(2): the offices of the Prime Minister or other Ministers, Ministers of State, Speaker or Deputy Speaker or member of the House of Representatives, President or Vice President or Senator, member of the Belize Advisory Council, or any Commission established under the Constitution, or the Clerk, Deputy Clerk or staff of the National Assembly, or the Ombudsman or the Contractor-General.
In addition, Regulation 3 provides that the Public Service Regulations do not apply to: an office of a Justice of appeal; an officer to whom section 110.B. of the Constitution applies;[?] an open vote worked (worker) to whom the Government (Open Vote) Workers Regulations apply; an ambassador or High Commissioner; offices to which sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Constitution apply;[?] an office of a Justice of the Supreme Court; and any other category or class of officers where special Regulations are made in respect of that category or class of officers.
(Are Government (Open Vote) Workers akin to Contract Employees as are found in many territories? This is merely for clarification)
Difference between OVW positions and Contract Officers:
Open Vote Workers (“OVW”) are, in a strict sense, temporary workers of the State and are governed by a separate set of regulations which also has its genesis from the Constitution. Contract officers, on the other hand, are governed by the specific terms of their contracts of service.
Positions for OVW are created when a number of elements are present: a real need arises in a particular Ministry; the need is properly justified; the budget allocation for the particular Ministry supports the salary of that additional person. Positions for contract officers usually already exist and are therefore “established positions’, but are held under contracts of service due to the nature of the post – for example, the post of a crown counsel is a professional post that is on establishment, but is governed by the terms of the contract of service.
With respect to contract officers, Regulation 11 (2) of the Services Commissions Regulations provides that “[a] person who is appointed under any law or agreement for a specified period to an office in the Public Service shall cease to be a Public Officer at the expiration of the period specified in such law or agreement.”
Through Circular 7 of 2008, the Government’s position (effective May 5th 2008) with respect to recruitment of Contract Officers and Open Vote Employees has been stated as follows:
a) final approval is required from the Ministry of Finance;
b) all requests must be submitted to the Ministry of the Public Service;
c) requests must include detailed justification for recruitment, as well as period of engagement;
d) the Ministry of the Public Service shall forward its considered recommendation to the Ministry of Finance for approval; and
e) “approval will be granted only in exceptional cases in the interest of the containment of staff in this category . . . [and] will not normally be granted for contracts to fill posts that are already provided for in the Permanent Establishment.”
Difference between OVW positions and “Established” Posts:
While posts for OVW are temporary, as described above, “established” posts are those that are contained in the Personal Emoluments item of any Head of Expenditure.
- With respect to access to the public service through a merit-based system, Regulation 6 provides that the educational or professional qualifications and other requirements for appointment to permanent posts in the Public Service shall be determined by the Chief Executive Officer, Ministry of the Public Service, after consultation with the appropriate Ministry. (Belize: this procedure is followed to ensure that the particular needs of the relevant Ministry are met since these “needs” regularly vary from Ministry to Ministry.) In addition, Regulation 11(2) provides that the promotion of officers to fill vacancies shall be approved by the relevant Commission, and that the Commission shall base its decision on the following three factors, in descending order or importance: (a) Performance/Merit; (b) Integrity/Professionalism; and (c) Experience/Employment History. (Belize: this provision allows the relevant Commission to fill vacant posts with qualified persons who are already in the system, i.e., from within the Government Service.)
Guyana comment: For clarity, could Belize advise if there are uniform/standard Job Descriptions and Job Specifications for the various posts in the Public Service, Judiciary, Security Services????
The revised criteria for appointment and advancement in the finance and administrative grades, foreign service officers and officers within the secretarial grade, effective since November 15, 2007 are as communicated vide Circular No 17 of 2007, which is attached hereto.
- With respect to vacancies in the public service, Regulation 7 provides that when a vacancy arises, the Chief Executive Officer of the Ministry shall report it to the Chief Executive Officer of the Ministry of the Public Service and state his recommendations for filling the post. (Belize: it should be understood that reference to “his recommendations” here is with respect to the relevant qualifications required by the needs to the particular Ministry, and does not refer to identification of a person who the CEO of the Ministry wishes to benefit.) Finally, Regulation 11(1) provides, inter-alia, that no officer shall be appointed to a post for which he is not qualified.
Guyana comment: It appears from the above that the Chief Executive of a Ministry can make recommendations to the Public Service Ministry for the filling of a vacancy at any or all levels within that Ministry. Secondly it appears that no justification is required for (a) filling the vacancy and (b) for the person recommended to fill the post. In addition, it appears as if the Public Service Commission’s role is merely to ratify the recommendation of the CEO via the Public Service Ministry.
Belize wishes to reiterate that, as a matter of practice, “recommendations” made by a Ministry’s CEO describe the qualifications that the Ministry requires to be met by the person who will be appointed to the post, and not the identity of the person that the Ministry wishes to benefit. This practice is necessary in order to take into consideration the particular needs of the Ministry in question, which quite often, vary from Ministry to Ministry. The “recommendation” also requires that the CEO provide a rationale for filling the vacancy.
The role of the Public Service Commission must not be underestimated; it is the authority that makes permanent appointments in the Public Service. Its functions are clearly defined in the Services Commissions Regulations.
The process for filling vacant positions, as has been reiterated by Circular 7 of 2008, requires final approval from the Ministry of the Public Service and must:
a) be submitted to the Ministry of the Public Service;
b) be accompanied by a detailed justification for the filling of the vacancy, including the date the vacancy occurred, the cause of the vacancy and proposed date for the filling of the post.
Could Belize clarify if there is any requirement for posts at a certain level, middle management upwards and specialized technical posts, to be advertised firstly internally in the given service and then publicly if there is no response or persons not suitably qualified within the service?
With the Delegation of Powers (which was recently suspended), it was specifically required that all vacancies that occurred within the junior posts (the posts that were affected by the delegation of powers) should be advertised within the Public Service (see point 6 at the end of page 4 of this Report). It is not unusual for these posts to, either subsequently or concurrently, be advertised to the general public in the newspapers of nationwide coverage.
Are there any provisions in the Belizean constitution Constitution or the Public Service Rules for gender balance?
There are no specific provisions in the Constitution or the Public Service Regulation (“the PSR”) requiring gender balance. However, the Constitution, from which the PSR derives, enshrines the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, among which is the right to not be discriminated against on the basis of sex.
- With respect to methods for challenging selection decisions, the Supreme Court Rules of 2005, at Part 56, allows applications for judicial review to be submitted to the Supreme Court.[?] Part 56.1(3) provides that the Court may provide the following remedies: (a) certiorari, for quashing unlawful acts; (b) prohibition; or (c) mandamus, for requiring performance of a public duty; while Part 56.1(4) also empowers the Court to grant an injunction; restitution or damages, or an order for the return of property.
Guyana comment: Is there any other recourse for challenging selection decisions, for example, firstly through the respective Commissions or through some mechanism equivalent to a Public Service Appellate Tribunal?
The relevant pieces of legislation (the Constitution, the Public Service Regulations and the Services Commissions Regulation) offer recourse to challenge decisions in general, including challenges for selection decisions. These pieces of legislation, however, apply only with respect to persons who are already in the system (persons who are already in the public service) and are aggrieved by a decision. They are, however, silent on the matter of appeals by persons who are not in the system. In practice, applicants who are not in the system but have been aggrieved by a selection decision have never challenged this situation.
In addition, Section 12(1) of the Ombudsman Act grants the Ombudsman the authority to investigate matters, where he or she has a reasonable cause to believe that (a) an authority or an officer or member of an authority has been guilty of corruption or other wrongdoing; or (b) any person or body of persons as or may have sustained injustice injury or abuse as a result of an action taken by an authority or an officer or a member of such authority. Additionally, Section 12(4) grants the Ombudsman the power to investigate any reports made to the Governor-General or to the Public Services Commission, in respect of the appointment, removal, promotion, disciplinary control or other personnel matters in relation to any person.
(Trinidad and Tobago respectfully asks of Belize the following questions:
Beyond the investigative powers of the Ombudsman, can the Ombudsman refer its findings to the Director of Public Prosecutions or to the Police Service for appropriate action?
The Ombudsman is required by section 22 (1) of the Ombudsman Act, to refer his findings to the National Assembly, which in turn, may, inter alia, refer the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The relevant section provides:
22.-(1) If the Ombudsman finds, during the conduct of his investigations or on the conclusion thereof, that there is evidence of a breach of duty, or misconduct, or of a criminal offence on the part of an officer or member of any authority, he shall refer the matter to the person or body of persons competent to take such disciplinary or other proceedings as may be appropriate against that officer or member and in all such cases shall lay a special report before the National Assembly.
(2) Where any special report is laid before the National Assembly, the National Assembly may, in addition to any other action it may take
(a) if the report discloses the commission of a criminal offence, report the said matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions for necessary action
Can the Ombudsman recommend or initiate any specific administrative action upon completion of the investigation?
The Ombudsman Act does not authorize the Ombudsman to initiate specific administrative proceedings or administer sanction upon the completing of an investigation. His role is to investigate and make recommendations to the competent authorities for appropriate sanctions to be administered against wrongdoers. If, after a reasonable or stipulated time, appropriate action is not taken against a wrongdoer, the Ombudsman is required to lay a report to the National Assembly on this matter. Note that this is in addition to his Annual Report. The relevant provision is transcribed below:
21.-(1) After conducting an investigation under this Act, the Ombudsman shall inform the principal officer of the authority concerned of the result of that investigation, and if the Ombudsman finds that an officer or member of an authority has been guilty of corruption or other wrongdoing, or that the complainant has sustained injustice, injury or abuse in consequence of a fault in the administration of that authority, he shall inform such officer aforesaid of his findings and may, as he thinks fit, make recommendations for action to be taken by that authority within a specified time.
(2) Where the Ombudsman has made a recommendation under subsection (1), and within the time specified or a reasonable time thereafter, he is of the opinion that no adequate action has been taken in pursuance of his recommendation, he shall lay before the National Assembly a special report on the case.
. . . . . .
(5) On the conclusion of an investigation, the Ombudsman may make to the authority concerned such recommendations as he thinks fit and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, may recommend any or all of the following-
(a) that the action which was the subject-matter of the complaint be reviewed;
(b) that an enactment, rule or regulation which causes or may cause injustice, be altered;
(c) that compensation be made to the complainant.
Perhaps the action that the Ombudsman may take, upon completion of an investigation, may be included in the body of the text to give greater clarity to the process. If the Ombudsman is required to pass the results of the investigation on to another independent authority, it may be helpful to say this.)
Guyana comment: It appears that the PSC has no authority on its own volition to investigate the above-mentioned matters??? or to initiate on its own? Could this be clarified??
The role of the Ombudsman is separate and apart from that of the PSC, and therefore they can exercise same concurrently – one does not depend on the other. The role and functions of the PSC are contained in the Public Service Regulations 2001, and on the Services Commissions Regulations of 2001.
- Statutory provisions, such as the Belize Constitution (Government Open Vote Workers) Regulations, which, pursuant to Article 2 thereof, applies to “employees of any Government Department whose post is not provided for under any Personal Emoluments item of any Head of Expenditure in the Estimates” Article 3 classifies workers in two categories: Category A, which includes workers engaged for any permanent year round service, as well as workers who have service for 5 years or more and whose employment is not intended to be permanent year round service, including workers whose employment is intended to be for a particular project only; and Category B, which includes workers with less than five years of service whose employment is not intended to be permanent round the year service, including workers whose employment is intended to be for a particular project only. (Does the underlined portion address the question by the State of Guyana?) Article 4 provides that the Head of Department shall engage all workers through the employment exchange of the Labor Department where such a service exists, and also requires the Head of Department to lay out the terms of employment in writing.
(Belize may wish to consider placing in the body of the Report information, if available, relating to the percentage or number of Government Open Vote Workers employed within the system. This may give perspective to the importance of this class of employee in a country with a relatively small population and somewhat finite human resources. These are important considerations for territories with small populations).
Guyana comment: Does Category A or B cater for contractual and temporary or casual employees? Does the Head of Department have the authority to create new terms of employment or is it within specified standard criteria for a given post?
(See underlined phrase in the preceding paragraph.)
- Statutory provisions, such as the National Assembly Staff (Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2003, which at Section 3 provides that the National Assembly Staff Committee makes all permanent appointments in the National Assembly; Section 5 requires the Clerk of the National Assembly to publish the professional qualifications and other requirements for appointment to permanent posts in the National Assembly, after consultation with the Committee; Section 9 requires the Clerk to report vacancies that arise to the Committee, together with his recommendations for filling the post; Section 15(1) provides that no officer shall be appointed or promoted to a post for which he is not qualified an, while Section 15(2) provides that the promotion of officers to fill vacancies shall be approved by the Governor-General or the Committee, and that the decision shall be based on the following factors, in descending order or importance: (a) Performance Track Record; (b) Integrity; and (c) Experience; and Section 18 allows officers who are qualified for a post pursuant to Section 15, to be appointed to act in a vacant post for up to a year, or in a post that is not vacant for a specified period.
Guyana comment: Could Belize provide information on how the National Assembly Staff Committee is established and who comprises its members, are these Members (of Parliament) of the National Assembly? What are their terms of reference? There appears to be little room for the Committee to involve itself in the recruitment and selection process? Also no information is provided to advise on if the Committee has review powers in relation to action by the Clerk in relation to recruitment, promotion, dismissal or disciplinary matters?
The National Assembly Staff Committee is established by s. 3 of the National Assembly Staff Act, Chapter 14 of the Laws of Belize, R.E. 2000 – 2003, which is accessible from . The relevant section provides:
3.- (1) For the purposes of this Act, there shall be established a National Assembly Staff Committee, which shall consist of:-
(a) the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or in his absence the Deputy Speaker;
(b) three members of the House of Representatives nominated by the House;
(c) the President of the Senate and one other member of the Senate nominated by the Senate; and
(d) one member of the staff of the National Assembly nominated by the Staff of the National Assembly or one other person who is not a member of staff nominated by the Staff of the National Assembly.
Section 6 of this Act vests on the National Assembly Staff Committee the power to appoint (including power to confirm appointments) and to exercise disciplinary Control over the staff of the National Assembly (other than the Clerk and the Deputy Clerk), including the power to remove such persons from office. Appeals from decisions of the Committee made pursuant to this s. 6 shall lie to the Belize Advisory Council.
1.1.2. Adequacy of the legal framework and/or other measures.
The constitutional and legal provisions that refer to the principal systems of government hiring that the Committee has examined, based on the information available to it, constitute, as a whole, a body of measures relevant to promoting the purposes of the Convention.
Notwithstanding, the Committee considers it appropriate to make certain observations with respect to the advisability of developing and complementing certain legal provisions that refer to these systems.
( With respect to the system of hiring of public servants in the Public Service, the Committee considers the following:
The Committee notes an absence of adequate development of the public service hiring system, as evidenced by various factors. (Trinidad and Tobago believes that the underlined sentence should be rephrased. Belize has noted that Regulation 11(2) requires a Commission to base its filling of vacancies upon Performance/Merit, Integrity/Professionalism, and Experience /Employment History. Such requirements can hardly be seen to be part of a public service hiring process that can be described in terms of an “absence of adequate development”. The statement appears to be somewhat strong. This sentence may be reworded as follows: “While the Committee notes the requirements of Regulation 11(2), there may exist some additional challenges to the public service hiring system”.
Belize is of the considered opinion that the system established by the Public Service Regulations, more specifically, s. 11 (2) renders the Committee’s observations inappropriate. As such, Belize concurs with the observations of Trinidad and Tobago and would accept the text proposed by that State to replace the observations of the Committee.
For instance, while the Public Services Regulations require that merit be considered when promoting officers to fill vacancies, and although the Regulations provide that no one shall be appointed or promoted to a post for which he is not qualified, there are no provisions which specifically require competition for posts in the public service, or otherwise provide uniform criteria to be considered when filling vacant posts.
Guyana comment: agree with this observation
To address Guyana’s question, uniform criteria for appointment and advancement in the finance and administrative grades, Foreign Service officers and officers within the secretarial grade, effective since November 15, 2007, as communicated vide Circular No 17 of 2007, which is attached hereto.
(Belize, at Regulation 11(2), provides for the evaluation of applications for the filling of vacant posts by the use of specific criteria. In the absence of specific mechanisms that encourage competition in the hiring process, does the Committee wish to identify these mechanisms at this stage of the text by giving one or two examples of the competition alluded to?)
Belize concurs with Trinidad and Tobago with respect to the importance of Regulation 11 (2).
In light of the information being provided by Belize by way of clarification, Belize considers that the observations of the Committee are not fully accurate and respectfully requests the Committee to adjust the text.
Similarly, the Committee has not found any mechanism which provides for a competitive process for filling vacant posts or for entry into the public service in general. In this regard, the Committee also notes that while Regulation 7 of the Public Services Regulations requires the Chief Executive Officer of each respective Ministry to report his recommendation for filling vacancies in that Ministry to the Chief Executive Officer of the Ministry of the Public Service, there is no provision which requires any justification of that recommendation. (In this regard, Belize wishes to refer the Secretariat and the Review sub-group to our observations in page 9 of this report and to the text of Circular 7 of 2008 which specifically require that justification be made for filling vacancies.) Therefore, the Committee considers that further development of the government hiring process is necessary in order to help to ensure the openness, equity and efficiency of that process, as required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(a) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: Agree with this observation.
Trinidad and Tobago respectfully suggests that the underlined text may be reworded as follows:
“Therefore the Committee suggests that the government hiring process may benefit by the adoption of provisions, which require the Chief Executive Officer to state the basis for his recommendations. This may encourage further openness, equity and efficiency in the hiring process”.
Belize wishes to clarify that it has been a historic requirement and practice for CEOs to justify request and/or recommendation to the PSC, to the CEO of the Ministry of the Public Service or to the Financial Secretary with respect to creating new vacancies and filling new ones. In any event, the text of Circular 7 of 2008 is instructive in this regard. On that basis, Belize is of the considered opinion that its existing system already complies with this recommendation.
In a similar sense, while the Committee notes that Regulation 6 of the Public Services Commission Regulations makes Chief Executive Officer, Ministry of the Public Service responsible for determining the educational or professional qualifications and other requirements for appointment to permanent posts in the Public Service, there are no provisions in force which require this determination to be done in a uniform or standardized manner. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(b) in Section III of this Report)
Guyana comment: Belize may wish to clarify whether the CEO is the authority by ordinance or statute; if so then the CEO is acting in accordance with their legal framework. If there is such a provision then what mechanism exists to reduce or remove areas for capriciousness in hiring practices???
Belize considers that this position is now clarified by Circular No. 7 of 2008, as explained above. See our preceding observation in this regard. Again, Belize considers that the existing system obviates the present recommendation.
The Committee also observes an absence of provisions, which require the publication of vacancies that occur in the public service. In this regard, the response of Belize notes that “There are no provisions requiring the advertisement of vacancies. We understand from relevant human resources personnel within the Public Services Commission that there is a preference to advertise vacancies within the public service, especially for technical positions, but sometimes the posts are filled by internal promotions or transfers, or from existing applications kept on file; and in those instances, there is no advertisement.”[?] The Committee considers the foregoing evidences a potential for wide discretion as to which positions in the public service are publicized. The Committee will formulate a recommendation bearing this circumstance in mind. (See Recommendation 1.1(c) in Section III of this report)
As noted on page 5 of this report, the Delegation of Powers (which has been suspended) specifically required that vacancies which occurred in the junior positions should be advertised within the government service. The practice of publishing vacancies both within and outside the Public Service has always existed and continues to be practiced to this day.
Guyana comment: This is a tendency in countries where there is a low level of attrition within the public service, however, as a principle whilst there is internal advertisement of vacancies within the public service, it is still wise to have open advertisements especially for key and critical posts in the public service.
Could Belize advise if once the appointment is made whether this is brought to the public’s attention through an advertisement, press statement or any other means by the PSC, Public Service Ministry or individual Ministry?
With respect to mechanisms for challenging selection decisions, the Committee observes that despite the possibility of judicial review, as well as the possibility of complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman, there is still a need for a specific mechanism allowing for complaints and dispute resolution at the administrative level, as well as a written procedure outlining how those challenges or complaints should be resolved. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(d) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: Agree with this observation
Belize considers that the Public Service Regulations and the Services Commissions Regulations do in fact establish a mechanism for persons who are already in the system to challenge decisions in general, including selection decisions. What does not exist is a mechanism for persons who are not public officers to challenge a selection decision.
In a similar sense, the Committee also notes that there are no provisions which empower the Service Commissions, as the entities responsible for the government hiring system, to take corrective action in the event that an appointment process was, among other things, irregular, improper, or made through a fraudulent competition. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(e) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: Agree with this observation
(Trinidad and Tobago wishes to enquire of Belize whether the above paragraph is completely accurate. If in fact the Service Commissions are completely powerless to correct or right a wrong, once discovered, then this paragraph is appropriate. If not, then the paragraph should be reconsidered).
Note that the Delegation of Powers to the CEOs is suspended and as such, the respective Services Commissions are the only entities authorized to make and/or confirm appointments, transfers and to implement disciplinary measures. The actions and decisions of the Services Commissions must be in accordance with the Public Service Regulations and the Services Commissions Regulations. Such actions and/or decisions can be appealed to the Belize Advisory Council.
In that light, Belize considers that the observation by the Secretariat is not accurate and requests that it be modified accordingly.
( With respect to the system of hiring of workers who are governed by the Belize Constitution (Government Open Vote Workers) Regulations, the Committee considers the following:
Although these workers are neither a part of the public service, nor are they appointed by one of the service commissions, inasmuch as these workers are government employees and also public servants for the purposes of the Convention, the Committee considers that the country under review should consider further developing the hiring system for this category of employee. In this regard, the Committee notes that this category of employee includes employees who are carrying out essentially permanent functions. (Belize respectfully requests the Committee to clarity the basis of this consideration, to enable us to address same.) Accordingly, the Committee considers that the country under review should consider the advisability of establishing criteria, which adequately develop the hiring system for this category of employee, based on the principles of openness, equity and efficiency enshrined in the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(f) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: Agree with this observation.
Could Belize say if the Joint Staff Advisory Council and the Human Resource Development Committee (2006) play any role in relation to public service development and modernization?
( With respect to the system of hiring for staff of the National Assembly, the Committee considers the following:
Not unlike the public service hiring system, the Committee notes an absence of adequate development of the system for the hiring of staff of the National Assembly, which would clearly define the different stages of the recruitment and selection process, in order to ensure the ensure the openness, equity and efficiency of that process, as required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(g) in Section III of this report)
Once again, Trinidad and Tobago is concerned about the use of the phrase “absence of adequate development” in this context. While the concept is understood, it may be advisable to refrain from the use of terminology that may be interpreted as being too judgmental of a State Party’s legal or administrative framework. Perhaps consideration may be given to rewording the paragraph as follows:
“Not unlike the Public Service hiring system, the committee notes that the system of hiring of staff of the National Assembly does not appear to clearly identify and define the different stages of recruitment and selection in the process, which would ensure openness, equity and efficiency of that process, as is required by the Convention”.
Guyana comment: The role of the National Assembly Staff Committee is unclear and appears to play a limited function in relation to the recruitment and promotion of staff. There is nothing to inform if this Committee can be appealed to in case of a challenge or the need for a review.
In an enhanced system of hiring being proposed it would be advisable to consider their role vis a vis the Clerk being more clearly defined.
Belize wishes to draw the attention of the Secretariat and the Review Sub-group to s. 6 of the National Assembly Staff Act, Chapter 14 of the Laws of Belize, RE 2000 – 2003, which vests on the National Assembly Staff Committee the power to appoint (including power to confirm appointments) and to exercise disciplinary Control over the staff of the National Assembly (other than the Clerk and the Deputy Clerk), including the power to remove such persons from office. Appeals from decisions of the Committee made pursuant to this s. 6 shall lie to the Belize Advisory Council.
With respect to the recruitment process, Belize considers that Part II of the National Assembly Staff (Conditions of Service) Regulations sets down the procedure.
In addition, unlike the Public Services Regulations, the Staff (Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2003, while stipulating that no one should be appointed for a post for which he is not qualified, do not at the same time require that staff be appointed based on merit. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(h) in Section III of this report)
Although Section 5 of the Staff (Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2003 requires publication of the qualification and other requirements for appointment to posts, there is no requirement that vacancies by publicized. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(i) in Section III of this report)
In a similar sense, the Committee notes an absence of provisions, which would allow for administrative challenges to be made with respect to the decisions taken in the process of appointing National Assembly staff. The Committee will also formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(j) in Section III of this report) Belize respectfully disagrees with this consideration as s. 6 of the National Assembly Staff Act specifically provide that challenges to the decisions of this Committee shall be made to the Belize Advisory Council, which is established under the Constitution. On that basis, Belize is of the considered opinion that the recommendation is already met.
1.1.3. Results of the legal framework and/or other measures.
With respect to results in this field, the response of Belize notes that “There is no statistical data on the matter. However, with respect to complaints made to the Ombudsman, information can be found in the annual reports produced by his Office.”[?]
In this regard, the Committee observes that the Sixth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, corresponding to 2004-2005, contains the following chart breaking down the number of complaints received by the Ombudsman from each Government Department, the number of complaints resolved, the number of complaints resolved, and the average processing time for complaints.
A SUMMARY OF ALL THE DEPARTMENTS
|Ministry or Department or Authority |Cases Resolved |Open |Total |Average Time of Resolution |
|Police Department |101 |8 |109 |78days |
|Lands Department |26 |2 |28 |192days |
|Department of Corrections |11 |0 |11 |28 days |
|Magistrates Court |20 |1 |21 |10 days |
|Family Court |12 |0 |12 |102 days |
|Labour Department |8 |2 |10 |41days |
|Ministry of Health |1 |0 |1 |300 days |
|Ministry of Immigration & Nationality |12 |6 |18 |43 days |
|Registry |1 |0 |1 |2 days |
|Ministry of Home Affairs |1 |0 |1 |20 days |
|Ministry of Housing |3 |0 |3 |52 days |
|Social Security |6 |0 |6 |25 days |
|Ministry of Foreign Affairs |1 |0 |1 |1 day |
|Customs |2 |0 |2 |24 days |
|Public Utilities Commission |1 |0 |1 |1 day |
|Ministry of Works |1 |1 |2 |1 day |
|Agriculture Department |2 |0 |2 |55 days |
|Department of the Environment |3 |0 |3 |32 days |
|Education Department |3 |2 |4 |37 days |
|Belize Defence Force |2 |0 |2 |13 days |
|University of the West Indies |1 |0 |1 |43 days |
|Belize City Council |8 |1 |9 |10 days |
|Orange Walk Town Council |1 |0 |1 |16 days |
|Supreme Court of Belize |2 |0 |2 |1 day |
|Director of Public Prosecutions |5 |0 |5 |47 days |
|Public Service Commission |3 |0 |3 |26 days |
|Ministry of Human Development |6 |1 |7 |25 days |
|Civil Matters |33 |0 |31 |21 days |
|ADR |36 |7 |43 |44 days |
|Own Initiative |7 |1 |8 |37 days |
|Ministry of Transport |2 |0 |2 |37 days |
|Accountant General |1 |0 |1 |97days |
|Bar Association |1 |0 |1 |150 days |
|Parole Board |1 |0 |1 |39 days |
|Supervisor of Insurance |1 |0 |1 |93 days |
|National Drug Council |1 |0 |1 |2 days |
|Area Representative |1 |0 |1 |34 days |
|BEL |2 |0 |2 |12 days |
|Vehicle Care Unit |1 |0 |1 |1 day |
|Sales Tax Department |1 |0 |1 |5 days |
|Lots Committees |1 |0 |1 |31 days |
|Village Councils |1 |0 |1 |45 days |
|RC School Management |1 |0 |1 |69 days |
|San Ignacio Hospital |1 |0 |1 |73 days |
|De Lille High School |1 |0 |1 |72 days |
|Stann Creek Ecumenical School |1 |0 |1 |11 days |
|DFC |1 |0 |1 |1 day |
|BWS |4 |0 |4 |4 days |
|Belize Security Force |1 |0 |1 |20 days |
|Elections & Boundaries |1 |0 |1 |1 day |
|PACT |1 |0 |1 |1 day |
|Northern Regional Hospital |1 |0 |1 |7 days |
|B.E.S.T |0 |1 |1 | |
|Supervisor of Credit Unions |0 |1 |1 | |
The Committee observes that the foregoing chart indicates that a significant number of complaints have been received and processed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Notwithstanding, considering the wide scope of the Ombudsman’s responsibility, which encompasses complaints regarding not only hiring, but also promotions, disciplinary actions, dismissals, as well as corruption and abuse of authority, the Committee considers that it would be useful for these results to be broken down in order to indicate the number of complaints which specifically relate to the government hiring and appointment process. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.1(k) in Chapter III of this report).
Guyana comment: The report quoted from above is interesting in terms of measuring the time it takes for these matters to be handled. This is a good way of indicating the level of efficiency in addressing complaints etcetera. The report which is quoted above refers to the years 2004/2005, are there any more up to date report for years 2006/2007?
The Ombudsman’s last report is for 2006/2007, and is attached hereto.
Is the annual report of the Ombudsman submitted to the National Assembly? Is there a parliamentary mechanism in place for the Ombudsman’s Reports to be debated, examined at committee level or is it only tabled with no debate?
Section 28 of the Ombudsman Act, Chapter 5 of the Laws of Belize, R.E. 2000 – 2003 require that the Ombudsman’s Report be submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly and to the President of the Senate, who shall table it before the respective Houses as soon as possible. The Report to the Speaker of the National Assembly goes to the Ombudsman’s Report Committee[?], which is a Standing House Committee, where it is discussed and recommendations made to the House of Representatives.
Due to the volume of complaints, reports, etc. made to the Ombudsman it would be interesting to know the level of technical and human resources made available to him/her?
The Office of the Ombudsman counts with the Ombudsman, an investigator an Administrator; computers, internet access, a motor vehicle.
Do complaints etc also go to the Judicial and Legal Services Commission and the Public Service Commission? Complaints are made directly to the Chief Executive Officers of each Ministry; and not directly to the Services Commissions per se. With respect to matter over which the Judicial and Legal Services Commission has jurisdiction, the Office of the Ombudsman informs that they do not make complaints direct to the Commission, but rather lobby with the relevant Department. For example, a complaint against a Magistrate would be addressed with the Chief Magistrate rather than immediately elevating the matter to the level of the JLSC.
In addition, due to the absence of results with respect to the government hiring and appointment process, as noted by Belize in its response, and considering that the Committee does not have any other information that might enable it to make a comprehensive evaluation of the results in this field, it will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 4.2 in Chapter III of this report)
1.2. GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF GOODS AND
SERVICES
1. Existence of provisions in the legal framework and/or other measures.
Belize has a set of provisions related to the above-mentioned systems, among which the following should be mentioned:
- Statutory provisions such as the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act, 2005, which at Section 17(1) authorizes the Government to enter into procurement or sales contracts; and at Section 17(2) provides for the following three methods of procurement: (1) the limited tendering procedure; (2) the open tendering procedure; and (3) the selective tendering procedure.
Section 17(3) provides that contracts may be lawfully signed by a Minister, or an Ambassador or High Commissioner or Chief Executive Officer or Permanent Representative, or by any other public officer. Per s. 17 (3) and (4), public officers must be duly authorized in writing by a Minister to sign contracts of behalf of the Government, and the authorization must be published in the Gazette.
Guyana comment: Would it be a correct assumption that this is only done in relation to financial/procurement matters after an oversight tendering assessment body such as a Tender Board has evaluated and then subjected it to Cabinet’s approval?
It appears as if all Ministers have this right in relation to procurement matters. In most countries this is restricted to the Minister of Finance/ Secretary to the Treasury or Permanent Secretaries as Chief Accounting Officers (or Chief Executive Officers in the case of Belize).
In Belize the persons referenced above, in Section 17(3) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act, 2005, do have capacity to enter into contracts on behalf of the Government of Belize; subject to the oversight of the Contractor General as contained herein.
Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Act, respectively, detail the procurement process with respect to each of the three forms of procurement provided for by Section 17(2), as follows:
• Open Tendering Procedure, which includes a public request for the submission of tenders, and which is required for procurements in excess of $5 million Belize Dollars (Section 19(5)).[?]
With respect to this form of procurement, Section 19 establishes various requirements that must be met by the Government, such as, inter-alia, ensuring that all conditions for participation in the tendering procedure as well as the qualification procedures are published adequately in advance so as to allow interested suppliers to participate and complete the qualification procedure (Section 19(1)(a)); ensuring that the conditions for participation in the tendering process are limited to those necessary to ensure the supplier’s capacity to perform the contract (Section 19(1)(b)); ensuring that the conditions for participation do not discriminate against applicable suppliers (Section 19(1)(c)); ensuring that qualified suppliers be included in any permanent list of qualified suppliers maintained by the Government, within a reasonable time (Section 19(1)(h)); and ensuring that any supplier included in any such list be notified as soon as possible if the list ceases to be used or if his name is removed therefrom (Section 19(1)(j)). In addition, Section 19(2) also contains provisions regarding when the Government may consider a supplier as ineligible to participate in the open tendering procedure.
• Selective Tendering Procedure, which includes the procurement of goods and services by the Government in which only invited suppliers are invited to submit tenders.[?]
With respect to this form of procurement, Section 20(1) of the Act requires the Government to ensure that a sufficient number of suppliers are invited to ensure competition without affecting the efficiency of the tendering process; Section 20(2) provides that in selecting the suppliers to be invited, the government shall apply the following guidelines: (a) the need for fairness and non-discrimination, (b) the relevant market for the procurement or sale, (c) the need for expediency in the public interest, (d) the number of available suppliers in the relevant market, and (e) the knowledge of government procedures by the applicable suppliers; and Section 20(3) provides that where a permanent list of qualified suppliers is maintained, the Government may select the supplier from that list and award the contract accordingly.
• Limited Tendering Procedure, which includes procurements where no request for tenders is issued and where the Government invites suppliers individually to submit tenders.[?]
Section 21(1) of the Act provides that limited tendering may be used (a) when no tenders were received under open or selective tendering; (b) where the Government considers that tenders received under open or selective tendering were collusive or not in compliance with a condition specified in the invitation to tender; (c) where, due to technical, reasons or for protection of exclusive rights, or for works of art, the goods or services can only be obtained from one supplier; (d) where, for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the Government, or in the public interest, the goods cannot be procured in time using open or selective tendering; (e) where the goods to be procured are replacement parts and when obtaining the goods from a different supplier would not meet interchangeability requirements with existing goods or installations; (f) where the service to be procured is and extension of an existing service, and when obtaining the service from a different supplier would not meet the interchangeability requirements with existing goods, installation, or service; (g) where the goods to be procured are a prototype, or subject to intellectual property rights, or product or service to be manufactured or performed for the first time; and (h) for reasons of national security or national emergency, or to purchase goods or services needed for the day-to-day operations of the Government.
Guyana Comment: There are several areas of concern in the section above and it may be a result of an oversight on the part of the reporting country. However, the Finance and Audit Act 2005 which is referred to, whilst it does provide for different types of tenders for the procurement of goods and services, does not appear to provide for the evaluation/assessment process leading to the stage when and/or how the tender is awarded. The Act appears to be silent (and may be this is included under another piece of legislation) on the provision for a body/bodies within individual Ministries or a separate Central Tender Board or a combination of both with defined financial ceilings on their awards.
While the Act does not spell out an evaluation/assessment process per se, prior to the award of a contract, it does require that all contracts to be awarded under any of the three tendering procedures be submitted to the Contractor General for his revision and comments, prior to the award. The Contractor General’s powers and duties are contained in the Contractor General Act[?], which also provides for a body/bodies within individual Ministries or a separate Central Tender Board or a combination of both with defined financial ceilings on their awards.
Does the Cabinet examine the recommendation of the evaluation body and give it a ‘no objection” or approval?
The Contractor General Act requires the Contractor General to either report to both Houses of the National Assembly for debate, when he considers that a contract is not in the interest or Belize, or to the Financial Secretary, when he considers that a contract is in the interest of Belize.
The Act refers to the Government procuring and awarding on these matters but does not appear to define any specific entity within the Government with such responsibility or accountability.
Under the Contractor General Act, the Contractor General has oversight powers in relation to these matters of procuring and awarding.
Are the awards once made publicized giving the amount of the award and the awardee, time period for implementation/execution of the award etc?
It would have been helpful if Belize could advise if there is a Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Public Accounts which reviews the Auditor General’s annual reports and examines individual government agencies expenditure and revenue for a given year?
The Public Accounts Committee is established under Order 72 (1)(k) of the Belize Constitution (House of Representatives) Standing Orders[?], and its powers and functions[?] are as follows:
“The Public Accounts Committee shall have the duty of examining, considering and reporting on –
(a) the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by the National Assembly to meet the public expenditures of the country;
(b) such other accounts as may be referred to the Committee by the House or under any Law; and
(c) the report of the Auditor General on any such accounts.”
- Statutory provisions establishing governing or administrative authorities for the government procurement system, such as the Contractor-General Act[?], which establishes the Office of the Contractor General, as an independent Office (Section 4); and at Section 14 charges the Contractor-General, with (a) monitoring the award and implementation of public contracts in order to ensure (i) impartiality and merit, (ii) that contracts do not involve impropriety or irregularity, (iii) that contracts are implemented pursuant to their terms; and (iv) that there is no fraud, corruption, mismanagement, waste or abuse in the awarding or contracts; (b) investigating fraud, mismanagement, waste or abuse; and (c) developing policy guidelines, evaluating performance, and monitoring actions taken with respect to contract award, execution or termination; and (d) monitoring the granting, suspension or revocation of any license.
Section 15 grants the Contractor-General the authority to investigate any of the following: (a) the selection of contractors; (b) tender procedures relating to contracts awarded by public bodies; (c) the award of any public contract; (d) any allegation of fraud, mismanagement, waste or abuse involving public contracts; (e) the implementation of the terms of any contract; and (f) practices and procedures involving the grant, suspension or revocation of any license.
In addition to the provisions contained in the Contractor-General Act, the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act, 2005, at Section 18(2), requires all contracts to be submitted to the Contractor General for review and comments prior to their execution; at Sections 18(3) and 18(4), respectively, the Act requires the Contractor General to either report to both Houses of the National Assembly for debate, when he considers that a contract is not in the interest or Belize, or to the Financial Secretary, when he considers that a contract is in the interest of Belize.
Guyana comment: Could Belize provide information on how the Contractor-General is selected? Is this a constitutional post? Section 19(5) of the FA (Reform) Act 2005 states that all contracts over $ 5 Million are to be submitted to the National Assembly within one month of its execution, does the Government or the Contractor-General do so?
According to Section 3(2) of the Contractor General Act, (2) The Contractor-General shall be appointed by the Governor-General, acting on the recommendations of both Houses of the National Assembly contained in resolutions passed in that behalf.
According to Sections 19(5) and 19(6); it is the Minister with responsibility for Finance who submits such contracts to the National Assembly.
- With respect to mechanisms for challenging or appealing procurement decisions, as discussed above, in Section 1.1.1, the Supreme Court Rules of 2005, allow applications for judicial review to be submitted to the Supreme Court.[?]
Similarly, the response of Belize also notes the possibility of recurring to the Office of the Ombudsman in order to challenge procurement decisions that were made based on abuse of authority In this regard, Section 12(1) of the Ombudsman Act grants the Ombudsman the authority to investigate matters, where he or she has a reasonable cause to believe that (a) an authority or an officer or member of an authority has been guilty of corruption or other wrongdoing; or (b) any person or body of persons as or may have sustained injustice injury or abuse as a result of an action taken by an authority or an officer or a member of such authority.
1.2.2. Adequacy of the legal framework and/or other measures.
The provisions and measures which refer to the principal government systems for the procurement of goods and services by Belize that the Committee has examined, based on the information made available to it, constitute a set of relevant measures for the promotion of the purposes of the Convention.
Nevertheless, the Committee considers it appropriate to formulate certain observations with respect to the advisability of developing (Trinidad and Tobago suggests the use of the term enhancing) and complementing certain legal provisions that refer to these systems.
Belize prefers the amended wording suggested by Trinidad and Tobago; and agrees that “enhancing” is a more appropriate term, since certain legal provisions have already been developed in Belize.
- To begin with, the Committee observes that there is no provision in the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005 that specifically applies the provisions of the Act to procurement activity in the legislative and judicial branches of Government. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(a) in Section III of this report)
(Trinidad and Tobago wishes to enquire of Belize whether or not the oversight powers of the Contractor General extend to the legislative and judicial branches of government in their procurement of contracts? If this is not so then the statement above is appropriate.)
Belize respectfully request clarification from the Secretariat as to why it has determined a need for recommendations to include provisions specifically applicable to procurement activity in the legislative and judicial branches. The Finance and Audit (Reform) Act refers to “government contracts”, which are contracts entered by the Government of Belize, whether it be the executive, legislative or judicial branches. Belize believes that developing separate legislation to apply the provisions of the Convention to procurement activity in the legislative and judicial branches of Government is unnecessary, and would be duplicative.
In response to the enquiry by Trinidad and Tobago, Belize confirms that the oversight powers of the Contractor General do extend to the legislative and judicial branches of government in their procurement of contracts.
- In addition, the Committee observes that although the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act contains provisions which provide for differing means of procurement, as well as specific criteria to be included in the respective invitations to tender, there do not appear to be provisions which provide clear criteria upon which the eventual selection will be made, such as, for instance, a requirement that for open tenders, the lowest technically acceptable offer will be awarded the contract. The Committee considers that having these criteria in place would help to ensure that selection decisions are not discretionary, arbitrary, or subjective, and would help to achieve the impartiality, transparency and equality required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(b) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: In addition to this observation is the lack of any definitive mechanism in the Act with reference to how/who evaluates the tender and how it is awarded. The absence of this is very disturbing.
Belize agrees with the Committee that there are provisions for different means of procurement, as well as specific criteria to be included in the respective invitations to tender. Belize also appreciates the Commission’s concern that there do not appear to be provisions which provide clear criteria upon which the eventual selection will be made. However, Belize suggests that the oversight powers of the Contractor General, along with certain guidelines which are in place, do help to ensure that selection decisions are not discretionary, arbitrary, or subjective, and help to achieve the impartiality, transparency and equality required by the Convention. In the example of open tenders, the section 19(3)(c) requirement that contracts be awarded to “suitable suppliers” does suggest that the lowest technically acceptable offer will be awarded the contract. However, to determine the “suitability” of a supplier necessarily implies that there are many other criteria to consider, such the supplier’s past performance and reputation, which may or may not inspire confidence in its ability to perform as required. Depending on the type of contract at issue, there may be a variety of factors to consider when making the eventual selection, and any amendment made here, must include objective ways of addressing these various factors.
- With respect to Section 20 of the Act, which inter-alia, provides guidelines for an instance of selective tendering, the Committee observes, that Section 20(3) allows the Government, in the event that a permanent list of qualified suppliers in maintained, to select the supplier from that list and award the contract accordingly. The Committee is concerned that this provision would appear to allow for the direct award of a contract to a particular supplier without competition, and would seem to contradict with Section 20(1), which requires the Government to ensure that the number of applicable suppliers is sufficient to ensure competition. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(c) in Section III of this report)
Belize agrees that there is some merit to consider reviewing Section 20(3) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005 to ensure that in instances where limited tendering is used, an adequate number of potential suppliers is included on the list that would encourage competition as is required by Section 20(1) of the Act.
- With respect to the limited tendering procedure provided for by Section 21 of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act, the Committee observes an absence of the definition of “extreme urgency” or “the public interest” as used in Section 21(1)(d); nor of “national emergency”, as used in Section 21(1)(h)(i). The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(d) in Section III of this report)
While Belize acknowledges that including a definition of “extreme urgency”, “public interest” (as is used in Sections 21(1)(d) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005), and “national emergency” (as is used in Section 21(1)(h)(i) of the Act) within the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act may be helpful, it is mindful that such a definition might result in the omission of circumstances which may arise in the future and would merit inclusion. As such, Belize considers that it is more convenient to continue the application of the legal maxim: Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent and interpret these terms according to the plain meaning thereof.
Similarly, with respect to Section 21(1)(h), the Committee notes that at subparagraph 21(1)(h)(ii), it provides for goods or services used for day-to-day government operations to be acquired through limited tendering. In this regard, the Committee is concerned that the absence of a definition of what constitutes day-to-day government operations, may allow for too much discretion as to when this type of procurement procedure is used for this purpose. In addition, while certain small purchases may need to be acquired by the government as a need arises, it might be preferable for other recurring expenses, such as the case of office supplies, to be acquired through competitive means. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(e) in Section III of this report)
(Trinidad and Tobago wishes to enquire of the Secretariat whether or not this observation is somewhat too specific? While it is clear that in the absence of a definition of “day-to-day government operations”, there is a danger that too much discretion may be exercised in the use of this type of procurement procedure, consideration must be given for the availability of goods and services within the specific Country. In this regard perhaps Belize may wish to comment as to the specificity of this observation. If Belize finds no difficulty with the observation, then it may be kept in the text).
Guyana comment: Agree with this observation
Belize concurs with the observations of Trinidad and Tobago; and agrees that a specific definition of “day-to-day operations of government” as used in Section 21(1)(h)(ii) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005, would be more dangerous that the absence thereof since such a definition might result in the omission of goods and services which may arise in the future and would merit inclusion.
In a similar sense, and with respect to the limited tendering procedure in general, the Committee notes an absence of provisions which require that a decision to use this procedure be justified in writing. The Committee considers that such a requirement would help ensure transparency in the process as well as reduce the opportunity for discretionary use of this procurement procedure. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(f) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: In most jurisdictions, the respective government agency would apply to the Tender Administration entity for approval to waive the requirement of open tender and go to selective or limited tender with a written justification.
Section 21 (1) of the Act specifies the circumstances under which the Limited Tendering Procedure should be used, which renders written justification/reasons unnecessary.
- The Committee also observes an absence of provisions which require publication of tender opportunities in the appropriate media, the conditions for participation therein, and the time, method and place for the submission of bids. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(g) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: Belize like Guyana is a relatively small developing country; could Belize say if the tendering process at the regional/provincial/local government are based on the Finance and Audit Act 2005 or is there separate legislation covering local government bodies and their procurement methodology?
To answer Guyana’s question, we have discussed above that the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act refers to “government contracts”, which applies to all contracts awarded by the Government of Belize. Irrespective of which Ministry will monitor works under a specific contract, all public contracts are entered into by or on behalf of the Government of Belize.
Belize wishes to refer the Secretariat and the Review Sub-group to s. 21 (1), which lists the circumstances under which the limited tendering procedure will be used, and which accounts for dispensation of the requirement for publishing under this tendering procedure.
- Similarly, in order to increase (perhaps replace with encourage or enhance) transparency in the procurement process, the Committee considers that Belize may wish to consider possibility, when appropriate, of publishing pre-bidding terms and conditions so that interested parties can find out about them and submit comments thereon. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(h) in Section III of this report)
Belize prefers the term “enhance”.
- With respect to electronic procurement methods and registries of contractors, the Committee notes that the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act, at Sections 19 and 20, addressing open and selective tendering procedures, respectively, contemplates the use of a list of qualified suppliers. In this connection, the response of Belize notes as follows: “There are no systems in place for electronic methods and no information systems for government procurement. In practice, however, the Ministry of Works used to keep a register of qualified contractors. It is our understanding that such practice was discontinued overtime. However, from its files, the Tendering Committee has knowledge of all tenderers who usually submit tenders, and due to their small numbers, it is not difficult to keep a mental record thereof.”[?]
Guyana comment: Whilst the populations of most of the English- speaking countries are small, and there is a familiarity of who are the main players in the provision of goods and services, in terms of good governance practices and transparency, greater efforts in relation to transparency of the process should be made. In relation to inclusion and opportunities to participate in the process at all levels this is a critical issue particularly at the local government levels and developing local capacities.
Notwithstanding the above, the Committee is of the view that the use of electronic methods and information systems for government procurement assists in adequately informing the public and ensuring openness, and therefore considers that Belize could consider the use of electronic means to provide information regarding procurement, including the status of bids and awards and the progress of major projects. Additionally, the Committee considers that use of an electronic procurement system in order to carry out the contracting needs of the State might be advantageous. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(i) and 1.2(j) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: Belize has developed a good government website where electronic forms for many services can be obtained, its expansion to include the above-mentioned could be easily implemented.
Belize notes that a cost benefit analysis of developing and implementing such a system must be undertaken to determine if the costs exceed the benefits, given our statement that it is not difficult to keep a mental and other records relating to Belize’s contracting needs.
Likewise, Belize agrees that strengthening and increasing the scope of use of electronic forms of communication, such as the internet, for publicizing the tender and consulting opportunities, status of bids and awards and the progress in the execution of major projects, would assist in adequately informing the public and ensuring openness.
Similarly, with respect to the use of a registry of contractors, the Committee believes that the country under review should consider the advisability of amending the existing legislation in order to create a centralized registry of contractors of works, goods and services. This registry should be compulsory for all State bodies and dependencies, its purpose being to foster the principles of openness, equity and efficiency provided for in the Convention. The Committee also suggests that the country under review consider granting to a public body the authority to exclude and/or sanction any contractor, for a certain period of time, from the proposed registry, as circumstances may warrant. There could, for example, be provisions outlining the reasons for an intended exclusion or sanction. This body should also maintain a list of sanctioned contractors. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(k) in Section III of this report)
(Should these points form part of the observations within this part of the text or should they be more appropriately placed within the recommendations section? It is an issue of format or style, which could possibly be raised at the MESICIC meeting and therefore need not be addressed here.)
Belize concurs with the observations of Trinidad and Tobago.
- The Committee also observes that there are no provisions in place which require prior planning sufficiently in advance of the launch of procurement processes, such as the preparation of studies, designs and technical evaluations, or assessing the appropriateness and timeliness of the purchase. The Committee considers that the adoption of provisions that require prior planning would help to ensure the openness, equity and efficiency of the procurement system. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(l) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: In general this recommendation should pertain to large or specialized contracts, caution should be exercised in making this a requirement. This should stipulate the type of projects/contracts where such studies may be /should be required (large foreign funded projects, projects over a certain amount).
Guyana’s Procurement Act and Audit Act are good models that may be of help.
Belize acknowledges the benefit of provisions that require planning sufficiently in advance of the launch of the procurement process. However, Belize recognizes that at times such prior planning is not possible. Moreover, the need for expedience in the public interest may trump such procedures, especially in times of national disasters or in response and unexpected incidents.
Belize appreciates the reference to Guyana’s Procurement Act and Audit Act.
- The Committee also notes an absence of provisions allowing for the establishment of citizen oversight mechanisms to monitor the execution of contracts where their nature, importance, or magnitude so warrants. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(m) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: A cursory examination of the Government of Belize website and some of the laws of Belize indicate that there are a number of entities such as the Council on Good Governance and Public Service Modernization (2006), and the Oversight Bodies for Selected Provisions; do these play any oversight role? Is there any parliamentary mechanism for the inclusion of citizens in an oversight role?
Per section 18 (2) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act, all contract to be offered under the three tendering procedures must be submitted to the Contractor General for his revision and comments, prior to execution. And though the Act itself does not specifically provide for the establishment of citizen oversight mechanisms to monitor the execution of contracts, citizens and civil society have traditionally used the mechanisms created under the Contractor General Act to make complaints with respect to both the award and execution of all contracts, including those awarded under any of the three tendering procedures.
- With respect to mechanisms allowing for challenges to be made with regard to procurement decisions, the response of Belize notes that “…there are no specified or legislated ways to challenge a selection other than the usual recourse to the courts for judicial review, or complaints to the Ombudsman regarding allegations of abuse of power. In practice, contractors have made recourse to the Contractor General with respect not only to the selection criteria, but also with regard to interpretation to provisions of the contract itself; while others have seen it fit to take their complaints to government Ministers, area representatives, and the media.”[?] In this regard, the Committee considers that Belize would benefit from implementing provisions, which allow for administrative challenge mechanisms. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 1.2(n) in Section III of this report)
Guyana comment: It may be of interest to Belize to peruse Guyana’s Procurement Act posted on the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board website and the Audit Office of Guyana website.
Belize agrees that there is some merit to consider the adoption of provisions which would enable, subject to due process, administrative challenges to the tendering process, such as the basis for the tender or bid, the rejection of bidders, and the designation of the winner. Such administrative challenges should be designed to clarify, modify, or revoke such acts. However, given the existing mechanisms, Belize is cautious that the operation of such mechanisms may cause undue delays in the tendering process.
1.2.3. Results of the legal framework and/or other measures.
With respect to results in this field, the response of Belize notes as follows, “No information available.”[?]
Due to the unavailability of results with respect to the government procurement system, as noted by Belize in its response, and considering that the Committee does not have any other information that might enable it to make a comprehensive evaluation of the results in this field, it will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 4.2 in Chapter III of this report)
In this regard, Belize presents the following yearly reports of the Contractor General: 2002 – 2003; 2004-2005; and 2005 – 2006. This last report is the last published report by the Contractor General. In considering these reports, the Secretariat and the Review Sub-group should bear in mind that the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act was published in 2005.
2. SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING PUBLIC SERVANTS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS WHO, IN GOOD FAITH, REPORT ACTS OF CORRUPTION (ARTICLE III (8) OF THE CONVENTION)
2.1. Existence of provisions in the legal framework and/or other measures.
Belize has certain provisions related to systems for protecting public servants and private citizens, who, in good faith, report acts of corruption, among which the following provisions referred to in its response, should be noted:
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, which at Section 32, provides that a person who is convicted of threatening to take or taking action harmful to any person, including their employment or occupation, as a result of a person making a disclosure under Section 30[?] thereof, shall be subject to a fine of no less than $25,000 or to imprisonment for no more than one year, or to both.
In addition, Section 35 of the Act provides that any person who makes a good faith complaint to the Integrity Commission, with a reasonable belief that it is substantially true, and in circumstances where it is reasonable to make the complaint, shall not be liable to any form of reprisal or criminal or civil suits.
- Mechanisms which provide mechanisms (should this not be opportunities instead of mechanisms?) (Belize concurs with Trinidad and Tobago) for reporting, such as the Crime Stopper Hotline,[?] which allows anonymous reporting of crimes.
- The Justice Protection Act, No. 48 of 2005, which gives legislative authority in Belize to the CARICOM Agreement Establishing a Regional Justice Protection Program, 1999, and which, pursuant to its the first schedule, would allow for participation in the program with respect to crimes which involve a money laundering component.[?]
Guyana comment: I could not find a copy of the Justice Protection Act 2005 referred to above. I am aware of the CARICOM Treaty referred to which was signed by most if not all CARICOM states.
2. Adequacy of the legal framework and/or other measures.
The provisions, measures and mechanisms which refer to the principal systems for the protection of public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption in Belize, that (have been examined by) the Committee has examined (perhaps has examined could be deleted), based on the information made available to it, are relevant to promoting the purposes of the Convention.
Notwithstanding, as noted by Belize in its response to the questionnaire, “The country itself, however, does not count?(unclear) with an established witness protection system, exclusively for the purposes of protecting public officers or private citizens who in good faith report acts of corruption.”[?]
Belize wishes to clarify that it does not have any ONE elaborate mechanism to protect servants and private citizens, who in good faith report acts of corruption. However, the existing procedures coordinated by the Police Department (which enjoys collaboration with Interpol) have proved sufficient to promote the purposes of the Convention.
Belize respectfully requests that its particular realities be taken into consideration in this regard.
In this connection, because the existing mechanisms are (appear) (perhaps the word are could be deleted) insufficient for the promotion of purposes of the Convention, the Committee will formulate the recommendations it deems advisable for Belize to consider, in accordance with Article III(8) of the Convention. (See the recommendation in Section 2 of Chapter III of this report).
3. Results of the legal framework and/or other measures
With respect to results in this field, the response of Belize notes as follows, “No statistical data is available on the matter.”[?]
Due to the unavailability of results with respect to the systems under review, as noted by Belize in its response, and considering that the Committee does not have any other information that might enable it to make a comprehensive evaluation of the results in this field, it will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 4.2 in Chapter III of this report)
3. ACTS OF CORRUPTION (ARTICLE VI OF THE CONVENTION)
3 Existence of provisions in the legal framework and/or other measures
Belize has a set of provisions related to the criminalization of the acts of corruption provided for in Article VI(1) of the Convention, among which the following should be noted:
( With respect to paragraph (a) of Article VI(1):
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, Section 3(1), which provides that “Every person who by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person corruptly solicits or receives, or agrees to receive, for himself or for any other person, any gift, advantage[?] or consideration[?] whatever as an inducement to, or reward for, or otherwise on account of, any member, officer, or servant of the Government or of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which the Government or the said public body is concerned, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, Section 4, which provides that “Any person on conviction on indictment for offending as aforesaid shall, at the discretion of the court before which he is convicted –
(a) be liable to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding two years or to pay a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars, or to both such fine and term of imprisonment; and
(b) in addition, be liable to be ordered to pay to such body, and in such manner as the court directs, the amount or value of any gift or consideration received by him or any part thereof; and
(c) be liable to be adjudged incapable of being elected or appointed to any public office for seven years from the date of his conviction, and to forfeit any such office held by him at the time of his conviction; and
(d) in the event of a second conviction for a like offence, in addition to the foregoing penalties, be liable to be adjudged to be forever incapable of holding any public office, and to be incapable for seven years of being registered as an elector, or voting at an election of members of any public body; and
(e) if such person is an officer or servant in the employ of any public body, upon such conviction, at the discretion of the court, be liable to forfeit his right and claim to any compensation or pension to which he would otherwise have been entitled.”
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, Section 7, which provides that “Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence under this Act, it is proved that any money, gift or other consideration has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of any Government Department or a public body by or from a person, or agent[?] of a person, holding or seeking to obtain a contract from any Government Department or public body, the money, gift or consideration shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as such inducement or reward as is mentioned in this Act unless the contrary is proved.”
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, Section 26(b), which provides that a person who “being a member of the National Assembly, solicits or accepts any advantage[?] as an inducement or a reward for his doing or forbearing to do any act in his capacity as such Member, commits an offence of corruption and is liable on conviction to a fine not less than twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding on year, or to both fine and imprisonment.”
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, Section 27(b), which provides that a person who “being a member of a public body, solicits or accepts any advantage[?] as an inducement or reward for any such act, or any such abstaining, as is referred to in paragraph (a)(i)(ii) and (iii), (i) [(i) that member’s voting or abstaining from voting at any meeting of the public body in favor or against any measure, resolution, or question submitted to that public body; (ii) the member’s performing, or abstaining from performing, or his aid in procuring, expediting, delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of, any official act; or (iii) the member’s aid in procuring or preventing the passage of any vote or the granting of any contract or advantage[?] in favor of any person…commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine note less than twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both find and imprisonment.”] …commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine note less than twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both find and imprisonment.”
( With respect to paragraph (b) of Article VI(1):
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, Section 3(2), which provides that “Every person who, by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly gives, promises or offers any gift, advantage[?] or consideration whatever to any person, whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account of any member, officer, or servant of the Government or of any public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatever, actual or proposed, in which the Government or such public body as aforesaid is concerned, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, Section 4, noted above with respect to paragraph (a) of Article VI(1) of the Convention.
- Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, which at Section 1(c)[?] provides that a person commits an act of corruption if “he offers or grants, directly or indirectly, to a public servant[?] any article, money or other benefit being a gift, favour, promise or advantage[?] to the public servant or another person, for doing any act or omitting to do any act in the performance of the public servant’s public functions;”
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, Section 26(a), which provides that a person who “offers any advantage[?] to a Member of the National Assembly as an inducement or a reward for such Member’s doing or forbearing to do any act in his capacity as such Member, commits an offence of corruption and is liable on conviction to a fine not less than twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding on year, or to both fine and imprisonment.”
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, Section 27(a), which provides that a person who “offers any advantage[?] to any member of a public body as an inducement or reward for (i) that member’s voting or abstaining from voting at any meeting of the public body in favor or against any measure, resolution, or question submitted to that public body; (ii) the member’s performing, or abstaining from performing, or his aid in procuring, expediting, delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of, any official act; or (iii) the member’s aid in procuring or preventing the passage of any vote or the granting of any contract or advantage[?] in favor of any person…commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine note less than twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both find and imprisonment.”
( With respect to paragraph (c) of Article VI(1):
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, Section 22(1), which provides, inter-alia, that “A person who, by himself or in conjunction with any other person, or an agent[?], engages or attempts to engage in any of the acts specified in Part 1 of the Third Schedule commits an act of corruption.”
- Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, which at Section 1(a) provides that a person commits an act of corruption if “he in the performance of his public functions does any act or omits to do any act for the purpose of obtaining any illicit benefit for himself or any other person.”
( With respect to paragraph (d) of Article VI(1):
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, Section 22(1), which provides, inter-alia, that “A person who, by himself or in conjunction with any other person, or an agent[?], engages or attempts to engage in any of the acts specified in Part 1 of the Third Schedule commits an act of corruption.”
- Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, which at Section 1(b) provides that a person commits an act of corruption if “he fraudulently uses or conceals any property or other benefit derived from any such act or omission to act under paragraph (a) or (b).”
( With respect to paragraph (e) of Article VI(1):
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, Section 22(1), which provides, inter-alia, that “A person who, by himself or in conjunction with any other person, or an agent[?], engages or attempts to engage in any of the acts specified in Part 1 of the Third Schedule commits an act of corruption.”
- Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, which at Section 1(k) provides that a person commits an act of corruption if “he instigates, aids, abets or is an accessory after the fact or participates in whatsoever manner in the commission or attempted commission of or conspires to commit any act of corruption referred to in paragraphs (a) to (k).”
1. Adequacy of the legal framework and/or other measures.
With respect to provisions related to the criminalization of the acts of corruption provided for in Article VI(1) of the Convention that have been examined by the Committee, based on the information made available to it, the Committee observes that they constitute a set of provisions relevant to the promotion of the purposes of the Convention.
Nonetheless, the Committee considers it appropriate to make certain observations regarding the advisability for Belize to consider complementing and implementing certain provisions in this area, taking into account the following:
• With respect to paragraphs (a) of Article VI(1):
- The Committee observes that Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, which criminalizes bribery, lacks the element of “directly or indirectly”, as required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.1(a) in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report) Belize is of the considered opinion that the operative phrase “by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person” which appears in that section fulfill the requirement of “directly or indirectly” of the Convention. The Act precedes the Convention – which accounts for the absence of the specific terms “directly or indirectly”. Belize considers further that it is not necessary to use the specific terms of the Convention in order to comply therewith.
- The Committee also observes that Section 3(1) requires that the solicitation or receipt be done “corruptly”. The Committee notes that this additional element is not required by Article VI(1) of the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.1(b) in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report) The legislative intent at the time required the mental element, bearing in mind that the Act precedes the Convention.
- In a similar sense, the Committee considers that Sections 26(b) and 27(b) of the 2007 POCA, which also criminalize bribery committed by members of the National Assembly and members of public bodies, respectively, both lack the element of “directly or indirectly”, as required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.2 in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report)
Guyana comment: The Belizean POCA should not be underestimated as there are very strident clauses referring to Members of the National Assembly, in particular Sections 26 (a and b) and Section 4 c, d, where if a Member is found guilty he would be incapable of being elected to public office for 7 years and in relation the same Section (e) if found guilty on a second conviction would not be allowed to be elected nor to vote! These clauses l am sure would not be ignored by any elected official in any democratic society.
• With respect to paragraph (b) of Article VI(1):
- The Committee observes that Section 3(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, which criminalizes bribery, lacks the element of “directly or indirectly”, as required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.3(a) in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report) In this regard, Belize reiterates its comments made in the preceding section with relation to s. 3(1) of the Act – that it precedes the Convention, hence the absence of the specific terms “directly or indirectly”, but that the existence of the operative phrase “by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person” have the effect of fulfilling the requirements of the Convention.
- The Committee also observes that Section 3(2) requires that the giving, promising, or offering, be done “corruptly”. The Committee notes that this additional element is not required by Article VI(1) of the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.3(b) in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report) The legislative intent at the time required the mental element, bearing in mind that the Act precedes the Convention.
- In a similar sense, the Committee considers that Sections 26(a) and 27(a) of the 2007 POCA, which also criminalize bribery committed in respect of members of the National Assembly and members of public bodies, respectively, both lack the element of “directly or indirectly”, as required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.4 in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report)
Guyana comment: The Common law jurisprudence would tend to interpret this clause to include whether a person was knowingly corrupt and whether it was done directly and indirectly. The burden would be on the Prosecutorial representatives to make their case.
- The Committee notes that Section 1(c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 2007 POCA also criminalizes the act of active bribery. In this regard, the Committee observes that unlike Section 3(2) of the 2003 POCA, Section 1(c) does include the element of “directly or indirectly”. Nonetheless, the Committee further notes that Section 1(c) makes specific reference to a bribe given to a “public servant” related to performance of the “public servant’s public functions.” The Committee considers that because the definition of “public servant” does not include a person who performs public functions, as contemplated by Article VI(1)(b) of the Convention, this provision is insufficient to achieve the objectives thereof. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.5 in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report) Belize respectfully requests the Secretariat to reconsider this consideration since it is of the considered opinion that the definition of the term “public servant” (which includes those has defined by s. 2 of the 2007 POCA is wide enough to cover any “any temporary or permanent, paid or honorary activity, performed by a natural person in the name of the State or in the service of the State or its institutions, at any level of its hierarchy”, as required by the Convention.
• With respect to paragraph (d) of Article VI(1):
- The Committee notes that although Section 1(b) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, criminalizes the fraudulent use or concealment of the proceeds of the corruption offences specified therein, the 2003 POCA has no similar provision.
Guyana comment: I was having some difficulties reconciling both pieces of legislation 2003 and 2007.
Thus, because Section 1(b) of the Third Schedule to the 2007 POCA does not apply to the offences criminalized by the 2003 POCA, due to the specific nature of the bribery provisions contained in the 2007 Act, the Committee considers that the provisions which criminalize the fraudulent use and concealment of the proceeds of passive and active bribery are insufficient to achieve the purposes of the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.6 in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report)
• With respect to paragraph (e) of Article VI(1):
- Unlike the situation with the 2007 POCA, the Committee notes an absence of provisions which criminalize the various forms of participating in those crimes contemplated in Article VI(1)(e), nor which criminalize the attempted commission of or conspiracies to commit the corruption offences defined in the 2003 POCA, as required by the Convention. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.7 in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report)
Title IV of our Criminal Code addresses this matter.
Finally, and with respect to the different definitions of the corruption offences contained in both the 2007 POCA and the 2003 POCA, the Committee considers that Belize might wish to consider the convenience of harmonizing the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, and the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003. The Committee will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 3.8 in Section 3 of Chapter III of this report)
Guyana comment: Agree to this as it was confusing trying to reconcile the two pieces of legislation
2. Results of the legal framework and/or other measures
With respect to results in this field, the response of Belize notes as follows, “The Prevention of Corruption Act, which repealed the Prevention of Corruption in Public Life Act, was enacted in 2007. As such, objective results as well as data on the objective results are still in the process of being obtained in the enforcement of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.”[?]
Due to the unavailability of results with respect to the systems under review, as noted by Belize in its response, and considering that the Committee does not have any other information that might enable it to make a comprehensive evaluation of the results in this field, it will formulate a recommendation in this regard. (See Recommendation 4.2 in Chapter III of this report)
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS SELECTED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECOND ROUND
Based on the review conducted in Chapter II of this report, the Committee formulates the following conclusions and recommendations with respect to the implementation, in the Belize, of the provisions contained in Articles III(5) (systems of government hiring and for the procurement of goods and services); III(8) (systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption); and VI (acts of corruption) of the Convention, which were selected for review within the framework of the second round.
1. SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT HIRING AND PROCUREMENT OF GOODS AND
SERVICES (ARTICLE III (5) OF THE CONVENTION)
1. Systems of Government Hiring
Belize has considered and adopted measures intended to establish, maintain and strengthen the systems of government hiring, as discussed in Section 1.1 of Chapter II of this report.
In light of the comments made in the above-noted section, the Committee makes the following recommendation to Belize:
Belize respectfully requests that these recommendations reviewed in light of the clarifications provided by the country in this regard.
- Strengthen the systems of government hiring. In meeting this recommendation, Belize could take the following measures into account:
a) Develop, through the relevant legal and/or administrative procedures, the different stages that comprise the process of selecting and appointing candidates to posts in the Public Service, by adopting provisions and clearly defined criteria that ensure access to the public service, always taking into account the principles of openness, equity and efficiency as provided in the Convention. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter III of this report)
b) Implement provisions, which ensure that the establishment of the educational and professional qualifications for posts in the public service is done in a uniform manner, with respect to the different entities that make up the public service. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter III of this report)
c) (Consider adopting) Adopt, through the appropriate legal and/or administrative procedures, provisions and mechanisms that contain clearly defined criteria for the advertisement of opportunities or vacancies in the public service, provide for their content and form as well as the time frame in which they should be advertised, and which take into account the use of the mass media, such as newspapers with national circulation and/or websites, among others. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter II of this report)
d) (Consider adopting) Adopt, through the respective legal and/or administrative procedures and in keeping with the principle of due process, provisions for the establishment of administrative challenge mechanisms to clarify, modify or revoke substantial acts that are part of the recruitment and selection procedures in the Public Service, ensuring a timely, objective, impartial, and effective procedures. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter II of this report)
e) Consider the strengthening of) Strengthen the legal provisions regarding the Service Commissions, so that these authorities have the competence to revoke or take other corrective measures when it is found that an appointment process was, among other things, irregular, improper, or made through a fraudulent competition. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter II of this report)
This recommendation is subject to Belize’s confirmation that Service Commissions do not already have this capacity.
f) (Consider the advisability of developing) Develop, through the relevant legal and/or administrative procedures, the different stages that comprise the process of selecting and appointing workers governed by the Belize Constitution (Government Open Vote Workers) Regulations, (through the adoption of) by adopting provisions and clearly defined criteria that ensure access to this category of service, always taking into account the principles of openness, equity and efficiency as provided in the Convention. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter III of this report)
g) (Consider developing) Develop, through the relevant legal and/or administrative procedures, the different stages that comprise the process of selecting and appointing National Assembly staff, (through the adoption of) by adopting provisions and clearly defined criteria that ensure access to those positions, always taking into account the principles of openness, equity and efficiency as provided in the Convention. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter III of this report)
h) (Consider adopting) Adopt, through the appropriate legislative and/or administrative procedures, provisions which provide that the selection and recruitment process for staff of the National Assembly is to be based on merit. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter III of this report)
i) (Consider adopting) Adopt, through the appropriate legislative and/or administrative procedures, provisions which provide for require the publication of staff vacancies that arise in the National Assembly. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter III of this report)
j) (Consider adopting) Adopt, through the respective legal and/or administrative procedures and in keeping with the principle of due process, provisions for the establishment of administrative challenge mechanisms to clarify, modify or revoke substantial acts that are part of the recruitment and selection procedures for the National Assembly, ensuring a timely, objective, impartial, and effective procedure. (See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter II of this report)
k) Consider (reconciling) breaking down the results provided by the Ombudsman on complaints received and their resolution, in order to indicate how many of those complaints were based on challenges to the government hiring and selection process. (See Section 1.1.3 of Chapter III of this report)
2. Government Systems for the Procurement of Goods and Services
Belize has considered and adopted measures intended to establish, maintain and strengthen the systems for government procurement of goods and services, as discussed in Section 1.2 of Chapter II of this report.
In light of the comments made in the above-noted section, the Committee makes the following recommendation to Belize:
Belize respectfully requests that these recommendations reviewed in light of the clarifications provided by the country in this regard.
Also, Belize wishes to concur with Trinidad and Tobago in the adoption of more neutral terminology such as consider strengthening, consider adopting, consider reviewing, etc.
- Strengthen the government systems for the procurement of goods and services. In meeting this recommendation, Belize could take the following measures into account:
a) Ensure that procurement activity that is carried out in the judicial and legislative branches of Government, is covered by the provisions of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005.
b) (Consider adopting) Implement provisions which establish objective selection factors(consider deleting this) criteria in the (final selection) evaluation of bids (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
c) Review Section 20 (3) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005, in order to ensure that in those instances where limited tendering is used, that the government sees to it that there are an adequate number of potential suppliers to ensure competition, as required by Section 20(1) thereof. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
Consider reviewing Section 20(3) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005 to ensure that in instances where limited tendering is used, an adequate number of potential suppliers is included on the list that would encourage competition as is required by Section 20(1) of the Act.
d) Implement provisions which provide examples of what type of situations would give rise to the use of the limited tendering procedure, in respect of “extreme urgency” or the “public interest”, as used in Sections 21(1)(d) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005; and “national emergency”, as used in (21)(1)(h)(i) of the same law. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
Consider the adoption within the legislation of the meaning of “extreme urgency” or “public interest” as is used in Sections 21(1)(d) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005; and “national emergency”, as is used in Section 21(1)(h)(i) of the Act. The inclusion of such meanings within the Act would clarify the circumstances under which the limited tendering procedure could be used in these instances.
e) (Consider the adoption of) Implement(delete) provisions which clarify what is meant by day-to-day operations of government, as used in Section 21(1)(h)(ii) of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act of 2005, in order to ensure that goods and services related to recurring expenses are procured competitively, where appropriate. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
f) (Consider the adoption of) Implement(delete) provisions which provide clear selection procedures where the limited tendering procedure is used, and which also require a written justification for the use of this procurement method. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
g) (Consider the adoption of) Implement(delete) provisions which require publication of tender opportunities, including the conditions for participation therein, and the time, method and place for the submission of bids. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
h) Study the possibility of publishing, when appropriate, pre-bidding terms and conditions so that interested parties can find out about them and submit comments thereon. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
i) Develop and implement electronic procurement systems, so that (goods and services may be acquired) the acquisition of goods and services may be carried out(delete) through those means. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
j) Strengthen and increase the scope of use of electronic forms of communication, such as the internet, for publicizing the tender and consulting opportunities, status of bids and awards and the progress in the execution of major projects. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
k) (Consider the advisability of establishing) Establish(delete) a national registry of contractors of goods and services, (for) of mandatory(delete) use by all State bodies. (Consideration should be given to the inclusion within the registry of) which contemplates the possibility of ensuring that the registry also include(delete) a list of sanctioned contractors, in order to foster the principles of openness, equity and efficiency provided for in the Convention. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
l) (Consider the adoption of) Implement(delete) provisions that (would) require prior(delete) planning sufficiently in advance of the launch of the procurement process. (Such provisions would include) as (delete) the preparation of studies, designs and technical evaluations, and (assessment of) to assess (delete) the timeliness of the purchase. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
m) (Consider the adoption of) Implement(delete) provisions that would facilitate the participation of citizen oversight mechanisms in monitoring the execution of contracts where their nature, importance, or magnitude so warrants. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
n) (Consider the adoption of) Implement(delete) provisions which (would enable) regulate(delete), in keeping with the principle of(delete), subject to due process, administrative challenges to mechanisms relating to the substantive acts of(delete) the tendering process, such as the basis for the tender or bid, the rejection of bidders, and the designation of the winner. Such administrative challenges should be which are(delete) designed to clarify, modify, or revoke such acts. (See Section 1.2.2 of Chapter III of this report)
Guyana comment: add a new clause (o) with reference to an amendment to the Finance and Audit Act that stipulates which is/are the body/ies which evaluate/assess the tenders and make the awards. A further amendment to define in the definitions section of the Act which agencies are referred to when it states “the Government” or whether this means the Cabinet or some other level of government.
Belize respectfully disagrees with Guyana that these terms need defining.
2. SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING PUBLIC SERVANTS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS WHO IN GOOD FAITH REPORT ACTS OF CORRUPTION (ARTICLE III (8) OF THE CONVENTION)
Belize has considered and adopted certain measures intended to establish, maintain and strengthen systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who in good faith report acts of corruption, as discussed in Section 2 of Chapter II of this report.
In light of the comments made in the above-noted section, the Committee suggests that Belize consider the following recommendation:
- Adopt a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that provides protection for public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of their identities, in accordance with its Constitution and the basic principles of its domestic legal system (See section 2.2 in Chapter II of this Report).
In meeting this recommendation, Belize could take into account the following measures:
a) Protection for persons who report acts of corruption pending subject to(delete) investigation into administrative or judicial proceedings; (This appears to be unclear)
b) Protection of whistleblowers and their families, not only in relation to their physical integrity but also as it concerns the workplace, especially when the person is a public official and the acts of corruption involve superiors or co-workers;
c) Expand the existing mechanisms for reporting such as(delete) to anonymous reporting or to the protection of the identity of the person reporting. Such mechanisms should that(delete) guarantee the personal security of the person and the confidentiality of the identity of public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption;
d) The creation of mechanisms to report any threats or reprisals against whistleblowers, stating the appropriate authorities to process protection requests and the bodies responsible for providing it;
e) Witness protection mechanisms that offer witnesses the same guarantees as public servants and private citizens;
f) Mechanisms to facilitate international cooperation on the foregoing matters, when appropriate, including the technical assistance and cooperation provided for by the Convention, as well as the exchanges of experiences, training, and mutual assistance.
g) A simple whistleblower protection application process.
h) Provisions, which provide for administrative and criminal sanctions for the failure to observe the rules and/or duties relating to protection.
i) Provisions that clearly delineate the respective competence of judicial and administrative authorities with respect to this area.
3. ACTS OF CORRUPTION (ARTICLE VI(1) OF THE CONVENTION)
Belize has adopted measures which criminalize the acts of corruption provided for by Article VI(1) of the Convention, as discussed in Section 3 of Chapter II of this Report.
In light of the comments made in the above-noted section, the Committee suggests that Belize consider the following recommendations:
3.1. Review Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, so as to make it more fully consistent with Article VI(1)(a) of the Convention, by:
a) Incorporating therein, the element of “directly or indirectly”. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
b) Eliminate the requirement that the solicitation or receipt be done “corruptly”. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
2. Review Section 26(b) and 27(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, so as to make it more fully consistent with Article VI(1)(a) of the Convention, by incorporating therein, the element of “directly or indirectly”. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
3. Review Section 3(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, Re 2003, so as to make it more fully consistent with Article VI(1)(a) of the Convention, by:
a) Incorporating therein, the element of “directly or indirectly”. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
b) Eliminate the requirement that the giving, promising, or offering, be done “corruptly”. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
4. Review Section 26(a) and 27(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, so as to make it
more fully consistent with Article VI(1)(a) of the Convention, by incorporating therein, the element of “directly or indirectly”.. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
5. Review Section 1(c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Prevention of Corruption Act,
2007, by incorporating therein, the element of “a person who performs public functions”. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
6. Implement provisions which criminalize the fraudulent use or concealment of the proceeds
of the acts of corruption criminalized by the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, Re 2003. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
7. Implement provisions which criminalize the various forms of participating in the crimes
criminalized by the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, Re 2003, as well as the attempted commission of or conspiracies to commit those offences. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
(Could Belize indicate whether or not it already has in its laws separate legislation that addresses aiding and abetting, attempts to commit a crime and conspiracy? If this is so, this recommendation may have to be revisited. If the existing law relates only to 2007 Act then the recommendation is appropriate.)
Title IV of our Criminal Code addresses this matter.
8. Consider the convenience of harmonizing the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, Re 2003, with those of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007. (See Section 3.2. of Chapter II of this Report).
4. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the review and comments made throughout this report, the Committee suggests that Belize consider the following recommendations:
4.1 Design and implement, when appropriate, training programs for public servants responsible for implementing the systems, provisions, measures, and mechanisms considered in this report, for the purpose of ensuring that they are adequately known, managed, and implemented.
4.2. Select and develop procedures and indicators, when appropriate and where they do not yet exist, to analyze the results of the systems, provisions, measures, and mechanisms considered in this report, and to verify follow-up on the recommendations made herein.
5. FOLLOW-UP
The Committee will consider the periodic update Reports submitted by Belize on its progress in implementing previous recommendations, within the framework of the plenary meetings of the Committee and in accordance with Article 31 of the Rules of Procedure and Other Provisions.
Similarly, the Committee will review the progress of Belize in implementing the recommendations made in this Report, in accordance with Article 29 of the Rules of Procedure and Other Provisions.
IV. OBSERVATIONS IN RELATION TO THE PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED IN THE REPORT FROM THE FIRST ROUND
Based on the information made available to the Committee on the implementation of the recommendations formulated for Belize in the Report in the First Round of Review, the Committee observes the following:
1. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND MECHANISMS TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE (ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THE CONVENTION)
1.1. Standards of conduct intended to prevent conflicts of interest and enforcement mechanisms
Recommendation 1.1:
Consider strengthening the implementation of the provisions on conflicts of interest, and ensure that the laws on this matter are applicable to all public officials and employees, so as to permit the practical and effective application of a public ethics system.
Measures suggested by the Committee:
Establish a standard for addressing the conflicts that can occur between individual specific government matters in which those persons that perform public functions would be expected to act as part of their responsibilities and an official’s or family member’s financial interests or his outside activities or negotiations for future private employment arrangements. Such a standard could include recusal, request by the person that performs public functions for permission to continue to act, request by the official for a transfer of duties (if appropriate), or direction by an appropriate authority for divestiture/resignation when the conflict is pervasive.
Establish suitable restrictions for persons who leave public service, such as prohibitions on participation as a representative of a private interest in ongoing specific matters in which they had participated in an official capacity, or for a reasonable time, restrictions on dealing with former government body in which they served.
In its response,[?] Belize presents information with respect to the foregoing recommendation. In this regard, the Committee notes, as steps, which contribute to progress in implementation of the recommendation, the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 2007.
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to pay further attention to the implementation of measures (a) and (b) of the foregoing recommendation.
1.2. Standards of conduct to ensure the proper conservation and use of resources entrusted to government officials in the performance of their functions and enforcement mechanisms
Recommendation 1.2:
Strengthen implementation of laws and regulatory systems on the proper conservation and use of public resources. `
In its response,[?] Belize presents information with respect to the foregoing recommendation. In this regard, the Committee notes, as steps, which contribute to progress in implementation of the recommendation, the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 2007.
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the satisfactory consideration of the foregoing recommendation.
1.3. Standards of conduct and mechanisms concerning measures and systems requiring government officials to report to appropriate authorities acts of corruption in the performance of public functions of which they are aware
Recommendation 1.3:
Develop and strengthen mechanisms requiring public officials to report to appropriate authorities acts of corruption in the performance of public functions of which they are aware.
Measures suggested by the Committee:
a. Establish standards and mechanisms that require public servants to report to appropriate authorities, acts of corruption in the performance of public functions of which they are aware. This should be complemented by measures that protect public servants who report acts of corruption in good faith.
b. Facilitate compliance with this obligation by such measures as it deems appropriate.
In its response,[?] Belize presents information with respect to the foregoing recommendation. In this regard, the Committee notes, as steps which contribute to progress in implementation of the recommendation, the measures taken with regard to the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 2007, which, as noted by the country under review provides, inter-alia, the following:
- “ to provide for the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption and corruption activities; to provide for the offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt activities; to provide for investigative measures in respect of corruption and related corrupt activities; to provide measures for establishing probity, integrity and accountability in public life…”[?]
- “Section 30(2) of the Act requires any person who knows, reasonably suspects or ought to have reasonably known or suspected that any person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under this act, or the offence of bribery, to disclose it as soon as is reasonably practicable…”
- Section 31(1) of the Act “makes the failure to comply with the disclosure requirements in s. 30an offence which attracts a fine of not less than ten thousand dollars (BZ$10,000.00) or imprisonment of up to one year.”[?]
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the satisfactory consideration by the country under review of the foregoing recommendation.
2. SYSTEMS FOR REGISTRATION OF INCOME, ASSETS, AND LIABILITIES (ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE CONVENTION)
Recommendation:
Consider strengthening the systems for registering income, assets, and liabilities.
Measures suggested by the Committee:
a. Consider taking necessary steps to enforce the current financial declaration requirements for those to whom the Prevention of Corruption in Public Life Act law currently applies, including implementing penalties for those who fail to file and establishing penalties for late filing.
b. Identify positions not currently covered by the Act which have duties where the potential for conflict of interest is substantial and require the individuals holding those positions to file financial declarations.
c. Use the financial declarations not only to detect actual violations of law and conflicts of interest, but to also serve as a basis for providing counseling on the prevention of conflicts of interest.
d. Consider making the reports public, were appropriate.
In its response,[?] Belize presents information with respect to the foregoing recommendation. In this regard, the Committee notes, as steps which contribute to progress in implementation of the recommendation, the measures taken with regard to the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 2007, which, as noted by the country under review, provides, inter-alia, the following:
With respect to measure (a):
- “…requires persons in public life, namely Members of the House of Representatives (including the Speaker), Members of the Senate (including the President), and Members of the Town and City Councils to file sworn declarations of assets, income and liabilities of him/herself, his, her spouse, children and agents in the manner prescribed by the Act.”[?]
- “Failure to file a declaration or to provide further particulars to the Commission or the Tribunal may attract a fine of not less than three thousand dollars on a first offence, and a fine of not less than five thousand dollars and/or imprisonment for one year on a second and subsequent offence. In addition, such offenders will be liable to pay the Commission an administrative fine of one hundred dollars for each day that the declaration or explanation remains outstanding.”[?]
- “The Act also creates the offence of filing false declarations, which attracts a fine of between one and five thousand dollars and/or imprisonment for six months.”[?]
With respect to measure (b):
- “The POCA makes provisions for the National Assembly to extend the application of this Act to any public servant of class of public servants…”[?]
With respect to measure (c):
- “The Act makes provisions for the reports on the enquiries of the Commission to be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions (“the DPP”) and to the Attorney General. If the DPP is satisfied that the evidence before him is sufficient to substantiate the commission of an offence under the act, he may institute criminal proceedings against such person. Where the person suspected of the commission of an offence is the DPP, the Attorney General may institute proceedings against him.”[?]
With respect to measure (d):
- “Pursuant to s. 12 of the POCA, the Commission is required to examine all financial declarations submitted by declarants and to publish Certificates of Declaration in the Gazette, if satisfied that the declarations have been fully made.”[?]
The Committee takes note of the satisfactory consideration by Belize of measures (a) and (b) of the foregoing recommendation, as well as of the steps taken towards compliance with measures (c) and (d), and of the need for the country under review to give further attention thereto.
3. OVERSIGHT BODIES FOR THE SELECTED PROVISIONS (ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPHS 1, 2, 4 AND 11, OF THE CONVENTION)
Recommendation:
Strengthen, and when appropriate create, oversight bodies in particular in the area of functions to enforce compliance with the matters covered by the provisions of Article III, paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 11 of the Convention; provide them with the necessary resources to enable them to carry out their functions in full; and establish mechanisms necessary to permit effective institutional coordination, as well as periodic evaluation and monitoring, of the measures they adopt.
In its response,[?] Belize presents information with respect to the foregoing recommendation. In this regard, the Committee notes, as steps which contribute to progress in implementation of the recommendation, the following:
- The Prevention in Corruption Act, 2007, which expands upon the powers of the Integrity Commission, which, according to the response of Belize, “…is given much wider powers that it had under its predecessor Act. As mentioned above, the Commission is now empowered to examine declarations, request further info in respect thereof, and enquire into declarations, and in so doing may advise the Governor General to appoint a Tribunal to carry out that enquiry…Further, to secure the financial stability of the Commission, the Act requires that the Secretariat submit the necessary budget estimates of the Commission each year to the Prime Minister, who shall include these sums in the budget for that year.”[?]
In light of the foregoing information, the Committee takes note of the steps taken by Belize to comply with this recommendation, as well as of the need for Belize to give additional attention to tits implementation.
4. MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE THE PARTICIPATION BY CIVIL SOCIETY AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EFFORTS TO PREVENT CORRUPTION (ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE CONVENTION)
4.1. General participation mechanisms
Consider whether the recommendations related to specific mechanisms referred to below indicate a need for Belize to strengthen its general approach to encouraging civil society and nongovernmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption.
4.2. Mechanisms for access to information
Recommendation:
Strengthen the mechanisms on access to information.
Measures suggested by the Committee:
a. Conduct a comprehensive review of the rules and regulations that provide exceptions to the right of access to public information, in order to ensure that they do not obstruct the exercise of the right to information as an effective mechanism in efforts against corruption, in accordance with the observations in section 4.2.2 of this report.
b. Strengthen systems that ensure public access, as appropriate, to information on public administration bodies and their program-related and financial activities, in particular as regards those bodies concerned with the issues covered in this report; and improve, where possible, the use of modern technologies to that effect
c. Carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the use and effectiveness of mechanisms for access to information, and, based on the results of that evaluation, consider the adoption of measures to promote, facilitate, and consolidate the effectiveness of these mechanisms.
In its response,[?] Belize notes in pertinent part as follows with respect to the implementation of the foregoing recommendation, “The general difficulty with respect to the recommendation of the honourable Committee of Experts on this matter is the complexity of engaging in comprehensive reviews and evaluations of systems, legislation and mechanisms. Some of these complexities are posed by the time-frame required to successfully carry out such evaluations, as well as the extremely limited resources, including financial and human, with which small countries like ours operate under. In light thereof, Belize humbly requests the Committee to consider removing these recommendations.
With regard to paragraph (b) in this section, information can be accessed from the website .bz in which reports from the Office of Governance are posted.”
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the satisfactory consideration by Belize of measure (b) of this recommendation, notwithstanding the fact, that because it is of a continuous nature, it should continue to be developed. In addition, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of measures (a) and (c) of this recommendation.
4.3. Mechanisms for consultation
Recommendation:
Strengthen existing mechanisms and consider creating other ones as part of their efforts to combat corruption.
Measures suggested by the Committee:
a. Strengthen consultation mechanisms to enable civil society and nongovernmental organizations to generate opinions and proposals to be taken into account in preventing, detecting, investigating, and punishing corruption.
b. Design and implement programs to publicize consultation mechanisms and, as appropriate, provide training and instruments to officials necessary for effective implementation of those mechanisms.
In its response,[?] Belize presents information with respect to the foregoing recommendation. In this
regard, the Committee notes, as steps which contribute to progress in implementation of the recommendation, the measures taken with respect to:
- The Human Resources Development Committee, created in June, 2006, and which is charged with providing transparency and development of human resources in the Public Service, and whose functions include, inter-alia, “…advising the Minister of the Public Service on policy goals and strategies regarding training and development of human resources in the Public Service as well as on the priority of training needs and scholarship programs, and to ensure the development, implementation and monitoring of human resource policy and strategy for the Public Service.”[?]
- The Council on Good Governance and Public Service Modernization, established in June, 2006, and the responsibilities of which, include, inter-alia, “making recommendations on good governance initiatives; providing guidance in the implementation of improvement initiatives in public sector administration; serving as a forum for interface between the Government of Belize and its social partners for the sharing of ideas and information arising from modernization and governance endeavors; and making recommendations on modernization initiatives to improve service delivery and enhance structures. Members of this Committee are persons of integrity and leaders from the public, private and social sectors.” [?]
- The Joint Staff Advisory Council, which “advises on matters of human resource development and management and among its duties is seeking improved conditions of work for public officers.”[?]
- In addition, Belize notes that “The membership of each of the above-mentioned Committees include the Chief Executive Officers and Heads of Department of key Ministries and of the Financial Secretary.”[?]
In light of the foregoing information, the Committee takes note of the satisfactory consideration by Belize of measures (b) above, notwithstanding the fact that, because they are of a continuous nature, it should continue to be developed. In addition, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give additional attention to the implementation of measure (a) of the foregoing recommendation.
4.4. Mechanisms to encourage participation in public administration
Recommendation:
Implement mechanisms to encourage civil society and nongovernmental organizations to participate in public administration.
Measures suggested by the Committee:
a. Develop standards and procedures to establish, maintain and strengthen mechanisms to encourage participation by civil society and nongovernmental organizations in public administration as part of the efforts to prevent corruption
b. Promote public awareness of available corruption prevention mechanisms.
In its response,[?] Belize provides information with respect to the foregoing recommendation, referring to the response that it provided to recommendation 4.3(a), above.[?]
In addition, Belize points to the creation of .bz.[?]
In light of the foregoing information, the Committee takes note of the satisfactory consideration by Belize of measure (b), above, notwithstanding the fact that, because it is of a continuous nature, it should continue to be developed. In addition, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of measure (a) of this recommendation.
4.5. Mechanisms for participation in the follow-up of public administration
Recommendation:
Implement mechanisms to encourage civil society and nongovernmental organizations to participate in public administration.
Measures suggested by the Committee:
a. Promote, where appropriate, methods to facilitate civil society and non-governmental organizations’ efforts to engage in activities in the follow up of public administration and prevention of corruption.
b. Design and implement specific programs to publicize mechanisms to encourage participation in follow-up on public administration and, as appropriate, provide the necessary training and tools to public officials for the effective implementation of those mechanisms.
In its response,[?] Belize provides information with respect to the foregoing recommendation, as follows:
- “As reported in the Report of Belize on the implementation of the Convention in the first evaluation round, such mechanisms are already in place at the highest level of governance in this country – civil society has membership in the composition of the Senate, the Upper House of the National Assembly. Additionally, the Bill referred to in Section 3 of this Report entitled “Oversight Bodies for the Selected Provisions” seeks to increase the number of Senators from twelve to thirteen, to provide for a representative from the non-governmental organizations. This will have the effect of effectively removing the majority (of members) in the Senate from the Government representatives to the Opposition and Civil Society. Again, this proposed amendment is viewed by the general public as a positive change and one which will promote transparency and accountability.”
With respect to the composition of the Senate transcribed above, the Committee notes that this refers to standards that were in place prior to the date of the Report from the First Round. In addition, with respect to the existence of the draft bill referred to above, the Committee considers that it can be examined once it becomes law. Accordingly, the Committee notes the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of measure (a) of the foregoing recommendation.
In addition, the Committee notes that in its response, Belize does not refer to any steps taken with respect to measure (b) of this recommendation, and the Committee accordingly takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to its implementation.
5. ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION (ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONVENTION)
Recommendation 5.1:
Design and implement a comprehensive program of dissemination and training specifically geared to the competent authorities and officials, to ensure they are familiar with and can apply the provisions in force on mutual legal assistance for investigation and prosecution of acts of corruption in the Convention and in other treaties signed by Belize.
In its response,[?] Belize notes in pertinent part as follows with respect to the implementation of the foregoing recommendation, “Belize has not developed specific comprehensive programs to train its competent authorities and officials on the implementation of the country’s mutual legal assistance obligations with regard to investigative and prosecution of acts of corruption. However, the country and its officials have benefitted from several training opportunities under the auspices of relevant international organizations which have been held at home and abroad.”
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of this recommendation.
Recommendation 5.2:
Identify and ascribe priority to specific areas in which it deems it could need or it could be useful for it to receive technical cooperation from other States Parties in order to further strengthen its capacity to prevent, detect, investigate and punish corruption.
In its response,[?] Belize notes as follows with respect to the implementation of the foregoing recommendation, “Needless to say, the country recognizes that it is in need of further training of its competent authorities and officials for a more effective collaboration with its counterparts. Training in the investigative field and exchange of information on best practices are a priority.”
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of this recommendation.
Recommendation 5.3:
Strengthen efforts to exchange technical cooperation with other States Parties on the most effective ways and means to prevent, detect, investigate, and punish corruption.
In its response,[?] Belize notes as follows with respect to the implementation of the foregoing recommendation, “Belize accepts the importance of this recommendation and is engaged in identifying the most effective ‘best practices’ regarding prevention; detection; investigation and punishment of corruption from within and from its counterparts in other countries, which it hopes, will greatly assist the country’s zero tolerance policy with respect to corruption and corrupt practices.”
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of this recommendation.
6. CENTRAL AUTHORITIES (ARTICLE XVIII OF THE CONVENTION)
Recommendation 6.1:
Formalize the designation of the Solicitor General as the Central Authority provided for in Article XCIII of the Convention for the purposes of international assistance and cooperation envisaged in that treaty, and communicate that designation to the Secretariat of the OAS in accordance with the procedures provided to that end.
In its response,[?] Belize presents the following information with respect to the forgoing recommendation:
“A decision on the matter will be forthcoming in the very near future since one view is that the Attorney General be designated as the Central Authority for Belize for the purposes of international assistance and cooperation anticipated in the present Convention. The Attorney General is the designated Central Authority under the Treaty with the United States of America and under the CARICOM Treaty, which are the most recent.
As soon as the matter is resolved, it shall be duly communicated to the Secretariat of the OAS.”
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of this recommendation.
Recommendation 6.2:
Ensure that said authority has sufficient resources to enable it to carry out its functions.
In its response,[?] Belize presents the following information with respect to the forgoing recommendation:
“This is one of the special considerations weighing in the final determination of the matter regarding the Central Authority discussed above. In practice, however, the requests for legal assistance from other countries have been addressed by the Attorney General’s Ministry with its existing staff and budget.”
In light of the foregoing, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to the implementation of this recommendation.
7. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 7.1:
Design and implement, when appropriate, training programs for public servants in charge of applying the systems, standards, measures and mechanisms considered in this report, with the objective of assuring adequate knowledge, handling, and implantation of the above.
Recommendation 7.2:
Select and develop procedures and indicators, as appropriate, that enable verification of the follow-up to the recommendations contained in this report, and communicate the results of this follow-up to the Committee through the Technical Secretariat. With this in mind, it may take into account the list of more general indicators applicable within the Inter-American system that were available for the selection indicated by the State under review and posted on the OAS website by the Technical Secretariat of the Committee; as well, consider information derived from the review of the mechanisms developed in accordance with recommendation 7.3 below.
Recommendation 7.3:
Develop, as appropriate and where they do not yet exist, procedures designed to analyze the mechanisms mentioned in this report, and the recommendations contained in it.
The Committee notes that the response of Belize does not refer to any specific steps taken with respect to the implementation of the three foregoing recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee takes note of the need for Belize to give further attention to their implementation.
END NOTES
[1] This draft preliminary report was prepared in accordance with the provisions of Articles 23 (a), 27 and 29 of the Committee's Rules of Procedure (SG/MESICIC/doc. 9/04 rev. 3), as well as the methodology for reviewing implementation of the Convention provisions selected in the framework of the Second Round (SG/MESICIC/doc. 171/06 rev.2) and the format for country reports (SG/MESICIC/doc. 173/06 rev. 1), which the Committee adopted at its Ninth Meeting, held at OAS headquarters in Washington DC from March 27 to 31, 2006.
[2] Pursuant to Section 110.F(2), the term “judicial and legal service” means “service in the Departments of Offices of the General Registry of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, Magistracy, Chief Parliamentary Counsel, Law Revision, Family Courts, Director of Public Prosecutions and Solicitor General.”
[3] Section 110.C of the Constitution established the Security Services Commission. Pursuant to Section 110.D(2), the term “security service”, means service in the Belize Police Department and in the military service.
[4] Regulation 2(1) of the Public Service Regulations, defines the term “public service”, as “service in a civil capacity in respect of the Government.”
[5] Section 107 (1) of the Belize Constitution provides that this section applies to the offices of “Financial Secretary, Deputy Financial Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet, Solicitor General, Permanent Secretary, head of a department of Government, Commissioner of Police, Director, Security and Intelligence Service, Commandant, Belize Defence Force, Ambassador, High Commissioner or principal representative of Belize in any other country or accredited to any international organization and, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, any other office designated by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Public Services Commission.”
[6] In this regard, a Disciplinary Procedures Manual for the Belize Public Service was published in July 2002 and it lists the purpose of the Manual, Codes of Practice on Disciplinary Procedures, Review and Appeals, and Offences and Penalties.
[7] Regulation 2(1) also defines “public office” as “any office of emolument in the Public Service”; and “public officer” as “a person holding or acting in any public office and the word ‘officer’ shall be construed accordingly.”
[8] Section 110.B of the Belize Constitution refers to the appointment of persons in the Prison Service.
[9] Section 107 of the Belize Constitution refers to appointment of Financial Secretary, Deputy Financial Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet, Solicitor General, Permanent Secretary, head of a department of Government, Commissioner of Police, Director, Security and Intelligence Service, Comandant, Belize Defence Force, Ambassador, High Commissioner, and other principal representatives of Belize in any country or accredited to any international organization.
Sections 108 and 109 of the Belize Constitution refer to the appointment of the Director or Public Prosecutions and the Auditor General, respectively.
[10] See Part 56 of the Supreme Court Rules of 2005 is available at .
[11] Response of Belize to the Questionnaire for the Second Round, at p. 5.
[12] Response of Belize to the Questionnaire for the Second Round, at p. 6.
[13] The Ombudsman’s Report Committee is established under Order 72 (1)(m) of the Belize Constitution (House of Representatives) Standing Orders, Chapter 4 of the Subsidiary Laws of Belize, R.E. 2000 and can be found at as Chapter 4S.
[14] As of September 10, 2008, $1 U.S. Dollar was equivalent to approximately $1.99 Belize Dollars.
[15] See Section 2 of the Interpretation section of the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Chapter 6 of the Laws of Belize, Revised Edition 2000-2003. Available at: .
[18] Chapter 4 of the Subsidiary Laws of Belize, R.E. 2000
[19] See Order 74 (1) (11) of the Belize Constitution (House of Representatives) Standing Orders.
[20] Chapter 6 of the Laws of Belize, Revised Edition 2000-2003. Available at: .
[21] Available at: .
[22] Response of Belize to the Questionnaire for the Second Round, at p. 9.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid, at p. 10.
[25] Section 30 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, provides in pertinent part:
“(1) A person exercising any public function who is offered or receives an advantage in circumstances which may constitute an offence under this Act, or the offence of bribery, shall disclose as reasonably practicable and in the prescribed manner
a) the existence of nature of the advantage, or the offer of it; and
b) the name, if known, of the person to whom it was given or procured or offered or who agreed to give or procure it.
(2) A person exercising any public function who knows or reasonably suspects, or ought to have known or reasonably to have suspected, that any person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under this Act, or the offence of bribery, must disclose, as soon as reasonably practicable and in the prescribed manner, that knowledge or suspicion, and the information on which it is based, or cause such knowledge or suspicion to be so disclosed.”
[26] The Crime Stoppers Belize program was founded in 2004 by the Rotary Club of Belize, with the collaborative support of the Rotary Club of Belmopan, Rotary Club of San Ignacio, the civic leaders, the media, and the law enforcement officials.
[27] See the Response of Belize to the Questionnaire for the Second Round, at p. 10. See also,
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid, at p. 13.
[30] Pursuant to Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, the term “advantage” includes: “(a) any office, employment, or contract; (b) the exercise or forbearance from the exercise of any right or any power or duty; (c) any aid, vote, consent or influence, or pretended aid, vote, consent or influence; (d) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, whether in whole or in part; (e) any gift, loan, fee, reward or commission consisting of money or of any valuable security or of other property or interest in property of any description; (f) any other service, or favor (other than entertainment), including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not already instituted; (g) any offer, undertaking or promise, whether conditional or unconditional, of any advantage within the meaning of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f).”
[31] Pursuant to Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, the term “consideration”, includes “valuable consideration of any kind”.
[32] Pursuant to Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 105 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, RE 2003, the phrase “agent”, means “any person employed by or acting for another and any person serving under the Government or any public body.”
[33] Pursuant to Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, the phrase “advantage” includes “(a) money or any donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property of any description, whether movable or immovable, over a value of $2,500.00; (b) the avoidance of a loss, liability, penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other disadvantage; (c) any office, dignity, employment, contract of employment or services and any agreement to give employment or render services in any capacity; (d) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, whether in whole or in part; (e) any valuable consideration or benefit of any kind or any discount, commission, rebate, bonus, deduction or percentage over a value of $2,500.00; (f) any forbearance to demand any money or money’s worth or valuable thing; (g) any service or favor or advantage of any description, including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not already instituted, and includes the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of any right or any official power or duty; (h) any right or privilege; (i) any aid, vote, consent or influence or pretended aid, vote, consent or influence; (j) any offer, undertaking or promise, whether conditional or unconditional, of any advantage within the meaning of paragraphs (a) to (i).”
[34] See footnote 24, supra.
[35] Ibid.
[36] See note 23, supra.
[37] Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, provides that the phrase “public servant”, includes “the Governor General, members of the National Assembly, members of the Belize Advisory Council, members of the Public Services Commission, members of Elections and Boundaries Commissions, public officers, members and officers of statutory corporations and government agencies, and members and employees of all public bodies, including local authorities.”
[38] See footnote 24, supra.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Pursuant to Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, the phrase “agent”, includes “any person employed by or acting for another, any trustee of an insolvent estate, the assignee of an estate assigned for the benefit or with the consent of creditors, the liquidator of a company that is being wound up, the executor of the estate of a deceased person, the legal representative of any person who is of unsound mind or is a minor or is otherwise under disability, any public servant or an officer serving in or under or acting for any public body, a trustee, an administrator or a subcontractor and any person appointed as an agent in terms of any law.”
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] See the Response of Belize to the Questionnaire for the Second Round, at p. 13.
[46] See the Report of Belize on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Committee of Experts in the First Round, at pp. 1-2.
[47] Ibid, at pp. 3-5.
[48] Ibid, at pp. 5-7
[49] Ibid, at p. 5.
[50] Ibid, at p. 6.
[51] Ibid, at pp. 7-9.
[52] Ibid, at p. 7.
[53] Ibid, at p. 8.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid, at p. 9.
[58] Ibid, at pp. 9-13.
[59] Ibid, at p. 10.
[60] Ibid, at pp. 14-15.
[61] Ibid, at pp. 15-16.
[62] Ibid, at p. 15.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] This response refers to the Human Resource Development Committee, the Council on Good Governance and Public Sector Modernization, and the Joint Staff Relations Council.
[68] See the Report of Belize on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Committee of Experts in the First Round, at p. 16.
[69] Ibid, at pp. 16-17.
[70] Ibid, at pp. 17-18.
[71] Ibid, at p. 18.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid, at pp. 18-19.
[74] Ibid, at p. 19.
[i] Regulation 2(2) provides that “For the purposes of these Regulations (a) reference to an office in the Public Service shall be construed as including officers on the Governor-General’s personal staff; (b) a reference to an office in the Public Service shall not be construed as including references to the offices of the Prime Minister or other Ministers, Ministers of State, Speaker or Deputy Speaker or member of the House of Representatives, President or Vice President or Senator, member of the Belize Advisory Council, or any Commission established under the Constitution, or the Clerk, Deputy Clerk or staff of the National Assembly, or the Ombudsman or the Contractor-General; or (c) person shall not be regarded as holding a public office by reason only of the fact that he is in receipt of a pension or other like allowance in respect of service under the Government.”
[ii] The full text of Section 1 of Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2007, provides as follows: “A person commits an act of corruption if (a) he in the performance of his public functions does any act or omits to do any act for the purpose of obtaining any illicit benefit for himself or any other person; (b) he fraudulently uses or conceals any property or other benefit derived from any such act or omission to act under paragraph (a) or (b); (c) he offers or grants, directly or indirectly, to a public servant any article, money or other benefit being a gift, favour, promise or advantage to the public servant or another person, for doing any act or omitting to do any act in the performance of the public servant’s public functions; (d) he allows his private interest to conflict with his public duties or to improperly influence his conduct in the performance of his public duties; (e) he being a natural person or a corporation, either aggregate or sole, club, society or other body of one or more persons, offers or grants, directly or indirectly to a person performing a public function in a foreign State, any article or money or other benefit, being a gift, favour, promise or advantage in connection with any economic or commercial transaction for an act to be performed or omitted to be performed by that person in the performance of his public functions; (f) he illegally uses for his own benefit or that of a third party, any property (including money) belonging to the Government or any statutory body or any government company or any body providing public utilities to which he has access as a result of or in the course of, the performance of his functions; (g) he, for his own benefit or that of a third person, illegally diverts any property belonging to Government or any other person, which is in his custody for the due administration of his duties; (h) he acquires, or becomes a partner, associate or shareholder in, or a director of a firm or company which has a contract with the Government or with the public body of which such person is a member or employee unless the person makes a disclosure of such partnership, association, shareholding or other interest to the Commission;(i) he illegally uses official influence in support of any scheme, or in furtherance of any contract or proposed contract or other matter in regard to which he has an interest; (j) he or any other person, on his behalf, illegally acquires property or pecuniary resource disproportionate to his legitimate sources of incom]g Îães; (k) he instigates, aids, abets, or is an accessory after the fact or participates in whatsoever manner in the commission or attempted commission of or conspires to commit any act of corruption referred to in paragraphs (a) or (k).”
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