Part I - NYU Law
NYU Project on International GMO Regulatory Conflicts
Argentina, GM nation
Chances and choices in uncertain times
by Ana María Vara
Centro de Estudios de Historia de la Ciencia José Babini
Escuela de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional de General San Martín (UNSAM)
September, 2005
“I’ve always been a little uncomfortable about the term “Frankenstein food”. It smacks on both sensationalism and trivialization. In politics, as in shopping, the cheaper the device, the less likely it is to last. But the label is becoming even more germane. For not only are GM crops cobbled together out of bits of other organisms, but they have also begun to demonstrate a ghoulish ability to rise from the dead, given a sufficient application of power.”
George Monbiot[1]
“Sucede que en 1996 (un año antes de que el USDA decidiera destruir a los productores sudamericanos de soja por medio del incremento del precio sostén del LDP) las autoridades agrícolas y sanitarias de los Estados Unidos y de la Argentina autorizaron la comercialización de la soja tolerante a glifosato, que fue desarrollada por la compañía estadounidense Monsanto. Se trató de un hecho inédito: nunca un producto tecnológico tan complejo había sido adoptado con tanta rapidez por un país latinoamericano, casi simultáneamente con los Estados Unidos.
Los investigadores de la compañía de agroinsumos Monsanto jamás imaginaron que su innovación tecnológica terminaría desbaratando los planes del USDA.”
Ezequiel Tambornini[2]
Index
Acknowledgments 3
Main acronyms 4
Introduction. One crop, two wars (and a half) 5
Part I. How Argentina became a GM nation 15
A. The case of GM soybean: enthusiasm and controversy 18
B. The case of GM corn: hybrids and insurance 59
C. The case of GM cotton: corporate strategies 65
Discussion 70
Part II. Argentina’s biosafety system: an early development 76
A. The biosafety regulatory system 77
B. Field trials 109
C. Evaluations 113
Discussion 126
Part III. Argentina’s scientific capacity: some research, little transfer 130
A. Biotechnology projects 132
B. Regional cooperation and international evaluations 135
Discussion 138
Part IV. Argentina’s international position: science and trade 143
Discussion 150
Part V. Public perception: competing frames, shared delusions 153
A. What people (might) see 155 B. What (some) people have said 171
Discussion 194
General conclusions 198
Acknowledgments
This work could not have been done without the early precious help of the late Dorothy Nelkin. David Schleifer, Tomas Hilde, Toby Miller, Moisés Burachik, Janet Grice, Eduardo Ablin, Eduardo Trigo and Diego Hurtado de Mendoza generously shared ideas and information with me, providing insights into crucial points. Dick Stewart’s enthusiasm, support and critical comments have also been essential to improve this paper. My sincere thanks to them all. Any misinterpretation or mistake are mine.
A substantial portion of the research for this paper was conducted while on an Antorchas-Fulbright scholarship in 2003.
Main acronyms
AACREA Argentine Association of Regional Consortiums for Agricultural Experimentation (Asociación Argentina de Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación)
AAPRESID Argentine No Till Farmers Association (Asociación Argentina de Productores de Siembra Directa)
ARPOV Association for the Protection of Plant Varieties (Asociación Argentina de Protección de las Obtenciones Vegetales)
ASA Argentine Seed Growers Association (Asociación de Semilleros Argentinos)
BSP Cartagena BioSafety Protocol
CONABIA National Advisory Commission on Agricultural Biotechnology (Comisión Nacional Asesora de Biotecnología Agropecuaria)
CONASE National Seed Commission (Comisión Nacional de Semillas)
CONICET National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (Comisión Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas)
INASE National Institute of Seeds (Instituto Nacional de Semillas)
INTA National Institute of Agricultural Biotechnology (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria)
BO Biotechnology Office (Oficina de Biotecnología, SAGPyA)
SAGPyA Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación)
SAGyP Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca, predecessor of SAGPyA)
SENASA National Agrifood Health and Quality Service (Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agropecuaria)
UBA University of Buenos Aires (Universidad de Buenos Aires)
Introduction. One crop, two wars (and a half)
In the evening of September 25, 2003, after a phone talk with Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ Da Silva—who was abroad—vice-President José Alencar signed a decree that authorized farmers to plant genetically modified (GM) soybean for just one year.[3] For the second time in 2003, Da Silva’s administration took a supposedly one-time pragmatic decision to address the irregular situation of GM soybean in the Southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, where farmers had illegally been planting this crop at least since 1999, using seeds smuggled from Argentina.[4] A previous decree issued on March 26 allowed 2002-2003 GM soybean harvest to be sold for both animal and human consumption. It had to be labeled.[5]
The illegal soybean was estimated to represent around 80 percent of 2003 harvest in the state of Rio Grande do Sul: 5 to 10 million tones, or 10 to 20 per cent of Brazil’s 51-million-ton soybean harvest.[6] It was Monsanto’s RR soybean, a crop designed to be resistant to Roundup herbicide—the most successful and one of the most controversial GM crops.[7] The fact that it was illegal does not mean RR soybean had not been tested in Brazil: in fact, former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration had approved its commercial planting, after it was reviewed by CNTBio, the agency in charge of assessing biotechnological products. But this approval was blocked in court by a legal challenge from Greenpeace and a local consumer advocacy group.[8]
The new exceptional decree was advanced by Brazil’s pro-GM agriculture minister Roberto Rodrigues who said it was a means to prevent “civil disobedience,” in view of the fact that many gaúcho farmers already had the GM seeds. Da Silva’s administration was divided, since his environment minister, Marina Silva, opposes GM crops. Vice President Alencar resented having to sign the decree. [9]
The decision was considered by observers a “u-turn” by Da Silva, since his party—Workers’ Party, Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT—had had a strong position against GM crops before coming into office. [10] The Brazilian Green party, as well as Greenpeace Brazil and other non-governmental groups protested the decision, which they considered was taken due to “pressure from economic interests.” [11] Certainly, one of the greatest winners would be Monsanto, which could gain up to U$S 62 million a year, according to estimations. The company had already made huge investments in Brazil, setting seed plants and buying Brazilian seed companies.[12] According to Monsanto estimations in 2003, once definitively approved, RR soybean would account for 70 per cent of Brazilian harvest within a decade.[13] But Brazilian farmers—particularly, those from Rio Grande do Sul—were celebrating, too. They also sounded as if they were ready to defy the law: “Even if they hadn’t changed the law, we would have planted again anyway. What could they do, arrest 150,000 of us?,” commented Rafael Moreno, a gaúcho farmer who had been planting GM soybean smuggled from Argentina for four years.[14]
Considered “by far the most important development for GM crops in 2003” by Clive James, chairman of the International Association for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA),[15] Brazil’s new exceptional decree was received with mixed feelings in Argentina. “If we had no export tariff we would still be competitive before Brazil, but production of commodities in the wet pampas will have to compete strongly with Mato Grosso,” said Oscar Alvarado, an Argentine farmer who also commented he would plant 7,300 ha with soybean in Brazilian fields. But Argentina’s secretary of Agriculture Miguel Campos sounded much more optimistic: he talked about the creation of a hemispheric block in favor of biotechnology—integrated by the US, Brazil and Argentina—, and mentioned the possibility that soybean low cost might open the door for its use as a source of biodiesel.[16]
While pointing at the promising emergence of a pro-GM hemispheric block, Campos may have had in mind a crucial dossier written by two Argentine experts who work for the government—although the dossier itself was not official. [17] Issued in August 2001, it represented an assessment of Argentina’s position as a GM soybean exporter vis-à-vis Japan’s already enforced—and European’s expected—labeling requirements. Although prepared in such worrisome times, the dossier was very optimistic. It foresaw the possibility that “the evolution of Brazil’s position regarding transgenic crops”—that is, Brazil’s eventual adoption of GM crops—would make the global offer of GM soybean represent “almost two thirds of the total international market.” From that moment on, the authors commented, the presence of GM soybean in the international market would be “very close to reaching a critical mass to turn the soybean market into a virtually transgenic market.” They also concluded that the higher the proportion of GM soybean in the market, the lower would be the perturbations to its commercialization, “because the debate over transgenic crops would be relegated in face of the predominance of the offer.” The dossier closed with a remarkable statement, which could also be read as a call to action: “The goal now is to become a transgenic Americas.” [18]
But Brazil’s move was not only celebrated in Argentina. Monsanto also took note of the apparently irreversible path towards a world soybean market dominated by its RR soybean. And began to rally Brazil as well as Paraguay—where RR soybean had also been introduced illegally from Argentina—to collect the royalties it had been missing. It also began to rally Argentina demanding royalties for RR soybean, protesting in quite urging tones against the huge black market of seeds they had somewhat accepted until then.[19] Once the market was dominated, they seemed to have thought, it was time to collect, as we shall discuss in Part I.
For Argentina’s economy, any challenge to the world soybean trade is a very serious issue. Argentina is the second largest exporter of GM crops, mostly due to its extremely rapid adoption of RR soybean, which began in 1996. Soybean—in the form of whole beans, soy meal for animal feed, and soy oil—represented more than a fifth of Argentina’s exports in 2004: more than U$S 7,100 million, over U$S 31,491 million.[20] More importantly, it has played a key role after Argentina defaulted on its U$S 140 billion national debt in December 2001, and an enormous devaluation took place.[21] As an Argentine agriculture trader commented in 2003—the year of the beginning of the recovery: “the I.M.F. should be very happy with us. Without agribusiness and oil, Argentina would never meet the surplus they are demanding.” [22] That is why Brazil’s decision regarding RR soybean, interpreted as a crucial move toward a “virtually transgenic market,” was certainly very promising—even if it implied having to deal with certain undesirable consequences.
The problem with soybean world trade has to do essentially with Europe’s opposition to GM food, which reached a peak in 1999/2000, [23] and finally led to a new EU legislation. After years of consumer and environmental groups’ protests that convinced “the European biotech firms” to slow down their research in agriculture and focus on pharmaceuticals, [24] and after a de facto moratorium on new GM crops established in 1998 that US representatives claimed caused 300 million dollars in lost profits annually just in corn, the European Union introduced what some observers considered the “toughest” labeling law.[25] Not only does it allow a mere 0.9 percent adventitious presence of detectable approved GM ingredients not to be labeled—and just 0.5 of not approved GM ingredients—, but it also requires labeling products such as glucose syrup produced from GM corn or soybean oil from GM plants. Being essentially pure oil or pure sugar, these products do not contain “any measurable GM protein or DNA”—as the science magazine The Scientist then commented.[26]
According to observers, Greenpeace was “delighted” with the new European legislation.[27] “This will send a strong message to commodity exporting nations such as the USA, Canada, Argentina and Brazil. The times when you could sneak millions of tonnes of GM soybeans and maize unlabelled into the food chain are definitely over,” commented Lorenzo Consoli, from Greenpeace’s British office. [28] However, the possibility of deception remains open: the United Kingdom Food Standards Agency (FSA) said the rules are a “cheat’s charter,” since there are no means to detect if certain products come from GM crops—precisely because some products may not actually contain proteins or DNA. “We think the proposals will be unenforceable and impractical, and don’t represent a positive move in terms of consumer choice,” stated a FSA spokesperson.[29]
There is some opposition to GM crops in Argentina, but principally observers have pointed at the “lack of transparency” in Argentina’s situation regarding the issue: many Argentine consumers simply do not know that Argentine farmers are planting so much GM soybean, among other GM crops, as we shall see in Part V.
After the EU new legislation was announced in November 2002, the US threatened to file a case against the European Union at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the four year moratorium, a move that was strategically delayed due to the debate over the war on Iraq.[30] However, on May 13, 2003, before the new legislation was enforced—and even if, once in effect, it could have meant an end to the moratorium—, the US finally filed the case, together with Canada and Argentina—Egypt was initially in the move, too, but finally walked away. Nine more countries registered their support. “Some of these countries, probably not coincidentally, are keen to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with the United States,” commented The Economist.[31]
Commenting on the case in La Nación newspaper, an Argentine prestigious columnist drew attention to the fact that Argentina had not been affected by the moratorium, since it had been selling GM products to Europe during the 1990s. “[Argentina] could have preserved the niche, but it preferred to make clear the common strategic interests with the US and Canada.”[32] He was partially right and partially wrong: it is true that Argentina had routinely been selling unlabeled GM crops to Europe since 1998—mostly soybean meal and corn for feed. However, it is also true that the EU moratorium did affect its plans regarding GM crops: to preserve its European markets, Argentina’s policy was based on the idea that no GM food crop would be approved unless it was already approved in Europe. [33] But this policy has just changed: in March and August 2005, Argentina approved two GM corn events that may not be approved in the EU by 2006, when the grain would be ready to be exported, as we shall see in Part I.
To give further support to the case at the WTO, on May 21 2003, US President George W. Bush connected the topic of Europe’s opposition against GM crops with a couple of very sensitive issues for developing countries: foreign aid and agricultural subsidies. In a speech pronounced at the United States Coast Guard Academy, which had to do mainly with “initiatives to combat AIDS and poverty,”—as a New York Times’ article described it[34]—President Bush talked about GM crops and world hunger not only within a food security framework—crops intended for local consumption—but also within a food to export framework. He also mentioned that subsidies imply denying developing countries “a fair chance” to compete in the global market:
“We can greatly reduce the long-term problem of hunger in Africa by applying the latest developments of science. I have proposed an initiative to End Hunger in Africa. By widening the use of new high-yield bio-crops and unleashing the power of markets, we can dramatically increase agricultural productivity and feed more people across the continent.
Yet, our partners in Europe are impeding this effort. They have blocked all new bio-crops because of unfounded, unscientific fears. This has caused many African nations to avoid investing in biotechnologies, for fear their products will be shut out of European markets. European governments should join—not hinder—the great cause of ending hunger in Africa.
We must also give farmers in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere a fair chance to compete in world markets. When wealthy nations subsidize their agricultural exports, it prevents poor countries from developing their own agricultural sectors. So I propose that all developed nations, including our partners in Europe, immediately eliminate subsidies on agricultural exports to developing countries so they can produce more food to export and more food to feed their own people. [35]
An article in The Economist recognized President Bush had a point on Europe’s agricultural subsidies:
“Yet on export subsidies Mr Bush has a point. The EU is the world’s most profligate wielder of such subsidies. They are a particularly pernicious form of agricultural support, as even the French now acknowledge. As part of his Evian agenda, Jacques Chirac, the French president, has proposed a moratorium on export subsidies to Africa. Why just Africa?, asks Washington. Why not eliminate export subsidies outright, which is ostensibly the goal of current Doha development round of global trade talks?”[36]
However, The Economist’s article expressed doubts on the American commitment to cut its own subsidies, although the US had already presented a remarkable proposal for reducing subsidies in the Doha trade talks round.[37] And to support its claim, the article mentioned President Bush’s administration farm bill, which multiplied subsidies—since it included a 40 billion dollar increase in subsidies to large grain and cotton farmers. [38] This was in turn protested by the Cairns group, a coalition of 17 agricultural exporting countries under the leadership of Australia of which Argentina is part. [39]
The Economist’s article also criticized US food-aid policies,
“America clearly trouces Europe in the ambition it holds for this trade round. The administration’s proposals are bold, not just on export subsidies, but on domestic farm support and agricultural-tariff cuts. Unfortunately, when it comes to action, America is not so squeaky clean itself. Not only did its farm bill last year dramatically increased support to farmers; its pampering of certain groups (such as cotton farmers) specifically hurts poor countries. Much of its largesse has a self-serving side: according to Europeans, America’s huge food-aid programme is itself a thinly disguised export subsidy.”[40]
The Economist’s early evaluation of the negotiations between the US and Europe implied a predictable conflict, and soon it appeared. When on August 13, only a month before the final Doha meeting in Cancún, the US-European joint proposal to the agricultural chapter was made public, divergent interpretations were apparent. “We have agreed to substantial reductions to domestic support,” said Pascal Lamy, Europe’s top trade official. But Allen Johnson, the chief agriculture trade negotiator for the office of the US trade representative, was less enthusiastic. According to New York Times reporters, “he described it [the agreement] as a breakthrough, but warned that there remained ‘tough issues ahead’.”[41]
In turn, the US-EU agreement was described by Argentina’s secretary of international economic relations Martín Redrado as “too vague, a very poor beginning.” After mentioning the possibility of responding “with the same level of vagueness in the issues that they [Europe and the US] are interested in, such as tariff reduction in industrial goods,” Redrado pointed at a future alliance with other developing countries: “We are having talks with Brazil and other countries that have interests similar to ours in order for the Cancún meeting to reflect Doha’s mandate.”[42] Argentina was not the only country that manifested some kind of disappointment. India’s WTO ambassador K. M. Chandrasekhar said: “This seems to be an attempt to [pry] open the developing country markets without any clear commitment on the part of [the U.S and EU] to open their own markets.”[43]
These conflicting views were certainly behind the “Cancún’s failure,” as journalists soon named the collapse of the WTO talks on September 14, 2003, when 21 developing nations from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean walked out of the talks, and formed the Group 21.[44] Observers in Argentina also commented the dawn of this new coalition could have signed the end of the Cairns group.[45]
However, beyond conflicting views and the need for further negotiations, President Bush’s address may be considered essentially adequate in order to understand how agricultural subsidies may be associated in Argentina to GM crops adoption. As Trigo et al. state in the first comprehensive study on GM crops in Argentina, the 1990s process of agriculture intensification, in which “structural reforms” as well as “incorporation of technologies”—among them, GM crops—played a key role, “took place in a context of erratic international prices, and competing with countries which, differently from Argentina, subsidize production and exports to the world market.” [46] Certainly, Tambornini’s belligerent epigraph represents an extreme case of this kind of framing. But he is not alone: in Argentina, not only GM proponents, but also GM opponents connect adoption of GM crops—particularly, of GM soybean—to competitiveness and agricultural subsidies. The rise of GM soybean, in particular, was certainly coincidental with the rise of agricultural subsidies in the US: between 1995 and 2002, soybean subsidies in the US totaled almost U$S 11 billion—mostly concentrated in the period 1998-2001.[47] However, this may be changing regarding soybean: after 2002 the US seems not to be very interested in continuing subsidizing soybean production—a situation attributed by Argentine analysts to Argentina’s and Brazil’s rising competitiveness.[48]
The process of adoption of GM crops in Argentina cannot be explained without taking into account the impact—real or perceived by economic actors—of agricultural subsidies on the country’s economy. In this sense, Argentina represents a case in which the food security framework most commonly used for explaining developing countries’ attitudes and policies towards GM crops, is certainly misguided. Argentina adopted GM crops within a food for export framework: this is a central aspect that must be considered in order to understand the GM crops it adopted, the policies it implemented, and the state of the public discussion on the subject.
Part I - How Argentina became a GM nation
Argentina is a traditional producer and exporter of meat and grain, mainly thanks to its natural conditions. As a classic article written in 1945 by J. A. Shellenberger summarizes,
“Argentina has attained world renown as an agricultural nation. This reputation has been based principally on the quantity and high quality of her meat and grain exports, which result from a combination of conditions, including favorable climate, fertile soil, and a limited population. Argentina has been able to produce foodstuffs far beyond her own domestic requirements, and every indication is that this condition will prevail for some time to come.”[49]
However, Argentina’s productivity rates consistently fell behind those in the US during the twentieth century.[50] Agricultural productivity began to grow in the 1970s, and had a substantial increase during the 1990s, when two symbolic “barriers” were overcome: the 25 million-ha area barrier, and the 60 million-ton production barrier.[51] In this process, soybean, non-till methods and the introduction of GM varieties had a leading role, as well as the increasing use of agro-chemicals, particularly during the 1990s. A series of structural reforms also took place in this decade. Although not all of them had a positive impact on the agricultural sector, the whole process of deregulation and globalization certainly contributed to a new “productive expansion” in this sector—as Barsky and Gelman describe it. This expansion was additionally impelled by increases in international prices for traditional and new Argentine agricultural exports: in 1996, the price of wheat grew 99 percent in relation to average prices from 1991 to 1995; corn price grew 78 percent; and soybean, 30.5 percent.[52] As Reca and Parrellada comment, “Argentina attained in the last decade, a productive potential that had remained latent for lack of adequate macroeconomic conditions.”[53]
As of 2004, with 16,2 million ha planted with GM crops, Argentina rates second in the world only after the US with 47,6 million ha; and before Canada with 5,4 million ha.[54] And certainly “it stands alone” among developing countries—as an IFPRI recent report highlights[55]—regarding the number of commercially approved events: ten for three crops, as of September 2005. However, Argentina’s status regarding GM crops is mostly due to GM soybean: almost 100 percent[56] of the 14,4 million ha devoted to soybean in 2004/2005 is planted with RR soybean,[57] which was introduced in 1996. Argentina’s total soybean production for 2003/2004 was 31,5 million tons, and for 2004/2005 it could be 38 million tons as estimated in May 2005. Thus, RR soybean represents almost 50 percent of Argentina’s commodity crops production: the total area planted in 2004/2005 is 29,4 million ha; and total production was 69,7 million tons in 2003/2004—as estimated in May 2005, it may reach 83,5 million tons in 2004/2005, which would represent a new record.[58]
Soybean—in the form of whole beans, soy meal for animal feed, and soy oil—represents more than a fifth of Argentina’s exports in 2004: more than U$S 7,100 million, over U$S 31,491 million, as already commented.[59]
GM corn was introduced in Argentina in 1998. Its early adoption rate was modest in comparison to RR soybean: by 2001, GM corn covered only 20 percent of the total corn area. [60] But it continued to grow steadily, and in 2003/2004 GM corn represented around 50 percent of the total area planted with corn.[61] However, it is certainly GM cotton the least successful GM crop commercially approved in Argentina so far: in 2001, after four years of its introduction, Bt cotton only represented 7-8.5 percent of the total cotton area in Argentina.[62] By 2003/2004, it is estimated Bt cotton represents 20 percent of the area planted.[63]
Many aspects help explain how Argentina became a GM soybean nation, but not a total GM nation. I will try to analyze what made this situation possible.
A. The case of GM soybean: enthusiasm and controversy
Traditionally, the main agricultural land, the Pampas region, was identified with extensive mixed crop-cattle farming, where it was practiced for more than a hundred years. However, this situation changed dramatically during the last 20 to 25 years, among other reasons, due to the need for greater farm income.[64] While the trend is not so simple, estimations performed in 1994 show that to pay for its expenses, an Argentine rural family needed a minimum cultivated area of 161 ha, while in the 1965/1969 period it needed 72 ha, and in 1979/83, 38 ha.[65]
For a long time, efforts were made to find a crop that could be sown right after harvesting wheat, the main crop planted in Argentina for most of the twentieth century. Millet, wheat and sunflower were tested, unsuccessfully. Finally, when soybean was introduced in Argentina in the 1970s, it became the favorite crop for this second sowing–“siembra de segunda.” In no time, also no-till methods were adopted, in part because of the requirements of this second sowing: it needed to be performed right after harvest—before autumn’s lowest temperatures arrive. So conventional tillage, which desiccates soil and requires several days of labor, soon revealed inappropriate. [66] No-till is a farming system that was first introduced in the US during the 1960s. After the harvest, the crop residue is left on the field as a protection against erosion, and as a way to retain water and protect the soil structure. This method requires special machinery, which cuts a tiny grove into which the seed and fertilizer are dropped.[67] No-till methods in the Pampas require an “‘arsenal’ of herbicides with enough stability and residuality so as to work effectively in soils covered with wheat residues,” as Poverene and Cantamutto comment. [68] The introduction of RR soybean—a crop designed to be tolerant to the wide-spectrum and relatively low-toxic herbicide glyphosate—represented a solution to this complex set of requirements and constrictions.
RR soybean was adopted in Argentina not only in the most fertile areas of the Pampas—the rolling Pampas—, but also in not so good lands—the flooding Pampas—,[69] and even in particularly problematic soils—such as the “extremely heavy soils of the center of Entre Ríos province, or those highly prone to erosion soils of the Southeastern part of San Luis province,” in Poverene and Cantamutto’s examples. [70] As of 2001, the most common rotation in the rolling Pampas tends to be full-season soybean/wheat double cropped with late-sown soybean/corn. In the southern Pampas, it is corn-sunflower-wheat. In some areas, there is monoculture of soybean, sporadically rotated with corn. In the western and flooding Pampas, where calf, beef cattle and/or dairy milk are still the most frequent production systems, both crop and animal production systems have been intensified, and the land under pastures has been reduced.[71] Although production of soybean is concentrated in the provinces of Córdoba with 28 percent of total production, Santa Fe with 27 percent, and Buenos Aires with 25, currently the contribution of other provinces is also important: Entre Ríos contributes with 7 percent—increasing in the 2004/2005 season—, Santiago del Estero with 4 percent, Salta with 3 percent, Chaco also with 3 percent, La Pampa with 1 percent, while other provinces contribute with the rest.[72] Monoculture in some areas is a crucial problem.
Soybean production has been increasing in Argentina since its introduction, mostly due to high international prices in the early 1970s, in turn connected to a fast growth in EU soybean consumption. This early rapid soybean adoption in Argentina is attributed to the profits it offered in comparison to other crops and cattle raising: by the mid-1970s, the gross margin of soybean per ha doubled that of corn.[73] However, adoption of RR varieties in 1996/1997 and its perfect match with no-till methods “marks a turning point since which this crop begins a period of extremely fast growth, which makes it the first crop, followed by wheat,” as Begenisic comments. As a result, she concludes:
“soybean has displaced other crops (substitution effect) as well as has been introduced in areas previously considered marginal from an agro-ecological perspective with good results thanks precisely to the association of transgenic soybean + no-till methods.” [74]
A few figures would help show how this process of agricultural expansion and displacement took place. The main crops in Argentina from 1992/1993 to 2002/2003 were the same: soybean, wheat, corn, and sunflower. However, while the whole area devoted to annual crops had an important expansion during this period (39 percent: from 19.71 to 27.32 million ha), this expansion was uneven. Corn area only grew 2 percent—from 2.96 to 3.01 million ha—; wheat area only grew 35 percent—from 4.54 to 6.15 million ha—; and sunflower area only grew 8 percent—from 2.17 to 2.37 million ha. But the area devoted to soybean grew 137 percent: from 5.32 ha to 12.6 million ha. Oat, sorghum, rye, canary grass, and cotton were displaced, but the expansion, as already commented, was mostly due to agricultural intensification.[75] Deforestation has also been a source of land for the expansion of RR soybean in Argentina, particularly in the Northern provinces, as we shall analyze later on.
Differently from the leading soybean producers—US and Brazil—Argentina does not consume much of the soybean it produces: only 2 percent of the soybean meal and 7 percent of the soybean oil remain in Argentina. Because of this, although Argentina only produces 17 percent of the total global soybean production, it ranks first in terms of soybean meal and oil exports—around 40 percent in each of the total export. Soybean oil is mostly exported to India (29 percent), and China (13 percent), while soybean meal is mostly exported to Europe (50 percent, particularly to Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Denmark). In terms of beans, Argentina’s soybean only represents 15 percent of the global soybean offer (45 of it goes to China, 11 percent to Thailand). These figures talk about the competitiveness of Argentina’s soybean agro-industrial complex. [76]
Inexpensive inputs
Argentina’s seed market has a tradition that goes back to the 1950s. At the end of the 1990s, it was the second largest seed market in Latin America, having reached a volume of 1.9 million tons, for a total value of U$S 850 in 1997. From that moment on, the volume of the market stabilizes, but its value tends to decrease, due to the strong reduction of the price of soybean seeds, and the rotation with wheat—two autogamous species widely traded in the black market of seeds in Argentina.[77] As of 2004, the seed market in Argentina is estimated in 2,000 million pesos, that is around U$S 700 assuming U$S 1 is 2.90 pesos.[78] As in most of the world, from the 1980s on the seed market in Argentina went through a process of consolidation and transnationalization, as a result of which it became dominated by multinational corporations, with a small participation of local companies, and a sharp decline in the public sector participation.[79]
In this context, the surprisingly low price of the two key components of the “technology package” associated with RR soybean in Argentina is certainly one important aspect to consider when trying to understand the extremely fast adoption of this technology by Argentine farmers.
First, the price of RR soybean seeds has been considerably lower in Argentina than in the US. A study performed by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) found that, in 1998, a 50lb. bag was U$S 12-15 in Argentina, while in the US it was U$S 20-25. The difference was particularly remarkable given the fact that almost no discrepancy was detected regarding Bt corn: U$S 75-117 per 80,000 seed bag in Argentina, and U$S 83-122 in the US.[80] The report pointed at three reasons: the fact that RR soybean is “not patented in Argentina;” that in Argentina farmers are allowed to replant the seeds—which is not the case in the US—;[81] and the existence of a “strong black market,” that accounts for 25 to 50 percent of the soybean seeds in Argentina, “in violation of Argentina’s seed law.” [82] It is also worth mentioning that, compared to conventional soybean seeds, RR soybean seeds were 2.5 times more expensive in 1996/97, but only 1.5 times in 1999/00.[83]
The laws that provide the framework for protecting intellectual property rights and genetic innovation will be reviewed in Part II. Essentially, they are in agreement with UPOV 78 Act, and with TRIPS.
The difficulty in controlling what farmers do with the seeds they legally keep for their own replanting helps in explaining why the black market is so hard to combat, even if it not only implies losses for agrochemical companies, but also for the government, in the form of fiscal evasion.[84] Another aspect that explains the huge black market of soybean seeds—as well as of wheat seeds—in Argentina is the fact that those are autogamous species, as already commented, so seeds keep characteristics generation after generation—unlike corn, which commercial varieties are mostly hybrids.
Regarding the black market, estimations performed by Argentine sources are similar, or even worse than those of the GAO’s report. In 2001, SAGPyA officials estimated that 35 percent of the soybean and wheat seeds were certified—recently legally bought—, 35 percent were obtained by the farmer, and 30 percent were bought in the black market. [85] In 2002 the Association for the Protection of Plant Varieties (ARPOV) estimated that only 23 percent of the soybean seeds planted in Argentina were certified.[86] Dissolution of the National Seed Institute (INASE) in 2000, as part of the process to “modernize” the state, as former President Fernando de la Rua’s administration stated, aggravated the situation. Due to criticism of many actors—among those, Monsanto, which abandoned soybean research in Argentina in January 2004—, INASE was reinstated in early 2004. [87]
Regarding the fact that RR soybena “is not patented in Argentina,” as the GAO’s report comments, it is important to note this situation is due to a series of circumstances. The RR gene was first obtained in mid-1980s from Monsanto by Asgrow International—at that time owned by Upjohn—through an agreement that allowed Asgrow to introduce RR technology into their soybean breeding lines. Shortly thereafter, Upjohn decided to sell or close its subsidiaries in the southern hemisphere, and Nidera, a multinational seed company, bought Asgrow Argentina. Although in the mid-1990s Monsanto bought the grain and oilseed business of Asgrow International and terminated the agreement with Nidera, the situation did not change regarding existing materials. Having already gained access to the gene and breeding lines, Nidera channeled the technology through Argentina biosafety process, and diffused it in Argentina. Nidera did not apply for a patent “because the company was not the inventor”, and Monsanto’s application in 1995 was denied “possibly because the novelty requirement could not be met,” according to Qaim and Traxler.[88]
However, Monsanto was able to make agreements with other seed companies, and granted licenses of the RR gene. So other companies are also selling their own RR soybean varieties in Argentina. In 2001, there were already more than forty varieties of RR soybean certified and commercially available in Argentina, of the more than two hundred launched between 1993 and 1999. In 2000, Nidera had a 67 percent of the market share of RR soybean seeds, followed by Dekalb, Monsanto, Pioneer Hi-Bred, and local companies such as Don Mario, Relmó and La Tijereta, with a Monsanto’s license.[89]
As a way to collect additional innovation rents, in 2000 Nidera agreed with other seed companies to launch contracts for “extended royalty” payments with farmers. As Qaim and Traxler comment, “considering that Nidera’s sharing of the market is almost 70%, other companies had little choice but to follow this procedure.” [90] These agreements imply farmers have to pay a fee every time they replant the seeds, as well as a series of requirements intended to make sure farmers only keep seeds for their own needs. According to Nidera’s agreements, the farmer has to pay a fee of U$S 2 every time he uses a 50kg bag of soybean seeds from his own harvest—U$S 1.5 in the case of wheat.[91] Monsanto charges the farmer a little more: U$S 1.5 for every 25kg bag of soybean seeds.[92] Since these contracts are not enforced by public authorities, Qaim and Traxler express doubts regarding their efficacy in increasing revenues.[93]
To summarize the situation of intellectual property rights regarding RR soybean in Argentina, as Trigo et al. comment,
“ (…) there had never been the conditions necessary for the original company [Monsanto] to be able to collect the ‘technology fee’, or to restrict the use of the seeds obtained by the farmer, as is the case in the US.”[94]
Something similar happened with glyphosate, the other crucial component of the RR soybean “technology package.” Its patent expired in Argentina in 1987,[95] and in the international market in 1991.[96]
The whole market of agro-chemical products in Argentina grew during the 1990s, and reached a peak of U$S 920 million in 1997. It decreased in 2000, to U$S 634 million, although the total volume continued to grow. That year, herbicides accounted for 70 percent of the total agro-chemical market—a proportion much higher than in the global market, where herbicides account for only 43 percent. [97]
Although during the 1980s, glyphosate in Argentina was more expensive than in industrialized countries, the situation dramatically changed during the 1990s. During the early 1980s, the price of glyphosate was around U$S 40 per liter,[98] but in the early 1990s it was already U$S 10, and in 2000 it was less that U$S 3—less than a third of the price in the US, where it was U$S 9.5.[99]
To explain these discrepancies, Ablin and Paz comment that historically a “non written rule” among commercial agents in Argentina consider the price of the seeds in Argentina are 2 to 1 in relation to the price of the harvested seeds, while in the US that relation is 3 to 1. They say this tacit rule takes into account Argentina’s and US’ different “structure of costs,” as well as the existence of “other tools that allow them [American farmers] to have access to international markets (subsidies, for example).” And something similar happens with agrochemicals. However, Ablin and Paz also recognize that in 2000 that relation was 4 to 1 for glyphosate, something they consider a result of the low prices of commodities, “which make providers decrease prices, in order to let local farmers remain competitive.” To support their view, they show how well the ups and downs of the price of glyphosate in Argentina during the 1990s matched the ups and downs of the price of soybean in the international market: from around U$S 6 per liter when the ton of soybean was around U$S 300 in 1996, to around U$S 3 when the ton of soybean was around U$S 200.[100]
Trigo et al. have a different explanation to account for the low price of glyphosate in Argentina in the 1990s. They correlate in particular the price of Roundup with a different variable: the number of glyphosate-based products present in the Argentine market. They show that in 1994, when there were only 3 glyphosate-based products in the market, the price of Roundup was U$S 8 per liter; while in 2001, when there were 15 products in the market, the price of Roundup was around U$S 3. They also mention the reduction in import taxation—which for agrochemical products was around 20 to 30 percent—as a further reason to account for the low prices of glyphosate in Argentina. [101] Qaim and Traxler also suggest the low price of glyphosate in Argentina has to do with the entering of generic products in the market.[102]
However, Trigo et al. also emphasize that the supply of glyphosate and glyphosate-based products in Argentina is concentrated in a small number of companies, led by Monsanto: in 1999, it sold 77 percent of the glyphosate imported in Argentina, and 85 percent of the local production (based on imported active ingredients).[103] Pengue has different figures for 2001: he says Monsanto had 48.68 percent of the market share of glyphosate, followed by Atanor (17.04 percent), Dow (11.29 percent), and Nidera (9.45 percent).[104] Qaim and Traxler talk about a market share of “around 50%” for Monsanto in spite of a higher price—a situation they attribute to “perceived product differentiation.” As they comment, since farmers are willing to pay a higher price for Roundup than for generic products, a “brand name rent is created which amounted to U$S 14 million in 2001 alone.” [105]
In 2002, Monsanto presented a dumping case on glyphosate ingredients imported from China before the Argentine judiciary. Initially, the press reported that a 40 percent tariff would be imposed—more or less the same as in Brazil, where the same products had received a 35 percent tariff. Before being enforced, the tariff was protested by local chambers, because local companies process the imported active ingredients. [106] Due to alleged conflicts of interest of the Minister of Economy made public in October 2003, the whole procedure was delayed.[107] The case was finally dropped in February 2004, and the tariff was not imposed. [108]
The battle for royalties
In mid-October 2003, Monsanto announced it would put on hold a U$S 40 million investment in Argentina arguing “lack of a clear midterm strategy in the country and lack of adequate intellectual property protection policy,” according to a press account. After investing U$S 185 million in five years—of those, U$S 136 million in a new glyphosate plant in Buenos Aires province—, Monsanto had found that its revenues in Argentina had fallen 30 percent in 2003 due to the economic crisis. The same press account also mentioned Monsanto’s concern about the black market of seeds, as well as the companies’ expectations regarding the commercial approval of its RR corn.[109]
This announcement was linked to the ambiguous position of Argentina’s administration regarding the dumping case against Chinese glyphosate ingredients. “They’re going after (royalties) a bit more aggressively now than perhaps they had in the past because they realize they may be losing some business on their chemical side,” commented an international analyst.[110] This interpretation was also shared by Argentine experts.[111] However it is also difficult not to link Monsanto’s renewed aggressive attitude with Brazilian government’s second exceptional decree authorizing farmers to replant RR soybean seeds, which opened the door to a “transgenic Americas” and secured this technology position in the world market, as commented in the Introduction.
But that was just the beginning of the final battle for RR soybean royalties in Argentina. In January 2004, Monsanto made a more worrying announcement: it would stop selling soybean seeds, due to the increasing black market of seeds: according to trade estimations, Monsanto’s revenues in Argentina had dropped from U$S 580 million in 2001 to U$S 300 million in 2002. Press accounts, while pointing at abolition of INASE in 2000 as “the root of the problem,” also reported that Monsanto’s decision was “widely seen” as an attempt to press Argentina’s government into passing more stringent laws regarding seed commercialization.[112]
The news triggered a series of reactions, including that of Argentina’s secretary of Agriculture, Miguel Campos. He asked a team of experts to begin working on a project on global royalties, since the illegal market was a problem affecting other companies as well. Campos’ efforts in promoting the project included a meeting with US Monsanto’s executives at the World Agricultural Forum.[113] In addition, sales of certified seeds were said to be growing in Argentina: in July INASE informed that for the first time in eight years, sales of certified seeds increased 50 percent: from 2,7 million bags in 2003 to 4,1 million bags in 2004.[114] A more explicit sign of good will from the Argentine government was the long awaited commercial approval of RR corn also granted in July. Although considered a bold decision—since RR corn had not been granted approval in the EU yet, and therefore it seemed to finish the mirror policy with the EU—Argentina’s officials were counting on the EU imminent approval. [115]
However, on September 17 Monsanto made a rude move—more or less coincidentally with a similar move in Brazil.[116] With big ads in main national newspapers, it announced it would collect royalties on Argentine grain shipments to countries where RR technology was patented.[117] Campos described Monsanto’s message as “extortion.” But then he accepted the critique and abandoned his project on global royalties. “Curiously”—as an Argentine press account commented—after just a three-hour meting an agreement was reached: a Technological Compensation Fund would be set up. [118]
While this agreement was celebrated by some Argentine press accounts as the end of the battle, very soon new obstacles became apparent. As foreseen by observers, the proposal would not be ready until December, and only after it would go to the Congress.[119] In addition, although certain press accounts informed in December that Monsanto was working with Argentina’s authorities on the new legislation,[120] it seemed the company was not able to influence key aspects. Campos’ proposal was finally presented on January 25, 2005 shortly after a new Monsanto’s warning—it announced it would collect U$S 3 for every ton of soybean commercialized abroad.[121] No Monsanto representative was present at the meeting with seed companies and representatives from the main farmers’ unions and associations, called for by Campos to make the announcement. The project could not please Monsanto: it foresaw royalties should be paid for only seven years; therefore, there would be no royalties for RR soybean, introduced to Argentina in 1996. The project also foresaw limiting farmers’ right to use seeds for replanting to farms smaller than 65 ha, and imposing fines for illegally obtained seeds—to be applied by INASE. But that was not good enough compensation for Monsanto.
Argentine farmers associations and unions expressed contrasted positions: while the more elitist and linked to traditional big landowners Argentine Rural Society (SRA) considered the project “worth of praise,” the most combative and linked to small farmers Argentine Agrarian Federation (FAA) rejected it because it limited farmer’s right to reuse seeds, and arguing “the State is loosing its regulatory capacity.” Other associations promised to review the project and to advance further suggestions. [122] Besides, the Argentine Seed Growers Association (ASA) and the Association for the Protection of Plant Varieties (ARPOV) sent messages of discomfort both to SAGPyA and to Monsanto. Regarding the project, they said it should foresee intellectual property protection for 20 years, instead of the proposed seven years. And regarding limiting farmers’ right to use the seeds to replant, they consider it should be based on farm profits instead of on farm size. To Monsanto, ARPOV and ASA said they did not like the idea of collecting royalties on grain instead of on seeds.[123]
New heated chapters would soon come up. At a crowded farmers’ meeting in March, vice-governor of Buenos Aires province Felipe Solá—secretary of Agriculture at the time when RR soybean was commercially approved in 1996—sent an angry message to Monsanto. He said Monsanto was “a national embarrassment,” because it had already made “a lot of money” in Argentina.[124] He was responding to a collapse in negotiations, which made Monsanto announce it would impose a U$S15-per-ton fine on Argentine shipments of RR soybeans in the EU. A threat Campos responded by threatening to take Monsanto to court.[125]
Campos rallied south cone countries, and managed to meet with farm ministers from Brazil, Paraguay and Chile, as well as with lower-level Uruguayan and Bolivian officials at a Southern Agricultural Council in Cartagena, Colombia.[126] As a result of this meeting, on April 1 Argentina issued an apparently joint statement—later denied by Brazil and Paraguay officials—saying that royalties “should only be charged when farmers buy seeds.” Previously, Campos had also met US Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns in Colombia to discuss the issue. Both officials presented well-known arguments in a surprisingly frank tone: Johanns said Argentina’s situation puts US farmers who pay royalties at a competitive disadvantage, and Campos replied that US subsidies on farm production and exports are even less fair, according to SAGPyA’s account of the meeting reported by the press.[127]
Finally, Campos along with Brazil and Paraguay’s ministers of Agriculture, agreed to pay “compensations” for the use of RR soybean technology, although adding that the mechanism would only be transitory. News reports in Argentina—as had already done international news reports on the issue—insisted on the fact that Argentina’s situation was different than that of Brazil and Paraguay, countries where RR soybean seeds had been smuggled, while in Argentina the problem with Monsanto had to do with the black market of seeds. “It is compensation and not a royalty,” commented Brazil’s minister. [128] The truth is that while in Paraguay—where an agreement was reached to pay Monsanto U$S 3 per ton of exported soybean—there seems no to be no clear voices against royalties on grain,[129] the situation is not so simple in Brazil. Since Brazilian farmers began paying royalties to Monsanto before the Biosafety law was approved, at least one judge temporarily suspended those payments considering the situation was not clear enough, and making apparent voices critical of this method for collecting royalties in Brazil.[130]
Meanwhile, a new chapter was opened up by private actors allegedly working on their own. A group of 150 farmers from Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Córdoba provinces—who control around 700,000 ha—approached Monsanto in late May to negotiate to pay royalties. According to a press account, they said to be willing to pay around U$S 0.50-1 per ton. Monsanto’s reported position was to charge no more than 2 percent of the soybean ton price in 2006, and no more than 3 percent in 2007. In exchange for paying royalties, farmers were reported as having asked Monsanto to promise to bring all new technologies to Argentina.[131] This initiative could be seen as an attempt to press Campos to accept Monsanto’s request of paying royalties on grain instead of on seed, at least provisionally. However, a few days later, seven farmers sent a letter to La Nación newspaper to clarify that their position was in favor of paying royalties on seeds, not on grain. They also expressed to be in favor of strengthening INASE in order to penalize the black market of seeds. More importantly, they rejected Monsanto’s “embargo threats” in order to collect royalties on “international patents never obtained in Argentina.”[132]
In late June, Monsanto finally filed lawsuits in Denmark and Holland—where Monsanto has a patent on RR soybean as in most of the EU—over the shipment of soybean products from Argentina. Soon thereafter, Campos met with journalists to announce Argentina would suspend talks with Monsanto, and respond the lawsuits: “Monsanto has shown that it continues to be a national embarrassment.” As press accounts reported, he commented the lawsuits had already affected Argentina’s farmers and exporters, and promised: “We will fight this, and we’ll use the best lawyers we can to defend ourselves.” Monsanto’s position was reported to be that the lawsuits were “merely” intended to support its claim on the legal right to collect royalties for RR soybean in Argentina, and that it wanted to continue talking with Argentine officials and farmers. [133]
As of September, 2005 Monsanto’s moves continue in various fronts. Locally, it seems to be trying to influence some actors, among those, members of the National Seed Commission (CONASE)—a consultative body integrated by private and public actors.[134] Internationally, the case in Denmark and Holland continues—soybean shipments from Argentina have been proven to contain RR technology. The Argentine government has hired a European law firm to respond the lawsuits, and Campos himself is expected to travel to Brussels in early October to follow the case. In spite of this contentious landscape, Monsanto is again sending more conciliatory messages. It would stop testing Argentine soybean shipments, according to press accounts.[135]
Agronomic costs and benefits
The extraordinarily fast pace of RR soybean adoption in Argentina clearly shows local farmers’ satisfaction with this GM crop. RR soybean was commercially introduced in the 1996/97 season, when the 40,000 hectares planted accounted for only 6 percent of the total soybean sowing hectares. [136] The name of the event approved is 40-3-2, the company that applied for the approval was Nidera S. A., and it was approved by SAPyA Resolution No. 167, on March 7, 1996.[137]
In 1997/98, there were already 1,756,000 ha planted with RR soybean, 25 percent of Argentina’s total soybean area. In 1998/99, RR soybean already occupied 5,600,000 ha, 80 percent of the soybean area. In 1999/00, RR was planted in 6,800,000 ha, and represented 85 percent of the soybean area. In 2000/01, the figures were 8,500,000 ha, and 85 percent, according to Penna and Lema,[138] and over 90 percent for Qaim and Traxler, and Trigo et al.[139] In 2002/03, the percentage of the area was 95-98 percent, and in 2004, almost 100 percent, as already commented. In comparison, in the US, where RR soybean was also introduced in 1996, it only accounted for two-thirds of the total soybean area in 2001.[140] Globally, GM soybean is the most successful GM crop: it represents 60 percent of the total global area of GM crops, and 56 percent of the total global soybean area.[141]
It is true that the rate of soybean adoption was rapid from the very introduction of this crop in Argentina: in 1970/71, the soybean area was 38,000 ha, and soybean production amounted to 59,000 tons; and just 10 years later, the figures were over 2,000,000 ha, and 4 million tons. However, the case of RR soybean may be considered unprecedented. Penna and Lema compare its rate of adoption to two other crucial crops in Argentina: wheat varieties with Mexican germ plasm, and hybrid corn. Reaching 80 percent of the sown area took about 13 years for this kind of wheat and 20 years for hybrid corns. [142]
An early survey conducted in 1996 shows the positive expectations Argentine farmers had regarding the introduction of RR soybean. Asked their opinions on the potential advantages of this genetically engineered variety over traditional ones, the three main responses were: 58 percent mentioned “better weed control;” 47 percent “less herbicide cost;” and 40 percent “spectrum of weed control.” Only 17 percent expected “higher yields per hectare,” as Penna and Lema comment. The survey also showed 84 percent of farmers were willing to adopt the new technology. According to the survey, farmers were influenced by information provided by “private consultants and extension agents of the INTA” (30 percent), “seed and agrochemical suppliers/agents of the input companies” (26 percent) and visits to experimental plots organized by input companies” (17 percent). [143] Thus it is apparent that a lot of education and public relations efforts were performed before launching this GM crop in Argentina.
There are also surveys conducted on early adopter farmers, which talk about the advantages they perceived. In one performed in 1997 and 1998 over 300 hundred farmers by Jefferson Davies Associates, farmers answered that RR soybean offered “more effective weed control” (66 percent), was “easier to use than current technology” (62 percent), and implied “lower costs” (55 percent). As Meninato comments, “a surprising 36 percent of the respondents indicated that in order to use the RR technology, they would be willing to accept up to 200 kg per hectare of yield loss if the new varieties didn’t prove to be as productive as the old ones.”[144] Similar results were shown by an INTA survey conducted in 1999 in the Northern Pampean region, an area where adoption of RR soybean rose from 23 percent in 1998 to 80 percent in 1999: farmers mentioned “lower costs” (93 percent), and “time saving” (71 percent) as the main advantages offered by GM varieties. Only 5 percent of the farmers considered RR soybean provided higher yields.[145]
Apart from these early accounts, a series of cost-benefit studies have been performed. All of them stress the ease of weed management and cost reduction RR technology represents. In his brief analysis, Meninato report the important cost reduction in weed control associated with the introduction of RR soybeans, and says it has been estimated in U$S 27 per ha.[146]
Penna and Lema perform a thorough analysis of RR soybean costs and benefits in Argentina. They say the increased profitability of RR soybean in Argentina is “a result of decreased herbicide costs,” which is “especially significant when compared to soybean production utilizing conventional tillage practices and traditional seed.” They emphasize RR soybean advanced the use of no-till methods, “which along with glyphosate has provided a more effective and efficient weed control treatment.” For “soybean I” (first sowing), they estimate the difference in the gross margin for RR soybean with no till techniques is of around U$S 15 to 17 per ha, while the difference for “soybean II” (second sowing) is smaller. They also find that RR soybean yields are not significantly different from those of traditional varieties. [147]
Regarding “farm size,” Penna and Lema say that small soybean farmers account for 90 percent of farmers using RR technology in Argentina, and add that farm size “does not affect the adoption of RR soybean in Argentina, because plant genetics is ‘a divisible technology’, which can be applied regardless of the size of the farm—especially when equipment services can be hired from contractors.” As a result, they conclude that “RR soybean and glyphosate have made it possible for thousands of small farmers to continue crop-after-crop pattern, and improve their comparative economics.” [148]
Trigo and Cap calculate a reduction of production costs of U$S 20 per ha for RR soybean. More importantly, they estimate that if this GM variety were not available, “the area under soybean cultivation would be about 60% of the present area”—a statement that clearly talks about how much RR technology has made soybean more competitive over traditional crops in Argentina.[149]
Qaim and Traxler have performed the most detailed assessment of the agronomic impacts of RR soybean in Argentina so far. In late 2001, they conducted an interview-based survey that covered 59 farms in the provinces of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe—“the humid Pampa region where 80% of all soybeans are grown”—, as well as in Chaco province, in the Northern region of the country, where soybean production was introduced more recently. Since most of the farmers had stopped growing conventional soybean a couple of years before, farmers were asked to give details for a three year average. Thus the authors obtained 118 plot observations, half of which were planted with RR soybean, and half with conventional varieties. Considering that there was no significant difference in yields, and that herbicide costs as well as machinery and labor costs were reduced—due to “fewer tillage operations” for weed control, and to the fact that “the harvester can be operated at higher speed without the danger of clogging” thanks to the reduced incidence of green weeds—, Qaim and Traxler estimate that RR technology leads to a gross margin gain of U$S 23 per ha.[150]
Regarding what they call “the widely held belief that RR is biased against small farmers,” Qaim and Traxler report that “small-scale farmers realize more pronounced cost savings and higher gains in gross margins than their larger counterparts.” They attribute these differences to “higher pesticide savings” and, more importantly, to the fact that the use of uncertified seeds is more widespread among small farmers, “without a notable effect on seed performance.”[151]
It is to note a slight discrepancy regarding yields. While the authors reviewed so far find no significant difference, Reca and Parrellada comment that although increase in soybean production in Argentina is the result of area expansion, and since “changes in yields have been scarce,” they find it “noteworthy that an area expansion of that magnitude has not implied a reduction in yields per ha.” [152] Meanwhile, Benbrook acknowledges the difference in yields because of the expansion of RR soybean in marginal lands, but still mentions an Argentine major soybean producer who he paraphrases as reporting “consistently higher yields in his farms where conventional soybeans were planted.”[153]
It is also important to note that two key actors much involved in RR soybean adoption by Argentine farmers are the Argentine No-Till Farmers Association (AAPRESID), and the Argentine Association of Regional Consortiums for Agricultural Experimentation (AACREA). Although they have slightly different focuses—AAPRESID is thoroughly devoted to encourage no-till farming, while AACREA has more broad interests, which have to do not only with agriculture, but also with cattle raising and dairy production—both of them played a key role in the information network that made possible the fast adoption of no-till methods and biotechnology products in Argentina. They also have characteristics in common. Both are essentially associations of farmers, and are very active in gathering and distributing information. Both are sponsored by seed and agrochemical companies, as well as by other corporate sponsors, such as banks. Both also have relatively good links with INTA and other public research institutions and universities. Among other services, they promote seminars and meetings, and offer practical courses to farmers.[154] It is important to note that many of 150 farmers who as of June 2005 were negotiating with Monsanto to pay royalties are part of these associations—very interested in innovations and not at all contrary to corporate sponsorship.[155]
Environmental impacts
Although there are no thorough analyses on the environmental impact of RR soybean in Argentina—as on no other GM crop—there is a number of Argentine and non-Argentine authors that evaluate it as benign if not directly positive mostly due to the combination of this technology with no till practices, and particularly in the Pampas. They also praise that RR soybean favored the substitution of highly toxic herbicides—such as atrazine—by glyphosate, which “belongs to toxicity class IV, the lowest class for ‘practically non-toxic’ pesticides,” as Qaim and Traxler put it.[156]
Meninato, as well as Penna and Lema dedicate just a few words to the issue, and both share a positive view regarding improvements in soil quality in the Pampas.[157]
In their paper on RR soybean in Argentina, Qaim and Traxler admit that a thorough analysis on environmental impact is out of the scope of their article; still they review certain key issues. First, they note that soybean has no wild relatives in Argentina, so no escapes of transgenes can occur—an important concern regarding GM crops.[158] On the emergence of resistance in weed populations—another key concern given the widespread use of glyphosate—they quote a study that indicates that this herbicide is considered to present “low risk for development of weed resistance.”[159] They report a duplication of the herbicide amounts used per ha in Argentina, while the average number of applications only slightly increases. This duplication is considered “surprising” compared to the US where “use of RR soybeans has been reported to lead to a decrease in the number of applications, with aggregate herbicide amounts more or less unaffected.” Even so, they highlight that “an increase in herbicide amounts does not inevitable entail negative environmental consequences,” and praise the “almost complete abandonment of herbicides belonging to toxicity classes II and III” thanks to the use of glyphosate. [160] They also point at the reduction of machinery hours by 20 percent, and at savings of fuel of almost 10 liters per ha.
Regarding expansion of the soybean area, Qaim and Traxler—who performed their study on farms in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Chaco province, as already commented—found in discussion with farmers that “pastures and bush lands”—as they describe them—with previous high weed infestation were gained for RR soybean production, and decline to evaluate this area conversion on wildlife. At least, they consider it positive that this conversion took place with no-till practices which “ensure that erosion problems are reduced.” As a result, they “tentatively” conclude that “the favorable effects outweigh the negative effects, so that the net impact on the environment is positive.”[161]
An even more clearly positive evaluation is presented by and Trigo and Cap, who highlight the fact that erosion due to “agriculturization” was “beginning to negatively affect operating results of farms” in most major areas of the Pampas before the introduction of no till practices—an observation shared by other authors, and which appears almost uncontested.[162] Trigo and Cap acknowledge that glyphosate is being used “in larger quantities per hectare” than the herbicides it substituted, but they do not find this pernicious since “glyphosate is a broad-spectrum herbicide with no residual effect”. Therefore, although “new mechanical technologies that modify the crop’s interaction with the soil” and the use of “full-range herbicides (primarily glyphosate)” imply more intense use of inputs—“usually described as a case of hard intensification”—they characterize Argentina’s situation as “a virtuous cycle of technological intensification.” They also mention other environmentally positive effects of no till practices, such as recovery of soil fertility and reduction of the greenhouse effect, as a result of which they describe Argentina as a win-win case, one “in which economic liberalization has encouraged the expansion of production and at the same time has made possible the adoption of environmentally friendly techniques.”[163]
In a more agronomic vein, Poverene and Cantamutto also praise the positive impact the adoption of non-till methods had on soils, improving different aspects:
“no-till methods have improved the activity of soil microflora and microfauna (particularly, earthworms), the content of superficial organic material, porosity, infiltration rate, water and nutrient retention; and has ostensibly diminished the risks of water and wind erosion.”[164]
However, Poverene and Cantamutto warn that adoption of no-till farming in Argentina was due to convenience—easy management and less labor requirements—, and not to some kind of commitment with sustainability. Regarding glyphosate, they acknowledge the positive impact of using a more environmentally friendly herbicide, but point at a negative impact the careless use of this wide-spectrum herbicide had: the loss of biodiversity in areas close to the sown areas, particularly those adjacent to roads. As they comment, “These communities are reservoirs of adapted species, which may be useful in the future, and a haven for beneficial fauna that takes part in the biological control of plagues.” That is why they say the government “should assure the existence of corridors of spontaneous vegetation.” [165]
It is precisely the widespread, abundant and maybe even careless use of glyphosate one of the environmental aspects more stressed by critics of GM technology regarding Argentina.
In this sense, the potential emergence of herbicide resistant weeds is one key concern. The first weed known to be resistant to glyphosate—ryegrass—was found in Australia a few years ago.[166] However, in 2003 The New York Times reported the existence of weeds resistant to Roundup in Delaware, Maryland, California, western Tennessee, Ohio and Indiana. According to scientists quoted in the news article, resistance is not due to cross-pollination but to evolution, that is, not a result of transgenic contamination—a risk prevented by the fact that soybean has no wild relatives in the Americas. [167]
In Argentina, the risk of the potential emergence of herbicide resistant weeds has already been acknowledged, and there are some research groups working on the issue—although most probably not all that would be needed, due to the low public investment in research and development, as we shall see in Part III.
An INTA project carried out at the Agricultural Experimental Station (EEA) General Villegas, in Buenos Aires province, monitors “The environmental impact of current technology for the management and control of weeds.” The project mentions that weeds tolerant to the imidazolinone group have already been found in Argentina, and suggests something is going on regarding RR resistant weeds—although there is no mention of glyphosate or soybean:
“a change in weed populations under certain widespread productive systems has been observed, something that lead us to suspect there might be new individuals resistant or tolerant to the mostly used active ingredients.”[168]
General Villegas is not the only INTA’s EEA that has found evidence of weed tolerance emergence. Researchers and technicians at the EEA Marcos Juárez, in Córdoba province, informed in 2003 the detection of a glyphosate-tolerant weed, Parietaria debilis, in their district, which they consider “the first sign of tolerance to glyphosate.” They report this weed is tolerant to usual doses of glyphosate of between 2-3 liters per ha, and it also shows tolerance to hormonal herbicides such as 2-4,D.[169] Papa, from EEA Oliveros, in Santa Fe province, reports on nine “weed species suspected to be tolerant to the standard doses of glyphosate”—suggesting the list is not exhaustive. Besides Parietaria debilis, he mentions Petunia axilaris, Verbena litoralis, Verbena bonariensis, Hybanthus parviflorus, Iresine diffusa, Commelina erecta, Ipomoea purpurea, Oenothera indecora.[170] In another report, aimed at presenting a different view on weeds—stressing their agroecological importance, and suggesting this issue should be approached from an ecological perspective—Papa adds to this list two more weed species found to be tolerant to glyphosate in Argentina: Convolvulus arvensis and Viola arvensis. Additionally, Papa warns about the “abuse” of herbicides, “associated with monoculture (soybean/soybean or wheat/soybean soybean/wheat) that caused substantial changes in the agroecosystem,” and about the “misuse” of herbicides, which may cause “contamination problems which may reduce or limit the use of resources such as soil, water, air, landscape and food.”[171]
The probably most detailed account of this issue published so far talks about changes in weed population after “massive” use of glyphosate. After interviewing crop advisers distributed over 6 million ha in the rolling Pampas “on their perception of weed importance since the introduction of glyphosate tolerant cultivars,” Vitta et al.—of the National University of Rosario—identify 37 weed species as “increasing in importance”—more frequently found—while 18 are considered as “decreasing in importance.” Of the 37 weed species listed as increasing in importance, at least 6 “are suspected to be tolerant to glyphosate at recommended rates”: Commelina erecta L., Ipomoea purpurea Lam., P. debilis G. Foster, Iresine diffusa Humb. and Bonpl., Verbena sp., and Hybanthus parviflorus L.f. Baill. The article treats the whole issue of adaptive changes in weed populations considering tolerance only one aspect of this process, and provides no clear forecast—thus pointing at the need for follow up research. As it concludes,
“Adaptive traits of weeds in glyphosate-based cropping systems seem to be variable. A few species have proven tolerant to glyphosate. Some species emerge late in the season, avoiding herbicide action. Late emergence could also facilitate completion of weed cycles when soybean is senescent or after harvest, thus escaping competition by the crop canopy. A third group is characterized by many rare species, with a great variety of life forms and growth cycles. Which are likely to be successful in the new ecosystem remains, however, largely unknown.”[172]
In his recent grim report on soybean production in Argentina, significantly titled Rust, Resistance, Run Down Soils, and Rising Costs - Problems Facing Soybean Producers in Argentina, Benbrook boldly states that “[glyphosate] resistant populations may already exist in some regions of the country.”[173] To justify his assertion, after mentioning some local reports on glyphosate tolerant weeds in Argentina, and counting 11 tolerant weeds already detected—adding to the previously listed Trifolium repens—, he concentrates on the use of glyphosate. Based on Qaim and Traxler’s paper on RR soybean in Argentina already commented, he shows the heavy reliance of Argentine farmers on glyphosate. With 2000 figures, the use of glyphosate in Argentina is heavier than in the US in all scenarios: when considering “conventional/conservation tillage,” the average number of applications in Argentina is 1.9 with 1.10 kg per ha, while in the US is 1.1 with 0.67 kg per ha; when considering “no-till with Roundup burn-down,” the average number of applications in Argentina is 2.5 with 1.20 kg per ha, while in the US is 2 with 0.78 kg per ha. As a result, when considering all tillage systems the average number of applications in Argentina is 2.3 with 1.20 kg per ha, while in the US is 1.3 with 0.76 kg per ha. Advancing updated figures, Benbrook shows that the use of glyphosate continues to increase: while total use of glyphosate increased 56-fold from 1996/1997 to 2003/2004, the increase from 2002/2003 to 2003/2004 was 24 percent. Regarding absolute figures, Benbrook estimates that 45.9 million kg of glyphosate were applied to soybeans in 2003/2004, which are “roughly equivalent to 100 million liters of formulated product that contains 48% glyphosate active ingredient by weight”—the commonest and lowest concentration when glyphosate is used alone.[174]
Benbrook also mentions how the use of other herbicides has increased in Argentina in recent years: Dicamba use has increased 157 percent; Imazethapyr use has increased “over” 50 percent; and 2,4-D use has increased 10 percent. He links the increasing use of these herbicides in Argentina with the case of marestail, a glyphosate resistant weed found in the US—first detected in Delaware in 2000, it currently infests “millions of acres in over a dozen states,” in Benbrook’s account. He finds it “interesting to note” that it is precisely 2,4-D and Dicamba the herbicides used to make “rescue treatments” for marestail in the US, as suggesting that something similar may be happening in Argentina.
In an another critical report on RR soybean in Argentina, written by Joensen and Semino, other herbicides are mentioned as been used by Argentine farmers to fight against weed “increasing tolerance” to glyphosate: besides 2,4.D, metsulfuron, methyl, imazetapir and atrazine, in an “extremely toxic mix.” They also talk about “volunteer soybean,” that is, soybean that grows spontaneously, which is fought with paraquat and atrazine. [175] It is important to note that Benbrook informs atrazine is used principally in corn.[176]
A third account of Argentina’s “soybean monoculture,” significantly titled “Argentina’s bitter harvest” and published in New Scientist, talks carelessly about “resistant” weeds. After commenting some of the research performed by Argentine scientists on “tolerant” weeds, the author surprisingly introduces the term “resistance”:
“For now, the problem appears to be limited to the proliferation of weeds that are naturally resistant, but some agronomists are warning that it is only a matter of time before glyphosate resistance is transferred to other weed species, turning them into superweeds.”[177]
Another careless information presented by Branford has to do with glyphosate-sales figures: quoting Argentine scientist Pengue, she informs that 150 million liters of glyphosate were sold in 2003 in Argentina, while Benbrook estimates 130 million liters—of those, only 100 used on soybean, as just commented.[178]
Going back to Benbrook’s report on the impact of the use of glyphosate in Argentina, another potential negative effect is mentioned: changes in microbial communities. In contrast to Poverene and Catamutto’s comment on the beneficial impact of no till on soil microflora and microfauna, he quotes research performed in the US that indicates the increased levels of Fusarium in the soil, a fungus that may trigger some diseases in soybean, and which also affects corn—it was ranked by authors quoted by Benbrook “the number one corn disease in terms of aggregate yield losses.” He also mentions a US study that “has documented” the adverse impact of RR soybean on root development and nitrogen fixation. On this, he comments, “impacts of RR technology on Fusarium-triggered diseases and food safety problems warrant careful attention in the U.S. and Argentina.”[179]
The main pest problem widely documented and acknowledged in all major soybean producing countries in the Americas is Asian soybean rust, Phakopsora pachyrhizi. In 2004, it had already reached not only Brazil and Paraguay—where it has already produced significant losses: U$S 2 billion only in 2003 in Brazil—, but also the US and Argentina, as expected. Considered a “devastating” fungus, at its arrival in the US the USDA estimated it could imply losses that range from U$S 240 million to 2 billion a year. All commercially available soybean varieties are susceptible. [180]
In Argentina, soybean rust was first found in Chaco province in 2002.[181] By 2005, it has been detected in most soybean producing provinces. To monitor and control rust expansion in Argentina, it has been recently set a National Program of Soybean Rust, coordinated by SAGPyA, which involves—besides SAGPyA own offices in many provinces—, SENASA offices, INTA EEAs, and public universities, among others. It covers all provinces where soybean is being planted.[182] There are also public-private initiatives at provincial level, and private initiatives.[183] The products already approved for commercialization in Argentina belong mostly to multinationals: Amistar, Amistar Xtra, Amistar Top, Taspa y Artea (Syngenta); Fusion (Agar Cross); Impact (Chemiplant); Rally (Dow Agrosciences); Opera (BASF Argentina); Folicur and Sphere (Bayer Cropscience, Orius (Magan), Poseidón (Bayer and Nidera).[184] By April 2005, fungicides for around U$S 50/60 million have already been sold in Argentina, according to press estimations.[185] Although there is debate over its efficacy, plane spraying has been presented as suitable for treating soybean rust in Argentina.[186]
Another environmental problem derived from agricultural intensification, and soybean “monoculture” is the loss of nutrients in soil. No-till methods and the fact that soybean fixes nitrogen, does not prevent all the nutrient loss in soils provoked by agricultural intensification: replacing the extensive mixed crop-cattle farming model with wheat/soybean or corn/soybean double crop represents a challenge—not to mention the cases where soybean monoculture is the rule. Darwich estimates that in the Pampas region, the use of land for agriculture increased to a current 80 percent from a 50 percent in 1976, while pastures on agricultural soils diminished from 10 million ha to 5 million ha. As a result, he estimates the annual nutrient loss represents U$S 1,140 million at market values.[187]
This problem is currently been acknowledged by Argentine experts and farmers, although probably not as seriously as it should. In the 2003/2004 sowing season it was expected around 25 to 30 percent—probably more in some regions—of the soybean area will receive fertilizers: either phosphate-based, sulfur-based or a mix of both.[188] According to more recent figures, these estimations were correct: 35 percent of the soybean area were finally fertilized. But figures are much better for wheat (82 percent) and corn (79 percent). [189] One of the reasons why soybean receives less fertilization seems to be that it does not improve yields. However, soybean fertilization is increasing: a study performed for the industry indicates that, in the Pampas, while only 9 percent of the 400 surveyed farmers identified themselves as habitual users of fertilizers in soybean in 1999, in the 2003/2004 season the percentage of habitual users grew to 52 percent.[190]
But it is certainly RR soybean success in marginal lands what ushers in the most negative environmental impact of this technology, one on which there is an increasing concern and consensus in Argentina: deforestation. This phenomenon has been called the “Pampeanization” of Argentina, calling attention to the fact that crops traditionally planted in the Pampas have moved North causing deforestation. Although the process began before the introduction of RR soybean in Argentina, it is most probably that the adaptability and profitability of this crop has aggravated the problem. It is estimated that deforestation advances at a rate of 30,000 ha per year. From 1998 to 2002, 306,055 ha of forest were lost in Santiago del Estero province; 194.389 ha in Salta province; 121,107 ha in Córdoba province; 117, 974 ha in Chaco province; 22,171 ha in Tucumán province; 20,112 ha in Formosa province; 6,081 ha in Jujuy province. According to official estimations, the forest conversion rate in the Northern provinces of Argentina is three to six times higher than the world average. An important case is the province of Salta, where 2.1 million ha have been converted to agriculture over the last decade: a least 75 percent have been planted with soybean. In this region, it is particularly problematic the situation of “the yunga,” the local piedmont rainforest already threatened by agriculture and mining projects. It s estimated that 1,5million ha have been turn into agricultural land mostly devoted to RR soybean. [191] As a recent report performed by the Directorate of Forests, Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development summarizes,
“In the last decades, Argentina is probably facing one of the strongest processes of deforestation in its history. Aggravated by the fact that forests are being replaced mostly with soybean monoculture. Although no-till planting is widespread in the country, sowing techniques that deteriorate the soil continue to be used and provoke desertification.”[192]
As commented, there is increasing consensus on the severity and detrimental character of the issue. Not only environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, Fundación Pro Yungas or Fundación Vida Silvestre are now committed to stop deforestation: President Néstor Kirchner’s administration—elected in 2003—seems to have taken deforestation quite seriously. When Santiago del Estero province was intervened in 2003, interventor-governor Pablo Lanusse declared a moratorium on deforestation and asked scientists of the National University of Santiago del Estero to prepare a report. It showed that from 1990 to 2002 almost 1million ha had been deforested in that province, in spite of the fact than only 400,000 ha had been authorized to be cleared.[193] In May 2005, a statement promoted by a representative close to president Kirchner was issued by the Chamber of Representatives to ask the national Executive Power to declare a national moratorium on deforestation until a law on territorial management establishes basic criteria on how to exploit native forests.[194]
It is important to note the role GM opponents—such as Greenpeace Argentina—have had in creating this new state of consciousness, although it was also a consequence of emblematic scandalous cases, such as the selling of provincial protected lands in Salta province, which motivated reactions even from actors traditionally close to the agricultural sector.[195] However, it is important to note that some experts consider agriculturization after deforestation in plain lands in the Northwestern region may be protecting mountain forests, formerly deforested for breeding cattle.[196]
Social impact
The more directly and clearly negative social impact of the introduction of RR soybean in Argentina is linked to the deforestation process it seems to have been aggravating in the Northern provinces: in 2004 it was estimated that in four years, between 10,000 and 15,000 woodcutters had abandoned the Chaco forest region, which comprises areas in the provinces of Córdoba, Chaco, Formosa, Salta, Santiago del Estero y Tucumán. Forests are also inhabited by some native groups, such as wichis. It is precisely people from this native group that used to inhabit the protected areas recently sold in Salta province. Aggressive advances by private companies eager to plant soybean on remote farms traditionally owned by poor families are also being reported; in some cases accompanied by para-police harassment. [197] As Reboratti, an Argentine expert, concludes after commenting social conflicts aroused in the Northern provinces, and comparing those with the situation in the Pampas region, where farmers were able to take advantage of the RR soybean boom either by cultivating this crop, or by selling or—more commonly—by renting the land,
“In these cases, it was not a relatively rational population displacement between productive and subsistence activities, as it happened in the Pampas region. It was rather a real expulsion, since farmers (“campesinos”) and indigenous people, eternal marginalized from the land, do not have any chance of taking part in the process, either as producers or by selling the land (because it does not formally belong to them).”[198]
Another problem linked to these abuses is poisoning of the air, water and adjacent croplands with agrochemicals improperly or careless used on RR soybean. A report by an NGOs lists a dozen cases in the provinces of Formosa—the internationally commented case of Colonia Loma Senés, in which small farmers won a judicial case against a private company—, Córdoba, Misiones and Entre Ríos.[199]
The problem of increasing land concentration—and its relation to the process of impoverishment of Argentina’s people—has also been linked to introduction of RR soybean. A sociologist advances interesting figures: using data from the National Agricultural Census, Giarracca shows that while in 1988 there were 421,221 agricultural exploitations in Argentina, in 2002 only 317,816 remain. The average farm size increased almost 100 ha from 1988: currently in Argentina it is 538 ha, while in the US is 170 ha, and in Europe is 50 ha. As a result, the number of agricultural exploitations decreased 24,5 percent on average in Argentina. Average decrease is more pronounced in traditionally semi-feudal provinces such as Tucumán (41,2 percent) in the Northwestern region, but it is also relevant in Buenos Aires province in the Pampas (33 percent). Giarraca also mentions that industrial crops—“main products of the regional economies”—are among those most displaced by soybean, and questions: “(…) are these figures somehow related with poverty, hunger, undernourishment? What does all this have to do with poverty in the provinces?” [200] However, it is important to note—as pro GM actors argue—that land concentration in the 1990s has also increased in Patagonia where soybean is not planted.[201]
Trigo et al. talk about the social impact of the whole series of transformations which took place during the 1990s in the rural sector in Argentina. Although they acknowledged that land concentration increased in the 1990s, they point at the increase in agricultural employment: agriculture intensification—which implied the “addition” of 3 million ha—motivated the creation of 200,000 new jobs, from 783,000 in 1993, to 966,000 in 1999. As they comment, this took place while the general unemployment rate grew almost 5 points in Argentina.[202]
Another important aspect is rural exodus. Almeyra et al. show that rural population has been steadily declining in Argentina for one hundred years: it represented 62.4 percent in 1895, 47.3 in 1914, 37.8 in 1947, 28.0 in 1960, 21.0 in 1970, 17.2 in 1980, 12.7 in 1991, and 10.7 in 2001. Given these figures, the role of soybean in this process needs to be analyzed in a broad, historical context. Regarding the Pampas region, as Reboratti comments, “Although deeper studies on the issue should be made, it can be said that soybean did not stopped rural exodus, and it probably accelerated it, but it cannot be blamed of having initiated it.” He also notes that—again in the Pampas region—“soybean brought prosperity to towns and cities in the region, which stretched out to the agro-industrial and related services complexes.”[203]
In addition, it is also important to take into account that rural migration is not always seen as inherently socially and environmentally negative.[204] The impact of rural migration most probably depends on how and why this process takes place, and there are no comprehensive analyses on what happened in Argentina in the second half of the 1990s.
Almeyra et al. also stress the fact that, in Argentina, the proportion of owners to workers is higher in the rural sector than on average in Argentina: for the whole country, that rate is 65/35 percent of owners to workers, while in the rural sector that proportion is 46/54 percent.[205] In this context, it is important to remember that, as Penna and Lema as well as Qaim and Traxler tell, RR soybean has been adopted equally by big and small farmers—being perhaps the latter those who benefited the most.[206]
More importantly, it is also worth mentioning Trigo et al.’s estimation of accumulated benefits due to adoption of RR soybean in Argentina from 1996 to 2001, which account for U$S 5,082 million without the black market of seeds, and to highlight that most of it went to the hands of Argentine farmers. The distribution of these benefits is 82.04 percent for farmers—production increase accounting for 69.88 percent, and cost reduction for 12.16 percent—, while only 17.95 to providers—for selling glyphosate 9.15 percent, and for selling the seeds 8.80 percent. Taking into account the black market of seeds, accumulated benefits are U$S 5,168 million. Of this figure, 87 percent go to farmers—cost reduction accounting for 18 percent, and production increase for 69 percent—, while only 13 percent to providers—for selling glyphosate 9 percent, and for selling the seeds only 4 percent.[207] And Trigo’s updated figures estimate an accumulated benefit of U$S 8,500 million, following the same distribution pattern.[208]
It is also noteworthy that even a very critical account on adoption of RR soybean in Argentina such as Branford’s one accepts Trigo et al.’s figures. As she says: “Overall, Argentina’s farmers made a profit of about $ 5 billion by adopting Roundup ready soya.”[209]
Authors such as Barsky and Gelman, among others, comment the advent of a new form of investment/exploitation in the 1990s: what they called in Spanglish “pools de siembra”: groups of investors, led by an agricultural engineer or other kind of rural expert, who rent farms in order to take advantage of expected good prices. They represent highly mobile capitals, because they never buy land.[210] Given soybean profitability, those are certainly linked to soybean planting. The impact of these mobile capitals on agricultural sustainability—and on social welfare—is contested in Argentina.[211]
Comparative analyses
It may be useful also to briefly compare environmental impact, and economic costs and benefits of RR soybean for farmers in Argentina and other countries.
Regarding costs and benefits, after an econometric analysis, Fernández-Cornejo et al. conclude that for American farmers, “increases in the adoption of herbicide tolerant soybeans did not lead to a statistically significant increase in net returns.” On environmental effects, they find that “commercialization of herbicide tolerant soybeans did not seem to encourage the adoption of no-till,” at the time of the survey in 1997. However, they add that “this may have changed in more recent years as herbicide tolerant soybeans gain greater acceptance.” Other positive environmental effect is similar to that found in Argentina:
“The substitution allowed the use of herbicide tolerant soybeans typically results on glyphosate replacing the use of herbicide, which are at least three times as toxic and persist in the environment nearly twice as long as glyphosate.”[212]
Another account of environmental impact is Nelson and Bullock’s, who analyze the environmental impact of RR soybean on different regions of the US. They also find positive effects:
“Our simulation results suggest that GR soybean seed technology is more environmentally friendly that nonGR technology for all farms in at least one dimension.”[213]
An extensive report prepared by Benbrook and issued in May 2001, shows a different landscape. Although he acknowledges that, “despite costing more, farmers have eagerly adopted Roundup ready soybean technology because it greatly simplifies weed management,” and that “RR soybean make it possible for farmers to cut back use of persistent, highly active low-dose herbicides,” he finds many negative impacts of RR soybean adoption in the US. After reviewing the current literature, he says the most important negative aspects of the relatively high RR soybean adoption rate in the US have to do with increased use of herbicide; yield drags, particularly under stress conditions;[214] and increased potentiality for the emergence of herbicide resistant weeds. He also denounces “the lack of independent research on the ecological, agronomic and plant defense consequences of RR soybean.” Finally, he concludes,
“Understanding should evolve quickly now that several independent research teams have started to publish results on the downsides of the RR soybean systems. But the mechanisms leading to RR soybean yield losses are many, complex and highly variable. Scientists will struggle to just keep pace with soybean weed management changes and many problems will come and go before anyone understands fully where they came from and why.” [215]
Regarding the different rate of RR soybean adoption in Argentina and the US, Bullock and Nitsi provide a cost-benefit analysis for the US that may be useful. They use a theoretical supply and demand model of soybean and soybean-related markets to assess the effects on farmers, seed companies, and consumers in the US. They conclude that taking into account seed price premium and labor management, RR soybean in the US “provides bigger cost savings in the western Corn belt than the eastern.” For some adopter’s farms, the cost reduction is more that US$ 20 per acre. Due to the fact that the use of glyphosate increases herbicide price competition, also non-adopters have benefits. However, they consider that “oligopolistic RR suppliers have set its price premium higher than potential cost-risk savings on many farms.” For that reason they conclude that not all US farmers have an economic incentive to adopt RR soybean:
“Monsanto, Pioneer and Novartis, those who hold the rights to use the technology to produce Roundup Ready seeds, have an incentive to exploit their market power to create a price premium on Roundup Ready soybean seeds that for some farms is greater than the potential cost savings from adopting Roundup Ready technology. Thus, we do not expect all farmers to adopt Roundup Ready soybean technology any time in the near future.” [216]
It may be useful to introduce a third party in this comparison: Ontario farmers. A survey conducted in 2002 by Brethour et al. to assess the economic and environmental impact of glyphosate tolerant soybean in Ontario showed that only 30 percent of the soybean area in that Canadian state was planted with RR soybean in 2001. Regarding environmental effects, Ontario’s results are similar to those in Argentina and the US, particularly in encouraging moving to no-till methods. According to the survey, Ontario farmers “believe GT [glyphosate tolerant] technology reduces costs of fuel, herbicides and labor.” However, regarding the size of the farm, the survey finds “a positive correlation between size of operation, the adoption of GT technology, and no-till practices.”[217]
Therefore, the low rate of adoption in Ontario does not have to do with environmental concerns. Economic aspects seem to be the clue. Brethour et al. mention two main reasons to account for the low adoption rate of RR soybean in Ontario. The first one has to do with most Ontario farmers planting “under contract,” of which many “require protocols for identity preservation and, many of these protocols specify varieties that are not genetically engineered.” The second one has to do with the US 1996 FAIR Act, which guarantees US farmers U$S 5.26 per bushel for commodity soybean, “thereby increasing their production and driving down prices in the world market.” In these authors’ analysis,
“Canadian growers needed to find alternatives that would increase their revenue; hence the higher likelihood of contracts to grow non-genetically engineered soybeans in Ontario. The price support system in the US gave US growers an incentive to grow beans at as low a cost as possible.”[218]
As a partial conclusion regarding economic benefits due to the introduction of RR soybean in Argentina, it can be mentioned a study that estimates the costs of producing soybean in Argentina, the US and Brazil. Baccarin and Vierheller compared the costs of production in three soybean areas: Argentina core area, Illinois in the US, and the Chapadâo do Sul region—Matto Grosso—in Brazil. Taking into account the cost of sowing and harvesting and the average productivity rate in those three regions, obtaining a ton of soybean requires an investment of U$S 46 in Argentina, U$S 65 in the US, and U$S 95 in Brazil. As they explain, the surprisingly high cost in Brazil has to do with the fact that they analyze a region that combines the lowest productivity rate (24 qq-ha) with the highest use of fertilizers (U$S 100 per ha). They also acknowledge that Argentina’s remarkable competitive advantage has to do with the low use of fertilizers, at the expense of increasingly depriving the soil of the nutrients it needs. Only 24 percent of the consumed nitrogen, 42 percent of the phosphorus, and less that 1 percent of the potassium are being currently reincorporated, according to their estimation. As a result, they comment, Argentina has “a ‘hidden’—but real—cost of about U$S 1,000 million we will have to face sooner or later.”[219]
There is a more thorough comparative analysis of RR soybean costs in Argentina, the US and Brazil, performed by USDA experts and issued in November 2001. It takes into account not only farm-level production costs, but also the costs of internal marketing and transportation, as well as shipping costs to a common export destination (Rotterdam). It shows, as the title of its conclusion states, “Argentina appears most competitive,”
“Both Argentine and Brazilian soybeans have become more competitive in recent years due to the declining international marketing and transportation costs, including the reduction/elimination of export taxes on soybeans. Brazilian soybeans have also benefited from substantial currency depreciation since 1999.
In 1998/99, the underlying cost structures for producing, transporting, and marketing soybeans from Argentina’s southern Santa Fe/northern Buenos Aires region and Brazil’s two principal growing areas allowed them to bring soybeans to Rotterdam at prices slightly below U.S. grown in the Corn Belt. These cost advantages help explain the rapid expansion of soybean production and soybean/product exports by Argentina and Brazil during the last decade.
In the future, increased soybean plantings by Argentina, holdings other factors constant, may be restrained by limitations on the ability to expand total area devoted to agricultural production. In contrast, increased soybean production in Brazil’s center-West (e.g., Mato Grosso) appears especially promising, given abundant, inexpensive land available for cultivation.” [220]
The quotation is a bit long, but it is worth mentioning, because it summarizes a substantial portion of the USDA report. Regarding prospected Argentina’s competitiveness as commented in this section of the report, it is important to note three things. First, Argentina abandoned convertibility right after the report was issued—and Argentina’s peso, which had been by law one to one with the dollar since 1991, after fluctuating during 2002, finally reached a more or less stable value of around one third of a dollar in 2003, as commented in the Introduction. So the peso is now much devalued, just like Brazil’s real.[221] A second and relatively less important aspect has to do with the possibility of Argentina expanding its agricultural land. According to a recent informal evaluation performed by a Brazilian correspondent to a US trade website, there are at least six million acres left for the soybean area to increase in the northwestern province of Salta, precisely the region where the soybean area is growing—at least partly at the expense of the “yunga.”[222]. The third factor is negative. Last year, export taxes were substantially increased in Argentina: to 20 percent from 10 for grains and oilseed (13.5 for unprocessed oilseeds), and from 5 percent for vegetable oils and vegetable meals. As a Reuters’ piece of news comments,
“the government targeted the farm sector, which gained from January’s [2002] devaluation because grains and oilseeds are sold on international markets at prices set in dollars, while most local costs are in devalued pesos.”[223]
As a partial summary of the remarkable growth of soybean production in Argentina during the 1990s, Reca and Parrellada comment,
“The great growth of soybean has been the result of a strong export demand, which was met by a system able to provide the needed technical inputs (seeds, agrochemicals, knowledge of the crop, and an increasing use of no-till farming), the natural resources and the existence of a business sector sensitive to market messages.”[224]
There are many important aspects in Reca and Parrellada’s comment. The first has to do with “export demand.” One important component of the global demand has to do with the EU. In turn, the expansion of the EU soybean needs has to do with the Dillon Round of the GATT, in May 1961 and March 2002, when the then EEC negotiated the import of soybean in the form of whole beans or soy meal for animal feed with no tariff. “Thus, it can be said that the huge expansion of the soybean market in the analyzed period is the involuntary result of a commercial concession, which the EEC has been unsuccessfully trying to get ride of,” as two Argentine officials comment.[225] And the Blair House Agreement on Oilseeds, signed in 1992 by the US and Europe, as part of the Uruguay Round Agreement of GATT for Agriculture, added to this: under this agreement, the oilseed plantings for food purposes in the EU—rapeseed, sunflower and soybean—were limited to 5.482 million ha.[226]
Not only the US but also Argentina and Brazil took advantage of these EU concessions. As an expert close to the agricultural sector commented quite triumphantly in 2003 in La Nación newspaper, in the context of the discussion over American and European subsidies and their impact on Argentina’s agriculture after Cancún’s failure,
“Before Blair House and the Marrakesh agreements [which established the WTO], Argentina used to produce 12 million tons of soybean. Now it produces 37. Brazil used to produce 25, and now its production exceeds 50. It seems obvious that not everything is bad in the negotiation field. After Marrakesh, Argentina began to receive private capitals from the international oilseed industry. Multinational corporations made huge investments in the Paraná’s ports. The largest oil processing plant was built. Today, nobody doubts about Argentina’s leadership in the global trade of oilseed products.”[227]
The expansion of the Asian soybean demand also played an important role in Argentina’s interest in soybean production. In 2000, of the total 118 million tons global offer of soybean for export, Asia and Oceania bought 55 million tons, the EU bought 29 million, the Americas bought 16 million tons, and Africa bought 10 million tons.[228] Currently, China represents the first buyer of Argentine soybean: 14 million tons between beans and oil in 2004—that is, around 40 percent of the 2003/2004 harvest.[229]
B. The case of GM corn: hybrids and insurance
As of September 2005, there are seven varieties of GM corn approved in Argentina: four resistant to lepidoptera, two herbicide tolerant, and one with both characteristics.
Bt corn—genetically modified to be resistant to lepidoptera—was the first GM corn introduced in Argentina in 1998. The first three events of Bt corn approved in Argentina were: event 176 (application by Ciba-Geigy), commercially approved by SAPyA Resolution No. 19 on January 16, 1998; event MON 810 (application by Monsanto Argentina S.A.I.C.), commercially approved by Resolution SAGPyA No. 429, on July 16, 1998; event Bt 11 (Novartis Agrosem S.A.), commercially approved by Resolution SAGPyA No. 392 on July 27, 2001.
Two glufosinate-tolerant corn events were also commercially approved in Argentina in 1998: events T25 and T14 (AgrEvo), both approved by SAGyP Resolution No. 372. However, due to the fact that the EU did not approve event T14, the permit for its commercialization was derogated in 1999 with SAGPyA Resolution No. 739, following the then established mirror policy.[230]
In 2004 and 2005, three new GM corn events were approved: glyphosate-tolerant corn event NK 603 (application by Monsanto Argentina S.A.I.C), commercially approved by SAGPyA Resolution No. 640 on July 13, 2004; lepidoptera-resistant (that is, Bt) and glufosinate-tolerant event TC 1507 (application by Dow AgroSciences S.A. and Pioneer Argentina S.A.), commercially approved by SAGPyA Resolution No. 143 on March 15, 2005; and glyphosate-tolerant corn event GA 21 (application by Syngenta), commercially approved by SAGPyA No. Resolution No. 640 on August 22, 2005. As of September 2005, TC 1507 and GA 21 are the only two events commercially approved in Argentina that have not been approved in the EU yet.
On the general situation of corn in Argentina, it is worth mentioning it is a well established crop in Argentina’s agrarian tradition. Although it is considered by many observers one of the crops that was displaced by the expansion of the soybean area during the 1990s, it is also truth that in 1997-98 it reached a record harvest of 19 million tons. Particularly remarkable is the fact that this record harvest was obtained proximately in the same area in which 8 million tons were obtained 25 years before, as Reca and Parrellada comment. In fact, contrary to soybean, the annual increase in corn yields during the 1990s was pretty high: 3.5 percent, a figure they consider “very significant.” These yield gains were part of a trend that began in the 1970s.[231]
With 14,5 million tons in 2002/2003, Argentina is the fifth largest corn producer in the world, and the second largest exporter: 9 million tons a year. (The first corn exporter is the US, which leads easily with more than 45 million tons, and the second is China, with 11.9 million tons.)[232] For the season 2004/2005, the estimated area planted with corn in Argentina is 3.43 million ha, and the estimated production if weather conditions remain benign is 19.5 million tons, a substantial increase from the 15 million tons in 2003/2004.[233]
In spite of the opposition against GM crops in Europe, Argentina has been exporting non segregated corn for feed to Europe, particularly in the late 1990s: around 800,000 tons a year to Spain, and 400,000 to Portugal.[234] Some of this corn may have been GM, given the fact that Argentina does not segregate its commodity corn—although it does for Flint corn. Argentina was able to export GM corn to Europe because it only commercially approved varieties that Europe had already approved before the de facto moratorium that began in 1998, as already commented. That is why this situation did not change after the EU traceability and labeling rules came into effect in early 2004, in spite of Argentine officials’ early statements.[235] According to industry traders, GM corn for feed continued to be sent to the Iberian Peninsula in 2004 and 2005, labeled as containing the events approved before 2005. This situation may change after the commercial approval of event TC 1507 in early 2005, since this Bt corn that has not been approved in the EU so far.[236]
Ironically, as Ablin and Paz point out, Argentina took advantage of a US request originated at the GATT Uruguay Round in 1995, to provide the Iberian Peninsula with 2 million tons of corn at preferential conditions. This situation was initially protested by Argentina. However, since US exports could have contained GM corn varieties that were not already approved in the EU—which was not the case with Argentine GM corn—the European demand concentrated on Argentina’s corn, which since then represents 75 percent of EU corn imports. [237] As with soybean and the Blair House agreements, regarding GM corn Argentina took advantage of a US-EU agreement on agricultural trade.
Adoption of Bt corn in Argentina has been much slower that adoption of RR soybean. Commercially approved in 1998, by 2000 Bt corn accounted for 6 percent of the total corn area; and in 2001, it covered 20 percent.[238] However, adoption of GM varieties is steadily increasing: in 2003/2004 GM corn represented more than 50 percent of the total area planted with corn, as already commented.[239]
There are few studies on the cost-benefit impact of Bt corn in Argentina. The first one was issued in 2000. It was based on an experimental comparison between one GM hybrid cultivar (Chaltén TD), and its conventional cultivar (Chaltén), in four different sowing dates. It is well known that the impact of pest infestation in corn in Argentina has to do with the moment a particular pest—“gusano barrenador del tallo,” Diatraea saccharalis—attacks plants. Its authors—Vallone et al.—conclude that BT corn benefits appear only in late sowing seasons:
“In the first sowing date the economic difference [for Bt corn], although positive, would not make it recommendable considering risks. (…) From the second sowing date on, the new technology would begin to be economically recommendable, given the fact that with a marginal cost of U$S 17.80/ha, we would obtain a marginal income of U$S 59.28 (11.57 qq x U$S 5.12/ha), therefore augmenting the gross margin in U$S 41.48/ha, that is, a 15.2 percent increase.” [240]
Additionally, Vallone et al. comment:
“In late sowing dates the economic advantages of GM corn are very important, and in these cases it is not justifiable under no circumstance not using this technology; given the fact that, in the fourth sowing date, for example, profitability on the invested marginal capital, which shows the economic result of the experiment is in the order of 855 percent.”[241]
A second experimental study by the same authors confirmed their early findings. Vallone et al. consider important the fact that it was performed in 2002, after a serious devaluation of the peso took place: seeds and agrochemicals’ costs rose 274 percent. According to their findings,
“This experimental study, which takes place for the second consecutive year, has confirmed previous year’s results regarding high yields obtained in second-sowing corn [after wheat] and, among these, best results obtained with transgenic varieties, in short as well as long cycle.”[242]
Trigo et al. mention an estimation performed by AACREA, according to which a Diatraea saccharalis attack should imply more that 7.7 percent losses in the gross margin to justify the premium price of Bt seeds. [243]
In their early analysis, performed in 2000, Ablin and Paz mention estimations by Argentine producers, who talk about a maximum yield gain of 15 percent for Bt corn. They also use estimations on Bt corn economic benefits in the US, carried out by the USDA and the European Commission, which talk about a yield gain in Bt corn of 8-10 percent.[244] Using a “conservative estimation” of yield gains of 5 percent for Bt corn in Argentina, and taking into account a seed price of U$S 72 for 50 kg of traditional hybrid varieties of corn, and of U$S 92 for 50 kg of Bt corn seeds, they conclude:
“Considering these data, we have estimated an average gross margin of U$S 196.6/ha for conventional corn, and of U$S 198.3/ha for Bt corn. From these figures, it emerges a very low incentive for the use of Bt corn, although it is reasonable to expect that better yields may exert a future influence in GM corn expansion [in Argentina].” [245]
Given the fact that Ablin and Paz take into account US estimations, it is worth mentioning a review report performed by Benbrok, issued in November 2001.[246] In the introduction, he reflects on the fact that “70 million acres of Bt corn” had already been planted in the US by 2001, “without a credible, independent national assessment of farm-level economic impacts.” Which is what he does. After reviewing data from different American states, he estimates the yield losses caused by the European corn borer (ECB) are between 14 to 1 percent: an average of 6 percent from 1996 to 2001.[247] As a result, Benbrook says that since its introduction, Bt corn in the US “has increased corn production by an estimated 276 million bushels, valued at $566.8 million dollars.” However, since farmers “have paid at least $659 million more for Bt corn seeds,” he estimates “a net loss of about $92.”[248] He concludes in a remarkable high tone, saying that rather than increasing farmer’s income, Bt corn in the US has mostly benefited “seed-biotechnolgy companies.” As he puts it:
“Hopefully, lessons learned in the commercial introduction and planting of today’s Bt varieties will pave the way for a smoother ride for the next generation of insect-resistan corn. Farmers, in particular, should pay closer attention to whether the next wave of ‘advanced’ corn genetics is likely, in the end, to leave them better off. It might, like Bt corn for the ECB, just shave another slice off per acre profits in the course of improving the profitability of seed-biotechnology companies.”[249]
Regarding distribution of the benefits of Bt corn in Argentina, Trigo et al. seem to reach similar conclusions. To analyze the distribution of Bt benefits in Argentina, they use trade estimations that show Bt corn offers a net benefit of 5 percent.[250] They also take into account that adoption of Bt corn has to do with preventing infestation with Diatraea saccharalis: that is why they estimate that Bt corn adoption rate in Argentina would never be higher that 50 percent. According to their model, accumulated benefits of adopting Bt corn in Argentina, from 1998 to 2003, are U$S 399 million. Of those, 79 percent goes to providers, in the form of purchase of seeds, and 21 percent to producers, in the form of yield gains.[251]
C. The case of GM cotton: corporate strategies
Bt cotton—genetically engineered to resist lepidoptera, particularly bollworms—was commercially launched in Argentina in 1998 by Genética Mandiyú, a joint venture between Monsanto, Delta and Pine Land (D&PL), and the local company Ciagro. It is event MON 531 (Monsanto Argentina S.A.I.C.), commercially approved by Resolution SAPyA No. 428, in July 16, 1998.
A glyphosate-tolerant cotton was also approved in Argentina, in 2001: event MON 1445 (Monsanto Argentina S.A.I.C.), commercially approved by Resolution No. SAGPyA No 32, on April 21, 2001.[252]
In the 1990s, the cotton area shrank in Argentina from 3.78 million ha in 1992/1993[253] to the lowest figure of 158,000 ha in 2002/2003.[254] Cotton planting is concentrated in the Northern provinces of Chaco (54 percent) and Santiago del Estero (25 percent).[255] In 2002/2003 cotton production in Argentina was just 201,000 tons, but it began to grow again, with a planted area of 266,000 ha and an estimated production of 354,000 tons in 2003/2004. Additionally, in 2004/2005, “better prices” as well as “official financing for farmers” —as stated in SAGPyA reports—motivated a new increase. It is estimated that in 2004/2005 cotton area would reach 404,000 ha, an increase of more than 50 percent; this could represent a production of 400,000 tons.[256]
Adoption of Bt cotton in Argentina has been particularly low. According to official estimations already commented, in 2001, after four years of its introduction, Bt cotton only represented 7-8.5, while currently represents around 20 percent. The high cost of the seeds seems to be the clue for this low adoption rate, according to most authors.
An economic analysis performed in 2001 by Elena, an INTA researcher, comparing 32 different sites where Bt cotton was planted, took into account that the price of Bt cotton seeds was between U$S 68.50 and 79.32 per ha higher than that of the conventional seeds—an average of U$S 73.89 per ha higher. Elena finds that Bt cotton required 2.41 less pesticide applications than conventional varieties—a reduction of 63.74 percent--, which implied a reduction in pesticide cost of U$S 27.55 per ha. Regarding other agrochemicals—herbicides, growth regulators, fertilizers, defoliants—cost differences were not significant. As a result, total costs were U$S 93.97 per ha higher for Bt cotton on average, within a range of U$S 68.27 to 115.31 per ha, according to the region. Benefits were also higher for Bt cotton: U$S 159.02 per ha on average. Due to the productivity differences between the sites—yields of 1,252 kg/ha in the most productive site, and of 227 kg/ha in the less productive—benefits for Bt cotton were also extremely variable: they ranged between a minimum of U$S 62.29 per ha to a maximum of U$S 289.80 per ha. As a result, Bt corn additional benefits were U$S 65.05 per ha on average; but those ranged between positive figures of U$S 174.50 to 10.97 per ha, to negative figures of U$S -12.43 to -9.54 per ha. Elena concludes that the lower use of pesticides in Bt cotton does not compensate for the higher price of the Bt seeds; and estimates that higher yields of between 345 to 518 kg/ha are required to compensate for the elevated cost of the Bt seeds. [257]
Qaim and Cap’s analysis issued in July 2002 shows similar results. After reviewing a representative survey on 299 cotton farms—89 adopters, which represent 60 percent of the total adopters, and 210 non-adopters—conducted in 2001, they consider that regarding Bt cotton in Argentina, “net benefits for producers are rather small.” They stress the fact that Genética Mandiyú is the only provider of the Bt cotton seeds, at a price of U$S 103 per ha, “which almost means four times the price of conventional varieties,” and implies a “technology fee of U$S 78,” similar to that of the US, as they highlight. They conclude this is the crucial reason why Argentine farmers are not adopting Bt cotton: “Although this technology significantly reduces insecticide applications and increases yields, these benefits are quite limited due to the high price of the Bt cotton seeds.” [258] They also say that farmers’s average willingness to pay is less than half the actual technology price. Finally, they suggest lower prices would boost adoption rates and, as a consequence, revenues for the companies, “resulting in a Pareto improvement.” As they put it,
“At the current price, annual revenue for the company is around U$S 1.7. The revenue rises sharply with decreasing prices, until it reaches its peak at a price of U$S 65. At this price, we predict a company revenue of U$S 6.3 per year. [259]
Qaim and Cap also stress two more negative consequences of the high price of the Bt seeds. One is bad publicity, “because [this price] backs critics of biotechnology in their argument that GM crops are too expensive for producers in developing countries.” The other one is that, according to these authors, “excessive prices encourage fraud.” Fraud, in turn, may be associated with no refuge areas, and an eventual increase in insect resistance. They also comment that charging the same price to Argentine farmers than to American farmers does not seem adequate, since Argentina is a “low-cost cotton producing country, and farmers do not receive output price subsidies,” which means the value of cotton is on average lower in Argentina—“the logical consequence should be differential pricing.” To explain why for four years Genética Mandiyú applied in Argentina a price policy that does not take into account these differences, and that does not maximize benefits for the company—as shown in their paper—, they speculate on the influence of external factors on Monsanto and D&PL’s strategy, due to the fact that these companies are global actors. Among these factors, Qaim and Cap suggest there might be “the US farm lobby, which fears US farmers might suffer competitive disadvantages.” Mentioning the GAO’s report on the price of RR soybean, they say Monsanto “is already under pressure because its RR soybean technology is sold at a lower price in Argentina than in the US.”[260]
The low rate of Bt cotton adoption in Argentina is further analyzed by Qaim et al., who focus on sustainability and the use of pesticides, taking into account that, as they comment, “Argentina is producing under free-trade conditions, with comparatively low inputs intensities and production costs,” a situation they consider “might influence the technology’s agronomic outcome.”
Reviewing the 2001 survey on 299 Argentine farmers, Qaim et al. find that Bt cotton adopting farmers “use 50 percent less insecticides on their Bt plots than they use on plots grown with conventional cotton.” As they highlight, “almost all of the reductions occur in highly toxic chemicals, with concomitants positive effects for the environment and farmer’s health.” In addition to pesticide reduction, BT cotton farmers in Argentina “also achieve significantly higher yields”—32 percent yield gains in two consecutive growing seasons. Again, they mention the high premium price of Bt seeds as a cause for the fact that “only relatively few large-scale farmers have adopted Bt cotton in Argentina.” The situation they describe is not so simple to understand, because it is also larger farms the ones where more insecticides are used. Small farms, where less insecticide applications take place, have low yields. As a result, they predict that Bt cotton would significantly increase productivity particularly in small farms,
“While the net yield gain is predicted at 19 percent for average large-scale growers, for small producers the gain could be around 41 percent. Similarly, total gross benefit per hectare of Bt cotton is predicted to be higher for smaller than for larger farms.” [261]
As they conclude,
“Therefore, promoting wider technological diffusion at reasonable prices would not only extend the aggregate agronomic and environmental benefits, but could also entail progressive social effects.”[262]
On the potential for developing insect resistance, Qaim et al. comment “the technological advantages” of Bt cotton in Argentina “can be maintained in the long run.” However, they are cautious: “More research is needed into the technology’s complex interactions with environmental systems, before statements about its sustainability can be made.”[263]
Regarding general estimation of the distribution of benefits of GM cotton in Argentina, based on Elena’s results Trigo et al. estimate that accumulated benefits of Bt cotton in Argentina is U$S 41 million (1998 to 2003). The distribution of these benefits is 83 percent for the company that sells the seeds, and 17 percent for farmers, due to a production increase. Again, a situation quite different than that of RR soybean. [264]
In a context of promotion of cotton production in which Argentine public and private sectors are involved, two GM varieties have been recently presented: DP 404 BG (a Bt cotton) and Guazuncho 2000 (a RR cotton). Developed by Genética Mandiyú and Ciagro with INTA’s germ plasm, they represent locally adapted varieties so there is some expectation regarding yields. It is certainly suggestive that a representative of Ciagro highlighted that cotton is “a social crop that puts in motion the whole provincial [Chaco province] economic context, and allows a better income distribution.”[265]
Regarding world trade, cotton has certainly been one of the crops most protected by developed countries—particularly, the US. The recent case won by Brazil—with some support from Argentina—on US cotton subsidies at the WTO shows that the impact of developed countries’ subsidies on developing countries’ agriculture can be measured, and are of substantial weight. It also opens the door to other cases, according to observers.[266] Although these subsidies may not be the only reason why the cotton area planted in Argentina consistently fell in the 1990s, it certainly have played a role in a context already complicated by other factors—among them, lack of financing, and a non transparent local market.[267]
On the social impact of this situation, estimations advanced by the Argentine Cotton Chamber say that between 1989/90 and 1998/99, cotton production drop in Argentina was accompanied by a loss of 102,000 jobs—counting registered and non-registered workers. The WTO decision has been celebrated in Argentina, where trade sectors estimated that if subsidies were abolished, cotton planting could drop 90 percent in the EU, and about a third in the US. Is that were the case, as commented recently by a representative of the Argentine Cotton Chamber, “(…) the horizon of the world market would be change, and countries such as Argentina would recover the competitive place on local and international levels.”[268]
Discussion
A brief reflection on the situation of GM crops adopted so far in Argentina shows a clearly differentiated picture: RR soybean adoption is one thing, but the situation of GM corn and GM cotton is much different, as suggested by Trigo et al.—who explicitly talk about the “exceptional” character of RR soybean adoption in Argentina. [269] Regarding who the adopters are, as well as how the costs and benefits are distributed, RR soybean seems to present a situation of relative equality among small, medium, and big farmers, particularly in the Pampas region, mostly due to the fact that the technology package is inexpensive, and that the machines needed are available through contracts. The easy management and “convenience factor,” that is, the relative simplicity of the technology used, may also have played a positive role here, encouraging small farmers’ adoption and explaining the fast rate of adoption. However, a somewhat opposite assertion can also be made: it may also have favored the entrance of actors not traditionally devoted to agricultural production, and thus, less committed with sustainability—in addition, to initiate soybean planting is much easier than cattle rising or dairy production.
Therefore, regarding adoption by small farmers, RR soybean contrasts with Bt corn and Bt cotton, which much more clearly favor those farmers who have access to credit, and who can take the risk of using seeds sometimes substantially more expensive than conventional ones. Technology fees and price premiums, among other aspects, seem to be playing a key role in this situation. However, since it is also possible for farmers to curb corn pests by controlling the time of sowing and, more importantly, since corn hybrids—GM and non GM—dominate the market in Argentina, this problem may be considered relatively neutral regarding GM varieties. So the main difference is found between RR soybean and Bt cotton.
The fact that Monsanto was not able to patent RR technology in Argentina plus the situation of glyphosate becoming a generic product contrast with the tight control of the Bt cotton market exerted by Monsanto in Argentina—a corporate strategy in turn probably linked to the low price of the RR soybean technology package, as suggested by Qaim and Cap and already commented.[270] In this context, the international market, biased against cotton due to developed countries’ heavy subsidies, and favorable to soybean due to increasing demand—in turn linked to EU trade concessions—may have also played a role.
The contrast between RR soybean and Bt cotton in Argentina is dramatic regarding the situation of traditional cotton producer provinces such as Chaco and Santiago del Estero, particularly considering that cotton production in smaller farms is labor intensive and RR soybean production is not. Ironically, those provinces seem to be among the most affected by the negative social and environmental impacts attributed to soybean expansion in Argentina. It is tempting to speculate that if an affordable Bt cotton—accompanied by educational work—had been available for small farmers in those provinces, the situation would have been different. However, it is not clear how soybean expansion affected the smallest landowners, since—as Reboratti speculates—for a big soybean grower “it is easier and more convenient to rent or buy larger fields, such as medium- and large sized fields used for corn, sunflower or cattle raising.”[271]
In relation to this, it seems more or less obvious that the situation of RR soybean adoption in the more fertile land and relatively more equal society of the Pampas may be different from the situation in the Northern provinces, with agriculturally marginal lands and more unequal, sometimes semi-feudal societies. Regarding increasing concentration of land, rural exodus, impoverishment, and abuse of power—the most dramatic social impacts attributed to RR soybean adoption in Argentina—, the inconclusive evidence so far needs to be further analyzed distinguishing between provinces. As the latest Nuffield Council of Bioethics’ report on the use of genetically modified crops in developing countries states, after commenting anti-GM actors’ claims that link RR soybean adoption in Argentina with disadvantages for smaller farms, deforestation, rural unemployment and food insecurity, “the highly complex interplay of technological factors as well as societal, political, and regulatory processes, means that it is difficult to evaluate these various claims.”[272]
It may be useful to take into account the Nuffield Council’s conclusion regarding the different impact that herbicide-tolerant crops may have in countries with different labor needs and availability such as India and Kenya. As it states, “the use of herbicide resistance crops will always have to be considered carefully on a case by case basis, taking into account the specific situation of the developing country concerned.”[273] Argentina may certainly be more than one country, and RR soybean—which was able to cross borders between those—may have had different impacts on different regions of the country.
“Heterogeneity” seems to be “a key function,” comments Oesterheld, editor of a recent dossier on “The transformation of Argentina’s agriculture”—almost completely devoted to RR soybean adoption and published in an Argentine science magazine. As he concludes,
“Changes in agriculture [in Argentina] were not the same, nor had the same consequences everywhere. Transformations in the Pampas—an already strongly agricultural region in the early 1990s—had different elements from those which took place in extra-Pampean regions. And, in these, it was not the same to replace the Chaco forest in the Northern area of Córdoba province, that to replace [the Chaco forest] in the Eastern area of Salta province.”[274]
More generally, collection, evaluation and interpretation of data depend heavily on interpretive frameworks. And it is well known that in the case of GMOs there are highly divergent frameworks, internationally and locally, which will be reviewed in Part V. As Reboratti comments regarding evaluation of soybean adoption in Argentina,
“As with any other social issue, as we proceed beyond description and presentation of data (and even this would be contestable), any evaluation is affected by the ideological framework used. For example, in the case of soybean [adoption], the obvious land concentration that has resulted from this process may be seen by some as a social catastrophe, while for others it is a positive and necessary consequence of economic modernization.”[275]
In addition, Trigo and Cap estimate that if “GM [soybean] varieties” were not available in Argentina, the area under soybean cultivation would only be about 60 percent of the present area.[276] Therefore, a second irony in GM crop adoption in Argentina is also related to the uncommonly low price of the RR technology package, which encouraged breeding efforts to include it in different germ plasm, and favored widespread adoption: would soybean have been adopted so widely—wildly?—in Argentina if the RR technology package had been monopolistic? Would it have displaced other crops? Would it have encouraged deforestation in the Northern provinces? Would it have encouraged such a massive use of glyphosate? Would we have been talking of soybean “monoculture” in Argentina?
A recent INTA’s report presents the issue of RR soybean adoption and “monoculture” in Argentina in a clear and balanced way, so it is worth spending some time with it. It begins mentioning a series of critical points regarding sustainability, and warning about the future if decisions are not taken to change the current situation,
“INTA’s concern for a sustainable agriculture (economically, socially and ecologically) involves pressing issues such as those related to environmental variables: erosion, organic matter loss, negative nutrient balance, desertification, reduction of biodiversity, as well as social impacts such as rural depopulation due to unemployment and substitution of labor intensive activities with labor extensive ones. On the other side, in part due to very favorable conditions for many of our for export products, figures on productivity and profitability are positive in most of the sector. However, unless a concerted strategy is reached, in the medium run this situation will tend to deteriorate as a direct consequence of the unordered process of agriculturization accompanied in many cases with monoculture (in agricultural as well as in forestry production), which we are currently witnessing.”[277]
Then, INTA’s report explicitly evaluates RR soybean monoculture in the Pampas, and highlights that “it does not constitute a sustainable alternative to approaches that include rotations.” On RR soybean monoculture in “extra-Pampean” regions it is even more severe: the report states that “it constitutes a path incompatible with agricultural production in those regions.” Finally, it warns:
“In this scenario, after a certain time, the stock of natural resources will suffer an irreversible deterioration, in quantity as well as in quality, particularly in the most fragile ecosystems.”[278]
INTA’s report also explores technological options that may “efficiently impact in favor of environmentally friendly alternatives,” and lists precision agriculture, more competitive corn, technology packages for meat and dairy production complementary to agriculture, and integral productive systems of permanent agriculture. But soon enough it also acknowledges—using Trigo et al.’s figures—that between 1996 and 2001 RR soybean implies accumulated benefits of more than U$S 5,000 million, and represents “the most important source of tax revenue.”[279] And it estimates that an increase in rotation with corn would represent an annual loss of 250 million pesos in gross margins, while an increase in rotation with cattle raising on pastures—which “would come close to a situation compatible with long run sustainability”—would represent an annual loss of 1,350 million pesos. It also points at the “cost of money,” which discourages corn planting, and at the probability that those who rent land—50 percent of producers—may be less prone to take care of sustainability if it implies lower profits.[280]
In summary, for Argentina, to change this situation is possible with new technologies, but it would be costly because RR soybean “monoculture” offers high profits due to increasing international demand, allows easy management and the use of marginal lands, and is at the reach even of small farmers. RR soybean “failure” in Argentina may be seen as a consequence of RR soybean “success.” This, in turn, may be considered a consequence of an extraordinary set of circumstances, internal and external.
Many of the environmental problems derived from agricultural intensification and RR soybean “monoculture” seem to have been acknowledged by key actors, public and private, in Argentina. And some of the social impacts—at least, the most directly attributable—seem to have been acknowledged. It remains to be seen how those are addressed: monoculture is a widespread concern, even among enthusiastic supporters of RR soybean and no till techniques, and soybean rust seem to have been addressed quite systematically and aggressively. Deforestation has also been recognized as a key problem, although it is less clear how it will be addressed. And problems derived from the use-abuse-misuse of glyphosate and other agrochemicals seem not to have aroused similar concerns.[281] Social problems are much more contested: at least, SAGPyA seems worried about the detrimental interaction between soybean and cotton in Northern provinces. [282] Another interesting aspect to consider for the future is precisely the interaction of these detrimental impacts: rust threat may hamper soybean profitability and encourage farmers to turn to other crops, as has been reported to happen in Santa Fe province in the 2004/2005 season, where a 20 percent increase in corn area has been preliminary attributed to farmers’ concern for rust by official sources.[283] However, these are very preliminary figures, and may not represent a trend.
Two more brief points. One: it seems uncontestable that agriculture intensification in the 1990s in Argentina implied the widespread adoption of technology packages offered by multinational corporations, both for GM as well as for non-GM crops.[284] Two: it seems also uncontestable that use of agrochemicals continues to be low in Argentina, compared to US and EU standards.[285]
Part II – Argentina’s biosafety system: an early development
Argentina was one of the first countries that established a regulatory system for GMOs. It was set up in 1991, not only as a result of local existing or projected needs, or due to any particular biosafety concern, but mostly due to corporate demand, particularly in the field of agricultural biotechnology. The first governmental office in charge of analyzing GMOs biosafety, the National Advisory Commission on Agricultural Biotechnology (CONABIA) was created within the then Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (SAGyP, now SAGPyA),[286] “in response to domestic interest and research in GM technologies and the desire by US and transnational seed companies to use Argentina as a location for off-season GM seed production and field trials,” according to a paper co-signed by one of his main officials Moisés Burachik.[287] Three applications for field trials were presented and authorized in 1991; the three of them from multinational corporations.[288]
Another report also co-signed by Burachik mentioned a key factor that made CONABIA possible: scientific capacity. In 1991, there were already a number of Argentine scientists doing research in the needed areas, such as virologists, plant pathologists, molecular biologists, geneticists, “so qualified people with expertise in molecular biology and related disciplines were available for the task of developing a workable biosafety system.”[289] Currently, Argentina’s scientific capacity—which will be reviewed in Part III—provides experts to the biosafety system on an ad hoc-consultation basis when needed.
In 1999, another governmental office was created specifically to deal with GMO food safety, the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) on the use of GMOs, within the National Agrifood Health and Quality Service (SENASA), also part of SAGPyA.
Finally, in 2004 the Biotechnology Office (BO) was created also within SAGPyA. It supersedes CONABIA and is intended to coordinate efforts regarding activities related to biotechnology and biosafety, the definition of policies, and the diffusion of activities.
From the beginning, then, oversight of agricultural biotechnology activities and products in Argentina has been totally handled within SAGPyA, in turn, part of the Ministry of Economy. The Ministry of Health and Environment also has a minor, essentially advisory, role in agricultural biotechnology regulatory oversight. The industry, other governmental offices, public research institutions and one consumers group have representatives in at least one of the two SAGPyA technical advisory committees, CONABIA and TAC – SENASA.
Within SAGPyA, plant GMOs go through a three-way review process: environment risk assessment is in charge of CONABIA; food safety assessment is in charge of TAC – SENASA—although CONABIA also has a role regarding food safety, as we shall see—; and market impact assessment is in charge of the National Directorate of Agri-Food Markets (DNMA). The authorization for the commercial release of a plant GMO is granted by SAGPyA head, the secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food, based on the recommendation of these three advisory bodies.
Argentina’s biosafety regulatory system does not require analysis of conventionally obtained varieties, no matter what trait they exhibit, and is based on the characteristics and risks of the particular GM product considered, not on the process by which it was developed.[290] “This implies that the focus of regulation is on the genetically modified organism, not on the diverse constructions which were used to develop the final product,” as a CONABIA official puts it. However, she also acknowledges that “some data on the process are usually required in the risk analysis, although always in relation to the final product.” [291]
In the design of the biosafety regulatory system, Argentina’s authorities initially took into account biosafety regulation of the “US, Canada, Mexico and the European Community,” as well as recommendations from an IICA Workshop held in Buenos Aires in 1992, as an early account by CONABIA’s officials states.[292] Later on regulations “proposed or adopted by the UN, USA (EPA and APHIS), Canada, and OECD,” were also taken into account, according to Cohen et al.[293] Recently, Codex Alimentarius documents and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have also been taken into account.
Maybe the salient characteristic of Argentina’s regulatory system as it has developed so far is that it reflects Argentina’s situation as an agro-exporting country. It is fairly robust regarding environmental and food risk assessment of GMOs to be planted and processed in Argentina, and it shows high interest in protecting the country’s position in the international agri-food market, taking into account both clients’ and competitors’ positions regarding agricultural biotechnology. Meanwhile, it does not have specific provisions regarding imported processed food which may contain GMOs not yet approved for consumption in Argentina.
In order to review Argentina’s regulatory system, this paper will focus first on administrative regulation, which builds on preexisting laws and decrees; secondly, it will describe the institutions involved in the regulatory process; and thirdly it will succinctly describe the regulatory process.
After that, already authorized and performed field trials will be commented. Local and international evaluations will then be considered.
A. The biosafety regulatory system
A.1. Administrative biosafety regulation
Lacking a comprehensive national law on biosafety—which has been proposed in the early 2000s,[294] and is again being discussed in 2005, as we shall see—Argentina’s regulation so far is based on specific administrative (non-legislative) resolutions issued by SAGPyA, that is, norms emanated from the Executive Power. In addition, this regulation builds on preexisting laws and decrees.
This paper will focus mainly on resolutions in force as of September 2005. However, it will also briefly mention resolutions successively issued and replaced during the ‘90s—particularly taking into account differences and similarities with resolutions issued in 2002, 2003 and 2004—since most evaluations of Argentina’s biosafety system available so far do not take into account these latest updates.
Successive administrative changes are mostly consistent, and may be seen at attempts at updating biosafety criteria and enhancing international harmonization, as well as—to a minor degree—at demarcating jurisdiction and responsibilities between governmental offices. While it is out of the reach of this paper to analyze how the international dispute on GMOs may have influenced these changes, those may be seen also as an indirect reaction to the increasingly contentious international landscape, which somehow put national biosafety systems under closer scrutiny, and led them more decidedly towards international harmonization, particularly regarding inter-governmental institutions such as the Codex Alimentarius, and international agreements such as the Cartagena BioSafety Protocol (BSP) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
A.1.1. Main resolutions regarding biosafety
SAGPyA Resolution No. 124/91
The first administrative resolution specifically issued to deal with GMOs in Argentina is Resolution No. 124, issued in 1991 by the then Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (SAGyP). [295] It creates CONABIA, and describes its composition—which will be commented later—and functions. Among the reasons included in this resolution to justify CONABIA’s creation, it is stated that “Agricultural Biotechnology produces a considerable impact on this sector’s activity and on the environment.” This impact, in turn, is optimistically attributed to “the incorporation of novel genetic materials that contribute to improve the quantity and quality of available food.” Then the actors involved in this process are named: “scientific knowledge,” “the productive apparatus,” and “the normative framework.” In this argumentation, a “biosafety system” is “required” to “guarantee the agro-ecological equilibrium.” It is also acknowledged that by that time there were already a number of requests to perform trials with “transgenic plants created by agricultural biotechnology.”
CONABIA is clearly set up as an advisory body, and its main function is described as follows:
“a) To advise the Secretariat on technical and biosafety requirements which should be followed by genetic materials obtained by biotechnological procedures prior to their release by any procedure or method and in any form (tests, diffusion) into the biosystem.”
SAGPyA Resolution No. 656/92
CONABIA’s jurisdiction and procedures on plant GMOs were formalized by successive SAGyP and SAGPyA resolutions: No. 656/92, No. 837/93, No. 289/97, and No. 131/98.[296] Of these four resolutions, only No. 656/92, is in force as of September 2005, since No. 289/97 replaced No. 837/93, and was in turn replaced by Resolution No. 39/03, along with No. 131/98.
Specifically, SAGyP Resolution No. 656/92, initially described the forms to be filled out and instructions to be followed in order to ask for permission to do “Experimentation and/or Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Plant Organisms, as well as those corresponding to Genetically Modified Organisms and/or their products to be used in animals.”
However, the forms for asking authorization for the release into the environment of plant GMOs would be changed in following resolutions—the one in force as of September 2005 is Resolution No. 39/03, as we shall see. Therefore, the only aspect of Resolution No. 656/92 regarding plant GMOs is that it insists on then SAGyP and CONABIA jurisdiction on GMOs.”[297] And it is totally in force regarding microorganisms and their products to be used in animals, such as vaccines. That is why Resolution No. 656/92 is now known as “Norm for Genetically Modified Microorganisms.”
SAGPyA Resolution No. 39/03
The most comprehensive norm in force as of September 2005 regarding plant GMOs in Argentina is SAGPyA Resolution No. 39/03, “Norm for the Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Plant Organisms,” which replaces Resolution No. 289/97, and Resolution No. 131/98, “Application for the Request of Flexibilized Conditions for Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Plants for Field Trials.”[298]
Resolution No. 289/97 had already established the stages needed to complete the impact evaluation of a genetically modified plant organism in the form of a three-way review process: environmental risk assessment in charge of CONABIA; food safety in charge of the National Agrifood Health and Quality Service (SENASA); and market impact in charge of the National Directorate of Agri-Food Markets (DNMA).
This three-way review process within the sphere of SAGPyA is again mentioned in Resolution No. 39/03, which explicitly states in its Introduction:
“In the ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, the regulatory framework for genetically modified plant organisms (GMPO) consists of Norms and Resolutions issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food. Authorization for the commercial release of a GMPO is granted by the Secretary based on THREE (3) independent dicta produced by advisory bodies which are part of the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food (SAGPyA). These THREE (3) dicta are:
a) the appraisal that the extensive field release of the GMPO will not cause an impact significantly different from that which would be caused by the non-genetically (GM) modified homologous organism, produced by the National Advisory Commission on Agricultural Biotechnology (CONABIA), and the applicable Norm is the one included in the present Document;
b) the appraisal of the aptness of the food derived from the GMPO for use as food and feed, produced by the Technical Advisory Committee on the Use of Genetically Modified Organisms, which is part of the NATIONAL AGRIFOOD HEALTH AND QUALITY SERVICE (SENASA); in this case, the applicable norm is SENASA Resolution No. 412/2002, issued on May 10 2002;
c) the appraisal that there will not be an undesirable impact on our international trade, produced by the National Directorate of Agri-Food Markets, which is also part of SAGPyA.”
Resolution No. 39/03 contains a thorough description of the environmental assessment needed for the release of a “genetically modified plant organism (GMPO)” into the environment, and represents an update of the information and a strengthening of the conditions for performing field trials required in the two resolutions it replaces. New data on the genetic characterization of the inserted DNA are required, that is, more information than that requested in Resolution No. 289/97. Besides, the same isolation distances for the two stages of environmental assessment are required—those established in SAGPyA Resolution No. 226/97, which will be commented later on—, while according to Resolution No. 131/98 no isolation distances were required for “flexibilized” GMOs, that is, for what is now the second stage of environmental assessment.[299] Another relevant difference between Resolution No. 39/03 and the norms it replaces has to do with confidential business information, which is now precisely demarcated, while it was not in Resolution No. 289/97.
Resolution No. 39/03 also requires information on food safety, similar to that required in the two resolutions it replaces—the reason behind this requirement will be discussed when analyzing CONABIA.
Resolution No. 39/03 uses a definition of “modern biotechnology” slightly different of the one previously used by SAGPyA, which referred specifically to “genetic modified organism.”[300] It is taken from the Cartagena Protocol and also used in Codex Alimentarius’ documents:
“(i) the application of in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or
(ii) the fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombinant barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection.”
Resolution No. 39/03 establishes two stages for environmental assessment, each of which implies different requirements, and separate applications for the request of authorization for release into the environment of GMPOs.[301]
The first stage assesses “experimental releases which purpose is to determine the probability of effects on the environment is non significant.” In turn, the first stage of assessment may involve a greenhouse-trial (ensayo “en invernadero”), or a field trial (ensayo “a campo”). Each of them requires slightly different conditions and data.
The second stage assesses “extensive releases which purpose is to determine that those GMPO releases will not generate an impact on the environment which significantly differs from that which would be occasioned by the non-GM homologous organism.”
Resolution No. 39/03 general conditions for first and second stages of environmental assessment include:
-The Petitioner should have a legal address in Buenos Aires.
-Forms should be filled out in Spanish, although supporting bibliographic references and “the complete bibliographic materials” may be presented in its original language. CONABIA could require those to be translated into Spanish.
-An Application for authorization of a field release which implies the “use” of the “genetically modified materials”—such as infections with pathogens—requires the presentation of the “corresponding protocol.”
-“Releases” could only be performed after authorization is granted, and is communicated to the Petitioner.
-The granted authorization could only used by the Petitioner.
-The Petitioner is held responsible of the “biosafety and risk management conditions established in the granted authorization for the release into the environment of the GMPO,” during the trial and the “post harvest monitoring period.”
-Non compliance would lead to “partial or total destruction of the trial/s involved, and eventually to revocation of the granted authorization.”
-Field releases should comply with Plant and Seed Sanitary and Quarantine rules, and with rules of the Agro-chemical and Biological Register.
-Dates for sowing and harvesting should be communicated within ten days.
-Field releases should comply with the “isolation conditions” specified in Resolution No. 226/97.
-Information on the field where the trial will be performed should be accompanied by a plan of the field and a copy of the contract signed with its owner.
-Access to the field where the trial is performed is responsibility of the Petitioner. Personnel in charge of the trial should be technically prepared, and informed of the kind of the materials involved.
-The Petitioner should promise to give access to the field for inspections, and to pay the expenses for each of those. Inspections will be in charge of agents authorized by SAGPyA, and will be performed “as many times as considered necessary during the trial, as well as during the post-harvest monitoring period.”
-“Unexpected characteristics” or “non-predicted or non-described effects” verified during the trial should be communicated to CONABIA within 48 hours.
-In case of an “eventual escape,” it should be communicated to CONABIA, and the “contingency plan included in the Application” should be performed.
-“Confidential Information (CI)” and any bibliography also considered confidential should be prepared in a separate envelope, and presented to SAGPyA Seed Area. The CI evaluator will be selected by the Petitioner from a list of experts presented by CONABIA. The Petitioner can also propose an evaluator, ad referendum by CONABIA. It could not be considered CI: name of the event; phenotypic characteristics introduced in the GMPO; name and address of the Petitioner, the Legal Representative, and the person responsible of technical matters; purpose of the requested authorization; location of the field release; “methods and plans to control the GMPO in case of an emergency”; final disposition of the “biological materials”; and “any information needed for the biosafety assessment.”
-During the “post harvest monitoring period,” the Petitioner should annually notify CONABIA on the use given to the field where the trial was performed, and on “any other news.” This will be verified during the “corresponding inspections.”
First stage of environmental assessment:
In addition to the common conditions described for the two stages of environmental assessment, the first stage requires a “closure report,” which should be presented by the petitioner within 180 days after the trial is performed, and even if it is cancelled for any reason. If the trial takes more than one year, reports should be presented annually during its performance.
The “Application for the Request of Authorization for Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Plant Organisms” that should be filled out by the petitioner to request authorization for the first stage of environmental assessment requires, besides name, address and other contact details of the Petitioner, a thorough description of the GMPO, both genetic—in relation to the transformation—and phenotypic, including some information on its potential toxicity and allergenicity, as well as some data on the center of origin and genetic diversity of the recipient organism.[302] In case more than one event is tested (“acumulación de eventos”), it is required to indicate also the phenotypic characteristics which are different from the expected ones, that is, “those already conferred for the simultaneous presence of the individual events”; and to indicate if, “if known, there are (or there are reasons to suppose there may be) interactions between the genes of the accumulated events and, if suitable, their possible consequences.”
A separate application is required for each “individual event,” “set of equivalent events,” “set of related events,” or “GMPO which presents stacked events.”[303]
Regarding biosafety conditions, besides a thorough climatic and agro-ecological description of the area where the trial will be performed,[304] it is required to describe “the biosafety procedures to be performed during the trial.”
Regarding location of the trial, the information required includes: detailed information on the greenhouse or the field; isolation procedures, and access control to the trial; schedule of activities; treatment of the ground after the trial; final disposal of the plant materials involved; contingency plans in case of an escape.[305]
Second stage of environmental assessment:
General conditions for the second stage of assessment are those already commented for both stages, including how to deal with Confidential Information (CI).
The second stage requires to fill out two applications. The first one is devoted to a thorough description of the GMPO, both genetic and phenotypic; its interaction with the environment; and an assessment of its toxicity and allergenicity. This application also requires to report the “Impacts expected from the production of the GMPO at a commercial scale,” which include “environmental impact,” and “effects on human health.” It is important to note that, although Resolution No. 39/03 deals with environmental assessment, the information it requires on “effects on human health” in this Application is in some aspects more detailed than that required by SENASA Resolution No. 412/02, as we shall see.[306]
This first Application for the second stage of environmental assessment is very similar to former “Application for the Request of Flexibilized Conditions for Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Plants for Field Trials,” an essential part of replaced Resolution No. 131/98.[307] There are only a few differences. One has to do with the former “equivalence statement,” which is now replaced by an “equivalence, difference and non-equivalence statement.”[308] Another difference—already commented—is that more data on the genetic characterization of the inserted DNA are required.[309] Certain requirements are also more clearly stated.[310]
The second Application for the second stage of environmental assessment is a request for release into the environment, which can be presented only after the information included in the first Application has been assessed. It is a shorter version of the Application for release into the environment requested for the first stage of environmental assessment.
SAGPyA Resolution No. 226/97:
SAGPyA Resolution No. 226/97 establishes the “Experimental conditions regarding the isolation distance for the Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Plant Organisms”. As already commented, these distances are mandatory for all field releases during the two stages of environmental assessment established in SAGPyA Resolution No. 39/03—only greenhouse tests are exempted, for obvious reasons. It mentions eight crops: cotton, canola, sunflower, corn, potato, soybean, tomato, and wheat.
Isolation distances required by Resolution No. 226/97 are stringent, particularly regarding species which have wild relatives in Argentina. For example, for GM canola, the required isolation distance is 3,000m “from any other canola or species which can crossbreed with the transgenic crop.” In addition, there should be no bee hives within a 3,000m radio, and if bees are needed for the test, bee hives should be at a 3,000m distance “from any other canola or species which can crossbreed with the transgenic crop.” After harvest, the cultivated field should be “free of canola and of any other species which can crossbreed with volunteer plants of the involved crop” for 5 years. For GM sunflower, similar requirements regarding isolation distance and bees are established. The only difference has to do with the posterior use of the field, which should be “free of sunflower and of any other species which can crossbreed with volunteer plants of the involved crop” for 2 years.
Regarding GM corn—a crop which is used for seed production to be exported, among those, GM varieties which are not commercially approved in Argentina—, the required isolation distance is 250m, and the required time lag before planting the field with corn or “any other species which can crossbreed with volunteer plants of the involved crop” is of one year.
The other crops considered have less stringent isolation requirements. For example, for GM soybean—a crop with no wild relatives in the Americas—the required isolation distance is 3m, and no other provisions are stated. Cotton is a peculiar case, because particular provisions are stated regarding a pest. [311]
SENASA Resolution No. 1265/99:
SENASA Resolution No. 1265/99 establishes the “ad honorem Technical Advisory Committee on the Use of Genetically Modified Organisms.” Its function is “to advise the President of the NATIONAL AGRIFOOD HEALTH AND QUALITY SERVICE.” Resolution No. 1265/99 states TAC is to be presided by the head of the National Directorate of Agrifood Oversight, and coordinated by a representative from the Directorate of Food Quality. TAC composition will be described later on.
SENASA Resolution No. 412/02:
As already commented, the food safety review foreseen in SAGPyA Resolution No. 39/03 is in charge of SENASA—this agency will be described later on. SENASA Resolution No. 412, issued in 2002, replaces SENASA Resolution No. 511/98, [312] and establishes “Requirements for the evaluation of the food aptitude of Genetically Modified Organisms.” It is based on Alinorm 01/34A of the Codex Alimentarius, the Report of the Second Session of the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology,” particularly its Appendixes II—“Proposed Draft Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology”—, and Appendix III—“Proposed Draft Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from Recombinant-DNA Plants.”
Codex principles for the human health risk analysis of GM foods dictate a pre-market assessment on a case-by-case basis which includes an evaluation of both direct and unintended effects. As described by Haslberger,
“they state that the safety assessment of GM foods needs to investigate direct health effects (toxicity), tendency to provoke allergic reactions (allergenicity), specific components thought to have nutritional or toxic properties, the stability of the inserted gene, nutritional effects associated with genetic modification and any unintended effects that could result from the gene insertion.”[313]
SENASA Resolution No. 412/02 Annex I, “Foundations and criteria for the evaluation of food derived from genetically modified organisms,” follows very closely, almost verbatim, Alinorm 01/34 Appendixes II and III—which are explicitly mentioned among the documents reviewed for preparing the resolution. But there are some significant exceptions. While in its Annex I, Article 6 Resolution No. 412/02 acknowledges, following Appendix II, that the “working principles of risk assessment” include risk evaluation, risk management, and risk communication, it does not include any of the articles that deal with risk communication—Appendix II, Articles 22, 23 and 24. Additionally, regarding risk management, Resolution No. 412/02 does not include Article 19 of the Appendix II—which mentions “food labeling” as well as “post-market monitoring,” among other aspects which may be included “when appropriate”—, nor Article 21—which refers to “traceability.”[314]
Resolution No. 412/02 Annex II, “Requirements and procedural norms,” establishes the conditions for presenting an Application. Those include:
-The petitioner should have a legal address in Argentina.
-Name, profession and personal data of the person responsible of technical matters.
-Name and personal data of the legal representative.
-A statement by the petitioner, “based on the history and studies conducted, on the event performance regarding its safety from the point of view of its use as food and feed, not existing criticism or limitation of use compared to its counterpart.”
-A project for monitoring the “event genetic stability and expression, in order to verify the structural and functional identity as it was approved, during the whole period of commercialization.”
-A statement which implies the plant breeder promises to recall “the product derived directly from the event in case SENASA requires to do it, based on reasonable causes.”
-History of approvals in other countries, already granted or under consideration.
-The language to be used is Spanish, except in the bibliography, which is accepted in English.
-Confidential Information should be declared as such, and sent to the Directorate of Agrifood Quality. It will be examined by one or two experts, who will prepare a report to be presented to TAC.
Resolution No. 412/02 Annex II, “Required information,” is the actual application form and asks for: information on the organism to be assessed;[315] information on the donor organism;[316] a thorough molecular description of the inserted DNA;[317] a thorough description of the “products of expression”;[318] information on chemical composition of the GMO, food derived from it (“if corresponding”), and conventional counterpart, comparing nutrients and anti-nutrients; information on bioavailability of nutrients (“in case the events are classified as non substantially equivalent”); information on allergenicity;[319] information on toxicity;[320] information on the “functional characterization of the GMO, food derived from it (if corresponding) and conventional counterpart (feed essay in laboratory animals)”; and information on any changes regarding how to process or use the food derived from the event compared to its “conventional counterpart.”
SAGPyA Resolution No. 644/03:
SAGPyA Resolution No. 644/03, “Protocol for the biosafety evaluation for the production of genetically modified corn seeds in assessment stage,” deals with a specific case: the production of GM corn seeds to be exported for agricultural purposes. It explicitly excludes events “intended for the production of pharmaceuticals or other industrial products.” The aim of this Protocol, presented in the Annex, is described as follows:
“To provide the necessary information in order for the National Advisory Commission on Agricultural Biotechnology to assess the potential biosafety risks of the production of genetically modified corn seeds in assessment stage, and to coordinate the inspections of any part of the seed production process which may be considered necessary.”
Resolution No. 644/03 requires information on the event considered, and if it is inserted in the male or female parental line; quantity of imported seeds; area, location, accessibility and other details on the field to be planted; an estimation of the expected seed production; schedule for the whole process; containers and labels to be used to identify the GM seeds. Regarding eventual escapes, it requires to indicate the method to be used in order to detect those, and to identify the parental lines sown, “indicating how the system will operate.” The petitioner should make available to inspectors authorized by SAGPyA “the analytical system for the rapid field detection of the event in a specific way.”
Resolution No. 644/03 requires the Petitioner to prepare as many as nine “protocols”—defined as documents “indicating procedures to perform, dates in which those will be performed, duration and involved personnel”—in order to carefully plan and monitor the whole process. These are an essential part of all the data required. In addition to the information already mentioned, detailed data is required on: transportation procedures; sowing procedures; pest control procedures; deflowering procedures; male destruction procedures; harvest procedures; labeling and storage procedures; and post-harvest procedures. Regarding the equipment used for processing the harvested seeds, it is stated those should be “purged.” The grain or seeds used for this purge can be non-GM or authorized GM varieties. After the procedure, the grain or seeds used for this purge should be tested—using a method suggested, and reactives provided by the petitioner—, and only those with less than 0.1 per cent of adventitious presence could be commercialized. Those above that threshold should be destroyed.
It is important to note that requirements foreseen in Resolution No. 644/03 should accompany one of the two Applications of release into the environment described in Resolution No. 39/03—either the one for the first stage of environmental assessment, or the second Application required for the second stage of environmental assessment, according to the stages of assessment already completed.
SAGPyA Resolution No. 46/04:
SAGPyA Resolution No. 46/04, “Register of GMPO Operators,” is intended to solve a potential ambiguity regarding registration of events and varieties during the experimental period. The need to establish a register of operators of “genetically modified plant organisms” derives from the fact that the usual procedure for registering varieties is posterior to completing the whole biosafety assessment, as we shall see when reviewing the biosafety process. Therefore, according to some interpretations, there was some kind of gap regarding Law No. 20247, “Of Seed and Phytogenetic Creations,” because, while being experimented, events and varieties were not actual “seeds,”[321] since they had not been registered as such. Important provisions of this law—such as Article 15, which establishes that SAGPyA may forbid or limit “production, multiplication, diffusion, promotion or commercialization” of “seeds,” when considered “adequate for agronomical or general interest reasons”—were then potentially non applicable to experimental plant GMOs.
Resolution No. 46/04 “complements” Resolution No. 39/03, as it explicitly states. In its Article 1, it creates the National Register of Genetically Modified Plant Organism Operators, and establishes that it is mandatory for all those who “experiment, import, export, produce, multiply, and/or perform any activity with Genetically Modified Plant Organisms (GMPOs)” to register at it. In addition, Article 3 establishes that only registered operators will be able to apply for authorization of “experimental or extensive” release into the environment of GMPOs. And Article 4 establishes that only registered operators will be able to “import or export” GMPO seeds.
Resolution No. 46/04, Article 6, also establishes a National List of Genetically Modified Plant Organisms, where every GMPO should be registered in order for it to enter “the trial or regulated multiplication stages,” following Resolution No. 39/03. Registration requires to fill out a specific form, and to hand in a seed sample. It does not replace the registration of the cultivar at the National Register of Cultivar Property—established in No. Law 20247, Chapter V; and included as an INASE subsection in Decree No. 2817/91, as we shall see.
Resolution No. 46/04 also refers to GM seed handling, which should be clearly identified and securely transported and stored, “in order to prevent the unauthorized release of the seeds.” Personnel involved in the process, “from reception of the seeds, sowing, cultivation, harvest, processing, preparation, storage, export and any other use” should be “specially trained.” Within ten days of sowing, the petitioner should inform the Coordination of Special Projects on Biotechnology, at SAGPyA Seed Area, on the quantity of seed used, the area sown, the seed left—which should be appropriately stored—, among other information on the process. The petitioner should also guarantee the equipment used for processing the harvested seeds is appropriately cleaned in order to prevent “escapes.” All equipment, as well as handling and storage areas could be inspected by SAGPyA. The petitioner should make sure SAGPyA “and/or other competent official bodies” will be able to access the area involved in the whole process “during the process as well as in posterior years.”
Resolution No. 46/04 also establishes that non compliance will be punished according to Law No. 20247, article 38; and according to Decree No. 2817, article 20—both of which establish fines and other penalties.
A.1.2. Relevant laws and decrees
In addition to the specific administrative (non-legislative) resolutions issued by SAGPyA and SENASA just commented, Argentina’s regulation of GMOs builds on preexisting laws and decrees, as well as on laws and decrees issued in the ‘90s following the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This paper will review the most relevant ones, which deal with protection of intellectual property, protection of the environment, and with phytosanitary issues. These laws and decrees give the biosafety regulatory system some of the “teeth” its administrative norms lack.
Legislation regarding intellectual property:
Law No. 20247, “Of Seed and Phytogenetic Creations,” issued in 1973, and Decree No. 2183, issued in 1991, protect the right of the plant breeder. Following this law, Decree No. 2817 created the National Seed Institute (INASE) within SAGPyA in 1991. INASE is in charge of the National Register of Cultivar Property (RNPC).
In addition, in 1994 Argentina officially adhere to 1978 UPOV Act, by Law No. 24376, which foresees the right for the farmer to keep seeds to replant, on three conditions: that the person who uses them is a farmer, that the seeds originate in his own harvest and that the seeds are used in his own lands. Protection is granted for 20 years. [322]
Regarding genetic innovation, Laws No. 24481 and 24572, issued in 2000, provide the framework for patenting pharmaceutical products, “an old request of multinational companies that previous legislation did not contemplate,” in Trigo et al.’s description. These laws are in agreement with TRIPS, and allow patenting of biotechnological products and processes provided the product fulfills “patentability conditions”: that it is a universal innovation, has inventive status, and is susceptible of industrial use. Although these laws exclude granting patents on “all living materials and substances naturally existent,” those allow for the patenting of “transgenic plants and animals,” according to Carullo and Dellacha.[323] Protection is granted for 17 years. [324]
While acknowledging that certain inconsistencies remain, Trigo et al. comment,
“(…) the regulatory framework regarding biotechnological products is based on the traditional legal body that regulates the seed market, and on patent legislation, which complement each other in order to protect innovation, genes or events, as well as its ‘material vehicle’, that is, the variety. Both seem to converge in offering an adequate framework to protect innovations.”[325]
Legislation regarding confidentiality of business information:
Following Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Law No. 24766, issued in 1999, grants protection of confidential information. It also establishes it is mandatory to notify on the confidential character of the information involved, and grants special protection for novel chemical, pharmaceutical and agricultural products.[326]
Legislation regarding phytosanitary protection:
Legislation includes Law-Decree No. 6704/63 of “Sanitary defense for agricultural protection” and its modifications regarding plant protection; and Law No. 13636/49 of “Veterinarian products - Control of its production and commercialization” regarding animal sanitary issues. [327] It is particularly important the former, which establishes the Executive Power jurisdiction on “sanitary defense” against “harmful animals, plants or agents of any biological origin.” It includes penalties for non compliance.
Legislation regarding protection of the environment:
Article 41 of the National Constitution—which foresees environmental rights for Argentine inhabitants, present and future, states:
“All inhabitants have the right to have a healthy, balanced environment, apt for human development and for productive activities that satisfy present needs without compromising those of future generations; and have the duty of preserving it. Environmental damage will primarily generate the obligation of recomposing, according to legislation. (…) The entrance into the national territory of residues actually or potentially dangerous, and of radioactive residues, is forbidden.”
In addition, Law No. 25675, “On the environment,” establishes “minimal requirements for a sustainable and adequate management of the environment.” It states the aims of a “national environmental policy” should include, among others: to ensure preservation, conservation, remediation, and improvement of environmental resources “both natural and cultural”; to promote the improvement of the quality of life of present and future generations; to stimulate “social participation” in decision-making processes; to promote “rational and sustainable” use of natural resources; to organize and put together information on the environment, and to ensure people’s free access to it; to ensure biodiversity conservation.
Law No. 25675 establishes mandatory environmental impact assessment of “any action or activity” which may harm the environment or affect people’s quality of life. It also foresees “citizen’s participation” regarding “administrative procedures related to environmental preservation and protection.”
Regarding access to information, it establishes that “every inhabitant could obtain from authorities the environmental information administered by them which is not considered legally reserved.”
Regarding “citizen’s participation,” it states, “authorities should institutionalize procedures for consultation and public audiences as mandatory steps for authorization of those activities which may have negative and significant effects on the environment.” Public opinions or objections would be non-binding.
A.2. Institutions involved in GM crop regulation
As already commented while reviewing SAGPyA Resolution No. 39/03, within SAGPyA three institutions are in charge of Argentina’s regulatory system for agricultural biotechnology: environmental risk assessment is in charge of CONABIA; food safety assessment is in charge of SENASA (also partly in charge of CONABIA); and market impact assessment is in charge of the DNMA.
CONABIA and the Biotechnology Office (BO)
The National Advisory Commission on Agricultural Biotechnology (CONABIA) is an advisory body within SAGPyA, created by SAGyP Resolution No. 124 in 1991—as already commented—, and integrated by representatives of public research institutions, governmental offices, trade chambers and associations, and a scientific society. Its membership has been successively enlarged, first to include more representatives from the private sector, and then to include more representatives from governmental offices and public research institutions. The original members of CONABIA, as foreseen in the already mentioned SAGyP Resolution No. 124/91; and SAGyP Resolution No. 669/93, were:
Public sector:
-Two representatives from the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA)
-Two representatives from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA)
-Two representatives from the National Science and Technology Research Council (CONICET)
-The national director from the Directorate of Agricultural Production and Commercialization
-The national director from the National Seeds Institute (INASE)
-The general administrator from the National Agrifood Health and Quality Service (SENASA)
-The national director from the Directorate of Agricultural Production (who would serve as CONABIA’s “general coordinator”).
Private sector:
-Two representatives from the Argentine Biotechnology Forum (FAB)
-Two representatives from the Argentine Seed Growers Association (ASA)
-Two representatives from the private livestock sector (later on, it would be selected the Argentine Chamber of Veterinary Products, CAPROVE).
In 1997, Resolution No. 328/97 foresaw the director of the National Directorate of Agricultural Production would serve as CONABIA’s “technical coordinator,” and her superior, the director of the National Directorate Agricultural and Forestry Production and Economy, would serve as CONABIA’s “general coordinator.” In addition, new members were invited to join CONABIA—the most interesting cases were those related to the Secretariat of Health and the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environmental Policies.[328]
Finally, in 2004, SAGPyA Resolution No. 244/04, which created the Biotechnology Office (BO), slightly restructured CONABIA. BO supersedes CONABIA and has more clearly stated aims. Its main responsibility is “to advise and assist” SAGPyA in dealing with:
-“activities related to biotechnology and biosafety, specially in the authorization of releases into the environment and commercialization of genetically modified plant or animal organisms, originated in agricultural and aquaculture activities”;
-“the definition of policies and design of specific norms”; and
-“the diffusion” of SAGPyA’s activities regarding biotechnology.
Following Resolution No. 244/04, BO has a general co-ordinator, an executive co-ordinator, and three technical coordinators—one in charge of biosafety issues, one in charge of policy analysis and formulation, and one in charge of regulatory design.[329] BO general coordinator will serve also as CONABIA executive secretary, and BO biosafety technical coordinator will be part of CONABIA. This resolution also states that all members of CONABIA will serve “ad honorem,” that is, without salary.
In Resolution No. 244/04 new members are invited to join CONABIA, all of them from the public scientific sector.[330] Burachik and Traynor mention a representative of the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environmental Policies, although invited to join CONABIA in 1997, only did it in 2000. [331] The Ministry of Health, although invited to name two representatives to CONABIA, has not appointed a permanent representative as late as May 2005.[332] This delay may not be attributable to problems between institutions but to some kind of lack of interest in these issues.
Each institution would have one vote. As previous resolutions stated, Resolution No. 244/04 establishes that a simple majority is needed for approvals; in case of even votes, the executive secretary’s vote would count double. However, final decisions are taken by consensus, as will be commented while reviewing the regulatory process.
CONABIA successive enlargements—particularly, the inclusion of representatives from the Ministry of Health and Environment—may be attributed at least in part to the growing climate of criticism regarding GMOs in the late ‘90s, both internationally and, up to a certain extent, national.[333] It may also be seen—not contradicting the former appreciation—as part of a continuous effort to improve its performance. It is quite clear that CONABIA composition reflects a “stakeholder’s representation” theory. In this sense, the inclusion of a growing number of representatives from public research institutions may represent not only a reaction to criticism regarding the dominant role private actors—mostly multinationals—have played in promoting GMOs locally and globally, but also interest in promoting the involvement of local scientists in the development of biotechnology, as we shall see in Part III when discussing BO first initiatives.
Regarding representation of consumers groups or environmental NGOs, members of CONABIA have argued that it is a technical advisory group, and that greater transparency is achieved through only taking into account technical arguments, “as both biosafety reviews and decisions must be consistent with available scientific information,” as Burachik and Traynor comment.[334]
CONABIA meetings are scheduled on an as-needed basis, averaging once every two weeks. While most members are concerned with plant GMOs, a few of them focus on products for veterinary use. As research on transgenic animals began to take place in the early 2000,[335] CONABIA prepared a resolution for these activities, which was issued in 2003 as SAGPyA Resolution No. 57/03, “Projects of Experimentation and/or Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Animal Organisms (GMAOs).”
As already commented while reviewing SAGPyA Resolution No. 39/03, although CONABIA has a clear regulatory mandate on environmental issues, it also asks for information on food safety issues. This decision has been made assuming that “human health effects must be assessed prior to field testing, as unauthorized consumption of GMOs cannot be completely ruled out,” as Burachik and Traynor argue.[336] It certainly opens the door to conflicts of jurisdiction with TAC – SENASA, although apparently that has not been the case so far.[337]
Burachik and Traynor also report that CONABIA has been informally approached for technical advice by industry representatives and scientists regarding matters not regulated by it—such as non-GM microbial formulations and bioremediation of contaminated soils. This situation somehow talks about CONABIA experts’ prestige and influence.
Regarding conflict of interest, a potential is always present, given CONABIA public-private composition. In relation to this, its members are encouraged to perform a voluntary disclosure of “any business interests, affiliations, and relationships” with the industry or “other research groups” prior to appointment. As Burachik and Traynor report, “Involved members are not allowed to take part in decisions pertaining to GMOs associated with their personal or professional interests.”[338]
Regarding confidential business information, given CONABIA members’ potential conflict of interest, the burden of reviewing it is mostly handled by only two people. CONABIA has not received complaints that confidential business information has been improperly handled so far.[339]
SENASA
The National Agrifood Health and Quality Service (SENASA) is the agency within SAGPyA in charge of regulating food safety and quality, animal health products such as vaccines, as well as pesticides. Its regulatory authority has been granted under Law 18284 on Argentine Food Codex; Decree 1585/96 on the creation and jurisdiction of SENASA; Decree 4238 on meat inspection; and Decree 815/99 on the food-control system. It is a fully empowered agency, which can issue its own administrative resolutions, and which can also develop rules applicable to outside institutions, such as grocery stores. [340]
In order to deal with GMOs, a Technical Advisory Commission on the Use of GMOs (TAC) was created within SENASA, by SENASA Resolution 1265, issued in 1999, and already commented. TAC includes representatives of public and private sector research institutions, government agencies, industry chambers, farmers associations, and a consumers group.[341] “Its main purpose is to provide SENASA with an external, multidisciplinary advisory body that will give a broader base to its regulatory decisions,” as described by Cohen et al.[342] TAC activities started with a thorough review of Resolution No. 511/98. As a result of this review, in 2002 SENASA issued the already analyzed Resolution No. 412. According to Burachik and Traynor, the creation of TAC “[has] speeded up the food-safety review process, which, in previous cases, had taken far longer than most applicants’ expectations.”[343]
INASE
The National Institute of Seeds (INASE) is the SAGPyA agency in charge of registering and controlling all commercially marketed seeds. GM varieties are treated similarly to new non-GM hybrids, and submitted to the same performance tests. After reviewing the results, a Technical Advisory Committee of the National Seed Commission (CONASE) decides if the materials submitted qualify as a new variety.
INASE also plays a role in the biosafety system by receiving and sorting applications of authorization for field trials. Confidential Information is filed at INASE. Its personnel inspect field trials of GM crops, checking for compliance with CONABIA biosafety requirements. [344]
INASE dissolution in 2000, as part of the process to “modernize” the state, as President Fernando de la Rua’s administration stated, was reversed by many actors’ criticism, as commented in Part I. INASE was reinstated with the same attributions it had before being dissolved, according to Law 25845, sanctioned on November 26, 2003 and issued on January 6, 2004, which revoked Decree 1104/2000, and reestablished Decree 2817/91.
Law 25845 slightly changes INASE directorate composition, which is established as follows: a president, a vice-president, and eight directors. Only the president—designated by the Executive Power following a proposal by SAGPyA head—perceives a salary; all other positions are ad honorem. A representative from the Federal Agricultural Council (CFA)—an advisory body to the Executive Power created in 1973—will serve as vice-president. The eight directors include a representative from SAGPyA, a representative from the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA), and six representatives from different private sectors involved in the commercial marketing and use of seeds.
A.3. The regulatory process
As already commented while reviewing SAGPyA Resolution No. 39/03, a three-way review process is needed to complete the impact evaluation of a genetically modified plant organism in order to be granted approval for commercial release in Argentina: environmental risk assessment is in charge of CONABIA; food safety assessment is in charge of SENASA; and market impact assessment is in charge of DNMA. The final decision is in charge of SAGPyA head.[345]
Applications for field trials—as described in Resolution No. 39/03—are received by INASE and passed on to CONABIA, which performs a preliminary review looking for missing information or inconsistencies. Once complete, the application is submitted to the full commission. As already commented, a case to consider involves a specific petitioner and a well-defined transformation event in a given crop. Changing any of those implies a new application must be submitted. At this stage, CONABIA members may individually seek for additional information, or consult outside experts for clarification—local scientific capacity plays a role here.[346]
When all CONABIA members consider they have enough information, a decision to recommend authorization or denial is taken. Then, the petitioner is notified the approval. The letter usually states “additional requirements, which are needed to ensure biosafety and/or for completing the information on the release.” The petitioner must acknowledge and respond to this letter with a “written notification of agreement to the conditions set forth by CONABIA.” Then a “recommendation for approval” is sent to SAGPyA head.[347]
A similar procedure is taken for the second stage of environmental impact assessment. Although successive resolutions which established CONABIA membership stipulate that a simple majority of votes is needed, final decisions are taken by consensus.[348] As Burachik and Traynor describe, when there is no agreement among CONABIA members, the situation is solved with further information and discussion:
“Should unanimous agreement not be reached after initial deliberations, the issue remains pending. Lack of consensus is interpreted as lack of information somewhere in the analysis or discussion process. The discussion then shifts to define what information is needed and how to obtain it. Once resolved, the Commission resumes discussion and, eventually, reaches consensus on its recommendation.”[349]
Since CONABIA second stage of assessment includes food safety issues, its decision documents are submitted to SENASA—in charge of the food safety review—as a “non-binding, preliminary review.”[350]
SENASA thorough food safety review is based on requirements established by SENASA Resolution No. 412/02, as already commented. The application is discussed in TAC plenary meetings, “although technical members take the lead, giving non-technical members an opportunity to verify that the evaluation is being done properly and consumer concerns are being taken into account.”[351] TAC then sends its position on the commercial approval of the GMO to SENASA president, through bureaucratic channels.
Then, it is the turn of the National Directorate of Agri-Food Marketing (DNMA), which conducts the market impact assessment. DNMA takes into account the following issues: Argentina’s position in international trade regarding the crop considered for the past three years; an estimation of each exporting country’s share of the market; market position of competitors; “the situation in client countries in terms of regulatory status and consumer acceptability”; and “any supporting or relevant information.” DNMA technical report is considered “the final determinant on commercialization” of any GM seed. [352]
CONABIA, SENASA, and DNMA reviews are the basis for a “Project of Resolution,” prepared by CONABIA. When signed by SAGPyA head, it grants approval for the commercial use of the GMO. The petitioner then applies to INASE for a new variety registration, as for conventional varieties. An additional, specific authorization from SENASA is required in case the GMO has pesticidal proteins—such as Bt corn—, or is herbicide tolerant—such as RR soybean, as for conventional varieties.[353]
Regarding cost of complying with Argentina’s biosafety regulation, a systematic study “has not yet been undertaken.”[354]
Other GM crop regulatory issues:
Inspections of field trials:
As already commented, Resolution No. 39/03 establishes inspections of field trials are in charge of personnel authorized by SAGPyA, and expenses are in charge of the petitioner. Occasionally, CONABIA members also conduct inspections. Every field trial is usually inspected more than once, “more often two or three times,” according to Burachik and Traynor.[355] Usually, inspections are conducted at flowering and harvest stages, and there are also post harvest inspections.[356]
Public participation and public communication:
Regarding public participation, Argentina’s regulatory process does not include a mandatory public review.
Regarding public communication, although it is not mandatory, authorizations of trials are yearly published on the internet, at SAGPyA website, stating: the petitioner company, crop involved, kind and name of the event, and kind of approval (for greenhouse test, field trial, or seed multiplication, named as “production”).
CONABIA final dicta have also been routinely published on the internet for a couple of years now. SAGPyA resolutions granting approval for commercial release are also published on the internet.
Requirements of information are handled by CONABIA, which meets with NGOs “and other opinion groups both formally, at meetings organized by third parties, and informally.”[357]
Other GM crop regulatory programs
Import and export of GM seeds and food products:
SENASA administers plant- and animal-quarantine regulations and phytosanitary requirements. When plants, plant parts, or animals intended for research are imported into Argentina, SENASA asks the importer to declare if those are genetically modified. If that is the case, the import application is referred to CONABIA. The applicant then has to provide CONABIA with a detailed description of the GMO, the nature of the work, and the facilities where the research is to be performed. While CONABIA conducts a safety assessment, and until authorization for importation is granted, SENASA provides temporary storage of the GMO in a “secure” place.[358]
As already commented, following SAGPyA Resolution No. 46/04, “import and/or export of Genetically Modified Plant Organisms (GMPOs)” that have not been authorized for commercialization in Argentina “could only be performed by a person registered” at the National Register of Genetically Modified Plant Organism Operators.
Regarding import of processed GM food, there are no special provisions. Following Decree 815/99—which establishes the National System of Food Control, in order to ensure compliance with the Argentine Food Codex—imported processed food is under supervision of the National Institute of Food (INAL), part of the National Administration of Food, Drugs and Medical Technology (ANMAT), within the Ministry of Health and Environment. It is accepted that food containing some GMOs not approved for commercialization in Argentina—which, therefore, have not been submitted to food safety review—has already been imported from the US.[359] This is certainly inconsistent regarding the design of the biosafety regulatory system, but fairly consistent with Argentina’s international position on GMOs, as we shall see in Part IV.
Post commercialization monitoring:
SENASA Resolution No. 412/02 establishes that the petitioner should present a project for monitoring the “event genetic stability and expression, in order to verify the structural and functional identity as it was approved, during the whole period of commercialization,” as already commented.
Regarding environmental issues, the only post-commercialization monitoring that takes place in Argentina has to do with insect-resistant management for Bt corn and Bt cotton. It is in charge of the seed industry, under the umbrella of the Argentine Seed Growers Association (ASA), and it follows CONABIA recommendations. As Burachik and Traynor report, “preliminary observations by ASA representatives indicate a good level of farmer compliance with the plan.” In the second quarter of 2001 compliance was estimated as 85 to 90 percent in the case of Bt cotton, and 68 percent in the case of Bt corn.[360]
Recall of GM food products:
SENASA Resolution No. 412/02 establishes that the petitioner should promise to recall “the product derived directly from the event in case SENASA requires to do it, based on reasonable causes.”
Pharma crops:
There are currently no special provisions regarding GM crops designed to produce pharmaceutical products in Argentina’s legislation and administrative procedures. Special provisions have not been considered necessary so far, since SAGPyA has not received any request for field trials for this kind of GM crops yet.[361]
A National Advisory Committee for Biotechnology and Health (CONBYSA), established by government Resolution No. 413/93 from the Secretariat of Health, advises the National Administration of Drugs, Food, and Medical Technologies, an agency within the Ministry of Health. CONBYSA has produced documents with recommendations regarding the regulatory framework for biopharmaceuticals, among others.[362]
In case a pharma crop was presented for authorization, it would be handled by CONABIA and CONBYSA.
Labeling:
During the experimental period, stringent rules for the identification of the GMO being tested are established, including specific labels intended to clearly identify experimental seeds. Storage rules are also stringent.
After approval for commercialization is granted, GM crops and GM food are not label as such, and are treated as their conventional counterparts. From time to time—usually, after NGO campaigns—, there have been attempts at labeling or identifying GM food at municipal or provincial levels. Those are discouraged by SENASA and SAGPyA, on the grounds that such labeling is not mandatory for companies.[363] Some companies, particularly those specialized in “healthy” or “natural” food, put GMO-free type labels on their products.[364]
As we shall see in Part IV, in international fora Argentina opposes labeling of GM crops or food.
B. Field trials
A merely numerical analysis of the authorizations for GMOs field trials that have been granted by CONABIA since 1991 shows that undoubtedly Argentina’s regulatory system has been performing well in terms of achieving one of the goals it was set up for—the corporate one. Of the total 495 field trials authorized until 2001, 380 were requested by multinational corporations, 72 by national companies, 38 by public research institutes, and 5 by public universities. [365] In 2002, 71 further authorizations were issued, 98 in 2003, and 121 in 2004 showing the same patterns. From 1991 to 2004, 788 field releases were authorized.[366] And all commercial approvals granted as of September 2005—and mentioned in Part I—have to do with events developed by multinational firms.
About the GMOs involved, from 1991 to 2004, corn leads with 54 percent of authorized field trials, followed by soybean with 15 percent, sunflower with 10 percent, cotton with 7 percent, rice with 4 percent, potato with 3 percent, wheat and alfalfa with 2 percent. Among others (3 percent) there are tobacco, fruits, and vaccines. Regarding the incorporated features, insect resistance leads with 26 percent of the field trials, followed by herbicide tolerance with 25 percent, both characteristics with 26 percent, quality traits with 10 percent, virus resistance with 3 percent, pathology resistance with 2 percent, while other characteristics represent 8 percent of approved field trials.[367] “Only in potato and alfalfa there is an important presence of local R&D, particularly by INTA,” as Trigo et al. comment. [368]
One of the most interesting aspects of CONABIA’s policy is that it is extremely cautious regarding crops that have wild relatives in Argentina, particularly regarding canola and sunflower—in accordance with it, SAGyP Resolution No. 656/92 establishes the most stringent conditions for field trials for these two crops, as already commented.
Burachik and Traynor report two key examples of this policy. Although canola is not extensively cultivated in Argentina, when an authorization for a relatively large field trial—500 ha—to test a glyphosate-resistant canola was requested, it was denied. Three kinds of considerations were made: “the applicant’s apparent intention” to move towards off-season seed increase for export and/or eventual commercialization in Argentina; the “inevitability” of outcrossing to compatible weeds—estimated at 20 percent—; and socio economic reasons, since the “extensive use of glyphosate by canola growers” would favor the growth of glyphosate-tolerant crop-weed hybrids, “which could be controlled only by less environmentally acceptable herbicides.” As a result, farmers would have to switch to “more expensive inputs.” Neither the petitioner nor other seed companies have submitted applications for field trials of other herbicide-tolerant canola.[369]
A precautionary policy is also taken regarding sunflower. As already commented, even if 10 percent of the field trials authorized and performed in Argentina between 1991 and 2004 involved sunflower, no GM sunflower has been approved for commercial release as of September 2005. Indeed, there is much discussion regarding the benefits and costs of approving a GM sunflower variety for commercialization. This is a much more important crop than canola in Argentina: sunflower is the second oil crop in the country after soybean, with 1.9 million ha planted, and an estimated production of 3.6 million tones in 2004/2005.[370] Although sunflower is by far the most extensively consumed oil in Argentina—70 percent—, Argentina ranks first among sunflower exporters: in 2005, it is estimated it will have a 40 percent of the international market share.[371]
The potential value of GM sunflower varieties has been acknowledged by CONABIA, which promotes an industry-sponsored Sunflower Biosafety Project. Its first results, concerning the problem of gene flow were presented to CONABIA in July 2001.[372]
There is another interesting analysis about GM sunflower in Argentina. A study on the potential impact of the introduction of GM sunflower sponsored by Monsanto and commissioned by the Argentine Sunflower Association (Asagir), concludes that “it is technically feasible to produce GM sunflower and there are no unmanageable risks.” The study also finds that “glyphosate-resistance is the biotechnological event which would best adapt.” Two other conflicting factors are crucial. One has to do with profitability in face of better revenues offered by other crops: the study foresees that if production with conventional varieties continues, it is expectable the area planted with sunflower will diminish. The other has to do with coexistence of GM and non GM varieties: both from a biological and a commercial point of view, coexistence is considered “non viable.” [373] There is much discussion of what to do regarding a potential GM sunflower in Argentina, in face of competitors such as Russia and Ukraine.[374] There are different positions—currently, precaution seems to be the norm.
Other cultivated species that have wild relatives in Argentina are alfalfa, rice, oat, potato, sweet potato, strawberry, asparagus, peanuts, tomato, carrots, lettuce, and different kinds of beans. Approval for any GM variety of these species should be carefully reviewed and considered, according to Poverene and Cantamutto.[375]
As already detailed in Part I, ten approvals for commercialization have been granted since 1996: one for GM soybean, seven for GM corn, and two for GM cotton.
C. Evaluations
Among other reports that have expressed positive evaluations on Argentina’s biosafety system, it is important to note that Argentina’s—along with Egypt’s—biosafety system has been praised by the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report 2001. This report points to Argentina and Egypt as examples of developing countries that “are moving forward in creating national guidelines, approval procedures and research institutes to evaluate GMO risk,” as an official press release on the report commented.[376] The report says both countries “share several successes in the way they have strengthened their capacity to handle biosafety issues.” It mentions in particular that national guidelines in these two countries were developed “by examining regulations from countries with expertise in this area, then adapting the regulations to agricultural conditions;” that regulations “were built on existing laws,” and “evolved over time, allowing regulatory procedures to be coordinated among ministries and regulators;” that these systems rely on local “advanced research institutes” experts; and that “clear standards have been established for evaluating the risks of a proposed release.” As a result, the report comments:
“Such policies show that, even when facing initial disadvantages, developing countries can create biosafety systems that enable them to move forward in managing technological safety.”[377]
Cohen et al.’s analysis—prepared for the International Service for National Agriculture Research (ISNAR) in 2001—also stresses the similarities between Argentina’s and Egypt’s biosafety systems. One important common feature is that in both countries, according to Cohen et al. “the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for environmental safety reviews, and the Ministry of Health is responsible for food safety reviews, and the Ministry of Environment has limited involvement in the regulatory process.” However, this is not completely true for Argentina. As we have seen, food safety assessment is performed by SENASA within SAGPyA (Ministry of Economy), although the health area of the Ministry of Health is represented by four representatives in SENASA Technical Advisory Committee.
Cohen et al. first praise Argentina’s and Egypt’s safety systems “similar strengths”:
“biosafety guidelines are operational, reviewers are generally confident and competent in their decision making, product reviews are largely science-based and timely, and feedback is used to improve the system.”[378]
However, Cohen et al. also address these systems’ shortcomings: that they only have “a modest level of support from paid staff,” and that the two countries “have a limited pool of scientists with the kind of expertise needed for a national biosafety committee.” As a result, “the committees must make a concerted effort to avoid conflicts of interest and to diversify their membership as much as possible.” Another common weakness is the fact that neither Argentina nor Egypt gives consideration “to either potential benefits or the risks of continuing to use current varieties and associated growing practices (such as damaging pesticide use).”[379]
Regarding specific recommendations to Argentina, Cohen et al. take into account three central aspects:
“1. Clarify and strengthen national and institutional policies:
- Develop and implement policies on the use of biotechnology in agriculture and the role of biosafety in technology adoption.
- Resolve issues of hierarchy and scope of authority.
- Engage the Ministry of Environment.
- Mandate additional CONABIA activities to include serving as an information resource, providing regional assistance, and advising the foreign office in international negotiations.
- Explore legal means to enforce compliance.
2. Strengthen the scientific base:
- Identify data needs for science-based safety assessments.
- Develop methods and mechanisms for ecological monitoring.
- Promote and support risk assessment research.
3. Implement a public awareness program:
- Conduct media programs.
- Increase the visibility of the biosafety system.
- Expand opportunities to disseminate information to all interested parties.
- Provide a means for open discussion of consumer-related concerns such as labeling.”[380]
Other important aspects in Cohen et al.’s analysis are considered under the title “common lessons.” Of those, it is worth noting the emphasis on the fact that Argentina’s as well as Egypt’s biosafety system only analyze risks associated with GMOs, but not benefits; and on the fact that “components of the regulatory system are implemented as needed.” The latter aspect could have negative and positive effects: it may make “internal consistency difficult to achieve,” and may reduce “coordination within, and coherency of, the total system.” On the positive side, authors note “this type of implementation allows each of the component ‘to be fitted in’ based on familiarity and experience with existing parts of the system.”[381]
Finally, Cohen et al. also mention that risk assessment is ultimately a kind of negotiation between risks and benefits, and suggest that biosafety systems should be adapted to local values and needs. As they put it, what each country considers “a risk” and “how much risk is acceptable” would help determine “the criteria that set acceptable trade-off levels between increased productivity and possible environmental or health effects.” They also warn that “regulatory procedures can be designed to either raise or lower barriers to research, development, and use of GM products.”[382]
Flint et al.’s comparative evaluation of Argentina’s, Canada’s and Chile’s biosafety systems, prepared for CamBioTec—Canadian and Latin American Biotechnology Intitiative for Sustainable Development—and issued in 2000, also makes a positive evaluation of Argentina’s biosafety system. It says SAGPyA “has done a very good job developing information systems to suit their current needs.” It highlights the fact that SAGPyA has created a website with features information on regulation and field releases, among other important aspects, such as contact information. Regulators were “found to be well informed about biosafety issues.”
Regarding recommendations, their main concern has to do with CONABIA’s capacity for handling “large volumes of information,” considering that, at the time the report was being written, applications had increased one hundred percent in one year—from 1996 to 1997. In comparison, the Chilean biosafety system is considered as being “still in its infancy.”[383]
Another study, performed by MacKenzie in 2001 for The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, compares the regulatory biosafety frameworks of Argentina, Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, and the US. It is certainly remarkable that the only developing country considered is Argentina—China, India, Mexico, Brazil or South Africa, for example, could have also been considered. Since it is not an evaluative assessment but simply a brief description of the regulatory systems considered, I will only mention the final remarks by McKenzie regarding Argentina, which point at distinctive characteristics, particularly the almost impossibility of segregation, and the absence of public health programs regarding post-marketing surveillance:
“At present, the segregation of genetically engineered commodities within the food supply chain is not practiced to any significant extent, nor is it seen as practicable with the current infrastructure. Should segregation become an issue, it will have an obvious impact on Argentina’s labeling requirements for genetically engineered foods, which are currently similar to those of Canada and the US. Bioengineered foods in which the nutritional quality, toxicology, or potential for allergenicity is significantly altered must be so labeled. There are no organized programs of population health surveillance related to any particular kind of food, including genetically engineered.”[384]
Regarding health surveillance, however, MacKenzie also mentions that under SENASA Resolution No. 511, issued in 1998, “companies with products approved for commercialization ‘are not exempted’ from a standard of care regarding continued surveillance for unanticipated effects.” [385] As already commented, this resolution has been replaced by SENASA Resolution No. 412/02, which following Codex Alimentarius Alinorm 01/34 Appendixes II and III, includes pre-approval analysis of unintended effects. Specifically, following Appendix II Article 18, it states that “risk management should take into account the uncertainties identified in the risk assessment and implement appropriate measures to manage these uncertainties.” While, as already commented, Resolution No. 412/02 skips Article 19—which mentions “labelling”—, it includes Article 20, which establishes that post-market monitoring “may be an appropriate risk management measure in specific circumstances.” [386] As already commented, Resolution No. 412/02 establishes that the petitioner should present a project for monitoring the “event genetic stability and expression, in order to verify the structural and functional identity as it was approved, during the whole period of commercialization”
In another comparative study which analyzes non-science issues in biotechnology regulations—prepared by Silverman for The Canadian Biotechnology Committee in 2000—Argentina is again the only developing country considered, apart from Denmark, UK, France, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the EU as a block.[387] Regarding Argentina, Silverman notes that “there are no ethics bodies that provide input into the regulatory process.” He considers that this weakness may be balanced up to a certain point by “the public and other stakeholders that are in some way represented in CONABIA.” However, the best practices he proposes include an ethics advisory body defined as “an independent body established by the government,” and composed of “chairperson and minority of members appointed by the government,” as well as by a body which should have “a mix of expert professionals and lay persons.” He thinks this body could “assist in reaching out to the public,” and lend credibility.[388] CONABIA fits quite well in a picture defined only by the first two characteristics. But it does not have representatives of the “public,” in the form of “lay persons.” As already seen, non consumers group is represented in CONABIA, and only one in SENASA TAC.
Another review performed in 2001 by Oliver, an Argentine expert, analyzes the political and judiciary aspects of GMOs biosafety systems at a regional level. [389] After comparing some Latin American biosafety systems (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) she mentions some of the “legal voids” and “critical points” these biosafety systems face. Her criticism points at four crucial aspects; all of them apply to Argentina. The first one is that these regulatory systems have not established legal steps for public participation. She suggests public participation would help in improving the decision-making process, in legitimizing decisions before society as a whole, and in making governmental actions transparent.
The second negative aspect Oliver mentions has to do with what she calls “the complex issue of ‘responsibility’ for the damages that may be caused to health or the environment because of the liberation or commercialization of GMOs.”[390] The only exception in this aspect is Brazil. Her third point deals with expert capacity. She comments that, “unfortunately, most Latin American countries have to face institutions that are weakened and impoverished regarding resources—either human, technical and economic.”[391] This is also the situation of the biosafety regulatory systems, according to Oliver. Among other negative consequences of this situation, she mentions the difficulties for increasing the number of experts involved, and the impossibility of performing certain tasks—such as “large-scale monitoring in risk evaluation,” and enforcing legal norms.[392]
Finally, the last point Oliver makes regarding Latin American countries’ biosafety systems has to do with the fact that no regional standardization has taken place in her view. One important negative consequence—particularly, for an exporting country such as Argentina—is that these differences may be used as “trade barriers.” She also points out that this standardization process would not be simple.
So far, the most extensive review of Argentina’s biosafety system was performed by Burachik and Traynor in 2002, as part of a project set up by ISNAR’s Biotechnology Service (IBS) and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.[393] As already commented, Burachik was at the time a member of CONABIA, and in 2004 was appointed general co-ordinator of the Biotechnology Office. This study had three kinds of sources of information: members of the national biosafety committee who serve as reviewers and decision makers; applicants from public research institutes and private companies who are customers of the biosafety system; and representatives from the media and from consumers and environmental groups—among them, a representative from Greenpeace Argentina. All interviewees were asked for suggestions on ways for improving any part of the system. The review includes a comment on the context for biotechnology in Argentina; a description of the current regulatory system and how it was developed, as well as its interactions with private sectors;[394] and a portrayal of public attitudes towards biotechnology, as well as recommendations.
One of the important points Burachik and Traynor make has to do with regulatory harmonization, at the regional and international level. They list a number of meetings mostly intended to facilitate regional harmonization—the first, on regional harmonization, was organized by the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) and the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applicationa (ISAAA), and took place in Buenos Aires as early as 1992. In 1995, delegates to the 2nd Latin Americal Meeting on Plant Biotechnology agreed on the need of regional harmonization. In the same sense, in 1996 an Argentine-UK workshop intended to promote the establishment of common criteria for biosafety oversight in the Southern Cone was held in Buenos Aires with delegates from Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.
One of the outcomes of these sustained efforts is that CONABIA gave direct assistance on a consultancy basis to Uruguay (since 1996), Paraguay (since 1997), and Bolivia (in 2000). CONABIA also made consistent efforts to get to a regulatory harmonization with the US and Canada, in the context of the US-Canada agreement on molecular biology data standardization. As the authors comment, the short term outcome of these efforts would be:
“1) an enhanced information exchange between the respective national agencies, and
2) the probable adoption by Argentina of the Molecular Characterization Data format for release permit request.”[395]
Regarding evaluation and recommendations, Burachik and Traynor’s report takes into account three aspects: the general policy environment, the organization and operation of the biosafety system, and the status of public awareness and acceptance. I will consider the last one in Part V.
On the general policy environment, Burachik and Traynor’s report comments that being CONABIA only an advisory board, and SENASA a fully empowered regulatory agency, “ad hoc actions on the part of one body have in some cases given the appearance of overlapping the institutional role of another, particularly to food safety review.” In this sense, the recommendation is “to clarify and strengthen national and institutional policies,” particularly giving CONABIA “the institutional support that currently is lacking.”
It is important to note that the report also mentions members of CONABIA “have a sense of mission and adhere to a code of conduct regarding conflict of interest,” a particularly sensitive point because of the potential conflict of interests. The report comments that “environmental and consumer activists credit CONABIA with having the proper expertise for biosafety review, doing a reasonably good job in evaluating proposals, and being open and accessible.”
Burachik and Traynor’s report also expresses some concern on the lack of enforcement mechanisms regarding violations of biosafety regulations.
Regarding procedures, the report recommends enhancing transparency by amplifying the number of CONABIA members who share confidential business information—whereas by then was it was shared by only two members—, and adding new members to CONABIA, who should not have ties to the agricultural biotechnology business sector. Some of this has been done, as already commented, with the invitation of representatives from three more public universities, and one more research institute in 2004. Representatives from other public universities are expected to be invited in the near future.[396]
Regarding post-marketing monitoring, Burachik and Traynor’s report recommends monitoring for long-term environmental effects, although acknowledging that “monitoring studies cost money, and thought must be given to who pays and through what mechanism.”
Final recommendations address the need for human resources, particularly regarding “the next generation” of biosafety officials and advisors. The report praises Argentina’s human resources (“Argentina is fortunate in having a strong biological research base with highly trained scientists”), and highlights that technical training should be “an ongoing process.” The report concludes with a general positive evaluation:
“As documented in this report, Argentina has taken a broadly based yet flexible approach to implementing a national biosafety system for GMOs. Where indicated, recommendations are made suggesting additional measures that could help to strengthen it. In total, the organization and operation of the Argentine biosafety system make it a useful model for other countries facing the challenging task of ensuring the safe and responsible use of agricultural biotechnology.”[397]
A more recent comparative analysis of regulatory processes in the US, the EU, South Africa, Taiwan and Argentina establishes five criteria to assess GMOs regulations. The “key components” which Jaffe—from the Center for Science in the Public Interest—considers necessary to a regulatory system that both “ensures safe products” and “engenders public trust” are: mandatory pre-market approval; established safety standards; transparency; public participation; use of outside scientists for expert scientific advice; independent agency decisions; post-approval activities; enforcement authorities and resources. [398]
Argentina is listed among the countries that have developed regulatory systems “that contain adequate legal authority to require pre-market review and approval” along with the EU and South Africa; and among the countries that have “established safety standards” along with the US and the EU.[399]
Regarding transparency, Jaffe considers that in each of the countries analyzed, “some aspects of transparency have been adequately addressed while others are lacking.” In the case of Argentina, there is transparency regarding “information about regulatory processes”—as every other country analyzed—but there is no transparency regarding “application and supporting data for field trials and commercialization.” However, those countries that provide this information only do it partially or in the form of summaries, like the US, the EU and South Africa. Jaffe considers that,
“Although partial information about the process and specific product application is better than nothing, a strong regulatory system that engenders public trust provides as much information as possible.” [400]
Consistently, regarding public participation in Argentina the situation is similar to regarding transparency: except from the consumers group’s representative in TAC – SENASA, there is no chance of public participation.[401]
Another negative aspect Jaffe finds in Argentina’s system has to do with the “use of outside scientists for expert scientific advice.” Jaffe is quite critical on the potential conflict of interest in CONABIA, since its members “conduct transgenic crop research at public institutions, work collaboratively with biotechnology companies, or belong to industry organizations.” To prevent biases, he recommends “those committees should require members to disclose their potential conflicts and recuse themselves when research they are directly involved in comes before the committee.” [402] It is interesting to note that CONABIA already does it, according to Burachik and Traynor, although it is not “required” by any resolution. [403] Jaffe—whose analysis is based, among other sources, on Burachick and Traynor’s report—seems to be asking for a legal commitment.
Regarding Jaffe’s position on independency of the agency in charge of the biosafety process, Argentina is listed among the countries—like Egypt and South Africa—that “have followed the U.S. model and have also established the Agriculture Ministry as the entity overseeing environmental issues surrounding agricultural biotechnology.” This is considered undesirable by Jaffe since the same institution—the USDA or the Secretariat of Agriculture in Argentina—is in charge of both promoting and regulating agriculture. And he recommends,
“To achieve consumer trust in the regulatory process, however, it is imperative that the agency regulating transgenic crops has a clear mandate that its primary responsibility is to protect public health and the environment.”[404]
Regarding “post approval activities,” Jaffe’s reports that those are “unknown” in Argentina, in a context in which “many current systems do not carry out those activities in a consistent manner.” As we have already commented, only two post-market monitoring activities are performed in Argentina, and both by private actors. On this topic, Jaffe has again a strong position, which includes favoring labeling. As he recommends,
“there should be post-approval monitoring for adverse environmental and adverse effects. Similarly, labeling and documentation to trace the transgenic crop in commerce may be other methods to identify harmful environmental effects.”[405]
Regarding “enforcement authority and resources,” Jaffe praises in Argentina “all field releases are inspected at least once”—quoting Burachik and Traynor’s report. Another positive comment on Argentina’s reviewing process has to do with the fact that, regarding “other societal concerns,” it considers the impact of the approval on international trade.[406]
Then Jaffe lists what he calls “key characteristics of a strong regulatory system.” He mentions and describes these characteristics, but not analyzes them regarding any particular national biosafety system. It can be said all of them apply to Argentina’s system, since it is “flexible and adaptable,” “equitable and fair,” with an “easily understandable process,” with a “case-by-case specific review,” and with a “proportionate risk-based review,” according to Jaffe’s classification.[407]
After reviewing all these topics, and having adopted such a strong position on some of them, Jaffe concludes with a somewhat contradictory statement. While he admits the appropriateness that every country has its own legislation according to its needs, he continues to look for some kind of perfect system:
“There is currently no country with an ideal regulatory system, although portions of many different country’s systems are worth using as models. It is important that every country be given the opportunity to establish its own biosafety system so it can make its own determination whether a particular product meets its safety standards.”[408]
Two other reviews of Argentina’s biosafety system are mostly descriptive, and do not add remarkable observations. Nap et al. review regulation for the release of GMOs into the environment of the US, Argentina, Canada, China, the EU, Australasia, Japan, as well as briefly some “other countries.”[409] Pachico reviews the regulatory systems of “the four largest growers of transgenic crops (Argentina, Canada, China, and the United States).” One interesting point in both analyses is the “broad agreement about the food safety and environmental risks that need to be taken into account,” as Pachico puts it.[410] Nap et al. focus only on environmental assessment, and comment:
“Despite all differences in philosophy and implementation of regulation in various countries, the questions asked and the science underpinning the regulations are generally alike. Regulatory bodies throughout the world require the documentation of similar information when considering applications for the release of GM crops.”[411]
More recently, regarding Cartagena Biosafety Protocol’s requirements, Huerga—technical coordinator of regulatory design at BO—concludes after summarizing Argentina’s biosafety system, at an UNEP-GEF conference,
“(…) we consider that the Argentine regulatory system is a sound system, backed by scientific experience, which counts with experts in agricultural biotechnology biosafety, which has made it possible to achieve highly satisfactory results regarding the performed evaluations, and which abundantly satisfies the biosafety requirements established in the Cartagena Protocol for its implementation.”[412]
However, Huerga also admits there are “some difficulties” in three aspects: regarding Cartagena Protocol administrative issues; regarding public communication of the decisions; and regarding “future international norms on commercialization of grains and grain-derived products.” Huerga also says it is necessary for Argentina to train more professionals “highly specialized in agricultural biotechnology biosafety”, and stresses that they are more needed “in those areas in which we have not developed enough regulatory experience (forestry, horticulture, ornamental plants, aquaculture and fishery).” To face these challenges, it is needed, according to Huerga’s presentation:
“-To increase material and economic resources.
-To improve the current regulatory framework.
-To provide international negotiators with expert technical support.
-To improve public communication.
-To have specific training on dealing with the BCH (Biosafety Clearing House).
-To strengthen management of the administrative issues derived from the Cartagena Protocol.”[413]
Discussion
An interesting statement made in an OECD meeting in 2001 by a very active Argentine biotechnology researcher—Esteban Hopp from INTA and CONABIA—highlighted the key role played by the scientific community in the whole process of establishing a biosafety system and related issues. His point was that “the best capacity building for handling GMOs issues is ‘standard’ capacity building.” As a result, his proposal was to strengthen scientific capacities in developing countries:
“It is crucial for a sound adoption of agricultural biotechnology to train good basic molecular biologists, ecologists, geneticists, etc. that will be able to address the unexpected issues that cannot be learned from the experience of developed countries.”[414]
Argentina was able to set up a competent, reliable biosafety system thanks to its scientific capacity. This allowed Argentina to take advantage of an imported technology already implemented by a crucial competitor in the international agricultural commodity market—the US. In this sense, although potential benefits are not explicitly analyzed during the review process, it seems quite obvious those are nevertheless taken into account. As Vicién comments while reviewing Argentina’s biosafety system, “It is assumed benefits come up from the fact that products lacking obvious benefits would most probably have no market value.” [415] Maybe the most important and obvious sign in this sense is the fact that the whole review process is handled within SAGPyA, an agency committed to promote Argentina’s agriculture, as Jaffe points out.
Thus, it can be said that Argentina’s biosafety system, although established in part as a response to corporate demand, was properly implemented in order to advance Argentina’s interests as an agro-exporting country. It has been judged as fairly competent and reliable by international agencies, which consider it an example to other developing countries. These agencies have also made recommendations to improve it. It is also noteworthy that Argentina’s biosafety system has a relatively positive image before local consumers and environmental groups.
It is out of the reach of this paper to thoroughly analyze and try to make compatible into a comprehensive proposal of improvement the disparate critical points made on Argentina’s biosafety system. To some extent, the different recommendations may be a result of the different perspectives of the analysts. This situation, in turn, somehow reflects the international controversy on GMOs, and the more precautionary or more promotional perspectives of some crucial actors. For example, regarding the observation that the same “potential hazards” identified for GM crops could also occur in conventionally bred crops, Jaffe—from the Center for Science in the Public Interest—boldly states that “the facts argue for including conventionally bred crops in the regulatory system, not eliminating transgenic crops.”[416] In turn, Nap et al.—affiliated at plant research institutes, ISAAA, and the industry—express concern for the increasing costs of what they call “the zero-risk” trend, and for “suggestions” to the effect that also conventionally bred crops should be tested, advanced by the National Academy of Sciences.[417]
In this sense, it is important to note that most—if not all—observations and recommendations aimed at Argentina’s biosafety system were not exclusively directed at it.
It is also noteworthy that, particularly regarding CONABIA and, to a lesser extent, SAGPyA and the Ministry of Economy, most of their general policies and resolutions are available on the internet. This speaks of a transparency and availability of official information and documents that, although insufficient, is not common in Argentina, and in most of Latin America.[418]
As a practical example of CONABIA’s performance, it may be useful to note that the Worldwide Register of GM Contamination—an “on-line register of genetically modified contamination incidents,” as presented by GeneWatch UK and Greenpeace International on June 1, 2005—only mentions two incidents occurred in Argentina, while it mentions eight at the UK. In addition, of those two “incidents” reported in Argentina, only one should be considered regarding CONABIA: it is a report on an illegal dissemination of RR corn in 2001, which CONABIA immediately reacted to. The other one is the whole Branford’s article on Argentina published in New Scientist and already commented in Part I, which does not mention any incident of this sort. It is simply a dark toned-account of the problems of RR soybean monoculture in Argentina. [419]
To put this in context, it is important to have in mind that Argentina is listed by Transparency International among the most corrupt countries in the world, where corruption is considered “endemic.”[420]
CONABIA officials’ performance and commitment have been indirectly praised by Argentina’s government with the creation inside SAGPyA of the Biotechnology Office (BO) in early 2004: Burachik—a biotechnologist and an early member of CONABIA—has been appointed its general coordinator. Established with the purpose of “coordinating and augmenting the interaction between the various sectors of the Secretary involved in Biotechnology issues (e. g., seed registration and control, international negotiations in fora such as Codex Alimentarius, CBD, WTO, SPS agreement, ICPP and OECD”), this office does not only have jurisdiction on biosafety, but also “on designing and implementing administrative norms and procedures, as well as on elaborating policies in relation to the application of Biotechnology to Agriculture,” as Burachik himself puts it. [421] The creation of this office also represents an acknowledgement of the serious challenges faced by Argentina as an exporter of GM crops in an increasingly contentious international landscape, and it is also evidence to the effect that Argentina is going to fight in all fronts to defend current and future adoption of GM crops, as we shall see in Part IV.
But BO does not only have to do with dealing with problems. It seems to have been also designed to be an agency for the promotion of biotechnology in Argentina, even if SAGPyA Resolution No. 244/04 which created it does not explicitly mention this aim. BO first action was to gather more than 150 experts from more than 60 public and private institutions to prepare the Strategic Plan for the Development of Agricultural Biotechnology 2005-2015. Issued in December 2004 and approved by SAGPyA Resolution No. 283 in May 2005, it is a very ambitious overarching project that requires participation of national and provincial offices as well as from public research institutes and universities, the industry and trade chambers. It is intended to coordinate efforts in order to “generate a commitment to growing” of those actors already involved in biotechnology development, and also to create the conditions for “new strategic projects developed by new protagonists,” as minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna states in its foreword. [422] In fact, the Strategic Plan includes actions intended to promoting local development of biotechnology, as we shall see in Part III.
Regarding some of the recommendations made by analysts of Argentina’s biosafety system and taken into account by BO, the Strategic Plan foresees the creation of a Public Consultation System to be implemented previously to GMOs commercialization. In addition, post-market monitoring is planned to be considerably expanded by the creation of an Observatory of Biotechnological Sustainability of the Agricultural and Aquatic Environment in 2005. However, there are no plans for a systematic post-market monitoring of GMOs health effects.
Certainly, the most important aspect regarding improving the current biosafety system it that the Strategic Plan foresees the approval in 2005 of a Regulatory Law with enforcement mechanisms. Interestingly, “it will comprise genetically modified plant and animal organisms, and will extend coverage to other biosafety issues which could derive from non-GM elements which may have similar effects on the agricultural environment.”[423] This extension, if confirmed, would imply a deepening of the current product-based approach.
It remains to be seen how all of these ambitious goals are timely met, particularly considering the many actors that need to be engaged.
Part III - Argentina’s research capacity: some research, little transfer
Argentina has a relatively well established research tradition, particularly in the biological sciences, as three Nobel prizes confirm—Bernardo Alberto Houssay, medicine, 1947; Luis Federico Leloir, chemistry, 1970; and César Milstein, medicine, 1984. Argentina’s research system is largely publicly funded. The Ministry of Education, trough its Secretariat of Science, Technology, and Industrial Innovation (Secretaría de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva, SETCIP) finances and oversees the most important research systems, integrated by the National Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, CONICET), with more than 50 research institutes; and the public universities system of more than 30 universities. A third research system is overseen by the Ministry of Economy: among these institutes, the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria, INTA) is by far the most important regarding agricultural research. The more than thirty private universities have “a very limited research activity in Argentina,” according to Cohen et al.[424]
The total budget of the public system is proximately 800 million pesos: it was 765,106.4 pesos in 2003; and it was planned to be 918,434.7 in 2004.[425] Before 2002 devaluation, when the peso was pegged one-to-one to the dollar, the public research budget was U$S 800/900 million dollars, according to a 1998 Nature report.[426] Cohen et al. quoting official reports, talk of around U$S 1,300 million in 1998/1999—but this figure comprises research performed by the industry as well as by private universities.[427] Currently, the peso is floating, and the exchange rate is of around 3 pesos to one dollar—as already commented—, so even if the total budget has not changed in pesos, it has in dollars: among other aspects, this has obvious consequences regarding imported inputs.
The Argentine ratio of research and development expenditures to the GDP is low. It was of around 0.47 percent in 1999,[428] according to official estimations; and it was of around 0,21 percent in 2003, according to unofficial estimations—although the latter figure is contended, because it depends on estimations of the GDP, which has been a particularly problematic estimation in Argentina after the 2001/2002 financial crisis.[429] Cohen et al. consider Argentina’s ratio is “substantially low compared to developed countries,” but “above average” in Latin America—where 1999 figures were 0.76 percent for Brazil, 0.63 percent for Chile, 0.41 percent for Colombia, 0.34 percent for Mexico, and 0.08 percent for Ecuador. [430]
According to official reports, in 1999 a total of 1,717 research projects were funded and developed in the agricultural and fisheries sector: 10.6 percent of all the projects, which represented around U$S 140 million.[431]
INTA is certainly a key player in the field of agricultural biotechnology: it had a budget of 157.131 million pesos in 2003; 189.395 in 2004.[432] (It was of about U$S 160 million before devaluation).[433]
Although research currently under way on GMOs in Argentina’s public sector is relevant compared to other developing countries, as we shall see, there is clear evidence that agricultural research as a whole does not receive funding proportional to the benefits agriculture offers to Argentina. According to 2004 estimations based on 2001 and 2002 figures, the U$S 80 millions devoted to agricultural research in Argentina represent only 0.5 percent of the primary agricultural products GDP. The same can be said of scientific production: although Argentina is the third soybean producer with 16 percent of the world production—after the US with 43 percent, and Brazil with 24 percent—it only contributes with 2 percent of the scientific articles on soybean. In comparison, the US contributes with 30 percent of the scientific articles on soybean, Brazil with 10 percent, and India—fifth producer of soybean, with an 8 percent of the world production—contributes with 9 percent. “This case is not qualitatively different from what can be seen in analyzing other items, and clearly shows that scientific and technological knowledge production in our country has fallen behind those in other countries,” comments one of the Argentine scientists who conducted the research.[434]
A. Biotechnology projects
Currently, biotechnology research in Argentina is performed in national research institutes, universities, and a few private local companies. According to Burachik and Traynor, there are “strong interactions” between scientists at INTA and universities, particularly in Buenos Aires.[435] The main weakness of Argentina’s research system has to do with its difficulties in developing and transferring technologies to private local companies.
Burachick and Traynor summarize the main research projects in biotechnology currently under way or projected in public research institutes:[436]
- Institute for Genetic Engineering and Molecular Biology (INGEBI): researchers are working on potato and tobacco, to obtain fungal and virus resistance. They plan to work on garlic, too.
- National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA): researchers are working on sunflower (fungal resistance, development of molecular markers for identification, marker-assisted breeding, genomics); potato (fungal and virus resistance, basic research to screen germplasm for new and better fungal resistance genes); alfalfa (vaccine for FMD and Newcastle viruses, introduction of antigens to several bovine viral diseases); corn (resistance to Mal de Río Cuarto virus); wheat, barley (fungal resistance, development of molecular markers for identification, marker assisted breeding, organelle mutational breeding); tomato (virus resistance); tobacco (model system for research); and chimeric virus vaccines, and vaccines for livestock. INTA researchers are also trying to transform rice and citrus plants.
- Institute for Physiological and Ecological Agriculture-related Research (Instituto de Investigaciones Fisiológicas y Ecológicas Vinculadas a la Agricultura, IFEVA, at the Faculty of Agronomy, Universidad de Buenos Aires, UBA): researchers are working on oat, Arabidopsis and potato, analyzing effects of levels of phytochrome expression in transgenic plants.
- University Institute of Biological Research (Instituto Superior de Investigaciones Biológicas, INSIBIO), at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumán: currently, doing research on strawberry (resistance to fungal disease), tobacco (model system for research).
- Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo: currently, doing research on grape (resistance to fungal diseases).
- Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Universidad Nacional de Río Cuarto: currently, doing research on tomato (peroxidases).
- Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Universidad Nacional del Sur: currently, doing research on pasture grasses (resistance to fungal diseases); onion (resistance to fungal diseases).
- Center for Photosynthetic and Biochemistry Research (Centro de Estudios Fotosintéticos y Bioquímicos, CEFOBI): currently, doing research on wheat and corn (herbicide resistance).
- Cellular and Molecular Research Institute of Rosario (Instituto de Biología Celular y Molecular de Rosario, IBR) at the Universidad Nacional de Rosario: currently, doing research on tobacco, Arabidopsis, and tomato (basic research on plant physiology), tobacco (resistance to abiotic stress).
- Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Universidad Nacional del Nordeste: researchers plan to do research on characterization of Paspalum apoximis genes.
- Universidad de Santa Fe: researchers plan to do research on characterization of sunflower homeotic genes.
- Institute for Biochemical Research (Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas, IIB, Institute Leloir Foundation, formerly know as Fundación Campomar) with IFEVA (Facultad de Agronomía, UBA): doing research on Arabidopsis and tobacco (basic research on phytochromes).
- Biotechnology Research Institute-Chascomús Institute of Technology (Instituto de Investigaciones Biotecnológicas-Instituto de Tecnología de Chascomús, IIB-INTECH): doing research on tobacco (basic research on mitochondrial genes).
- Food Cryotechnology Research and Development Center (Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo en Criotecnología de Alimentos, CIDCA) at the Faculty of Exact Sciences, Universidad Nacional de La Plata: doing research on tobacco (basic research on gene expression in transgenic plants).
Among private companies, there are a few which perform research in biotechnology. According to Burachik and Traynor, these are the most relevant projects:[437]
- Bio Sidus: presently, working on recombinant DNA pharmaceutical proteins, and expression of pharmaceuticals—human growth hormone—in cow’s milk;[438] also production of human proteins in tobacco.
- Technoplant (Bio Sidus): researchers are working on potato (virus resistance, herbicide tolerance); and plan to work on improved varieties of yerba mate, berries, garlic, ornamentals, sugar cane, grapes.
- Advanta: researchers are working on sunflower (gene mapping of factors controlling fungal resistance, and virus resistance, among other traits; also marker-assisted selection for international breeding programs).
One interesting effect of the introduction of GM varieties in Argentina is the interest in research some sectors seem to have developed. In 2002, a venture capital company was created by AAPRESID, with participation of mostly local companies. With an initial capital of U$S 240,000, Bioceres was created to establish agreements with research centers, in order to look for and develop new plant varieties. The first project, conducted by researchers of the Faculty of Exact and Natural Sciences (UBA) was intended to develop a fungus-resistant soybean variety, according to Bioceres president, Gustavo Grobocopatel—a leading representative of a new generation of innovative farmers in Argentina, quite enthusiastic regarding biotechnology.[439] A recent key development backed by Bioceres was the identification of a gene linked to drought resistance by a team of researchers from Universidad del Litoral and CONICET. There are plans to introduce this gene into corn, soybean, and wheat, to create drought-resistant GM varieties. Bioceres is looking for investors to finance the U$S 1.4 million project.[440]
A much more ambitious project was fueled by AAPRESID: to develop a research center on informatics, molecular biology and biotechnology, to be located in Rosario, Santa Fe province—one key area devoted to soybean and other agricultural products—and funded by the private and the public sector.[441] Finally, Bioceres in association with Bio Sidus began the construction of a 4,000m2 laboratory in Rosario in early 2005. Indear, a U$S 10 million project, is expected to host around 150 scientists and technicians—most of them from CONICET.[442]
B. Regional cooperation and international evaluation
Almost all of the public and private plant-biotechnology laboratories in Argentina are members of the FAO-sponsored technical cooperation network on plant biotechnology (REDBIO), founded in 1991. REDBIO’s website has a list of them, as well as of most Latin American countries’ biotechnology laboratories.[443]
There are some programs devoted to foster sub-regional cooperation. The most important is the Argentine-Brazilian Center for Biotechnology (Centro Argentino Brasileño de Biotecnología, CABBIO), in operation since 1985. In 2001, it was funding around 70 projects, many of them in agricultural and food-related areas. Although established as a bi-national initiative, it expanded to include other countries in the subregion, such as Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. According to Trigo et al. “human resource development and technology transfer are the two most important outputs of CABBIO to date, but there are significant R&D results in a number or areas that are rapidly maturing into the product development stage.” [444]
Other relevant sub-regional initiatives are the Cooperative Agricultural Research Program for the Southern Cone (PROCISUR);[445] as well as CamBioTec, a Canadian initiative funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Development Research Centre (IDRC), which has been involved in policy development and capacity building projects, and a series of specialized research studies. [446] In addition, INTA collaborates with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT, one of the 16 CGIAR centers) in crop-management research and technology transfer.[447]
Two recent international reports situate Argentina in a relatively good position among developing countries regarding agricultural biotechnology.
In a study conducted for the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) regarding publicly developed GM crops in developing countries, Cohen reviews the number of transformation events conducted in Asia, Africa and Latin America. With 21 transformation events—in alfalfa, citrus, potatoes, soybeans, strawberry, sunflowers and wheat—Argentina ranks first in Latin America, followed by Brazil with 9, Costa Rica with 5, and Mexico with 3. However, Cohen mentions that Brazil also reported 37 events contracted by the private sector with Embrapa—the main public agricultural research institute in Brazil—to address their market needs. On a global scale, Argentina ranks relatively well even compared to China with 30 events, India with 21, South Africa with 20, or Egypt and the Philippines, each one with 17. Like most developing countries, public research in Argentina is performed on local adapted varieties to address local problems—such as the Mal de Río Cuarto virus, as already commented. [448]
These promising figures regarding research contrast with Cohen’s critical, even worrisome observations regarding transfer in developing countries—and Argentina constitutes no exception. As he concludes, developing countries’ public sector is found to be “a competent, but largely unproven, player for GM crop production”, being China the only country where official approval has been granted for a publicly developed GM crop—an insect-resistant cotton.
The achievements in research are not matched with achievements in compiling regulatory information, situation Cohen attributes to a set of factors, which can be classified as mostly internal or external. Some of the internal factors—“the overall isolation of public research institutes”, “the inability of public research to meet food safety and environmental regulatory requirements and confusion regarding regulatory standards between confined versus open trials”, “lack of regional abilities to exchange and evaluate regulatory data on specific transgenes and crops”, “expertise with public genetic resources but few opportunities to use or evaluate proprietary germ plasm”, “limited progress in determining authorities and frameworks for science-based decision making”—may be considered not applicable or relatively easy to overcome by Argentina’s public research sector.
However, external factors cited by Cohen—“implementing processes arising from the international level (e.g., the Cartagena Protocol for Biosafety)”, and “external political barriers that (…) have implications for world trade (e.g. impasse over GM crops between the United States and Europe)”—are much more difficult to address by Argentina as well as by most developing countries, particularly the export-oriented ones. In addition, although IPR complex landscape and costly regulatory requirements suggest the need for associations, Cohen found “successful public-private partnerships in plant biotech are still rare,” and he did not detect any “South-to-South” collaboration.[449]
Similar conclusions were reached by Dhlamini et al. in a review of the FAO Biotechnology in Developing Countries Database (FAO-BioDeC), which covered both genetically modified (GM) crops and non-GM biotechnologies, and which represents the first analysis of the information contained in the database as of 31 August 2004. In it, Argentina is counted among the countries that “have well developed agricultural biotechnologies programmes in both NARS and in the academic sector”—along with Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Mexico and South Africa. An interesting point made by Dhlamini et al. is that even in those cases where the transgenic variety has been developed using local germ plasm, “it is still often likely that the transgene cassette and transformation protocols for the development of the transgenic variety were developed elsewhere”.
One observation particularly relevant to Argentina, where GM biotechnologies are extensively being used on a commercial scale, is that in the countries surveyed only a few studies have been carried out to assess their socio-economic impacts. As a general conclusion, the report stresses that, in addition to “the lack of national legal frameworks on biosafety” —which obviously does not apply to Argentina—, other factors limiting adoption of GMOs in developing countries are “the lack of appropriate mechanisms for technology transfer as well as the high complexity and costs of the currently elaborated GMO regulatory system”, as well as “lack of appropriate intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and “weak national plant breeding programmes and seed systems”. All of these “combine to limit applications only for GM products with large commercial markets”. [450]
Discussion
Argentina’s research capacity in plant biotechnology comprises from the most rudimentary techniques to those relatively highly sophisticated. Currently, the most notably lack of development could be found in the area of genomics, particularly compared to Brazil, where the genome of the citrus pathogen Xilella fastidiosa was sequenced in 2000, or to China, where the rice genome was sequenced in 2002.[451]
The problem of technology transfer is crucial, and it is common to major Latin American countries: from 1977 to 1998, “all of Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Mexico’s companies and individuals produced 2,442 US patents,” while IBM and General Electric produced 37,104.[452] And the situation in Argentina is not changing at a promising pace: although the number of registered patents in Argentina doubled from 1992 to 2001, it is still very low—3 per 100.000 inhabitants. The Latin American average is 2.2; Brazil is the leader in the region, with 5.3.[453] A recent report written by a local researcher addresses the issue, emphasizing lack of administrative capacity and cultural barriers. [454]
Low investment in agricultural research has so far not represented a barrier to developing adapted commercial varieties, particularly regarding soybean. However, Trigo et al. warn that this may be a “happy result” of the peculiar adaptability of RR soybean. That is why they predict that “local investment—or lack of them—will play an increasingly important role in the country’s capacities of taking advantage the potential benefits of these technologies.”[455] Bioceres may represent to some extent an acknowledgment of this challenge by the farming and trade sectors, but Trigo considers breeding initiatives should be mostly in charge of INTA.[456]
National authorities have also acknowledged the problem of lack of transfer, and have recently taken decisions in this area. One interesting initiative was the creation of the National Technological Fund (Fondo Tecnológico Argentino, FONTAR), part of the National Agency for the Promotion of Science and Technology (Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica, “la Agencia”). Established in 1998 with a U$S 35 million budget, mostly obtained through loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (BID), this Agency allocates grants of between U$S 25,000 and 50,000, through a competitive peer-review process.[457] Another governmental initiative, launched in 2003, allows CONICET researchers to work for private local companies for some time in developing projects.[458]
A modest private-public initiative has been the creation of a 1.5 million pesos (around U$S 500,000) grant fund for research in sunflower. Half of the funds are provided by the Agency, and half are provided by ASA and the oilseed industry. All of the first grantees in 2003 work at the public research system (INTA, CONICET, and public universities). The projects are expected to solve “aspects that condition sunflower productivity.” Of the nine selected projects, only one has to do with developing a GM variety—one fungus resistant. The others involve conventional breeding, germ plasm conservation, new methods for processing sunflower proteins, and improving sustainability in the semi-arid region.[459]
It remains to be seen how these kinds of initiatives develop in the future.
Until the late 1990s, nor governmental plans nor industrial interests were leading the efforts in the development of agricultural biotechnology research in Argentina. Trigo considers that the research institutes created during the 1980s in the region—among them, INTA Center for Molecular Biology, and CONICET Center for Genetic Engineering—were mostly the result of initiatives driven by the science sector. [460]
Trigo suggests that one single figure may be seen as a key element to understand the potential impact of low investment in biotechnology in Latin America and the Caribbean: Monsanto employs in its laboratories more than twice the number of biotechnology scientists in the whole region. He considers this figure represents “the most significant constraint to effectively exploiting the benefits that biotechnology holds for agricultural development” in the region. In 2000, his forecast was not at all optimistic:
“Unfortunately, there are no signs that this situation will change any time soon, since the biotech sector simply reflects current overall trends in regional R&D investments”.[461]
It is in this context that the initiatives foreseen by the Strategic Plan for the Development of Agricultural Biotechology—issued by BO in late 2004—have to be considered. As already commented, one of its main aims is to promote biotechnology in Argentina. Regarding strengthening local developments, many actions are planned.
For 2005, an overarching Promotional Law, a Communication Network in order to connect Argentine scientists, and a Report on Biotechnological Solutions to Agricultural Limitations are foreseen.
For 2006, the goals are more, and more ambitious: one is to select four projects to be financed. Of those, two would be five-year projects—one on bioinformatics and one on proteomics/genomics, and in bioprospection. And two would be eight-year projects on new “plant events or transgenesis or animal cloning, in order to generate pathogen-resistance, production of biomolecules and/or specialties development.” Another initiative for 2006 is the designing of a Federal Map of bioproductive regions in order to determine “regional investment capacities” as well as “deficit in human resources.” A third initiative is to develop a Network of Laboratories for the Development of Bioinformatics. And a fourth is an Offer of Remote Professional Training, specialized in agro-biotechnological intellectual property.
For 2007, it is foreseen the selected research projects would began, and a project for every “bioproductive region” would also be selected. Besides, Regional Delegations for Technical Assistance on Intellectual Property and Agro-bio-products would be set up in some provinces. [462]
It remains to be seen how this ambitious Strategic Plan develops. An auspicious beginning was the sending to Congress of President Nestor Kirchner a draft of the “Law on the promotion and development of modern biotechnology” in late August 2005. It foresees creating incentives for corporations to create partnerships with biotech startups, providing seed capital and early-stage funding for biotechnology companies through the Fund of Economic Stimulus for New Business Enterprises. According to international press accounts, it enjoys “broad political support,” and “is expected to pass without delay.”[463] In its presentation to the press, Minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna highlighted Argentina has “60 biotechnology companies” as well as “16,000,000 ha planted with genetically modified organisms,” and the fact that Argentina “produces human growth hormone.” He explicitly said this law “calls the private sector to work with the public sector,” according to local press accounts.[464]
A critical challenge to the Strategic Plan is certainly that Argentina abandoned any idea of developing national plans in any sector or activity during the 1990s. Another crucial challenge is coordinating national and provincial agencies, as well as private and public actors’ initiatives.
Part IV – Argentina’s international position: science and trade
No less than nine international agencies have to do with food safety—and therefore, with GM crops. As Phillips—based on Buckingham and Phillips—shows, these nine institutions may be analyzed as falling into three types. He considers five of them are “largely science-based organizations”: the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), the International Epizootics Organization (OIE), Codex Alimentarius (Codex), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). One is described as “a trade-based organization”: the World Trade Organization (WTO). The remaining three institutions involved with food-safety issues are vaguely described by Philips as having “broader objectives, such as environmental protection and other social or political goals”. These are: the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), regional initiatives, and the Cartagena BioSafety Protocol (BSP).[465]
In Phillips’ analysis “despite the substantial effort being undertaken, there is no common view on the goal of international regulation.” Although all of these international bodies agree that “safety is the bottom line,” there is no consensus on how to define it, or on how much weight must be recognized to scientists’ or citizens’ positions.
At the same time, the IPPC and OIE seem to have a strong influence on the WTO: the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) takes into account the IPPC and OIE standards as the basis for evaluating SPS disputes, and relies on their experts as well as on their technical background information. As a result, “they can have far-reaching economic and political consequences on food trade.”
Something similar happens regarding the Codex: its standards, guidelines and recommendations “are acknowledged in the SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade Agreements during considerations of trade disputes.” The Codex is “under the joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program.” Phillips notes that FAO and WHO “have worked to develop a consensus about the implications of biotechnology for their areas of interest.” Although linked to FAO and WHO, and despite its influence, no consensus has been reached so far regarding products of biotechnology at the Codex. [466] In the last meeting of the international Codex Committee on Food Labeling, held in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, in May 2005 decision was deferred on the mandatory labeling of GM food. [467] In this sense, the Codex continues to be one important source of uncertainty regarding biotechnology food products.
The other source of uncertainty is the potential conflict between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol. As observers commented in September 2003, when the BSP was about to go into effect, it was apparent that the BSP, derived from the Convention on Biological Diversity and then not initially a trade but an environmental treaty, would collide with trade regulations, and increase uncertainty in trade negotiations, among other problems.[468]
In Phillips’ analysis, although the WTO is “the main locus of dispute for many countries, it has some limitations.” Among the issues that the WTO does not take into consideration to resolve trade disputes, he mentions “non-science concerns such as consumer preference, animal welfare, or nonmeasurable environmental risks.” And Philips considers these limitations have been acknowledged in the Cartagena Protocol, which he describes as “one effort to provide a more comprehensive international structure to ensure the protection of biodiversity and to facilitate consideration of nonscientific concerns in food trade.” [469]
Haslberger also connects WTO and the Codex, saying that although Codex principles do not have a binding effect on national legislation, “are referred to specifically” in the SPS, and “can be used as a reference in case of trade dispute.”[470]
Argentina’s position in this complex international regulatory framework is essentially marked by its situation as an agro-exporting country which has adopted GM crops: its policy decisions are mostly guided by concerns about loosing markets, and about facing technical, non-trade barriers. In this sense, Argentina’s attitude regarding international conflicts derived from adoption of GM crops adds to another concern regarding the global market: developed countries’ subsidies.
OECD and harmonization
Regarding OECD, Phillips comments it “has actively assisted in harmonizing international regulatory requirements, standards, and policies related to biotechnology since 1985,” mainly directed at making “regulatory processes more transparent and efficient,” at facilitating trade, and at providing “information exchange and dialogue with non-OECD countries.”[471] These efforts, as well as bilateral or multilateral agreements, can be understood as a way to influence the establishing of international rules. As Philips puts it,
“These institutions help create the consensus necessary to establish international rules, given that many food safety concerns in trade are bilateral and the knowledge base to develop standards resides in a few countries only.”[472]
It is within this framework that we have to understand the many efforts made by Argentina’s biosafety authorities in terms of capacity building and harmonization initiatives, particularly with the US and Canada, as well as with other countries in the region—such as Uruguay and Bolivia—commented in Part II. In this sense, multilateral agreements are not a source of conflict per se, but a first, local-regional step towards influencing international disputes and attempts at harmonization.
Codex Alimentarius
Regarding the Codex, Argentina’s has a definite position against labeling, and it was ratified in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, in May 2005. An account of the meeting listed Argentina among the countries “that tried to terminate discussions on the GM labelling guidelines”—along with the US, Mexico, Paraguay and Philippines.[473]
It is significant that, as of 2003, all the documents presented by Argentina were written by the Biotechnology Group. According to Gabriela Catalani, a SAGPyA official and technical coordinator of the Focal Point of the Codex, as of December 1, 2003, they were all approved. It is important to note that the Biotechnology Group (Grupo Biotecnología, o Grupo Bio) is an industry, scientific and trade group in which most commercial chambers, farmers’ associations and companies that have something to do with agricultural biotechnology are represented. It is a strongly pro-GM group.[474] It was created after 2000 Greenpeace campaigns in Argentina, and described as a lobbying group.[475]
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
Regarding the SPS, Argentina has expressed its position, saying that it opposes a renegotiation of the SPS, and stressing that sanitary restrictions should be based on scientific arguments, and in risk-assessment methodologies already internationally accepted, according to Galperín, Fernández and Doporto.[476]
Cartagena Protocol
Approved in Montreal in January 2000, Argentina signed the BSP in May of the same year, but did not ratify it. During negotiations, Argentina was part of the “Miami group,” along with the US, Canada, Australia, Chile and Uruguay. According to Hodson de Jaramillo and Aramedis, the “Miami group” “favored the consideration of trade and commercial considerations over the environmental and the social ones.”[477]
Argentina’s official position regarding the BSP and international trade is expressed in the document titled UNEP/CBD/BS/TE-HT-PI/I/INF.1, prepared by the General Directorate for the Environment of the Ministry of Exterior. [478] Regarding segregation, it states that Argentina does not differentiate grain products, although under certain circumstances grains are segregated, and mentions the case of Flint corn, which is separated taking into account its quality, as well as its non-GM character. The document also mentions that there are regulations in order to differentiate organic produce from non-organic produce. (It is important to add that as of 2004, 2.8 million ha are certified as organic in Argentina. Of the 47,000 tones of organic production, 90 percent are exported.)[479] Then the document explains important aspects of Argentina’s biosafety regulation: that GMOs for contained used are clearly identified in Argentina, and are inspected by INASE and SENASA; that “Argentina has a long experience in applying informed consent agreements”; and that GMOs for commercialization follow identity procedures ruled by Argentine legislation on seeds, in accord to UPOV, according to which every seed bag is identified and labeled—this identification includes characteristics, contact information, name and address of the importing company, and special requirements, if needed, for handling, storage, transportation and safe use.
In the same vein and from CONABIA, Burachik and Traynor comment the BSP calls for the development of regulatory frameworks and a capacity for risk assessment which Argentina already has. More recently, another CONABIA official has publicly ratified it, as already commented in Part II.[480] However, Burachik and Traynor warn that segregating GM crops would represent “a significant challenge” for Argentina, “as the country is not prepared to segregate them in an efficient way.”
A recent analysis on the cost of segregation in Argentina in relation to article 18, 2.a) of the BSP was performed by SAGPyA and FAO in 2004. It estimates that to segregate a ton of non-GM corn considering an adventitious presence threshold of 0.9 percent—as required by the EU labeling and traceability norms—implies an investment of U$S 39.74 million in storage capacity, analysis capacity and “institutional training and strengthening.” There is no need of investment in transportation, since current capacities allow segregation. The investment needed for segregating a ton of non-GM soybean at the same threshold is quite similar: U$S 40.03 million. However, a higher 5 percent threshold would imply a much lower cost of U$S 7.4 million for a ton of non-GM corn, and of U$S 10.2 million for a ton of non-GM soybean.
The study also mentions Argentina already has experience in handling “new products or qualities with differential prices” such as Flint- and high value-corn, as well as high oleic sunflower, and high-protein soybean. It also notes that the global market for soybean seems to be becoming predominantly GM, while the situation is the contrary for GM corn—a trend attributed to the fact that non-GM varieties are preferred for “direct human consumption.”
Other important conclusion of the study has to do with availability of non-GM seeds. There are currently non-GM corn seeds available in Argentina both for the core agricultural region and for marginal regions. However, this is not the case for non-GM soybean because local and multinational companies in Argentina have stopped multiplying non-GM soybean seeds. And there is another significant difference between corn and soybean regarding segregation: that while in segregating corn most of the estimated cost increase has to do with increasing storage capacity, in soybean most of the estimated cost increase has to do with higher production costs. Additionally, in corn the estimated cost of analyses, certification and eventual refusal at the end of the transaction are also significant.
The main conclusion has to do with the needed premium prices for compensating the increased cost of segregating. These are substantially different for the two thresholds considered. With a 0.9 threshold, premium prices needed for non-GM corn would be of U$S 12.2—that is, “14,7 percent of average FAS Rosario price”—, and U$S 18.3 for non-GM soybean—“10.7 percent of its price.” However, with a 5 percent threshold, premium prices needed would be much lower: 4.2 percent for non-GM corn, and 5.3 percent for non-GM soybean. As the report concludes, the threshold makes the difference:
“Once again, it can be seen that a 0.9 segregation would require significant premium prices, while a 0.5 [segregation] would have values not very far from those already offered in some markets, such as Japan in soybean and other Asian countries in corn.”[481]
Turning back to Burachik and Traynor’s observations on the BSP, another important aspect they highlight has to do with the fact that it incorporates into decision procedures the application of the “ ‘precautionary principle,’ by which a country may refuse the import of a particular GMO even when there is a lack of scientific certainty, due to insufficient scientific information and knowledge, regarding its potential harmfulness.”[482] In this sense, the BSP opens the door to a level of uncertainty which results challenging to Argentina as to any GMOs exporting country. However and particularly regarding RR soybean, it is important to keep in mind that the BSP only has to do with “living modified organisms.”[483] In this sense, labeling requirements only cover exports of soybean beans, not of soybean meal or oil—which represent a significant part of Argentina’s soybean exports.
Another important aspect regarding BSP has to do with how Argentina deals with biodiversity, IP and biopiracy issues. Due to the fact that Argentina did not ratify BSP, there are no norms that regulate access to genetic resources, according to Carullo and Dellacha. In the absence of national regulations, they comment, “research institutes such as INTA follow international agreements, such as the code for access to Genetic Resources of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).” As of 2003, they also comment that “access norms are under discussion.” [484] But this is just one aspect of one major weakness regarding biodiversity in Argentina. The ambitious Strategic Plan for the Development of Agricultural Biotechnology launched in 2004 explicitly acknowledges,
“There is a central factor for biotechnological development: preservation, exploration, and use of the country’s rich biodiversity, which has not been duly studied and its development economically promoted. Thus, although having adhere to international conventions on biodiversity, the country has not created the regulatory framework needed to secure its protection, and currently does not have descriptors of native species.”[485]
A final point on the BSP has to do with Argentina’s strategy to influence what is yet to decide, as well as about how to continue its commodity trade with signatory countries. At a meeting held in Buenos Aires in May 2004, contrasted positions were expressed by a Ministry of Exterior official and a SAGPyA official. These can be considered representative of more widespread opposite opinions in Argentina. While Aguilar suggested it would be better for Argentina to ratify the BSP, and therefore to be able influence on “key aspects” such as article 18 and responsibility and compensation procedures,[486] Sarquis highlighted the fact that the overwhelming majority of the countries that ratified the BSP are importing countries, suggesting Argentina should not do it. Regarding trade, she seemed to be in favor of signing bilateral agreements with client, BSP signatory countries—following the lead of the US-Canada agreement with Mexico. [487]
Although Sarquis commented that as of May 2004 a series of consultations were being held in order to decide what Argentina would do, it is important to note that by far, the dominant view regarding BSP among Argentina’s authorities both at SAGPyA and the Ministry of Exterior seems to be Argentina should not ratify it. Behind their opposition, it seems to lie the idea that ratifying it would imply somewhat legitimizing it. Off the record, some influential Argentine officials comment the BSP had somewhat betrayed its mandate, and turned into a trade treaty controlled by the EU, mostly through its influence on small African countries.
In late August 2005, Argentina signed a bilateral agreement within the BSP framework with Nicaragua,[488] which implies it is exploring the way Sarquis suggested—which in turn means it is unlikely Argentina would ratify the BSP in the near future.
Discussion
A good summary of Argentina’s position regarding GMOs regulation in international trade can be deduced from the document written by Ablin and Paz in 2000. Essentially, they commented that Argentina bases its position on the substantial equivalence principle. As they put it,
“Argentina’s position acknowledges the total equivalence of both kind of products [GM and non-GM], as well as the total innocuous character of the GMOs approved in accord to the usual risk assessment practices, therefore rejecting any commercial discrimination against them based on the methodology or production processes.”
In relation to this position, Ablin and Paz insisted on the fact that no labeling laws should be passed in Argentina:
“Any domestic rule which introduced any doubt on these criteria would obviously harm the previous definition; we cannot state that there are no potential risks for consumers in other countries while having a policy of protection regarding the domestic consumer.” [489]
Ablin and Paz also mentioned what kind of alliances Argentina should look for. Specifically, they pointed at a very powerful partner which would be expected to take the lead in addressing the challenges of a “broad precautionary criterion—distant from a reasonable sanitary risk evaluation—” as the Cartagena Protocol represents: the US, which they referred to indirectly but very clearly,
“(…) in spite of the importance this topic may assume for Argentine interests, we can speculate that other WTO Members with more global interests—and a bigger share of relative power—would ask for clarification on this important topic for the future of the agricultural world trade.” [490]
In accordance with this position, as already commented in the Introduction, Argentina has joined the US and Canada in their complaint to the WTO against the EU de facto moratorium on GMOs.[491] It may well be put into question to what extent Argentina’s interests would be represented by those of the US, particularly considering they are competitors in world trade. Not surprisingly, one SAGPyA official commented off the record that it could be considered more in Argentina’s interest to protest the EU labeling and traceability rules than the moratorium—which may certainly imply Argentina is not following its main interests and strategies but its big partner’s. However, other Argentine experts consider that to protest the moratorium first is the best strategy for Argentina. In general terms, there seems to be some proud among the Argentine officials involved in the case—officials from SAGPyA and the Ministry of Exterior—among other reasons because Argentina has been part of this case not hiring any external consultant, but relying on its own human resources for the first time.[492] In addition, it is certainly not negligible that in mid-2005, some Argentine officials were already foreseeing a positive outcome of the panel, as they commented off the record.
With the creation of the Biotechnology Office within SAGPyA in charge of “coordinating and augmenting the interaction between the various sectors of the Secretary involved in Biotechnology issues (e. g., seed registration and control, international negotiations in fora such as Codex Alimentarius, CBD, WTO, SPS agreement, ICPP and OECD,”[493] among other aspects already commented in Parts II and III, it seems clear that Argentina is getting prepared to fight in all fronts to defend current and future adoption of GM crops.
Part V – Public perception: competing frames, shared delusions
Although many of the arguments put forward in the international dispute over GMOs revolve around scientific issues and ideas about risk, it is already apparent that this dispute goes beyond scientific aspects. What I mean is that it is not addressed just in scientific terms. And not only because no risk can be handled just as an expert’s matter—precisely because it has to do with social impacts, and we are talking about democratic countries—,[494] but more broadly, because a purely scientific framing fails to address the many issues involved.
As Nelkin points out, after noting parallels with the nuclear controversy, controversies on GMOs “are not just about risk.” They involve much more things than scientific evidences and values. As she puts it, quoting Heller:
“They are socio-cultural debates about food quality, cultural autonomy and globalization. They are explicit expressions of ‘the collision between competing frames’.”[495]
What happens in developing countries? Is the debate over GM crops differently addressed? As Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Marc J. Cohen warn,
“The current debate about the potential utility of modern biotechnology for food and agriculture and the associated risks and opportunities often ignores the differences between conditions in rich and poor countries.” [496]
While this observation implies a step ahead in terms of understanding what may be going on regarding public perception of GMOs in developing countries, it is certainly insufficient. As surveys—and policies—show, the US, the UK, or France’s public do not think the same about GMOs—and, particularly, about GM crops. In the same way, it is not a difficult exercise of imagination to speculate that culturally and economically different developing countries—such as India and Argentina, for example—may frame the public controversy over GM crops in a different way.
This limit to Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen approach is apparent in the results of an early survey conducted by Environics International, Ltd. in 1998, quoted in their article. This survey places public opinion on GM crops in Argentina close to public opinion in Germany, the UK, and Japan, and far away from public opinion in India and China—even far away from Mexico, although close to Brazil. When in Argentina GM crops had already been planted for two years, the percentage of adults who said to “agree” to the assertion that “benefits of using biotechnology in food are greater than the risks” was only slightly superior to those of Germany, the UK and France: around 42 percent for Argentina, 40 for Germany, and 38 for the UK. Japan, for example—currently, a totally GM-free market—had a percentage of agreement of around 44, that is, higher than Argentina’s. South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria were the only developing countries relatively close to Argentina—all of them with percentage of agreement of around 43 to 45 percent—while China’s and India’s percentages were clearly above 70 percent, and Mexico’s was above 60 percent.[497]
Another international survey conducted by Environics in 2000 shows similar results. Asked if “benefits of biotechnology outweigh the risks,” only 44 percent of Argentine citizens “agree,” a percentage again close to that of the UK with 42 percent, and Germany with 41. In contrast, as much as 66 percent of Americans, 55 percent of Canadians, 62 percent of Mexicans, and 55 percent of Brazilians “agree.” But from 1998 to 2000 the situation seems to have changed in France—only 22 percent “agree” to this question—and Japan—with 33 percent.[498]
More specifically, a survey conducted by SAGPyA only in Argentina in 2003, within the framework of the UNEP-GEF Project on Evaluation of a National Biosafety Framework—following requirements of the BSP regarding public awareness and participation—shows that the Argentine society has become divided regarding GMOs in agriculture: while 75 percent of farmers say that eating GM food “does not represent a health risk,” only 40 percent of consumers share that opinion.[499]
What do these figures imply? What effects have they had on public policies in Argentina? It seems they have had really little impact. To analyze what has been going on in Argentina regarding public perception of GM crops, I would first address some of the factors that might have contributed to make the international dispute over GM crops so intense, polarized, and so much pervaded of skepticism and suspicion. In every case, I would analyze which of these factors, and to what extent, might be impacting—or might impact in the future—on Argentina’s public opinion. After that, I will analyze some public exchanges that took place in the early 2000s in Argentina which show how the debate over GM crops has been framed, and briefly review the position of representative sectors—particularly farmers, NGOs, and consumer advocacy groups. The focus on a time period a little before and after the economic crisis erupted in Argentina in December 2001 allows us to see how the arguments of pro- and anti-GM actors linked adoption of GM crops with Argentina’s macro and micro economy.
A. What people (might) see
i) A new relationship between the corporate world and the academy
During the 1980s, a series of changes encouraged the increasing involvement of companies in funding academic research, particularly in the US, but then also in the EU. As Sheldom Krimsky points out, in the US it had to do not only with a decline in federal funding, but also with a perceived problem of technology transfer.[500] In the life sciences’ field, in particular, it was also a result of the introduction of recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology in 1973:
“The introduction of rDNA technology established the absolute fungibility of genes, opening up possibilities for synthesizing new organisms and biological products. The commercial opportunities of this discovery were recognized almost immediately.”[501]
All of a sudden, biotechnology firms became ubiquitous in the academy. Among other consequences, these liaisons dangereux were held responsible for increasing secrecy and decreasing collaboration between academic scientists, as well as for skewing the research agenda, and privileging applied research. Conflicts of interest suddenly emerged.[502] It is not a coincidence that in two major academic controversies regarding GM crops—“the Pusztai affair” in 1999,[503] and “the maize scandal,” in 2001[504] —accusations regarding conflict of interests and secrecy played a central role. Although not completely aware of this new scenario, the lay public, particularly in developed countries, might perfectly well feel that scientists are not anymore the disinterested community Robert Merton dreamed of, as Krimsky comments.[505] In this context, what is an “independent expert”?
In parallel to these changes in the academy, also corporate scientists became more ‘corporate’ and less ‘scientific’—that is more profit-oriented—during the 1980s. As Roli Varma concludes, after interviewing seventy-two scientists and eighteen managers working in six centralized corporate R&D laboratories, there was a cultural change inside corporations:
“Until the mid-1980s, a scientific perspective dominated centralized corporate laboratories in high technology industries. Corporate management and scientists in industry and academia viewed them as scientific or technology-driven companies. Corporate laboratories lacked structure, sought consensus, made bottom-up decisions, took risks, and prided themselves on scientific and technical accomplishments. Now, research is being carried out in the context of immediate business interests, and there is less emphasis on fundamental long-term research. (…) The quality of research is determined not only by technical results but by marketability and cost effectiveness.”[506]
Additionally, Varma mentions how much of the corporate research now is done in academic labs, and how this research is also shaped by corporate values. As a result, traditional boundaries between the academic and the corporate world are vanishing:
“Because of contracting out R&D with universities and foreign companies, scientists everywhere are being placed more directly in the context of usefulness to industry. As boundaries between basic and applied research are dissolving and university is involved in joint ventures with industry, institutional differences between academia and industry are becoming less relevant; instead, attention is focused primarily on the problem area relevant to industry.”[507]
Given this close relationship between the corporate world and academy, it is not surprising that conflict of interests soon began to be apparent. The first revealing results on how previous relationship with companies may bias an expert’s view on a given scientific topic were published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1998. The case analyzed involved the debate over calcium-channel antagonists and the experts’ relationship with pharmaceutical companies. Stelfox et al. conclusions were clearly stated:
“Our results demonstrate a strong association between authors’ published positions on the safety of calcium-channel antagonists and their financial relationship with pharmaceutical manufacturers.” [508]
A recent meta-analysis on conflicts of interest in biomedical research showed that, after five years, the situation is the same. As Bekelman at al. comment in JAMA,
“Financial relationships among industry, scientific investigators, and academic institutions are widespread. Conflict of interest arising from these ties can influence biomedical research in important ways.”[509]
Conflicts of interest in research on agricultural biotechnology, in particular, have not been sufficiently studied yet. The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology issued a report, based primarily on the findings of a November 2002 Pew Initiative workshop that addresses this situation. The report acknowledges the relationship between the academy and the biotechnology industry changed “after important legal and legislative actions were taken in the 1980s,” and attributes the current “lack of clarity” about conflict of interests to “the short period since collaborations between universities and agricultural biotechnology firms emerged.” In its Preface, current arguments on positive and negative potential outcomes of this relationship are mentioned:
“Some believe the agreements encourage innovation and early application of new technologies that benefit the agricultural sector, consumers and the environment. Others raise concerns, for example, that the greater emphasis on commercial applications diverts academic researchers away from research and technology development that may have significant public benefit but little commercial potential.”[510]
This new relationship between the academy and the industry could certainly be one of the reasons behind the general “mistrust” in science Nelkin and Marden describe when they analyze the StarLink controversy in the US.[511] This might also be one of the reasons why environmental groups—much more informed—became so diffident of the scientific community, too[512]—although some authors consider this has to do with “green thought” ideology, also called “deep ecology.” (I will analyze this in point v.)
Regarding Argentina, as we have seen in Part III, biotechnology research, as well as science research in general, is overwhelmingly performed in public research institutes and universities. The government is encouraging a more close relationship between the scientific system and local companies, and science journalism—to mention one public actor that may influence public opinion—sees this effort as valuable.[513] Local scientists, in general, are trusted, and perceived as part of a mostly uninterested community. A recent survey conducted in Argentina, Spain, Brazil and Uruguay by Redes Center—Centro Redes, an independent research center based in Buenos Aires—shows that:
“Vocation for knowledge is considered the main reason that motivates scientists. More than 40 percent of the responses in Argentina, Spain and Uruguay—less in Brazil—agree with this assertion. Additionally, respondents of the four countries choose “solving people’s problems” as the second option. Pursue of power, money, prestige or awards are considered secondary motives (…).”[514]
ii) New legislation regarding biotechnology patents
The first patent on a genetically modified organism was granted in 1980. It involved a bacterium designed to degrade petroleum. Very soon, patenting just mere sequences of DNA from all kinds of organisms—virus, bacteria, plants, animals, humans—was also possible. As Rebecca S. Eisemberg explains, “the analogy to chemical patent practice has supplied an answer” on what can be patented.[515] Among other authors, Dorothy Nelkin has analyzed the negative impact this has had on research, the information available to the public, and the medical practice.[516]
When these changes were taking place, granting IP on crops was already a standard practice, so it can be argued that this situation had no impact on public perception of the issue.[517] However, many times one topic is not so incorrectly connected to another, because many controversial issues during recent years involved corporations trying to patent all kind of biological products, some of them originated in developing countries—not only plants, but also human products. [518] The fact that there is currently a market for human tissues, and highly controversial cases such as John Moore’s—an American citizen whose cells were used to develop a very lucrative cell line without his informed consent—may help explain why the informed public became more suspicious on these matters. [519]
Regarding Argentina, I will comment on this point together with point iii).
iii) Corporate monopoly of GM crop technology.
The history of GM crops is inextricably related to the increasing power of corporations. In this dispute, the bad guys have names, and Monsanto and Syngenta are certainly two of the most targeted public enemies of GMOs opponents. The overwhelming majority of GM crops approved and planted so far belong to one of only five corporations. [520] And this is not simply because they have been extremely efficient, or because loose regulation allowed them to get to the market in almost no time—as opponents usually argue—, but because they were able to get rid of competitors. As Millers explains, in the early 1980s a few agrochemical corporations, “led by Monsanto (St. Louis, MO)”—although not all of them were American—, successfully lobbied President Ronald Reagan’s administration: they requested more restrictive regulations for GM crops. The cost of field testing GM plants became twenty-fold higher. This way, they managed to use regulation as a “market barrier.” [521] As a result,
“Seed and entrepreneurial biotechnology companies for the most part failed to compete successfully on this tilted playing field, and subsequently many were bought at a fraction of their value by Monsanto, Novartis (Basel, Swizterland), and DuPont (Wilmington, DE).”[522]
According to Miller, this initially successful move by the industry contributed both to “overregulation” and “public antagonism,” two key factors that are slowing down the release of new GM crops. The counterintuitive character of Miller’s account of the development of the GM crop market is not only provoking, but also useful to understand why mostly commodity crops for large scale farming—that benefit mostly rich countries—have been developed so far. As Robert Paarlberg says, commenting on the fact that GM crops have been adopted by a just few countries so far:
“One reason for this clustering of GM crop acreage in just three relatively prosperous Western hemisphere countries was a decision by the private companies selling GM seeds to focus first on their best-paying customers. Successful farmers in the United States, Canada, and Argentina had the purchasing power and the commercial seed buying habits to constitute an instantly lucrative market.” [523]
In addition, as a Marco and Rausser’s study shows, behind the “dozens of mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances” between agrochemical companies, which took place mostly during the 1990s, there was a particular interest in protecting intellectual property rights (IPRs). It seems that, in enforcing IPRs, size matters. As they put it,
“Our studies show, among other things, that the average enforceability of a firm’s patent portfolio is positively related to the probability of acquiring and been acquired. Put another way, the estimated ability of a firm to enforce its property is important in its consolidation decision.”[524]
Regarding Argentina, and particularly in the case of Bt cotton, for example, the price strategy implemented by Genética Mandiyú clearly shows how the global strategy of a multinational corporation may influence local decisions, as Qaim and De Janvry’s study suggests. As we will see, the public debate over GM crops in Argentina already reflects this concern for corporate monopoly of the seeds and agrochemicals, and of the potential consequences of it. Ironically, the argument is most commonly applied to the case of RR soybean and glyphosate—which was not a monopolistic market after all, as we have seen in Part I. However, Monsanto’s aggressive moves towards collecting royalties on RR soybean in Argentina after Brazil’s legal adoption have begun to play a part in the public discussion. Also, a local NGO raises the issue of how some Argentina’s plant varieties may have been bought by corporations, as we shall see.
iv) New forms of activism and a new environmental sensibility
“An ecological sensibility is rippling through societies all over the world,” says Paul Wapner.[525] One after another, surveys show people from developed as well as from developing countries are increasingly concerned about the environment, and express they are willing to pay higher prices for products if it helps protect the environment.[526]
This new sensibility may be considered in part a consequence of the emergence of trasnational environmental activist groups, which encourage awareness regarding environmental problems. Wapner attributes this strategy and its consequences particularly to Greenpeace—which was formally founded in 1972, after a series of campaigns against US testing of nuclear weapons initiated in1969—; but also to the World Wildlife Fund—established in 1961 as a conservacionist initiative headquartered in Switzerland—; and to Friends of the Earth, created in 1969 after disputes at the Sierra Club—one of the oldest environmental groups in the US.[527]
Wapner believes this new sensibility entails “a type of governance”: “It represents a mechanism of authority that is able to shape human behavior,” and has impact on private as well as on public policies. He mentions the voluntary ceasing of producing chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by corporations as an example of how this mechanism can influence decision-making processes. [528]
Regarding GM crops, Nelkin has analyzed how public actions—in person as well as on the Internet, through “global networks of information”—performed by more than twenty activist groups might have influenced and be currently influencing public opinion and public decisions in Europe and the US. He mentions “groups with religious interests or affiliations,” “organic food and farm groups,” “environmental organizations,” “policy and consumer organizations,” “activist groups,” “third world groups”—all of them with some kind of environmentalist attitude, and located mostly in developed countries. [529] Certainly, the moratorium on GM crops and the new labeling law in Europe may be considered in part a result of these processes.[530]
Additionally, authors such as Andrew Dobson have pointed out that “green ideology” or “deep ecology”—as a kind of extreme form of environmentalism—does not favor technology, on the assumption that “technological solutions cannot provide a way out of the impasse of the impossibility of aspiring to infinite growth in a finite system.”[531] And this opposition could even lead to a radical rejection of science. Dobson quotes M. Lewis critique of what he calls “radical environmentalism,” and the four postulates Lewis attributes to this thought:
“(…) that ‘primal’ (or ‘primitive’) exemplify how we can live in harmony with nature (and with each other); that thoroughgoing decentralization, leading to local autarky, is necessary for social and ecological health; that technological advance, if not scientific progress itself, is inherently harmful and dehumanizing; and that the capitalist market system is inescapably destructive and wasteful.”[532]
What happens with this “environmental sensibility” in Argentina? It is out of the reach of this paper to thoroughly review this issue. But, in reference to the GMOs dispute, one important aspect is the level of trust people have in environmental NGOs. Centro Redes’ survey shows that, regarding information on nuclear issues and biotechnology—by far, the most publicly controversial scientific issues nowadays—, the Argentine public trusts “university scientists” in the first place—41 percent on nuclear issues, and 39.5 percent on biotechnology issues—, and “environmental defense organizations” in the second place—28.3 and 28 per cent. It is important to note that the situation is similar in Uruguay and Spain, but different in Brazil, where “environmental defense organizations” rank first regarding both issues—35 percent on nuclear issues, and 37.4 percent on biotechnology issues—, while “university scientists” rank second—30.7 and 33 percent.[533]
SAGPyA’s survey shows similar results for Argentina. In a more specific wording of more or less the same question (reliability of environmental NGOs), Greenpeace, the environmental NGO most visible in Argentina, is perceived as a highly reliable source: 69 percent of respondents “trust” “Greenpeace” regarding biotechnology issues. Only the general item “scientists” ranks better (76 percent of trust), while INTA ranks third (60 percent), and SAGPyA itself ranks fourth (31 percent).[534]
v) Anti-globalism as “anti-Americanization”
Opposition against the increasing connection of markets is often seen both by proponents and opponents—as Amartya Sen points out—as “global westernization.”[535]
In this sense, Vandana Shiva’s description of globalization as the imposition of a certain culture on all others, and as the process that allows the interests of a group of people—essentially, the developed countries’ elites, in her description—to unfairly prevail over the interests of the rest of the world, represents a summary of the main critiques against this process:
“Globalization is not a natural, evolutionary or inevitable phenomenon. It is a political process which has been forced on the weak by the powerful. Globalization is not the cross-cultural interaction of diverse societies. It is the imposition of a particular culture on all others. Nor is globalization the search for ecological balance on a planetary scale. It is the predation of one class, one race and often one gender of a single species on all others. The ‘global’ in the dominant discourse is the political space in which the dominant local seeks global control, and tries to free itself from natural limits arising from the imperatives of ecological sustainability and social justice.”[536]
Although discomfort with globalization predates 1999, that year’s demonstrations against the World Trade Organization’s meeting in Seattle marked the beginning of a broad protest movement. [537] This movement is heterogeneous and, up to a certain extent, contradictory. That is why I would like to focus only on one particular example: paysan reframing, described by Heller. She analyzes how the GM crops dispute in France was reframed in 1997-2000 from an “objetivist risk frame” to a “‘food quality’ issue”, “linked to productivist agriculture, cultural homogeneization, and globalization.”[538] In her account of this reframing process, he mentions some issues that implicitly have to do with some kind of competition between the US and Europe, as well as with globalization. One of the key characters in her story is José Bové, a French farmer who represents many of the values present in this dispute. As she describes him,
“Bové has indeed become a cultural folk hero in France and internationally, symbolizing French resistance to perceived processes of Americanization in domains of food, language, music, and business.”[539]
Bové’s paysan reframing, presented in terms of “anti-globalism,” coincides both with environmentalist positions as well with Europe’s strategy in the global market, as a provider of quality food. [540] His call in favor of a traditional, non-productivist agriculture has had some echo in sectors that oppose GM crops in many developing countries—among them, Argentina, as we shall see. He targets American corporations, particularly McDonald’s.
Regarding agrochemical companies, this “anti-Americanization” is also apparent: Monsanto has become the preferred target of GM opponents. Dickson compares public sentiment toward Monsanto in the 1990s with opposition to Dow Chemical in the 1960s and 1970s among anti-Vietnam demonstrators: “Monsanto has become to new generations of protestors what Dow Chemical represented to their parents.”[541]
McDonald’s and Monsanto have also been targeted in Argentina by opponents of globalization, as well as by other protest groups—particularly, McDonalds’s, during the massive and occasionally violent demonstrations which took place in December 2001 in Argentina, which motivated and followed President Fernando De la Rúa’s resignation.[542] However, as Trigo et al. point out, most of the hostility toward globalization, during those days as well as afterwards, was focused on banks and privatized companies[543]—and consumer advocacy groups, as we shall see, also focus their criticism on these kinds of companies, many of which are European.
Additionally, the influence of Bové’s proposals may be limited by the fact that he is a member of a community which receives EU agricultural subsidies, a highly controversial topic in Argentina, present in most framings regarding agricultural issues, as we shall see.
vi) Issues regarding public perception of risk
Some of the key issues regarding public perception of risk of GMOs have to do not only with how risk issues are communicated [544] but, more importantly, with distributing risk. As Magnum and Caplan comment when they analyze the accusation of “playing God” made to scientists who work on GMOs by opponents of this technology, one of the meanings behind this accusation may have to do with a demand for controlling “power,” and for increasing “accountability.”[545]
As already commented in this section, changes in the way science is funded and in the way patents are granted may have something to do with the growing diffidence toward scientists among the public—that is, consumers. This might be exacerbated by the fact that, regarding food safety issues, the distribution of the risk is not even: so far, and due to the GM varieties available, most of the risk is faced by consumers, while farmers and corporations receive the benefits. In addition, in technical matters, the decision-making process is usually out of the reach of the public. According to Magnus and Caplan,
“Many of the things people care about when thinking about risks and benefits are not the relative weighting of the factors, but rather their distribution: who is exposed to the risk, who benefits, and who gets to decide? People object to being exposed to risk if it is not of their own choosing and if it is done for the benefit of others (even if the amount of risk is smaller than risk they are willing to expose themselves to on a routine basis). These features point to the fact that considerations of justice and fairness may well matter more than utility in most people’s assessment of the technology.”[546]
Another distinct aspect of GM crops regarding risk is that they have to do with “DNA technologies,” which—according to Slovic, an expert in measuring public perception of risk through psychometric research—are very prone to prompt social concern. This is not surprising, considering how much power has been attributed to the gene by popular culture, as Nelkin and Lindee have shown.[547] Actually, Slovic compares DNA technologies with nuclear power, on which he says “people judge the benefits from nuclear power to be quite small and the risks to be unacceptably high.”[548] Although that cannot be said of all DNA technologies—since some studies show people have great expectations regarding medical applications, or at least not so much concern—,[549] this seems to be the case with GM crops. It is interesting to note that Slovic wrote his article in 1987, when recombinant DNA technology had already faced opposition,[550] although not as much as GM crops are now facing. He predicted an accident with these technologies would have devastating effect on public trust:
“DNA technologies seem to evoke several of the perceptions that make nuclear power so hard to manage. In the aftermath of an accident, this technology could face some of the same problems and opposition now confronting the nuclear industry.”[551]
The StarLink case, which involved the contamination of corn for human consumption with a variety of GM corn that had only been approved for animal consumption—because of its potential allergenic effect—might have something to do with increasing awareness and opposition against GM crops in the US, which is relatively new. [552] As a recent report issued by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology states, “the September 2000 discovery of StarLink corn in taco shells caught the public and much of American food system by surprise.” [553] This was considered “a seminal event.” [554]
And there is more. As Slovic points out, some accidents may have consequences that far exceed their direct impact, and therefore affect other technologies. As he puts it:
“In extreme cases, the indirect costs of a mishap may extend past industry boundaries, affecting companies, industries and agencies whose business is minimally related to the initial event.”[555]
Many authors consider that the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) scandal in the UK may help explain why British as well as other European consumers have so little confidence in regulatory agencies and are so diffident of novel foods.[556]
Additionally, regarding food safety, other factors may have impact on public perception of risk: the “tainting effect,” as Comstock calls it. He mentions a study that shows that, regarding food safety, consumers have what he describes as a “precautionary response.” When faced with two contrasting positions about food safety, consumers pay more attention to negative information. In this sense, it does not matter how many studies show that some kind of food is safe: any accusation—even if not well founded or completely illogical—may lead to rejection. As he comments, “the precautionary response is particularly strong when a consumer sees little to gain from a new food technology.” [557] Comstock points out this may have consequences in the development of GM crops from an international perspective,“In a worldwide context, the precautionary response of those facing food abundance in developed countries may lead to be insensitive to the conditions of those in less fortunate situations.”[558]
Furthermore, some authors explicitly link opposition against GM crops to a broad opposition against all kinds of technology, which could have to do with the general mistrust in science we have already commented. As Thompson suggests:
“Virtually all of the issues that have been tied to agricultural biotechnology in the last twenty-five years could have also been raised with respect to other technologies, both within agriculture and for society at large. Debate over agricultural biotechnology is, in this sense, a surrogate for debate over technological progress itself.”[559]
Regarding perception of risk, the case of Argentina is complex, as we shall see. Argentina’s situation in terms of food security has been considered comparable to that of developed countries[560]—after all, it has produced more food than what it needed for most of its history, and currently it produces almost 2 million tones of grain and oilseeds per capita: that may be the highest ratio in the world. [561] However, there is hunger in Argentina, and it is not surprising: as Sen has shown, food production is only one of the factors that influence food security. Actually, he says, “the coexistence of hunger and food exports is a common phenomenon in many famines.” [562] It is unemployment and lack of a supportive welfare system what may bring about hunger, according to Sen:
“Famines can occur even without any decline in food production or availability. A laborer may be reduced to starvation through unemployment, combined with the absence of a social security system of safety nets (such as unemployment insurance). This can easily happen, and indeed even a large famine can actually occur, despite a high and undiminished general level of food availability— perhaps even a “peak” level of food availability—in the economy as a whole.”[563]
During 2002, national and international media showed cases of undernourished children from all over Argentina—particularly from the North Western region.[564] In fact, starvation in Argentina goes beyond anecdotal information. Argentina’s census and statistics institute, INDEC, says the infant mortality rate has risen in some areas to 30 per 1,000 children born alive. The figure was 18 per 1,000 until recently.[565] According to World Bank estimations, 55 percent of the Argentine population was below the national poverty line in 2002.[566] The dramatic paradox of a relatively large portion of the population starving in a country that produces so much food is certainly one of the key original topics in Argentina’s public debate over GM crops, as we shall see.
When comparing “rich and poor countries perspectives” on GM food, Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen mention a series of factors that may influence differing perspectives. One is “the budget share for food.” They say that “low-income people in developing countries often spend 50-80 percent of their total disposable income on food whereas Americans, Australians and Europeans spend 10-15 percent on average.”[567] That 35 percent of the Argentine population do not have access to basic food products, even if they spend 66 percent of their income on food, [568] may certainly make Comstock “tainting effect” irrelevant. And a similar assertion can be made regarding risk perception on DNA technologies. However, not all of the population is at risk of starving, so perspectives may differ between different portions of the population. In Argentina, as all over the world, some people live in a risk society, while some people simply live dangerously.
In particular, regarding acceptance of applications of biotechnology, Argentine consumers seem to follow developed countries patterns. SAGPyA’s survey shows 78 percent of respondents “agree” on the medical or pharmaceutical use of biotechnology, while only 46 percent “agree” on agricultural uses, and 24 “agree” on the use of biotechnology in animals.[569] In spite of the fact that the use of biotechnology in animals has the lowest acceptance according to this survey, the transgenic cow Pampa Mansa, developed by the local company Bio Sidus, was welcomed by most of the media. Are the media so disconnected with people’s expectations and fears?[570] Or is there something else going on here? Certainly, that 81 percent of the population considers local “scientific development” is “very important” for Argentina, according to a survey conducted in 1998 by Ciencia Hoy Association—an Argentine scientific association—may have something to do with accepting what in other contexts would be seen as less acceptable.[571]
In the interplay of these aspects, which may pull Argentina’s public opinion in different directions, different framings are crucial. The kind of narrative proponents and opponents of GM crops construct to explain Argentina’s adoption of GM crops, how they link this process to the current economic situation, and the role of corporations and local actors in it, is of vital importance. There lies a broad terrain of negotiation and of meaning construction. Something similar can be said regarding distribution of risk and benefits, which can be framed in different ways. As we shall see, in widespread framings of the GM crops controversy in Argentina, the economic crisis in Argentina is linked to developed countries’ agricultural subsidies, decisively contributing to dissolve the “farmers/consumers” opposition within Argentina, in favor of a collective “Argentine citizens.”
B. What (some) people have said
Regarding public awareness and perception of GM crops in Argentina, Burachik and Traynor summarize the situation as of 2000/2001, when they were writing their review. Essentially, they say Argentine consumers were then hardly aware of the fact that they were already consuming GM food, although much of the specialized press—particularly, newspaper’s sections on agricultural and economic issues—had been regularly covering the topic of GM crops from an agricultural perspective, since these crops were introduced in Argentina. As they put it,
“From information about GMO grain production and exports found in newspaper articles, interested consumers can easily deduce that some processed foods (soy milk, maize-based snack foods) being sold in grocery stores contain some percentage of ingredients derived from transgenic soybeans or maize. Nonetheless, the majority of people are only marginally aware of genetically modified crops and food. As there is no requirement to label GM foods in Argentina, most consumers presumably are unaware of the possible GM content in some of the foods they buy.”[572]
This certainly represented a challenge to acceptability. Was it possible to say that the Argentine public had already accepted GM crops, when there was not real awareness of their presence in food, or of their role in Argentina’s economy? As Burachik and Traynor comment in their review, there was “potential for opponents to turn this situation into a major bio-technology public relations campaign.” And they describe what happened in 2000, when Greenpeace along with other groups intensified their campaigning against GM crops in Argentina. In turn, these campaigns were responded by sectors involved in doing research, monitoring and producing GM crops. As they put it,
“During the course of this study, in fact, the level of public awareness began changing due to increased activity by opposition groups. Against this negative shifting background, proponents are beginning to increase their visibility. Members of CONABIA, SENASA spokespersons, academic scientists, and government officials are speaking out, making positive statements about biotechnology in media interviews and speeches. Individual agencies and organizations are beginning to develop their own public information initiatives having variable content, target audience, visibility, and budget.”[573]
One of the key results of the 2000/2001 campaigns and counter campaigns was the creation of the Biotechnology Group, a strong pro-GM coalition, as commented in Part V.[574]
However, even after this process of campaigns and counter-campaigns—which included direct actions in supermarkets, series of lectures by international and local scholars, and the creation of websites devoted to the issue, among others—[575] the Argentine public at large seemed to continue being relatively unaware of the whole issue and its implications, as Burachik and Traynor comment in the Recommendations section of their review.[576] A slightly different picture seems to come up from a 2003 SAGPyA’s survey. It shows that 90 percent of Argentine farmers “know, use or have heard about GMOs,”[577] and—more interestingly—64 percent of consumers “know or have heard of food with GMOs ingredients.” [578] However, the wording of the latter question does not allow us to really grasp if Argentine consumers are aware they are already eating this kind of food—they may just be aware of their existence. Additionally, when asked which food is genetically altered in Argentina, they include many products which are not GM, such as potatoes, fruits, meat or bread.[579] Notably, Michael Rodemayer, executive director of the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, says that polls indicate US consumers are not aware they are eating GM food, either.[580]
Rebellion in the farm
In spite of this continuing general lack of awareness regarding GM crops in Argentina, in the early 2000s there were a series of interesting public debates over GM crops in the media. To understand the conflicting framings presented in these debates, I would like to begin analyzing an op-ed article which criticizes adoption of GM crops in Argentina, written by Malena Gainza, “a housewife and an agricultural producer”—as she is introduced. It was published in La Nación newspaper on July 25, 2002, in the height of Argentina’s economic crisis and when there was already much concern about adoption of GM crops I Argentina, mostly because of Europe’s opposition. It is important to note that La Nación is the second largest national newspaper published in Buenos Aires, and one of the most prestigious and influential. It is a relatively conservative newspaper, traditionally close to the agricultural sector. It has a small daily section on agricultural market information—Tuesdays through Saturdays—, a one-page section on Thursdays, and a large weekly section on Saturdays, all of which have recently been renewed. And a small section on TV was introduced in 2003.[581]
Gainza’s article, titled “Transgenic Argentina,” is accompanied by a drawing that echoes the usual DNA imagery. It shows a series of plants represented as DNA strands—planted on a profile of Argentina’s territory—which are being watered with a hand-held sprinkler, which floats in the air. This article, and the debate it aroused in La Nación’s letters to the editor and op-ed sections, may be considered part of a reflective effort performed by some of the most informed—and involved—sectors in Argentina regarding GM crops. As we shall see, this debate is only secondarily about risk, and distribution of risks and benefits—the labeling issue is addressed very briefly. Primarily, it deals with national autonomy and identity issues, mostly by discussing Argentina’s position in world trade. Within this framework, the agricultural sector has a leading role, and national authorities.
In her article, Gainza analyzes the current situation of GM crops within the framework of Argentina’s agricultural history, and links adoption of GM crops by Argentine farmers with agricultural subsidies in Europe and the US. She begins recalling one of Argentina’s constitutive myths: Argentina, “granary of the world.” (This had to do particularly with Europe, final port for most of Argentina’s exports during the end of the eighteenth century, and in the first half of the twentieth century. Some scholars call this system “the agro-exporting system”—“ el modelo agroexportador”).[582] She considers Argentina’s agricultural leadership was threatened after World War II by agricultural subsidies granted by governments in “the Northern hemisphere”—she makes no distinctions between the US and Europe. In turn, she says, subsidies made the traditional Argentine ranch [“la tradicional estancia argentina”] go bankrupt, and forced Argentina to import a foreign model in order to increase productivity “by artificial means.” GM crops are part of these “gringo techniques” [“técnicas gringas”], which replaced “old criollo customs” [“antiguas costumbres criollas”]. The language she uses is tremendously evocative, particularly the opposition gringo/criollo, which gains peculiar—yet not unusual—connotations in Gainza’s narrative. In her article, “gringo” not only connotes ‘foreign’, but also ‘old’, ‘over-populated’, ‘exhausted’, ‘selfish’, ‘artificial’, and ‘unhealthy’. Conversely, “criollo” connotes ‘authentic’, ‘young’, ‘low-populated’, ‘productive’, ‘generous’, ‘natural’, and ‘healthy’. This text does not talk only about the economy, the market “distorted” by agricultural subsidies, and Argentina’s position in world trade: primarily, it talks about identity, and autonomy. This is how the article begins:
“Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the huge extension of fertile unpopulated plains, the benign weather with its peculiar distribution of rain, and the low population density, made it possible in Argentina the flourishing of a prosperous agricultural activity, unparalleled in the world, which, based in an equilibrated agriculture and cattle-breeding rotation as well as in a wise crop rotation, without the need for artificial fertilizers or contaminating agro-toxics, was able to preserve soil quality while producing healthy food.
But the economic equation that allowed Argentina to prosper as the ‘granary of the world’ and to assimilate a huge immigration was distorted by subsidies which, after Second World War, governments of the Northern hemisphere granted their farmers, in order for them to produce food politically more profitable than the healthy food produced in the distant South.
This way, the traditional Argentine ranch went bankrupt. In order to survive, it was necessary to abandon old criollo customs, and to increase productivity by artificial means, well beyond the most generous natural yields achieved in our hemisphere. We copied gringo techniques, successful in those lands exhausted after centuries of overexplotaition, without calculating the risk of ruining our fertile lands, and health.”[583]
After that, Gainza’s article tells the story of the introduction of soybean in Argentina, and particularly of GM soybean. She talks about the rise and fall of the price of soybean in the world market, saying that the only ones who took advantage of the falling prices were “the American laboratory that provided the seeds and the herbicide, as well as Northern hemisphere cattle-breeders who had cheap protein to feed their cattle, and Northern Hemisphere farmers who were able to plant their fields with better-paid crops”—in obvious reference to Monsanto and the EU. She then mentions some of the most common accusations made to RR soybean in the international risk dispute, particularly regarding environmental impacts. One interesting and original point she makes is that although GM crop’s risks are yet unknown—“We will need fifteen years to prove arguments posed by proponents and opponents of this food”—, conventional, productivistic agriculture has already been proved as toxic: “What has already been proved is the allergenic, teratogenic, and carcinogenic potential of the European agrochemicals used in conventional soybean cultures.” And then she fires against a potential ally: “But where is Greenpeace?”
Then Gainza links subsidies with overproduction, and with hunger in developing countries, contradicting one of the main arguments posed by multinational corporations—that GM crops will feed the poor and provide food security:
“It is not true that we have to produce more in order to end hunger (year after year we see how the food left [by rich people] does not reach the hungry). There would be less hunger, if the First World countries paid what healthy food is worth of.”
Additionally, Gainza implies that RR soybean was introduced in Argentina without the required studies—this is consistent with her depiction of GM crops as a novel, not yet well known type of food—and criticizes the use of “this soybean” in charity plans in Argentina. She is talking about what is known as Generous Soybean Plan (“Plan Soja Solidaria”). I will talk about it later. Finally, after acknowledging Argentina has also a relatively large organic production, she concludes by equating Argentina’s traditional agricultural methods with organic methods. She also makes a call to return to these methods –in order to protect Argentina’s potentials—, and to publicize them in the world, as a way to regain a privileged position in the world market by offering healthy food. Again, connotations of generosity are linked to Argentina’s potential and intentions, in her narrative:
“Why should we restrict our unparalleled productive potential to niches of organic food destined to foreign economic elites, if our whole national production could be obtained organically, and our market deserves to be the whole world?
Let us tell the international community about our privileged conditions to feed the humankind. Let us preserve the exceptional geography which we have been blessed with, and regarding the gold eggs’ hen that still has its nest in Argentine soil, let us protect it from all those foxes that hang about the hen-house.”
Gainza’s article had a series of replies in the same newspaper. The first one was a letter to the editor, published on August 3, 2002. The reader, Guillermo Bernaudo, introduces himself as an “agricultural engineer” and “soybean producer.” After saying he will not comment on the “subjective or opinionated aspects” of Gainza’s article—he seems to be referring to Gainza’s framing of the issue—, he responds one by one Gainza’s assertions on the perils and negative outcomes of GM soybean introduction. Regarding food safety, and Argentina’s biosafety system, he comments—interestingly enough in a country where governmental offices are generally perceived as corrupt and/or inept:
“There is no other agricultural product which undergoes so many controls such as transgenic ones, and CONABIA’s action has been so far an example of seriousness which is difficult to find in other governmental offices, as well as in the Argentine society.”[584]
In the last paragraph of his letter, Bernaudo talks about hunger in Argentina, and the Generous Soybean Plan. He implies Gainza offended him:
“To conclude, I am proud to be part of a community of producers that donates part of its transgenic soybean in order to help malnourished children, in this absurd situation Argentina is in. Mrs. Gainza’s assertions in this regard go beyond the limit of ignorance, and enter the terrain of gratuitous offense.”
Gainza responds to Bernaudo’s letter in another letter to the editor, published on August 6. She recommends him to read The Biotech Century, by Jeremy Rifkin, and mentions two websites which have critical information regarding GM crops: biotech-, and . This framing, again, refers mostly to the international risk dispute, because she is responding to Bernaudo’s arguments about risk. She also mentions a local source: “agricultural engineer Adolfo Boy’s articles”—I will talk about him later, because he is part of one of the main local NGOs that opposes GM crops in Argentina, Group of Rural Reflection. She insists on criticizing agricultural subsidies, calling the countries that grant them “disloyal competitors”—“competidores desleales,” a relatively common phrase in this kind of framing—and links them with GM crops again:
“All those years of negotiations regarding subsidies in international fora were useless. The technological recipes which were sold to us by our disloyal competitors increased the volume of our harvest, but damaged its quality. Today, concerns about food quality and environmental preservation gain supporters among First World consumers, whereas Argentina is risking loosing unique natural conditions by satisfying those demands.”[585]
On August 10, another letter to the editor. This is not a response to Gainza but to Bernaudo. Carlos Velar, a reader without affiliation, says “this is a debate we should have had years before, because of what it represents from an economic perspective.” He also makes a joke about labeling and the Generous Soybean Plan, saying that if soybean producers represent a community more charitable than others, then “they should label themselves, in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of those who donate non-transgenic food.” Afterwards, he makes four important points. First, he acknowledges that the international debate is entangled due to “economic interests”—that is, he dismisses the risk dispute. Then he says that biotechnological crops in Argentina have been imported, so there is nothing to be proud of: “we are simply buyers of technology.” He also links hunger with overproduction and technological dependence. Finally, he says he is not “against biotechnology”—in fact, this word has positive connotations in his text, because it is linked to science, and to serving consumers. Curiously, it is contrasted against “what is increasingly more questioned”—transgenic food, we might imagine. Revealingly, he explicitly states that the debate he is engaged in is about “Argentina’s identity as a food producer,” and he introduces the demand for a role of the State:
“I think we strongly need biotechnological development, but that has nothing to do with producing what is increasingly more questioned, but with using biotechnological research and development to satisfy in the best possible way the demands of consumers, who are increasingly aware of social and quality of life aspects.”
These are a couple of reflections I do while I wait for us to work together in order to look for an identity as food producers, and in order to design a strategy of communication and development free of trifles and meanness [“pequeñeces y mezquindades”] where the State plays the role it should.”[586]
On August 18, Bernaudo responds to Gainza, showing his credentials, and going back to scientific issues. As he says, his letter,
“Is not the result of a quick intellectual exercise, as she [Gainza] imagines. It has the support of 20 years of professional work, in which I have had a fluent exchange with prestigious researchers, making a team with outstanding professionals, and in permanent contact with producers who bet their future in every sowing season.”[587]
Bernaudo then names the system he and these other farmers he refers to were performing as “high yields sustainable agriculture,” which includes the use of GM crops. He praises it using some of the usual environmental arguments used by international pro-GM groups, saying it is “the best technology known so far to produce food, while reducing erosion and using the least possible area in order to preserve wild species’ habitats.” Finally, he equates GM crops to conventional crops in Argentina, both in terms of environmental impacts and food safety aspects, and introduces an important topic: the novel discussion about soybean monoculture in Argentina:
“Argentine agriculture is one of the most sustainable in the world. Argentine agricultural products, either transgenic or conventional, are healthy and healthful.
Concern about the current expansion of the area devoted to soybean, in face of corn area reduction, is not a weakness. [sic] It is a positive sign of how our production system’s sustainability is monitored by the actors involved. Many First World and Third World countries have not reacted yet to centuries or decades of monoculture.”
The last letter published regarding the debate generated by Gainza’s article appeals to national solidarity and pride. It is a very brief letter, which I transcribe complete. On August 25, a month after Gainza’s article was published, writes Norberto Brodsky, another reader with no affiliation:
“On the controversy between Mrs. Malena Gainza, the engineer G. Bernaudo, and Mr. Carlos Velar, in several letters published in this section, I would like to make the following reflection: there is no doubt about the importance of the topic. Why are we discussing technical aspects? Why don’t they work together, and prepare a joint proposal, complementing each other? Remember Martín Fierro: if siblings fight against each other… strangers will eat them!”[588]
Brodsky alludes to one of Argentina’s most important literary pieces: the nineteenth century gaucho poem Martín Fierro, by José Hernández. The idea of the importance of getting united to face competition in the world market is clear, while there is also a tacit acknowledgment regarding Argentina’s history as an agricultural country—even if gauchos were more like landless cowboys than farmers. So this reference must be read in terms of national identity and autonomy. [589]
The official response
But before Brodsky’s poetic closure in the letters to the editor section, La Nación published a much more formal response to Gainza’s article, in charge of Víctor Hugo Trucco, then president of AAPRESID, the farmers’ associations that had—and still has—the leading role in promoting no-till methods—and therefore, RR soybean, among other GM crops—during the 1990s, as mentioned in Part I.
On August 12, Trucco signed an op-ed article in the same section where Gainza’s original article was published, where he is presented not only as president of AAPRESID, but also as a “doctor in Biochemistry.” The article is titled “Biotechnological Argentina,” and represents an extensive and detailed defense of the introduction of GM crops and no-till methods in Argentina during the 1990s. Its title certainly mirrors Gainza’s title, as if correcting it, but the selected adjective has much more positive connotations (mostly, ‘scientific’ and even ‘futuristic’ connotations). Most importantly, it is not “tainted”—in Comstock’s terms—with accusations against GM crops, most commonly identified in Argentina as “transgenic.” Its first two paragraphs mirror Gainza’s first paragraphs, and respond to them, following her narrative regarding those good old times, yet stressing that they have passed. His central argument is that traditional methods were good during the first part of the twentieth century, but that modern times require new methods. This is how his article begins:
“Before World War II, Argentina had thirty five years of economic growth. Those were good times, when people did what was according to those times, and when Argentina grew with foreign impulse, with the work force, capital and markets that our products demanded. Back then, our country was the first corn exporter.
Of course, back then nobody thought about rotating crops, and there were neither agrochemicals nor fertilizers. Our yields were of around a ton per hectare. Development only reached out around 800 km from Buenos Aires city. Undoubtedly, Argentina progressed, and it did it because it performed an economic activity in accord to the technology and economy of those times.
Most of Trucco’s article—more extensive than Gainza’s—is dedicated to risk aspects within a framework of food security in Malthusian terms—that is, the traditional framework used by many international pro-GM sectors. It also has a strong science popularizing tone, as if he were trying to educate the public—behind this effort, certainly lies what scholars in the public understanding of science call “the deficit model,” which connects negative opinions about science with scientific illiteracy.[590] For example, he explains how RR soybean–“a soybean variety,” which he introduces as a biotechnological development—was created, and why it is resistant to an herbicide. He also talks about old erosion problems in Argentina due to traditional tilling—quoting INTA’s studies—, and the advantages of no-till farming. In a move also typical of science popularizing pieces in developing countries, Trucco compares Argentina with the most scientific advanced country: “currently, Argentina is a world leader in conservative agriculture: no-till farming exceeds 50 percent, while in the US it only reaches 15 percent.” Certainly, although it is only mentioned once, the US is Argentina’s main model and competitor in Trucco’s narrative.
On the international dispute, he says that in it “multiple elements take part: interests that have to do with economics, with international politics, with public perception aspects due to associations with events unrelated to biotechnology, as well as ideological interests.” He then dismisses the potential impact of Europe’s opposition to GM crops on Argentina’s trade, using risk and economic arguments. He first says that Argentina exports “most of its transgenic soybean meal” to Europe, because “they know that from a nutritional perspective it does not differ from non-transgenic soybean,” and because “they need it.” Another argument that supports his vision that GM crops are not jeopardizing Argentina’s exports has to do with the fact “people who reject biotechnology and agrochemicals represent a market that can be served from Argentina—and in fact there are producers who do it.” However, he warns, “we cannot fail to differentiate a small organic market, which can surely grow, with another, such as the agro-food market, which represents 15,000 million dollars.”
Regarding hunger and the economic crisis—Argentina made international news during 2002, due to its economic crisis, and its dramatic cases of hunger, among other serious social problems—he makes a crucial distinction between the economic crisis and the agricultural system:
“Let us make clear that the world is not worried about Argentina’s production methods: it is worried about the incompetence of public administration, which has led the country with the highest per capita protein production to a situation of malnutrition.”
Immediately after, he strongly defends the Generous Soybean Plan—“a fantastically generous plan”—, which he says covers 25,000 people in Buenos Aires, 40,000 in Rosario, among “many other cities.” Finally, he concludes stating why, in his view, Argentina should continue using these new methodologies. Responding to Gainza’s article main argument—which connected the introduction of productivist methods in Argentina with agricultural subsidies—he says that subsidies represent a challenge that has been successfully met with new methodologies. That is: essentially, he does not contradict Gainza’s framing, but corrects it, praising the use of what he calls “the best current technology” as a key element in this competition. Additionally, he introduces a sensitive issue for Argentine farmers—the increased export tariff imposed in 2002, which was resisted, as I commented in Part I, but which is also used as a pro-GM argument, because of its important contribution to the fiscal system. He also frames the debate as part of a crucial effort in deciding Argentina’s future:
“Argentina’s agriculture is competitive because it is practiced according to the times in which we live: we produce with the best current technology. That is what allows us to compete with countries that subsidize, even when we have to pay at this moment a 20 percent export tariff. (…)
We cannot analyze agriculture and food security using a domestic logic, without information, thinking that what one believes has to do with knowledge. Argentina is going through a key moment in its history: we have to decide which way to go, how to get out of the predicament; we have to discus about dreams and new paradigms. We can learn from our history. What we cannot do is to aspire to live in the same way as we did a century ago, with the technology of those times.”[591]
Trucco’s article has an interesting feature, which both confirms it is part of a debate about Argentina’s agriculture, and clearly shows lack of public awareness about GM crops as of 2002. His article is accompanied by a drawing, which shows a tractor driven by a lady with long hair and a bonnet, who represents Argentina—this is the usual personification of Argentina. The most interesting feature is the background: it represents a tilled soil, with its characteristic stripes. That is not a common landscape in rural areas anymore in Argentina, after massive adoption of non-till farming, mostly in the almost 15 million ha devoted to RR soybean—half the total planted area in Argentina, as commented in Part I. It is certainly an irony that this drawing illustrates an article signed by the president of the no-till farmers’ association as late as 2002.
I think the series of exchanges triggered by Gainza’s article shows the status of one of the key debates on GM crops in Argentina in the early 2000. Many of the issues present in the international dispute over GM crops were also present in this debate: sustainability and food safety issues, labeling, world markets. However, this debate describes the international dispute as tainted by economic and political interests, subsuming it into the local debate—displacing and relativizing risk issues. That is why the usual topics appear redimensioned, and slightly resignified in the local farmers’ debate. They were reframed: labeling is a minor topic, and risk issues—although discussed in some detail by the three farmers involved in this exchange—are considered as a secondary topic in relation to national interest, autonomy, and identity. There are also topics by that time exclusively Argentine in this debate, such as concern about monoculture regarding RR soybean, and the responsibility and role of wealthy sectors—particularly, farmers—in face of the dramatic and relatively new situation of starvation of large portions of the population. Interestingly, nobody uses the word “globalization,” although one central topic is Argentina’s position in the world market. From Gainza’s framing in relation to the myth of ‘Argentina, granary of the world’, it is taken for granted that Argentina is an exporter of agricultural products. Her critique of agricultural subsidies certainly has to do with globalization. However, it is apparent that Argentine farmers are not interested in a broad critique of globalization, but in a more specific one.
A shared view
According to Trigo et al., as of the early 2000s all of the sectors involved in adoption of GM crops in Argentina shared a common positive view: they mention “input providers”—that is, agrochemical corporations as well as local seed and agrochemical companies—, “farmers,” “the scientific community,” and “governmental authorities.” They attribute this shared view to the fact that adoption of GM crops has had no negative impact on Argentina’s economy, since the country has not have access problems to foreign markets yet. Additionally, although there are differentiated prices for GM and no-GM soybean in the world market, they are small, as already commented in Part I.[592]
Just to illustrate this point, I am going to briefly mention two more op-ed articles, published a few months after the case against the EU moratorium was filed at the WTO in 2003. Both were published in Clarín—the leading national newspaper, published in Buenos Aires, which also has an extensive weekly rural section. One was written by an Argentine scientist, and the other one by an Argentine government official. Both echo the general framing presented in Trucco’s article: Argentina as an exporting country which has to take advantage of biotechnology—that is, of GM crops—to remain competitive. Risk issues are dismissed, and the whole approach has to do with stressing Argentina’s autonomy by increasing scientific development, and by strengthening its position in the world market.
Alejandro Mentaberry is one of the scientists who took the lead in publicly defending GM crops and biotechnology in Argentina.[593] He is a professor at the University of Buenos Aires, and a researcher at CONICET. He does research and development on GM crops for the public research system, and he has also received funds from Bioceres, a venture capital company created by AAPRESID to promote local research in biotechnology, and mentioned in Part III.[594] In his extensive op-ed article, titled “Transgenic crops are not unsafe,” published on July 23, 2003, he addresses the issue of the new EU labeling requirements. First, he gives general information on GM crops and reviews risk issues much in the same way as Trucco did, that is, as part of a science popularizing strategy based on a deficit model of the public. Regarding labeling, he states it would not provide “necessary or useful information.” Interestingly, he considers EU labeling requirements as part of an “obscurantist wave,” which “may have a serious impact on European science.” So far, Mentaberry is doing what is generally expected from a scientist: talking about science, and about science policy issues. However, he does not stop there: he also talks about Argentina’s foreign policy. In the last paragraphs of his article, he addresses the impact of EU labeling requirements on Argentina’s exports, stresses the importance biotechnology had in Argentina’s agricultural expansion in the 1990s, and recommends Argentina should have a strong foreign policy to defend its markets, and its economic autonomy. Finally, after acknowledging the central role played by multinational corporations in GM crop adoption in Argentina, he highlights local scientific capacity and potentials in the area of biotechnology, and the importance of science in Argentina’s development and autonomy:
“Due to the strong adoption of transgenic varieties, restrictions originated in European regulations could add vulnerability to our exporting scheme, something that would represent bigger economic and social problems. In the case of eventual negative effects, Argentina’s response to these policies should imply an energetic action in the public relations realm, be it at the WTO, or at other international organizations, such as the Codex Alimentarius.
At the same time, and as long as the current situation remains the same, Argentina should develop strategies for food identity preservation, and correct our excessive dependence on certain markets, such as it is clearly the case regarding Europe.
Argentina has been producing record harvests year after year, and has become an important player in the world agro-alimentary commerce by its own merits. The reason for this, not sufficiently valued by our own society, has been a strong component of technological innovation in which, among other factors, biotechnology made a contribution.
Even if the main biotechnological applications were introduced by multinational corporations, Argentina has enough scientific-technological capacity to sustain an original development in this field, and could aspire to reach a much better position in the future, much in the same way as countries such as Canada or Australia have already achieved.
In the knowledge society, strengthening negotiation capacity implies to participate in generating it [knowledge], and to develop the capacity to generate local technology. That requires a substantially greater investment in all of the stages involved, from basic research to technological products, and in the establishment of state policies much more congruent with the productive effort.”[595]
The second interesting op-ed article published in Clarín was written by Eduardo Ablin, member of the Ministry of Exterior—who co-authored crucial papers on GM crops in Argentina quoted in the Introduction, and Parts I and IV. Although the article explicitly states that these are his personal opinions, we may consider his framing of the situation is shared by many people at the government, and take into account he is a respected and influential voice. Ablin’s article, published on August 23, is titled “Why should we fight back?,” and is essentially an explanation of Argentina’s decision on presenting a WTO case against the EU moratorium, together with the US and Canada. First, he makes the story of Argentina’s adoption of GM crops, and explains Argentina’s policy of only granting commercial approvals to GM events already approved by the EU. Again, his narrative evokes Trucco’s framing: adoption of GM crops represents a positive decision in terms of strengthening Argentina’s development and autonomy. The EU moratorium now threatens both of them. As a result, Argentina’s competitiveness may be affected. These are the first two paragraphs of the article:
“The system adopted for the introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in Argentina’s agriculture revealed to be quite wise, to the effect that it adopted the ‘mirror theory’, which consists in only granting approval—subject to a rigorous risk-analysis procedure—of those events that had been previously authorized by the European Union (EU), our main market.
However, since 1998 the introduction of genetically modified plant technology has been limited because the EU stopped approving new events (the ‘moratorium’).
In practical terms, that meant freezing the GMOs technological development in our country, to the extent that approval, field release and commercial authorization of any event not approved by the EU could jeopardize access of Argentine products to its main market. This way, Argentina’s agricultural development became a hostage in the hands of the unpredictable Communitarian decisions, a situation that could affect our competitiveness on the international stage.”
Ablin then dedicates five long paragraphs to explaining why the EU moratorium, although it did not affect Argentina’s exports, impacted its competitiveness—by limiting “the dynamic advantages of introducing new GM crop events”—, and why Argentina has a legitimate case about it, “based on a philosophy of trade liberalization.” In the last paragraph, he dismisses risk issues—although he is not a scientist—, and explicitly states that the WTO case represents a defense of Argentina’s interests and autonomy:
“That is why we are where we are, that is, defending the Argentine farmers’ rights to cultivate 98 % of transgenic soybean and almost 40 % of GM corn, as long as with this technology we improve our productive efficiency, and our international competitiveness on the basis of firm arguments, given the fact that these products are safe food, as has been reliably proved. That is why we have the conviction that the EU will rapidly proceed to lift all the national and communitarian norms that block the approval of new GM events, because this is what corresponds with multilateral norms.”[596]
Other voices
Maybe the only voice close to the agricultural sector in Argentina that talks against the exporting model of agriculture present in Trucco’s as well as in Gainza’s framings, is that of the Group of Rural Reflexion (Grupo de Reflexión Rural, GRR). Gainza’s mentions one of its members in her response to Bernaudo, as a source of critical information on GM crops. GRR has a very critical view of GM crops, not only in terms of environmental or food safety issues, but mostly in terms of what they represent to rural life. It is difficult to find an article about GRR in Clarín or La Nación. The only national newspaper that mentions this group is Página/12, the leading left-wing national newspaper, also published in Buenos Aires, which represents a well-established alternative medium. Another medium which quotes GRR is Hecho en Buenos Aires, an alternative magazine sold by homeless, as part of a charity project.[597]
In an op-ed article signed by one of Página/12’s then leading writers in economic matters, GRR is presented as a critical voice which is not heard by Argentina’s government. Nudler’s article, published on November 25, 2000, delineates a critique quite similar to Gainza’s, in terms of the agricultural productivist model introduced in Argentina in the 1990s, which he calls “the commodifying model”—“el modelo de comoditización.” Nudler links this model with food insecurity and poverty, and proposes that “every town, every municipality should have a food security program, with its small producers and its local market.” He says that, differently from Brazil, there are no peasant movements that ask for land in Argentina, because “peasants [“campesinos”] in Argentina do not have the seeds.” Ignoring Argentina’s laws, and the huge black market of soybean and wheat seeds, he states that “first with hybrids and then with transgenic crops, the cultivator [“el labriego”] cannot get seed from his own harvest.” He then compares welfare plans in Argentina, which distributed food in 2000, with US food aid to Ecuador, “which made Ecuadorian people’s wheat production go bankrupt.” It is important to note that some of the words used to refer to Argentine farmers in Nudler’s article are deliberately old-fashioned—“labriego,” “agricultor,” “colono”—, or are much more commonly used in other countries of Latin America—such as “campesino.” He defends the words he uses, arguing that shifting from using the word “cultivator” [“agricultor”] to “producer” [“productor,” now, the most common word in Argentina] has also to do with this productivist shift—however, as we shall see, he also uses it.
Nudler first presents these views as his, and then he introduces GRR, which has a critical view of Argentina’s agro-exporting model. In GRR views, small producers’ needs are neglected, because only the exporting model is backed by the state. Even organic production is presented as “an agriculture of scale” by GRR—something which Nudler seems to disagree with in his parenthetical phrase:
“According to GRR, there is no state policy for small producers. He is presented the same model than is presented to big producers; and that represents a condemnation. Here, nobody provides a technology adequate for twenty hectares, and there are no local markets set to absorb this production, no seals of origin—and if there are, they are not properly controlled, and have lost their prestige. (…)
The Group also refers critically to ecological or organic agriculture (which does without agrochemicals, and stresses the importance of using wise agrarian practices, always paying attention to the ecosystem) because it adopted the Argentine agrarian model, set up for exporting commodities. Above all, the present ecological agriculture (which is strong in the olive oil sector, fruit juices, honey and pastoral [sic] meat) should be addressed to the internal market, and not specifically for export. Being already an agriculture of scale, which covers a million hectares, it resembles industrial agriculture.”[598]
As presented in Nudler’s article, GRR advocates in favor of a diversified production in every farm, which would then produce “from wheat to cheese, understanding in which way a species helps the other,” following the model proposed by José Bové, characterized as “the French peasant.” Argentine farmers are prevented from seeing these “positive interactions,” argues GRR, because they are “obsessed with competition, in which the “colonists [“colonos”], who do not know about the soil and the rain anymore, fight increasingly powerful enemies.” This situation, in turn, is linked to the increasing use of agrochemicals, depicted in very negative terms, and linked to agrochemicals corporations:
“Those who irremediably win are the ‘arms traders,’ that is, those who provide herbicides and pesticides, which are simple adaptations, performed by the German chemical industry, of the gases used by the Nazis.”
Nudler’s article then stresses that most of Argentina’s agricultural production is used as feed—he mentions not only soybean, but also potatoes. According to his account of what GRR says, the low prices of GM soybean seeds and glyphosate in Argentina responded to a strategy intended to “transgenize” [“transgenizar,” this is a word he coined] Argentina’s production “through a smart price policy.” The article then reflects a serious accusation to INTA: that it sold all of its “cotton genetics” to Genética Mandiyú, “which belongs to Monsanto.” The INTA officials in charge of this transaction then left INTA due to downsizing. “Now, all of them have been appointed as executives by Genética Mandiyú,” says Nudler with a tone of denunciation. And nobody denounced the situation, he says, “in spite of the fact that, according to the Convention on Biological Diversity, this genetic patrimony belongs to the Argentine people.”
Being quoted in op-ed pieces is not the only public activity performed by GRR in early 2000. It was relatively active, took part in public debates, and organized talks. For example, on August 8, 2003, GRR’s activist Jorge Rulli lectured at the School of Philosophy and Literature of the University of Buenos Aires, on “Soybean and human rights.” In this talk, GRR’s activist Eduardo Vior linked soybean adoption in Argentina with human rights “in a broad sense.” According to an account of the talk available at GRR’s website, and prepared by activist Jorge Rulli, it was a serious, thorough accusation against adoption of GM soybean in Argentina:
“in addition to emigration, hunger, loss of biodiversity and soil, economic vulnerability, and input and market dependence, soybean provided Europe with low-price services and worse quality of life” [599]
GRR’s position, as presented by Nudler as well as at its website, is certainly very critical of GM crops adoption in Argentina, but also of the agro-exporting model. In this sense, athough it is critical of GM crops as Gainza’s framing is, it deeply differs from it in relation to which Argentina’s position in the world market should be. However, it shares with it—as well as with all of the other framings we have already reviewed—a common, strong rhetoric on Argentina’s autonomy. GRR position, particularly as presented in Nudler’s article, is also one which has an anti-Americanization position, close to Bové’s.
A weak defense of consumers
What happened with one of the internationally most active GM-opponents—such as Greenpeace—in Argentina in the early 2000s? Greenpeace Argentina’s position regarding this controversy is certainly the most surprising. After 2000/2001 campaigns and counter campaigns, it adopted a much lower profile in Argentina—but not internationally—regarding GM crops.
In 2002, for example, Greenpeace Argentina made a small campaign mostly directed to the international public. It connected the problem of hunger with GM crops in Argentina. As part of it, Greenpeace Argentina produced an 8-page report called “Record harvest, record hunger” (“Cosecha récord, hambre récord”), which was launched at the FAO Summit on June 11, 2002 in Rome. Its central argument is that adoption of GM crops does not provide food security in Argentina:
“There are several different factors that caused the present economic crisis in Argentina. But dissemination of GM crops did nothing to improve this situation. Indeed, it enhances the industrial model of agriculture, which weakens small and medium producers’ autonomy, and their reaction time when the State fails.”[600]
The report provides information on how land ownership concentrated during the 1990s, and quotes Monsanto’s figures on the money RR soybean brought to Argentina—U$S 3 billion in three years.[601] It calls for a series of points. Among them: to forbid release of GM crops to the environment; to guarantee food security, prioritizing sustainable practices which respect “traditional knowledge and the environment;” to “immediately” ratify the Cartagena Protocol; to stop granting “patents over life forms,” and to forbid ‘Terminator technologies’; and to eliminate “governmental subsidies that sustain agricultural practices that are environmentally destructive.” This statement could be considered at least ambiguous. But there is another one even more sensitive point, given the fact that Argentina exports GM crops: in its report on hunger, Greenpeace Argentina calls to:
“recognize and implement the sovereign right of nations to forbid GMOs imports, and to protect from genetic contamination their genetic patrimony, especially in countries which are also centers of crops diversity.”[602]
In a country which was going through the deepest economic crisis in its history, where people were worried about the billion dollars that vanished, speaking against one of the main sources of foreign currency does not seem timely. Greenpeace Argentina was clearly making a contribution to Greenpeace global campaign against GM crops, and not trying to reach Argentina’s public. The report made news in Argentina only because it was launched at the FAO Summit. La Nación covered the press conference offered by Rafael Delpech, Argentina’s envoy to the summit, to respond the report, presented by Emiliano Ezcurra, from Greenpeace Argentina. Not surprisingly, La Nación correspondent in Rome begins her article talking about GM crops—the first five paragraphs—, and ends it talking about agricultural subsidies—the last four. Delpech is first quoted at the press conference, saying that “hunger has nothing to do with GM crops, it is a political problem,” and insisting on the fact that “Argentina does not export any product which has not been approved by the EU.” But then, the article mentions Delpech did not talk about GM crops during the summit plenary session, and summarizes his speech. It quotes him saying that food production is “our first industry, and our main source of foreign currency,” and introducing the topic of agricultural subsidies:
“It is absolutely contradictory that the UE and other developed countries encourage the ideals of free market, while they subsidize their agricultural production with almost daily 1,000 million dollars.”[603]
Turning back to Greenpeace campaigns in the early 2000s, in 2003 its main target was the Generous Soybean Plan. Greenpeace prepared a 31-page report, which talked against the nutritional value of soybean—particularly, for children. The report certainly adopts an “objetivist risk frame”—in Heller’s terms—quoting a number of scientific sources, and government leaflets, which show that soybean is not recommended for children under 2, or for people who suffer malnutrition, among other cases. It stresses soybean has “anti-nutrients” which interfere with absorption of micronutrients, and that it does not replace milk or meat. [604] The message is simple: soybean is not quality food. Or rather: it is not food—it is feed.
Essentially, the report considers Generous Soybean Plan as part of a PR campaign, and compares it with US food-aid policy:
“This initiative in Argentina is clearly similar to food-aid international programs, which distribute grain to extremely poor countries, where the US, main producer of genetically modified crops, intends to locate these products. This way, Washington intends to impose consumption of genetically modified organisms, and open up new markets, blaming any country which objects to this on preventing them from alleviating hunger.”[605]
As an alternative to Generous Soybean Plan, Greenpeace Argentina’s report mentions other initiatives, such as more varied food donations—like those performed by AACREA, among other farmers’ associations—, and programs that teach people how to develop communitarian farms—such as INTA’s Pro-Huerta program.[606] Interestingly, one former Pro-Huerta expert is now part of GRR.[607]
However, one of the arguments most clearly directed to the Argentine public by Greenpeace Argentina in the early 2000s was the demand for labeling. It was—and continues to be as of June 2005—expressed in the slogans: “Transgenic food: don’t eat with your eyes shut” (“Alimentos transgénicos: No comas a ciegas”), and “Transgenic food: Demand to know” (“Alimentos transgénicos: Exigí saber”). [608] Greenpeace Argentina was not alone asking for labeling in Argentina in the early 2000s; most consumer advocacy groups had this position, too.
During the 2000/2001 period of campaigns and counter campaigns, the positions of the main Argentine consumer advocacy groups were collected by La Nación. In an article published on July 15, 2000, four consumer advocacy groups were mentioned: Consumers Action League (Liga de Acción del Consumidor, Adelco), [609] Free Consumers (Consumidores Libres), the Argentine Association for the Defense of Consumers and Users (Asociación de Defensa de Consumidores y Usuarios de la Argentina, Adecua), and the Argentine Consumers Association (Asociación de Consumidores Argentinos).
Adelco’s representative was quoted as denouncing the “lack of information,” but also stating Adelco was not against progress. He also commented about acceptability and risk distribution,
“ ‘Until now, there is only an absolute lack of information, because people don’t know they are eating transgenic products. Besides, if a consumer were told this product is natural and that is not, it is for sure he would chose the one he knows and is safer,’ commented Guillermo Zucal, technical coordinator of Adelco. (…) ‘As consumers, we see that genetically modified food does not contribute any benefit, either in price or in nutritional quality. They arouse lots of doubts, because the mere fact of making products different from traditional ones has already begun to cause concern.’ ”
In turn, Free Consumers’ representative insisted on labeling GM food, and also commented on the possibility that, due to Europe’s opposition, Argentina’s exports may face problems:
“It is important to increase awareness in the country, and that the State has a clear position, because one of the problems that may come up is, that, due to Europe’s opposition, some national products may face limits in trying to sell them.”
Adecua’s representative said that labeling would be a first step in increasing public awareness. And Patricia Vaca Narvaja, representative of the Argentine Consumers’ Association, invoked the precautionary principle, but also said it did not oppose “biotechnological developments.” [610]
Three years after this La Nación’s article was published—that is, as of 2003—the only consumer advocacy group that had information on GM crops on its website was the Association for the Protection of Consumers of the Southern Common Market (Asociación Protección Consumidores del Mercado Común del Sur, Proconsumer), which had an article on the international controversy and on the position of other developing countries on the issue, as well as on the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA, ALCA in Spanish). After critically reviewing the most usual concerns about GM crops, Proconsumer’s article cites a UN documents issued on April 9, 1985, regarding “consumer’s right to be informed,” and to have access “to safe food and a healthy environment.” [611] A sixth consumers’ association contacted for this research in 2003, Argentine Consumers (Consumidores Argentinos), also stated it is in favor of labeling, “although to do that, legislation should be changed, as it was in Europe and Brazil.”[612]
These examples, although brief, clearly show that GM crops did not—and probably still do not, as of September 2005—represent a priority to consumer advocacy groups in Argentina. As already commented, consumer advocacy groups in Argentina focus on other, more urgent issues, such as banking, and privatized utility companies. And this is also a priority for President Kirchner’s administration, who appointed Vaca Narvaja as advisor in 2003 in the context of his administration confrontation with privatized utility companies.[613] However, other interpretations remain. In his comparative study on four Latin American countries, Bottino attributes the fact that “Argentina has consumed transgenic foods without any noticeable public reaction,” since 1996 to “the absence of a ‘consumer culture’.”[614]
Discussion
Regarding persistent lack of awareness about GM crops and food in Argentina, although it is out of the reach of this paper to thoroughly analyze the reasons behind this phenomenon, two observations can be made. One is that the existence of GM crops—and particularly, of GM soybean—has not been kept secret: these cases are continuously mentioned in the rural section of Argentina’s major newspapers. The other one is that GM crops have not been linked to controversy in Argentina as much as they have been, for example, in European newspapers, as Bauer shows.[615] However, there are no available studies on how newspapers and media in general have been depicting GM crops and biotechnology in Argentina, so this observation remains simply an opinion.
Some important issues arise after reviewing the early 2000s debates over GM crops in Argentina, which took place mostly among informed—and interested—sectors. One remarkable point is that the rhetoric that connects agricultural subsidies presented as a challenge to Argentina’s exports, and adoption of GM crops in Argentina presented as a response to this challenge, is not exclusive of GM proponents: Gainza, as well as GRR also establish this connection. However, this rhetoric certainly reaches a peak among GM advocates, particularly in Tambornini’s book Transgénicos, la otra Guerra (GM Crops, the Other War), quoted in the Introduction. Tambornini—is already time to say it—is a journalist close to AACREA, the farmers’ association mentioned in Part I. This rhetoric is so popular in Argentina that even Monsanto’s executives use it. In a 2002 interview, Jorge Ghergo, Monsanto Argentina’s director, was quoted saying: “If [Argentina] is a big grain exporter, with many buyers and without subsidies, it has to be very efficient with very low costs.” Accordingly, the article was titled by Reuters “GMOs help Argentina fight subsidies, Monsanto.”[616]
Another important point has to do with a very significant absence in the public debate—or, better, a misunderstanding: RR soybean is considered a leading case in public discourse both by proponents and opponents of GM crops, a central example where pros and cons of GM crops can and must be analyzed. However, as already commented in Part I, RR soybean is a peculiar case: a series of coincidences were necessary for Argentine farmers to adopt it so enthusiastically. For good or bad, RR soybean represents an exception, not the rule. This does not mean adoption of RR soybean should not be thoroughly discussed in Argentina: because of the impact of this crop in Argentina’s economy, it is inevitable—and desirable—that RR soybean is at the center of the public debate. But no direct conclusions can be reached by only looking at this case, particularly regarding the future.
Another interesting point has to do with the status of soybean as food or feed. Greenpeace Argentina’s 2003 report on the Generous Soybean Plan echoes GRR arguments on GM crops—and industrial agriculture in general—to the effect that those are not food products. Gainza also insisted on soybean as feed: it is a direct attack to ‘Argentina, granary of the world’ myth—and through it, to national pride. Argentina’s soybean is not feeding people but animals.
Curiously, this strong attack on the status of soybean clashes with previous efforts to install soybean as a healthy food, one which could replace meat—depicted as unhealthy food, too much present in the Argentine diet for most of its history. These efforts began as early as the mid-1970s. Currently, soybean is mostly considered—particularly by educated, middle-class consumers—as healthy food. [617]
SAGPyA is currently engaged in efforts to increase public awareness of GMOs, as well as in stimulating a public debate, in compliance with BSP requirements—and SAGPyA’s survey commented in this section is part of these efforts. It is apparent that if a demand for labeling arouse as a result of this consultation process, it would collide with Argentina’s position in the international trade dispute. Certain decisions, for good or bad, seem to have already been taken.
It is relevant to note that after the early 2000s debates just analyzed, public discussion on GM crops seems to have slightly changed in Argentina. Some of the different points made by GM opponents like Greenpeace Argentina, GRR or even Gainza in a somewhat packaged way, have been sorted out, and addressed by different actors.
Discussion on strictly risk issues—such as food safety issues—has been almost abandoned. Regarding environmental issues, some allegations have been taken into account, while others have not. For example, deforestation—a problem shortly mentioned in Greenpeace Argentina’s report “Record harvest, record hunger” launched in 2002—has been increasingly paid attention to after the height of the crisis was left behind in 2004/2005. A series of actions against deforestation have been taken by actors quite close to President Kirchner, and even actors close to the agricultural sector supported those actions, as commented in Part I. Something similar can be said regarding soybean monoculture—mentioned in Gainza’s debate—, which was acknowledged by secretary of Agriculture Miguel Campos just after he was appointed office,[618] and also by such pro-GM actors as AAPRESID and AACREA, as commented in Part I. However, in no case acknowledging and addressing these problems by traditionally pro GM actors implied proposing Argentina should abandon GM crops—already adopted or new ones.
Other allegations have been disputed, such as the role of GM crops in Argentina’s economic crisis: actors close to the agricultural sector have made high-profile public presentations on the many jobs generated by the agro-industry in Argentina.[619] Although sharing this view, SAGPyA has nevertheless acknowledged the negative social impact soybean has had in provinces such as Chaco and Santiago del Estero, where labor-intensive cotton production has been displaced by easy-to-manage RR soybean, as commented in Part I.[620]
However, currently the central debate regarding agriculture in Argentina is by far the debate on export tariffs. It is mentioned week after week in rural sections of the main national newspapers, and quite often it reaches the cover pages.
A really new, interesting chapter regarding GM crops adoption in Argentina might be beginning with the battle for royalties with Monsanto, commented in Part I. For the first time, the many actors involved in GM crops’ adoption in Argentina—all of which have had a positive evaluation of the situation so far, according to Trigo et al. and already commented in this section—are not agreeing. This is a situation that deserves to be closely followed. It is already apparent, for example, that the different farmers unions and associations in Argentina have different positions. A certainly curious situation is the recent alliance of a farmers union, the Argentine Agrarian Federation (FAA)—which represents mostly medium and small farmers—with Greenpeace International. Last April they presented a case against Monsanto’s demand for royalties in Argentina before the International Patent Office in Munich, which was dismissed.[621] It is certainly a paradox to see Greenpeace defending Argentine small farmers’ right to plant RR soybean. Particularly considering that it seems it is precisely RR soybean low price in Argentina what made possible its extremely fast and widespread adoption—a situation in turn linked to monoculture and deforestation, as commented in Part I. [622]
General conclusions
Heller argues that biotechnology represents the emergence of a series of transformations which have recently taken place in developed as well as in developing countries. In this sense, it cannot be analyzed in purely scientific terms, separated from the way biotechnology innovations have been developed, diffused and adopted. As she puts it,
“Biotechnology is more than a scientific practice. It is a network of actors, tools, and discourses that circulate through the corporate, state and international trade apparatuses that emerged after the dust settled over post-World-War II capital. While some claim that it is ‘nothing really new’, that its transgenic creations represent a continuity with such previous biotechnologies as plant and animal breeding, they deny the underlying issue: transgenic biotechnology emerges out of a different world than plant breeding or beer making. It emerges out of a different set of economic, political, and social demands and commitments. Biotechnology is a new form of production that emerged as capital hit the limits of industrial production and began to enter what may be called its organic phase: a phase in which capital targets the reproductive dimensions of cultural and biological life as loci for intensified production and commodification.”[623]
The intense and increasing relationship between the academy and the industry, the possibility of patenting living organisms and genes, the growing power of multinationals in a context of globalization are among the reasons behind an indisputable fact so far: that GM crops are basically a product of the international industry. Almost every event currently planted belongs to multinationals. In fact, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) has developed of only transgenic insect resistance source apart from the Bt genes patented by Monsanto. But in Argentina, Mexico, South Africa and other countries “only a few cotton varieties are available, all containing the Monsanto CrylAc gene,” as Raney and Pingali note.[624]
In this sense, the surprisingly fast and widespread adoption of RR soybean in Argentina certainly represents an oddity, particularly if—as authors such as Qaim and Traxler, and Trigo et al. suggest—it was not in Monsanto’s plans to “liberate” the event in Argentina as it finally happened. On the contrary, GM corn and GM cotton adoption in Argentina follow more expectable patterns. It is certainly an irony that the local as well as the international debate on GM crops’ adoption in Argentina focuses on RR soybean adoption, when it is obvious that conclusions taken from this case would not be easily generalizable in order to predict how GM crop adoption in other developing countries could take place.
Although Argentina’s agricultural sector continues to experience a boom—with successive records that could reach another peak in 2005, with a production of 85 million tons and exports of U$S 12,300 million—there are challenges still ahead.[625] Besides internal debate on export tariffs and the sustainability challenge soybean monoculture represents, EU opposition to GM food, as well as the BSP and Codex Alimentarius uncertainties represent obstacles which are being acknowledged and addressed, as the creation of the Biotechnology Office shows. Particularly the BSP represents a problem for all exporting countries, since compliance costs could be significant and increase with lower thresholds, and since incremental risks could represent a strong source of uncertainty. [626]
Regarding soybean, Argentina does not face the problem of segregation, since its production is almost totally RR soybean. But there is the problem of its acceptability, and of the potential losses due to differential prices. In this sense, Argentina’s future seems to be linked to Brazil’s decisions—as in many other aspects. If GM soybean is finally massively accepted in Brazil as it has been predicted,[627] the world market would become virtually GM, and highly differential prices would have to be paid by those countries which do not accept GM soybean. Although it is out of the reach of this paper to thoroughly discuss market dynamics—and, least of all, to predict outcomes—, in addition to Ablin and Paz’ report mentioned in the Introduction, there are other reports and preliminary reviews that suggest future scenarios in which a mostly GM soybean offer could make the European market accept willy-nilly GM soybean for feed, labeled. Otherwise, the premium price for non-GM soybean could impact its livestock sector.[628] Furthermore, the demand of countries such as China and India, which until now do not require labeling GM food, may continue to grow, as already commented in Part I.
However, if it were necessary to segregate soybean, it would be quite difficult, as has been shown by the study performed by SAGPyA and FAO commented in Part IV. More importantly, all uncertainties regarding GM soybean could have a massive impact on Argentina’s economy, given the central role played by this crop. As Trigo puts is,
“(…) concentration of production implies macroeconomic and social risks, particularly if it is taken into account that Argentina exports its agricultural production to a small number of countries: the European Union, China and Brazil buy more than 50 % of it.”[629]
Regarding GM cotton, it will not represent a problem for Argentina regarding trade, since it is not food. A much more complicated situation regarding the GMO international controversy is that of GM corn. Since Argentina lacks segregation capacity, the current 50 percent of Bt corn planted represents a potential problem to the 50 percent non-GM corn. Besides, regarding corn there seems to be an incipient trend toward cultivating non-GM specialties. During the launch of a new association intended to promote the cultivation and use of corn in Argentina in 2003, the Argentine Corn Association (Asociación Maíz Argentino, Maizar), three specialties were particularly highlighted for their potential: pop corn (Argentina is the first exporter of pop corn: 122,000 tones, while the US exports 65,000), high value corn for feed, and a non-GM Flint corn developed by Dow Agrosciences.[630] And the first corn launched by the School of Agronomics, University of Buenos Aires (FAUBA), after 52 years of not launching crop varieties, is a high quality non-GM corn.[631] As acommented in Part IV, Argentina’s small crop segregation capacity has basically to do with high quality corn.
However, as the commercial approval of RR corn (event NK 603) in July 2004, as well as—more importantly—glufosinate-tolerant and insect-resistant corn (event TC 1507) and glyphosate-tolerant (event GA 21) in March and August 2005 show, Argentina has decided to continue adopting new GM crops. Even if it implies risking its Iberian Peninsula quota—881,300 tons to Spain and 345,400 tons to Portugal in 2002—since TC 1507 and GA 21 events have not been approved by the EU yet.[632] This move could be considered audacious, but mostly somewhat aggressive, much in the same direction of the case presented to the WTO—that is, as a way to influence UE policies. The consequences of this decision would be seen in 2006, but those have certainly been considered by SAGPyA.
Regarding the WTO case, it is out of the reach of this paper to discuss its possible outcome. Argentine officials’ mostly optimistic expectations—commented in Part IV—certainly collide with the fact that even a positive decision at the WTO may not change EU consumers’ opposition to GMOs.[633]
Going back to premium prices for non-GM crops or for GM varieties with special traits, it is also apparent that potential losses or gains may also be analyzed analyzing the potential impact of lowering agricultural subsidies. Very few studies take into account the impact subsidies may have on adoption of GM crops, and on the costs and benefits linked to GM crops. In fact, it is only recently that the issue of GMOs in developing countries is analyzed in the context of agricultural trade, that is, within a food for export framework instead of the usual food security framework.[634]
An interesting point regarding agricultural subsidies has to do with their environmental impact—a very sensitive issue regarding GM crops. Myers talks about “perverse subsidies,” among which he counts agricultural subsidies. To current developed countries subsidies (U$S 325 billion), he adds his estimations of their “environmental externalities,” which he estimates have a cost of U$S 250 billion. This would total U$S 575 billion. Of that total, “perverse agricultural subsidies” account for the astonishing figure of U$S 460 billion—within a range of U$S 390 to 520 billion.[635] Among the countries which subsidize their rural sector, the EU and Japan seem to be particularly cautious regarding the environmental impact of GM crops, but not about the environmental impact of their subsidies.
Developed countries agricultural subsidies would continue to represent a problem for Argentina as well as for other developing countries for the years to come, in spite of the recent promising decisions adopted by the WTO—such as Brazil’s case against US cotton subsidies, commented in Part I. The outcome of the Doha Round—the so called July framework—has been received with mixed feelings by developing nations.[636] Argentina is listed among the countries which have most to gain in the process of agricultural trade liberalization—more that U$S 2,500 million per year according to IFPRI estimations. Therefore, signs that show increasing efforts by Argentina’s authorities in this sense are not surprising. [637]
Another interesting aspect regarding agricultural subsidies has to do with the hidden character they might have. A World Bank study claims that both developed and developing countries have some kind of covert subsidies.[638] In this category, we could include the black market of seeds in Argentina, and maybe the lack of response to Monsanto’s case of dumping regarding glyphosate, commented in Part I. As Giannakas explain when discussing “infringement” of intellectual property rights—and having in mind mostly Argentina’s adoption of RR soybean—, “lax IPR enforcement can be used strategically by governments intent on increasing the competitiveness of their producers in international markets.”[639]
Regarding the development of new GM varieties, it is apparent that, although Argentina has some research capacity, it cannot compete with multinational corporations. In this sense, Argentina needs multinationals, and multinationals will most probably continue to find Argentina an interesting market.[640]
Two aspects are important regarding new GM varieties. One is the paradoxical effect of concerns regarding GM crops, which have resulted in extremely high approval costs. McElroy estimates that the regulatory approval costs for GM crops have increased from U$S 5-10 million in the 1990s, to U$S 20-30 million today. As he comments,
“This hinders the exploitation of agricultural biotechnology in the minor crops and restricts licensing opportunities for both private and public sector technology providers in these crops. This regulatory situation also excludes the public sector from independent participation in agbiotechnology product development, especially for those opportunities that are important to developing nations, many of which could benefit from these new agricultural technologies.”[641]
But then, of course, there is the problem of lowering standards. Even if a crop were developed for the internal market—and if it were acceptable to have double-standards for the internal and the external market—costs would remain high. However, this is not an alternative for Argentina, for two reasons: because it is an exporting country, and—most importantly—because double standards are unacceptable to CONABIA authorities.[642] This challenge is currently being acknowledged by the international scientific community—some actors even state that “the regulation of risk is turning into a risk of regulation”[643]—, and new approaches are being proposed to reduce regulatory costs. [644] However, there seems to be no easy technical[645] and certainly no easy political way out of the current costly regulatory path. So multinationals will continue to be major—if not only—players regarding GM crops in the near future.
An interesting paradox derived from this concern regarding GMOs safety has to do with a potential change in comparative advantages. It is related to environmental impact, particularly with potential cross-pollination with wild relatives. I would call it “the sunflower paradox,” because it is particularly apparent regarding sunflower in Argentina: even if Argentina is the leading exporter of sunflower, no GM variety has been approved due to these concerns, as commented in Part II. These concerns are well-founded: regarding sunflower, for example, a report on GM crops in the US prepared by two experts of the Union of Concerned Scientists, mentions that Bt genes that moved into wild sunflowers from Bt-crop sunflowers in the US conferred “substantial advantages” to the wild relatives. [646] If GM crops represented a strong competitive advantage, Argentina might loose competitiveness regarding sunflower. And something similar might happen with corn in Mexico.
Two brief final points. One has to do with sustainability and production outcomes in the near future in Argentina, particularly in face of grim reports by GM opponents commented in Part I. Two recent reports predict Argentina’s production would continue to increase in the near future. An OECD report issued in June 2004 states that Brazil, China and Argentina are the countries that would experience the highest growth in agricultural production between 2004 and 2013.[647] And USDA estimations confirm this view, listing Argentina after Brazil and before Canada, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan among the countries whose “expanding production” would represent “competition to US exports for some agricultural commodities” between 2005 and 2014.[648]
The final point has to do with Argentina’s commitment with GM crops, which will certainly continue in the near future, as recent decisions show. It is important to have in mind that Argentina is the second producer of certified organic products in the world, which cover 2,8 million ha. Production is estimated in 47,000 tones; of those 90 percent are exported, mostly grain and fruits, as commented in Part II.[649] Therefore, if Argentina may be called a GM nation, it may also be called an organic nation. What must be understood is that Argentina has been for most of its history—and increasingly since the 1990s—an agro-exporting country. It adopted GM crops to compete in the world agricultural market, and it seems obvious it will continue to look for ways to remain competitive.
* * *
-----------------------
[1] Monbiot, George, “Market enforcers,” The Guardian, Tuesday August 21, 2001. Available at:
[2] “It happened that in 1996 (a year before the USDA decided to destroy South American soybean farmers by increasing the LDP price) American and Argentine agriculture and biosafety authorities had authorized the commercialization of glyphosate-tolerant soybean, developed by the American company Monsanto. It was an unprecedented event: never before such a complex technological product had been adopted so quickly by a Latin American country, almost simultaneously with the US. Monsanto’s researchers never imagined that their technological innovation would ruin USDA’s plans.” Tambornini, Ezequiel (2003), Biotecnología: la otra guerra, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 11-12. As with every other translation in this paper, it is the author of this paper’s responsibility.
[3] Folha Online, “José Alencar assina MP e libera plantação de soja transgênica,” Folha Online, September 25, 2003. Available at:
[4] Nature, “Access issues may determine whether agri-biotech will help the world’s poor,” Nature, Vol. 402, 25 November 1999, pp. 341-4.
[5] Massarani, Luisa, “Brazil to allow sale of illegally grown GM food,” . Available at:
[6] Massarani, Luisa, “Brazil faces dilemma of ‘illegal’ GM soy” , . See also: The Economist, “An amber light for agri-business; GM crops in Brazil,” The Economist, October 4, 2003, vol. 369, Iss. 8344, p. 54.
[7] La Nación, “Transgénicos. Hasta enero de 2004 Brasil negociará soja RR,” La Nación, Buenos Aires, March 29, 2003, página 06, Economía. Available at: http: .ar/03/03/29/de_48506.asp
[8] Aldous, Peter, “More heat than light,” Nature, Vol. 420, 19/26 December 2002, pp. 730-1. Also: “An amber light…”
[9] Folha Online, “José Alencar assina MP…”
[10] Vidal, John and Gareth Chetwynd, “Brazil agrees to grow GM crops,” The Guardian, September 26, 2003. Available at:
[11] Quoted in The Economist (2003a),“An amber light…”
[12] Vidal and Chetwynd.
[13] Quoted in The Economist (2003a), “An amber light…”
[14] Quoted in Smith, Tony, “Farmers help deliver modified crops to Brazil,” The New York Times, October 14, 2003. Available at: $en=cfcb23f68747bb96
[15] Quoted in “Biotech crops continue to gain ground in the Americas,” 29 March, 2004, Council for Biotechnology Information. Available at: .
[16] Quoted in Mira, Cristian (2003c), “Brasil legaliza por un año el cultivo de soja trangénica,” La Nación, September 27. Available at:
[17] Ablin, Eduardo R., and Santiago Paz, Hacia la trazabilidad en el mercado mundial de soja: una nueva mirada a la ley de la oferta y la demanda, (Buenos Aires: Cancillería Argentina, Dirección Nacional de Negociaciones Económicas y Cooperación Internacional, August 2001). Manuscript. Available at:
[18] “El objetivo es ahora una América transgénica.” Ablin and Paz (2001), p. 24.
[19] Burke, Hilary (2004), “Monsanto prods South American nations on soy royalties,” September 28, Reuters.
[20] Galli, Emiliano (2005), “De la chaucha de soja al reactor nuclear de investigación”, La Nación, Comercio Exterior section p. 2, January 4.
[21] After a decade of “convertibility,” in which the peso was one-to-one with the dollar, the peso was cut loose, and now is about three-to-one. Smith, Tony (2003), “Farm exports boom in Argentina,” The New York Times, March 26, pp. W1 and W7. See also: “Crisis-hit Argentina defaults on debt,” BBC news, Thursday 21 November 2002. Available at: .
[22] Alejandro G. Elsztain, chief executive of Cresud, quoted in Smith (2003), p. W7.
[23] See, for example, two Nature editorials, “GM food debate needs a recipe for restoring trust,” Nature, 398, 22 Apr 1999, p. 639; and “The wages of spin,” Nature, 399, 27 May 1999, p. 285.
[24] Scott, Andrew (2003), “Dramatic reduction in GM crop trials,” New Scientist, April 17. Available at: ; and George, Susan (2002), “Unfree trade,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May. Available at:
[25] Coghlan, Andy (2002), “Europe set for toughest GMO labelling laws,” The Scientist, November 29. Available at: .
[26] Coghlan, p. 2.
[27] Idem, p. 2.
[28] Quoted in Coghlan (2002), p. 2.
[29] Idem, p. 2.
[30] Becker, Elizabeth (2003), “U.S. delays suing Europe over ban on modified food,” The New York Times, February 5. Available at:
[31] “Finance and economics: the GM gamble; Trade” The Economist, May 17, 2003, Vol. 367, Iss. 8324, p. 84; and Longoni, Matías (2003), “Pelea por los transgénicos,” Clarín, May 14p. 30. The other nine countries are: Australia, New Zeland, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay.
[32] Morales Solá, Joaquín (2003), “Dos presidentes con un origen coincidente,” La Nación, July 24, main section, p. 1. Available at: .
[33] Ablin, Eduardo and Santiago Paz (2000), Productos transgénicos y exportaciones agrícolas: Reflexiones en torno de un dilema argentino, Buenos Aires, Cancillería Argentina, September. Manuscript. Available at: .
[34] Sanger, David E. (2003), “Bush links Europe’s ban on bio crops with hunger,” The New York Times May 22, p. A 3.
[35] “President delivers commencement address at Coast Guard. Remarks by the President address to United States Coast Guard Academy.” Available at: .
[36] “Finance and economics: Bush, hero or hypocrite?; American foreign aid,” The Economist, May 31, 2003, Vol. 367, Iss. 8326, p. 75.
[37] The Economist summarized US proposal as follows: “The Americans want to phase out export subsidies over five years, to cut subsidies to 5% of the value of farm production and to slash tariffs to no more than 25%.” “The Doha squabble,” The Economist, March 29, 2003, p. 63.
[38] Rosemberg,Tina (2003), “Why Mexico’s small corn farmers go hungry,” The New York Times, March 3, 2003, Page A22.
[39] “The Bill contains a massive 80 per cent increase in farm subsidies over base support levels contained in the 1996 Fair Act. It is damaging to the international economy and could undermine efforts to achieve global reform of this heavily subsidized and distorted sector,” a group’s declaration stated in May 2002. “Cairns Group condemns United States farm bill,” The Cairns Group web site, available at: .
[40] “Finance and economics…”
[41] Lamy and Johnson quoted in Meller, Paul with David Barboza (2003), “Framework set for reduction of subsidies,” The New York Times, August 14, p. C 1.
[42] Mira, Cristian (2003a), “Para la Argentina, la oferta de baja de subsidios es insuficiente,” La Nación, August 14, Economía & Negocios section, p. 2.
[43] Quoted in Meller and Barboza (2003). See also: Cox, James (2003), “U.S., European union urge cuts in farm subsidies,” USA TODAY, August 14, p. B 03.
[44] Becker, Elizabeth (2003), “Poorer countries pull out of talks over world trade,” The New York Times, September 15, p. A 1; and “The Cancun Failure,” The New York Times, September 16, 2003, p. A 24.
[45] Mira, Cristian (2003b), “Con las piezas cambiadas,” La Nación, September 20. Available at: . See also La Nación’ s editorial: “Después de Cancún,” September 20, 2003. Available at: .
[46] Trigo, Eduardo, Daniel Chudnovsky, Eugenio Cap, and Andrés López (2002), Los transgénicos en la agricultura argentina. Una historia con final abierto, Buenos Aires, Libros del Zorzal-IICA, pp. 165-166.
[47] “Soybean subsidies in the US,” Environmental Working Group website:
[48] Ablin, Eduardo and Santiago Paz (2004), “El mercado mundial de la soja, la República Argentina y los organismos genéticamente modificados”, Las Negociaciones Comerciales Multilaterales de la Ronda de Doha. Desafíos para la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Centro de Economía Internacional, Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación, pp. 7-54, p. 43-44. They analyze target prizes and loan rates foreseen for soybean by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, which they consider may be showing the US decision “to diminish the relative support to soybean in its territory, concomitantly with loosing the predominance as first exporter.”
[49] Shellenberger, J. A. (1945), “Argentina’s agricultural future,” The Scientific Monthly, Vol 60, No. 4 (April), pp. 257-260.
[50] Regúnaga, Marcelo (2003), “Las políticas públicas para el crecimiento de la producción de alimentos”, Revista de la Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario, year 93, No 1490, pp. 30-35, p. 32.
[51] Begenisic, Flory (2002a), Hacia un País Sojero, Buenos Aires: Dirección de Agricultura, July, p. 2. Available at:
[52] Barsky, Osvaldo and Jorge Gelman (2001), Historia del Agro Argentino. Desde la Conquista hasta Fines del Siglo XX, Buenos Aires, Grijalbo, p. 379.
[53] Reca, Lucio G. and Gabriel H. Parrellada (2001), El Sector Agropecuario Argentino. Aspectos de su Evolución, Razones de su Crecimiento Reciente y Posibilidades Futuras, Buenos Aires: Editorial Facultad de Agronomía, p. 41. This book represents a thorough account of Argentina’s agricultural expansion in the 1990s. Other useful sources are: Mario Rapoport (2000), Historia Económica, Política y Social de la Argentina (1880-2000), Buenos Aires, Ediciones Macchi, chapters 8 and 9; and Barsky and Gelman (2001), pp. 374-387.
[54] James, Clive (2004), Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM crops: 2004 – ISAA Briefs No. 32, ISAAA, Ithaca, NY, p. 4.
[55] Atanassov, Atanas, Ahmed Bahieldin, Johan Brink, Moisés Burachik, Joel I. Cohen, Vibha Dhawan, Reynaldo V. Ebora, José Falck-Zepeda, Luis Herrera-Estrella, John Komen, Fee Chon Low, Emeka Omaliko. Benjamin Odhiambo, Hector Quemada, Yufa Peng, Maria Jose Sampaio, Idah Sithole-Niang, Ana Sittefeld, Melinda Smale, Sutrisno, Ruud Vayasevi, Yusuf Zafar, and Patricia Zambrano (2004), To Reach the Poor – Results from the ISNAR-IFPRI Next Harvest Study on Genetically Modified Crops, Public Research and Policy Implications. EPTD Discussion Paper No. 116, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C., March, p. 2. When this paper was prepared, Argentina had only commercially approved seven events.
[56] James (2004), p. 6.
[57] This figure represents a slight decline compared to the 14,5 million ha planted with soybean in 2003/2004, but still an increase compared to the 12,6 million ha planted in 2002/2003.
[58] Estimations of area and production are taken from two official documents: SAGPyA (2005), Estimaciones Agrícolas. Informe Semanal al 29-04-2005, p. 14-15; and SAGPyA (2005), CampaH[pic]a Agrícola 2004-2005. Cifras Oficiales al 13/05/2005. Available at: sagpya.mecňa Agrícola 2004-2005. Cifras Oficiales al 13/05/2005. Available at: sagpya..ar. Regarding soybean in Argentina, USDA’s figures as of May 2005 are slightly different: the estimated area planted is 14 million ha for 2003/2004, and 14.40 for 2004/2005. Soybean production is estimated in 33 million tons for 2003/2004, and 39 million tons for 2004/2005. Available at:
[59] Galli, Emiliano (2005), “De la chaucha de soja al reactor nuclear de investigación”, La Nación, Comercio Exterior section p. 2, January 4.
[60] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 88.
[61] SAGPyA (2005), “Tipos de semillas,” in Maíz. Available at: .
[62] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 88.
[63] SAGPyA (2004), Plan Estratégico para el Desarrollo de la Biotecnología Agropecuaria 2005-2015, Buenos Aires, December, p. 20. Available at: .
[64] Satorre, Emilio H. (2001), “Production systems in the Argentine Pampas and their ecological impact,” in Otto Solbrig, Robert Paarlberg, and Franceso di Castri, Globalization and the Rural Environment (Cambridge: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies,) pp. 79-102.
[65] Barsky and Gelman (2001), p. 378.
[66] Poverene, Mónica, and Miguel Cantamutto (2003), “Impacto ambiental de los cultivos transgénicos.” Revista Ciencia Hoy, Vol 13, No 75, June-July, pp. 26-37. Available at: .
[67] Roberto A. Peiretti (2001), “Direct seed cropping in Argentina: economic, agronomic, and sustainability benefits,” in Solbrig et al. pp. 178-200.
[68] Poverene and Cantamutto (2003), p. 29.
[69] Satorre (2001), p. 86.
[70] Poverene and Cantamutto (2003), p. 29.
[71] Satorre (2001), p. 87.
[72] SAGPyA (2005), “Producción de soja por provincia,” table in Soja. Available at: .
[73] Penna, Julio A. and Daniel Lema (2003), “Adoption of herbicide tolerant soybeans in Argentina: an economic analysis,” in Kalitzandonakes, Nicholas (2003), The Economic and Environmental Impacts of Agbiotech. A global Perspective, New York, Kluwer Academic, pp. 203-221, p. 204. They quote Peretti, M. and C. Ghida Daza (1995), “Aspectos económicos del cultivo,” in Manual de Soja.Campaña 95/96, Proyecto IPG, INTA-EEA Marcos Juárez, no page number.
[74] Begenisic, Flory (2002b), El Quinquenio de la Soja Transgénica, Buenos Aires: Dirección de Agricultura, September, p. 3. Available at:
[75] Castro Almeyra, Ana, Pablo Corradi, Gastón Eleicegui, and Teo Zorraquin (2003), Agroalimentos Argentinos, Buenos Aires, AACREA, p. 24. Available at: .
[76] Idem. pp. 39-47.
[77] Trigo et al. (2002), pp. 115-116.
[78] SAGPyA (2004), Plan Estratégico…, p. 15.
[79] Up to the 1980s, the Argentine seed market was dominated by the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA)—a public research institute—and a group of local companies such as Buck and Klein in wheat, and Morgan in corn, as well as multinational companies such as Cargill, Asgrow Dekalb, NK and Ciba-Geigy. See: Trigo et al. (2002), pp. 115-116. Proportion of national versus foreign cultivars granted protection gradually changed in the 1990s: in 1994 the rate was 67 percent to 33 percent, while in 1999 it was 37 percent to 63 percent. See: Carullo, Juan C. and Juan M. Dellacha, “Argentina,” in Verástegui, Javier (2003), La Biotenología en América Latina: Panorama al aňo 2002, Ottawa, CamBioTec, February, p. 53. They quote: Wendt, Jan and Juan Izquierdo (2000), La Práctica del Acceso a los Recursos Genéticos y de los Derechos de Obtenciones Vegetales en América Latina, Santiago de Chile, Oficina Regional de la FAO para América Latina y el Caribe, December 13. See also Shand, Hope (2001), “Control and ownership of GM technology. What impact on farmers and food security?,” in Leff, Enrique y Mindahi Bastida, Comercio, Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable. Perspectivas de América Latina y el Caribe, México, Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente, Oficina Regional para América Latina y el Caribe, y Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y Humanidades, pp. 381-394; and Pengue, Walter Alberto (2001), La Transnacionalización de la Agricultura y la Alimentación en América Latina – Informe Regional – Resumen Ejecutivo, GRAIN, October.
[80] United States General Accounting Office (2000), “Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops, Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives. Biotechnology: Information on Prices of Genetically Modified Seeds in the United States and Argentina,” Washington, DC, USA, January 21.
[81] In the US, Monsanto uses contracts, called “grower agreements,” which imply the farmers cannot keep seeds, sell them, or give them away for replanting purposes. The seed companies that license the product collect these fees for Monsanto. Goldsmith, Peter D. (2001), “Innovation, supply chain control, and the welfare of farmers,” The American Behavioral Scientist, April, 44, 8, pp. 1302-1326.
[82] GAO (2000), p. 5.
[83] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 117.
[84] In 1998, fiscal evasion due to the black market of seeds was estimated in U$S 60 millions. Nasif Carlos E. (1999), “Investigan una estafa millonaria con semillas,” La Nación, November 25. Available at:
[85] Quoted in “Realizarán operativos de control en la comercialización de semillas,” La Nación, June 9, 2001. Available at:
[86] Marull, Adolfo (2003), “Las semillas de la discordia,” La Nación, February 22,
[87] Regarding criticism after INASE’s dissolution, the business representative of the EU in Buenos Aires, Giulio Menato, presented a note expressing “concern.” The Argentine Seed Growers Association (ASA) also expressed criticism. See: Héctor Müller (2003), “Tras un organismo perdido,” La Nación, July 26, p. 2, 5º section. Available at: ; and ASA, “Por qué disolver un organismo con reconocimiento internacional?,” December 1, 2000. Available at: .regarding. Regarding Monsanto’s protest, see: Tony Smith (2004) “Argentine Soy Exports Are Up, But Monsanto Is Not Amused,” New York Times, Jan 21, p. W.1
[88] Qaim, Matin and Greg Traxler (in press), “Roundup ready soybeans in Argentina: farm level and aggregate welfare effects”, Agricultural Economics, pp. 2-3. See also: Trigo et al. (2002), p. 119. Trigo attributes this situation to the fact that Monsanto was then a chemical company, and was not completely competent regarding seed market issues. Trigo, Eduardo, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005.
[89] Pengue, Walter (2001), “Impactos tecnológicos y ambientales de la liberación de organismos genéticamente modificados,” paper presented at the Conferencia Internacional sobre Comercio, Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable. Perspectivas de América Latina y el Caribe, Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el medio Ambiente –PNUMA, Oficina regional para América Latina y el Caribe, Mexico, February 19-21. See also: Trigo et al. (2002), p. 120-121. See also some of the companies’ websites: , , .
[90] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 3.
[91] “Regalía extendida” agreement used by Nidera at
[92] “Regalía extendida” agreement used by Monsanto:
[93] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 4.
[94] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 119.
[95] Idem, p. 122. They quote Del Bello, J. C. (1998), “Difusión de plaguicidas y estructua de la oferta,” in Barsky, O et al., La gricultura pampeana. Transformaciones productivas y sociales, Buenos Aires, FCE, IICA, CISEA.
[96] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 4.
[97] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 122. For global figures, they quote Clive James, “Global Review of Commercialized Transgenic Crops,” ISAAA Briefs No 23.
[98] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 122. They quote Del Bello (1998).
[99] Ablin and Paz (2000), p. 9.
[100] Ablin and Paz (2000), p. 9-10.
[101] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 122-123.
[102] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 4.
[103] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 122.
[104] Pengue (2001), p. 6.
[105] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 4 and 12.
[106] Varise, Franco (2003), “Subiría el arancel de un herbicida importado,” La Nación, October 8,
[107] “No habrá aranceles extra para un herbicida,” La Nación, October 18, 2003. Available at:
[108] Burke, Hilary (2004), “Monsanto prods South American nations on soy royalties,” September 28, Reuters.
[109] Johnson, Elizabeth (2004), “Monsanto puts $40m Argentine investment on hold,” Chemical News & Intelligence, October 17.
[110] Frank Mitsch, an analyst at Fulcrum Global Partners in New York. Quoted in Burke (2004), “Monsanto prods…”
[111] An Argentine unidentified expert is quoted in Varise, Franco (2005), “La patente de la discordia,” La Nación, September 25, Campo section, pp. 1 and 6.
[112] Smith, Tony (2004) “Argentine Soy Exports Are Up, But Monsanto Is Not Amused,” New York Times, Jan 21, p. W.1.
[113] Varise (2005), “La patente… .”
[114] Bertello, Fernando (2004), “Hay más venta de semilla fiscalizada,” La Nación, July 10, Economía & Negocios section, p. 3.
[115] Varise, Franco (2004), “Se podrá sembrar maíz transgénico,” La Nación, July 14, Economía & Negocios section, p. 3,
[116] Stancato, Renato and Gustavo Porto (2004), “Monsanto quer dobrar royalty,” O Estado de São Paulo, October 20. Available at: .
[117] Monsanto (2004), “La tecnología agrícola, un factor clave para el crecimiento de la Argentina,” ad published in La Nación, September 17, Economía & Negocios section, p. 3.
[118] Varise, Franco 2005), “La patente… . ”
[119] Burke (2004), “Monsanto prods….”
[120] “Monsanto to take part in drafting legislation to regulate Argentina’s GM seed trade,” December 12, 2004, Business Latin America via NewsEdge Corporation, Edconomist Intelligence Unit. Available at: .
[121] According to news accounts, Monsanto proposed to charge U$S 3 per ton in December, 2004; while in February 2005 it proposed to charge U$S 1 per ton in 2005, rising to U$S 2.50 per ton between 2006 and 2011. See: “Monsanto insistirá con el cobro de regalías por la soja,” La Nación, December 17, Economía & Negocios section, p. 10; and Burke, Hillary (2005), “South American ministers reject Monsanto soy royalty plan,” April 4, Reuters.
[122] Varise, Franco (2005), “Modificarán el cobro de regalías acotadas,” La Nación, January 26, Economía & Negocios section, p. 4.
[123] “Nuevo capítulo en la discusión por las regalías,” La Nación, February 19, Campo section, p. 2.
[124] Mira, Cristian (2005a), “El conflicto por el cobro de las regalías de la soja RR se trasladó hasta la muestra,” La Nación, March 19, Economía & Negocios section, p. 3.
[125] Burke (2004), “Monsanto prods…”
[126] The Southern Agricultural Council (CAS) is a regional forum created in April 2003 in order to facilitate regional coordination of agricultural issues. It is integrated by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Its technical-administrative secretary has been entrusted to the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA). IICA News, May-June 2003, p. 4.
[127] Burke, (2005), “South American ministers… .” On Brazil and Paraguay’s official denials, see: “Desmentida y revés. Regalías de la discordia,” La Nación, April 4, 2005, Campo section, p. 3.
[128] Quoted in “Aceptan el pago de compensaciones a la empresa Monsanto,” La Nación, April 30, 2005, main section, p. 14.
[129] “Paraguay gives green light for GMO soy,” October 20, Reuters.
[130] “Brazil court temporarily halts Monsanto royalties,” January 12, 2005, Reuters.
[131] Bertello, Fernando (2005), “Hacia un acuerdo por las regalías de la soja,” La Nación, May 28, Economía & Negocios section, p. 3.
[132] Ferrere, Juan Pablo et al. (2005), “Regalías,” La Nación, June 4, Campo section, Correo de Lectores, p. 3.
[133] Turner, Taos (2005), “Argentina to fight Monsanto in court, suspend talks,” Associated Press, July 1. Available at: .
[134] “Crisis en la CONASE,” La Nación, Campo, September 17, 2005, p. 3.
[135] Varise, Franco (2005), “Soja: inician juicios a exportadores locales por no pagar regalías,” La Nación, Economía, September 21, 2005, p. 3.
[136] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 3.
[137] SAGPyA, Eventos Aprobados Comercialmente. Available at:
[138] Penna and Lema (2003), p. 205.
[139] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 3. Trigo et al. (2002), p. 88.
[140] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 2. They quote Gianessi, L.P. et al.(2002) Plant Biotechnology: Current and Potential Impact for Improving Pest Management in US Agriculture. An Analysis of 40 Case Studies, Washington DC, National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy.
[141] James (2004), pp. 6-7.
[142] Penna and Lema (2003), pp. 203-204.
[143] White, D., “Biotecnología agrícola: Actitud del sector argentino.” Revista Agromercado. Quoted in Penna and Lema (2003), pp. 206-207. 400 farmers were interviewed.
[144] Meninato, R. (2001), “The impact of biotechnology in Argentina”, in Solbrig, Otto, Robert Paarlberg and Francesco Di Castri (2001), Globalization and the Rural Environment , Cambridge, Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, pp. 217-223, p. 219.
[145] Aguirre, S. and L. Segura, Encuesta de Adopción de Soja Trangénica—Campaña. Soja-Información para Extensión, Marcos Juárez: INTA-EEA, 1998/99: 59. Quoted in Penna and Lema (2003), pp. 206-207.
[146] Meninato (2001), p. 219.
[147] Penna and Lema (2003), pp. 208-213.
[148] Idem, p. 209. Regarding percentage of farmers who adopted RR soybean, they quote Cazenave and Associates (2000), Argentine agricultural sector consulting report.
[149] Trigo and Cap (2003), “The impact of the introduction of transgenic crops in Argentinean agriculture,” AgBioForum, 6(3): pp. 87-94, p. 89.
[150] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 5-6.
[151] Idem, p. 6.
[152] Reca and Parrellada (2001), p. 42.
[153] Benbrook, Charles M. (2005), Rust, Resistance, Run Down Soils, and Rising Costs – Problems Facing Soybean Producers in Argentina, Ag BioTech InfoNet Technical Paper Number 8, January, p. 11. He paraphrases Gustavo Grobocopatel, head of a conglomerate which is “among the biggest, if not the biggest, soybean farm conglomerates controlled by a single family in the world.” Grobocopatel gave his presentation at the workshop Transgenic in Argentine Agriculture: Toward Defining a National Policy, held December 5, 2002, and sponsored by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the Institute for Interamerican Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA).
[154] Regarding AAPRESID, see Peiretti (2001), pp. 181-182. Regarding AACREA, see Satorre (2001), pp. 94-95. For more information regarding these two farmers’ associations, see their websites: , and .
[155] Varise (2005), “La patente… .”
[156] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p. 7.
[157] Meninato (2001), p. 217; Penna and Lema (2003), p 220.
[158] On the risks of transgenes escapes, see: Ellstrand, Norman C. (2002), “When transgenes wander, should we worry?,” in Ruse, Michael and David Castle, Genetically Modified Foods (Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books), pp. 325-330.
[159] Qaim and Traxler (in press), p 7. They quote Brandshaw, L.., et al.(1997), “Perspectives on glyphosate resistance,” Weed Technology, 11, 189-198.
[160] Idem, p. 7. They quote Fernandez-Cornejo, J., and M.D. McBride (2000), Genetically Engineered Crops for Pest Management in US Agriculture: Farm Level Effects. Agricultural Economics Report No. 786, Washington DC, Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture.
[161] Qaim and Traxler (in press), pp. 7-8.
[162] Trigo and Cap (2003), p. 91. They define agriculturization “as the permanent substitution of agriculture for the crop/livestock rotation, which was the dominant farming system in Argentina until the mid-1970s.” Regarding soil erosion in the Pampas before and after the introduction of no till practices, see: Casas Roberto R. (2003), “La sustentabilidad de la producción agrícola en la región pampeana,” Revista de la Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario, año 93, No 1490, pp. 4-13.
[163] Trigo and Cap (2003), p. 91-92. Emphases in original.
[164] Poverene and Cantamutto (2003), p. 29.
[165] Poverene and Cantamutto (2003), p. 29.
[166] Mellon, Margaret and Jane Rissler (2003), “Environmental effects of genetically modified food,” paper presented at the conference Genetically Modified Foods—the American Experience, sponsored by the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 12-13. Available at: . They mention Pratley, J., P. Saines, P. Eberbach, M. Incerti, and J. Broster, “Glyphosate resistance in annual ryegrass,” Proceedings of the 11th Conference, Grasslands Society of New South Wales, Wagga Wagga, 1996, p. 122. Available at: Case/Case.asp?ResistID=380.
[167] Pollack, Andrew (2003), “Widely used crop herbicide is losing weed resistance,” The New York Times, January 14, page C1.
[168] The whole paragraph says: “ En Argentina ya se han detectado biotipos resistentes a herbicidas del grupo de las imidazolinonas y se ha observado un cambio en las poblaciones de malezas bajo determinados sistemas productivos muy difundidos, que permiten sospechar la presencia de nuevos individuos resistentes o tolerantes a los pincipios químicos de mayor uso actual.”, INTA, Estación Experimental Agropecuaria General Villegas (no date) “Impacto medio ambiental de tecnología de uso actual para el manejo y control de malezas”. Abstract available at:
[169] INTA EEA Marcos Juárez (2003), “Ocucha: maleza resistente al glifosato detectada en el área del Departamento Marcos Juárez (Córdoba),” Gacetilla de prensa - Sección Comunicaciones - Area Desarrollo Rural – December. Available at:
[170] Papa, J.C.M. (no date), “Malezas tolerantes y resistentes a herbicidas,” INTA EEA Oliveros. Available at:
[171] Papa, Juan Carlos M. (no date), “Malezas: Frente a un punto de vista diferente,” INTA EEA Oliveros. Available at: .
[172] Vitta, J. L., D. Tuesca and E. Puricelli (in press), “Widespread use of glyphosate tolerant soybean and weed communities richness in Argentina,” Agricultural Ecosystems & Environment, p. 4. doi:10.1016/j.agee.2003.10.016.
[173] It s important to note that the International Service on Herbicide Resistant Weeds (ISHRS) has no account of glyphosate-resistant weeds in Argentina. ISHRS is “a collaborative effort between weed scientists in over 80 countries” committed to maintaining “scientific accuracy in the reporting of herbicide resistant weeds globally,” and funded by the Herbicide Resistance Action Committee, the North American Herbicide Resistance Action Committee, and the Weed Science Society of America. See: Heap, I. (2005), International Service on Herbicide Resistant Weeds, available at: .
[174] Benbrook (2005), pp. 29-34. He adds the glyphosate tolerant weeds based on Puricelli, I. et al., (2003), “Control de Trifolium repens con distintas dosis de herbicidas,” Siembra Directa, AAPRESID, year 14, No 70, pp. 39-40, December. Burndown application is defined by Benbrook as “the spraying of a broad-spectrum herbicide prior to planting.” The other two concentrations of glyphosate used in Argentina mentioned by Benbrook are 74,8 percent and 62 percent. There is a combination of glyphosate (at a 24 percent concentration) and imazetaphyr (at a 2 percent concentration). The sales of glyphoste in Argentina totalized a bit more than 130 million liters in 2003.
[175] Joensen, Lilian and Stella Semino, “Argentina’s torrid love affair with the soybean.” This article is a summary of a longer case entitled “Argentina: Case study on the impact of RoundUp Ready soya.” Joensen and Semino are presented as member of the Rural reflection Group, an Argentine NGO that explicitly opposes GM crops, as we shall see in Part IV.
[176] Benbrook (2005), p. 29.
[177] Branford, Sue (2004), “Argentina’s bitter harvest,” New Scientist, 17 April, pp. 40-43, p. 42.
[178] Idem, p. 42. It is important to mention that Branford’s somewhat biased approach against GM crops is noted in The Scientist editorial which comments her piece. As it states, “Argentina’s troubles are caused more by a mishandling of the technology than by the technology itself. Turning over large areas of farmland to just one crop, relying on one method of weed control, and failing to take precautions such as rotating crops, is asking for trouble.” “Growing pains,” New Scientist, 17 April, p. 3. Branford’s piece had coverage in British newspapers, and triggered angry responses from Argentine relatively independent experts such as Trigo, and from Argentine experts close to the biotechnology industry such as Gabriela Levitus. See: Brown, Paul (2004), “Soya ‘miracle’ turned sour in Argentina,” The Guardian, April 16, available at: . And: Mirodan, Seamus and David Harrison (2004), “GM soya saved us, says angry Argentina after ‘superweed claim’,” Daily Telegraph, April 18, available at: .
[179] Idem, p. 34. The three studies he mentions are: King, C., L. Purcell and E. Vories (2001), Plant growth and nitrogenase activity of glyphosate-tolerant soybeans in response to foliar application,” Agronomy Journal, Vol. 9, p. 179-186; University of Missouri (2000), “MU researchers find fungi buildup in glyphosate-treated soybean fields,” a press-release available at: ; Pike, P.D.R. (2002), Field Corn Pest Management Plan, North Central Region, August 14.
[180] Stokstad, Erik (2004), “Plant pathologists gear up for battle with dread fungus,” Science, Vol 306 3 December, pp.1672-1673.
[181] Ivancovich, A. y G. Botta (2002), “La roya de la soja en la Argentina,” published in Revista de Tecnología Agropecuaria-Divulgacion Tecnica del INTA Pergamino Vol. VII No. 19, September-December. Available at:
[182] SAGPyA (2005), Programa Nacional Roya de la Soja. Available at:
[183] Palermo, Angel (2004), “Monitoreos para enfrentar los ataques de roya de la soja,” La Nación, October 2, Campo section, p. 5.; INTA Centro Regional Santa Fe, “Campaňa provincial de alerta temprana de roya de la soja. Organizándonos para minimizar su impacto. Available at:
[184] Palermo, Angel (2004), “Los productores se ‘arman’ contra la roya,” La Nación, October 30, Campo section, p. 13.
[185] Bertello, Fernando (2005), “Temen que la roya de la soja se expanda al sur bonaerense,” La Nación, May 2, Economía & Negocios section, p. 8; and Palermo, Angel (2004), “La roya de la soja llega a nuevas áreas,” La Nación, April 2, Campo section, p. 9.
[186] “Las ventajas de fumigar desde el aire,” La Nación, November 13, Campo section, p. 14.
[187] Darwrich, Néstor (2004), quoted in “La deuda interna argentina,” La Nación, October 30, 2004, Campo section, p. 17.
[188] Palermo, Angel (2003), “Sed de nutrientes,” La Nación, October 17. Available at: .
[189] Seifert, Roberto (2004), “La expansión de la frontera agrícola,” La Nación, October 30, Campo section, p. 17.
[190] Study performed by Icasa/Mora y Araujo y Asociados for Fertilizar, an association of 9 companies. Quoted in Bertello, Fernando (2004), “Más fertilizantes en trigo y maíz menos para la soja,” December 11, Campo section, p. 7.
[191] Pengue, W. A. (2004), “La ‘pampeanización’ de la Argentina,” Le Monde diplomatique/el Dipló, July, pp. 10. Pengue quotes the report Atlas Argentino, INTA, Agencia Alemana de Cooperación (GTZ) and Programa de Acción Nacional de Lucha contra la Desertificación (PAN), Buenos Aires, April 2003. See also: Ministerio de Salud y Ambiente (2004), Mapa Forestal Provincia de Salta, Secretaría de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable, marzo; Fundación Pro Yungas (2003), “Las cifras de la selva pedemontana,” Tucumán; Brown, D. A. and L. R. Malicia, (2001) “Selva Pedemontana: un ecosistema al borde de la extinción,” August, quoted in a Greenpeace report (2002), “Cosecha récord, hambre récord,” June. Available at: ; Foro del Buen Aires (2005), El cambio climático y la agenda local, report prepared for the second preparatory meeting for COP10, Buenos Aires, November 18 and 19.
[192] Dirección de Bosques, SSec R.N. IyRI – SAyDS (no date), Informe sobre Deforestación en la Argentina.
[193] Rofi, Dante A. (2004), “El agro frente a una cuestión de límites,” La Nación, Campo section, July 17, pp. 1 and 6-7.
[194] “Piden que se suspenda el desmonte en el país,” La Nación, main section, May 7 2005, p. 24.
[195] See, for example, two La Nación’s editorials: “Salta: la venta de áreas protegidas,” 24 June, 2004, p. 18; and “Al rescate de un área protegida,” May 14, 2005, p. 28. La Nación is the second largest national newspaper, and traditionally the closest to the agricultural sector.
[196] Grau, H. Ricardo, N. Ignacio Gasparri, and T. Mitchell Aide (2005), Ciencia Hoy, Vol. 15, No. 87, June-July, pp. 16-17.
[197] Rocha, Laura (2004), “Un país jaqueado por el desmonte,” La Nación, August 17, main section, p. 1 and 16. See also: Joensen, Lilian and Mae-Wan Ho (2003), “Argentina’s GM woes.” Available at: . This article also talks about police and para-police harassment to peasants in Santiago del Estero province in order to oust them to plant soybean. As already commented, Santiago del Estero province has been recently intervened by the national government following scandalous cases of abuse of power that far exceed agricultural issues.
[198] Reboratti, Carlos E. (2005), “Efectos sociales de los cambios en la agricultura,” Ciencia Hoy, Vol. 15, No. 87, June-July, pp. 52-61.
[199] Foro de la Tierra y la Alimentación (2004), “Jugando con fuego. Casos de contaminación vegetal, animal y humana en áreas rurales con presencia de sojales transgénicos,” March. Regarding the case in Loma Senés, for a local account see: Vales, Laura (2004), “El veneno llegó con el viento,” Página/12, May 5. Internationally, the case was commented, among others, in: Joensen and Ho (2003); and Branford (2004), p. 41. The latter article—and the case—were in turn quoted in Ching, Lim Li (2004), “How GM Crops Destroy the Third World (Case studies from Argentina, Indonesia and India)”, London, The Independent Science Panel, 29 April. Available at: .
[200] Dr. Norma Giarracca of the Grupo de Estudios Rurales, University of Buenos Aires. Quoted in La Soja: un Debate Impostergable, dossier prepared by the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI).
Available at:
[201] Letter to the Editor by Ing. Agr. Mariano R. Tapia, La Nacion, Campo section, January 29, 2005, p. 3. Unexpectedly, Tapia attributes increasing land concentration to convertibility—the peso pegged to the dollar during the 1990s in Argentina—and to “distortion of world trade” by developed countries’ subsidies.
[202] Trigo et al. (2002), pp. 95-101.
[203] Reboratti (2005), p. 57.
[204] Aide, T., and H. Grau (2004), “Globalization, migration and Latin American ecosystems,” Science, 305, pp. 1915-1916.
[205] Almeyra et al. (2003), pp. 29-33.
[206] Penna and Lema (2003), pp. 208-213, and Qaim and Traxler (in press), pp. 5-6.
[207] Trigo et al. (2002), pp. 138-139. “Accumulated benefits” are “extra income which would have not been generated in the absence of the technology.”
[208] Trigo, Eduardo (2005), “Consecuencias económicas de la transformación agrícola,” Ciencia Hoy, Vol. 15, No. 87, June-July, pp. 46-51.
[209] Branford (2004), p. 42.
[210] Barsky and Gelman (2001), pp. 374-387.
[211] It is reasonable to imagine that these mobile capitals may not be committed to sustainability, but this assumption is contested. A recent analysis performed by researchers from CEMA University—an Argentine private university—based on figures from the National Agricultural Survey indicates that, in the Pampas, “pools de siembra” tend to use no-till techniques to a wider extent than “companies with other kind of capital structure.” Quoted in Gallacher, Marcos, “Tenencia de la tierra y cuidado del suelo,” La Nación, Campo section, November 20, 2004, p. 15. Additionally, Trigo suggests that simple measures could be taken to encourage better treatment of land—for example, by offering tax reductions to those who rent land for longer periods. Trigo, Eduardo, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005.
[212] Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge, Cassandra Klotz-Ingram, Ralph Heimlich, Meredith Soule, William McBride and Sharon Jans, “Economic and environmental impacts of herbicide and insect resistant crops in the United States,” in Kalaitzdonakes (2003), pp. 63-87.
[213] Nelson, Gerald C. and David S. Bullock, “Environmental effects of glyphosate resistant and soybeans in the United States,” in Kalaitzdonakes (2003), pp. 89-101.
[214] Apart from discussing different studies, which talk about RR soybean yield drags of up to 15 percent, Benbrook mentions a study performed by the University of Arkansas, which shows “the bacterial symbiont responsible for nitrogen fixation in soybeans, Bradyrhizobium japonicum, is very sensitive to both Roundup and drought.” Benbrook, Charles M., Troubled Times Amid Commercial Success for Roundup Ready Soybeans: Glyphosate Efficacy is Slipping and Unstable Transgene Expression Erodes Plant Defenses and Yields. AgBioTech InfoNet Technical Paper Number 4. May 3, 2001. Available at:
[215] Idem, p. 5.
[216] Bullock, David S. and Elisabeth I. Nitsi (2001), “Roundup ready soybean technology and farm production costs: measuring the incentive to adopt genetically modified seeds,” The American Behavioral Scientist, April 2001; 44,8; ABI/INFORM Global p. 1283-1301.
[217] Brethour, Cher, Al Mussell, Holly Mayer and Larry Martin (2002), Agronomic, Economic and Environmental Impacts of the Commercial Cultivation of Glyphosate Tolerant Soybeans in Ontario. Final Report, prepared for the Council for Biotechnology Information (Canada), (Ontario: George Morris Centre, July 3). The survey was conducted on 325 farmers, sampled at random from a 8,000 farmers database. They were surveyed by phone.
[218] Brethour et al. (2002), p. 46.
[219] Baccarin, Ricardo and Arthuro Vierheller (h) (2003), “Señales de agotamiento tras un ciclo de notable expansión,” La Nación, October 17. Available at: .
[220] Schnepf, Randall D., Erik Dohlman, and Christine Bolling. Agriculture in Brazil and Argentina: Developments and Prospects for Major Field Crops. Market and Trade Economics Division, Economic research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural and Trade report. WRS-01-3, p. 60
[221] And the current administration is trying to keep it that way, as repeated interventions in the currency market confirm. See: “Dólar: otro record en las compras oficales,” La Nación, June 4, 2005, Economía & Negocios section, p. 2.
[222] The source is DTN Brazil correspondent Anderson Gomes. Quoted in: “More Argentine soy area?,” High Plains Journal, February 13, 2003. DTN is a trade website. Available at: , and at: .
[223] “Agriculture groups ask Argentina to dump tax hike,” Reuters, April 6, 2002. Available at:
[224] Reca and Parrellada (2001), p. 42.
[225] Ablin and Paz (2004), p. 7.
[226]
[227] Ledesma, Manuel Alvarado (2003), “Proteccionismo: ricos versus pobres?,” La Nación, October 4, 2003. Available at: .
[228] Ablin and Paz (2001), p.6.
[229] Andreani, Pablo (2004), “La movilizadora demanda china,” La Nación, Campo section, November 27, p. 5.
[230] SAGPyA (2005), Eventos Aprobados. Available at: .
[231] Reca and Parrellada, p. 42.
[232] Almeyra et al. (2003). pp. 61-62.
[233] SAGPyA (2005), Cifras Oficiales al 13/05/2005. Available at: .
[234] Wroclavsky, Damian (2002), “GMOs help Argentina fight subsidies, Monsanto,” Reuters, December 11. Available at: .
[235] Tomsom, Bill (2003), “Argentina Foresees Export Loss from New EU Food Rules”, Dow Jones News Service, December 18. Availabe at: . See also: Rani, Tania (2004), “Modified-Food Labeling Begins in Europe,” New York Times, April 21, p. F 6. Available at: ientId=9269&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
[236] Iolster, Andrés, from Cargill Argentina, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005.
[237] Ablin and Paz (2000), p. 7.
[238] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 88.
[239] SAGPyA (2005), “Tipos de semillas,” in Maíz. Available at: .
[240] Vallone, Pedro, Carlos Galarza, Vicente Gudelj, Guillermo Nieri, Beatriz Masiero, and Miguel Peretti, “Primera evaluación técnico económica de los maíces trasngénicos,” INTA Marcos Juárez, 2000. Available at:
[241] “En las fechas de siembra atrasadas las ventajas económicas del Maíz GM son muy importantes y en estos casos no se justificaría desde ningún punto de vista dejar de usar esta tecnología, ya que en la cuarta fecha por ejemplo, la rentabilidad sobre el capital de trabajo marginal invertido, que muestra el resultado económico del ensayo, es del orden del 855 % en seis meses.” Vallone et al. (2000).
[242] Vallone, Pedro, Carlos Galarza, Vicente Gudelj, Guillermo Nieri, Beatriz Masiero, and Miguel Peretti, “Maíz: actualización 2002. Información para extension no 73. July 2002. INTA EEA Marcos Juárez. A summary is available at:
[243] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 118.
[244] They cite USDA/ERS, Genetically Engineered Crops for Pest Management, June 1999; and European Commission, Facts on GMOs in the US. Memo 0043. Brussels, July 13, 2000.
[245] Ablin and Paz (2000), p. 16.
[246] Benbrook, Charles M. (2001), When does it pay to plant BT corn? Farm-Level Economic Impacts of Bt corn, 1996-2001, November. Available at: . As stated on its cover page, this report summarizes for farm communities the major findings of a longer technical report by Dr. Benbrook entitled ‘The Farm-Level Economic Impacts of Bt Corn from 1996 through 2001: An Independent National Assessment,” This thorough report is available at: .
[247] Benbrook (2001b), p. 18.
[248] Idem, p. 29.
[249] Idem, p. 30.
[250] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 141. They mention Márgenes Agropecuarios magazine, December 2001. Márgenes Agropercaurios is an Argentine monthly trade magazine founded in 1985, “with a clear agro-economic orientation,” edited by Mario R. Arbolave. Its website is:
[251] Idem, pp. 141-143.
[252] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 87.
[253] Almeyra et al. (2003), p. 24.
[254] SAGPyA (2005), Estimaciones Agrícolas. Informe Semanal al 29-04-2005, p. 14-15.
[255] Almeyra et al. (2003), p. 147.
[256] SAGPyA (2005), Campaňa Agrícola 2004-2005. Cifras Oficiales al 13/5/2005. Available at: .
[257] Elena, M. G. (2001), “Ventajas económicas del algodón transgénico en Argentina,” INTA, Estación Experimental Saénz Peña, Chaco Province, Argentina. Manuscript. Available at:
[258] Qaim, Matin and Eugenio Cap (2002), “Algodón Bt en Argentina: un análisis de su adopción y la disposición a pagar de los productores,” INTA, Instituto de Economía y Sociología. Manuscript. Available at: . Similar results were presented in Matin Qaim and Alain de Janvry “Bt cotton in Argentina: analyzing adoption and farmer’s willingness to pay,” selected paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA), in Long beach, July 28-31, 2002. Available at: . Finally, these results were also published in Matin Qaim and Alain De Janvry (2003), “Genetically modified crops, corporate pricing strategy, and farmers adoption: the case of BT cotton in Argentina,” American Journal of Agricultural Economy, 85 (4) (November): 814-828.
[259] Qaim and Cap (2002), p. 27.
[260] Idem, p. 30.
[261] Qaim Matin, Eugenio Cap, and Alain de Janvry, “Agronomics and sustainability of transgenic cotton in Argentina, invited submission to AgBioForum, July 2003. Available at:
[262] Idem, pp. 14-15.
[263] Idem, p. 15.
[264] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 140-141.
[265] Derewicki, José (2004), “Nuevos rumbos para el algodón,” La Nación, May 29, Campo section, p. 9.
[266] Miller, Scott (2004), “La batalla contra los subsidios cobra fuerza con un fallo de la OMC sobre el algodón,” The Wall Street Journal Americas, in La Nación April 28, Economía & Negocios section, p. 2.
[267] On problems faced by cotton production in Argentina, see: “Algodón: en busca de soluciones,” in La Nación, July 23, 2004, Economía & Negocios section, p. 7; and “Piden tres aňos sin retenciones,” in La Nación, December 31, 2004, Campo section, p. 7. On the reception of the WTO decision in Argentina, see: Liboreiro, Ernesto and Ariel Ibaňez (2005), “Avances contra el proteccionismo agrícola”; and Mira, Cristian (2005b), “La estrategia argentina es diferente del camino adoptado por Brasil,” both in La Nación, May 21, Campo section, pp. 6-7.
[268] Bolton, Ernesto (2005), “Ante un nuevo horizonte productivo,” La Nación, May 21, Campo section, p. 7.
[269] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 169.
[270] Qaim and Cap (2002), p. 27.
[271] Reboratti (2005), p. 57.
[272] Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2004), The Use Of Genetically Modified Crops In Developing Countries. A Follow-up Discussion Paper, London, p. 41.
[273] Idem, p. 42.
[274] Oesterheld, Martín (2005), “Los cambios de la agricultura argentina y sus consecuencias,” Ciencia Hoy, Vol. 15, No. 87, June-July, pp. 6-12.
[275] Reboratti (2005), p. 52.
[276] Trigo and Cap (2003), p. 89.
[277] INTA (2003), INTA on the Concern on Long-Run Sustainability of the Argentine Agricultural Production, December 4, p. 1. Available at: .
[278] Idem, p. 3.
[279] It is estimated that in 2004, soybean export tariff represented between 4,400 and 5,200 million pesos. “Agricultura, comercio exterior e ingresos fiscales,” Ciencia Hoy, Vol. 15, No. 87, June-July, p. 50.
[280] Idem, pp. 3-4.
[281] Commercial approval of two events of RR corn in 2004 and 2005, although seen as a concession to Monsanto, certainly shows that SAGPyA is not very worried about massive use of glyphosate, particularly considering that corn is the crop most promoted to rotate with soybean in order to increase soil organic matter.
[282] It is noteworthy how SAGPyA describes soybean, corn and cotton production in the context of “agriculturization” and “sojización” –increased soybean production—in Argentina: it states that the current situation “in many provinces” is “worrying.” See: SAGPyA’s website on Maiz, Soja and Cotton at . Another sign of the current acknowledgment of the situation is AAPRESID concern about monoculture: its president currently states that “no till” must be understood as an integral approach which includes rotations. See: Romagnoli, Jorge (2004), “Sustentabilidad ambiental”, presentation at the Jornada sobre Sustentabilidad de la Agroindustria Argentina, Buenos Aires, October 19. A final example is the annual conference on soybean MundoSoja, first organized in 2003 by AACREA and AAPRESID explicitely to address soybean cultivation problems. See “La soja frente al desafío de la sustentabilidad,” La Nación, 2003, Campo section. Available at: . In 2005, SAGPyA and INTA participated in organizing MundoSoja. In 2005, MundoSoja eloquent slogan was: “Overcoming barriers with responsibility.” Available at: .
[283] “Cambio de cultivo en Santa Fe,” La Nación, January 5, 2005, Economía & Negocios section, p. 1.
[284] Bisang, Roberto (2004), “Innovación y estructura productiva: la aplicación de biotecnología en la producción agrícola pampeana argentina,” in Bárcena, Alicia, Jorge Katz, César Morales and Marianne Schaper, Los Transgénicos en América Latina y el Caribe: un Debate Abierto, Santiago de Chile, CEPAL, June, pp. 71-110.
[285] Satorre (2001), p. 88. See also: Castro, Victor, Alberto Arizu and Marcos Gallacher (2004), Impacto Económico del Conocimiento Científico. El Caso de la Genética Vegetal, Buenos Aires, Universidad del CEMA.
[286] SAGPyA, for Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food.
[287] Cohen, Joel I., Patricia L. Traynor, Moisés Burachik, Magdy Madkour and John Komen (2001a), “Biosafety Studies in Egypt and Argentina: Two Pathways to Implementation,” in Mclean, M. A., R. J. Frederick, P. L Traynor, J. I. Cohen, and J. Komen (eds.), A Framework for Biosafety Implementation: Report of a Meeting, The Hague, The Netherlands: International Service for National Agricultural Research Biotechnology Service, p. 23.
[288] Calgene Inc. asked permission to test a Bt and Bromoxynil-tolerant cotton; Nidera S. A., to test a glyphosate-tolerant soybean; and Ciba Geigy Arg. S.A.I.C to test marker genes in corn. SAGPyA wesbsite: sagpya..ar.
[289] Burachik, Moisés and Patricia Traynor (2002), Analysis of a National Biosafety System: Regulatory Policies and Procedures in Argentina, ISNAR Country Report 63, The Hague: International Service for National Agriculture Research, p. 2. Available at: and . Also: Moisés Burachik, general coordinator, Biotechnology Office, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005.
[290] MacKenzie (2001), Donald J., International Comparison of Regulatory Frameworks for Food Products of Biotechnology, Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, p. 62. Available at: $FILE/InternatComparisons_MacKenzie.pdf.
[291] Vicién, Carmen (2004), “El sistema regulatorio argentino en el contexto mundial,” paper presented at the II Seminario Biotecnología Agropecuaria en la Argentina. Propuestas para Enfrentar el Nuevo Contexto Internacional, UNEP-GEF and SAGPyA, Buenos Aires, May 6, p. 6.
[292] Vicién, Carmen, and Perla Godoy (1997), “El marco regulatorio para la liberación al medio de oganismos genéticamente modificados en la Argentina,” in Marquard, Helen and Carmen Vicién, Bioseguridad Agropecuaria. Hacia la comercialización de vegetales y vacunas genéticamente modificados Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación and Department of the Environment, Buenos Aires, September, pp. 68-73.
[293] Cohen, Joel, John Komen, and Javier Verástegui (2001b), “Plant biotechnology research in Latin American countries: overview, strategies and development policies, paper presented at the IV Latin American Plant Biotechnology meeting, REDBIO 2001, June 4-8, Goiania, Brazil.
[294] Burachik and Traynor (2002, p. 31) mention a biosafety law that would have carried penalties for violations was expected to reach the parliament in 2002. This law was not passed as expected, due to the “institutional crisis” of December 2001—which, among other consequences, led to President Fernando de la Rúa’s resignation—, according to Trigo et al. (2002).
[295] The following description is based on Burachik and Traynor (2002), and SAGPyA (2005), Marco Regulatorio de la Biotecnología Agropecuaria en la República Argentina, Buenos Aires. Available at: . In all cases, the norms have been translated into English by the author. The use of capital letters follows the use in these norms in Spanish.
[296] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 12.
[297] SAGyP Resolution No. 656/92 states in its Annex: “The Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries is the authority responsible for conceding this permit for experimentation and/or release into the environment of Genetically Modified Microorganisms, counting on the previous dictum of the National Advisory Commission on Agricultural Biotechnology. Information in this request will only be used in the evaluation of the suitability of granting permits for Genetically Modified Microorganisms. Permit will not be granted until this request is approved. The experimentation and/or release into the environment of Genetically Modified Microorganisms which do not have the due permit granted by this authority are expressly forbidden.”
[298] “Flexibilization” means “that the applicant only needs to notify the release for the purpose of inspections (at planting, harvest and residue disposal). No isolation distances are required.” Burachik and Traynor (2002), 53. Regarding these two former norms, see: Idem, pp. 18-25.
[299] These changes have been taken on two grounds. Regarding new genetic information required, it has been argued that there are now new analytical methods that allow for a more precise characterization of the “insert,” the inserted DNA. Regarding isolation distances and the end of the “flexibilized” status, it has been argued that since production of GM seeds for off-season exportation to the “Northern hemisphere” has increased in Argentina, and since some of the events have not been approved in Argentina or in countries that purchase Argentine crops, the “risk of contamination” due to pollen flow must be prevented “in order for the authorized materials to continue to be exportable.” See: Burachik, Moisés (2004), “Breve descripción del marco regulatorio de los organismos genéticamente modificados (OGMs) en Argentina”, paper presented at the II Seminario Biotecnología Agropecuaria en la Argentina. Propuestas para Enfrentar el Nuevo Contexto Internacional, UNEP-GEF and SAGPyA, Buenos Aires, May 6, p. 1.
[300] A “Genetically Modified Organism” is defined as “any organism in which any of the genes or other genetic material have been modified by means of modern biotechnology techniques,” such as:
- “the insertion by any method into a virus, bacterial plasmid or other vector system of a nucleic acid molecule, which has been produced by any method outside that virus, bacterial plasmid or other vector, as to produce a new combination of genetic material which is capable of being inserted into an organism in which that combination does not occur naturally and within which it will be heritable genetic material;
- “the insertion into an organism, by micro-injection, macro-injection, micro-encapsulation or other direct means, of heritable genetic material prepared outside that organism;
- “where they involve the use of recombinant DNA molecules in in vitro fertilization that implies the genetic transformation of an eukaryotic cell.”
The translation of this definition is mostly taken from: Flint, Jason, Lionel Gil, Javier Verastegui, Carlos Irrarzabal, and Juan Dellacha (2000) “Biosafety information management systems. A comparative analysis of the regulatory systems in Canada, Argentina, and Chile,” EJB Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, Vol. 3 No 1, April 15, pp. 9-29. Available at: . This definition, in Spanish, is still available in SAGPyA website:
[301] It is important to note that in Resolution No. 39/03, “release into the environment” (“liberación al medio”) is defined as “the deliberate introduction of a GMPO into the environment” (“la introducción intencional de un OVGM en el ambiente”). The Spanish words for “environment” are either “medio” or “ambiente,” and a combination of both (“medioambiente”) is also common in some contexts–not in SAGPyA norms—, although some experts consider it redundant. In this resolution the word “trial” (“ensayo”), is used to refer to the actual experiment to be performed.
[302] The information required is: the plant scientific and common name; introduced characteristics (“as detailed as possible”); name of the event/s; introduced genes (main and accompanying, of which it is required a complete description and origin, regulatory elements, “detailed” molecular mechanism involved in the expressed phenotype, and bibliography); origin and description of the “material to be tested”; previous authorizations in other countries; data on the people and institutions who “developed or provided the GMPO”; history of the introduction of the gene/s in the same or other species; thorough description of the molecular biology of the donor-vector-recipient system relevant in the generation of the GMPO, including (if possible) quantitative data on the expressed proteins in different tissues; sequence homologies of the expressed products with known sequences of expressed products of pathogens, toxins or allergens; if the sequences incorporated have sequence homologies with the genomes of DNA viruses which can lead to recombinations, and if any of these viral species may infect the transformed species as well as those sexually compatible with it; “other possible risk factors derived from the presence of the introduced genes or their expression”; phenotypic description of the GMPO; centers if origin and genetic diversity (“if known”); brief phenotypic description of the recipient organism or the parental line; heritability pattern of the characteristic incorporated by the main gene/s; phenotypic stability of the GMPO, indicating the number of generations it was verified; and to indicate if, as a result of the genetic modification, it is expected the generation of allergenic or toxic proteins, or an increase in the expression of allergenic or toxic proteins already existent in the non-transformed material.
[303] “Individual event” or “event” is defined as “the insertion into the plant genome in a stable, simultaneous form of ONE (1) or more genes that are part of a defined construction.” “Set of equivalent events” is defined as “those [events] which have been obtained by transforming a given plant species with the same vector and the same genetic construction.” “Set of related events” is defined as “those [events] which have been obtained by combining different vectors, or vectors that have different regulatory constructions or elements, but which are related to a common phenotype.”
[304] Description of the “climatic and agro-ecological characteristics of the area where the release will take place” includes: description of the species taxonomically related to the GMPO which may be present in the area; possibility of cross-pollination; description of the propagation and dispersion mechanisms and periods, and conditions of latent life or inactivity; weediness potential of the GMPO; description of the possible interactions of the GMPO with “non plant organisms” in the ecosystems where it is usually planted.
[305] For trials inside a greenhouse: detailed location of the greenhouse; norms for access control; quantity of the materials to be sown; which other plants will be inside the greenhouse, and measures to prevent “gene flow”; methods to prevent the entering of “any kind of vectors”; to indicate if “specific reactives” for detecting the event will be available; prospected use of the ground after the trial. For trials in open fields: on top of those requested for greenhouse trials, estimated date for sowing, flowering, and harvest, as well as date of other projected activities (infestation or inoculation, etc.), and date of final disposal of the plant materials involved; post- harvest treatment of the ground; posterior control of the field (“elimination of volunteer plants, of taxonomically related species, etc.”); contingency plans in case of a escape, among others.
[306] For example, for accessing toxicity, Resolution No. 39/03 requires information on digestibility and Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) of the newly expressed proteins, while SENASA Resolution No. 412/02 does not.
[307] “Application for the Request of Flexibilized Conditions for Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Plants for Field Trials,” an essential part of SAGyP Resolution No. 131/98, is available in English in Burachik and Traynor (2002), pp. 53-58.
[308] Resolution No. 39/03 requires an “equivalence, difference and non-equivalence statement” described as follows:
“A.5.1.The petitioner will state that the GMPO is equivalent to the similar, non-GM counterpart, except for the phenotype contributed by the newly introduced gene. The statement should refer to all those characteristics of the GMPO which were not intended to be modified in the event. Reference to the studies—included as addenda—that support this statement should be QUOTED. The equivalence should refer at least to: (a) compositional analysis, processing technology, derived products, and byproducts; and (b) agricultural practices including growing and management practices, geographic areas, environment types, specific precautions for the extensive growing of it in relation to environmental effects, if there were such.
“A.5.2.The petitioner will state observations on any unintended or unexpected difference, observed on any aspect of the phenotypic expression of the GMPO compared to the non-GM counterpart. It should be INCLUDED all observations from the post-market monitoring of the event (if it has been commercially released in other countries), as well as those resulting from the studies conducted after those commercial releases:
“A.5.3. If corresponding, the petitioner will state if the kind of genetic modification has the purpose of introducing differences which determine the GMPO cannot be considered substantially equivalent to the non GMPO, briefly explaining those differences.”
[309] Additional data on the insert required in Resolution No 39/03 is:
“B.3.4. Detailed information on transpositions and/or re-arrangements inside the insert present in the plant (versus the positions the genetic elements had in the vector) and/or of/with portions of the plant genome inside the insert and in the adjacent regions:
“B.3.5. Detailed information on the plant genome sequences adjacent to the insert:
“B.3.6. Detailed information on the presence/absence of fragments of the insert in regions of the plant genome outside the functional insert:”
[310] For example, “Actions required in the event of an accidental release or inappropriate use” in Resolution No. 131/98 is replaced in Resolution No. 39/03 by “Methodology for the detection of adventitious presence of the GMPO in non-GM plants, seeds, and grain, and in materials derived from those.”
[311] For GM potato, the required isolation distance is 10m, and the required time lag before planting potato in the same field is 3 years. For tomato, the required isolation distance is 200m, and the required time lag before planting tomato in the same field is 2 years. For wheat, the required isolation distance is only 3 m, and the required time lag before planting wheat in the same field is 2 years. For cotton, different isolation distances are required for varieties resistant to a pest, “enfermedad azul,” also known for its French-origin name, “maladie bleue”: 500m for “resistant varieties,” and 800m for “susceptible varieties.” The required time lag before planting cotton in the same field is 3 years, the same for both cases.
[312] SENASA Resolution No. 511/98 was based on “FAO and WHO documents, as well as on relevant regulations from Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan and the US.” Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 14.
[313] Halsberger, Alexander (2003), “Codex guidelines for GM foods include the analysis of unintended effects,” Nature Biotechnology, volume 21, numer 7, July, pp. 739-741, p. 739.
[314] Article 19 of the Appendix II states: “Risk management measures may include, as appropriate, food labelling, conditions for marketing approvals, post-market monitoring and development of analytical methods for the detection or identification of foods derived from modern biotechnology.” Article 21 of the Appendix II states: “[Risk management may include traceability.]”
[315] On the organism to be assessed, it is required to inform: common and scientific name; known pathogenic characteristics; history of use as food; description of the recipient genotype (variety, cultivar).
[316] On the donor organism, it is required to inform: common and scientific name; known pathogenic characteristics; history of use as food.
[317] On the event, it is required to inform: introduced characteristics; introduction method. On the sequence: detailed map of the vector; main gene/s; accompanying sequence/s; number of inserts (complete or incomplete) and their sequences; genetic stability.
[318] On the “products of expression,” information required is: identification of the newly expressed proteins; characteristics and biological activity; patterns and levels of expression in different tissues and ontogenic stages; nutritional characteristics.
[319] On allergenicity, it is required to inform: identification of the known allergens in donor and recipient species; similarity of the newly expressed proteins to known allergens; other potentially allergenic characteristics: molecular weight, resistance to processing (heat or other), in vitro digestibility.
[320] On toxicity, it is required to inform: identification of known toxins naturally occurring in donor and recipient species; identification of new substances with toxic activity derived from the transgene/s; similarity of the newly expressed proteins to known toxins; assessment of acute toxicity in animals of the newly expressed proteins with no food history; assessment of chronic or sub-chronic toxicity of the newly expressed proteins (if corresponding); assessment of chronic or sub-chronic toxicity of the whole food (if corresponding).
[321] Law No. 20247, Article 1, defines “seed” as “any plant structure destined to sowing and propagation.”
[322] Trigo et al. (2002), pp. 114-117; and Carullo and Dellacha (2003), pp. 52-53. Law No. 24376 explicitly states in its Article 2, that UPOV Act prevails on Law No. 20247, that is, on local legislation. Complete legislation is available at SAGPyA’s website, Marco Regulatorio de la Biotecnología en la Argentina, . Regarding protection of plant breeder’s rights, Trigo et al. (2002, 112-113) highlight the creation of the Argentine Association for the Protection of Obtained Plants (Asociación Argentina de Protección de las Obtenciones Vegetales, ARPOV) in 1991. This institution, along with INASE, “represent “the basis for the development of the seed market in the past two decades.”
[323] Carullo and Dellacha (2003), p. 51.
[324] For example, by late 2001, 31 patents on genes, vectors, plasmids or proteins in relation to Bt genes had already been granted by the National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI). The first one, No. AR 243.234, was granted to Monsanto Company on July 7 1993. However, the first submission was presented by Mycogen Plant Science Inc. on September 24, 1984; it was granted on April 15, 1996 (No. AR 248.617). Trigo et al. (2002), p. 112-114 and 131.
[325] Idem, p. 112. Regarding inconsistencies they quote Correa, C. M. (1999), “Normativa nacional, regional e internacional sobre propiedad intelectual y su aplicación en los INIAs del Cono Sur,” Programa Cooperativo para el Desarrollo Tecnológico Agropecuario del Cono Sur, PROCISUR, Montevideo.
[326] Carullo and Dellacha (2003), p. 52.
[327] Vicién (2004), p. 2, note 1.
[328] From the public sector: two representatives from INASE (instead of just its national director); four representatives from SENASA (instead of just its general administrator; of those, “two specialized in animal sanitary and quality matters,” and “two specialized in plant sanitary and quality matters”); two representatives from the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environmental Policies; two representatives from the Secretariat of Health at the Ministry of Health. From the private sector: two representatives from the Argentine Ecology Society (SAE); two representatives from the Argentine Chamber of Plant Health and Fertilizer Products Manufacturers (CASAFE).
[329] The general co-ordinator functions are: “to assist the SAGPyA in the issues within the competence of the Biotechnology Office, in order to provide a stable and simultaneous development of the policies, the implementation rules and the regulation procedures”; “to assist the SAGPyA in the actions concerted with other areas and related organisms”; “to develop and to suggest the promotion of issues of interest for the development of the activities, and everything that allow the solicitors to appreciate the institutional work of the SAGPyA as a regulation authority from the process of environmental release of a GMO until the granting of the corresponding trading permits”; and “to be in charge of the executive secretariat of CONABIA.” The executive co-ordinator functions are: “to assist the General Co-ordinator, and to replace him/her in case of absence or impediment, especially regarding the management of the regulation actions.”
[330] Two representatives from the National University of Mar del Plata; two representatives from the National University of Quilmes; two representatives from the National University of Comahue; two representatives from the National Institute of Fisheries Research and Development.
[331] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 20.
[332] Moisés Burachik, general coordinator, Biotechnology Office, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005.
[333] Burachik and Traynor (2002), pp. 34-37. See also Part V.
[334] Idem, p. 21.
[335] Idem, p. 13. See also Part III.
[336] Idem, p. 13.
[337] Huerga, Gladys, technical coordinator of regulatory design, Biotechnology Office, personal communication, Buenos Aires, September 2005.
[338] Idem, p. 13.
[339] Idem, p. 32, and Huerga, Gladys (2005), technical coordinator of regulatory design, Biotechnology Office, personal communication, Buenos Aires, September 2005.
[340] Idem, p. 14.
[341] From the public sector: National Drug Institute, National Food Institute, National Food Directorate, and National Administration of Food, Drugs and Medical Technology, ANMAT (the four of them, part of the Ministry of Health and Environment); National Directorate of Agri-Food Quality (SENASA); Food Directorate (SAGPyA); public universities; National Science and Technology Research Council (CONICET); and CONABIA (SAGPyA). From the private sector: Argentine Seed Growers Association (ASA); Argentine Agrarian Federation; Coordination of the Food Products Industry (COPAL); Argentine Rural Confederation; Agricultural Inter-cooperative Confederation (CONINAGRO); Argentine Rural Society (SRA); Action in Defense of Consumers; Argentine Oil Industry Chamber; Argentine Supermarket Chamber.
[342] Cohen et al. (2001b), p. 5.
[343] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 14.
[344] Idem, p. 15.
[345] Description of the regulatory process is mostly based on Burachik and Traynor (2002), pp. 22-29.
[346] For example, in 1998, an application requesting “flexibilization”—currently, the second stage of environmental assessment—of a Bt corn expressing a gene, Cry9C, from Bacillus thuringiensis subsp. tolworthi, prompted outside consultation. Data analyzed by CONABIA showed the Cry9C protein exhibited resistance to hydrolysis under simulated gastric conditions, and led CONABIA experts to consult with two external experts: a physician and two biochemists from the School of Pharmacy and Biochemistry, University of Buenos Aires. It is also important to note that, in this case, CONABIA concern had to do with food safety (SENASA area), not with its specific area, that is, environmental assessment. Idem, p. 25.
[347] Idem, p. 24.
[348] Regarding authorizations for field trials, those are not always taken by consensus. Huerga, Gladys, technical coordinator of regulatory design, Biotechnology Office, personal communication, Buenos Aires, September 2005.
[349] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 23.
[350] Idem, p. 25.
[351] Idem, p. 26.
[352] Idem. p. 27.
[353] Idem, p. 22.
[354] Idem, p. 34.
[355] Idem, p.30.
[356] Vicién, Carmen (2004), p. 7.
[357] Idem, p. 14.
[358] Idem, p. 14.
[359] An example usually put forward is a GM potato present in a snack produced in the US imported in the 1990s.
[360] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 33.
[361] Huerga, Gladys, technical coordinator of regulatory design, Biotechnology Office, personal communication, Buenos Aires, September 2005.
[362] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 33.
[363] “Etiquetas para los alimentos transgénicos,” La Nación, March 24, 2003. Available at: .
[364] One of these companies is La esquina de las flores.
[365] Trigo et al. (2002) p. 110.
[366] The whole information regarding field trials performed from 1991 to 2004 is available at SAGPyA website:
[367] Idem.
[368] Trigo et al. (2002) p. 110.
[369] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 23.
[370] SAGPyA (2005), Campaña agricola 2005/2005. Cifras al 13/5/2005. Available at: .
[371] Andreni, Pablo (2005), “El aceite de girasol recupera mercados,” La Nación, June 4, Campo section, p. 5.
[372] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 30.
[373] The study is discussed in “Se abre el debate con los transgénicos,” La Nación, November 27, 2004, Campo section, p. 8.
[374] Andreani (2005), “El aceite de girasol…”
[375] Poverene and Cantamutto (2003), p. 32.
[376] United Nations Development Program (2001a), “Although controversial, GMOs could be a breakthrough technology for developing countries,” Human Development Report 2001 press release, July 10. Available at:
[377] United Nations Development Program (2001b), Human Development Report 2001. Making Technologies Work for Human Development (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 76. Available at:
[378] Cohen et al. (2001a), p. 23.
[379] Idem, p. 22.
[380] Idem, p. 23-24.
[381] Idem, p. 24.
[382] Idem, p. 24.
[383] Quoted in Flint, Jason, Lionel Gil, Javier Verastegui, Carlos Irrarzabal, and Juan Dellacha (2000) “Biosafety information management systems. A comparative analysis of the regulatory systems in Canada, Argentina, and Chile,” EJB Electronic Journal of Biotechnology, Vol. 3 No 1, April 15, pp. 20-21. Available at: .
[384] MacKenzie (2001) p. 14.
[385] Idem, p. 14.
[386] The complete text of Alinorm 01/34A article 20—reproduced in SENASA Resolution 412/02 Annex I, Article 13—states: “Post-market monitoring may be an appropriate risk management measure in specific circumstances. Its need and utility should be considered, on a case-by-case basis, during risk assessment and practicability in addition during risk management. Post-market monitoring may be undertaken for the purpose of:
A) verifying conclusions about the absence or the possible occurrence, impact and significance of
potential consumer health effects; and
B) monitoring changes in nutrient intake levels, associated with the introduction of foods likely to significantly alter nutritional status, to determine their human health impact.”
[387] Silverman, Ozzie (2000), International Approaches to Non-Science Issues in Regulating the Products of Biotechnology, prepared for The Canadian Biotechnology Committee Project Steering Committee on the Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, November. Available at $FILE/RegulatingProds_Silverman_e.pdf.
[388] Silverman (2000), p. 64.
[389] Oliver, María Fabiana (2001), “El comercio de transgénicos en América del Sur. Elementos politicos – jurídicos para su tratamiento en el marco de la integración regional,” in Nicolás Luco (ed.), Cinco Estudios Sudamericanos sobre Comercio y Ambiente (Buenos Aires: Grupo Zapallar), pp. 83-105. Available at: and
[390] Idem, p. 98
[391] Idem, p. 98
[392] Idem, p. 99.
[393] Burachik and Traynor (2002).
[394] This paper has made extensive use of this aspect of Burachik and Traynor’s paper, as other studies have done—such as Jaffe’s, Nap et al.’s and Pachico’s, which will be commented later on.
[395] Idem, pp. 7-8.
[396] Burachik (2005), personal communication, Buenos Aires, May.
[397] Burachik and Traynor (2002), pp. 37-47.
[398] Jaffe, Gregory (2004), “Regulating transgenic crops: a comparative analysis of different regulatory processes”, Transgenic Research 13, pp. 5-19, p. 5.
[399] Idem, pp. 14-15.
[400] Idem, pp. 9 and 15.
[401] Idem, pp. 10 and 16.
[402] Idem, p. 16.
[403] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 13.
[404] Idem, p. 16.
[405] Idem, pp. 10 and 16-17.
[406] Idem, p. 17.
[407] Idem. pp. 17-18.
[408] Idem, p. 18.
[409] Nap, Jan-Peter, Meter L. J. Metz, Marga Escaler, and Anthony J. Conner (2003), “The release of genetically modified crops into the environment. Part I. Overview of current status and regulations,” The Plant Journal, 33, pp. 1-18.
[410] Pachico, Douglas (2003), “Regulation of transgenic crops: an international comparison,” 7th International Consortium on Agricultural Research (ICABR) International Conference on Public Policy for Agricultural Biotechnology, Ravello, Italy, June 29-July 3, 2003.
[411] Nap et al. (2003), p. 13
[412] Huerga, Gladys (2004) “Protocolo de Cartagena y su implementación. Situación en Argentina. Aspectos de Bioseguridad”, paper presented at the II Seminario Biotecnología Agropecuaria en la Argentina. Propuestas para Enfrentar el Nuevo Contexto Internacional, UNEP-GEF and SAGPyA, Buenos Aires, May 6, p. 3.
[413] Idem, p. 3.
[414] Hopp, Esteban (2001), “Applying science to take conscious advantage of the benefits and address the issues of agricultural biotechnology in a developing country,” abstract of the New Biotechnology Foods and Crops: Science, Safety and Society, Bangkok Conference, 10-12 July. Available at: , p. 2.
[415] Vicién (2004), p. 10. See also the title of the paper presented by Hopp—member of CONABIA—in Bangkok, note 414. A more import
[416] Jaffe (2004), p. 7.
[417] Nap et al. (2003), p. 15.
[418] Waisbord, Silvio (2000), Watchdog Journalism in South America. News, Accountability and Democracy, New York, Columbia University Press.
[419] Worldwide Register of GM Contamination, .
[420] Transparency International reports quoted in “La percepción de la corrupción no tuvo cambios en la Argentina,” La Nación, October 20, main section. Available at: .
[421] Burachik (2004), p. 2.
[422] SAGPyA (2004), Plan Estratégico para el Desarrollo de la Biotecnología Agropecuaria 2005-2025, Buenos Aires, December, p. 3.
[423] Idem, p. 31.
[424] Cohen et al. (2001b).
[425] Puig de Stubrin, Lilia, “Otra mirada al presupuesto de ciencia y tecnología,” La Nación, November 6, 2003. Available at:
[426] C. M. (1998), “Argentina gives peer review a boost,” Nature, Vol. 391, 5 February, p. 525; and Macilwain, Colin (1999), “Science in Latin America,” Nature, Vol. 398, Supp., 1 April 1999, p. A15. C.M speaks of U$S 900, and Macilwain, of U$S 800.
[427] Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología, Argentina-1999, SECyT. Quoted in Cohen et al. (2001b), p. 22.
[428] Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología, Argentina-1999, SECyT. Quoted in Cohen et al. (2001b), p. 22.
[429] Stubrin.
[430] Cohen et al. (2001b), p. 22.
[431] Idem, p. 22.
[432] Stubrin (2003).
[433] Macilwain (1999), A15.
[434] Oesterheld, Martín (2004), “Fortalezas y debilidades de las ciencias agropecuarias en la Argentina”, paper presented at XVII Congreso Nacional CREA, Mar del Plata, Argentina, September 1-3. See also: Oesterheld, Martín, María Semmartin and Antonio Hall, “Análisis bibliográfico de la investigación agronómica en la Argentina” (2002), Ciencia Hoy , Volume 12, number 170, August-September, pp. 52-62.
[435] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 9.
[436] Idem, pp. 10-11.
[437] Burachik and Traynor (2002), pp. 10-11.
[438] Bio Sidus has already obtained a transgenic cow, Pampa Mansa, which produces human growth hormone. See Bär, Nora (2003), “Mansa, una ternera única en el mundo,” La Nación, October 2. Available at: ; and “Un laboratorio obtuvo leche medicinal de una vaca clon,” Clarín, October 2, 2003. Available at .
[439] Mira, Cristian (2002), “Productores agropecuarios se unen e invierten en biotecnología,” La Nación, August 21. Available at: .
[440] Mira, Cristian (2005c), “Buscan inversores para un proyecto de biotecnología,” La Nación, Economía & Negocios section, August 13, p. 8.
[441] Gasparetti, Walter (2003), “Impulsan en Rosario un polo biotecnológico,” La Nación, July 12. Available at: .
[442] Mira (2005c), p. 8.
[443] REDBIO website: rlc.redes/redbio/html/home.htm.
[444] Trigo, Eduardo, Greg Traxler, Carl Pray, and Ruben Echeverría (2001), “Agricultural Biotechnology in Latin America and the Caribbean,” in Philip Pardey, The Future of Food. Biotechnology Markets and Policies in an International Setting (Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute), chapter 11.
[445] Trigo et al. (2001), p. 229.
[446] “CamBioTec Network promotes exchanges between Canada and Latin America,” The Biotech HR Pulse (Ottawa, Biotechnology Human Resources), September 02, 2000. Available at:
[447] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 9.
[448] Cohen, Joel I. (2005), “Poorer nations turn to publicly develop GM crops”, Nature Biotechnology, Volume 23, Number 1, January, pp. 27-33, p. 28. In this report, an event is defined as “a stable transformation—the incorporation of foreign DNA into a living plant cell—undertaken by a single institute among the participant countries, thereby providing a unique crop-and-trait combination” (Idem, p. 27).
[449] Idem, p. 32-33.
[450] Dhalmini, Z., C. Spillane, J. P. Moss, J. Ruane, N. Urquia, A. Sonnino (2005), Status of Research and Application of Crop Biotechnologies in Developing Countries”, Food and Agricultural Organization, Rome, pp. 43-50.
[451] Simpson, A. J. G. et al. (2000),“The genome sequence of the plant pathogen Xylella fastidiosa,” Nature, 406, pp. 151-157, 13 July; Yu, Jun et al. (2002), “A draft sequence of the rice genomics (Oryza sativa L. ssp. indica), Science 296, 5565 (April 5), pp. 79-92.
[452] Enriquez, Juan (2001), “Technology, gene research and national competitiveness,” in Solbrig et al. (2001), pp. 225-254, p. 247. It is important to note that it is not only Latin America that is being left behind by multinationals’ innovative and patenting efforts: as Enriquez points out, “IBM alone has produced more patents than 139 of the world’s countries combined.” Idem, p. 247-248.
[453] Albornoz, Mario, Situación de la Ciencia y la Tecnología en las Américas (Buenos Aires: Centro Redes, 2002). Available at:
[454] Felice, Carmelo José (2002). El patentamiento y la generación de riquezas a partir de la ciencia en la Argentina (Buenos Aires). Manuscript. Available at: .
[455] Trigo et al (2002), p. 108.
[456] Trigo, Eduardo, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005.
[457] M. C. (1998), “Argentina…”, p. 525.
[458] “Científicos en empresas,” La Nación, November 7, 2003. Available at: .
[459] “Fomento al cultivo de girasol en la Argentina,” La Nación, November 8, 2003. Available at:
[460] Trigo, Eduardo J. (2000), “The situation of agriculture biotechnology capacities and exploitation in Latin America and the Caribbean ,” in Matin Qaim, Anatole F. Krattinger and Joachim von Braum, Agricultural Biotechnology in Developing Countries: Towards Optimizing the Benefits for the Poor (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 73-90, p. 74.
[461] Trigo (2000), p. 88.
[462] SAGPyA (2005), Plan Estratégico…, p. 36.
[463] Guerrero, Veronica (2005), “Argentina gets serious about biotech,” New@Nature website, published online on 8 September, doi:10.1038/bioent880. Available at:
[464] “Proyecto de estímulo a la biotecnología,” La Nación, August 19, 2005, p. 14.
[465] Phillips, Peter W. B. (2003), “Policy, national regulation, and international standards for GM food,” Research at a Glance, Biotechnology and Genetic Resource Policies, Washington, International Food Policy Research Institute, Brief 1, January. He bases his analysis on: Buckingham, Donald E. and Peter W.B. Phillips (2001), “Hot potato, hot potato,” Journal of World Trade 35 (1): 1-31.
[466] Philips (2003), p. 3.
[467] Stearman, Kaye (2005), “United States tries to derail discussion on labelling of GM food,” press release of Consumers International, Kota Kinabalu, Malasya, May 11. Available at:
[468] “Biodiversity treaty called disastrous,” Ths Scientist, September 10, 2003. Available at: , and “Magna Cartagena,” The Financial Express, 10 September 2003. Available at: .
[469] Philips (2003), p. 4-5.
[470] Haslberger, Alexander G. (2003), “Codex guidelines for Gm foods include the analysis of unintended effects,” Nature Biotechnology, Volume 21, Number 7, pp. 739-741.
[471] Philips (2003), p. 4.
[472] Idem, p. 4.
[473] Stearman (2005), “United States… .”
[474] Grupo Bio position is expressed in “Biotecnología. La alternativa estratégica para Argentina,” Buenos Aires, December 2000. Available at: .
[475] “Lobby a favor de la biotecnología,” La Nación, October 31, 2000. Available at: .
[476] Galperín,Carlos, Leonardo Fernández e Ivana Doporto (2001), “Los productos transgénicos, el comercio agrícola y el impacto sobre el agro,” Panorama del Mercosur, No 4, pp-135-168. Available at:
[477] Hodson-de-Jaramillo, Elizabeth and Rafael H. Aramendis (1999), “New confrontations,” Nature Biotechnology, Vol 17, June, pp. 512-513.
[478] Quoted in Salgar Ana María (2001), “Organismos genéticamente modificados: aspectos científicos y técnicos,” in Lucos. (ed.) pp. 61-82, pp.73-74.
[479] Méndez Brandam (2005), “Granero orgánico del mundo?,” La Nación, June 7, Comercio Exterior section, pp. 1 and 6-7.
[480] Huerga (2004), p. 3.
[481] SAGPyA and FAO (2004), Evaluación de la capacidad, estructura y logística de manejos post-cosecha de organismos vivos modificados e identificación de estrategias para aplicar el artículo 18, 2.a) del Protocolo de Cartagena sobre seguridad de la biotecnología (TCP/ARG/2903 A). Contexto y opciones para la exportación segregada de maíz OVM y no-OVM en condiciones de bioseguridad, conforme al Protocolo de Cartagena. Resultados Principales, pp. 18-23.
[482] Burachick and Traynor (2002), pp. 8-9.
[483] Jank, Bernard and Helmut Gaugitsch (2001), “Decision making under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” TRENDS in Biotechnology, Vol 19 No 5, May, pp. 194-197.
[484] Carullo and Dellacha (2003), p. 55.
[485] SAGPyA (2004), Plan Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Biotecnología Agropecuaria 2005-2015, Buenos Aires, December, p. 8.
[486] Aguilar, Soledad (2004), “Cuestiones jurídicas en las negociaciones del Protocolo de Cartagena sobre Seguridad en la Biotecnología,” presentation at the II Seminario Biotenología en la Argentina organizad by SAGPyA and UNEP/GEF, Buenos Aires, May 6.
[487] Sarquis, Alejandra (2004), “El Protocolo de Cartagena. Aspectos Comerciales,” presentation at the II Seminario Biotenología en la Argentina organizad by SAGPyA and UNEP/GEF, Buenos Aires, May 6.
[488] SAGPyA (2005), “Acuerdo Bilateral sobre Biotecnología,” press release. Available at: .
[489] Ablin and Paz (2000), p. 60.
[490] Ablin and Paz (2000), p. 60. These are their exact words, “(…) no obstante la importancia que este tema pudiera asumir para los intereses argentinos, cabe imaginar que otros Miembros de la OMC con intereses más globales—y una mayor cuota de poder relativo—requirieran clarificar este importante tema para el futuro del comercio mundial.”
[491] Kinderler, Julian (2003), “The WTO complaint—why now?,” Nature Biotechnology, Volume 21, Number 7, July, pp. 735-736.
[492] Moisés Burachik, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005. See also: Chiaradía, Alfredo (2005), “Intensa actividad de la Argentina ante la OMC,” La Nación, Campo section, June 4, p. 11. Chiaradía is ambassador and secretary of Trade and Economic International Relations.
[493] Burachik (2004), p. 2.
[494] Anand, P. (20020, “Decision-making when science is ambiguous,” Science, Vol. 295, 8 March, P. 1839.
[495] Nelkin Dorothy, “The social and cultural meaning of risk. Biotechnology disputes,” February 8, 2003, manuscript, p. 33.
[496] Pinstrup-Andersen, Per and Marc J. Cohen (2001), “Rich and poor country perspectives on biotechnology,” in Phillip G. Pardey, The Future of Food. Biotechnology Markets in an International Setting,Washington, the International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001, pp.17-48.
[497] Environics International, Ltd, The Environmental Monitor: 1998 International Report (Toronto: Environics International, Ltd., 1998). Quoted in Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen (2001), p. 25.
[498] Quoted in Hoban, Thomas J. (2004), Public Attitudes Toeard Agricultural Biotechnology, ESA Working Paper 04-09, FAO, May. Available at: .
[499] Sarquis, Alejandra et al. (2003), Consultas sobre Biotecnología en la Argentina, Buenos Aires: SAGPyA, p. 18. Available at: . It is important to note that the survey was conducted in supermarkets, so only middle-class people were interviewed.
[500] Krimsky, Sheldom, “The profit of scientific discovery and its normative implications,” Chicago Kent Law Review, Vol 75:3, pages 15-39.
[501] Krimsky, pp. 17-8.
[502] Krimsky, p. 30.
[503] On the Pusztai affair, see: Massod, Ehsan (1999), “Gag on food scientist is lifted as gene modification row hots up…” Nature, Vol. 397, 18 February, p. 547; and Loder, Natasha (1999), “Journal under attack over controversial paper on GM food,” Nature,Vol. 401, 21 October, p. 731. The case was so hot and controversial that the Nuffield Council of Bioethics’ report on GM foods released in 1999 included an appendix on it: Genetically Modified Crops: the Ethical and Social Issues, London, 1999, pp. 139-42, Available at: . Pusztai presented his case and talked about the possible impact of conflict of interests and industry’s demand for secrecy in Arpad Pusztai, “GM food safety: scientific and institutional issues,” Science as Culture, Volume 11, Number 1, 2002 pp. 69-92.
[504] On the “maize scandal,” see: Quist, David and Ignacio Chapela (2001), “Transgenic DNA introgressed into traditional maize landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico,” Nature, Vol. 414, 29 November, pp. 541-3; Butler, Declan (2002), “Alleged flaws in gene-transfer paper spark row over,” Nature, Vol. 414, 28 February, pp. 948-9; Charles C. Mann, “Has GM corn ‘invaded’ Mexico?” Science, Vol. 295, 1 March 2002, pp. 1617-9; Editorial note, Nature, Vol. 416, 11 April 2002; and Adam, David and Jonathan Knight (2002), “Publish, and be damned,” Nature, Vol. 419, 24 October 2002, pages 772-776.
[505] Krimsky, p. 39.
[506] Varma, Roli (2000), “Changing research cultures in U.S. industry,” Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. 25 No. 4, Autumn, pp. 395-416.
[507] Varma, p. 414.
[508] Stelfox H. T., Chua G., O'Rourke K., Detsky A. S., (1998), “Conflict of interest in the debate over calcium-channel antagonists,” New England Journal of Medicine; 338:101-106, January 8.
[509] Bekelman, Justin E., Yan Li, and Cary P. Gross (2003), “Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research: a systematic review,” JAMA 289: 454-465.
[510] Davis, Erwin et al (2001)., Universitry-Industry relationships: Framing the Issues for Academic research in Agricultural Biotechnology, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina: Pew Initiative in Food and Biotechnology, 2001. Available at: .
[511] Nelkin, Dorothy and Emily Marden, “The StarLink controversy. The competing frames of risk disputes,” April 15, manuscript, pp. 19-20
[512] Perry, Joe N. (2002), “Genetically modified crops,” in Michael Ruse and David Castle, Genetically Modified Foods. Debating Biotechnology, Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books, 2002, pp. 115-121.
[513] See for example, Nora Bär’s op-ed articles, such as, “El país de las paradojas,” La Nación, November 5, 2003. Available at: ; or: “Eureka, la fórmula,” La Nación, September 24, 2003. Available at: . Particularly regarding biotechnology applications, see the highly favorable article by Folgarait, Alejandra (2003), “Quién le teme a Frankenstein?,” in Noticias, October 17 Año XXI, No 19398. Available at: .
[514] Albornoz, Mario et al. (2003), Resultados de la Encuesta de Percepción Percepción Pública de la Ciencia Realizada en Argentina, Brasil, España y Uruguay (RICYT/CYTED-OEI), Buenos Aires, Centro Redes, 2003, p. 38. Available at: .
[515] Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “How can you patent genes?” AJOB, Summer 2002, Vol. 2, number 3, pp. 3-11.
[516] Dorothy Nelkin, “Patenting genes and the public interest,” AJOB, Summer 2002, Vol. 2, number 3, pp. 13-5
[517] In the US, the first plant patent, for the “New Dawn” rose, was granted in 1930. Crucial laws were passed in 1970—the Plant Variety Protection Act—and 1985, when the Patent and Trademark Office ruled that “any type of plant could in principle be patented.” Glenn E. Bugos and Daniel J. Kevles, “Plants as intellectual property: American practice, law, and policy in world context,” Osiris, 2nd series, Vol. 7, Issue Science after ’40 (1992), pp. 74-104. I have already commented the general legal framework in Argentina regarding patenting plant varieties in Part I.
[518] Nelkin, Dorothy and Lori Andrews (1998), “Homo economicus. Commercialization of body tissue in the age of biotechnology,” Hastings Center Report, September-October, pp. 31-9.
[519] Nelkin and Andrews, pp. 32-33.
[520] Food Ethics Council’s website. Available at: , p. 28.
[521] Miller, Henry I. (1999), “The real curse of Frankenfood,” Nature Biotechnology, Vol. 17, February, p. 113.
[522] Miller, p. 113.
[523] Paarlberg, Robert L. (2001), The Politics of Precaution. Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries, Johns Hopkins University Press. The phrase “relatively prosperous” used to describe Argentina in the 1990s certainly has involuntarily ironic connotations after the 2001 crisis.
[524] Marco, Alan C. and Gordon C. Rausser (2002), “Mergers and intellectual property in agricultural biotechnology,” in R. E. Evenson, V. Santaniello and D. Silverman, Economic and Social Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, New York, Cabi International, p. 134.
[525] Wapner, Paul (1996), Environmenal Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: State University of New York, p. 64.
[526] Idem, p. 65.
[527] Idem, pp. 44-5, 77, and pp. 121-22
[528] Wapner, p. 65.
[529] Nelkin, “The social and cultural…” pp. 10-15.
[530] Alvarez, Lizette (2003), “Consumers in Europe resist gene-altered foods,” The New York Times, February 11, p. A3.
[531] Dobson, Alexander (2000), Green Political Thought, New York, Routledge, p. 65.
[532] Lewis, M. (1992), Green Delusions: an Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism, Durham, Duke University Press, p. 3. Quoted in Dobson, p. 203. (Emphasis is mine)
[533] Albornoz at al. p. 53.
[534] Sarquis et al. (2003), p. 18.
[535] Sen, Amartya (2002), “How to judge globalism,” The American Prospect, Vol 13 No 1, January 1/January 14, pp. A2-6. Available at:
[536] Shiva, Vandana (1999), “Ecological balance in an era of globalization,” in Nicholas Low, Global Ethics and Environment, New York, Routledge, pp. 47-8. (Emphasis in original)
[537] Singer, Peter (2002), One World. The Ethics of Globalization, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 51.
[538] Heller, Chaia (2002), “From scientific risk to paysan savoir faire: peasant expertise in the French and global debate over GM crops,” Science as Culture, Vol. 11, Number 1, pp. 5-37.
[539] Heller (2002), p. 27.
[540] “The Doha squabble,” The Economist, March 29, 2003, pp. 63-4.
[541] Dickson, David (2003), “Public attitudes: where are they heading?,” speech delivered to the Conference on New Biotechnology Food and Crops: Science, Safety and Society, United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok, 10-12 July. Available at: .
[542] See, for example: “Destrozaron comercios frente al Obelisco,” La Nación, December 20, 2001. Available at: .
[543] Trigo et al.(2002), p. 171.
[544] Russell, Milton and Michael Gruber (1987), “Risk assessment in environmental policy-making,” Science, Vol. 236, April 17, 1987, pp. 286-290.
[545] Magnus, David and Arthur Caplan (2002), “Food for thought,” in Michael Ruse and David Castle, p. 86.
[546] Magnus and Caplan (2002), p. 84.
[547] Nelkin, Dorothy and Susan Lindee (1995), The DNA Mystique. The Gene as a Cultural Icon, New York: WH Freeman.
[548] Slovic, Paul (1987), “Perception of risk,” Science, Vol. 236, April 17, pp. 280-5.
[549] A study is commented in Perry (2002), page 118. However, another study challenges this view: Lynn J. Frewer, Chaya Howard and Richard Shepherd (1997), “Public concerns in the United Kingdom about general and specific applications of genetic engineering: risks, benefits, and ethics” Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol 22, Issue 1 (Winter), pp. 98-124.
[550] Krimsky, Sheldom (1995), “Regulating recombinant DNA research and its applications,” in Dorothy Nelkin (ed.), Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions, Newbury Park, Cal., Sage Publications, pp. 219-248.
[551] Slovic (1987), p. 285
[552] Nelkin and Marden, pp. 25-6.
[553] Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechonolgy, “Post-market oversight of biotech foods,” April 2003. Available at:
[554] Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechonolgy, “The StarLink case: issues for the future,” October 2001. Available at:
[555] Slovic (1987), p. 283.
[556] Among others: Comstock (2002), p. 102; Magnus and Caplan (2002), p. 84; and Paarlberg (2001), p. 5.
[557] Comstock, p. 97. He mentions a study performed by Dermot Hayes, John A. Fox, and Jason F. Shogren, “Consumer preferences for food irradiation: how favorable and unfavorable descriptions affect preferences for irradiated pork in experimental auctions,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24, Number 1 (2002): pp. 73-95.
[558] Comstock (2002), p. 100.
[559] Thompson, Paul B. (2002), “Bioethics issues in a biobased economy,” in Michael Ruse and David Castle, pp. 68-76.
[560] Diaz Bonilla, Eugenio et al. (2000), Food Security and Trade Negotiations in World Trade Organizations: a Cluster Analysis of Country Groups, Washington, Trade and Macroeconomics Division, International Food Policy Research Institute, p. 23.
[561] At least, that is what an Argentine economist linked to the agricultural sector says in a recent article. Ambrosetti, Ernesto (2003), “Hay que dejarlo invertir,” La Nación, November 21. Available at: .
[562] Sen, Amartya (1999), Development as Freedom, New York: Anchor Books, p. 170.
[563] Idem, p. 165. (Emphasis in original)
[564] “In pictures: starvation in Argentina,” BBC News World Edition. Available at: /2484061.stm.
[565] Quoted in Prada, Leandro (2002), “Starving children in once-rich Argentina,” The Washington Times, 11/18. Available at: .
[566] World Bank, “Argentina at a glance.” Available at:
[567] Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen (2001), p. 18.
[568] This is an estimation of the Center for Studies on Nutrition (CESNI), an Argentine medical association. Quoted in Amato, Alberto (2003), “Desnutrición infantil: el verdadero riesgo país,” Clarín, November 16, Available at: .
[569] Sarquis et al. (2003), p.15.
[570] See Nora Bär’s “Mansa, una ternera única en el mundo,” La Nación, October 2, 2003. Available at: ; and “Un laboratorio obtuvo leche medicinal de una vaca clon,” Clarín, October 2, 2003. Available at .
[571] “Encuesta de opinión: Qué piensan de la ciencia los argentinos?,” Ciencia Hoy, Vol. 8, No 48, September/October 1998. Available at: .
[572] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 42.
[573] Idem, p. 42.
[574] Carullo and Dellacha (2003), p. 55.
[575] See, for example, Por qué Biotenología website, . On the program that supports this site, which has an annual funding of U$S 170,000 provided by ASA, according to Burachik and Traynor, they comment: “While the quality of the information presented in high, most of it comes from foreign sources and is not focused on what is happening in Argentina.” They also list “the educational efforts” performed by the Argentine Forum of Biotechnology (FAB) in 2000, which targeted government leaders, people from the food industry, journalists, and consumer representatives, as well as CONABIA’s officials’ activities. “It is expected that these and other actions already programmed for the near future will help counteract campaigns against GMOs and bring some rationality into the discussion.” Burachik and Traynor (2002), pp. 36-37.
[576] Burachik and Traynor (2002), p. 46.
[577] Sarquis et al. (2003), p. 3.
[578] Idem, p. 14.
[579] Idem, p. 16.
[580] Quoted in Charles J. Arntzen, et al., (2003) “GM crops: science, politics and communication,” Nature Reviews/Genetics, Vol. 4, October, pp.839-843.
[581] “Desde mañana, el Nuevo Campo en La Nación,” La Nación, November 21, 2003. Available at:
[582] Rapoport (2000), chapter one.
[583] Gainza, Malena (2002), “La Argentina transgénica,” La Nación, July 25. Available at: .
[584] Bernaudo, Guillermo (2002), “Argentina transgénica,” La Nación, Cartas de lectores section, August 3. Available at: .
[585] Gainza, Malena (2002), “Transgénicos,” La Nación, Cartas de lectores August 6. Available at: .
[586] Velar, Carlos (2002), “Transgénicos II,” La Nación, Cartas de lectores section, August 10. Available at:
[587] Bernaudo, Guillermo (2002), “Argentina transgénica II,” La Nación, Cartas de lectores section, August 18. Available at:
[588] Brodsky, Norberto (2002), “Transgénicos IV,” La Nación, August 25. Available at:
[589] The poem says: “Los hermanos sean unidos/ porque ésa es la ley primera./ Tengan unión verdadera/ en cualquier tiempo que sea,/ porque si entre ellos pelean/ los devoran los de afuera.” Many people in Argentina could recall this strophe, as I do. Brodsky only mentions the last two verses.
[590] Wynne, Brian (1991), “Knowledges in context,” Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol 16, No 1, Winter.
[591] Trucco, Víctor H. (2002), “La Argentina biotecnológica,” La Nación, August 12. Available at:
[592] Trigo et al. (2002), p. 171.
[593] Mentaberry has been giving public lectures and participating in round tables on biotechnology at least since 2000. See, for example, .
[594] Alejandro Mentaberry, personal communication, Buenos Aires, July 2003.
[595] Mentaberry, Alejandro (2003), “Los transgénicos no son inseguros,” Clarín, July 23. Available at:
[596] Ablin, Eduardo R. (2003), “Por qué hay que dar batalla?,” Clarín, August 23. Available at:
[597] Magnani, Esteban (2003), “Caso/Soja,” Hecho en Buenos Aires. September 11. This is a critical article on RR soybean in Argentina.
[598] Nudler, Julio (2000), “La trampa del piquete,” Página/12, November 25. Available at: .
[599] Rulli Jorge (2003= , “Soja y derechos humanos.” Available at GRR’s website,
[600] Greenpeace Argentina (2002), “Cosecha récord, hambre récord,” June. Available at: .
[601] Idem, p. 4.
[602] Idem, p. 4.
[603] Piqué, Elisabetta (2002), “La Argentina se pronunció a favor de los alimentos transgénicos,” La Nación, June 12. Available at: .
[604] Greenpeace (2003) “ ‘Soja Solidaria’/Soja Irresponsable,” September, p. 3. Available at: .
[605] Idem, p. 3.
[606] Idem, p. 7.
[607] He is Alfredo Galli, who traveled to Armenia as part of a UN mission, to promote this approach in 1997. See: Castillo, Ramón (1997), “El proyecto Pro Huerta del INTA desembarcó en Armenia,” La Nación, June 14. Available at: .
[608] Greenpeace Argentina’s website, visited in October 2003:
[609] A representative of Consumers Action League—probably the most active and recognized consumer advocacy group in Argentina—is part of SENASA Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), as commented in Part II. Its website is:
[610] Bertello, Fernando (2000), “Sin convicción frente a las góndolas,” La Nación, July 15. Available at:
[611] “Transgénicos.” Available at: .
[612] De Tosi, Alicia, from Consumidores Argentinos, e-mail message received in November 2003.
[613] Rohter, Larry (2003), “Argentina calling companies to task,” The New York Times, December 1, p. C 17.
[614] Bottino Gabriel (2001), “Genetically modified food. A comparative study in four Latin American countries,” International Development Research Center, Project No 100440, June 2000-March. Manuscript. Available at: .
[615] Bauer, Martin (2002), “Controversial medical and agri-food biotechnology: a cultivation analysis,” Public Understanding of Science, No 11, April, pp. 93-111.
[616] Quoted in Wroclavsky, Damian (2002), “GMOs help Argentina fight subsidies, Monsanto,” Reuters, December 11. Available at: .
[617] “People associate soybean with natural things,” comment the owner of a Buenos Aires downtown restaurant called “Grill and Soybean.” (Quoted in Folgarait, 2003). And an article on healthy food published in 2002 linked soybean consumption with low prevalence of breast and colon cancer, besides attributing soybean “a high nutritional value.” Gambier, Marina (2002), “Comer bien, vivir mejor,” La Nación revista, August 18. Available at: . In both cases, the GM character of the soybean was commented—and dismissed as irrelevant—in the articles.
[618] “We did not adopt GM soybean and corn to stop there, but to continue progressing and, with the support of biotechnology, reintroduce traditional rotating practices and mixed explotaitions, which may be of help to increase benefits, diversify risks, and make farming more sustainable.” Quoted in: “Campos promueve políticas de largo plazo,” InfoBae, November 22, 2003. Available at: .
[619] “Afirman que la agroindustria genera 1 de cada 3 empleos,” Clarín, June 3, 2004, p. 22.
[620] SAGPyA, Algodón. Available at: .
[621] Greenpeace (2005), “Greenpeace y la Federación Agraria Argentina protestan contra el patentamiento de semillas,” April 1. Available at: ; and “Regalías de la discordia,” La Nación, Campo section, April 9, p. 3.
[622] In fact, deforestation and environmental problems attributed to RR soybean in Argentina had been protested by Greenpeace International and José Bové by trying to stop Argentine soybean shipments just a few months before this case was presented. “Greenpeace, José Bové Protest Against Genetically Engineered Soy on High Seas,” January 25. Available at: . This action in Spain against a shipment of GM soybean from Argentina followed publication of Benbrook (2005), mentioned in Part I.
[623] Heller, Chaia (2001), “McDonalds, MTV, and Monsanto: Resisting biotechnology in the age of informational capital,” in Tokar, Brian (ed.), Redesigning Life? The Worldwide Challenge of Genetic Engineering, London, Zed Books. Available at: .
[624] Raney, Terri and Prabhu Pingali (2004), Private Research and Public Goods: Implications of Biotechnology for Biodiversity, ESA Working Paper No 04-07, Agricultural and Development Economic Division, FAO, April, p. 20.
[625] Seifert, Roberto (2005), “Más ingresos por la cosecha record,” La Nación, June 11, Campo section, pp. 1 and 6-7.
[626] Kalaitzandonakes, Nicholas (2004), The Potential Impacts of Biosafety Protocol on Agricultural Commodity Trade, Washington, International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council – IPC Technology Issue Brief, December 26.
[627] It is estimated that 2004/2005 GM soybean production in Brazil would be of around 15 to 20 million tons, from around 8 to 10 million tons in 2003/2004. Cost reduction is what makes it more attractive, as in Argentina. Stancato and Porto (2004), “Monsanto quer… .” Present trends were anticipated in Paarlberg, Robert (2001), The Politics of Precaution. Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
[628] Directorate General for Agriculture, Commission for the European Communities, Economic Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops on the Agri-Food Sector. A First Review, Working Document Rev.2. Available at: ; “GM crop market dynamics: the example of soya bean,” European Federation of Biotechnology, Briefing paper 12, March 2002. Available at: ; and Pohl Nielsen, Chantal, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder (2002), Trade in Genetically Modified Food: a Survey of Empirical Studies, TMD Discussion Paper No 106, November Available at: .
[629] Trigo (2005), p. 50.
[630] Palermo, Angel (2003), “Productos especiales que revalorizan la cadena,” La Nación, October 25. Available at: ; and Roberto Seifert, “El maíz sale a recuperar el terreno perdido,” La Nación, October 25, 2003. Available at: .
[631] “De vuelta al ruedo,” La U. El Diario Universitario, July 6, 2005, p. 5.
[632] Kalitzandonakes (2004), p. 8.
[633] Brack, Duncan, Robert Falkner and Judith Goll (2003), The Next Trade War? GM Products, the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Briefing No. 8, September.
[634] See, for example: Abdalla, A, P. Berry, P. Connell, Q. Tran, B. Buetre (2003), Agricultural Biotechnology: Potential for Use in Developing Countries, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra, October; Strategy Unit (2003), Developing Country Background Working Paper: Potential UK Impact on Developing Countries, UK Strategy Unit. In particular, The Nuffield Council On Bioethics (2003, p. 16), states regarding “food security and the role of agriculture”: “Land reforms and fairer agricultural policies in the developed world can help in several ways. First, more equitable distribution of land and access to it could enable more people to benefit from agriculture. Secondly, trade barriers to agricultural imports from poor countries could be lowered, which would increase markets for developing countries. Thirdly, reducing subsidies to farmers in developed countries would reduce the glutting of world markets for agricultural products, which depresses prices and consequently the attractiveness of agricultural production in developing countries.”
[635] Myers, Norman (1998), “Lifting the veil on perverse subsidies,” Nature, Vol 392, 26 March, pp. 327-328.
[636] IPC (2004), “The World Trade Organization: What are the prospects for agriculture in the Doha Round?,” Issues in South American Agriculture brief by IPC, Buenos Aires, October 25.
[637] Diao, Xinshen, Eugenio Díaz Bonilla and Sherman Robinson (2003), How Much Does it Hurt? The Impact of Agricultural Trade Policies on Developing Countries Countries, International Food Policy Research Institute, August.
[638] Messerlin, Patrick A. (2002), “Agriculture in the Doha Agenda,” paper prepared for the World bank Roundtable on Policy Research in preparation for the 5th WTO Ministerial, Cairo, May 20-21.
[639] Giannakas, Konstantinos (2003), “Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights: Developing Countries, Agricultural Biotechnology, and the TRIPs Agreement,” in Pardey, Philip and Bonwoo Koo, Biotechnology and Genetic Resource Policies, Washington, International Food Policy Research Institute, Brief 5, p. 3.
[640] Therefore, a peaceful solution for the current dispute on RR soybean royalties with Monsanto cannot be discarded, in spite of the heated and uncertain state of the confrontation in late 2005. Mira, Cristian (2005d), “Un choque de trenes,” La Nación, September 24, Campo section, p. 2.
[641] McElroy, David (2003), “Sustaining biotechnology through lean times,” Nature Biotechnology, Volume 21, Number 9, September, pp. 996-1002.
[642] Moisés Burachik, general coordinator, Biotechnology Office, and Perla Godoy biosafety technical coordinator, Biotechnology Office, personal communication, Buenos Aires, May 2005.
[643] Nap, Jan-Peter, Peter L. J. Metz, Marga Escaler and Anthony J. Conner (2003), “The release of genetically modified crops into the environment,” The Plant Journal 33, pp. 1–18, p. 15.
[644] Bradford, Kent J., Allen Van Deynze, Neal Gutterson, Wayne Parrot and Steven Strauss (2005), “Regulating transgenic crops sensibly: essons from plant breeding, biotechnology and genomics,” Nature Bioechnology, Volume 23, No 4, April, pp. 439-444.
[645] Schubert, David (2005), “Regulatory regimes for transgenic crops,” Nature Biotechnology 23, pp. 785-787.
[646] Mellon and Rissler. They mention results in Snow, A.A. et al., “A Bt transgene reduces herbivory and enhances fecundity in wild sunflowers,” Ecological Applications 13: 279-86.
[647] “Mayor crecimiento”, La Nación, June 12, 2004, Campo section, p. 2.
[648] USDA (2005), “Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2014,” USDA Interagency Agricultural Projections Committee, February.
[649] Méndez Brandam, Andrea (2005), “¿Granero orgánico del mundo?,” in La Nación, June 7. Comercio Internacional section, pp.6-7.
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.
Related searches
- should i go to law school quiz
- what type of law should i practice
- should i do law school
- should i go to law school
- should i attend law school
- can i study law online
- u of i law school
- what type of law should i study
- what law school can i get into
- what law should i study quiz
- what law degree should i get
- nyu law school tuition and fees