162 DSCFC 16 E rev 1 fin - Nato and the future of naval power



DSC162 DSCFC 16 E rev.1 finOriginal: EnglishNATO Parliamentary AssemblyDEFENCE and Security COMMITTEENATO and the Future role of Naval PowerReportMadeleine MOON (United Kingdom)RapporteurSub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilitiesnato-pa.int 19 November 2016TABLE OF CONTENTS TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u I.INTRODUCTION PAGEREF _Toc462321262 \h 1II.NEW MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PAGEREF _Toc462321263 \h 1A.WHAT ROLE FOR THE NAVY IN SECURITY? PAGEREF _Toc462321264 \h 2B.NAVAL POWER AND THE ALLIANCE WRIT LARGE PAGEREF _Toc462321265 \h 3C.NATO’S MARITIME SECURITY AREAS OF OPERATION AND CONCERN PAGEREF _Toc462321266 \h 3III.CURRENT TRENDS IN NAVAL POWER PAGEREF _Toc462321267 \h 4A.LARGE ALLIED NAVAL FORCES TODAY PAGEREF _Toc462321268 \h 4B.EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM PAGEREF _Toc462321269 \h 5POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON BRITISH NAVAL INVESTMENT PAGEREF _Toc462321270 \h 5C.NEW ITALIAN INVESTMENT AND INTER-EUROPEAN COOPERATION PAGEREF _Toc462321271 \h 6D.STRATEGIC NAVAL COMPETITION ON THE RISE – RUSSIA AND CHINA PAGEREF _Toc462321272 \h 61.Russia PAGEREF _Toc462321273 \h 62. China PAGEREF _Toc462321274 \h 7E.HIGH SEAS COMPETITION WILL CHALLENGE GLOBAL NORMS PAGEREF _Toc462321275 \h 7IV.NATO’S CURRENT MARITIME COMMAND STRUCTURE AND AVAILABLE ASSETS PAGEREF _Toc462321276 \h 7V.THE ALLIED MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE WALES SUMMIT: MARITIME AS KEY ENABLER IN THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PAGEREF _Toc462321277 \h 8A.TOWARD THE NEW ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY (AMS) PAGEREF _Toc462321278 \h 8B.THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF NATO CORE TASKS PAGEREF _Toc462321279 \h 9C.OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR – EXEMPLIFYING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW AMS PAGEREF _Toc462321280 \h 10D.THE WALES SUMMIT MARITIME PROVISIONS – ENABLING THE IMPLEMENTATION AND REACH OF THE AMS PAGEREF _Toc462321281 \h 10E.NEW MOMENTUM – EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE AND LARGE POWER BUY-IN PAGEREF _Toc462321282 \h 11VI.CURRENT NATO MARITIME OPERATIONS PAGEREF _Toc462321283 \h 11VII.CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATO MEMBER STATE PARLIAMENTARIANS PAGEREF _Toc462321284 \h 13BIBLIOGRAPHY PAGEREF _Toc462321285 \h 16IntroductionNATO is a maritime alliance. The transatlantic link is, in its most concrete manifestation, a deep blue ocean serving as a vital medium of exchange between Europe and North America. The role of maritime in NATO, however, often takes a back seat in Allies’ immediate thinking about near and long-term threats as well as opportunities for the Alliance. This is understandable, given the more visible role that land and air power have played throughout most of the Alliance’s history and its recent mand of the seas is, however, increasingly indispensable to Allied security. Not only to preserve the vital transatlantic sea lanes of communication, but also to preserve Alliance freedom of movement and credibility along its eastern and southern flanks. NATO’s strategic nuclear deterrence is guaranteed by its naval forces, and it plays a pivotal role in signalling Alliance resolve vis-à-vis its deterrence posture in the seas along its northern, eastern, and southern flanks.The importance of Allied maritime power expands well beyond the roles of deterrence and collective defence however, as it is a key instrument in the promotion and protection of political, economic, and diplomatic interests as well. In an era of increasing strategic competition, NATO member states’ maritime forces will be instrumental to the protection and projection of Alliance interests. Individually and collectively, Allied maritime forces are expected to perform a range of tasks from deterrence and collective defence to projecting stability through crisis response (including complex humanitarian missions), cooperative security, and maritime security. The principal areas where NATO’s potential conflicts and crises will play out in the near and likely long-term future are all accessible by sea, and in the event of potential operations, maritime forces will be essential enablers of Allied forces’ joint power projection. This is a tall order in an era of declining naval budgets and ever-increasing price tags for modern warships. The reality today is that NATO member states’ navies are increasing in capability but decreasing in size and, along with it, their global reach. However capable a ship may be, it can only be in one place at one time. Further, this rise in costs and complexity encourages capability gaps. Very few countries, other than the United States, maintain full spectrum capable navies in sufficient numbers to project power in multiple theatres of operation, while others have developed highlevel capabilities in specific areas. Given the clear importance of maritime capabilities to national and, therefore, Alliance-level power, it is time for NATO member states to take a new look at investments in their navies at home as well as their contributions to the Alliance more broadly.This report will examine the importance of the maritime environment today and the growing security threats facing it. It will examine the role of naval power today and consider the expectations of NATO’s maritime forces as indicated in the Alliance Maritime Strategy and in the wake of the Wales and Warsaw Summits. In addition to an overview of NATO’s current maritime forces and operations, it will look to future trends in Allied navies as they seek to uphold the expanding responsibilities given to them. It will review the new momentum given to the maritime arena via larger Allied investment in naval capabilities. The report will conclude with several interim considerations.New Maritime Security EnvironmentThe interests of all NATO member states today are, to varying degrees, both local and global. The role of the sea as avenue, arena, and area in the global expansion of interests cannot be understated. In many respects the freedom of the seas drives not only global economic interests, but also global norms. Today, a full 95% of global tradable goods by volume and about 80% of global hydrocarbons are transported by sea. In addition, 95% of internet traffic and communications move through well over 200 undersea cables (Parry, 2014). Finally, a full 80% of marine traffic passes through eight critical choke points, three of which are critical to NATO – into the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Red Sea (Parry, 2014). In parallel, the threat to sea transit is clearly rising with the volume and value of transiting goods: a fact proven by the ebb and flow of seaborne piracy at various global choke points over the last couple decades. Further, global population shifts are demonstrating a trend that the 21st?century and beyond will be urban, littoral, and connected – already approximately 80% of the world’s population lives within 60 miles of a coastline, and a full 75% of the world’s major cities are littoral (Kilcullen, 2012). The rapid rise in scope and scale of all forms of trafficking over water routes by organised criminal networks also threatens essential external and internal security interests of all Allies. The potential for terrorist acts against Allied assets at sea is growing, as are the chances for the use of international sea transit in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Arms transfers by sea to terrorist groups such as Daesh* is also growing and of significant concern; reflected in the recent UN Security Council Resolution 2292 broadening international enforcement of the arms embargo into Libya. As this Assembly knows well from reporting and parliamentary missions, the last several years, particularly 2015-2016, witnessed a dramatic spike in trans-Mediterranean and Aegean Seas’ borne illegal migrant trafficking. These seas became virtual highways of human suffering causing the deaths of thousands, and forcing the EU, NATO, and individual states to scramble rescue missions and to seek ways to counter the proliferation of criminal networks fuelling the near-global migrant trafficking industry. Further complicating the issue is the ensuing migrant-related Europe-wide political crisis. Finally, the continued and escalating adverse effects of climate change will pose many seaborne challenges across the globe.What Role for the Navy in Security?NATO member states’ naval capacities, both individually and collectively, provide four essential tasks, which are enumerated and developed in the 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) as; collective defence and deterrence, crisis management, cooperative security with partners, and maritime security. At Warsaw, the Heads of State and Government described the latter three tasks as part of the Alliance’s broader efforts to project stability, requiring the necessary capabilities to protect Allied interests at sea and on land. Broadly speaking an effective AMS requires three central capabilities: forward presence, manoeuvre, and power projection. Having ships deployed and signalling readiness is essential to maritime security, enabling free use of global sea lanes of communication for trade and transit. Naval manoeuvre at sea implies the deployment of maritime assets when and where desired and the ability to divert assets to emerging crisis areas rapidly. Finally, naval power projection is essential to protect assets at sea and affect the outcome of events on land through the enabling of joint operations by bringing air, land, and sea assets to bear in a conflict. In addition to facilitating the fight, naval assets can also serve to deny maritime access to competitors by providing mobile anti-access/area denial capabilities. The benefits of all three of these are clear to the protection and projection of Allied interests, but also to the deterrence of potential enemies or competitors. The strategic and tactical value of the greater freedom of action in the maritime realm cannot be understated. Power at sea is fundamental for NATO power at all levels. Naval Power and the Alliance Writ LargeAs a political-military alliance imbued with the combined national power of 28 member states, NATO’s naval power serves as an essential enabler of deterrence posture, political will and determination, economic prosperity, and global diplomacy. Deterrence - As NATO seeks to adapt and reaffirm its deterrence posture in the 21st century against an array of security challenges emanating from state and non-state actors, the ability to manoeuvre freely on the high seas and in potentially contested water spaces is fundamental. A strong and present naval force can signal Alliance credibility and strength of purpose in the North Atlantic, Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas without the danger of accidentally crossing the more closely patrolled land and air frontiers of the eastern Allies. Naval forces also play a critical role in Strategic Anticipation of potential adversary actions through regular intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance monitoring and tracking, as validated and supported at Warsaw. They can also patrol and interdict in international water spaces to shut down the potential trafficking of illicit, arms, substances, and, in the case of the Mediterranean today, people. Political – A strong navy signals political credibility and commitment. The ability to send strong naval fleets into the seas around the Alliance for exercises, presence, and manoeuvres demonstrates clearly to competitors the Alliance will not be cowed by new demonstrations of power or attempts to discourage access and that the Allies will defend Alliance territory under the Article 5 commitment. Economic – As noted above, the benefits of maintaining free passage on the world’s seas and through geographic choke points is vital. Use of sea lanes of communication for the transit of goods and services globally is growing at an annual rate of 4.7%, thereby only increasing its role as the principal avenue for economic exchange (Parry, 2014). All member states have a clear role in maintaining free passage and freedom of action on all major sea lanes, particularly keeping the transatlantic space open to Alliance member state commerce and transit.Diplomatic – Navies have long been diplomatic ambassadors through port calls to both Allied, partner, and non-partner nations. Perhaps more importantly, however, strong naval capabilities and presence globally are essential to upholding the global norms of behaviour to which the Alliance strongly adheres. This is essential in an era where external powers, such as Russia, seek to upend global security norms through actions such as the annexation of territory belonging to another sovereign state.NATO’s Maritime Security Areas of Operation and ConcernFirst, NATO’s maritime interests are broad. Alliance strategic sea interests expand well beyond the vital link of the Atlantic Ocean between the United States and Canada and their European Allies. In addition, although outside the formal treaty area, NATO is indirectly a Pacific power by way of the interests and important roles played in the Asia Pacific by the United States Navy in concert with its regional allies, particularly Japan and Korea. Further, NATO forces have developed close working relationships with Pacific navies in other parts of the world such as the Indian Ocean. Though the Alliance continues to lack a clear policy on the Arctic, which does lie within the treaty area, there is a growing potential role for NATO in the Arctic as it continues to open to year-round use as an area of transit and exploitation, and as Russia continues to militarise the region.Second, and most importantly today, NATO maritime forces are increasingly focusing on several key bodies of water: NATO maritime situational awareness (MSA) and presence is most pressing in the seas along its northern and eastern flanks from the North Atlantic and Arctic Seas, down to the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas. The importance of the Alliance’s ability to manoeuvre and if necessary command these bodies of water has figured importantly from the launching of NATO’s post-9/11 Mediterranean operation through the execution of Operation Unified Protector. Maritime situational awareness and presence was also stressed in the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, and will soon be on display today in the stand up of Operation Sea Guardian, Operation Active Endeavour’s successor in the Mediterranean. This focus is also visible in the Aegean efforts of maritime NATO to help stem illegal migrant trafficking through enhanced maritime situational awareness.Current Trends in Naval PowerThe Alliance has its most ambitious maritime agenda since the Cold War, but it is facing the range of tasks it assigned itself in the AMS following an era of broadly declining maritime investment across the Alliance. In line with the general trend of defence budget cuts, the Alliance’s principal naval powers have not been spared. The reality is Alliance naval fleets are shrinking.Two principal factors contribute to the downsizing of Allied fleets. First, much like their counterpart services, naval budgets were devastated by the cuts started after the Cold War as part of the ‘peace dividend’, and accelerated in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, which continues to plague many of the Alliance’s European member states. In addition, however, it is clear the perception of an increasingly secure environment drove legislators to look to the defence sector for cuts when economic times became increasingly difficult. Though fleets are clearly getting smaller, the ships built today are far more capable than their predecessors. While this is certainly a bonus for the abilities of Allied navies to perform their core tasks, it is coming at a significant price, as new ships are proving much more expensive. The increasing price tag of new naval high performance and power platforms is straining the ability of any country, outside of the United States, to maintain full spectrum fleets.Large Allied Naval Forces TodayIt is no secret that in the maritime domain, much like the others, the Alliance is multi-tiered, as far as capabilities are concerned. The United States Navy is by far the largest with a fullspectrum navy, larger than the size of many closest competitors combined, and operating with a truly global reach. But as the last truly global power, the US Navy needs to be present everywhere, which limits the concentration of naval power that can be brought to bear in any specific theatre. After the United States, only the United Kingdom and France maintain full spectrum fleets, and just barely, at that. Italy maintains a full spectrum fleet in conventional warfare terms only. Germany, The Netherlands, and Spain maintain capable fleets with clear strengths in some arenas, but have abandoned the idea of paying for full spectrum fleets. Other Allies’ fleets drop off in size and capability precipitously after these six fleets. Both France and the United Kingdom maintain their strategic nuclear submarine fleets (each with four SSBNs – Ballistic Missile Submarines), but the strains of maintaining these forces today is palpable. The UK’s Royal Navy has declined by over a third since 2000, and the current plan is to maintain a surface fleet of only 19 major combatant ships. The United Kingdom is moving forward with the construction and operation of two new aircraft carriers and is debating the funding for the replacement of its ageing strategic nuclear deterrent subs. Under clear budgetary constraints, both France and the United Kingdom continue to maintain full spectrum naval fleets of approximately the same size. The question remains as to how much longer either will be able to sustain them. Given the persistent and prevailing maritime threats in the Mediterranean, and despite budget constraints, the Italian Navy is scheduled to maintain its full-spectrum conventional naval forces for the foreseeable future. In terms of conventional naval forces, Italy maintains a suite of high-level naval capabilities, such as: an aircraft carrier, a naval air wing, a sizeable submarine fleet, and multi-purpose amphibious assault ships. As is noted below, the Italian Navy is currently working to reverse the trend of naval divestment, and is actively investing in new fleet capabilities.The German and Spanish navies maintain some real capabilities for their respective fleets, but none has the ambition to enlarge their current fleet size or expand their capabilities. Germany and Spain continue to maintain and develop destroyers, frigates, and other amphibious ships, as well as a number of tactical submarines. Example of the United KingdomFrom 2010 to 2015, the Royal Navy saw a 33% decline in the number of carrier/amphibious ships, a 17% decline in submarines, and another 17% decline in destroyers and frigates. The Royal Navy fleet that met the challenge of the Falkland Islands War 33 years ago was bigger than the entire standing Royal Navy fleet today. At the time, the UK had three operational aircraft carriers (versus none today; though two super-carriers are under construction), patrol aviation (versus none today with plans to purchase P8s), and a significant number more of frigates and destroyers (Kuehn, 2015). A series of budget cuts have dwindled the UK Navy down to 30,000?personnel. Measures taken over the summer of 2015, however, have at least frozen cuts to the Royal Navy, and there is momentum gathering to reinvest. The commitment to operate both new aircraft carriers will substantially enhance British maritime power projection, but this puts a huge strain on funding for escort vessels and has also placed a substantial pressure on manning and skills. With the renewal of Trident and the commitment to two operational carriers, it is safe to say that the UK has turned the corner in maritime investment. But maintaining momentum will be a challenge. Potential Impact of Brexit on British Naval InvestmentOne variable that could have a potentially significant impact on British commitment to new naval investment is the recent referendum calling for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. A key to the impact of Brexit on British defence investment and commitments will be the medium-to-long term impacts on the UK’s economy – with a protracted economic recession forcing the British government to consider previously taken defence investment decisions. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Strategic Review (SDSR) published by the British government to fund its defence institutions uses a projected average 2.4 % GDP growth in the UK over the next four years (Chalmers, 2016). The real economic impact of the Brexit vote will not be seen for some time to come, however, and will depend on many other variables, not the least of which the outcome of the Article 50 (Treaty on European Union) negotiations, as well as the domestic political shake-up that continues to unsettle business as usual in the United Kingdom. A June 2016 RUSI report on the potential implications of Brexit noted that some key defence commitments would likely remain untouched even in the event of a reduction in defence spending. The report noted, for example; the planned upgrading of the UK’s strategic nuclear submarine fleet, new investments in counterterrorism programmes and cyber-security, as well as the entry into service of the two super-carriers (Chalmers, 2016). Clearly, the remaining programmes will be affected by UK positioning at the global, European, and domestic commitments in the wake of Article 50 negotiations. Indications are the maintenance of, if not increasing, UK global presence with an increased investment in the global strike capabilities of the two new super-carriers. Further, the UK Parliament voted through the ?41 billion financing of the modernisation of the UK’s strategic nuclear submarine fleet and its Trident missile system by a wide margin, 472 in favour to 117 against.There remain some concerns, however, about the funding and timing of the major repairs needed to the propulsion systems of the British Type 45 destroyers, and the delay to the main gate development of the replacements for the 12 remaining Type 23 frigates. Planned production of the new Type 26 global combat ships has been cut from 13 to 8, with the option of building an additional five general purpose vessels. NEw ITALIAN INVESTMENT and INter-European CooperationDespite plans to reduce the overall size of its fleet by up to 51 vessels over the next decade, Italy has committed to a multi-year naval modernisation and renewal programme, investing 5.4?billion Euros in new equipment acquisition from 2014-2032. The programme is designed to maintain the navy’s overall capacity, despite the decommissioning of a wide range of ships in the current fleet. The acquisition programme focuses on different types of maritime vessels, such as: multi-role offshore patrol vessels; offshore logistical support; a multi-role naval support vessel for the rapid deployment of military and humanitarian assets; and, high-speed, multi-role vessels for the Italian Special Forces (two vessels). Italy is also involved in two of Europe’s largest joint naval acquisition programmes. The first is the Franco-Italian EUR 11 billion multi-mission frigate (FREMM) project; and, the second is the Italo-German U212A joint programme to produce nextgeneration submarines, which are scheduled to enter service by the end of 2016; a new operational requirement is in progress for four additional vessels. The Italian Navy also plans to upgrade its amphibious capabilities via the acquisition of a new amphibious combat vehicle (in conjunction with the Army), as well as a mine countermeasures component.As such, the last several years have seen the Italian Navy invest in a wide array of capabilities – including power projection – and has been substantially committed to the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean. By funding its naval modernisation programme, Italy will avoid a potential critical gap by maintaining in the interim (until approximately 2032) the assets necessary to play a pivotal role in Mediterranean security and beyond. STRATEGIC NAVaL COMPETITION on the rise – Russia and CHinaStrategic competition on the high seas will be an important feature of the 21st century security environment. Both Russia and China have placed significant focus on building new modern fleets with significant anti-access/area denial capabilities. Both nations have also made sea power projection a priority in their most recent defence strategies. 1.RussiaNaval reinvestment is a centrepiece of Russia’s State Armament Plan (SAP), which pledges a major overhaul of all Russian armed forces over the decade from 2011-2021. While significantly smaller than the naval forces of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Navy focuses on capabilities that will make it a significantly and qualitatively different force than it has been in the decades since the end of the Cold War (Gorenburg, 2015). The Russian Navy intends to pursue traditional missions such as strategic deterrence, power projection, as well as sea denial and control, and coastal defence. The principal focus of the 2015 Maritime Doctrine is on Russian capabilities in both the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans (Novichkov, 2015). A very large but informal objective of the Russian navy is strategic communications – signalling their return as a global naval power through showcase cruise missile attacks into Syria in 2016 from submarines and frigates in the Mediterranean Sea and from patrol craft in the Caspian Sea. Russia’s build-up of the Black Sea Fleet with modern missile-carrying submarines and surface warships presents a major potential challenge to Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Alliance security.Russian naval investment will consume approximately 26% of the SAP. Major new naval assets to be commissioned are: eight new strategic submarines, seven new multi-role submarines, six to ten new diesel electric submarines equipped with Kalibr land attack cruise missiles, and 50?new surface combat ships (mainly frigates and corvettes, most equipped with cruise missile systems) (IISS, 2016). Strategic nuclear deterrence will remain the number one mission of the Russian Navy, and the construction of Russian nuclear submarines has received top priority, and is therefore insulated from recent cuts made to other programmes because of the economic squeeze placed on Russia under the international sanctions regimes and the declining price of oil (IISS, 2016; Stratfor, 2016). In addition, Russia’s naval air arm is receiving significant upgrading and reinforcement. MiG29K combat aircraft, for example, will be attached to the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier group. The regiments of the shore-based based fighters and attack aircraft will be updated with Su-30SM multi-role fighter; by 2020 the Russian Navy will receive more than 50. Russia also fields a fleet of 40 nuclear powered icebreakers (Judson, 2015).2. ChinaThe 2014 Chinese Defence White Paper notes the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) attention to power projection and ability to protect assets on the open seas. Under the current budgeting scheme, the navy and air force continue to receive the majority of new investment in equipment. In 2016, the PLAN has almost fully modernised its surface action groups. The white paper notes particular attention to readiness for “maritime military struggle and maritime preparation for military struggle” (IISS, 2016). In the drive toward modernisation the PLAN fleet has seen the development of several classes of surface and subsurface combatant vessels.The Chinese shipbuilding industry also has at least four active nuclear and conventional submarine programmes in process; R&D foci are on the development of new capable aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes, and a class of amphibious ships. Steadily, Chinese shipbuilders are also reducing their reliance on imported foreign (particularly Russian) technologies. Chinese antiaccess/area denial abilities are also on the rise in parallel to fleet modernisation (IISS, 2016).High Seas Competition Will Challenge Global NormsIn the face of this new level of competition, NATO member states need to be aware of the importance of reinforcing and maintaining global norms on the high seas and those related to the access and exploitation of water spaces. The West was able to shape the defining measure of norms in the maritime arena customary international law and in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Recent actions by both Russia in the Arctic and China in the South China Sea are challenging the credibility and, therefore, the viability of customary law and UNCLOS. NATO’s Current Maritime Command Structure and Available AssetsThe transition out of the Cold War saw significant changes in the organisation of the Alliance’s posture and mindset. In terms of maritime command and control, the Alliance winnowed its headquarters responsible for maritime training, planning, and operations from five to one. Today’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is located in Northwood, UK. MARCOM is one of only two headquarters in the NATO command and force structures capable of commanding multiple naval task forces. It reports directly to SACEUR but in a joint operation would be assigned to one of the Joint Force Commands. It is also capable of commanding a maritime-heavy joint operation. NATO has Standing Naval Forces (SNF) providing the Alliance with a permanent multinational naval presence based on rotating naval forces. The SNF consists of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs), made up by the SNMG1 and the SNMG2, and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2). The SNF carry out assurance, deterrence, ISR, exercises, manoeuvres, and port visits, but can also be deployed swiftly into operations in times of crisis. All four groups are integrated into the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Alliance’s rapid-reaction force.SNMG1 and SNMG2 are each mandated to have a force of six destroyers and frigates at any given time, plus a replenishment ship. The forces operate and train as a group, providing daytoday verification of current NATO maritime operations. The force commander and the staff are appointed for one year, with the force commander rotating among the participating countries. Both SNMG1 and SNMG2 are permanently available to NATO to perform various tasks from exercises to operational missions. They help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct diplomatic visits to different countries and support partner engagement. Despite their nominal larger mandates, the numbers of ships assigned to both of NATO’s standing maritime groups have been trending downwards in recent years; the norm being closer to two ships typically assigned to SNMG1 and a varying number are assigned to SNMG2. Due to their current MSA roles in the Aegean, as well as the uptick in exercising by the Alliance (particularly in places like the Baltic), both groups are currently experiencing relative revivals. At the time of writing, SNMG1 was operating four ships and seven vessels were under the SNMG2 flag.NATO’s SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2 (mandated at six ships per group) are multinational forces primarily engaged in the search for and disposal of mines threatening maritime passages in NATO’s area of operations. They are both assets in the NATO NRF. They can deploy at short notice and are often the first assets to enter an operational theatre to clear the passage for the maritime fleet seeking to enter the area. An example of the effectiveness of the NATO mine countermeasures groups is demonstrated by the SNMCMG1’s location and dismantling of 229?explosives in the Baltic region (SHAPE, 2015). The Allied Maritime Strategy and the Wales Summit: Maritime as Key Enabler in the New European Security EnvironmentToward the New Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS)The deployments in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks drove the adaptation of the Alliance’s overarching strategic concept as well as its maritime strategy. Though published later, the AMS was developed in parallel to the 2010 Strategic Concept announced by the Alliance at the Lisbon Summit that year and aligns broadly with its central tenets (Smith-Windsor, 2013). The publication of the 2011 AMS was a significant upgrade from the original strategy which dates back to 1984. The 2010 Strategic Concept notes the growing complexity of the international security environment and its potential effects on NATO Allies. The concept centres on the dangers of WMD proliferation, terrorism, conflict and its regional consequences (such as failed states and ungoverned spaces), as well as the growing menaces of all forms of trafficking, threats to critical infrastructure protection, energy and transit security, and the constraints of limited natural resources and climate change. While the Strategic Concept does not actually mention the maritime or naval aspects of the evolving security environment specifically, there is a clear maritime component to virtually every near and long-term threat it highlights. The principal outcome of the Strategic Concept was the highlighting of three core tasks the Alliance must take on as it seeks to acquire the necessary capabilities to confront and mitigate the dangers of the challenges it faces – deterrence and collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. The 2011 AMS notes the three core NATO tasks, but adds a fourth, maritime security.The Maritime Dimension of NATO Core TasksNATO maritime forces provide essential elements to all the Strategic Concept’s core tasks. Deterrence and collective defence anticipate: sea-based strategic nuclear deterrence by the three NATO nuclear powers (the United States, the United Kingdom and France), sea-based ballistic missile defence, and the above-mentioned conventional assets to defend assets at sea, guarantee freedom of manoeuvre, project power, conduct ISR on potential adversaries to ensure strategic anticipation and facilitate amphibious reach. At Warsaw, NATO’s direction expanded from assurance of Eastern Allies to positive efforts to deter aggression by potential adversaries, in particular Russia and Mediterranean littoral terrorism. Alliance naval forces (both Standing Naval Forces (SNF) and national) have taken on a critical new role in this effort over the past year, showing deterrent presence in the seas of the NATO Area of Responsibility (AOR), conducting ISR and tracking of potential adversary naval activities. This enhanced activity was highlighted at Warsaw which called for the galvanising of the totality of Alliance naval power in support of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence tasks. MARCOM plays a key role as an informal operational coordination hub to deconflict and coordinate SNF and Allied national ISR and tracking activity.Maritime crisis management includes the provision of expeditionary capabilities, sea control and denial, logistical support for amphibious operations (strike and ashore), embargo and no-fly zone enforcement, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and non-combat evacuation (Smith-Windsor, 2013). Cooperative security entails partner capacity building, training, joint exercising, and naval diplomacy. Maritime security denotes the support of maritime situational awareness (above and below the surface), protection of sea lanes of communication and critical infrastructure, maritime interdiction capacity (countering WMD, terrorism, and trafficking). At Warsaw, the Heads of State and Government described the fusion of Crisis Management, Cooperative Security and Maritime Security as Projecting Stability. The maritime contribution to Projecting Stability can be seen in SNMG’s efforts to provide monitoring and surveillance support to efforts to stem illegal migrant trafficking in the Aegean, in the stand up of Operation Sea Guardian as the framework NATO Maritime Security Operation (MSO) in the Mediterranean and in current efforts to define a maritime NATO role to support or address the various aspects of Central Mediterranean crises stemming out of Libya. These are discussed below.Attention to port security as a facet of maritime security should not be understood as less important than the security of assets on the high seas. Port security is an essential link between domestic and international security as ports serve as a bridge between the two. Following the trends noted above, the volume of goods shipped through 20-foot equivalent units (container boxes) is simply massive today, with the top 20 EU ports seeing 77.7 million boxes pass through its ports, and 49.5 million through the top 18 ports in North America (Barnard, 2016). Knowing what is passing through ports inside of these boxes is a challenge at all levels, with unknown shipping traffic posing a threat of the highest level.Operation Unified Protector – Exemplifying the Importance of the New AMSAlmost simultaneous with the publication of the AMS, NATO forces took over responsibility for the UNSCR 1973-mandated mission in Libya, under the title Operation Unified Protector (OUP). UNSCR 1973 authorised the enforcement of the arms embargo imposed on Libya under UNSCR?1979, a no-fly zone, and the use of all necessary measures (short of occupation) to protect the civilian population deemed to be under threat from the Ghaddafi regime. At its most intense tempo, OUP included 21 Allied maritime assets (including aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships, submarines, and supply ships) enabling an air campaign, enforcing the embargo via interdiction and diversion measures, the provision of a humanitarian sea corridor for the supply of relief aid, and amphibious support. The operation demonstrated that the demands upon maritime forces in a crisis response situation require a wide spectrum of capabilities (Smith-Windsor, 2013).The Wales Summit Maritime Provisions – Enabling the implementation and reach of the AMSThis Committee has been particularly focused on the rapid evolution of the European security environment since the 2014 events triggering renewed attention to the eastern and southern flanks – Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine and the rapid rise of Daesh in Syria and Iraq, increasing the mixed migration flow into Europe and raising justified concerns about increased terrorism at home. The Wales Summit in 2014 tried to adapt the Alliance to the increasingly complex and dangerous security environment – particularly through the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the Defence Spending Pledge. Renewing attention to NATO and member states’ maritime resources figures prominently in the Wales Summit Declaration (NATO, 2014). First, it notes Alliance assurance measures in the eastern part of the Alliance will include continuous air, land, and maritime presence, providing “the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.” Second, it also notes that an important element of the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) will be the availability of maritime forces. Third, the declaration notes that NATO will enhance its Standing Naval Forces, as a means of improving maritime situational awareness and MARCOM’s ability to engage in full spectrum operations – which led to the inclusion of the call for Allies to ensure their maritime forces meet the guidelines for “deployability and sustainability”.The Wales Declaration also underlines the rapidly expanding geopolitical and economic importance of the maritime domain; the increased use of which presents new, myriad challenges in the security arena. As such, the declaration calls for the intensification and expansion of the AMS. Doing so, it continues, would contribute further to NATO core tasks, as well as its capacity for maritime security. To get there, NATO notes that it will “reinvigorate NATO’s Standing Naval Forces by making their composition and the duration of national contributions more flexible and, in principle, no longer using them for protracted operations or operations with low-end tasks.” Another objective is achieving better cooperation and coordination with the EU, which published a Maritime Security Strategy in 2014, as the organisations have considerable overlap in interests in the maritime domain.The call for the reinvigoration of the Standing Naval Forces was the result of a declining level of commitment from the Allies. Over the last decade the SNF was often used for operations to which the member states were not prepared to contribute the necessary maritime capabilities (surface, submarine, and air). By no longer using the SNF for protracted operations or low-end tasks, the SNF will have more readily available resources to fulfil core tasks.New Momentum – European Reassurance Initiative and Large Power Buy-inAs the Defence and Security Committee General Report on the defence aspects of the Warsaw Summit notes well, the rapid evolution of the security environment has pushed many to call for even more from NATO Allies, particularly European member states, to contribute to the efforts needed to accomplish core tasks. The reason for such calls being the perception that current force posture and available resources are not sufficient to deter and defend NATO Allies adequately against the range of threats they face. This sentiment applies to the maritime domain as well. A problem with the current contribution scheme to NATO maritime is that there is a clear lack of larger power buy-in. The tide, however, does appear to be changing in favour of larger powers signalling their interest in investing in NATO maritime contribution. In 2016, the United Kingdom doubled its maritime support to NATO. For the first time since 2010, the United Kingdom is contributing to SNMG1. The United?Kingdom will donate three Mine Sweepers to SNMCMG1, programmed to cover the Baltic, North Atlantic, North, and Mediterranean Seas. As UK MoD stated: “2016 will see a particular focus on the Baltic Region with our ships sent there as part of the Maritime Group, the Mine Counter Measure Group, and the Baltops exercise.” (Mehta, 2016) The announcement by the United Kingdom came shortly on the heels of the United States’ announcement to quadruple the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) (US DoD, 2016). The FY2017 ERI budget proposal plans to allocate an additional USD86.3 million to US Navy contributions to Europe, particularly along the eastern flank of the Alliance. As part of its assurance package, the US Navy will maintain its heightened level of engagements in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, particularly focusing on joint exercises. The US Navy will also invest in the upgrading of its communications systems in the region, and increase investments in its Theatre Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) capabilities. Finally, it will invest in its Keflavik Airfield facilities in Iceland to accommodate more P8A aircraft, which are instrumental to the conduct of antisubmarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), shipping interdiction, and ELINT (electronic intelligence) gathering (US DoD, 2016). In addition, NATO’s maritime forces are in line with the significant increased tempo of exercises announced at the Wales Summit. Particular attention is being paid to joint operational capabilities. Already in 2016, SNMG2 and the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle have conducted exercises in the Mediterranean. Many other exercises will take place in the Baltic, Black, and North Seas in the coming months. As former MARCOM Commander Peter Hudson noted: “NATO’s true maritime power lies in the ability of the Standing Forces to rapidly join with high readiness, high capability national task groups, such as the Charles De Gaulle carrier strike group, to deliver strategic effect” (NATO MARCOM, 2016). NATO will also use the UK’s October 2016 Joint Warrior exercise in Northern Scotland and in the North Atlantic to train and certify the NRF’s maritime and air components for their 2017 commitments. Current NATO Maritime OperationsNATO’s longest running current maritime operation is Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), which began on 4 October 2001 as one of the eight different responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 against the United States and has adapted continuously to meet the evolving security risks in the Mediterranean. Since its beginning, the operation has hailed over 124,000 merchant ships, escorted several hundred, and boarded over 170 suspicious vessels. The Alliance decided to transition OAE to a Maritime Security Operation in July 2015, giving it the authorisation to perform seven different tasks. These are supporting situational awareness, maintaining freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction operations, combatting the proliferation of WMD, protecting Allied critical infrastructure, supporting maritime counter-terrorism operations, and contributing to maritime security capacity building. Counterterrorism tasks will likely grow as non-state armed groups continue to expand their abilities and desire to use the seas as avenues and arenas for their activities, from transfer of weaponry to direct attacks on critical infrastructure such as seaborne vessels or standing infrastructure such as oil rigs. Further, it is well known that al-Qaeda has been trying for more than 15 years to acquire a nuclear weapon or nuclear material to construct a dirty bomb. The impact of such a group acquiring such material is a challenge to port security and high seas interdiction capabilities. As Graham Allison, Director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs notes, “A nuclear attack on the U.S. is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile” (Nadler, et al., 2012).At the Warsaw Summit, the Heads of State and Government approved the reform of OAE as a non-Article 5 MSO. The new mission – named Operation Sea Guardian – will conduct counterterrorism, MSA, freedom of navigation and capacity building activities as standing mandates and will be prepared to conduct the other named MSOs as directed by the North?Atlantic?Council (NAC). The changing role of OAE is an excellent example of the adaptability and enabling role of maritime assets in addressing the evolving security environment. NATO’s patrolling of the Mediterranean has grown in importance over the past decade, conceived of as counterterrorist operation the OAE has evolved to allow NATO not only to build a better maritime picture in the area, but it has also given the Alliance valuable experience in conducting multilateral maritime operations in the growing complexity of today’s security environment. NATO conducted Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) since August 2009 after the spike in piracy off the Horn of Africa, which engaged NATO warships and aircraft in international counter piracy efforts as well as capacity-building efforts with regional governments. OOS was mandated by a UNSCR, and is operating with the consent of the Somali authorities to take action in the waters off its coast to halt maritime piracy. The resounding success of the mission is clear as there were 18 recorded hijacks and 67 attacks in 2009, while the last recorded incidents were in 2013 with one attack and only two disruptions. The operation was extended by the NAC in June 2014 until the end of 2016 (NATO MARCOM, 2016). At Warsaw, it was decided to end OOS in December 2016 but to maintain the regional linkages and mission knowledge gained by the Operation. Instability in the Indian Ocean as well as the presence of many NATO partners makes the region a continuing part of NATO’s Area of Interest and one that MARCOM intends to maintain its links with via the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and engagement in SHADE and the UN Contact Group on Piracy of the Coast of Somalia (Bergeron, 2016).NATO’s Maritime Mission in the AegeanMost recently, NATO authorised the deployment of SNMG2 to the Aegean Sea in response to the growing mixed migration crisis. The most popular migrant route shifted from the central Mediterranean to the eastern Mediterranean over the course of 2015, bringing with it an even higher volume of refugees and economic migrants seeking entry into the European Union. With this push to cross the Aegean, the death toll from drowning approached 1,000 over the year, with 91 recorded in the first three weeks of January 2016 alone (IOM, 2016).On 8 February 2016, NATO took the swift decision to deploy ships to the Aegean Sea to provide monitoring and surveillance support Greece, Turkey, and the EU’s border agency FRONTEX to disrupt the uncontrolled mixed migration flows, with particular attention paid to the criminal networks enabling and profiting from human trafficking. The decision to deploy maritime assets was rapid and demonstrated the degree to which the Alliance was repositioning itself to respond to internal as well as external security challenges of the new security environment. On 9 February 2016, NATO SACEUR General Breedlove ordered three warships from SNMG2, already deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, to begin patrols in the Aegean Sea. The multinational force, consisting of ships from Canada, Germany, Greece and Turkey, expanded the monitoring and surveillance activity to Greek and Turkish territorial waters. NATO’s ability to operate in Turkish territorial waters – the origin for mixed migration traffic headed toward the EU – gives it a key advantage over previous EU efforts, which were limited to international waters (Zhukov, 2016). NATO activities in Turkish and Greek territorial waters are carried out in close consultation and coordination with both Greece and Turkey who have agreed to cooperate on the issue (Barnes, 2016). NATO is ideally suited to facilitate closer cooperation between Greece and Turkey as both are NATO Allies, but only Greece is a member of the EU. To prevent any potential misunderstandings, Greek and Turkish forces do not operate in each other’s territorial waters and airspace (Stoltenberg, 2016).SNMG2’s activities provide critical information to the Greek and Turkish coastguards as well as to FRONTEX. The SNMG2 is not authorised to stop refugee ships, but rather to deter human trafficking networks through its presence. The limited scope of the mandate, however, might decrease SNMG2’s impact. The main obstacle to an expanded NATO mission in the Aegean is political will, not military might (Zhukov, 2016). The SNMG2 has proven through exercises that it would be capable of taking on a more robust mandate. With the new mission, NATO faces a challenge to put the newly coined 360?degrees’ security vision into practice. It should be noted, however, that since the implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, migrant flows through the eastern Mediterranean route have come to a relative standstill when compared with 2015. As such, it would appear NATO’s current level of MSA assistance in the Aegean is sufficient given the status quo. NATO member states, therefore, should not push to expand the breadth and depth of the mission’s current mandate.Further to the above, there is a broader impact of the Aegean operation on NATO’s SNMG2, the consequences of which often remain unmentioned: while NATO’s SNMG2 is fulfilling its mission in the Aegean, only one NATO SNMG task unit ship is currently available to conduct MARCOM’s current SNMG programme. This means one ship is expected to fulfil the group’s exercise programme, be tasked as a part of Alliance deterrence presence and posture, engage with partners and other capacity building efforts. As noted above, the Warsaw Summit called for its maritime forces to be an essential part of the Alliance’s efforts to project stability throughout the Alliance’s coastal and open waters; a task that is very hard to complete by NATO’s standing naval groups as they dedicate what is likely too many of their high-end vessels to the Aegean operation given its current demands. In order to meet the projecting stability goal, therefore, the Alliance would do well to assign ‘lower’ spectrum vessels to the Aegean, such as offshore patrol boats or even corvettes, and thereby free up the Alliance’s assigned frigates and destroyers to get to the core tasks required in the post-Warsaw era. Conclusions and Considerations for NATO member State ParliamentariansStrong naval forces in the Alliance, working in concert can and will serve as key protectors of Allied interests and essential enablers of Allied power. The new momentum flowing toward NATO’s maritime assets and naval readiness is on target for the coming challenges to the European security environment; almost all of which have a maritime component to them.Equipping the current forces must remain a focus for all Alliance member states. Renewed attention to European member state naval capabilities can serve as a kind of American Reassurance Initiative to assuage Washington’s concerns that its transatlantic allies continue to fail to invest sufficiently in their defence institutions. It also represents an effort towards equitable burden sharing with those Allies that have committed land forces under the RAP and Enhanced Forward Presence initiatives. The following are interim points of consideration for NATO member state parliamentarians.Greater NATO-EU Maritime Cooperation: There is much overlap between NATO’s 2011 AMS and the EU’s 2014 Maritime Security Strategy. There continues to be much discussion about pairing NATO-EU maritime assets to defend common interests in the seas surrounding Europe and beyond, but relatively little concrete action. Though this may change in the wake of the EU ‘global strategy’ publication in June 2016, partnering with NATO in areas of common concern would be a good start; particularly taking on some of the lower-end tasks that NATO forces will no longer focus on as it shifts the role of the SNF in maritime strategy. Examples of this are already evident. Operating in the Central Mediterranean, the EU mission Operation Sophia is leading efforts to stem illegal migrant trafficking from Libya. NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian has overlapping equities in the same area; coordination and cooperation between the two should be increased. The Warsaw summit tasked NATO to look at potential support or coordination with Operation Sophia, to explore capacity building with the Libyan Government of National Accord and to consider NATO action to enforce the arms embargo imposed under UNSCR 2292. All of these present valuable opportunities to increase the scope for NATO-EU cooperation at the tactical and operational levels and should be further developed.Reforming Existing Operations: The stand up of Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean is essential, but it needs to adapt even more to the realities of the rapidly evolving security environment, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. The relationship between the Aegean MSA activities, Operation Sea Guardian and any potential Central Mediterranean maritime tasking should be both simple and transparent. Ideally all of these activities would fall within the scope of Operation Sea Guardian as NATO’s comprehensive maritime security operation in the Mediterranean. With the ending of Operation Ocean Shield in the Indian Ocean, the geographic scope of Operation Sea Guardian could also be expanded to become the operating framework for MSO for NATO naval forces wherever they operate.Autonomous Vessels and Future Naval Fleets – Much like the advent and adoption of RPAs (Remotely Piloted Aircraft - drones) as valuable ISR and strike platforms for air forces, autonomous underwater vehicles will soon become the norm for naval forces. NATO’s Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) considers autonomous underwater vehicles as critical enablers for future naval forces, playing important roles in tasks such as mine counter measures and even anti-submarine warfare. The real immediate benefits are more likely to be in the arenas of mine detection and search and rescue capacities, rather than hunting down strategic nuclear forces.The benefits of autonomous underwater vehicles are clear. First, they are, on the whole cheaper to build and operate, and often faster than traditional vessels. Second, and perhaps most importantly, they keep the man out of the minefield, but in the operational loop. NATO Parliamentarians should consider encouraging the expansion of research and incorporation of autonomous naval vessels into their fleets, as they reverse the crippling trend of ever-more expensive platforms and can likely save lives in times of conflict. CMRE has done important science and technology research in underwater autonomy. NATO and the Allies should support the Centre to continue its efforts.Continued Allied Buy-In to the Standing Naval Forces and Enhanced Naval Coordination – The examples set by the increasing naval contributions of the larger powers in the Alliance, particularly the US’s European Reassurance Initiative commitments and the new contributions of the UK to MARCOM’s efforts, should serve as a signal to other more powerful member states that the time to focus on NATO’s Standing Naval Forces is now. Large power contribution to the SNF can and will serve as a signal to the United States that European powers are serious about their future security and are willing to invest in it today. Further, they can serve as essential leaders for all other member states seeking to work with NATO. Focusing on contributing to NATO’s maritime assets on hand will also endow the VJTF with the follow-on capacity necessary to be the deterrent force all Allies want it to be.In parallel, the remarkable increase in Allied naval coordination of ISR activities using MARCOM as the Alliance operational hub is both welcome and should be intensified. As SACLANT did in the past, MARCOM now acts as a coordinator of national surface force and Maritime Patrol Aircraft activity that is not part of the SNF but which is supporting Alliance objectives of ISR and Strategic Anticipation which requires water space management and a rational division of labour. This development since 2015 has changed the equation for forces in maritime NATO. Four fully resourced standing groups remain important for NATO posture, deterrence and operations. However, the new levels of informal coordination provide powerful tools for consensual Allied Maritime Governance between Allied stakeholders and should be fully encouraged. This new level of coordination lays the foundation for the rapid stand up of multiple task forces from already deployed assets in an Article 5 crisis.Port Security Equals Alliance Security – As noted above, the threat to NATO member states domestic security is high in an era when the volume and pace of sea trade is constantly growing. Defence matters involved with attention to port security are clear; this means thinking about and working towards greater defence is not just a matter for Defence Ministries, but also it involves the private sector as the losses from a potential attack will affect them directly as well. As such, greater effort should be made to bring in the private sector to help find the necessary technological and best practices fixes to address the gaps in knowledge about what is flowing in and out of Allied ports. Readiness for New Challenges – There are many challenges that will lie ahead in the arena of maritime security and readiness. Thinking creatively now about new forms of resilience is important. For example, NATO member state parliamentarians could question their own home navies about the percentage of their domestic Merchant Marine fleets that could be repurposed quickly in a time of crisis. Another point for consideration would be the amount of ice-enabled hull ships NATO has available as it is clear that operations, exercises, and shipping in the High North will likely increase as Arctic ice coverage recedes due to global warming. 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