Governing river basins in Brazil: a model for evaluation



Governing river basins in Brazil: a model for evaluation

Beate Frank

1. Governing water and water governance: an introduction

The interlinked and complex problems that have contributed to the so called water crisis have motivated in-depth reforms and new policies in the water sector, which have been taking place in recent decades in many countries. Perret (2006) referred to this reform process as going on in developing countries, but as the literature shows, discussions and attempts to improve water governance structures have occurred in nations distributed over all continents, and sometimes between countries. Central to the reform process is a shift from traditional engineering tasks - water providing, hydropower extraction, flood control, pollution control, etc. - to institutional aspects, aimed at finding acceptable solutions for all stakeholders, considering the complex nature of water ecosystems and their sustainability.

The water crisis is ever more realized as a crisis in governing water. Governing, according to Koimann (2003, 4), can be considered as “the totality of interactions, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions as contexts for these governing interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities”. The problems that water management has faced indicate that governing water via usual formal state institutions doesn’t work anymore, and that new governance structures for water management need to be created and developed. The emergence of the idea of governance relates to the fact that such problems need to be tackled simultaneously at all relevant policy levels, from the local to the regional to the national to the supranational levels, and that these levels need to be connected (FINGER, 2006).

Governance generally refers to all sorts of new arrangements for creating order and structuring collective action (STOKER, 1998). As Peet and Watts (1996) pointed out, the exploration of new governance structures springs from a new emphasis on “nature-society relations” that is related to the collapse of socialisms and the rise of a neo-liberal hegemony, the resurgence of environmental concerns, and the rise of political ecology.

Koimann (2003, p.4) argues that “governance can be seen as the totality of theoretical conceptions on governing”. Further, he distinguishes three modes of governance: self-governance, co-governance, and hierarchical governance. Self governance is the capacity of societal entities to provide the necessary means to develop and maintain their own identity, and thus show a relatively high degree of social-political autonomy (KOIMANN, 2003, p.79). In co-modes of governance the essential element is that the interacting parties have something ‘in common’ to pursue together, that in some way autonomy and identity are at stake (KOIMANN, 2003, p.96).

The term governance is widely used, not always in exactly the same sense. More common is the concept of governance as providing “a framework for understanding changing processes of governing” (STOKER 1998, p.18), and therefore work on governance reflects interest in exploring new processes for “creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action” (STOKER 1998, p.17). In this respect, Evans (2002) suggests that the creation of collaborative arrangements – which he calls state-society synergies – is essential for constructing improved public policy outcomes.

Renewed governance is also one of the core ideas of the new phase of water management, with the following core principles: decentralization and the development of new forms of local governance, participation and the quest of greater equity, sustainability and environmental concerns, liberalization and overall state/public withdrawal in technical and financial terms. Such reforms have been implemented through the following policy options: (1) integrated water resource management policies at river basin level, (2) the emergence of new decentralized institutions, at both river basin (basin committees or catchment management agencies) and local levels (water user’s associations), (3) the development of alternative environmental, social, economic and policy frameworks and tools and (4) irrigation management transfer policies and the privatization of individual schemes (PERRET, 2006).

In Brazil, such a formal reform has been taking place since the 1990s, due to a number of problems experienced in the last decades, as described below. In 1991, São Paulo State, the most industrialized in Brazil, was the first to enact a new water law based largely on the Dublin Principles[i] for integrated water management, defined formally in 1992. In 1997 a nationwide water law was enacted, based on the same ideas. The social participation of water users and civil society stands out in all water laws, in consonance as well with the 1988 Brazilian Constitution that called for greater participation in public policies of various types.

As a consequence, great importance is given to the new Brazilian decentralized institutions, river basin committees, intended to be state-society synergies, according to Evans, or, co-governance structures, according to Koimann. The question this paper addresses is related to the effectiveness of these committees. I do not ask whether they are or not effective, but how this effectiveness can be defined and by which process variables it is influenced. I argue that to be able to actually govern water issues, or to effectively address the problems that governments alone did not, these structures have not only to be created but also to be prepared. Therefore, it is necessary not only to discuss how the governance structure has changed, but how the governance in the new institutions is being built or has to be built to achieve the aimed results.

To understand the water problems river basin committees are facing, the next section provides a brief description of Brazilian water issues.

A basic concept related to the attempts to develop water management at river basin level is the idea of Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM). In the third section I describe this concept and some critical views, and its relation with scale and with the participatory water management bodies.

The fourth section is dedicated to developing an approach to understanding the process of building river basin governance, or establishing a river basin committee, based on collaboration approaches from several authors.

The last section describes the scope of my proposed research project designed to apply the developed approach to Brazilian river basin committees, to gather empirical data to test the model and to identify the needs to improve process to make river basin committees more effective.

2. The Brazilian water issues[ii]

The main water resources demand in Brazil, including abstractions, consumption, and return rates by user type, is presented in Table 1. Abstractions for consumptive uses in 2000 (the reference year) totaled 1,592 m3/s, with 53% of this volume (841 m3/s) effectively consumed and 751 m3/s returning to the river basins.

Table 1: Abstractions, consumption, and return rates, by user type

|Types of use |Abstraction |Consumption |Return |

| |M³/s |% |M³/s |% |m³/s |% |

|Urban |420 |26 |88 |11 |332 |44 |

| | | | | | | |

|Industrial |281 |18 |55 |7 |226 |30 |

| | | | | | | |

|Rural |40 |3 |18 |2 |22 |3 |

| | | | | | | |

|Livestock |112 |7 |89 |11 |23 |3 |

| | | | | | | |

|Irrigation |739 |46 |591 |69 |148 |20 |

|Total |1592 |100 |841 |100 |751 |100 |

| | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |

Although Brazil has significant water potential, it is important to underscore the appreciable variability in time and space of water in the various regions. Consequently, basins in areas with low availability and heavy use of water resources experience water shortages and stress situations. According to the index used by the United Nations to express water availability, Brazil is in a very comfortable situation, with only the Eastern Northeast Atlantic Region in an unfavorable situation in terms of water stress (1,145 m3/person/year). This figure corresponds to less than one half of the water volume estimated by the United Nations (2,500 m3/persons/day) as sufficient for community life, aquatic eco-systems, and sustaining human, social and economic activities.

The following data will explain the internal differences through the country. The average annual flow-rate of rivers in Brazil is 179,000 m3/s (5,660 km3/year), corresponding to approximately 12% of the world’s available water resources. Taking into account the rivers flowing into Brazil from other countries through the Amazon, Uruguay and Paraguay Basins, total available water volume reaches some 267,000 m3/s, corresponding to 18% of available water worldwide.

The Amazon Hydrographic Region holds 73.6% of the Nation’s surface water resources, followed by the Tocantins/Araguaia region, with 7.6%, and the Paraná region, with 6.4%. The lowest surface water availability rates are found in Eastern Northeast Atlantic, the East Atlantic, and the Parnaíba Hydrographic Region (see map in Figure 1).

[pic]

Figure 1: Brazilian hydrographic regions

Despite the abundant water coming from the highlands (Planalto), the Pantanal Region (Paraguay Hydrographic Region) is not a water producer, resulting in a low contribution by the Pantanal Region to surface run-off.

In most parts of Brazil, flow-rate regularization levels are set through reservoirs, which ensure some 60% average flow-rate. In addition to power dams, there are other reservoirs designed to boost water supplies, such as the weirs along some water courses in Northeast Brazil that are vital for supplying communities, watering livestock, and irrigation in this semi-arid region.

In semi-arid areas of Brazil, irregular rainfall of 800 mm or less, and high evapotranspiration rates, imply that many streams and rivers vanish during longer dry seasons, causing drought, with severe economic and social impacts on local communities.

Collection of rainwater in small water-storage cisterns for subsequent use is one of the alternatives for mitigating the scourge of drought for low-income communities with limited access to water in semi-arid areas.

Groundwater (spring and well water), generally of good quality, is being used intensively for a wide variety of purposes, such as human water supply, irrigation, industry and recreation. Estimates indicate that there are at least 400,000 boreholes. In Brazil, 15.6% of households use only groundwater. Although the use of groundwater sources supplement surface water in many regions, in some parts of the country they constitute the main source of water.

The high quality of groundwater in Brazil is substantiated by the significant consumption of bottled mineral and tabled waters, particularly in major urban centers. But over the past few decades, anthropogenic activities have adversely affected some aquifers. The main problems include: drilling of boreholes without adequate construction designs, not complying with the technical standards; location-specific pollution due to a lack of adequate sanitation systems; excessive pumping from boreholes along the coast, which increases the inflow of the seawater wedge, resulting in salinity problems; leaks from fuel storage tanks; and the use of agricultural inputs with ample potential for diffuse pollution, among other problems.

Critical water pollution regions are located close to major metropolitan regions, associated mainly with the discharge of household sewage. Despite ongoing water quality problems in Brazil, the progress achieved in remedying the situation that existed some decades ago should not be disregarded.

Nationwide, the main water pollution is caused by discharge of household sewage, because only 47% of Brazilian municipalities have sewerage collection networks, and only 18% of sewage receives any form of treatment. In rivers with low water-availability levels, particularly in the semi-arid region and high urbanized areas, the consequences for the water quality are visible.

Mining activities, industrial liquid wastes, and point and non-point pollution resulting from urban and agricultural run-off and solid wastes are major problems throughout Brazil, in practically all Hydrographic Regions.

The effects of soil impermeabilization in major cities are all too evident, while the use of permeable coverage materials to enable rainfall seepage is rare. In parallel to the expansion of impermeable areas, the density of population is growing steadily, and demand for drinking water is increasing, making issues of human water supply a major concern.

In summary, the Brazilian river basins present some water shortage problems, and a large variety of environmental problems caused by land use and water uses, related to the characteristics of the river basins and their sizes. Therefore, the needs for management and problem solving are recognized differently at different scales and by different actors.

The implementation of participatory water management concepts in Brazil, introduced by the new water laws already mentioned is a great challenge. The Brazilian Federal Constitution establishes that all three levels of government – federation, states and municipalities - are jointly responsible for environmental protection, but responsibilities related to water resources management are defined differently. Surface waters are under federal domain if rivers cross more than one state or are shared with other countries, and under state domain, if the entire river flows within a single state. Groundwater is exclusively under state domain. So, unlike environmental management, municipalities have no formal authority over bulk water management. Nonetheless, they are responsible for water supply and sewage systems, both important water uses, and for land use management, which is, of course, closely connected to water quality and quantity. This means that cooperation among the different administrative levels is necessary for water management to occur in most river basins.

The National Water Resources Management System (SINGREH) was created in 1997 in the attempt to confront the complexity of this situation. In addition to state and federal agencies responsible for water management, this system includes a participatory National Water Resources Council (CNRH), water councils in each state, and River Basin Committees, in which civic participation is particularly important. In each state, the characteristics of the councils and committees vary substantially, due to the socio-economic and political-cultural diversity among regions. But all have formal responsibilities related to conflict resolution and defining water use plans at the state or basin level.

In addition to these councils and committees, the national government and each state have created a water resources management department or agency, almost always connected to environmental agencies. Their functions basically involve providing technical support to councils and committees and implementing – in collaboration with council, committees and agencies – a set of management tools including water planning, water use permits and a bulk water charging system, established by the new water laws.

This framework is a work in progress. By 2007 more than 130 river basin committees at state level and 6 at federal level had been legally created. This does not mean that governance was achieved in all river basins. Some challenges for water governance in Brazil can be identified (Moreira and Frank, 2007). The greatest challenge to be faced in solving water use conflicts at the river basin level is the political culture. Traditionally, public officials have made decisions unilaterally. Not only does this bureaucratic culture need to change, but also society must overcome its inexperience in this kind of dialogue if participatory water management is to become a reality.

3. Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM[iii]): from coordination to collaboration

The concept of integrated water resources management (IWRM) is not new, but it has changed over the course of time (WATSON, 2004). Is has been applied for many decades in United States, Canada, England and Wales, Australia, New Zealand and France (MITCHELL, 2007). In general IRBM is an holistic or ecosystem approach for the river basin, with different interpretations according to Mitchell (1990, 2007). There is the notion of “comprehensive” water resources development, the older notion, and there is the “integrated” interpretation. While the former requires a broader consideration and management of all the different elements, relationships and processes within a water resources system, the latter concentrates on the interactions among elements that are significant in a particular river basin (WATSON 2004). Mitchell (2007) argues that the comprehensive approach is useful at a strategic level, whereas the integrated interpretation is a more selective approach, useful at an operational scale, “focusing on those variables, relationships and processes understood to be the main influences on the behavior and variation of the catchment system and for which management intervention can be expected to make a difference” (MITCHELL, 2007, p. 52).

A new or more advanced view in the discussion about IRBM is advocated by Postel and Richter (2005), which is the idea of river governance instead of water governance, because, in their view, the focus on the basin is not enough. This perspective considers the natural flows and thus the river ecosystem as one of the building blocks for better river governance. They argue that there is “scientific consensus that restoring some measure of a river’s natural flow pattern can revitalize river health and resuscitate endangered fish and wildlife even in a heavily dammed and mechanized river” (POSTEL and RICHTER, 2003, p.167), and that has to be considered as goals of IRBM. The subject arose in connection with the world commission on dams (WCD), whose recommendations have “built the foundation and frame for a new architecture of river governance” (POSTEL and RICHTER, 2003, p.177).

Two other concepts have to be cleared to understand the IRBM challenge: the meaning of integration and the meaning of scale.

Warner (2007) describes IWRM as “decompartmentalising” of water management functions. Based on Mitchell (1990), he sees integrated management as a multi-layered systems approach, integrating: (1) relations between surface and groundwater, quantity and quality, (2) relations between water and land use, and (3) relations between water and stakeholder interests. To this set of relations to be integrated, Warner (2007) adds relations between water institutions.

This fourth kind of integration proposed actually is not new, but has been called coordination. Throughout the time IWRM has been defined, conceptualized and implemented in different ways, it was always founded on a “myth” of inter-agency coordination (WATSON 2004). According to Watson, many organizations, policy makers and researchers, including the Global Water Partnership (2001, p.1), continue to subscribe to the myth that improved co-ordination is the key to successful IWRM practice. Co-ordination means an arrangement whereby two or more organizations create and/or use existing decision rules in order to align their separate policies or activities. As such, a formal rigid and rule-based relationship is implied, which enables organizations to assist each other in working towards their separate objectives (WATSON, 2004, p245). While improved co-ordination can reduce to some extent the fragmentation, Watson argues, it does not represent an adequate strategy. In the last years, rivers have been identified more and more as unstable, open and chaotic socio-biophysical systems, giving rise to wicked management problems (complex, uncertain, changeable and conflictual, according to Holling 1978, and WATSON 2004). In such circumstances, the ends and the means of management are uncertain, effective solutions are beyond the reach of any single agency or organization, and producing agreement over causes, consequences and decisions about a problem is extremely difficult.

Mitchell (2007, p. 52), however, argues that not always it is necessary to co-ordinate inter-agency efforts: “There will be many situations in which relatively straightforward initiatives by one agency will be sufficient to deal with an issue”.

A number of other changes challenge the legitimacy of traditional state institutions. Governments no longer appear to occupy a supreme position in policy processes because of a redistribution of responsibilities among complex networks of private and new third-sector organizations. Watson argues that this implies that intergovernmental and inter-agency co-ordination cannot provide the kind of system-response capability that is often required and that it is time to reform the myth of co-ordination in IRBM (WATSON, 2004). He suggests its substitution by an alternative myth, the myth of collaboration.

As Watson asserts, collaboration extends the level of interaction well beyond co-ordination, improving institutional arrangements and responses for IRBM that “reflect the complex, uncertain, dynamic, interconnected, open and adaptive characteristics of the river basin system themselves”, because “a system’s survival is threatened when the response repertoire cannot match the variety emanating from the environment” – law of requisite variety (Ashby 1960; WATSON 2004, 2007).

Scale, the second concept mentioned as an important element to discuss collaboration for IRBM, refers to the physical dimensions, in either space or time, of phenomena or observations (REID, et. al 2006). Actually, it means the size of the watershed intended to be managed.

The Register of International River Basins (UN 1978) of the world defines a river basin as the area that contributes hydrologically (including both surface- and groundwater) to a first order stream, which, in turn, is defined by its outlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed) lake or inland sea. Different denominations, however, are used in English speaking countries[iv].

Watershed sizes can range from very large basins to very small catchments. Schueler (2000; RANDOLPH, 2004) uses the following classification of watershed sizes:

• Catchment: area that drains development sites to their first intersection with stream

• Subwatershed: 1 to 10 square miles (second order streams)

• Watershed: 10 to 100 square miles

• Subbasin: 100 to 1000 square miles

• Basin: 1000 to 10,000 square miles

Above these units, the denomination sub-region and region are included (RANDOLPH, 2004). Of course, integration of management at each of these areas implies different scales, and will also require different practices and meanings, from a very operational (catchment) to a strategic one (basin). And “adopting a particular scale of assessment limits the types of problems that can be addressed” (REID, et. al, 2006, p.8).

For management proposals the concept of level is also important. Level is a characterization of perceived influence. It is not a physical measure but, according to Reid et al (2006), it is what people accept it to be. Thus, scale and level are not related.

Now, Mitchell (2007) and Verhallen and Warner (2007) raise the question of whether collaboration among stakeholders, through river basin decision-making bodies, is compatible with IRBM, because stakeholders tend to focus on more local areas within a larger system. To overcome this tension, Mitchell (2007) suggests working simultaneously at two scales: the entire basin and sub-basins, with appropriate decision-making bodies. The collaborative for the entire basin should integrate representation from all sub-areas and sectors in the basin.

4. Building river basin governance

The approaches for water management adopted in different countries and in different conditions, at river basin or watershed level, are discussed by several scholars. Two main directions are acknowledged in these studies: the human relations necessary to establish a collaboration process and the institutional challenges to develop collaboration. These differences are related to the multidisciplinary nature of the research subject. This means that the different approaches don’t show controversies, but instead, different aspects or different characteristics of the same objects. In this section several approaches are discussed and then compared. Table 2 is an attempt to summarize them.

Barbara Gray is a behavioral scientist. Based on several empirical studies about collaborative processes not related to water management, she established a process model. She defines collaboration as: “(1) the pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources (eq. information, money, labor, etc), (2) by two or more stakeholders, (3) to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually” (GRAY, 1985, p.912).

An underpinning concept of collaboration is the domain, which “can be thought of as the set of actors (individuals, groups, and/or organizations) that become joined by a common problem of interest.” Gray argues that a domain level focus is essential both for understanding and for solving common problems. Further she describes some circumstances in which collaborative problem solving among stakeholders is warranted: the existence of “indivisible” problems, limitations of traditional adversarial methods of resolving conflicts, and increasing environmental turbulence.

Her focus on collaboration within domains differs from other perspectives in inter-organizational relations, because: (1) she focus on domain level development; (2) she is concerned with underorganized systems, that is, the domain of interest representing potential networks of organizations rather than already established networks or federations of organizations; (3) she is concerned with problem domains which cannot be satisfactorily managed by a single organization or by an oligopoly, but instead advance the interests of all stakeholders; (4) she adapts a process-oriented approach, concerned with the need for a development of collaborative relationships within organizational domains.

Based on these assumptions, Gray suggests a process model of collaboration in three steps: (1) problem-setting, (2) direction-setting, (3) structuring to regulate collaborative activities. For each of these steps she describes the conditions which facilitate the process. Thus, problem-setting is facilitated by identification of stakeholders, stakeholder expectations about outcomes, degree of recognized interdependence, legitimacy, and convenor characteristics; direction-setting is facilitated by coincidence of values among stakeholders and dispersion of power among stakeholders; and structuring is facilitated by degree of ongoing interdependence, external mandates, redistribution of power, geographic factors and influencing the contextual environment.

Geographic factors mean the scale of the problem domain. If the common problem of interest is a local one, it is easier to structure collaboration. Thus, the dimension of the watershed that is to be managed, already mentioned in the previous section, is a crucial aspect. It is interesting that the result of the collaboration process - influencing the contextual environment - is seen as a condition for structuring. This means that Gray emphasizes the outcomes of collaboration as a necessary condition to structure further collaboration.

Watson (2004, 2007) is a geographer working on institutional issues of resources management. He discusses collaboration as a way to achieve IWRM - integrated water resources management – using a successful case study, the Fraser River Basin, in British Columbia (Canada). His model for the collaboration process goes beyond Gray’s model discussed above. Collaboration here is portrayed as an emergent and iterative process rather than a highly structured and linear arrangement. Obstacles or disagreements may be encountered at any point in the process which may require the participants to re-visit earlier phases in order to re-define or re-organize their joint activities and arrangements.

This collaborative governance model states that by improving the quality of the decision-making process, collaboration reduces the risks of dispute and implementation failure in the policy circle. Attempts at collaborative problem solving may involve several repetitions of this cycle and the length of time devoted to each phase will vary from case to case. All told, collaboration is a fragile and complex process.

In the model, (1) context means that a wide variety of changes in contextual conditions can trigger decisions to pursue collaboration or to reject approaches from other organizations. (2) Problem-setting is concerned with establishing the identity of the problem and the legitimate stakeholders who occupy the problem domain. Although this seems logical, it is common to jump to conclusions without examining the nature of problems in sufficient depth and to try to get agreement on the solution before there is agreement on the problem. (3) Direction setting means the identification of desirable future conditions and a direction for action. In order to gain legitimacy and support, super-ordinate goals must reflect the desires and aspirations of the collaborating organizations, be feasible, and also must be deemed worthwhile by society at large. In practice the establishment of long-term goals and actions is unlikely to be straightforward due to different understandings, values, attitudes, and aspirations among the collaborating organizations and groups in the policy arena. (4) Structuring means that inter-organizational structures and procedures must be created to guide subsequent collective action. These explicit mechanisms are often missing and there is a tendency to rely on bureaucratic management principles. Failure to develop adequate structural arrangements for the inter-organisational environment has major implications, since the collaborators will not be able to move forward in the desired direction. (5) Outputs and outcomes: Watson (2004, p 248) argues that collaboration should not be viewed as an end in itself: “By working through the first three phases of collaboration, organizations should be able to develop joint policies, programs and projects (outputs) designed to produce outcomes, which are consistent with established long-term goals and ambitions. Failure to generate outputs or to achieve positive outcomes is likely to undermine the commitment of participants to the collaborative arrangement.”

Sabatier, a political scientist, developed with other authors (SABATIER et al, 2005; LUBELL, 2005) a dynamic framework for watershed management, based on empirical studies of many watershed partnerships in the United States. This kind of partnerships has several variants - collaborative engagement processes, collaborative watershed partnerships and collaborative superagencies - that can be distinguished by two dimensions: duration and decision-making power or influence (informal advisory versus formal authority). Following Ostrom (1990), they conceptualize “a collaborative process as essentially a set of rules regarding the types of participants, their entry and exit from the process, their authority to undertake tasks, and how their actions lead to policy outcomes” (SABATIER et. al, p15).

They find that collaborative watershed institutions represent a new approach to environmental governance, combining important elements of old management approaches with a series of adaptations and innovative choices that exploit emerging opportunities (LUBELL et. al, 2005, p.261). They develop a framework with six main components – context, process, legitimacy, civic community, policy outputs and watershed outcomes – strongly related to each other. Their research findings are summarized in six main themes related to this dynamic framework of collaborative institutions, and focalize mainly the relations among the components of the dynamic framework: (1) process and context, (2) participation and representation, (3) civic community, (4) effectiveness, (5) legitimacy, and (6) survival.

The first theme, process and context, focus on how collaborative institutions depend on the context. Collaborative institutions consist of formal and informal rules for making collective decisions and governing actual resource use behavior. The ability to combine core ideas of collaborative institutions in various ways directly contributes to the adaptive capacity and survivability of the institution. Therefore, “a successful environmental governance institution adapts to the structure of the action-decision arena (the context), including the type of environmental problems, the constellation of political actors and venues, existing policy tools, civic culture, and socioeconomic conditions” (LUBELL et. al, p262).

The next theme, participation and representation, discusses who participates in collaborative institutions, which segments of the population they represent and why people participate. Data from some watershed partnerships indicate that people participate for two primary reasons: (1) to improve ecological and/or socioeconomic conditions in the watershed and/or (2) to protect themselves by making sure the partnership does not do something to harm their basic interests.

Civic community[v] represents the basic human dimensions that relate to the success or failure of collaborative processes. Six aspects of civic community were considered: human capital, social capital, trust, political efficacy, collective action beliefs and legitimacy. Among them, trust was identified as the most important for collaborative action to succeed. Collaborative processes that give members a sense of fair treatment can create considerable trust and new social and human capital.

The effectiveness of partnership is related to outputs and outcomes. As seen above, people are primarily interested in policy outputs from the collaborative process because these are seen as essential contributors to policy outcomes, but they do so if they judge the process to have substantive legitimacy. It is almost impossible to measure whether the policy outputs of a collaborative process affected a policy objective.

Another empirical result is that the age of the partnership influences the effectiveness. Data indicate that “the number of activities increases substantially over time and that partnerships found it easier to agree on, and implement, specific projects than they did to agree on a comprehensive management plan” (Leach, Pelkey and Sabatier, 2002; LUBELL et al). The outputs also are influenced by context variables, including a perceived watershed crisis and preexisting norms of reciprocity, and process variables, the extent of trust and having organizational representatives with the authority to negotiate. For implementation projects, the only important variables were partnership age and the amount of grant funding.

With respect to the theme legitimacy, Lubell et. al argue that it must be understood as a twofold normative requirement, expressed by procedural criteria (based on fundamental value of autonomy and hold that those bound by watershed policy must have a voice in formulating it) and substantive criteria (based on fundamental values of welfare and justice and hold that watershed policy outcomes must improve the conditions of life for watershed stakeholders and the costs and benefits must be distributed fairly). Collaborative institutions display a wide range of structures with respect to procedural legitimacy. The authors observe that, “there is some evidence that involvement in collaborative institutions does satisfy many of the participants’ own concerns regarding procedural fairness” and, “as in other domains of social life, it could be very difficult to cultivate full participation among groups excluded from political power in the past” (LUBELL 2005, p.282). The substantive legitimacy of watershed collaboration is difficult to determine, and therefore stakeholder perceptions of changes in the watershed may be used as a surrogate for data on actual changes in evaluations of substantive legitimacy.

The last theme is survival, which is about the circumstances in which watershed collaboratives will survive long enough to have a reasonable chance of improving watershed conditions. Lubell et. al (2005) conclude that survival in this sense is a function of both procedural and substantive legitimacy.

In Table 2, I consider the components of the approach as the elements of the dynamic framework, reframed by the description of the six themes: (a) context, (b) process, (c) participation and representation, (d) legitimacy, (e) civic community, (f) effectiveness (outputs and outcome), (g) survival.

The next approach to be considered was developed by Warner and Verhallen (2007) and Verhallen et. al (2007), as a result of an international research initiative on multi-stakeholder platforms (MSP), with case studies in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Jeroen Warner is a political scientist with experience in environmental conflict, risk and participation and Annemarie Verhallen is a sociologist, specialized in innovation of vocational training. An MPS is defined as a decision-making body (voluntary or statutory) comprising different stakeholders who perceive the same resource management problems, realize their interdependence for solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies for solving the problem (Steins and Edwards 1998; WARNER, 2007). MSPs are viewed as new forms of cooperation in the face of water conflicts.

Using experiences of several case studies, Warner and Verhallen (2007) developed a typology for MSPs. As platforms are the result of interrelations among different social actors, embedded in different social and political contexts, they argue that there is no room for normative definitions on how they must be structured or which methodology is the best for their functioning. In other words, “there is no such a thing as a standard MSP” (Warner and Verhallen, 2007, p23).

They defined twelve dimensions to describe MSPs, as follows: (a) arenas (domains) refers to the sectors or groups that are part of the platform; (b) multiple use refers to all water uses, including environmental flows; (c) power balance is related to efforts to address imbalance between a multitude of interests; (d) saliency of goal is required because if a problem is experienced as urgent and salient, a resource platform will seem logical for its participants; (e) joint fact finding refers to an open and inclusive information and knowledge process; (f) decision space refers to the level of authority - no mandate, only consultative or informative to plenty of mandate - with influences in decision making processes, depending on the degree to which central governments are willing to share power; (g) support generating means the extent of the support – human and financial - generating capacity; (h) synergy means that the platform is able to generate added value, that people try to understand and augment each other’s perspectives and jointly come up with new and bold approaches; (i) adaptivity refers to the ability of the platform, over time, to redirect its work for land and water resources, because the development of platforms take years; (j) favorable context refers to a context absent for severe conflicts or chaos for the platform to function; (k) governance structure means that non-coercive government guarantees stable preconditions and shares power; (l) outcome is substantial to address land and water management issues in a practical way and means that the platform is seen as a relevant network to tackle them; (m) reflective capacity means that the platform takes time for reflection of the outcome, the process, the content, their efficacy and efficiency.

The role of facilitation and framing is not included in the above typology, although it impacts on all dimensions. Warner’s and Verhallen’s research finds that “just sitting together does not solve problems. People have to bring, or develop, skills for making a multi-stakeholder process work.” To form a dialogue in which collaborating persons fully grasp the complex situation, including an understanding of the different perspectives and interest, requires proper awareness-raising, training and facilitation. In several of the studied cases a charismatic leader or facilitator (or facilitating organization) is platform’s convener or motivator. Different organizations play this role in top-down and bottom-up MSPs. Facilitators have a key function in almost all steps of structuring the MSP, and “it therefore seems highly important that the platform and its facilitator obtain the legitimacy and mandate from the participants, and that the facilitator’s activities are monitored by all” (WARNER and VERHALLEN, 2007, p28).

Scholz and Stiftel (2005), presented the results of an interdisciplinary research project carried out in Florida, on the collaborative approaches adopted to solve eight water conflicts. They distinguished first order from second order conflicts. While first order conflicts are the conflicts solved by traditional institutions, normally related to one specific water use, second order conflicts are considered conflicts among different uses, for which solutions of a new kind of governance must be developed.

Due to the complex nature of water conflicts, they argue that adaptive management tools did not work, due to the fact that they are useful when there is broad agreement on policy goals but on about the appropriate means to achieve these goals. Therefore a new approach, where goals and means are inseparable, is necessary. Thus they define adaptive governance (AG) as an approach that “involves the evolution of new governance institutions capable of generating long-term, sustainable policy solutions to wicked problems through coordinated efforts involving previously independent system of users, knowledge, authorities, and organized interests” (Scholz and Stiftel, 2005, p.5).

The Florida case studies reveal that AG faces five challenges: (1) representation - requires innovative means of ensuring legitimate, meaningful involvement of affected groups in a manner congruent with the norms of representation in the overall political system; (2) decision-making process - deliberative process design requires a decision-making process capable of recognizing and articulating the needs of affected users and consolidating them into practical policies that can achieve consensus; (3) scientific learning – requires incorporation of diverse scientific viewpoints to answer critical policy questions, monitor outcomes, and challenge policy assumptions inconsistent with new findings; (4) public learning – requires transformation of beliefs and preferences about legitimate water rights and decision processes among users as well as the community and political institutions; and (5) problem responsiveness – requires that the process produces an efficient, equitable, and sustainable solution.

Discussion about the AG approach case studies show that public learning, including both increasing knowledge about possible outcomes of different policy and behavioral choices, and also changing views about the legitimacy of decision processes and behavioral restrictions, is the most ambiguous and less understood of the challenges (Scholz and Stiftel 2005b, Lubell 2005, p174). According to Lubell, adaptive governance does not necessarily imply collaboration, but that the complexity of watershed problems provides a niche for the evolution of collaborative institutions and explains how cooperation can be developed through a successful adaptive governance network.

Ozawa (2005) discusses the role of science in the adaptive governance approach. Based on three sets of challenges of science in public decision making, she proposes guidelines to face these challenges that can be understand as guidelines for public learning processes. Besides these guidelines, she argues that AG requires new attitudes toward interacting with one another and institutions restructured to support such interactions; she also advocates that these attitudes are necessary to develop trust, to focus on knowledge that matters, to incorporate different sources of knowledge and to resolve tensions between rights and environmental responsibilities.

Sabatier (2005) argues that the AG approach gives comparatively little attention to human behavior. He sees scientific learning by policy adversaries as much more problematic, but indicates some conditions that facilitate such learning. The most interesting is the creation of a forum, dominated by scientific norms, and prestigious enough to force professionals to form different coalitions to participate.

The authors conclude that the consensus process of adaptive governance is a major contribution to water governance, but nevertheless, the role the adaptive decision process can play within the overall governing system is limited by the resistance of existing authorities to delegate power to local, ad hoc processes. To improve adaptive governance, the five challenges suggest three key-themes: (1) stronger collaboration in consensual processes, (2) more realistic use of scientific information, and (3) greater incorporation of market incentives (Scholz and Stiftel, 2005b, p.233). In Table 2, the first two of these themes describe the challenges (decision process and public learning). I consider the third theme, greater incorporation of market incentives, a new challenge or condition for the overall working process.

The last approach considered here is the work of Saleth (2006), based on Saleth and Dinar (2004). He develops a framework to evaluate water institutions, so that the “critical linkages between formal and informal institutions as well as the structural and spatial linkages among local, regional and national institutions”, are considered (SALETH, 2004, p3). According to Saleth (2006), water institutional structure includes the structurally nested and embedded legal, policy and organizational rules governing various facets of water resource management. The overall performance of water institutions and their ultimate impacts on water sector performance depends not only on the capabilities of their individual institutional components and aspects but also on the strength of structural and functional linkages among them. The water institutional environment or context characterizes the overall social, economic, political and resource context within which the water institutional structure evolves and interacts with the water sector. This defines the context row of Saleth’s approach in Table 2.

Saleth, following Saleth and Dinar (2004), argues that there are many theories to explain different aspects of institutional reform processes, which must be used in a complementary way. For a better and more realistic description of the process of institutional change he proposes a four-stage model, as follows: (a) mind change (perceptional convergence), (b) political articulation (crystallization of the demand), (c) actual institutional change (implementation of the reform program), (d) ultimate impact of institutional change (perceptible flow of benefits). The four stages are linked in a circular process subject to constant subjective and objective feedbacks, learning, participation and adaptations. All these elements characterize the approach and are considered in Table 2.

In the implementation stage – the actual institutional change - financial, organizational and bureaucratic aspects play a major role. The impact of institutional change on economic performance is not immediate but has a very long gestation period, in which behavioral changes play a major role.

Although Saleth (2006) focus on the macro and formal segments of water institutions, he argues that the framework can be generalized and applied to basin and local contexts.

An important remark about the framework is made in respect to the demand-side role of education and the supply-side role of research. The author suggest that “the way water institutions and their change process are conceptualized here can be seen as a starting point for developing institutional learning and evaluation tools to facilitate a better and more consensual understanding of institutions among both the public and policy-makers” (SALETH, 2006, p17). In comparison with the other approaches, however, the four stage model is a poor model to describe the evolution of water institutions at the river basin level.

Table 2 presents a comparison of the six discussed approaches. They are chosen as the most important due to the different perspectives of their authors. The literature indicates however, that beyond the above described approaches there are other studies related to the subject. Mitchell (2007), a geographer with long experience in river basin management, based on analysis of integrated water resources management experiences and multistakeholder platforms in Canada, Australia, Britain and the USA, deduced lessons for effective stakeholder implementation and integrated water resources management. His arguments are directed towards overcoming the tension in using IWRM and MSPs together, that are mainly related to the scale problem. He also mentions the “top ten hint list” for successful catchment management, proposed by the United States Department of Agriculture Conservation Technology Information Center (Stout, 1998; MITCHELL, 2007). Kemper et. al (2007), developed an analytical framework to analyze the decentralization process that results in establishing basin-level institutional arrangements. This means that the evaluation, the learning process and the necessary care that has to be taken in conducting platforms or partnerships or general collaboration efforts at river basin level have been an object of research for many scholars.

The content of Table 2 shows a shift, from left to right, from human relations and social aspects of collaboration to institutional aspects of creating new structures for water management. Each of these approaches consider different and complementary perspectives of the collaboration process in the new decision bodies.

Table 2: Comparison of approaches for river basin governance (next two pages)

|Approaches → |Collaboration process |Collaboration for IWRM |Watershed partnerships |Multistakeholder Platforms |Adaptive governance |Institutional change process |

| |(Gray 1985) |(Watson 2004) |(Sabatier et al; Lubell et al|for IWRM |(Scholz and Stiftel 2005) |(Saleth 2006) |

| | | |2005) |(Verhallen et al; Warner | | |

| | | | |2007) | | |

|Categories ↓ | | | | | | |

Scientific backgrounds |Behavioral sciences |Geography |Political Sciences |Sociology and Political Sciences |Political Sciences and Regional and Urban Planning |Economics | |Conclusions based on… |Various empirical studies, not related to water |Fraser basin (BC – Canada) |Watersheds USA |Catchment/river basin in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe |Eight water conflicts in Florida |River basin and higher levels governance in developing countries | |Level of formality of collaboration

|Several |High |Low |Several |Low |High | |Context | |(a) Context

(potential obstacles) |(a) Context

Type of environmental problems

Constellation of political actors and venues

Existing policy tools

Civic culture

Socioeconomic conditions |(j) Favorable context |[conflict history described individually] |Political system

Legal system Demography

Economic development and policies

Resources/

environment

Water sector performance | |Problem perception |(a) Problem-setting

Identification of stakeholders

Stakeholder expectations about outcomes

Degree of recognized interdependence

Legitimacy

Convenor characteristics |(b) Problem-setting (key questions)

Identity of the problem

Legitimate stakeholders |(c) Participation and representation

|(a) Arenas

(b) Multiple use

(c) Power balance

Facilitator |(a) Representation Legitimate involvement of affected groups

|(a) Mind change

Political entrepreneurs

Information and learning

(b) Political articulation process

Actual reform program | |Goals |(b) Direction-setting

Coincidence of values among stakeholders

Dispersion of power among stakeholders |(c) Direction setting (establishment of long term goals and actions is unlikely to be straightforward) |[Goals defined a priori, because watershed partnerships are created to improve water quality] |(d) Saliency of goal | | | |Structuring |(c) Structuring

Degree of ongoing interdependence

External mandates

Redistribution of power

Geographic factors

Influencing the contextual environment |(d) Structuring Interorganizational structures and procedures must be created to guide collective action |(b) Process Institutions for collaborative watershed management

(d) Legitimacy

Procedural and substantive

(e) Civic community

Human capital

Social capital

Trust

Political efficacy

Collective action beliefs |(e) Joint fact finding

(f) Decision space

(g) Support generating

(h) Synergy

(i) Adaptivity

(k) Governance structure

|(b) Decision process

Stronger collaboration in consensual processes

(c) Scientific learning

(d) Public learning

More realistic use of scientific information

(f) Greater incorporation of market incentives |(c) Institutional change

Behavioral changes | |Results | |(e) Output

Policies, programs and projects and

Outcomes

consistent with long-term goals and ambitions |(f) Effectiveness

Outputs

Outcomes

(g) Survival

|(l) Outcome

(m) Reflective capacity |(e) Problem responsiveness |(d) Actual impact

Expectation consistency

Adaptive instrumental evaluation

Subjective and objective factors | |

Collecting the most relevant contributions of the discussed approaches, I suggest a new framework, presented in Figure 2. In this framework, there are seven main components. According to almost all approaches summarized in Table 2, the context is the background for the collaboration. Influenced by this context, four components form a circle – problem-setting, direction-setting, structuring and results – similar to the collaboration circle proposed by Watson (2004). Inspired by the research results from Sabatier and Lubell, the process structure and results are strongly influenced by the civic community and by legitimacy. Legitimacy is, thus, like a central invisible indicator for the soundness of the process at all.

[pic]

Figure 2: Framework for adaptive governance of river basin

According to the framework, building governance for river basin begins through problem recognition, a perception or awareness that a new approach for solving a problem of the context is necessary. If this perception is shared by the domain, a participative process will start. If the perception is easily shared with a broader public, the initiative will gain legitimacy.

In the next step the direction has to be set. A collaborative effort needs to have a direction, an overall goal that is shared by all participants. To pursue and to define actions related to the goal is necessary, because generally people don’t engage for a long time based only on ideas. Concrete tasks are necessary to mobilize stakeholders, because participation needs some action, and action influences legitimacy.

Once the direction is defined, structuring the collaboration is necessary. As Gray (1985) put forward, short term collaborations may not require structuring. River basin committees, however, are thought of as long term collaboratives, and therefore they must create interorganizational structures and procedures to guide collective action. This is certainly the less understood component in the evolution of Brazilian river basin committees. The civic community, which represents the basic human dimensions related to the success or failure of collaborative processes (LUBELL et al 2005), is influenced by the collaboration structure. Both structure and civic community influence legitimacy and are influenced by it. Thus the legitimacy can be thought of as a mirror that tells about and “controls” the collaborative process. However, legitimacy alone does not guarantee collaborative survival.

Both structure and civic community influence the last step, the results, which influence legitimacy and also feed back to the structure. According to Lubell et al (2005), results indicate the process effectiveness. The results are outputs and outcomes aligned with previously defined goals; they may change the context and bring new participants to the table. Results, therefore, are necessary for collaboration survival.

As mentioned by Watson (2004), this framework isn’t a single loop cycle. Building governance of river basins requires a permanent looping through the four steps, looking towards the goals and the legitimacy mirror. Looping implies integrating new stakeholders in the collaborative, to redefine goals, review procedures, improve structures, and evaluate results. Looping in the collaboration circle is, therefore, a public learning process.

The context encompasses socioeconomic conditions, natural resource uses, type of environmental problems, the constellation of political actors and venues, the civic culture, the legal system, the existing policy tools, and the performance of the water sector. The latter comprises water management and environment agencies, which are essential partners in the collaboration.

Eventually this context favors a change in problem awareness, a perception that problems have to be tackled in another way, via collective action. If some political entrepreneurs are successful in gathering people around the new idea, they will promote a political articulation to initiate collaboration. Important conditions to fulfilling this step are a clear problem identification, the representation of multiple uses and interests, the perception that stakeholders are legitimate, the recognition of interdependence among stakeholders, and a skilled and legitimate convener.

As argued by Warner and Verhallen (2007), “just sitting together does not solve problems”. To form a dialogue in which collaborating persons fully grasp the complex situation, including an understanding of the different perspectives and interest, requires proper awareness-raising, training and facilitation. This task begins in the first step of the collaboration circle, in organizing the domain. Therefore the facilitator plays an essential role in the collaboration process.

Another condition that can facilitate the first step is the dimension of the basin. In small watersheds all the other conditions are easier to fulfill.

The direction-setting seems easy but is unlikely to be a straightforward step. It can be facilitated if stakeholders have similar values and if power is well distributed among them. Although long term goals are important to guide collaboration efforts, short term actions, as already mentioned, are necessary to bring collaboration to life.

Structuring implies the creation of inter-organizational structures and procedures to guide collaboration. Different as usual institutions, the structure must be synergic and adaptive to cope with, one, the instabilities of the political system in which it is supposed to act, and two, the unpredictability of the river system which it is supposed to manage. The conditions which facilitate structuring are the perception of a high degree of interdependence, external mandates of representatives and redistribution of power. Legitimacy, as indicated in Figure 2, also conditions structuring. Some tools are helpful in structuring collaboration: a decision process which facilitates consensus, scientific learning to deal with incomplete knowledge, and public learning to promote information and experience sharing and to transform collaborative decisions into practice (Scholz and Stiftel 2005; Lubell 2005). Structuring is, thus, the most difficult and work-intense step to develop.

The last step encompasses the results generated by the collaboration: the outputs, in form of policies, programs and projects, and also the outcomes, the actual impacts on the watershed. Another intangible output is the reflective capacity of the collaborative, which helps to close and to reinitiate the circle.

In the above described framework I do not mention the legal attributes of river basin committees, nor the water management tools which committees should apply in connection with water agencies and other components of the Brazilian Water Management System. As policy tools they are part of the context. Management tools are there to help committees in problem solving; they are tools and not results. As shown in the framework, problems can only be solved if a sound structure is built. And as argued by Frank and Schult (2005), a public learning process is necessary to learn how to use the policy tools to solve problems and to achieve at least part of the goals.

5. Research proposal

The research activity to be implemented in 2008 aims to analyze at least three river basin committees using the framework proposed in the previous section.

Three data sets will be used in this study: 1) qualitative descriptive data (Projeto Marca D´Água 2003, complete reports at .br and published papers); 2) survey data collected in 2004; 3) qualitative data to be collected from March to June 2008, with special attention to the tools used in the structuring process.

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[i] The Dublin Statement (1992) principles: (1) Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment; (2) Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels; (3) Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; (4) Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.

[ii] This section is based mainly on the National Water Resources Plan (BRASIL, 2006)

[iii] The terms IRBM (Integrated River Basin Management) and IWRM (Integrated Water Resources Management) are used as synonyms in the literature. For instance, Watson uses IRBM in 2004 and IWRM in 2007, in the same context and referring to the same former publications. The term IRBM indicates with more explicitness that the integration is thought to happen at river basin level. It seems that the adopted term in each case express editor’s preferences. IRBM is the term chosen by the International Journal of Integrated River Basin Management.

[iv] River basin is synonymous with what is referred to in the United States as a watershed and in the United Kingdom as a catchment, and includes lakes and shallow, unconfined groundwater units (confined or fossil groundwater is not included).

[v] The term civic community was first used by Putnam, Leonardi and Rafaella (1993, apud LUBELL et all, 2005), and refers to a republican theory of successful self-governance.

-----------------------

Problem recognition

Direction-setting

Political articulation for establishment of actions and long term goals

Legitimacy

Structuring

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Results

Outputs and outcomes

Context

Civic community

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