Control + 1 – Block Headings
Afghanistan – Stop the Surge Case Neg
Strat Sheet 2
Pakistan 1NC FL (1/3) 3
Pakistan 1NC FL (2/3) 4
Pakistan 1NC FL (3/3) 5
Jirga 1NC FL (1/3) 6
Jirga 1NC FL (2/3) 7
Jirga 1NC FL (3/3) 8
Solvency 1NC FL (1/2) 9
Solvency 1NC FL (2/2) 10
Solvency Case Ext 11
T – 1NC – Decrease 13
T – 2NC – Decrease 14
T – 1NC – Presence 15
T – 2NC – Presence 16
India CP 1NC (1/2) 17
India CP 1NC (2/2) 18
India CP 2NC (1/2) 19
India CP 2NC (2/2) 20
India CP A2 Perm 21
India CP A2 International Fiat Bad 22
Taliban Takeover DA 1NC (1/3) 24
Taliban Takeover DA 1NC (2/3) 25
Taliban Takeover DA 1NC (3/3) 26
Taliban Takeover DA Uniqueness Wall 27
Taliban Takeover DA Link Wall 29
Taliban Takeover DA Impact Wall 30
Politics Links: Goldilocks 31
Politics Links: Withdrawal Popular 32
Politics Links: Withdrawal Unpopular 33
Clinton Politics DA 34
Clinton Politics DA – A2 Palin Won’t Run 37
Strat Sheet
Afghanistan ‘Stop the Surge’ case neg is a very policy based file – the best neg strat that you could run against this aff would be a policy oriented one.
That being said, the aff doesn’t have the strongest k link in the world, so you could possibly run the Security/Imperialism kritik but it won’t be super-devastating (sorry for taking your line Maggie). A good counterplan would do.
Most of the neg strat you’ll need is here. The case frontlines are generally solid, so author indicts shouldn’t be a large problem. Pay close attention to Nagl. You should extend his evidence a lot through the 2NC. He’s the flagship ‘surge good’ author.
The basic strat for the aff is T – decrease, India CP, case FLs, solvency, Taliban takeover DA. Other files that aren’t in the actual case neg that would also help in a 1NC are politics and PMCs.
The India CP is pretty good but you’ll inevitable run into some theory issues; most likely international fiat. It’s blocked out already and the evidence afterwards are not just cards; use them to say that Indian action is justified because Washington shouldn’t pressure India to withdraw because it’s bad. You could call it an international fiat bad DA.
Oh, and the Clinton ptx DA is just something I cut for fun. Don’t go for it unless you want a good laugh.
Go honey badgers :)
Pakistan 1NC FL (1/3)
1. Their Coll evidence doesn’t actually say that Pakistan is cooperating with the United States; all the card says is that they’re pissed off at Al-Qaeda.
2. The surge is the only plausible method of achieving long-term goals in Afghanistan
John A. Nagl is president of the Center for a New American Security and author of Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam. 2/23/09, < >
There is an increasingly intense desire to transfer lessons learned from what appears to be a successful counterinsurgency effort in Iraq to America's long-neglected war in Afghanistan. The shift in attention is both laudable and overdue. While Iraq is increasingly secure and stable, Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever. We can certainly do better in Afghanistan than we have over the past seven years of war—but it will require a careful appraisal of what we're trying to accomplish and an appreciation for the resources required to get there. A strategic review must reflect an understanding of how to apply all the components of American power—not just the military—to achieve our ends. We need an Afghan surge—an increase of troops (including Afghan forces) to enable the application of a population- and oil-spot-security strategy. While additional U.S. troops are necessary, they are not sufficient to achieve success in Afghanistan. The ends we seek are no sanctuary for terrorists and no regional meltdown. American goals in Afghanistan have suffered from the most fundamental of all strategic errors: insufficient resources to accomplish maximalist goals. Building a liberal democracy in Afghanistan may be possible, but after 30 years of war, the country simply does not have the human capital and institutions that democracy requires. Creating that human infrastructure is a noble long-term enterprise for the international community, but in the meantime, the United States should focus on more achievable goals: ensuring that terrorists never again have a sanctuary on Afghan territory from which to launch attacks on the United States and our allies, and preventing Afghanistan from further destabilizing its neighbors, especially the fragile, nuclear-armed state of Pakistan. While an expanded international commitment of security and development forces can assist in the achievement of these goals in the short term, ultimately Afghans must ensure stability and security in their own country. Building a state, even if it is a flawed one, that is able to provide a modicum of security and governance to its people is the American exit strategy from Afghanistan. Achieving these minimal goals will be hard enough. In terms of means, we can use U.S. soldiers now, but we must transition to advisers for the long haul. More troops are desperately needed in Afghanistan, but troops alone are insufficient to achieve even limited goals for American policy in Afghanistan over the next five years. Success in counterinsurgency requires the integration of military, diplomatic, and economic assistance to a country afflicted by insurgents; Gen. David McKiernan, the American commander responsible for the International Security Assistance Forces, briefed just such a strategy to a group of scholars visiting Afghanistan in November. Unfortunately, he has not been given the resources required to accomplish his mission. The first requirement for success in any counterinsurgency campaign is population security. This requires boots on the ground and plenty of them—20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 people is the historically derived approximate ratio required for success, according to the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. That force ratio prescribes some 600,000 counterinsurgents to protect Afghanistan, a country larger and more populous than Iraq—some three times as large as the current international and Afghan force. The planned surge of 30,000 additional American forces to Afghanistan over the next year is merely a down payment on the vastly expanded force needed to protect all 30 million Afghan people. The long-term answer is an expanded Afghan National Army. Currently at 70,000 and projected to grow to 135,000, the Afghan Army is the most respected institution in the country. It must be expanded to 250,000, and mirrored by sizable local police forces, to provide the security that will prevent Taliban insurgent infiltration of the population. Building Afghan security forces will be a long-term effort that will require American assistance and advisers for many years, but there is no viable alternative.
Pakistan 1NC FL (2/3)
3. The aff has it wrong; India is key to Pakistan
The Nation, 2/7/10, written by Special Correspondent, India and Pakistan urged to help US stabilize Afghanistan, < >
A noted American columnist has urged India and Pakistan to cooperate with each other and help the United States stabilize the "tinderbox of Afghanistan." "India won't be secure unless Pakistan is, and vice versa. And neither country can be comfortable so long as Afghanistan remains a battleground," columnist David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post on Sunday as he welcomed New Delhi's offer of talks with Islamabad. "Each nation fears (often with good reason) that the other's intelligence service is using Afghanistan as a staging ground," he said in his regular column: A new thaw between India and Pakistan. "This Indo-Pak version of the 'Great Game' is poisonous, and the two need to begin sharing intelligence about common threats, rather than fighting spy wars," Ignatius wrote. "The Indo-Pak problem is partly one of political asymmetry. India has a strong democracy, in which the military is powerful but subordinate to political leadership. Pakistan is the opposite: The military is the most robust segment of the Pakistani elite. Military command changes there are gossiped about almost as if they were elections". Noting that Admiral Mike Mullen likes to say: The key to Kabul lies in Islamabad, meaning that success in Afghanistan will be impossible without Pakistan's help, Ignatius said: "But the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is said to have an additional rubric: Given the political complications in that part of the world, the key to Islamabad lies in the Indian capital of New Delhi."So it was welcome news indeed Thursday when a Pakistani government spokesman announced that India had proposed high-level talks with Pakistan -- opening the way for a dialogue the region desperately needs. "How might India play the constructive role that Mullen and other top U.S. officials would like to see? The answer is easy to describe, but agonizingly difficult to put in practice: India could reassure Pakistan that as it works with the United States to contain the Taliban insurgency on its western frontier, the Indian military would ease pressure on the eastern border.
4. Prefer our link evidence
A. Our Nation evidence is from this year, whereas their Nation evidence is from ’09; we win on recency
B. The aff’s evidence doesn’t give warrants as to how a surge would destabilize the Pakistani government; our evidence specifically indicates that issues between India and Pakistan have actually hampered Pakistan’s capabilities in supporting the US
C. Their own evidence admits that the US needs to engage in counterterrorism, by which we cite that needs much more troops than what exists in the status quo
5. Nuclear terrorism won’t happen—no means or motivation.
John Mueller, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, “The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,
Thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists on the issue, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. It is highly improbable that a would-be atomic terrorist would be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state because the donor could not control its use and because the ultimate source of the weapon might be discovered. Although there has been great worry about terrorists illicitly stealing or purchasing a nuclear weapon, it seems likely that neither “loose nukes” nor a market in illicit nuclear materials exists. Moreover, finished bombs have been outfitted with an array of locks and safety devices. There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks, and could probably be followed and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials. This task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered in sequence, including the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. In addition, a host of corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly
Pakistan 1NC FL (3/3)
(card continues, no text deleted)
reliable, international and local security services must be kept perpetually in the dark, and no curious outsider must get consequential wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off. In addition, the financial costs of the operation could easily become monumental. Moreover, the difficulties are likely to increase because of enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments and because any foiled attempt would expose flaws in the defense system, holes the defenders would then plug. The evidence of al-Qaeda’s desire to go atomic, and about its progress in accomplishing this exceedingly difficult task, is remarkably skimpy, if not completely negligible. The scariest stuff—a decade’s worth of loose nuke rumor—seems to have no substance whatever. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan: “Make use of that which is available ... rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In part because of current policies—but also because of a wealth of other technical and organizational difficulties—the atomic terrorists’ task is already monumental, and their likelihood of success is vanishingly small. Efforts to further enhance this monumentality, if cost-effective and accompanied with only tolerable side effects, are generally desirable.
6. Their Sid-Ahmed evidence is blown totally out of proportion; it doesn’t say extinction, doesn’t say to what extend our world is exacerbated, and the possibility of third world war happens ONLY if it SUCCEEDS
7. Their Fai impact evidence explains that a nuclear arms race will only happen in a world where India and Pakistan face off, which has nothing to do with the previous cards in relation to their impact scenario; it’s only more proof that our link evidence takes out the aff
Jirga 1NC FL (1/3)
1. Their own Haqbeen 6/23 evidence indicates that Jirgas in relation to the issue of the Taliban have been around since 2001. Had jirgas been absolutely key to negotiating and keeping stability the aff would have been solved by now
2. Jirgas can’t ensure stability; it’s one-sided, elitist, corrupt, ineffective, and doesn’t solve the problem of the insurgency bleeding in from Pakistan
Wazhma Frogh is a gender and development specialist and human rights activist and recipient of the 2009 International Woman of Courage Award Afghanistan, 5/11/10, < >
Afghanistan is preparing for a consultative peace jirga through which it aspires to build national consensus on the political approach to the insurgency, and create a roadmap towards ending the perpetual violence in the country. The government has indicated that during the jirga it will open its reintegration and reconciliation plan for debate. A version of this plan was first presented at the London conference on Afghanistan in January, where the initiative received financial and political support. Traditionally, jirgas have been a mechanism for resolving communal and tribal conflicts in many parts of Afghanistan, as well as at the national level. Jirgas have been useful in solving disputes and averting further deterioration or perpetration of violence. Their decisions are often binding and forced, and resolutions arrived at through jirgas do not necessarily pass tests of justice or fairness. Furthermore, jirga representatives are often notables and local power-holders who may see it fit to impose their own will on the public, rather than represent the public's desires. We may be tempted to hope that the coming jirga might put an end to the continuing violence. However, as the new developments unfold around the reintegration and reconciliation plan, including the latest on offering exile to the Taliban commanders, the hope gets murkier. We hear various arguments against the reintegration plan. One of its only known components is the provision of incentives for the insurgents to renounce violence. Many claim that it's an unsustainable strategy and will further antagonise the majority youth who are feeling deprived of the development and security initiatives of the international community and the Afghan government. Women's rights activists and civil society groups raise their concern over the issue of justice for human rights violations and fear that a blank offer of amnesty will not bring enduring peace to Afghanistan. While many critics believe that Taliban leadership or forces will not participate in the jirga, another perspective can bring some optimism as well. The arrest of the leading Taliban commanders in Pakistan has disturbed the relationship between the Taliban and the Pakistani intelligence services. So the jirga can be an opportunity for the Afghan Taliban leadership to withdraw their affiliation from the Pakistani intelligence and become part of the political and national processes in Afghanistan. Otherwise, they will be continuously used as scapegoats by the Pakistani government to cash its cheques in Washington. The risk is that jirga may be a one-sided interaction of the people in power with the vulnerable Afghan elders – asking the elders to help with the peace process while ignoring that some of these elders might be executed upon their return to their village, and some will not even try to come due to such fear from the local militants and insurgents. This risk is more likely to materialise in relation to elders from the southern and south-eastern provinces, the focus of ongoing violence. It is wrong to set high expectations for the coming jirga. It may serve as a step towards stabilising Afghanistan, but such hopes should be tempered by a realisation that the realities on the ground continue to be violent. If the Taliban movement was national, independent and based on Afghan patriotic sentiments, such a jirga might be more sensible and productive, but it is undeniable that much of the violence in Afghanistan is caused by an exported insurgency – one that is created and sustained by Afghanistan's neighbour, Pakistan. The time has come for the Afghan government to seriously talk with the Pakistani military and the intelligence services that have been the fathers of the Taliban movement and insurgency.
Jirga 1NC FL (2/3)
3. Their impact evidence is terrible; it’s all outdated, Bush Administration-era pieces of information that doesn’t take into account the surge in Iraq, the current surge in Afghanistan, and the change in foreign policy that has taken into account via leadership position changes.
4. Don’t buy their Waldman evidence regarding how reconciliation is key; the article was based off of development and humanitarian purposes, not national security
5. Jirgas are merely corrupt bribery schemes that only exist due to government weakness
TLO, The Liaison Office is a non-governmental organization aiming at improving local governance, stability and security in Afghanistan through systematic and institutionalized engagement with traditional tribal structures and civil society groups., March 2009 Program Brief, Between the Jirga and the Judge, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Southeastern Afghanistan, < >
“I would say that in the past the work of jirgas was transparent and almost all of the tribal elders wanted to serve their tribes by resolving their conflicts and bringing peace among them,” one Khost CCM member recently noted. “But now I can say that corruption is associated wth jirgas and most of the tribal elders do jirgas for their own benefit by taking bribes of by taking kalaat [a customary fee for conducting a jirga]. Such things influence the process of decision making and most of the time unjust decisions are made in jirgas.” Even though tribal systems have gradually weakened during the last 30 years of conflict, these systems still remain relatively strong when compared to government justice mechanisms which have been largely absent or ineffective in much of rural Afghanistan. It is clear that both formal and customary systems have weaknesses. It is also clear that in Southeast Afghanistan tribal systems need the government as much as the government needs tribal systems.
6. Jirgas are based off obsolete, patriarchal forms of dealing with problems; tradition is used to justify murders and other crimes
AHRC. The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. 11/3/08, < >
In March 2008 a 17-year old girl in Sindh province was pressured by her uncle to convince her parents to hand over acres of farm land. On her refusal, the uncle and his accomplices brought in her father and made him watch as the girl was mauled by a pack of dogs and then shot. In May a Jirga was arranged in which the dead girl was posthumously declared ‘Kari’ (involved in an illicit relationship). The murderers were vindicated and a local man was forced to confess to being the illicit lover of the girl, and to pay Rs 400,000 as compensation. The majority of the more barbaric human rights violations making their way out of Pakistan can be traced to the Jirga, court-like gatherings of tribal men which have been declared illegal by the superior courts in Pakistan. Despite this, over 4,000 people have reportedly died in Jirga-ordered murders over the last six years, two thirds of them women. Many of those involved in implementing Jirgas hold, or will likely go on to hold, places in Pakistan’s parliament. In order to appreciate the destructive, random nature of the Jirga, its methods must be looked at. In a tribal court, witnesses and hearsay are the main forms of evidence and a verdict often rests on the reputation or power of a witness. Women are considered sexually corrupt, and their testimonies are never given any weight. In fact, in Jirga proceedings women are not allowed to participate. During a session spectators tend to gather, pick a side and heckle, putting pressure on the decision makers. Some spectators head to Jirgas for entertainment and needless to say, the most popular verdict may not always be a just one; it is difficult to reconcile justice with the will of an over-excited mob. In many instances, superstition also comes into play. In certain cases defendants have been told to walk on hot coals; if they feel and show no pain then they are deemed to be innocent. These are not conditions of a humane or rational system, and yet it is one that regularly deals out the death sentence. The power of the Jirga has increased over the years because of failings in Pakistan’s existing legal system. Judgments can take years, even generations, and Pakistanis with small civil complaints often prefer to take the swifter route through local Jirgas because they have little faith in the system. It is from here that the Jirga’s advent into life and death judgments has grown. The likelihood of justice has become so bad that a Jirga-issued death sentence has become a way to resolve personal and political vendettas and property disputes (particularly by male family members who resent losing property to another family through the marriage of a woman relative). One of the main problems in combating Jirgas is its defense under the umbrella of custom. When one case of eight women who
Jirga 1NC FL (3/3)
(card continues, no text deleted)
were buried alive came to light, two Pakistani senators (Israrullah Zehri and Jan Mohammad Jamali) defended the act as an example of Baloch tradition. This word ‘tradition’ conjures up wholesome, age-old, culturally rich practices that are under threat from secular or western values. One obvious question is whether the terms ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’ should apply to arbitrary, extra-judicial killings. Another would be to note that upon Islam’s birth in 7AD the faith was a force against the live burial of female babies - common at that time. The Quran does not support such murders. However, these murders are committed in its name. The justification of such murders in the name of the Quran needs to be questioned and exposed. Actual development of such practices of murder have more to do with property disputes and the very distortion of the tribal practices themselves in order to support injustices and discrimination against women. What takes place as Jirgas today are mob trials, manipulated by the rich, powerful and male elements. At one time Jirgas may have had some very legitimate aspects of tribal dispute settlement. However, what is found today is an aberration of such systems to justify cruelties that would not have been acceptable to tribal people in the earlier stages of history.
Solvency 1NC FL (1/2)
1. The surge is our only option to ensure Afghanistan’s stability. That’s Nagl.
2. The only way to win in Afghanistan is a long-term commitment, and all of that depends on the surge
Pete Hegseth served in Iraq with the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division for their deployment to Iraq from 2005-2006 and serves as the executive director for Vets for Freedom, 7/29/09, < >
This morning Defense Secretary Robert Gates indicated that in Iraq, “There’s at least some chance of a modest acceleration [of the drawdown] because of the way General Odierno sees things going. But that remains to be seen.” According to the New York Times and as indicated by the Pentagon, two Brigade Combat Teams (roughly 10,000 soldiers) are scheduled to leave Iraq — without replacements — by the end of 2009; Gates believes an additional BCT (5,000 soldiers) could leave by then as well. General Odierno — commander of all forces in Iraq, and General Petraeus’s top deputy during the Surge — believes conditions on the ground have improved quicker than expected, and the drawdown may be accelerated without undercutting Iraqi gains on the ground. The Iraqis are indeed stepping up, as news reports have independently verified as of late. It also sounds like this decision is not set in stone, and if conditions worsen, the drawdown could be slowed; as Gates says, “This remains to be seen.” So, on the face of it, this looks like a conditions-based assessment, based on recommendations of commanders on the ground and without a fixed-timeline. All good stuff. At the same time, the news out of Afghanistan is more complicated. The fight is tough, and definitely under-resourced (as it has been for some time). Bing West outlined the shortages well in today’s Wall Street Journal. We need more troops, more equipment, and a clear commitment to a sustained counter-insurgency mission. In light of this fact, why not use the early drawdown in Iraq as an opportunity to quickly shift even more troops to Afghanistan? Provided the Army and Marine Corps can facilitate the logistical platforms necessary to support even more war-fighters, a sudden — and unexpected — surge of even more troops into Afghanistan would knock the enemy off balance and allow U.S. troops to truly hold the ground, and not just clear it (which was our 2004-2006 mistake in Iraq). More troops, more helicopters, and more trainers are badly needed in Afghanistan — and this shift could alleviate that. Bing West also calls for these. However I disagree with Bing when he writes “A year from now, coalition forces should be able to gradually withdraw [from Afghanistan].” I'm not sure we should be talking “withdrawal” yet, even though that is the desired end state for everyone. Succeeding in Afghanistan will require a prolonged commitment, for numerous reasons. And before we bring our boys home, we need to give them the chance to choke out the enemy (with more troops and aggressive COIN operations) and drastically grow the Afghan National Army to replace them (which comes with better security and more trainers). It will take years, not months to create the conditions necessary for the Afghan government and security forces to stand on their own.
3. THE SURGE IS WORKING. Six reasons.
Newsweek, written by reporter Chris Charney, 2/26/10, < >
Even as the Marines' battle for Marja grabs headlines, it's diverting attention from a bigger story. Though the Taliban is entrenched in Helmand province, where Marja is situated, its grip is slipping in the rest of Afghanistan as President Barack Obama's 30,000-troop surge unfolds. These developments undercut the common belief that America is doomed to fail in a land of fiercely tribal, pro-Taliban Pashtuns who hate infidel invaders. In fact, Afghanistan's demography, sociology, military situation, and politics all favor Obama's counterinsurgency strategy. That's why it's working. The strategy, devised by U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, aims to win over Afghans by protecting them from the Taliban, restraining firepower to limit civilian casualties, and speeding up development, along with seizing Taliban sanctuaries like Marja. It has six things going for it. Most Afghans aren't Pashtuns —and most Pashtuns oppose the Taliban. Three fifths of Afghans are Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, and other ethnicities who suffered under Taliban rule and dread its return. What's more, while most Taliban fighters are Pashtun, 70 percent of Pashtuns dislike the Taliban. Only one Pashtun in four favors the insurgents. Most Pashtuns desire closer ties with the West. Why? Polls say they, like other Afghans, mainly want jobs, electricity, and reconstruction—none of which the Taliban offers. Civilian casualties are down. Despite tragedies like last week's errant airstrike that killed 27 noncombatants, McChrystal's strategy cut civilian deaths from U.S. and NATO action by 30 percent, to 596 last year. The Taliban killed many more civilians in 2009: 1,630, a 60 percent jump from 2008. Afghans noticed. Over the course of 2009, polls show, they started blaming Afghanistan's violence on the Taliban instead of the Americans. Afghans feel more secure when U.S. troops are around. As U.S. forces have surged in Afghanistan, so has their popularity. Support for the U.S. military presence climbed 5 points in 2009 to 68 percent, reversing three years of
Solvency 1NC FL (2/2)
(card continues, no text deleted)
decline. Polls show that Afghans have confidence in U.S. forces when they think the American presence is strong in their area. Civilian casualties worry them, but Afghans' chief gripe about our forces is their absence, not their presence. Afghan forces are gaining on-the-ground presence and popularity. Afghanistan's Army and police are surging, too, doubling in size since 2008. As they've fanned out, the proportion of Afghans reporting a weak government presence where they live has fallen by half, to just 19 percent. Greater presence has raised the forces' standing with their people. Despite often-justified criticism of both forces for ineptitude and corruption, December's ABC News poll found 70 percent of Afghans are positive about the Army and 62 percent about the police, significantly up from a year before. Though government forces have failings, most Afghans prefer them to the Taliban for security. The Taliban is stuck in thinly populated rural areas. ABC's poll showed that the Taliban gained little ground in 2009, even as it killed more. Only 14 percent of Afghans said it was strong in their areas, the same as the year before. The Taliban had infiltrated most Pashtun areas by 2008, leaving few other easy targets—and those big swaths of the map under Taliban influence have few people. So McChrystal's focus on protecting towns and other populated areas from Taliban attack makes sense. The antigovernment alliance is showing cracks. Osama bin Laden is disliked by over half of Afghans, especially influential male elders in the Pashtun south. Polls also show Taliban supporters detest the Hezb-i-Islami movement of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Taliban ally, while Hekmatyar supporters return the disfavor. Moreover, one third to one half of Afghans mention poor local security or compulsion as the reason people in their areas support the insurgents, just as many as cite religion. Many Taliban supporters aren't religious fanatics; offer what they want or play on their divisions and they can be peeled away. The fight for Marja is the climax of the struggle for Helmand, home of the majority of the Taliban's full-time fighters and lucrative opium revenues. It's the Anbar province of Afghanistan: like its Iraqi equivalent, it must be taken to remove an insurgent heartland. But Afghanistan's main battle is elsewhere. If the Taliban can't gain popular support or silence, it can't win. Obama's gamble recognizes this—and it's started to pay off.
Solvency Case Ext
Surge must be there for the long-term
NPR, National Review: Mixed Signals on Afghan Surge, 6/14/10,
Afghans are masters of hedging their bets, and Pres. Hamid Karzai is hedging his. Who can blame him? After an agonizingly long period of deliberation, President Obama approved an Afghan surge with an expiration date of July 2011 attached. That's when Obama said we'd "begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan." For Obama, stuffed full of cautionary tales about LBJ and Vietnam, that was a clever way to limit his commitment and to placate his anti-war base. For the region, it was a disastrous signal communicating a lack of resolve and staying power. It gave the Taliban yet more reason to believe that they can outlast us and Karzai more reason to consider his options if we leave precipitously. In that event, he basically has three choices—get killed, flee the country, or reach a desperation-driven deal with the Taliban and the Pakistanis. He's showing an understandable inclination toward preparing the ground for the last of these. President Obama needs to walk back his deadline by making it clear that next July is the date for a review of the current strategy rather than its necessary endpoint. In his West Point speech, Obama said he'd take "account of conditions on the ground." If he does that now, he'll realize the folly of July as the hard deadline for the beginning of the transition to the Afghans. There's no rushing a war of counterinsurgency, especially in the difficult circumstances of Afghanistan. In Marjah, the Taliban stronghold in Helmand province that became a kind of early showcase for the surge, Gen. Stanley McChrystal has learned that there is no such thing as a "government in a box," his unfortunately glib phrase for the Afghan government he hoped to import into the city after clearing it of the enemy. But Marjah isn't remotely as important as Kandahar, the country's second-biggest city and the spiritual home of the Taliban. The timeframe for our move into Kandahar has been delayed. The power wielded by Karzai's corrupt half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, makes Kandahar a hideously difficult political problem. We have to decide how aggressively to take on his network, the depredations of which fuel the insurgency. Or as McChrystal has said, "I want to make sure we've got conditions shaped politically with the local leaders, with the people." That will take time, and McChrystal shouldn't have to make his decisions with an eye to a looming artificial deadline. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates hasn't been helpful in this respect. He has repeatedly said the general must show progress by December. But the entirety of the surge forces will barely have reached the country by the end of the year. In Iraq, we surged five combat brigades in five months. In Afghanistan, the last unit of the surge isn't scheduled to arrive until November, nearly 12 months after Obama announced the infusion. Our patience in Afghanistan needn't be endless. Certainly it's reasonable to expect progress by next year. But McChrystal's instinct is correct: "It is more important we get it right than we get it fast." Obama should make it clear he understands that as well, and dump his civilian team that has so disastrously mishandled President Karzai. Both special envoy Richard Holbrooke and Amb. Karl Eikenberry have poisonous relationships with the Afghan leader, making McChrystal effectively our top general and diplomat. Whatever this is, it isn't "smart power." Karzai is a deeply flawed figure, but if we handle him with more deftness than either Holbrooke or Eikenberry has been able to summon, it should be possible to work with him productively. The first step is to assure him—and the region—that we aren't leaving beginning next July.
Despite more projected casualties, top command insist that surge is key to repelling Taliban and Al-Qaeda
BBC News, 12/2/09,
A Taliban commander told the BBC that if more US troops came, more would die. US President Barack Obama, announcing a long-awaited strategy on Tuesday, said another 30,000 American troops would be deployed quickly in Afghanistan. Defence Secretary Robert Gates told the US Congress that curbing the Taliban was essential for regional security. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr Gates stressed that the US goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan was to defeat the al-Qaeda network - and to do that, the Taliban must be pushed back. "Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil war," he said. "Taliban-ruled areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for al-Qaeda as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan." He said the first of the new US troops could hit the ground in Afghanistan in two to three weeks. "Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical - and, in my view achievable," he said. Senator John McCain, the senior Republican on the committee, told the BBC he backed Mr Obama's decision to deploy more troops but not the announcement that their withdrawal would begin in July 2011. "We need to make it clear to the enemy that we're going to succeed and we are going to stay as long as necessary to succeed," he said. He also warned that the US and UK should expect more casualties in the short term as the surge gets under way.
Surge key to NATO participation in the war and Afghan support
BBC News, 12/2/09,
Rising violence - more than 900 US soldiers have died in Afghanistan - and August's discredited elections in the country have fanned domestic opposition to the eight-year-old war. Gen Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, who had asked for 40,000 extra troops, welcomed Mr Obama's speech, saying he had been given "a clear military mission" and the necessary resources. The reinforcements will take the total number of US troops in Afghanistan to more than 100,000. The BBC's Aleem Maqbool in Kandahar says that Gen McChrystal's message is that the president's announcement is not just about troop numbers but about a new clarity in the US mission there. He told troops that the success of their operation would be judged not on how many militants were killed but how many Afghans were given new opportunities and gave up their support for the insurgency, our correspondent says. Gen McChrystal also backed Mr Obama's estimate that enough progress would have been made by 2011 for the withdrawal of American forces to begin, although he warned of further casualties to come. Some 32,000 other foreign troops are also serving in Afghanistan. Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged members to do more. He told reporters on Wednesday that 5,000 extra troops would be sent in 2010, and "probably" a few thousand in addition. "This is our fight together," he said. "We must
finish it together." The UN envoy to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, told the BBC he did not believe the announcement from Washington amounted to an exit strategy because a long-term commitment remained. He stressed the need to strengthen Afghan institutions at a local level and build a sustainable economy. The Afghan government said it supported the new US strategy. Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta said that with international help, Afghanistan's armed forces would be able to start taking responsibility for security in 18 months.
T – 1NC – Decrease
A. Interpretation: Reduce means to diminish
Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, 2010,
b (1) : to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number
B. Violation: The aff is not a reduction – stopping the surge does not decrease the amount of standing forces in Afghanistan
C. Vote negative:
1. Fx topicality bad – it allows the aff to spike out of generic disad links and kill neg strat
2. Ground – we can’t debate on an unfair playing field where the aff can dodge our off-case positions
3. Fairness – key to good debate and critical to clash within rounds; if debate wasn’t fair people would leave
T – 2NC – Decrease
Overview: The aff is not a decrease; stopping an action that increases does not actually decrease in terms of the effect of the plan. Whatever decrease happens after the plan is implemented is not a product of the plan. T is a voter for fairness.
They say:
1. We meet – the actual mechanism of the aff does nothing about the current situation in Afghanistan. Decrease must be an actual reduction, that’s Merriam-Webster
2. C/I future or phased reduction – the aff doesn’t even meet this definition; they’re fx topical and that’s bad.
Refusing to accept is not the equivalent of reduce
Guy, 91 - Circuit Judge (TIM BOETTGER, BECKY BOETTGER, individually and as Next Friend for their Minor Daughter, AMANDA BOETTGER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. OTIS R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services (89-1832); and C. PATRICK BABCOCK, Director, Michigan Department of Social Services (89-1831), Defendants-Appellants Nos. 89-1831, 89-1832 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 923 F.2d 1183; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 671)
The district court concluded that the plain meaning of the statutory language does not apply to the termination of employment one obtains on his own. A termination, the court held, is not a refusal to accept employment.
In this case, the plain meaning of the various words suggests that "refuse to accept" is not the equivalent of "terminate" and "reduce." As a matter of logic [**18] and common understanding, one cannot terminate or reduce something that one has not accepted. Acceptance is [*1189] a pre-condition to termination or reduction. Thus, a refusal to accept is a precursor to, not the equivalent of, a termination or a reduction. n3 n.3 This distinction is also reflected in the dictionary definitions of the words. "Accept" is defined in anticipatory terms that suggest a precondition ("to undertake the responsibility of"), whereas "terminate" and "reduce" are defined in conclusory terms ("to bring to end, . . . to discontinue"; "to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number."). See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1985).
3. Fx topicality good – extend 1NC C1; fx topicality allows excessive neg flexibility and allows them to spike out of disads and avoid links to our off-case args
4. Potential abuse – Our 1NC strat has already been screwed over by the 1AC; abuse is not potential, rather, it is real
5. Reasonability – That’s bad; reasonability forces the judge to be an intermediary player in the debate and forces the judge to make a biased and subjective decision in regards to the outcome of the debate
6. Education good – Fairness trumps education; education is good, but it can be about anything, whereas fairness dictates that topical education is maintained in debate. If education o/w fairness then we could literally talk about anything and that kills clash and debate. That’s 1NC C3.
7. Not a voter – Voting for the aff puts us on a slippery slope that allows the topic to progressively degenerate into a massive pool of non-topical cases that are allowed to be run. Voting neg is the only way to ensure the integrity of debate as well as the topic
T – 1NC – Presence
A. Interpretation: Presence excludes combat operations; it’s distinct from surges
Henry, 6 – served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since February 2003 (Ryan, “Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century,” ed: Lords,
)
Finally, operational access comprises the presence, global management, and surging of our forces overseas, all enabled by the political and geographic access we enjoy with hostnation partners. Presence is defined by the permanent and rotational forces that conduct military activities (training, exercises, and operations) worldwide, from security cooperation to crisis response. That presence consists of both small units working together in a wide range of capacities and major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in multinational operations. Second, our posture supports our new approach to force management, which seeks both to relieve stresses on our military forces and their families and to manage our forces on a global, rather than regional, basis. Combatant commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters; rather, forces are managed according to global priorities. Third, managing our military forces globally also allows us to surge a greater percentage of the force wherever and whenever necessary.
B. Violation: The aff doesn’t reduce non-combat operations, which are topical
C. Vote neg:
1. The aff explodes the topic; adding combat troops makes the number of affs infinitely larger, giving the neg an unfair research burden
2. Predictability; key to clash in debates and unpredictable affs make clash impossible to generate, which make for bad debates
3. Fairness - key to good debate and critical to clash within rounds; if debate wasn’t fair people would leave
T – 2NC – Presence
Overview: Presence is only non-combat troops; that’s Henry 6. The aff violates by adding combat troops and that’s bad because fairness is key to clash in debate and without clash debate isn’t debate anymore and we’d all quit
They say:
1. We meet – no they don’t; our interpretation says that they must not have combat troops when they clearly do. Come on, it’s the surge.
2. C/I Includes combat troops – prefer our Henry evidence; he worked for the DoD and has a better grasp of the definitions that are relevant to the plan and topic
3. Neg interp arbitrary/too limiting/no ground:
Not all US troops in Afghanistan are combat troops.
The Guardian, October 13, 2009,
President Barack Obama is quietly deploying an extra 13,000 troops to Afghanistan, an unannounced move that is separate from a request by the US commander in the country for even more reinforcements. The extra 13,000 is part of a gradual shift in priority since Obama became president away from Iraq to Afghanistan. The White House and the Pentagon both announced earlier this year that the number of US troops in Afghanistan was to be raised by 21,000, bringing the total at present to 62,000, with the aim of 68,000 by the end of the year. But the Washington Post, based on conversations with Pentagon officials, said that on top of those an extra 13,000 "enablers" are also being deployed. They are mainly engineers, medical staff, intelligence officers and military police. About 3,000 of them are specialists in explosives, being sent to try to combat the growing fatality rate from roadside bombs. The deployment of such non-combat troops is in line with the professed aim of the new US commander, General Stanley McChrystal, to try to win the hearts and minds of the Afghanistan population.
India CP 1NC (1/2)
Thus the plan: India should withdraw all combat troops from Kashmir. We’ll clarify.
Observation 1: The counterplan is non-topical
Observation 2: The counterplan is a competitive policy option with the 1AC
Observation 3: Net benefits
Withdrawal allows for more meaningful discourse between India and Pakistan
Rezaul H. Kaskar, foreign correspondent for PTI, 7/24/10, < >
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan president Asif Ali Zardari today said Pakistan and India should withdraw their troops from Siachen as the military deployment on the glacier has become a burden on the national exchequers of the two countries. Zardari made the remarks while addressing members of the media during a gathering at the chief minister's house in the southern city of Karachi. The time has come to demilitarise the Siachen glacier because of the high cost of the troop deployments, he said. He claimed that the Indian Army's expenditure on troops deployed on Siachen was more than that of Pakistan. Despite this, Pakistan had suggested to India that both countries should withdraw their forces from the region, he said. Referring to the lack of headway in the foreign minister-level talks between the two countries on July 15, Zardari contended that India's domestic politics were responsible for glitches in the parleys. However, Zardari said Pakistan was hopeful about the resumption of "meaningful dialogue" with India. Addressing another gathering at the same venue, Zardari said Pakistan had hired an international firm to work as arbitrator to resolve differences with India on the sharing of river waters. Since India had not come up with a viable solution to the water issue, Pakistan opted for international arbitration, he said. "The first time I met (Indian prime minister) Manmohan Singh, the first thing I spoke to him about was water. I am talking about the time almost two years ago, when I had just become president and I was at a UN programme where I met Manmohan Singh," he told the gathering. "When (Singh) met me again, he said if there is a dispute on water, then you can go to the World Bank, you can go to the adjudicating authorities with your problem and we will not mind that," he added. Zardari said he had then consulted the water and power ministry and the federal government and Pakistan hired an international firm as an arbitrator to negotiate with the World Bank and the Indian government on the water problem.
Solves the aff better – India is key to Pakistan’s role in the war in Afghanistan
The Nation, 2/7/10, written by Special Correspondent, India and Pakistan urged to help US stabilize Afghanistan, < >
A noted American columnist has urged India and Pakistan to cooperate with each other and help the United States stabilize the "tinderbox of Afghanistan." "India won't be secure unless Pakistan is, and vice versa. And neither country can be comfortable so long as Afghanistan remains a battleground," columnist David Ignatius wrote in the Washington Post on Sunday as he welcomed New Delhi's offer of talks with Islamabad. "Each nation fears (often with good reason) that the other's intelligence service is using Afghanistan as a staging ground," he said in his regular column: A new thaw between India and Pakistan. "This Indo-Pak version of the 'Great Game' is poisonous, and the two need to begin sharing intelligence about common threats, rather than fighting spy wars," Ignatius wrote. "The Indo-Pak problem is partly one of political asymmetry. India has a strong democracy, in which the military is powerful but subordinate to political leadership. Pakistan is the opposite: The military is the most robust segment of the Pakistani elite. Military command changes there are gossiped about almost as if they were elections". Noting that Admiral Mike Mullen likes to say: The key to Kabul lies in Islamabad, meaning that success in Afghanistan will be impossible without Pakistan's help, Ignatius said: "But the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is said to have an additional rubric: Given the political complications in that part of the world, the key to Islamabad lies in the Indian capital of New Delhi."So it was welcome news indeed Thursday when a Pakistani government spokesman announced that India had proposed high-level talks with Pakistan -- opening the way for a dialogue the region desperately needs. "How might India play the constructive role that Mullen and other top U.S. officials would like to see? The answer is easy to describe, but agonizingly difficult to put in practice:
India CP 1NC (2/2)
(card continues, no text deleted)
India could reassure Pakistan that as it works with the United States to contain the Taliban insurgency on its western frontier, the Indian military would ease pressure on the eastern border.
Withdrawal especially in Kashmir empirically proven to ease tensions; the region is the root cause of jihadist conflict in Afghanistan. Only the CP can solve the aff’s impacts
The Atlantic Wire, website that is associated with major magazine The Atlantic, written by Max Fisher, 12/18/09, < >
There are signs that long-simmering tensions over Kashmir, the disputed border region between Pakistan and India, may be cooling, if slowly. This week, India announced it had pulled 30,000 troops from Kashmir, the largest draw-down since 1999. It is a small step, given that up to 500,000 Indian troops remain in the region and antagonism still runs high between the two nuclear-armed states, but it is seen as an encouraging one. Kashmir is also of special interest to the U.S., as a de-escalation could allow Pakistan to take a larger role in fighting the Taliban. * Indian Concession To U.S.? Muslim-Indian blogger Manas Shaik speculates of India's claim that it was reducing troops due to a decrease in violence, "It could also be due to US pressure. But whatever the reason, it's a welcome decision." * Broad Political Willingness For Peace Kashmir Watch reports, "[Indian Home Affairs Minister] Chidambaram had also remarked that the Central government was ready to speak to all shades of political opinion in the state and was prepared to discuss self-determination, self-rule, autonomy and other such issues. Interestingly, various mainstream political parties have been demanding withdrawal of the troops from the state. Even separatist leaders like Syed Ali Shah Geelnai have also demanded total withdrawal of troops from all parts of the state." * U.S. Must Focus On Kashmir Time's Joe Klein has long argues as much. He wrote days after Obama's inauguration that the "ultimate good strategic sense behind Obama's thinking: Kashmir is at the heart of Pakistan's support for various Islamic extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban [...] for Afghanistan to settle down on a long-term basis, Pakistan is going to have to turn away from sponsoring Islamic extremist groups...which won't happen until there is some resolution of the historic Kashmir mess. For the moment, though, that will have to be done surreptitiously, if at all." Klein wrote on Thursday: [The] U.S. military presence in the region gives strength, and credibility, to the most important work that needs to be done--the diplomatic efforts to lower the temperature between Pakistan and India. This has to be the unstated, opaque priority of the coming months. Several years ago, the Indians and Pakistanis came close to a deal on Kashmir. We need to nudge them back to that agreement. * How India and Pakistan Can Resolve Kashmir Christian Science Monitor's Mansoor Ijaz makes the case for intelligence cooperation against Kashmir-based terror, for "mini free-trade zones" to deepen economic connections, and for both states to mobilize politically behind self-determination in Kashmir. "Two things need to happen: India needs to be prepared to systematically reduce its troops' presence, replacing military might and intimidation with economic growth and opportunity. And Pakistan must be prepared to end support for the jihadists." * India Must 'Seize The Moment' The Hindu's Suhasini Haidar insists "that the opportunity for a resolution in Jammu and Kashmir is presenting itself. A window of rare opportunity to break a twenty-year-old cycle of violence that must be seized." Haidar writes, "Ironically, the most far-reaching initiative for the resolution of the Kashmir problem to date was the one taken not by this government -- but the NDA government that preceded it, when it announced a ceasefire along the Line of Control in November 2003. That ceasefire, which has largely held for six years, became the springboard for all the initiatives that followed, including the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus." * Afghanistan's Forgotten Front Foreign Policy's Joshua Gross says it's Kashmir. "Kashmir is a void in U.S. foreign policy, all the more noticeable for its absence in our diplomats' discourse," he writes. "However, the 'hands off' approach ensures the prolongation of a perilous status quo. A perpetually unstable South Asia flooded with jihadi groups, with two combustible nuclear powers, undermines U.S. national security. In the interim, American troops are caught in the web of a conflict dynamic that extends far beyond the borders of Afghanistan. The Obama Administration must finalize the next steps for America's strategy in Afghanistan with a regional perspective. In the quest to stabilize Afghanistan, breaking the diplomatic impasse over Kashmir is a necessity, not a luxury."
India CP 2NC (1/2)
Overview: Even though Pakistan is important for the effort in Afghanistan, India’s withdrawal from disputed territory amongst the two countries is more key. That’s The Nation. Only the CP can solve for terrorism and taking away tensions in regions like Kashmir is key to avoiding disaster in South Asia
1. Kashmir key to stability and Pakistan’s role in anti-terror operations
Bloomberg, Paul Tighe, 12/2/09, < >
Dec. 3 (Bloomberg) -- Pakistan and India will achieve peace only with an accord on the disputed territory of Kashmir, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said as India’s government said it won’t hold talks until the government in Islamabad tackles terrorism. Gilani said Pakistan wants to resume talks on improving relations, a five-year process interrupted after last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai that India blamed on a Pakistan-based group. “For the elimination of terrorism, regional cooperation is vital,” the official Associated Press of Pakistan cited Gilani as saying. Talks with Pakistan can’t be held until the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks are dealt with, Indian Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram said yesterday, state-run broadcaster Doordarshan reported. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947, two of them over Kashmir, a divided Himalayan territory claimed in full by both countries. The peace process, begun in 2003, led to increased cultural, transport and sporting links between the nuclear-armed neighbors. The Indian-ruled portion, Jammu and Kashmir, is India’s only Muslim-majority state. Pakistan desires peaceful relations with its neighbor, APP cited Gilani as telling members of the Pakistani community in London yesterday at the start of a visit to the U.K. Troop Withdrawal India will withdraw a significant number of security personnel from Jammu and Kashmir, Chidambaram told Parliament yesterday, according to Doordarshan. He didn’t elaborate. Groups in Jammu and Kashmir have responded positively to an initiative by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government for “quiet talks” on the future of the state, Chidambaram said. While some organizations want self-determination for the region, “I do not think we should shy away from talking to any group,” he said. The “quiet diplomacy” will take place “far away from the glare of the media.” Singh visited Jammu and Kashmir in October, renewing a call for talks with Kashmiri groups seeking self- determination and underlining his government’s commitment to help the economic development of the region where insurgents have staged a 20-year fight against Indian rule. The All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, an alliance of Kashmiri groups, wants India to pull its troops back from cities and end martial law. Armed Groups India accuses Pakistan of supporting armed extremists in Jammu and Kashmir, a charge denied by Pakistan, which says it offers only moral support to separatists. India and Pakistan account for four-fifths of South Asia’s $1.3 billion economy and economic progress in the region has suffered because of tensions between the nations. Pakistan takes only 4.8 percent of its imports from India, almost three times less than its biggest partner China, according to U.S. government data. The countries are members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a group known as Saarc, which includes Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives and Bhutan. Saarc nations, where a quarter of the world’s population lives, contribute less than 2 percent to global commerce 24 years after the association was set up. Prosecution Demanded India says the so-called composite dialogue with Pakistan can’t resume until Pakistan upholds pledges to prevent terrorist activity on its territory. India has demanded that Pakistan prosecute members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group who it says carried out the Mumbai attack that killed 166 people. Pakistan acknowledged the raid was planned on its soil. An anti-terrorism court in Pakistan last month charged seven people, including Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a Lashkar commander, with involvement in the attacks. The group’s founder has been put under house arrest. Gilani, speaking in London, said Pakistan is taking steps against terrorism and has carried out a successful military operation to drive Taliban fighters from the Swat Valley in North West Frontier Province and is now engaged in an offensive in the South Waziristan tribal region bordering Afghanistan. Terror Cost The military campaign against the Taliban is costing the government more than $8.5 billion a year, Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin has said.
India CP 2NC (2/2)
2. And, the CP uniquely solves because Kashmir is the root cause of conflict, which includes terrorism. The aff doesn’t target Kashmir and other disputed territories and therefore can’t solve. That’s The Atlantic Wire.
3. Without withdrawal from Kashmir India and Pakistan will always be on the edge of nuclear war
The San Diego Union-Tribune, Byline Copley News Service, Back from the brink, 6/4/02, Lexis
Nuclear weapons are meant to deter wars, not fight them. This has been accepted military doctrine since the only time nuclear weapons were ever used in warfare, to end the war against Japan in 1945. The India-Pakistan crisis represents the first time two nuclear nations have ever been mobilized to go to war. The 1962 U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Cuba was between nations that shared no common border, had never fought a hot war and always recognized the need for diplomacy. India and Pakistan are nations that share a border, have fought three wars and, as new nuclear nations, are no longer talking. Their leaders, we hope, understand that nuclear weapons are not meant to be used. It is the paradox of nuclear deterrence: Because nuclear war is unthinkable, both sides are moving cautiously, listening to mediators and looking for a way out. There is every chance a fourth India-Pakistan war can be avoided. To go to war as nuclear nations would be to step into the unknown, to test the proposition that deterrence works for nuclear war, but not conventional war, that the two nations can fight a fourth conventional war as if they did not possess nuclear weapons. It is probable that would be the case. U.S. and Soviet war planners believed in a "firebreak" between conventional and nuclear war, and the Soviet Union, like India today, stated it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war. Like Pakistan today, the United States declined such a "no first use" policy during the Cold War because it undermines deterrence. If a potential aggressor thinks you might be the first to use nuclear weapons, he is deterred from starting the fight. The problem with all this nuclear theory is that it does very little about problem solving. The India-Pakistan issue is Kashmir, and without a solution on Kashmir the two nations will remain on the permanent brink of war. India wants Pakistan to end incursions by Islamic militants from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir into India-controlled Kashmir. That reasonable request unfortunately does nothing to address the cause of these incursions. Without addressing the cause, it is unlikely Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf could stop the incursions even if he wanted to. The quid pro quo is up to India. Most Kashmiris, if they don't want to be part of Pakistan, don't want to be part of India, either. Indian misrule in Kashmir is the direct cause of Kashmiri unrest, and until India - along with Pakistan and Kashmiris - agrees to address the cause, war brinksmanship will continue. Indian intransigence endangers us all. The British botched the Kashmir issue at Indian and Pakistani independence 55 years ago, and Indian insistence that all is fine in the Kashmir Valley has a ludicrous ring today. The many mediators now heading for New Delhi must make this point clear.
India CP A2 Perm
(X-apply Solvency FL, or you can just read this block)
Perm doesn’t solve; the surge is necessary
John A. Nagl is president of the Center for a New American Security and author of Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam. 2/23/09, < >
There is an increasingly intense desire to transfer lessons learned from what appears to be a successful counterinsurgency effort in Iraq to America's long-neglected war in Afghanistan. The shift in attention is both laudable and overdue. While Iraq is increasingly secure and stable, Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever. We can certainly do better in Afghanistan than we have over the past seven years of war—but it will require a careful appraisal of what we're trying to accomplish and an appreciation for the resources required to get there. A strategic review must reflect an understanding of how to apply all the components of American power—not just the military—to achieve our ends. We need an Afghan surge—an increase of troops (including Afghan forces) to enable the application of a population- and oil-spot-security strategy. While additional U.S. troops are necessary, they are not sufficient to achieve success in Afghanistan. The ends we seek are no sanctuary for terrorists and no regional meltdown. American goals in Afghanistan have suffered from the most fundamental of all strategic errors: insufficient resources to accomplish maximalist goals. Building a liberal democracy in Afghanistan may be possible, but after 30 years of war, the country simply does not have the human capital and institutions that democracy requires. Creating that human infrastructure is a noble long-term enterprise for the international community, but in the meantime, the United States should focus on more achievable goals: ensuring that terrorists never again have a sanctuary on Afghan territory from which to launch attacks on the United States and our allies, and preventing Afghanistan from further destabilizing its neighbors, especially the fragile, nuclear-armed state of Pakistan. While an expanded international commitment of security and development forces can assist in the achievement of these goals in the short term, ultimately Afghans must ensure stability and security in their own country. Building a state, even if it is a flawed one, that is able to provide a modicum of security and governance to its people is the American exit strategy from Afghanistan. Achieving these minimal goals will be hard enough. In terms of means, we can use U.S. soldiers now, but we must transition to advisers for the long haul. More troops are desperately needed in Afghanistan, but troops alone are insufficient to achieve even limited goals for American policy in Afghanistan over the next five years. Success in counterinsurgency requires the integration of military, diplomatic, and economic assistance to a country afflicted by insurgents; Gen. David McKiernan, the American commander responsible for the International Security Assistance Forces, briefed just such a strategy to a group of scholars visiting Afghanistan in November. Unfortunately, he has not been given the resources required to accomplish his mission. The first requirement for success in any counterinsurgency campaign is population security. This requires boots on the ground and plenty of them—20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 people is the historically derived approximate ratio required for success, according to the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. That force ratio prescribes some 600,000 counterinsurgents to protect Afghanistan, a country larger and more populous than Iraq—some three times as large as the current international and Afghan force. The planned surge of 30,000 additional American forces to Afghanistan over the next year is merely a down payment on the vastly expanded force needed to protect all 30 million Afghan people. The long-term answer is an expanded Afghan National Army. Currently at 70,000 and projected to grow to 135,000, the Afghan Army is the most respected institution in the country. It must be expanded to 250,000, and mirrored by sizable local police forces, to provide the security that will prevent Taliban insurgent infiltration of the population. Building Afghan security forces will be a long-term effort that will require American assistance and advisers for many years, but there is no viable alternative.
India CP A2 International Fiat Bad
International Fiat Good:
1. Increases topic education – learning that Kashmir is key to topical issues within the topic is good since we get a deeper education on what really causes what. Education is what decides debates, not theory
2. Increases aff ground – allows the aff to debate the logistics of the counterplan through any angle and compare it in relation to the 1AC
3. Encourages clash – more critical debates through a creative spectrum enforced with arguments like this counterplan makes debates more educational and fun, encouraging people to join
Warranted Defense:
1. Washington can only hurt reconciliation processes between India and Pakistan
Dhruva Jaishankar, Research Assistant, Foreign Policy and Anit Mukherjee, Ph.D. candidate, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Brookings Institution, 1/15/09,
The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has once again received international attention following November’s terrorist attacks on Mumbai. Given the longstanding nature of the dispute, the series of wars fought over the territory, and the possession of nuclear weapons by both parties, the inaction by the U.S. government over the last few years is often a cause for lament in foreign policy circles. Reports that the next administration plans on appointing a special envoy for the region have raised hopes that this policy would be remedied. Unfortunately, renewed U.S. engagement on Kashmir – especially if it were led by a high-profile envoy – is likely to prove counterproductive, a setback for U.S. foreign policy, for the India-Pakistan peace process and, ironically, for Kashmir itself. Over the last four years, an India-Pakistan peace process has made steady steps towards a mutually acceptable settlement. The so-called ‘composite dialogue’ between the two states, reinforced by back-channel talks between representatives of both countries’ leaders, made significant, albeit slow-moving, progress before it was derailed by domestic political turbulence in Pakistan and recurring terrorist attacks in India, Mumbai being but the latest – and most high profile – example. Despite these setbacks, most Indian and Pakistani policymakers still believe that their two countries have reached a mutually hurting stalemate, which cannot end without a lasting bilateral settlement. Indian strategists have made sustained calls for a 'grand bargain’ with Pakistan, and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has followed Pervez Musharraf in making conciliatory statements regarding India. The two countries have moved towards lowering trade barriers (including in Kashmir) and greater regional cooperation. Yet for four reasons, active American engagement on Kashmir by the incoming administration risks reversing such positive developments. First, both Islamabad and New Delhi view Washington as favoring the other side. Pakistan increasingly views the United States as preferential to India, an impression reinforced by Washington having brokered a civilian nuclear agreement with New Delhi. Indian policy elites, meanwhile, are worried that the United States will pressure India to make concessions in order to ensure continued Pakistani support in fighting the Taliban. Second, the biggest remaining hurdle to a lasting Kashmir agreement is the inability of the two governments to sell it domestically, something American intervention can do little to alter. India’s raucous domestic politics will not tolerate any overt U.S. pressure on a Kashmir resolution, even if it matches India’s objectives. In Pakistan, an agreement on Kashmir will have to be accepted by the army leadership, on whom Washington has historically failed to exert much influence. Third, unlike the disputes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, both sides have not requested American mediation. Any attempt will face a similar fate to the efforts of a proactive Kennedy administration in 1963, which succeeded only in stoking both countries’ resentment of the United States.
2. Unnecessary engagement justifies more terrorism and destabilizes the region as a whole
Dhruva Jaishankar, Research Assistant, Foreign Policy and Anit Mukherjee, Ph.D. candidate, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Brookings Institution, 1/15/09,
Finally, American engagement would embolden Kashmiri separatists to raise their demands, thus complicating the ongoing bilateral negotiations. Political groups favoring independence for Indian-administered Kashmir were quick to welcome Obama's stated intention of American engagement in the run-up to his election. American involvement will also unintentionally justify the use of terrorism by organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group ostensibly behind the Mumbai assault, for political objectives. A public decision by the next president and his national security team to engage the two regional rivals on a Kashmir settlement therefore looks certain to be a disaster. At the very least, such a move will embarrass the new administration and set back relations with New Delhi. At worst, it could prove counterproductive to what remains of the India-Pakistan peace process, and destabilizing for the region as a whole. Instead, the two sides should be left to themselves to minimize the damage to the peace process caused by the Mumbai attacks. A real effort by Pakistan at permanently dismantling the terrorist infrastructure and bringing to justice the perpetrators of the Mumbai massacre should be the first step. India, in turn, should consider a phrased withdrawal of troops from counterinsurgency duties in the Kashmir valley commensurate with a decrease in violence. Peaceful state-level elections in Kashmir in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks provide a good enough reason for such a move by New Delhi. Taken together, these steps offer the best hope for reviving the peace process in the region. Undoubtedly, inaction might not appeal to the incoming Obama administration bent on renewing American engagement with the rest of the world. While well-intended, the idea that a focused American effort on settling the Kashmir dispute will dramatically stabilize the region to the benefit of American strategic goals is far-fetched and simplistic. Instead, the American role in this process should remain what it has been over the past four years: supportive, but from a distance.
Taliban Takeover DA 1NC (1/3)
Uniqueness: The results of the surge in Afghanistan was a good first step in driving out the Taliban and stabilizing the country
Gordon Lubold, staff writer for The Christian Science Monitor, 5/8/10,
The surge of American forces President Obama directed to Afghanistan is under way. So far, 17,000 of the 30,000 additional forces are there, bringing the US total in Afghanistan to 86,000. The rest are expected on the ground by December, for a total of 100,000. How have things been progressing so far, and what can be expected during the next year? Has the surge had an impact yet? The increase of Marine forces enabled the United States to conduct operations in the Marjah district of Helmand Province this winter, the first operation since the beginning of the surge. The Marjah offensive drove out some insurgents and tempered their influence in the area, at least somewhat. In Afghanistan, where progress is expected to be incremental, the offensive has been seen as a success. In the wake of initial operations, markets opened, villagers returned, and some semblance of security emerged. The next major operation is now beginning in Kandahar, arguably the second most important cultural, political, and economic city in Afghanistan after Kabul, and considered the spiritual home of the Taliban. Those operations have begun quietly in recent weeks as more surge forces arrive. How will the surge be different from the first eight years of the war? The Marjah offensive offered clues. It employed some key new strategies that will be implemented by surge forces. First, in an effort to encourage insurgents to leave, coalition forces telegraphed their intentions very publicly. It worked. For the most part, the offensive was anticlimactic. Insurgents either left or went into hiding as the US and coalition forces arrived. This points to the coalition's shift from an emphasis on killing insurgents to protecting populations. After arriving, coalition forces essentially built a ring around the area. This contrasts with many presurge offenses, in which troops attacked and then mostly returned to their bases. The goal of the surge is to "clear" key population centers of insurgents, then "hold" them to prevent insurgents from returning. The next step is to maintain law and order to allow Afghans to "build" normal lives. This is called a "clear, hold, build" strategy, which US forces also used in Iraq. What does the Iraq surge tell us about what might happen in Afghanistan? During the surge of forces in Iraq, which began in early 2007, the number of US casualties swelled. In January 2007, for example, there were 137,000 troops in Iraq and 86 coalition fatalities, according to . By May 2007, there were 148,000 American troops on the ground and 131 coalition fatalities. But that trend started to change when certain factors converged to help stabilize Iraq. One of those factors, many experts argue, was that the increasing number of troops created a critical mass to help stem the violence. By October, there were 166,000 American troops in Iraq, but the number of fatalities per month had dropped to 40. Afghanistan may be considerably different, and experts and military officials are reluctant to predict that the surge will work the same way in two distinctly different places. Iraq's relative homogeneity stands in stark contrast to the tribal and ethnic diversity of Afghanistan, where few village elders think alike, and are motivated by different things. One village leader might want money for a new school, another might want the US to vacate an area to give him more credibility. Are US forces working to co-opt local forces as they did in Iraq with the 'Anbar Awakening'? Not in any comprehensive way. The Pentagon has been pushing the small triumphs of its Local Defense Initiative, which attempts to leverage tribal militias into anti-insurgent "neighborhood watches." But Kabul has pushed back against the initiative, fearing that the arming and promotion of local militias could lead to a civil war similar to the one that engulfed Afghanistan after the Soviets left and which led to the rise of the Taliban. With the Americans wanting to have an Afghan face on everything they do, they are wary of going against Kabul's wishes. President Hamid Karzai plans to hold a "peace jirga" to bring together different leaders. Out of that a "Sons of Afghanistan"-like program could emerge. But it may still be too soon.
Taliban Takeover DA 1NC (2/3)
Link: War efforts in Afghanistan are unsustainable without the surge
Wall Street Journal, 9/3/09, We can still win a counterinsurgency, but not on the cheap, < >
Opposition to the war is rising, even in the President's own party and even before his new military strategy has been fully implemented. Our ally's leaders look weak and corrupt, Americans are increasingly opposed to the war, and prominent politicians and columnists are saying it is time to leave and redeploy our forces to focus on the real danger to the U.S., which is from al Qaeda. Sound familiar? That was roughly the state of play regarding Iraq in September 2007, even as General David Petraeus's troop surge and counterinsurgency strategy were beginning to work in Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle. Despite a few shaky moments, President Bush stuck with it, and a looming U.S. defeat became a victory. We are now approaching a similar pass in Afghanistan, amid rising doubts about the wisdom of continuing that war nearly eight years after 9/11. Evidence that President Hamid Karzai's allies stuffed ballot boxes have tarnished the recent Afghan election, U.S. casualties are rising, and the Taliban enemy seems increasingly menacing. Though new theater commander Stanley McChrystal has only recently submitted his strategic plan, the calls are growing for the U.S. to leave. We are about to see if our current Commander in Chief has the nerve of his predecessor to withstand a Washington panic. *** The great irony of this panic is that only months ago the consensus was that Afghanistan was a "war of necessity," as President Obama likes to put it. Even the left seemed to agree that Afghanistan couldn't again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda, that retreat from Afghanistan would be a strategic victory for jihadists, and that it would weaken our influence in Islamabad and perhaps threaten the stability of Pakistan itself as Islamists tried to turn the Pakistan military and population its way. Now we're told we can accomplish these same strategic goals merely by maintaining a much smaller force than the 68,000 currently committed to Afghanistan. Drones and special forces based offshore can contain the jihadists, while the Kabul government will have to fend for itself. We thus don't need to "nation build" to achieve U.S. ends. This sounds appealing as a way to ease our military burden, but isn't this also more or less what we've already been doing in Afghanistan? Until Mr. Obama's recent increase in troops, the U.S. and NATO have provided only the lightest of Afghan footprints, depending on air power and strike teams to hit the Taliban. It was precisely these stand-off attacks that raised concerns about civilian casualties and allowed the Taliban to return to dominate territory after our troops had cleared it and departed.
Internal Link: Taliban and Al-Qaeda would reoccupy Afghanistan
Wall Street Journal, 9/3/09, We can still win a counterinsurgency, but not on the cheap, < >
The Afghan army will eventually have to do most of the fighting, but for now it remains too small at 173,000 army and police to do so. If the U.S. were to depart, the Taliban would soon control at least the southern and eastern parts of the country. Kandahar would probably fall, too. Al Qaeda could re-establish itself in this territory, as opposed to being confined as it is now to the mountainous border regions. If Generals McChrystal and Petraeus believe they can successfully defeat al Qaeda in such a vast area from offshore, they should say so. But we haven't heard that so far.
Taliban Takeover DA 1NC (3/3)
Impact: Genocide
Mohammad Amin Wahidi, staff writer for Kabul Press, Officialy sanctioned genocide in Afghanistan? 8/13/08,
The Hazaras in Afghanistan are great supporters of democracy and social justice, because they are tools to help eliminate the discrimination they, as a people, have suffered for too many years. Among the Hazaras, education and freedom for women, involvement of women in social and political issues, and literacy for all, are being pursued more ambitiously than in any other part of Afghanistan. This openness has marked them by autocratic fundamentalists throughout Central Asia and certain Arab countries as Afghanistan’s historic victims who have suffered discrimination, oppression, torture, obligatory displacements, and genocide for at least for one and half centuries. The Taliban always considered the Hazaras to be one of their main enemies. Under Taliban rule, the Hazaras faced genocide for the second time in modern history. This genocide was a continuation of the same genocide they faced in 1880s and 90s by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, the Pashtoon tyrant king who killed 62 % of the Hazara population and forced many to flee to neighboring countries. The Hazaras have always opposed the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan’s political arena, but since the Karzai administration needs the Taliban’s ethnic support, the return of the Taliban is continually supported by the government. The vigorous opposition of the Hazaras to this policy explains the administration’s on-going anti-Hazara discrimination. As the elections draw nearer, this discrimination has become distressingly bloody. The government wants to destroy the Hazara opposition to the Taliban and thereby cement its criminal management of Afghanistan. So the Taliban has received direct and indirect support of the government to weaken the Hazaras in political, social and economic arenas. Given the basic ethnic tribal structure of Afghanistan, it is essential for the government to assist and unite every ethnic group to create a strong, just nation. The Karzai administration, has failed in this unification effort. However, to fortify its power, it has adopted a policy of impunity for the Taliban, in support of the Pashtoons. This occurs, despite five years of crimes against humanity the Taliban have committed since the arrival of coalition forces. The Taliban, who should have been prosecuted and tried for war crimes, are shielded by the current Afghan government. It encourages the international military in Afghanistan to fight Taliban insurgents. On the other hand, it allocates large sums of money to the “forgiveness commission,” which releases Taliban from prison and pays them large amounts of money as compensation. The released Taliban misuse these favors, then return to the front lines to battle against the government, Afghan civilians, and coalition soldiers. This is not the end of the traitorous deals. The government also supports the Taliban’s opium production with drug-related deals involving senior governmental officials including family members of the president in Kandahar. These people get rich off the drug trade, and when it finally blows up in their face, will escape to their villas in the Mediterranean, California, New York, and the Washington, D.C. suburbs, protected by big bank accounts in Switzerland, the US and Dubai. Next year’s presidential and parliamentary elections are forcing the Karzai administration to seek Taliban support, while encouraging ethnic conflict to distract normally peaceful, democratic regions from the electoral process. Taliban attacks on Hazaras in the name of the Kochies (nomads) Within last two to three years, using the name of The Kochies (Nomads) the Taliban have begin their attacks on Hazarajaat by the support of specific senior governmental officials within the Karzai administration team as a result they have killed people and livestock, burnt many houses, schools, and forced thousands of people including the women, the elderly and children to obligatory displacement in Behsood district Maidan Wardak province.
Taliban Takeover DA Uniqueness Wall
The surge, although long-term success cannot be determined just yet, is heading in the right direction
ERIN M. SIMPSON, Member of the Afghan International Security Assistance Force's Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team; spent the past several months in southern Afghanistan; the views expressed are her own, Washington Post, 5/9/10,
Any discussion of the effectiveness of the surge must begin with two observations. First, counterinsurgency is an exercise in competitive governance, meaning the troops "surged" to Afghanistan are only part of a very complex equation. Second, less than half the troops that President Obama authorized in December have arrived here. It's far too early to tell whether the so-called surge has "worked." Most of the troops who have arrived are Marine battalions deployed to Helmand province, with many participating in coalition operations in Marja -- in many ways the hardest test-case of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy. After tough fighting, we see initial, fragile signs of progress. Marja has shifted from being under 100 percent Taliban control, with no Afghan officials, to ever-increasing government presence. Twenty Afghan officials work there and are starting to bring basic services to long-neglected Afghans. Elsewhere in Helmand, Marines have moved into the "hold" and "build" phases of their campaign -- especially in Nawa and Garmsir, where many senior government and tribal officials have returned to work after violence drove them into "exile" in the provincial capital. For the "surge" to succeed, coalition and Afghan officials will need to capitalize on this change in momentum in Helmand. This includes maintaining government effectiveness through the critical fall planting season, providing the assistance necessary to allow farmers to plant winter wheat instead of pernicious poppy. But the Taliban won't win by outfighting the coalition; it can win only by outgoverning the Afghans. The early phase of the surge is getting Afghans back into the governance game. This is where we must focus our attention.
The surge is putting pressure on the Taliban; it’s a good first step
John A. Nagl is president of the Center for a New American Security and author of Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam. 5/9/10, Washington Post,
The counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan that President Obama committed to twice over the course of 2009 is beginning to take hold. This strategy, like the one adopted in Iraq in 2007, is much more than an additional commitment of troops and civilian experts; it focuses on protecting the local population in order to provide a secure space within which political solutions to the underlying problems driving the insurgency can develop. Counterinsurgency campaigns are not won by killing or capturing every insurgent and terrorist; while the most committed ideologues have to be killed or captured, many of the foot soldiers and even the mid-level leaders decide at some point that renouncing violence and becoming part of the political process offer a better chance for success than continuing to fight. The increased U.S. troop commitment in south and east Afghanistan, where the insurgency is strongest, along with more effective drone strikes and an increasing Pakistani government commitment to counterinsurgency, are putting more pressure on the Taliban and giving the Afghan government an opportunity to outgovern its enemies. During his visit to Washington, Afghan President Hamid Karzai will discuss with Obama how the political effort is faring -- and what the United States will be willing to accept from Taliban negotiators who are seeking reconciliation with the Afghan government. Whether Karzai is able to provide effective political solutions will be the ultimate test of Obama's counterinsurgency strategy.
There are mixed signs, but we’re headed in the right direction
KURT VOLKER. Ambassador to NATO from 2008 to 2009; managing director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; senior adviser at the Atlantic Council of the United States. 5/9/10, Washington Post,
The surge was always part of a bigger strategy to be implemented over time. This means we can't judge the surge by itself, and it's too early to judge the whole effort. As of today, here's the score sheet: Reversing the Taliban's military momentum: on track. Fighting smarter, to engage the local population: making progress, thanks to Gen. Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency approach. Pressuring the Taliban inside Pakistan: surprisingly successful. Training more and better Afghan security forces, so they can lead: lagging. Strengthening civilian efforts, including governance, anti-corruption policies and the economy: real problems here, especially in the relationship with President Hamid Karzai. Hopefully his visit will get us all on the same page. Implementing a regional political and economic strategy to help make Afghanistan sustainable: still on the drawing board. Our biggest liability is that regional actors and NATO allies believe we will pull out beginning in July 2011. Thus the villains play for time, the good actors hedge their bets and the allies guard their wallets. Success in Afghanistan is a vital U.S. interest for a dozen different reasons. So we may as well be clear, for friend and foe alike: We are in for the long haul and will do whatever it takes.
Taliban Takeover DA Link Wall
The surge isn’t complete yet
Richard Kemp, 30 year British Armed Forces veteran and commander of the British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 6/18/10,
Has the Afghan surge been a failure? It’s not a failure. The surge is not yet complete. American forces are still building up in Afghanistan. Operation Moshtarak, which began a few months back and is still ongoing, has succeeded driving large elements of the Taliban out of areas they formerly controlled. There was reinfiltration and in that situation there will always be reinfiltration, but now there are more forces on the ground to prevent that reinfiltration and to retain greater control of areas that have been taken and I’m optimistic about that. We’re about to see, I think, an offensive begin against the Taliban in the Kandahar area. That’s probably the heartland of the Taliban, and I think they’re going to be quite tenacious in their desire to hold on to that territory, so I think we might see some pretty stiff resistance being put up. We’ve already seen signs of them building up their forces in the area and trying to extend their influence before the inevitable operation against them commences. But I don’t think we could in any way say the troop surge has been a failure.
Afghanistan must be stable before US forces leave
Richard Kemp, 30 year British Armed Forces veteran and commander of the British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 6/18/10,
I think there is such a thing as victory, and victory in Afghanistan in the 21st century is creating a situation where a resilient Afghan government can maintain security over the majority of its own territory. I certainly wouldn’t suggest that we will ever impose a Western style of democracy on Afghanistan. We don’t particularly want that; they don’t particularly want that. What we in the Western world need and what Afghanistan as well as Pakistan need, is a country that is controllable and that is not a security vacuum which the Taliban can occupy and allow other international extremists to come in to do what they did before, train and prepare, plan and carry out large-scale terrorist attacks against the West. I don’t see a time when the West will ever be able to turn its back on Afghanistan and let it just get on. I think there will always be a need of support from the West for the Afghan government. I’m talking not so much about troops on the ground, but in terms of perhaps air support, technical support, training, specialist support.
Taliban Takeover DA Impact Wall
Taliban controlled areas are subject to gruesome minority ethnic cleansing that is not acted upon by the UN
HRW, February 2001, (Human Rights Watch)
The two massacres of civilians described in this report constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law. They raise grave concerns about the security of civilian populations in Taliban-administered areas, particularly Hazaras and members of other ethnic or religious minorities. What has emerged from these cases, as well as prior events in Hazarajat and northern Afghanistan, is a pattern of efforts to intimidate minority populations and to deter them from cooperating with the United Front, through the arbitrary detention and summary execution of male civilians. These abuses, including the massacre at Yakaolang and the detention of civilians prior to their execution at Robatak, have frequently been of such a scale and duration that they could not have been carried out without the knowledge and consent of senior Taliban commanders. Impartially amassing an exhaustive record of the events in both cases and identifying the commanders responsible will require an independent investigation under the auspices of the United Nations. Such an investigation could have a significant impact in deterring further abuses by all of the warring factions in Afghanistan. However, the United Nations has failed to systematically monitor and document abuses in Afghanistan. The only field investigation undertaken by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights-into the killings in Mazar-i Sharif in 1997 and 1998-failed to make use of existing evidence to establish responsibility for extrajudicial executions and other abuses committed by United Front forces in 1997 and by the Taliban in 1998. It also neglected to make use of extensive testimony from refugees, or of detailed information gathered by U.N. staff and offices. Other monitoring mechanisms have been impeded by a lack of access or adequate security. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, Dr. Kamal Hossain, has issued periodic reports that have noted serious abuses, but has not been granted permission to visit Taliban-controlled Afghanistan since 1999.
Politics Links: Goldilocks
Republicans key to balancing Democratic opposition to the surge
NPR, 7/27/10, < >
The House voted, 308-114, to approve the spending boost for the additional 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Other non-war provisions brought the total bill to nearly $59 billion. From Obama on down, the disclosure of the documents was condemned by administration officials and military leaders on Tuesday, but the material failed to stir new anti-war sentiment. The bad news for the White House: A pervasive weariness with the war was still there — and possibly growing.
Republicans in Congress still were strongly behind the boost in war spending, but there was unusually strong opposition from members of Obama's own Democratic Party. All but 12 of the "no" votes in the House came from Democrats.
War funding for the surge bipartisan but losing democratic support
Global Times, 7/29/10, < >
US lawmakers easily approved urgent funding Tuesday for President Barack Obama's military escalation in Afghanistan, despite a huge leak of secret military files that stoked anger at the unpopular war. The 308-114 vote in the House of Representatives set the stage for Obama to sign the legislation, which provides some $37 billion to fund the conflict in Iraq and pay for his "surge" of 33,000 more troops to Afghanistan. More than 100 Democrats voted against the measure, which also provides funds for disaster relief in Haiti. The House also beat back a blunt challenge to Obama's war strategy, defeating a resolution calling for the removal of US forces from Pakistan by a crushing 38-372 margin. However, lawmakers - who face a war-weary public in November mid-term elections - argued passionately about the nearly 9-year-old conflict and Obama's plan to right the faltering campaign in time to start a draw-down by July 2011. "Wake up America. Wikileaks' release of secret war documents gave us 92,000 reasons to end the wars. Pick one," Democratic Representative Dennis Kucinich said as debate began. According to CNN, the leaked files reveal a conflict among Afghan security forces, including attacks on one another, as well as heavy drug use among sol-diers. "The Afghan government has not demonstrated the focused determination, reliability and judgment necessary to bring this effort to a rational and successful conclusion," Democratic Representative Dave Obey said after the vote. According to The Wall Street Journal, the Pentagon is now focusing on Pfc (Private First Class) Bradley Manning, a military intelligence analyst charged with providing classified documents and video to Wikileaks earlier this year. Manning, 22, was charged by the military earlier this month with illegally taking and disseminating a classified video as well as secret State Department files, the newspaper said, adding that a decision on whether to court-martial him is expected in August. However, Wikileaks' editor-in-chief Julian Assange once again claimed that his organization doesn't know who sent those secret files, according to the AP. "We never know the source of the leak," he told journalists at London's Frontline Club late Tuesday. "Our whole system is designed such that we don't have to keep that secret." As the US Army opened a criminal investigation into the Wikileaks disclosures, Obama said the documents showed he was right to craft a new Afghan war-fighting approach and vowed to stick with it. "We have to see that strategy through," said the president, who said the leaked documents "don't reveal any issues that haven't already informed our public debate on Afghanistan."
Politics Links: Withdrawal Popular
Timetabling is generally popular across the board
Stephanie Condon, staff writer for CBS News, 7/13/10, < >
Most Americans continue to say things are going badly for the U.S. in Afghanistan, and those assessments are more pessimistic now than they were just two months ago, a new CBS News poll shows. Most Americans also want a timetable for withdrawal from the country. Today, the poll finds, 62 percent of Americans say the war is going badly, up from 49 percent in May. Just 31 percent say the war in Afghanistan is going well. Nine years into the war, 33 percent of Americans say they do not want large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan for another year. Twenty-three percent of Americans say they are willing to have troops stay there for one or two more years. Just 35 percent are willing to have troops stay longer than two years. Most Americans -- 54 percent -- think the U.S. should set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Forty-one percent disagree. There is a partisan divide on the issue: 73 percent of Democrats think the U.S. should set a timetable, while only 32 percent of Republicans say the U.S. should do so. Fifty-four percent of independents want a timetable. Americans are divided over President Obama's handling of Afghanistan: 43 percent say they approve of his handling of the war, while 44 percent say they disapprove. On Iraq, Americans continue to hold more positive views of the war- 55 percent say things are going well for the U.S. there.
Most Americans support withdrawal timetable
Huffington Post, 6/29/10, < >
A majority of Americans support President Obama's plan for withdrawing from Afghanistan starting in July 2011, according to a USA Today/Gallup poll released Tuesday. Fifty-eight percent of Americans said they agreed with the plan, while 38 percent opposed it. Most of the opposition was to having a deadline at all -- 29 percent of respondents did not think that that U.S. should set a timetable. Self-identified Democrats overwhelmingly responded that they favored Obama's withdrawal plan. Independents favored the plan 57 percent to 36 percent, while Republicans opposed the plan 65 percent to 31 percent. On Tuesday, Gen. David Patraeus said that any reduction in American forces in Afghanistan would be "conditions-based." He added that Americans will provide assistance and support in Afghanistan for years to come. Gallup interviewed 1,044 adults in all 50 states between June 25 and June 26.
Politics Links: Withdrawal Unpopular
Opposition for withdrawal is bipartisan and overwhelming
The Washington Times, 3/11/10, < >
In an overwhelming show of bipartisan support for President Obama's surge in Afghanistan, the House on Wednesday soundly defeated a resolution setting a timetable for withdrawal. The vote, which marked the first time the House has had a full debate on Afghanistan since Mr. Obama announced his surge last year, unleashed years of pent-up frustration from liberal Democrats and a few conservative Republicans angry over the direction the nine-year-old conflict has taken. But the 356-65 vote against withdrawal was a dominant endorsement to give Mr. Obama the time he's asked for to stabilize the troubled nation. "Have we forgotten? Have we forgotten what happened to America on 9-11?" demanded Rep. Ike Skelton, Missouri Democrat and chairman of the Armed Services Committee. "Have we forgotten who did it? Have we forgotten those who protected and gave them a safe haven?" Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich, though, the Ohio Democrat who wrote the failed measure, said corrupt Afghan leaders don't deserve the blood American troops are shedding, and said the money the U.S. is spending should instead be used at home.
Overwhelming opposition to withdrawal
Fox News 7/1/10, < >
The House of Representatives okayed a $60 billion bill Thursday to pay for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and fund a variety of other programs like education, Pell Grants, natural disaster relief and relief efforts following the earthquake in Haiti. Many Democrats opposed the bill, concerned about the length of the conflict in Afghanistan. And President Obama even threatened to veto the package if House liberals tried to tie his hands with an amendment to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. “If the final bill presented to the president contains provisions that would undermine his ability as commander in chief to conduct military operations in Afghanistan, the president’s senior advisers would recommend a veto,” said a statement issued by the White House Thursday evening. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Congress needed to pass the bill by July 4. But the entire package isn’t complete. The Senate approved its version of the bill in May. And the House legislation is different. That means the issue must return to the Senate. And the Senate isn’t going to take up the bill any time soon. The Senate is out of session Friday so lawmakers may travel to West Virginia for the funeral of the late-Sen. Robert Byrd,D-W.Va. The Senate next meets July 12. The House voted down a proposal to strike all funding for the war, 376-26. Twenty-two lawmakers voted "present." The House also voted against a plan authored by Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., to order a withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. That idea failed 321-100. In addition, the House defeated an amendment to require the president to present a withdrawal strategy to Congress next year.
The tally there was 260 nays to 162. With some unique parliamentary engineering, the bill was split into four separate sections, producing four distinct roll call votes that paid for social programs or attempted to strike all money for the war. Thus, unlike most bills, there was no definitive vote that passed the war measure.
Clinton Politics DA
Uniqueness: Afghanistan presence key to Clinton campaign in 2012
Chris Stirewalt is the political editor of The Washington Examiner, 7/19/10, < >
What will it take to get Hillary Clinton into a 2012 run? The answer can be found in the top item on the secretary of state's itinerary this week: Afghanistan. She is spending a few days in Afghanistan to get a sense of the mounting problems for the U.S. mission there. And according to some longtime Clinton backers, including one veteran of the Clinton Democratic National Committee, the Afghan war is the catalyst that could start Clinton toward a 2012 run. The war is going badly. The Taliban has borrowed the fighting tactics -- suicide and roadside bombings -- that have killed 4,400 Americans in Iraq. The NATO force in Afghanistan is on track to have its first consecutive 100-fatality months in June and July. American deaths doubled from 150 in 2008 to 300 in 2009 and are on track to double again in 2010. The latest CBS News poll was bad all around for President Obama -- with poor showings on the economy, Obamacare, the Gulf oil spill, presidential empathy, etc. But while his economic and domestic policies pose the greatest immediate political risk to the president and his party, it's his foreign policy that is the looming problem. The percent of Americans who think the Afghan war is going badly jumped from 49 percent in May to 62 percent in July. Obama won plaudits for quickly sacking his Afghan commander after Gen. Stanley McChrystal's indiscreet comments to Rolling Stone. But the article that deep-sixed McChrystal pointed to all of the president's problem points on Afghanistan: that he is seen as an uncertain leader, that troops are weary of the restrictive rules of engagement, that the Afghans are not up to the task of Western-style self-governance in anything like the 10 months remaining in the Obama surge. Busting McChrystal also meant elevating Gen. David Petraeus. Obama has some obvious misgivings about George W. Bush's favorite general. But the author of the Iraq surge was the only man for the job. Now, Obama will be under pressure to do the bidding of America's most respected military man. Most voters support the president's timetable for withdrawal. Some actually favor the idea of a hamstrung surge and others favor getting out of Afghanistan whenever we can. Without the timetable, liberals would be obliged to denounce "endless war." The timetable is the last politically useful fiction in Obama's long list of undeliverable promises. But if Petraeus lets it be known next spring that he needs another 30,000 troops and asks Obama to officially push back the start of the U.S. withdrawal, the president will have to choose whether to consent and shatter his liberal coalition or refuse and lose all those who grudgingly support his war. That's some choice -- agree and lose your base, or refuse and lose your ability to prosecute the war, and, by extension, your credibility as a leader. Which brings us back to Secretary Clinton. If Democrats take a pasting this fall, it will be widely seen as a repudiation of Obama. The national economic malaise and independent anger about government overreach have rehabilitated the Clintons' "third way" in Democratic circles. Regret at having passed over Hillary in 2008 will reach a new high in November. And with Obama leaning on Bill to act as his emissary to the frustrated middle class, the Clintons' reputation will be further restored. The Democrats rooting for Hillary to knock out Obama in 2012 say she must begin her pivot by early next year. First, she must leave the administration on friendly terms. Then, she can carefully start to express misgivings about Obama's Afghan policies. Obama thought he would better control Hillary by refusing her the vice presidency. But by exiling her to the State Department, Obama has allowed his rival to shore up the one weak spot on her resume -- foreign policy experience. Obama has painted himself into a corner with his Afghan timetable. And come next spring, Clinton friends could start the chorus of pleas for her to try again to break the "highest, hardest glass ceiling." The message: "Only Hillary can bring the troops home." That would leave Clinton able to bring together doves who want the war over by any means necessary and the growing number who support Vice President Biden's strategy of maintaining a small, deadly force in the region but abandoning full-scale nation-building in the Obama style. That would have some nice symmetry to it. Obama won the Democratic nomination by pummeling Hillary with her initial support for the Iraq war. She might like to return the favor on Afghanistan.
Link: Withdrawal from Afghanistan boosts democratic support for Obama
I/L: Polls show that Obama can’t win against Sarah Palin; Hillary is key
Ed Ross is the President and Chief Executive Officer of EWRoss International LLC. 7/19/10, < >
With Democrats headed for a man-made disaster in November and the Obama presidency increasingly looking like a quagmired domestic-contingency operation, speculation about Hillary Clinton running for president in 2012 is on the rise. We know Secretary Clinton has a strong desire to be the president, but will she step down as Secretary of State and challenge Barack Obama, the first African-American president and a fellow Democrat? And if she won her party’s nomination what are her prospects for winning the general election? The conventional wisdom is that if President Obama begins governing more from the center after losses in the 2010 elections and gets his approval rating up around 50 percent, Secretary Clinton is unlikely to challenge him. If Obama’s approval ratings continue to tank, and he looks more like Jimmy Carter than Bill Clinton, there is a good chance Clinton will challenge Obama as Ted Kennedy challenged an unpopular Carter in 1980. Kennedy, of course, failed to capture the nomination because Chappaquiddick and other issues got in the way; and Clinton is by no means a shoo-in for the nomination in 2012 regardless of Obama’s poll numbers. Let’s assume, however, for the sake of argument, that Hillary Clinton wins the Democratic nomination in 2012—without the majority of African-American voters that are unlikely to abandon Obama. Could she assemble a winning coalition in November, and who would be the most difficult Republican to defeat? Assembling a winning coalition following a divisive intra-party struggle in an environment where the majority of Americans are dissatisfied with the way Democrats have been governing won’t be easy. Many disaffected Democrats, especially African Americans, are likely to stay home on Election Day. Many Independents who voted for Obama in 2008, suffered buyers remorse, and believe the country has shifted too far to the left are likely to vote Republican. Nevertheless, Hillary Clinton would give any Republican a run for their money and indeed could win the 2012 election under the right circumstances. She’s an experienced campaigner, she has a deep reservoir of talented Democratic political operatives she can call on, and she knows every trick in the Democrats’ playbook. Much, then, will depend on which Republican Clinton is up against. Right now the top four prospects for the Republican nomination are Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Mike Huckabee, and Sarah Palin. A recent poll by Public Policy Polling matched them up against Barack Obama in a 2012 race. “He trails Mitt Romney 46-43, Mike Huckabee 47-45, Newt Gingrich 46-45, and is even tied with Sarah Palin at 46 . . .” What’s noteworthy about this poll is not that three out of four Republicans beat Obama in these hypothetical matchups, but that Sarah Palin tied him. It’s Palin that Democrats and some Republicans have written off as the least likely Republican to win the 2012 election. The results of this and other polls belie that. Increasingly, she’s looking more like a viable candidate. As I wrote back in February, Sarah Palin’s presidential prospects are not as bad as some would lead you to believe—a judgment others now are coming to
Impact: Palin leads to American implosion
David Harsanyi, columnist and staff writer for Real Clear Politics, 7/10/09, < >
Can you believe the gall of these Sarah Palin cultists? Presidential aspirations? This is a woman who named one of her kids "Track," for God's sake. (Well, if it really is her kid.) William Buckley once wrote that he rather would "entrust the government of the United States to the first 400 people listed in the Boston telephone directory than to the faculty of Harvard University." But running government is no longer a suitable vocation for the bumbling proletariat. It's for folks with schoolin' and such. It's a job for herculean thinkers with degrees from Ivy League schools. In other words, no one from Alaska need apply. Former sports reporters certainly won't do. We need former constitutional scholars. Who else, after all, has a better understanding of how to undermine the document? Really, where would we be if a bumpkin like Palin were president? With her brainpower, we probably would be stuck with a Cabinet full of tax cheats, retreads and moralizing social engineers. If Palin were president, chances are we'd have a gaffe-generating motormouth for a vice president. That's the kind of decision-making one expects from Miss Congeniality. The job of building generational debt is not for the unsophisticated. Enriching political donors with taxpayer dollars takes intellectual prowess, not the skills of a moose-hunting point guard. The talent to print money we don't have to pay for programs we can't afford is the work of a finely tuned imagination, soaring gravitas and endless policy know-how. Palin is so clueless she probably would have rushed through some colossal stimulus plan that ended up stimulating nothing. If Palin were president, no one doubts this nation would have continued the Bush-era policy of indefinite detention of enemy combatants and the CIA's program of transferring prisoners to other countries without legal rights. Be thankful you have a president who makes you think this nation doesn't. If Palin were commander in chief -- and, again, can anyone imagine anything so preposterous? -- the United States still would be fighting endless and expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's true that Palin's first veto as Alaska governor was of a bill that would have blocked state employee benefits and health insurance for same-sex couples, but does anyone doubt her true intentions? If she were president, brave American soldiers still would be living under the dark specter of "don't ask, don't tell." Palin even might have instructed her Justice Department to file a brief in defense of the Defense of Marriage Act. Such is the depth of her depravity. Does anyone believe that Palin possesses the competence to nationalize entire industries without the consent of the people? A housewife from Wasilla isn't equipped with political brawn to shake down banks and bondholders. Palin never would be able to convince Americans that a trillion-dollar government-run health care plan would save taxpayers money or have the rhetorical ability to convince even a single person that a European-style cap-and-trade scheme has any benefit at all. Palin is such a goofball that she probably believes oil will continue to be a vital American energy source. And how is anyone as simplistic as Palin going to help change the habits of all these fatsos in America? We need a mommy ... but, you know, not a real mommy.
Clinton Politics DA – A2 Palin Won’t Run
1. Empirically denied. Momma grizzlies prove
2. She’s raising enough money to run in 2012
Mark McKinnon, vice chairman of Public Strategies and president of Maverick Media, The Daily Beast, 7/14/10, < >
The Money: Sarah Palin's political action committee collected $865,800 in contributions for the second quarter of this year, more than in any previous three-month period. As of June 30, SarahPAC had more than $1 million cash on hand. Beyond the $87,500 contributed to conservative candidates, the committee also spent nearly twice as much as it had previously on list-building and direct mail. The move from online fundraising only, where she has garnered a remarkably high percentage of donations under $200, to slick direct-mail solicitations shows a ramping up for things to come. Though she does not yet have a backroom machine like Gov. Mitt Romney, the addition of political staff hints at a coalescing campaign organization.
3. Her media efforts are a clear sign of her running
Mark McKinnon, vice chairman of Public Strategies and president of Maverick Media, The Daily Beast, 7/14/10, < >
The Media: The elephant in the room is impossible to ignore. Though the national media may bray and belittle her, they continue to pay attention to her. Some praise is begrudgingly bestowed. Chuck Todd marvels: "...it is amazing the ability this woman has to get media attention with as little as she does, whether it's a Twitter or a Facebook update..." Even Kathleen Parker, who declared Palin "Clearly Out of Her League," now sees Sarah as "a genius," noting, "This woman is not to be feared or loathed... she's a public-relations machine who manipulates public perception with well-timed and, recently, sophisticated messaging." Whether driven by jealousy or pure capitalism, media coverage of Palin continues, and it helps sell magazines and generate clicks. (Just wait for the cavalcade of cover stories to come on daughter Bristol's re-engagement to Levi Johnston. The franchise grows.) The Mamas: An endorsement from Sarah is second-to-none. The coveted mantle of Mama Grizzly has been shared with a growing list of candidates, men and women alike. Her latest endorsements include Karen Handel for Georgia governor, Ann Marie Buerkle for New York's 25th District, CeCe Heil for Tennessee's 5th, and Rep. Todd Tiahrt from Kansas for senator. The former governor of Alaska has awakened an enviable constituency no other Republican leader has: conservative mamas and papas. The newly released SarahPAC video, with already over 368,000 views, is not slick but very well done, in part because it's not highly produced. It's rough documentary feel oozes authenticity—what voters are craving right now.
4. And, current momentum ensures that she will run and is determined to win; defeat means the end of the GOP
Mark McKinnon, vice chairman of Public Strategies and president of Maverick Media, The Daily Beast, 7/14/10, < >
The Momentum: I spent a good deal of time around Ann Richards as she was deciding whether to run for governor of Texas. After her keynote speech at the Democratic convention, momentum began to build for her to run. And while I never felt that she resolved the issue completely for herself, at a certain point it seemed that she just couldn't say no due to the centrifugal forces of expectation among women, labor, migrant workers in the Rio Grande Valley, and others—a myriad of constituencies who were counting on her to run. She didn't want to let them down. I suspect as much will be true for Palin. The Maker: Palin has often said she gets guidance from above, that God "opens doors" for her to walk through. I suspect she'll soon be knocking hard enough that he'll hear her. No stranger to risk, having risen to rock-star fame along a most unlikely trajectory, Palin will weigh her options. If she runs and loses the Republican nomination, her opportunity to influence the future is diminished. While she could follow a Reagan-like path and compete again, her loss would create a perilous split in the Republican Party. If her fervent fans refuse to support the nominee (think of Hillary Clinton voters' angst times 10), chances of a Democratic victory in 2012 and beyond could improve significantly. If Palin runs, wins the nomination and then loses the general election, she could leave the Republican brand in pieces. Intra-party cannibalization will commence. Polarization will hit new levels. And divisions in the country will likely worsen, not heal. Or she could wait another cycle. But wield enormous influence in 2012, be a huge player in the nomination process and enhance her power and prestige and broaden her burgeoning platform. That would be smart. Palin isn't ready to run. And the country isn't ready for her to run. But that's unlikely to stop her now. The physics are in motion.
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.
Related searches
- 1.14 new block recipes
- minecraft 1 14 new block recipes
- minecraft 1 14 4 command block commands
- cool command block commands 1 14 4
- 1 14 new block recipes
- printable block numbers 1 10
- cool command block commands 1 15
- command block commands 1 12
- cool command block commands 1 16
- minecraft command block commands 1 14
- lucky block command 1 15
- command block commands 1 14 list