Donny Lucy - Stanford University



Donny Lucy

3/11/2004

EDGE Research paper

Bruce Lusignan

Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

North Korea has been the most publicized nation in the last ten years regarding nuclear proliferation. They are often debated in the highest political circles and are considered by many in the United States the US’s greatest threat. However, many politicians and critics are divided on how to deal with North Korea, and the nuclear threat it poses to the rest of the world. In my research I stumbled upon a fascinating book entitled Crisis on the Korean Peninsula that deals precisely with this issue. The book written by, opinion leaders and foreign policy scholars Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, introduces an ambitious strategy that attempts to answer the nuclear problems as well as the problems within the state itself. In the book their strategy is very clear cut and attacks three core issues where they see room for improvement. Foremost, they address the nuclear weapons issue that so clouds North Korea’s present and future global status as well as northeast Asia’s security. Additionally they argue for the reduction of conventional military forces and reconstruction of the nation’s shattered economy. Lastly, they argue for calming security assurances to North Korea’s embattled leaders, who show signs they might welcome such pledges. The three core issues covered by Mochizuki and O’Hanlon will serve as the basis of my research but will be backed by other sources that talk about the same important issues from different view points allowing a wide ranging view point. Altogether in my research of North Korea I hope to learn from the ideas of O’Hanlon, Mochizuki and others sources and have the ability to expound on the ideas of these men and women with my own.

In order to cover the three main points I divided O’Hanlon’s and Mochizuki’s book into three similar sections: 1. Current situation in North Korea and world regarding nuclear weapons, 2. Confrontation capabilities, and 3. Bargaining possibilities. These sections serve as a road map ultimately conveying both the situation of nuclear proliferation in North Korea in their strongest arguments to the reader. Furthermore, as the authors follow these guidelines so will I with my research of their information. I will include in these sections ideas from other papers and authors as well as a section in which I provide some of my own analysis.

Current Situation

Crisis on the Korean Peninsula opens with a quick history background of the country through the twentieth century. In this background check O’Hanlon and Mochizuki cover the history of the country following the split of Korea after World War II. In this unglamorous review of the country’s history O’Hanlon and Mochizuki mention failed agriculture, famine, brainwashing propaganda, restrictions of freedoms, and make the comparison of Kim Jong II and his political hierarchy to that of Stalin. They go on to explain that the above mentioned struggles following WWII are a result of a military state that prides itself in an excess of troops and military spending on items such as nuclear material. Accordingly, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki follow this brief history with their first important question of the book; Is North Korea trying to mend its Ways?

O’Hanlon and Mochizuki answer this question in a broad outlook. They argue that due to the financial circumstances that have strapped the country since the end of the Cold War many changes have had to be made. “Meanwhile, his heavy industries are falling into disrepair, a half century of abuse has destroyed much of his country’s farmland, and a half century of brain washing and suppression have left the North Korean people ill-equipped to compete in the modern global economy.”[1] As a result of this faltering economy Jong II has had to make some alterations in order to keep the country together and under his power. The provisions mentioned in the chapter refer to the lifting of price controls, increased wages, reduction of terrorism and arm sales, and the signing of the Agreed Framework with the United States, which capped its fledgling nuclear capabilities. All of these provisions were made in the 90’s and seemed to promote a more positive view of the situation in North Korea. Unfortunately, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki go on to explain how this little progress, made during the 90’s, has recently been marred by the discovery of North Korea’s resuscitated nuclear program.

The U.S. discovery of North Korea’s recent nuclear activity has set back any progress made by Jong II, claims O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, and has clearly violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Agreed Framework, and an accord between North Korea and South Korea which was signed in 1991. They also detailed many of the violations. The reprocessing of spent chemical fuel rods, the restart of a small research reactor and even hinted at the idea of testing a nuclear bomb. Furthermore, the two authors add that the motivation for the restarting of North Korea’s nuclear program is highly debated, but believes North Korea’s actions are directly related to the playing out of recent foreign affairs following September 11. North Korea saw what happened to Afghanistan and Iraq and believed nuclear weapons to be essential to their own defense. This information regarding North Korean recent nuclear activities provided by O’Hanlon is backed by a recent speech made by George Tenet to the Senate Arms Committee. In this recent speech by Tenet he indicates that little strides are being made by the North Koreans to mend its ways in the area of nuclear weapons. “North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear weapons programs into international legitimacy and bargaining power, announcing its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent.”[2] Also, since withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Tenet argues that the North Koreans are on a mission to produce enriched uranium. All these indications in Tenet’s recent speech point to information that shows North Korea has no plans of ending its nuclear and military endeavors.

O’Hanlon and Mochizuki criticize President Bush’s cabinet for these recent problems noting that the few talks between the country’s have produced very little progress and the hard line the U.S. claims has been hardly that. In addition, at the end of this first section O’Hanlon and Mochizuki offer their first real argument, “…the United States and its regional partners need to develop a comprehensive plan, not just a set of short-term negotiating tactics, for addressing the North Korea problem.”[3] This strategy that O’Hanlon and Mochizuki argue for is described in an article by James A. Kelley, the assistant Secretary of State of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. In Kelley’s strategy he points to only two ways of possible disarmament. “Dismantlement that insists on the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea's nuclear programs because we must not again allow a situation in which the North's dismantlement of its nuclear arms program is put off into the distant future, as it was under the Agreed Framework. That would permit North Korea, at any time, to resume its use of nuclear threats to blackmail the international community.”[4] The second point made by Kelly’s plan is that disarmament and stabilization of North Korea as a whole can only take place through a multiparty framework. “Other countries need to bring their interests, influence, and resources to bear, not only in persuading North Korea to end its nuclear arms program but to ensure that the program is never resumed and that broader conditions on the Korean Peninsula are conducive to lasting peace and security.”[5] Both these points made by Kelly point to a strategy that has not been implemented by the United States in the past but offers possible solutions for the future. In addition to Kelly’s ideas of possible solutions to the crisis in North Korea, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki offer a few possible solutions that I will cover a little later in the paper.

Confrontation Capabilities

The next section O’Hanlon and Mochizuki focuses on regards conventional military threat, and conventional military balance, in Korea. In this overlooked section the authors and much of the information I found focuses on how to fully asses the military capabilities of all involved actors in the Korean conflict, as well as, establish a clear baseline in which to evaluate proposals for conventional arms reductions. Furthermore, throughout this section numerous scenarios and military capabilities are assessed-In this research paper I am only going to focus on the scenario of preemption, the United States military capabilities, and North Korea’s capabilities.

O’Hanlon and Mochizuki analyze the idea of a preemptive strike in great detail in this section. Before any of the logistics of the preemptive strike begin in this section they point to the campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. Both mention these campaigns as successful examples of preemptive strikes and draw comparisons between the three countries in the spheres of terrorism and evil. However, both are quick to point out that this may not be a feasible option. They point to three reasons why this might not be the best option. First, there are far too many weapons close to Seoul, South Korea that could not be stopped, even in an attack that was ran flawlessly. Second, the U.S. would have a much harder time penetrating Korean headquarters and supplies, much or which are buried deeply underground. Even more difficult would be infiltrating the country with Special Forces to obtain the targets for bombing. Third, the terrain of North Korea is difficult to operate and any invasion of the country would be much harder than racing through the open desert of Iraq. Outside of these three main reasons O’Hanlon and Mochizuki also mention the large army of North Korea and the dedication of Korean troops to their nation, unlike Saddam’s forces in Iraq. Altogether, the picture of a preemptive strike does not look good and would only occur in a last resort situation claims O’Hanlon and Mochizuki.

Unlike O’Hanlon and Mochizuki in my research I found many opinion leaders that would advocate a preemptive strike if the issues in North Korea escalated. One of these men is a writer for the National Review named Stanley Kurtz. In Kurtz 2003 article, entitled “It’s all about North Korea,” he points to growing circumstances that might only be handled by a preemptive strike in order for the U.S. to prevent an all out war. He lays out the strike in a two plan attack. “1) A raid on Pyongyang and other Korean nuclear facilities followed by the threat of a massive nuclear strike if the North Koreans do not stand down; 2) raids against North Korea's nuclear facilities, and simultaneous nuclear strikes against its ground forces and artillery emplacements, to preclude the possibility that the North could destroy Seoul in retaliation for our attack.”[6] Kurtz admits that such an attack might break the nuclear taboo and bring the United States under the guise of the rest world, but he also argues that the alternative is the North Koreans continuation of nuclear development and the very good possibility of one of those nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of a terrorist group, through arms deals, is a danger that might be worth the risk. Regardless, of whether you support or are against any kind of preemptive strike it is important to know the capabilities of your adversary as well as your own.

The capabilities in the possible escalation of war in North Korea are a situation that United States military leaders have already contemplated, according to the book. O’Hanlon and Mochizuki provide military numbers in the case of such a confrontation. Nearly 600,000 U.S. troops would be deployed from bases in Hawaii and the West Coast along with the two brigades of troops that are already stationed in South Korea. Furthermore, the U.S. would deploy air craft carries from the Pacific and Indian Oceans that would give the U.S. immediate air support and ground support. Further mobilization would include helicopters, bombers, and submarine support. Altogether, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki believe it would take the U.S. around 100 days to mobilize in full strength for an attack or defense. Also, mentioned in this section, which is extremely important, would be the cohesiveness between the military forces of the U.S. and South Korea. Together they would organize, communicate, and fight as one.

North Korea’s capabilities are highlighted by O’Hanlon and Mochizuki as well as the CIA in much the same fashion as the United States. Both admit that the accuracy of some of their numbers may be questionable but give the reader a good estimate of what kind of capabilities the military forces of North Korea boast. For starters the N. Koreans are said to have close to 1.1 million active troops on duty and 6 million on reserve, 90 percent of which are ground forces. Other military forces mentioned include 3,500 battle tanks, 3,000 personnel carriers, 12,000 large bore artillery pieces (500 of which can reach Seoul), 620 aircrafts, and 26 submarines. All of these numbers reflect a solid military, except for the fact that the majority of their supplies are obsolete, with money rare for new military expenditures. O’Hanlon and Mochizuki also comment on the mobilization and training procedures as poor and void of solid leadership among the ranks. However, Tenet, in his speech to the Senate Arms Committee, paints a slightly different picture while talking about the ballistic missile capabilities of North Korea. “Pyongyang is sending individuals abroad and is seeking dual-use expertise and technology. North Korea also continues to advance its missile programs. It is nearly self-sufficient in ballistic missiles, and has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources. The North also has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities and a basis for domestic development efforts earlier than would otherwise have been possible.”[7] This information concerning North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is a little more frightening coming from the head of the CIA and puts into question the true capabilities of North Koreas military capabilities, especially considering the North Koreans growing ballistic capabilities.

Altogether understanding a scenario of a preemptive strike and military capabilities of the United States and North Korea is extremely important especially in the midst of today’s situation in Korea. In my opinion O’Hanlon and Mochizuki and other resources do a good job in highlighting these scenarios and capabilities that many people rarely mention. Furthermore, while researching the different sources I found the information on this particular section most fascinating. I think as a public we are always caught up in the big picture of military politics and often don’t have the information to back up many of our arguments. For example, many of the nuclear related lectures and sections I have attended in my three years at Stanford have been related to preemptive strikes. In these discussions everyone knows the advantages and disadvantages of such strikes but few know the advantages and disadvantages pertaining to a certain nation or scenario. By researching this particular information on North Korea and the United States I feel as though I have been able to grasp the little details of the preemptive strike scenario in North Korea as well as the military capabilities of the United States and North Korea.

The data and military information in this section does offer validity to the threat of North Korea, however I was disappointed by how this threat was conveyed by both authors. Throughout the section O’Hanlon and Mochizuki offer accurate information but they seem to down play the severity of any threat to the U.S. or surrounding nations. “Thus, it is doubtful that North Korea has produced many good mid-level officers. Nor has it been able, particularly of late, to afford the types of large-scale combined-arms training that characterize the U.S. and South Korean militaries.”[8] Quotes like this one appear throughout this section and seem suspect in my estimates. We can’t even verify if there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and O’Hanlon and Mochizuki are telling the reader they know that North Korea’s military doesn’t have good mid-level officers and their training is poor. In complete contrast documents I found from the CIA and other resources respect the North Koreans and hold them in the highest regard as a possible threat to the US. In my opinion O’Hanlon and Mochizuki lose validity to the rest of the arguments of North Korea and the nuclear unstableness by downplaying their active military capabilities. While at the same time I believe our government often puts to much emphasis on the worst case situation instead of the more feasible possibility. A clear example of this takes place in Iraq where we attacked on the marginal evidence of nuclear activity by Saddam. From my research I realize that situations like Iraq offers valuable information into when either preemption should be used, in a case like North Korea, or when bargaining might be used to calmly resolve a situation.

Bargaining Possibilities

Up to this point I have covered both the current nuclear situation regarding North Korea along with the confrontational capabilities. Both of these sections contain important information, but their information all caters to this category of bargaining possibilities. This is the category most debated in political circles and the category containing the majority of O’Hanlon’s and Mochizuki’s arguments and other arguments from researched sources. Additionally, in this section all researched sources call for a completely different policy regarding North Korea and its interaction with the rest of the world.

To begin this section O’Hanlon and Mochizuki explain how the approaches of the past, coercion, sanctions, and treaties, regarding North Korea have been unable to provide a complete solution to a major problem. Instead, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki propose a new alternative that would offer North Korea more incentive, but at the same time more stringent terms. The proposal starts with the complete denuclearization of North Korea, under the watch of the IAEA and NPT, over a number of years to improve the accords negotiability. In turn it would also end all testing, production and development of missiles and missile systems. The treaty also calls for deep reductions in the use of conventional forces. O’Hanlon believes that 50 percent reductions would be appropriate especially in the area of heavy artillery. Further grounds of the proposal insist on a better human rights initiative by the country as well as putting an end to terrorism backing, counter-fitting, and drug-trafficking.

These seem like harsh initiatives but O’Hanlon and Mochizuki are sure to provide North Korea with incentives if these actions are carried through. The incentives would start with an explicit and public nonaggression pledge from the U.S. and even an active security guarantee if such reassurance would increase its willingness to negotiate. However, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki also imply that none of this becomes permanent until North Korea complies with denuclearization obligations. This includes the incentive of diplomatic relations. The U.S. would lift North Korea’s name from the state sponsored terrorist list and would promise to lift trade sanctions that have crippled the Korean economy. The list of incentives offered by the U.S. goes on to cover North Koreas energy problems and the distribution of aid over a period of years according to the compliance of proposals. The majority of this aid would come from the United States and is mentioned in the Non-Proliferation budget set forth by President Bush for the 2005 year. In this budget he proposes $439.2 million for the Department of Energy, $409.2 million for the Department of Defense, and $195 million for the Department of State. All of these proposals and allotted monies will work towards preventing proliferation in places like North Korea according to the Center for Defense Information.[9]

Overall, the plan that O’Hanlon and Mochizuki are proposing is one of risk/reward for North Korea. Clearly the country has to be willing to give up all of its nuclear capabilities and power of its military in exchange for a better position in the world community and economy. To me this proposal makes a lot of sense in the wake of past attempts. In my opinion, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki have a clear strategy they believe will work in the current situation between North Korea and the rest of the world community. Furthermore, I like the way they breakdown their proposal. The proposal is very easy to follow and seems feasible in a growing period of no answers. However, what I like most about the proposal is the balance it offers. For every provision that is taken away is an incentative backing it up. For example, for ending terrorism, drug-trafficking, and counter-fitting the country will have the ability to earn honest money through trade and a resuscitated economy courtesy of financial aid. Also, important about the proposal offered by O’Hanlon and Mochizuki is that it is written on the same supported guidelines as other opinion leaders in the field. For example, I talked about James Kelly’s two main points for solution earlier in the paper, which were complete disarmament and multilateral negotiations and aid, both of these strategic ideas mimic many of the ideas shared in O’Hanlon’s and Mochizuki’s plan. This kind of support is pivotal, in my opinion, because the research I did showed a consensus of political leaders whom felt the same way concerning the actions that should be made concerning Korea. This offers validity to the arguments of both O’Hanlon and Mochizuki and offers hope that an established plan of action will be created that will settle the nuclear dispute and bring peace and prosperity to the people of North Korea.

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[1]O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003) pg. 28

[2] Tenet, George. (2004, March). CIA Gov. The Worldwide Threat: Challenges in a Changing Global Context. Retrieved March 3, 2004 from

[3]O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003) pg. 38

[4] Kelley, James. (2004, February). State Department. Ensuring a Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved March 7, 2004 from

[5] Kelley, James. (2004, February). State Department. Ensuring a Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved March 9, 2004 from

[6] Kurtz, Stanley. (2003, March). National Review. It’s all about North Korea. Retrieved March 9, 2004 from

[7] Tenet, George. (2004, March). CIA Gov. The Worldwide Threat: Challenges in a Changing Global Context. Retrieved March 3, 2004 from

[8] O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003) pg. 68

[9] No author. (2004, February). Center for Defense Intelligence. Non-Proliferation and the FY 2005 Budget Request. Retrieved March 9, 2004 from

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