International Model Nato



33 rd Annual Model NATOWashington, D.C.February 15th – 18th, 20182018 Final CommuniquéBe it hereby resolved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:North Atlantic Council(NAC III/A)Decries the recent aggressive actions taken by the Russian Federation along the frontier with NATO Allies, although political channels of communication remain open;Remains open to fruitful NATO-Russia relations conditional on Russia respecting the sovereign territory of NATO as well as partner countries;Defines the term “Eastern Frontier” as the eastern borders of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Turkey for the purpose of this document;Adjusts the security policy of the NATO regarding its eastern dimension, to prioritize enhancing naval, cyber, air, and land deterrence beyond existing assurance measures already present on the frontier by adding further fully-equipped troops and experts to be temporarily added under the JTF by the approval of SACEUR conditional upon Russian exercises along the Eastern Frontier for the duration in the following ways:No more than one third of all armed Russian personnel be matched by voluntary temporary NATO forces within 5 hours transit from Russian exercise,Doubling the number of air and sea missions for the duration of the Russian exercise, equipment permitting,Suggesting the movement of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) to a region no less than two hours from the border exercise of the Russian military for the duration of the exercise as well as 48 hours before and after it, andRamping up staffing schedules at Centres of Excellence and other support institutions run by NATO for the duration of the exercise;Requests that the Eastern Frontier be treated as a unitary front, and that the enhanced Forward Presence Troops and tailored Forward Presence Units to be tasked with coordinated simultaneous operations in accordance to respectively similar operations outside NATO states;Proposes that additional trainings be facilitated in individual NATO Force Integration Units, the NATO Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, and collectively in areas such as:Cyber defence,Traditional military exercises,Maritime security, andReadiness response;Invites NATO partners to contribute to the above mentioned trainings when beneficial to increase cooperation with partner countries;Requests that the Military Committee:Task the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR), SHAPE, or Allied Command Operations to further develop joint exercises between NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and Tailored Forward Presence troops,Develop a report to the Council on the feasibility of adding an additional NATO Force Integration Unit on the Baltic and/or Aegean coast, Present the North Atlantic Council with a schedule of training exercises that includes larger and more frequent exercises across the eastern frontier of the Alliance, including joint use of air, naval, land, and cyber defense systems,Prioritize the modernization of air policing units, specifically AWACS, to extend the life of the E-3 fleet until 2035 with certainty, Discuss alternate and improved evolutions of our air policing units at the Brussels Summit of 2018, andTo work with the EU to adopt GPS technology or other best practices to aid in logistical support for the transport of military equipment and vehicles;Additionally purposes the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation Training Centre (NMIOTC) to:Increase naval readiness in the North Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea through an increase of missile defense operations and aerial response operations,Maintain at least the current level of national funding on modernization of sea-based missiles, and Redesign traditional responses from naval aerial, and ballistic threats through Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) with the specific goal of addressing the threats facing periphery states along the eastern front of the Alliance;Reinforces the Alliance’s eastern flank by establishing an additional rotational deployment of the Baltic Air Policing based at Lielvārde Air Base in Latvia:Building upon the current parameters of the existing Air Policing missions in Estonia and Lithuania, Provided by willing and capable contributions from Allies with sufficient aerial capabilities, and Noting the feasible increase in flight hours for Alliance pilots provided by this additional deployment;Encourages member states to further increase coordination between Allies, and cooperation with the EU and OEC in expertise related to:Cyber interoperability capabilities,Logistics, andHybrid and cyber warfare;Further improves military efficiency by:Encouraging increased military communications between member states and unification of bureaucratic procedure for military transportation across European and North American borders,Utilizing primarily troops stationed within neighboring countries or countries of the same geographic region, thereby decreasing the proportion of time spent in transit and further increasing knowledge of the territory in which they are stationed, andEnsuring a continuity policy;Resolves to notify the Russian government to ensure their awareness in NATO policy changes;(NAC III/B)Augments the number and frequency of joint and combined military exercises, including participation of partner nations, to be scheduled by the military committee, along the Eastern dimension of the NATO alliance through increasing exercises involving traditional defense measures such as:Air, Sea, andLand capabilities;Emphasizes multiple trainings focusing on effective and ineffective communication between member states employing: Satellite and radio communication to be used by NATO members, andDebilitated satellite communications to prepare the Alliance should a space or cyber attack render communications ineffective;Suggests the Military Committee consider recommendations for improvement with regards to Trident Juncture 2018, hosted in Norway, including:Coordinating troop movements with lack of satellite communications to increase readiness in the event of a cyber attack, Increasing troop participation,Cooperate with the Emerging Securities Committee to address cyber, hybrid, and aerospace threats from asymmetric warfare, Participating in aerial exercises that imitate penetration of anti-access/area denial capabilities, and Emphasizing a focus on interoperability within joint maneuvers; Recommits to the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) in order to express support of increased Baltic Air Policing, NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and their role of deterrence within the Baltic region, with specific consideration towards increasing:Efficiency of deterrence and defence measures,Intelligence sharing between Allies,Interoperability with NATO Allies and partners, andCommunication and decision-making procedures;Utilizes the Small Arms and Light Weapons Information Sharing Platform (SALW) through:Extended programs with Belarus dictated by the previously completed NATO Trust Program,Extended programs with Ukraine as dictated by the Phase I and II operations which remain in progress, andInformation gathering regarding paramilitary cells along the periphery of the eastern Alliance member states, especially in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey;Supports domestic authorities through information sharing between willing and able member states with the goal of:Reducing domestic instability within periphery states,Increasing resilience of government institutions and traditional defensive infrastructure, andUsing existing EU and Europol structures to make intel sharing more efficient;Develops non-traditional training exercises according to recommendations from the Military Committee to respond to asymmetric and potentially destabilizing threats utilizing SALW’s intra-Alliance operations, including but not limited to:Attacks on critical infrastructure,Attacks on soft infrastructure, andAttacks on military infrastructure;Additionally develops response missions and operations in the Eastern Frontier at the discretion of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE);Reaffirms political and military transparency with the presence of Russian observers during the exercises as well as the presence of NATO observers during Russian exercises all in accordance with the Vienna document;(NAC III/C)Emphasizes engaging a bottom-up approach focused on re-establishing military-to-military communication, transparency in military exercises and rules of engagement to rebuild a minimum level of confidence and trust between the Russian Federation and NATO;Further calls upon the full reactivation of mutual briefings within the NATO-Russia Council;Authorizes a third neutral party mediator that is not affiliated with NATO or Russia to ensure candid dialogue is occurring within the NATO-Russia council;Further requests the strengthening of existing security regimes and arms control agreements, as well as negotiations on inspections under the Vienna documents 2011, keeping in mind negotiations are important in themselves as forum of dialogue and exchange of information;Encourages regional, bilateral and multilateral agreements with NATO member states, OSCE, and EU on limiting dangerous military incidents, especially in the Baltic, Nordic, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions at the discretion of NATO member states agreed upon; Considers potential agendas for mutual cooperation with the Russian Federation in the long term, in line with the European Union Global Strategy, including a selective engagement on areas such as, but not limited to:Climate, Deconfliction in the Arctic, Naval communication, Research, and Cross-border cooperation;Remains committed to ensuring and encouraging Russian cooperation and compliance with standards of peace, security, and sovereignty;Emphasizes that in order for NATO allies to engage in the abovementioned efforts, Russia must accept the sovereignty of all NATO states and respect all previous agreements between NATO and Russia;(NAC Crisis)Reaffirms the Alliance’s commitment to uphold the highest standards of international humanitarian law; Discusses the current political climate in Syria with regards to the Russian Federation, including discourse with Russia through communication channels:Exploring alternative, peaceful measures to de-escalate the Syrian situation as opposed to military action, andReleasing a press release of the invocation of Article IV and NATO’s stance on the issue;Develops a framework for and discussion of NATO partner states’ position on the crisis at hand in Syria, and considering opening dialogue with CSTO and its member states;Discusses the potential for collateral damage in future conflicts involving NATO states; Develops a strategic and tactical concept that may address, but is not limited to topics in: Preparing potential military operations responding to the recent developments in Syria, and as well as potential acts by the CSTO against NATO forces, suggesting the production of, but not limited to: A logistical and transport contingency plan that will support the movement and enhance the response time of NATO forces through NATO to the nation of crisis,Develop a temporary mobilization plan developed by SACEUR in the event that an attack on the Alliance’s territory occurs to increase readiness and rapid deployment, andDevelopment of the specific force allocation details of the augmented force to supplement the VJTF, in the event that a sustained military presence is required, andGathering intelligence regarding movement of Russian nuclear weapons;Political Affairs Committee(POL I/A)Recommends that NATO capacity building resources be focused on the European border security specifically regarding: Training of national police forces (or their equivalent) as well as border security forces, and Collaboration with the ATLAS network to enhance interoperability on counterterrorism matters and cooperation in field operations; Calls upon the NATO-EU Capability group to discuss:The effectiveness of the capacity building on the European and Mediterranean border regarding allies and member states in the region,Transparency between the EU and NATO regarding cooperation, and The redundancy of efforts between the two alliances;Suggests maintaining and streamlining cooperation between NATO’s HQ MARCOM and the EU’s Frontex and Eurosur, in order to:Further augment Operation Sea Guardian,Increase collaboration on counterterrorism in the Mediterranean Sea, andMonitor human rights and potential security threats stemming from migratory movements originating from countries such as but not limited to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Morocco;Encourages the utilization of the Defense Against Terrorism Center of Excellence (DAT COE) located in Ankara, Turkey and any other relevant Centers for Excellence for the purposes of:Training and education of NATO security forces operating in the Southern dimension,Sharing of defense technologies with allies in critical locations, andStrengthening of NATO-compatible weapons systems;Suggests exploring the redirection of existing aerial capabilities to the Mediterranean in the event of heightened tensions:The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Torrejón, Spain, in collaboration with Poland, Germany, Belgium, and Hungary, The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), andAny willing and able member states of NATO and the EU;Encourages collaboration between EUROPOL, the NATO Joint CBRN Defense center of Excellence and the EU CBRN Centre of Excellence on: Crisis response, Shared situational awareness,Training capabilities, andThreat analyses; Enhances collaboration within the framework of the Defence Against Terrorism and the Science for Peace and Security programmes to develop the CT and detection capabilities of EU agencies Europol and Frontex regarding:Counter-WMD capabilities,Dual-use,Conventional weapons proliferations,Criminal network trafficking, andBorder and maritime security;Notes that funding and contributions to new NATO_EU joint operations will be provided on a bilateral basis between individual Alliance members and the EU;(POL I/B)Collaborates through biannual meetings with the EU and EU cyber security agencies in order to: Initiate an optional education program in collaboration with Romania and Estonia which will work to increase cyber security education in EU and NATO member countries, Encourage collaboration with IT experts from the private sector who will add substantially to the education, andInitiate cooperation with German Cyber and Information Space Command to increase collective capacity to defend from cyber-attacks; Creates a joint NATO-EU ongoing exercises tasked with monitoring cyber security threats to be held under the auspices of the NATO Training Group (NTG) with a particular focus on testing readiness for cyber warfare; Calls for the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) to prepare a report regarding the efficacy of the aforementioned education clauses, and to include a recommendation regarding the program going forward; Examines the feasibility and necessity of reestablishing the 2016 Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence as a framework to exchange information and best practices between: NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), Computer Emergency Response Team of the EU (CERT-EU), andComputer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs); Suggest to strengthen cyber security organizations that are already in place within NATO, such as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and the NATO Cyber Defence Trust Fund which will:Allows for a location where the exchanging of best practices and the development of new tactics and strategies may take place, andWork closely with NATO’s upcoming IT Academy in Oeiras, Portugal (ready by the third quarter of 2019) to ensure that the expert training provided to civilian and military NATO staff will tackle these new strategies;(POL I/C) Enhances maritime collaboration between NATO countries in the Baltic, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Arctic, and Northern Atlantic regions only in the threat of a sovereignty issue through the means of:Joint exercises which practice the need for a rapid response to possible aggression,Surveillance of the region, andFacilitating maritime travel for military purposes; Recognizes the need to share EU and NATO resources and achieves it by ensuring the availability of information about how to proceed in the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Sea regions regarding maritime aspects; Hosts a summit in Berlin, Germany between the leaders of the EU and NATO for the purpose of reviewing interoperability capabilities and efforts between the EU and NATO and reducing redundancies between the organizations; Calls upon Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to develop specific NATO proposals on all topics to be brought up during the proposed Berlin Summit, with specific proposals solicited from: Commanders of the Force Integration Units, regarding logistical deficiencies in infrastructure networks near their deployment regions, and The NATO Training Group (NTG) on potential designs of joint exercises between NATO and EU national elements; Recommends the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and NATO to establish frequently recurring discussions between NATO command staff and the Political and Security Committee, as well as the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO), which shall include:Meetings between Allied Joint Force Command HQ (JFC) Brunssum and comparable CSDP staff, Yearly reports issued by commanders of the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) regarding barriers to successful deployment of troops in a crisis situation, Discussions regarding future developments of the CSDP which shall augment NATO’s force posture, andDiscussion regarding the development of the Permanent Structure Cooperation which shall augment NATO’s force posture; (POL IV/A)Recommends the assignment of Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD) to preside over NATO current Intelligence Sharing and Defence Institutions, in order to:Create uniformity between centres of excellence and international intelligence divisions, Encourage cooperation between NATO Intelligence agencies with the intent of improving security capabilities throughout NATO, and Have NATO members work towards pooling information from existing databases;Encourages an increase in NATO member states’ expenditures at their discretion in the domain of intelligence and security infrastructure, both physical and non-physical, under the oversight of SMART Defence, in order to:Improve security and intelligence capabilities in under-developed member states, Ensure NATO intelligence sharing operations are transacted in a secure network, andSecure the most vulnerable NATO member states from potential attack through increase in intelligence capabilities; Creates an assessment which will analyze the work done by the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD) within its first year of its’ establishment, which will:Analyze the work done to see what needs to be changed or added to better intelligence sharing, Assess the strength of the organization to determine if the organization is capable of countering intelligence security threats, Be conducted by intelligence officials selected by NATO, andBe completed by September of 2018; Calls upon the Assistant Secretary General of Intelligence and Security (ASG-IS) to create individualized plans for member countries to update their standard of intelligence, as well as establish minimal standards for intelligence production and stocking practices; Recommends the expansion of the Joint Intelligence Security Division (JISD) to:Incorporate the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) with the supervision of the military committee, andEstablish a database, accessible to all NATO Allies, of open source intelligence;Encourages any Center of Excellence pertaining to intelligence be used to encourage and assist in information sharing between willing and able Alliance members, which will:Expand training and educational operations for voluntary countries who require or requests these operations, Study developing threats, such as terrorism, threats from state actors, and any and all new challenges which will develop to increase the amount of relevant information gathered, Emphasize bilateral and multilateral relationship growth in conjunction with the growth of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), and Include relevant COE’s such as: NATO Counter Intelligence Center of Excellence (CI COE), NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (STRAT COM),NATO Human Intelligence Center of Excellence (HUMINTCOE), andNATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE);Invites NATO to further collaborate with European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center in Brussels on:Intelligence analysis,Data sharing on security such as terrorism, organized crime, and conflict, andNetworks of research and development; Military Affairs Committee(MIL I/A)Recognizes the need to extend current assurance measures to protect NATO members in the East and South by establishing further transparency and commitment to communication with non-member state officials with intentions of lowering tensions in the region;Reaffirms NATO’s commitment to existing operations and exercises made in the Mediterranean Seas through:Operation SEA GUARDIAN,Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1),Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), andDeployment of NATO staff and personnel in these operations and all additional naval operations listed in this document to receive training at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center in the Hellenic Republic;Extends DYNAMIC MANTA and MONARCH to be conducted in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea for the purpose of increasing interoperability of land, sea, and air forces through:Utilizing the Boeing E-3A Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) to increase interoperability with the Enhanced Forward Presence and NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) via collaborative training,Utilizing anti-submarine and anti-surface capabilities, Deploying naval forces to the Black Sea and Baltic Sea in case of increased aggression, andDeveloping anti-undersea detection and response capabilities;Recommends the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to review its emergency decision making procedures in order to facilitate faster response times for the Very-High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF);Recommends to SACEUR that the timeline for establishing the JSEC in Germany as a new logistics command in order to allow rapid maneuverability of the NRF;Calls upon NATO commands to further integrate their resources into the Command and Control (C2) Systems, especially air and naval resources, for the purpose of a more effective and comprehensive common operating picture;(MIL I/B)Recommends ?increased training for NATO Readiness Force by:Training at one of the United States Army's Armor, Airborne, Air Assault, or Cavalry schools or the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway ?in order to provide for 12-24 hour deployment capability,Annual training exercises for the NATO Response Force at British Army Training Suffield in:Area denial operations,Interoperability in air and ground warfare, andRapid forward deployment in their respective areas of specialtyAnnual training will be conducted in four waves, one for each specialty, as they rotate from forward deployment,Annual training will be conducted in training ranges within the United States, and the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway, andAnnual training exercises for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in the United States, Norway, Estonia, and Romania, that will include 5 waves of training working toward the goal of 12-hour deployment capability;(MIL II/A)Recommends that member states audit their country’s own military expenditure in order to: Identify areas for adjustments in spending in line with NATO’s goal of specialization, prioritization and cooperation in line with the strategic concept, Better commit 20% of their GDP allocation towards defence to military spending for modernization of their capabilities and resources as agreed in the 2014 Wales Summit, andSubmit an annual report recording their monetary expenditure progressions specifically in regards to funding for active and reserve personnel, equipment, and defense contracts to meet NATO’s obligations;Requests the Financial Controller (FC) evaluate the allocation of NATO’s current defense expenditure to determine relative financial efficiency; Encourages member states to continue investing in domestic defense to further strengthen the alliance by:Conducting training and operations of domestic security organizations,Modernizing military equipment, Investigating non traditional threats and the most effective ways to respond to them, andWorking toward better interoperability with NATO allies;(MIL II/B)Reaffirms the commitment of the body to the 2% GDP commitment agreed to in the 2014 Wales Summit by commissioning the Military Expenditures Committee based in Brussels, which will:Consist of delegates from each NATO member nation,Analyze member contributions to determine the military effectiveness of governmental expenditures,Allow for common defense infrastructure spending on projects approved by this body such as international transportation, resource pipelines and NATO military bases, to underscore the value of the contributions of all nations,Provide financial advice to nations that have not met the 2% goal in reaching the 2014 Wales Summit goals using sustainable methods, andRecognize efforts made by members on the investment in overseas development aid to prevent threats against international peace and security;Nuclear Planning Group(NPG II/A)Requests that all Member States of the Alliance, if they have not done so already, to become party to the United Nations International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (hereinafter the ‘Nuclear Terrorism Convention’), particularly in spirit of its provisions on:Exchanging information relating to growing potential threats of nuclear terrorism and actions of non-state actors in pursuit of nuclear capabilities, andStates’ responsibilities to render harmless radioactive byproducts of nuclear energy production within borders and maintain compliance with International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards and safety standards;Urges Member States to individually strengthen national measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring radioactive materials and to prevent breaches and attacks on nuclear facilities, particularly in measures that are in accordance with international obligations;Suggests Member States who either contribute to or host nuclear facilities to work towards increasing security standards around nuclear storage facilities by methods including, but not limited to:Requesting willing and able Member States to contribute security forces to reinforce protection of nuclear storage sites, as their perimeter protection is currently staffed only by forces of the host nations,Assessing and developing the cyber defence capabilities of nuclear storage and production sites within their borders to limit vulnerabilities to cyber attacks that erode the security of facilities and leave them open to potential infiltration,Conducting regular security consultations from other willing Alliance Members to ensure optimal nuclear weapon storage,Security and confidentiality of plans to move nuclear weapons within the Alliance, andRecommending Member Nations conduct regular reviews of the security of nuclear materials as they are transported across NATO member territories;Recommends Member Nuclear States and Nuclear Sharing states to invite other willing Members of the Alliance to conduct consultations on the optimal security of nuclear storage sites at regular interval in the spirit of best practice sharing;Further Recommends member states to more efficiently conduct surveillance and intelligence collections in strategic regions globally at risk of illicit nuclear activity:Increased focus on joint intelligence collection and information sharing among willing and able allied states,Encourages willing and able allied countries to allocate resources to ensure technological improvements in surveillance and intelligence collections, andInvites willing and able member states to further share intelligence regarding potential terrorist threats, especially in regards to potential nuclear acquisition;Encourages the Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) to develop research and response in reference to topics including, but not limited to:Proliferation of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and source material,Nuclear threats on member states from terrorist cells or rogue states,Develop recommended surveillance tactics within the Mediterranean and MENA region involving black market moving of source material, andRecommend guidelines for nuclear waste disposal;(NPG II/B)Reaffirms the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an alliance with nuclear capabilities, and while nuclear weapons exist in the world that the Alliance should maintain its nuclear capabilities, noting:Miscommunication between NATO and partner or external nations is a regrettable possibility can be meaningfully minimised by dialogue,Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent must be balanced with a genuine and demonstrable commitment to transparency and the maintenance of deterrence rather than intimidation,The nuclear deterrence provided by the alliance must be able to protect and respond to any threat against all fronts of the alliance,General arms control and non-proliferation remain key focuses of the Alliance and its member nations, andNATO sees no state as an inherent enemy or a target of its nuclear forces, andNuclear forces are an arsenal whose primary objective is the deterrence against nuclear actions;Prioritizes the security of NATO members’ nuclear facilities and weapons through:Recommending the modernization of the nuclear arsenals of member states within the regulation of all treaties that NATO adheres to,Urging members with nuclear facilities to review and recommit to nuclear safety standards set by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency),Committing to the regular practice of:Internal personnel vetting and training to mitigate insider threat,Updating cyber security technology and updating requirements, andRegular inspections and surveillance of transportation in and out of facilities and the facilities themselves;Tasking the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence located in Tallinn, Estonia (CCDCOE) to analyze current cyber vulnerabilities of nuclear capabilities, including Alliance missiles sites and delivery systems:Working towards supplying the Alliance with solutions to these vulnerabilities, andRecommends an annual cyber security test of integral nuclear systems and defense missile systems in member states within the Nuclear Planning Group, the timings of which are to be clearly communicated through channels deemed appropriate by the NAC to avoid misinterpretation by external actors;Proposes a close monitoring and surveillance of potential nuclear threats along the borders of our allies including:Tasking the Military Intelligence Committee to work with the Nuclear Planning Group on advancing surveillance technologies focused on potential nuclear threats,Increase surveillance on potential nuclear threats 360 degrees around NATO member states,Recommending increased intelligence sharing to ensure all allied states understand the actions that different state actors are taking in regards to nuclear weapon development, andRecommends the increased sophistication of intelligence collection systems on an individual basis to ensure improved intelligence collection, sharing best practices between all NATO member states and utilizing the HUMINT Centre of Excellence in Oradea Romania and the Joint Air Power Competence Centre in Kalkar, Germany;Suggests the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to keep channels of dialogue open with Russia, to discuss all topics related to Nuclear Planning when deemed necessary and justified;Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee(PCSC IV/A) Utilizes pre-existing frameworks to promote a safer and more stable Iraq by focusing on:The NATO Training and Capacity Building Activity in Iraq (NTCB-I), specifically:countering-improvised explosive devices(C-IED), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), civil military cooperation, civil emergency planning, reforming Iraqi security institutions, and Soviet-era equipment maintenance,Initiatives such as the:Science for Peace and Security (SPS),United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS),NATO’s Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, andNATO Training and Capacity Building Activity in Iraq (NTCB-I);Suggests referring to the existing NTCB-I framework in solving the security and stability issues facing the state of Iraq by developing new NTCB-I evaluation mechanisms to continually reevaluate the effectiveness and consequences of NATO activity in Iraq with reference to the partnerships detailed in the previous clause:A meeting between NATO members to discuss findings a week after the evaluation,The consequences and successes of the NTCB-I framework will be reevaluated on a yearly basis by this committee, andIf no major successes are demonstrated within a time frame of three years, this framework will be reevaluated by this committee for the purpose of addressing ongoing issues within the state of Iraq;Recommits use of the DCB Initiative in Iraq on an as requested basis, including but not limited to:Education and training of Iraqi officials with the goal of continuing the current “train-the-trainers” concept,Explosive ordnance disposal and demining,German assistance in the organization of additional aid and training for members without the resources to do so bilaterally,Military medicine and medical assistance, andWorking with existing mandate of NTCB-I to include more efficient capacity building activities in Iraq;Reaffirms invitation to Iraqi officers to utilize:NATO’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Center of Excellence in Madrid, Spain to enhance their capabilities to counter, reduce, and eliminate threats from existing IEDs in Iraq, andNATO’s Centre of Excellence for the phenomenon of Foreign Fighters in Tirana, Albania to enhance their counterterrorism efforts in order to reduce and deter the threats of violent extremism in the region; Pushes for cooperation and collaboration with the government of Iraq by working on making defined areas safer--only contingent on Iraqi government consent and clear willingness to maintain such safe zones--to assist the displaced Iraqi citizens return to their country in assistance with the Iraqi government by:Recognizing that these areas would be established in the geographical areas with sufficient infrastructure and that have already been cleared of mines by NATO personnel and are deemed as hospitable to Iraqi Citizens by NATO and the government of Iraq;Focus on emphasizing the role of the existing Iraqi military structures to monitor and protect these areas, rather than NATO aligned military forces;(PCSC I/A)Invites Mediterranean Dialogue member countries to create an agreement on information sharing which will:Be drafted between the members of the Dialogue and NATO, andBe completed as the member country sees fit;Suggests an annual meeting of the Mediterranean Dialogue;Increases the frequency of maritime exercises in the Southern dimension to augment the security of Southern member states and the Mediterranean Dialogue, to be hosted by NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC);Requests that members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO work to consolidate their policies on the various issues facing the Middle East and North Africa, which include, but are not limited to:Border security, Terrorism in the Mediterranean,Any other immediate threatening activities that raise security concerns,Illicit trafficking of all kinds;Proposes the expansion of the Strategic Direction South Hub (NSD-S Hub) in Naples, Italy to:Be used as a platform for the development, exchange of knowledge, expertise, and ideas, and as an avenue for discussing ongoing security issues in the region, between NATO experts and non-NATO entities to facilitate responses to the ongoing issues facing the Middle East and North Africa region, andBe established to encourage the further implementation of defensive capacity building initiatives for partner countries as members of the Mediterranean Dialogue;(PCSC I/B)Cooperates with Georgia and Ukraine to evaluate their individual partnerships for the purpose of strengthening connections, doing so through ensuring progress in the areas of: The above mentioned partners’ successful completion of Annual National Programs, and Foreign policy aimed at resolving existing international legal disputes;Reevaluates NATO’s response to security on the Eastern border of NATO member states by:Suggesting that NATO increases dialogue and cooperation will all members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), but specifically the Baltic and Balkan regions, Aiming to work with these states to develop a proactive foreign policy for the purpose of more easily resolving international disputes within the framework of PfP, andReiterating NATO’s commitment to the autonomy of individual members to engage in bilateral communication with non-NATO states;Recognizes the importance of the Balkan partner states, specifically the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and therefore suggests that NATO increases its cooperation with Partnership for Peace members in the Balkans for the purpose of furthering dialogue and cooperation in order to mitigate any possible threats on the Eastern Front;Promotes the participation in the PfP process leading to the Membership Action Plan, while maintaining the integrity of the membership requirements by:Prioritizing democratic institutions and processes, Encouraging partners to develop and maintain:Active participation in the program,Future contributions, andA spirit of cooperative security;(PCSC I/C)Invites ICI, Saudi Arabia, and Oman to participate in NATO maritime security operations to establish maritime security off the coast of Somalia in order to:Help reduce security costs, andAllow NATO countries, ICI, Saudi Arabia, and Oman to benefit by:Protecting Oil exports, andProtecting European and North American Oil imports; Encourages ICI, Saudi Arabia, and Oman to actively participate in the sharing of information and expertise related to countering piracy, human trafficking, and terrorist operations within their own waters and along their sea trade routes by:Establishing a NATO-Gulf Maritime Security Initiative in order to facilitate the discussion of emerging and existing threats and develop action plans for dealing with these threats, and Conducting joint training exercises with these states in order to increase interoperability and share best practices;Requests NATO countries to coordinate security with the African Union to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia in the form of:Security sector reform,Foreign internal defense,Information sharing, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and Increased focus on existing multilateral and bilateral relations that NATO member states may already have with African Union member states;Suggests cooperation with Oman’s National Computer Emergency Readiness Team (OCERT) to:Enhance the Alliance's cyber-security capabilities across NATO partner nations, as well as the broader Southern Front, andDevelop a memorandum of understanding with the abovementioned body on future avenues to increase cooperation between NATO, NATO member states, and partner members, specifically those in the Middle East and North Africa region;Recognizing the Kingdom of Oman’s advanced cyber security infrastructure, andIncreasing cooperation with Oman’s National Computer Emergency Readiness Team (OCERT) will expand NATO’s influence with the greater Middle East and with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),Utilize Estonia’s Centre of Excellence in conjunction to other cyber programs, and collaborate in training exercises to increase understanding and cooperation between NATO and its members and partners;(PCSC I/D)Invites New Zealand to the membership of the Enhanced Opportunities partnership group; Committee on Emerging Security Challenges(ESC I/A)Creates? a cyber-attack mitigation investigative force in order to efficiently limit the effects of cyberattacks on member states that will: Act to analyze how much a cyber attack will affect infrastructure and information systems, and has the potential to effect, Work with the country’s cyber intelligence agencies to develop mitigation plans to best prevent further damage, and Be based in Bucharest, Romania; Declares? an effective minimum standard of training established by the CCD COE for members that will improve efficiency as well as response speed to international crises related to cyber security threats; Affirms? ?that this investigative force will be made of experts within NATO and will be deployed on request from a member state; Determines? that the group created by this document will exist under the purview of NATO’s Cyber Defense Council (CDC), and that within this overview, the CDC may determine priority as well as magnitude of response, based on a majority vote;(ESC I/B)Creates? the following guidelines on how cyberattacks should be dealt with by NATO which says:Attacks which specifically target and harm infrastructure of Ally States should provoke an appropriate NATO response based upon the perpetrator of the attacks and if perpetrated:By a state actor NATO should strongly consider cooperative, retaliatory action in an immediate, emergency meeting of the NAC, should the attack be demonstrably equivalent to an armed attack, and By a non-state actor, the NAC should meet immediately to consider possible courses of action, dependent upon if the non-state actor can be definitively identified or targeted,Attacks which specifically target, harm and eventually seriously damage the economy of the targeted country should not necessarily merit NATO response, but a country suffering such an attack should receive immediate assistance from the other NATO member states in order to ensure such economic attacks do not lead to political, military or social insecurity, and Major cyber attacks on NATO member states should result in a coordinated NATO cyber response, bearing in mind the fact that lack of effective response results in perceived weakness and vulnerability to more attacks; Determines? ?that NATO members should work to further develop existing information-sharing networks in order to more quickly determine when cyber attacks occur and characterize such attacks, thus allowing NATO to expeditiously decide upon an appropriate response, including but not limited to: Calling to attention the Technical Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation signed in 2016 between the EU and NATO, andCreate a standard for info sharing technical language to promote efficiency and efficacy of communication between nations;(ESC I/C)Emphasizes? the need to further expand upon already existing security measures, through ways such as, but not limited to: Suggests utilizing existing groups to share knowledge and expertise for use in NATO’s networks and the networks of member states, groups such as: Training bodies, including: Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCD CoE), NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS), Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS), Crisis Management Exercises (CMX), and NCI Academy in Oeiras, Reactionary bodies, including: NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), and Cyber Defense Committee (CDC), andPrivate Sector and Governmental Organization Advisory Groups, including:International Organization for Standardization, and Internet Engineering Task Force, and Expansion of the existing NATO cyber industry partnership and further interoperability between Allies in order to leverage the private sector’s ability to introduce a cognitive computing approach to NATO’s existing cyber network, Recommend to cyber capable partner nations outside NATO that they apply to join the Center of Excellence in Estonia, andExpanding the scope of the NATO Cyber Defense Committee to facilitate information sharing between nations by: Working with domestic cyber security bodies to determine what information could be shared within the NATO body, and Encourage the sharing of information that currently takes place bilaterally between two NATO nations; (ESC I/D)Encourages NATO to expand its cooperation with partner organizations by having the cyber capabilities of each partnership evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the Cyber Defense Committee (CDC) and Cyber Defense Management Board (CDMB) and private sectors and infrastructure at risk of attack;Recommends that NATO increase interoperability between the European Union, partnerships, and internal NATO programs involved in cyber security by:Increasing information sharing within these partnerships, andIncluding logistical cyber security support to all willing and evaluated partners through cyber security experts provided by NATO member states;(ESC II/A)Recommends that the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ESCE) research and publish annual reports regarding the state of NATO’s energy security;Notes that renewable or sustainable energy sources are likely to ensure the most energy security and should receive prioritization; (ESC II/B)Encourages member states with transnational energy infrastructure to improve interoperability by:Sharing information about potential threats to the infrastructure shared between countries,Conducting joint operations with member states with respect to both:Land-based infrastructure targets, such as pipelines and nuclear reactors, andSea-based trade and transportation targets, such as trade routes;Strongly urges the creation of flexible crisis and consequence management plan in case of an attack on energy infrastructure;Advises the evaluation of key military operations and points of infrastructure in order to:Access points of weakness in security for these and evaluate methods of improvement, andEvaluate and determine a minimum reserve of resources to ensure operability for a determined and recommended amount of hours such that operations might continue in the event of interruption to energy infrastructure;Encourage the members states to work closely with the EU in terms of future needs in NATO Operations support by:Providing scientific analysis on the different aspect of energy supply, andModernizing NATO’s exercises concerning the critical infrastructure protection;(ESC II/C)Reaffirms NATO’s commitment to the policy and consideration of green military technology;Calls upon NATO members states to work closely with the EU in ways such as, but not limited to:Providing help to the member states to:Ensure the security of all energy infrastructures during times of transition, andEncourage the EU commission to work on an efficient plan concerning the reduction of EU dependence on foreign energy, andEnhancing cooperation through research; (ESC II/D)Promotes further partnership between the EU and thus further the collective defense of states within NATO and the EU through a strategic petroleum reserve;Emphasizes the importance of reinforcing defence and resiliency of critical energy infrastructure dependent on unreliable energy sources;Recommends NATO members mitigate threats to energy security by:Increasing information sharing and best practices through the The NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSECCOE) in Lithuania,Diversifying sources of energy imports,Diversifying types of energy used,Improving efficiency of energy use in military sectors to lower demand for energy sources, andEmphasizing the need for Allied states to develop individualized flexible plans to work towards greater energy independence and diversification in order to prevent potential energy crises and promote a greater and stronger NATO alliance;(Ad Hoc Crisis Committee Press Release)Declares? that NATO has met in response to the United States’ invocation of Article IV, due to concern over security in the conflict in Syria;Strongly encourages? the return of the Americans currently being held captive, unharmed; andCalls for? multilateral discussions be opened with heads of the CSTO and heads of NATO in order to:Negotiate hostage release, and Create a temporary armistice to de-escalate the current situation.(Ad-Hoc Crisis Committee I/A) Emphasizes the necessity for all involved parties to work towards avoiding escalation of conflict within the Syrian and Greater Middle East region by:Recommends the avoidance of any language that could potentially escalate the ongoing crisis, including, but not limited to:Any unprovoked military action, andAggressive actions by any NATO member states or partner states in relation to this crisis,Expresses that mobilization of NATO forces would further escalate conflict with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),Urges further cooperation and dialogue with the CSTO and CSTO member states in order to reach a mutual understanding of the ongoing crisis and of reasonable paths forward to solve the crisis, andNotes that participation in this dialogue is not mandatory for any Allied member or any Allied partner;Recognizes the increased need for dialogue with the Russian Federation in order resolve this crisis diplomatically by:Recommending continuing dialogue with the CSTO through allied and partner countries to work towards de-escalation of the crisis, andRecommending establishing a mediatory committee between the United States and Russia, along with any other parties affected by this crisis, hosted by a non-NATO member, through:Recommending that this body request that the nation of Mongolia host this summit,Recognizing Mongolia’s “Third Neighbor Policy” as a buffer between Russia, China, and the West, andUnderstanding the necessity of having a completely neutral nation mediate discussions in the crisis;Calls upon the NATO Response Force to expand the responsive capabilities for the purposes of preparing any action that may be necessary in the case of direct attacks on European or North American territory, in line with the Alliance’s collective defence posture, by measures including, but not limited to:Mobilization of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) troops, including land, air, maritime, and special operations components, for deployment on NATO bases in Turkey,Further utilizing the Initial Follow-On Forces Group (IFFG) for its rapid deployment capabilities in Alliance efforts to protect against aggression into Allied territory, andEmphasizing that these are simply defence preparation measures and are by no means for invasion into Syrian territory;Reaffirms the Alliance’s progress towards advancing its Readiness Action Plan and both its assurance and adaptation measures in preparing the Alliances force readiness for future Alliance engagements;Advises that Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) work with other nations, both NATO member states and partners, to develop further protection without provocation course of action, as de-escalation is paramount, under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC); andDecides to remain actively seized of the matter. ................
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