Mark Curtis – British Historian & Journalist



National ArchivesIndonesia 1945FO 371/46398Chiefs of Staff, “The situation in the Netherlands East Indies”, 20 October 45Contains letter from Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia, to Chiefs of Staff. Existing Indonesian administration in Java “is temporarily in a strong position” because the administration of the country “is in their hands”, and they are well armed with Japanese equipment.Clement Attlee, Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia, 5 November 1945“Tension [in Netherlands East Indies] is now acute and if we are to avoid a general flare-up, immediate need is to show a firm front and to support Force Commander’s warning to Indonesians. Any suggestion that the problem should be referred to an international body might well lead extremists to argue that such a development was direct result of their policy of violence… We have to be careful to do nothing which could be construed as an attempt to impede resumption of Dutch control”.UK embassy Batavia [now Jakarta] to Foreign Office, 5 November 1945“It is intended to take the strongest possible armed action against Indonesians in Sourbaya [sic] if they reject our ultimatum and refuse to lay down their arms… we are determined to enforce law and order in our key areas if Indonesian leaders cannot do so themselves”.FO 371/46402Mountbatten to Chiefs of Staff, 21 November 1945In August Mountbatten was given instructions including “the despatch of forces to Java as soon as possible to accept the surrender of Japanese forces and to prepare for the eventual handing over of this country to the Dutch civil authorities”. When this was drafted “there was no particular reason to suppose than an Indonesia Republic would be declared and would in fact turn out to be a strongly organised nationalist movement, prepared to resist the return of the Dutch by force of arms but I consider that we are reaching a position where we have either to declare that our policy is that… we are going to withdraw or that we propose to restore Dutch sovereignty by force of arms”.Copy of a letter dated 25th November 1945 from Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to Foreign OfficeThe Chiefs of Staff considered a request from the Netherlands government to the US government that arms from US dumps in the Pacific should be released for use by Dutch forces in the Netherlands East Indies. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this request be supported “as they felt than any contribution which will improve the quality of Dutch forces destined from NEI [sic] will enable them to undertake further responsibility more quickly in their own areas”.Chiefs of Staff committee, “Long term policy in NEI”, 25 November 1945Contains draft letter from the Chiefs of Staff to the Foreign Office, a response to Mountbatten. “At no time have we stated that we intend to enforce Dutch rule by force of arms but Admiral Mountbatten considers that we are, in fact, drifting towards such a policy; this is becoming daily more apparent, and is the cause of suspicion both inside and outside Java”. The conclusion is that a decision will have to be taken in the very near future on whether to withdraw or impose Dutch rule.FO 371/46403Note by A.Anderson, 20 November 1945UK capital invested in various Indonesian plantations – tea, rubber, coffee and others – was worth around ?30m. Notes: “The close relationship between British and Dutch financial interests…”Foreign Office to various embassies, 27 November 1945The US press has recently published a report from Batavia saying that the Japanese are assisting UK forces in fighting the Indonesians. “Report purported to quote a British spokesman saying ‘Japanese are good troops who fight well’”. But says “following for your information are the facts: (a) as stated by Foreign Secretary in his speech in House of Commons on 23rd November…we were obliged in Java for want of manpower or transport to use expedient of placing on Japanese commanders responsibility for maintenance of law and order and for safety of prisoners. Japanese in disobedience of these orders later relinquished control, together with large quantity of equipment to Indonesian forces whom they had previously armed and trained. (b) Admiral Mountbatten has reported that in no instance have Japanese been used to quell Indonesian resistance, though they have on occasion been employed on guard duties and have fought Indonesians in self-defence when attacked; general evidence is that Japanese elements have been and still are assisting Indonesians”.Mountbatten to Chiefs of Staff, 3 December 1945“The question of the morale of our own troops is a delicate one. Both by the press and by letters from home the British troops are being made to believe that the imposition of Dutch authority by force of British arms is a wrong cause… the longer we remain in Java and Sumatra the more the morale will deteriorate”.FO 371/46404Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Netherlands East Indies – Dutch request for use of American arms and equipment”, 3 December 1945The Foreign Office has decided to approve the Dutch request to use US arms.Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Long term policy in Netherlands East Indies”, 2 December 1945“The scale of the fighting at Sourbaya gives reason to believe that the Indonesian rising is a serious nationalist movement, and that strong forces are required to deal with it”. UK is using Indian troops in Java. Withdrawing troops would have the advantage of providing additional forces to meet commitments elsewhere but there are four disadvantages: “strong obligations to the Dutch… the peoples of India, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya would undoubtedly draw the inference that by using a sufficient degree of violence it was possible to obtain complete independence… it is in our long-term interests that there should be a strong and friendly government in the East Indian [sic] islands which would not be the case if the Indonesians were in power… if we withdraw we shall inevitably leave to their fate in the island a large number of APWI [allied prisoners of war and internees] and Japanese at present scattered throughout central Java.” Recommends neither withdrawal nor conquering the whole of Java but continuing to hold limited areas.FO 371/46405Memo of 7 December says that the Defence Committee today agreed that the UK would propose a conference with the Dutch and Indonesians and that British forces should remain in Java and hold western Java.Mountbatten to JSM Washington, 7 December 1945Message from Mountbatten to Field Marshall Wilson. “Japanese troops are not being used for operations against the Indonesians except on a number of occasions when the lives of RAPWI [recovery of allied prisoners of war and internees] women and children have been in acute danger owing to attacks on RAPWI camps by Indonesian extremists… Normally, when Japanese troops have to be used, it is for static guards of RAPWI camps and arms dumps”.Browning, Supreme Allied Command, Southeast Asia to JSM Washington, 10 December 1945On 6 December a battalion whose objective was to evacuate 500 starving APWI who had been abducted by Indonesians were met by “heavily fortified strong points” which could not have been overcome by an infantry attack without heavy loss of life to own troops. “None of own artillery in locality and an ad hoc troop of Japanese guns formed to give own troops support. Can therefore categorically state that Japanese artillery were only used as a special case to save lives of internees… There is no intention of using Japanese troops anywhere in an offensive role and they never have been so used”. It should be impressed on the press that thousands of people in Java are in danger of being massacred and that Indonesians have often shown barbaric brutality. “There may be occasions when all possible expedients including somewhat more active use of Japanese troops may be necessary in absolute emergency”. ................
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