Courtney Hillebrecht, Ph.D. | Research and …



International Law and OrganizationsPOLS 960Fall 2012Oldfather 538Thursday 2:00-4:50 pmInstructor InfoProfessor HillebrechtEmail: chillebrecht2@unl.eduOffice Hours: Thursdays, 12:00-2:00and by appointment.Course DescriptionThis course is an introduction to the study of international law and organizations. Throughout the semester, we will ask three major questions: 1) Do international law and organizations matter? 2) If international law and organizations matter, how and to what effect? And 3) What is the relationship between international law and organizations and domestic politics? We will use a variety of empirical examples, from trade to human rights, security to environmental protection, to try to answer these questions. Our goal throughout the semester will be to gain theoretical and methodological leverage on some of the most important questions about the prospects and challenges of cooperation in international relations.The required readings, listed below, only scratch the surface of the very prolific political science and law literatures on international organizations. I also have included a more extensive—but obviously not comprehensive—bibliography on international law and organizations at the end of this syllabus. Students planning on writing a comprehensive exam in international relations should familiarize themselves with the required readings, as well as those included in the bibliography at the end of the syllabus.Course RequirementsClass Participation (15%): Your class participation grade reflects your weekly contribution to class discussion. This means coming to class having read and thought about the readings. Come prepared to actively participate, and remember, quality counts just as much as quantity. Attendance is mandatory, although I do allow one “free pass” day over the course of the semester. You needn’t tell me why you won’t be attending seminar on this day. After that, however, any absence will negatively affect your grade; with two or more absences you are in serious risk of failing the class. Response Papers (15% Total): Every week (minus the first and last weeks of class, the week of APSA and Thanksgiving break), you should turn in a one-page, single-spaced response paper that synthesizes the readings, identifies any inconsistencies or gaps in the related literature and poses questions for further inquiry. Response papers will be graded on 0/check/check-plus basis and are due by 9:00 am on Thursday mornings and should be submitted via SafeAssign on Blackboard. No late response papers will be accepted. Discussion Leader (10%): Over the course of the semester, each student will serve as the discussion leader for one of our class meetings. As discussion leader, you should come to class prepared to lead the discussion and cover the main topics in the readings, including but not limited to theoretical and methodological contributions and shortcomings, implications for the field, and unanswered questions. You should put together a handout or summary for the class to help guide discussion.Research Paper (50%): Each student will write a 25- to 35-page research paper on a topic of their choosing related to IL/IOs. All papers should present original research and follow the typical format of scholarly political science articles: presentation of research question, literature review, theoretical framework, research method, data analysis and conclusion. You are required to meet with the instructor at three points during the semester to discuss the different elements of your project. These meeting times are highlighted below. These meeting are designed to provide guidance and troubleshooting as you work on your projects and make sure that you are on-track to producing a quality end-result. Research Presentations (10%): The final week of the course, students will present their research in 12-15 minute formal presentations and then take questions from the class. Students’ presentation grade will be comprised equally of their peer’s assessment and the instructor’s. More details to follow. Course PoliciesAcademic Honesty: I have a zero-tolerance policy for academic dishonesty. Please refer to the Student Handbook, the University’s Code of Conduct and the Office of Undergraduate Studies’ document on academic integrity for the University’s policies on plagiarism, cheating and other forms of academic dishonesty. If you have any questions concerning the proper use of citations or sourcing, I would be more than happy to answer them. Communication: The best way to get in touch with me is via email (chillebrecht2@unl.edu) or during office hours. This semester I will hold office hours from 12:00-2:00 on Thursdays. I also am available by appointment. I rarely check voicemail, so please do not leave me voice mail messages. Deadlines: I expect that all students submit their work in a timely fashion and always by the given deadlines. I will return your graded work in an equally timely manner. Late papers will be penalized with a 5-point deduction from your assigned grade for each 24-hour period past the deadline, including weekends and holidays. Please note that I do not give incompletes for this course.Emergencies: If an emergency should arise during the course of the semester that prevents you from attending class or completing your work, please be in touch as soon as possible. Learning Assistance: If you need learning assistance, please follow the appropriate University and ADA policies: “Students with disabilities are encouraged to contact the instructor for a confidential discussion of their individual needs for academic accommodation. It is the policy of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to provide flexible and individualized accommodation to students with documented disabilities that may affect their ability to fully participate in course activities or to meet course requirements. To receive accommodation services, students must be registered with the Services for Students with Disabilities (SSD) office, 132 Canfield Administration, 472-3787 voice or TTY.”Grading RubricA = 93+C = 73-76A- = 90-92 C- = 70-72B+ = 87-89D+ = 67-69 B = 83-86 D = 63-66B- = 80-82 D- = 60-62C+ = 77-79 F = < 59ReadingsYou should complete the assigned readings for the week prior to writing your response papers, which are due on Thursday mornings before our seminar. Please note that this list is not exhaustive, but rather is intended to provide you with a taste of the core works in the field and introduce you to the substantive, methodological and epistemological diversity within the field of international law and organizations. The following books are required and are available for purchase at the UNL book store: ADDIN ZOTERO_BIBL {"custom":[]} CSL_BIBLIOGRAPHY Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. Rules For The World: International Organizations In Global Politics. Cornell University Press, 2004.Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner. The Limits of International Law. Oxford University Press, 2005.Guzman, Andrew. How International Law Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.Milner, Helen V. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton University Press, 1997.Mitchell, Professor Sara McLaughlin, and Emilia Justyna Powell. Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and International Courts. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2011.Pevehouse, Jon C. Democracy From Above: Regional Organizations And Democratization. Cambridge University Press, 2005.Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A New World Order. Princeton University Press, 2004.Tomz, Michael. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries. Princeton University Press, 2007.Course OutlineWeek 1: (Aug. 23) Introductions, Course Overview and Discussion Leader Selection (Aug. 23) ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"x3dPRyFT","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, \\uc0\\u8220{}Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,\\uc0\\u8221{} \\i Journal of Conflict Resolution\\i0{} 42, no. 1 (1998): 3\\uc0\\u8211{}32.}","plainCitation":"Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3–32."},"citationItems":[{"id":12726,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":12726,"type":"article-journal","title":"Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations","container-title":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","page":"3-32","volume":"42","issue":"1","abstract":"\"States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interations and more drmatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary internaly theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizatiosn by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational-institutionalist perspective that sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their ends, the authors examine power and distributive questions and the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding. Centralization and independence ar identified as the key properties of formal organizations, and their importance is illustrated with a wide array of examples. IOs as community representatives further allow states to create and implement community values and enforce international commitments\" (p. 3).","author":[{"family":"Abbott","given":"Kenneth W"},{"family":"Snidal","given":"Duncan"}],"issued":{"year":1998},"page-first":"3"}}],"schema":""} Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3–32.Week 2: APSA, No Class (Aug. 30)Week 3: International Law and/or International Organizations: Screens or Constraints? (Sept. 6)Beth Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” The American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 819–835. Jana Von Stein, “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (2005): 611–622.Beth Simmons and Daniel J. Hopkins, “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (2005): 623–631.James Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture,” International Organization 62, no. 1 (2008): 65–101.Week 4: Realist Approaches to IL and IOs (Sept. 13)Research Questions Due: 150 Word Abstract Due ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"0FlTIIl5","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, \\i The Limits of International Law\\i0{} (Oxford University Press, 2005).}","plainCitation":"Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005)."},"citationItems":[{"id":1251,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":1251,"type":"book","title":"The Limits of International Law","publisher":"Oxford University Press","number-of-pages":"272","abstract":"International law is much debated and discussed, but poorly understood. Does international law matter, or do states regularly violate it with impunity? If international law is of no importance, then why do states devote so much energy to negotiating treaties and providing legal defenses for their actions? In turn, if international law does matter, why does it reflect the interests of powerful states, why does it change so often, and why are violations of international law usually not punished? In this book, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that international law matters but that it is less powerful and less significant than public officials, legal experts, and the media believe. International law, they contend, is simply a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not pull states towards compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited. It follows that many global problems are simply unsolvable. The book has important implications for debates about the role of international law in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. The authors see international law as an instrument for advancing national policy, but one that is precarious and delicate, constantly changing in unpredictable ways based on non-legal changes in international politics. They believe that efforts to replace international politics with international law rest on unjustified optimism about international law's past accomplishments and present capacities.","ISBN":"9780195168396","language":"en","author":[{"family":"Goldsmith","given":"Jack L."},{"family":"Posner","given":"Eric A."}],"issued":{"year":2005,"month":2,"day":3}}}],"schema":""} Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005).Week 5: Rational Institutionalist Approaches to IL and IOs (Sept. 20) ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"mFnedZfS","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Andrew Guzman, \\i How International Law Works\\i0{} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).}","plainCitation":"Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)."},"citationItems":[{"id":6623,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":6623,"type":"book","title":"How International Law Works","publisher":"Oxford University Press","publisher-place":"Oxford","event-place":"Oxford","author":[{"family":"Guzman","given":"Andrew"}],"issued":{"year":2008}}}],"schema":""} Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).Week 6: Constructivist Approaches to IL and IOs (Sept. 27) ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"B8XuBwCo","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, \\i Rules For The World: International Organizations In Global Politics\\i0{} (Cornell University Press, 2004).}","plainCitation":"Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules For The World: International Organizations In Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004)."},"citationItems":[{"id":1253,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":1253,"type":"book","title":"Rules For The World: International Organizations In Global Politics","publisher":"Cornell University Press","number-of-pages":"244","abstract":"Rules for the World provides an innovative perspective on the behavior of international organizations and their effects on global politics. Arguing against the conventional wisdom that these bodies are little more than instruments of states, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore begin with the fundamental insight that international organizations are bureaucracies that have authority to make rules and so exercise power. At the same time, Barnett and Finnemore maintain, such bureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules, producing unresponsive, inefficient, and self-defeating outcomes. Authority thus gives international organizations autonomy and allows them to evolve and expand in ways unintended by their creators.Barnett and Finnemore reinterpret three areas of activity that have prompted extensive policy debate: the use of expertise by the IMF to expand its intrusion into national economies; the redefinition of the category \"refugees\" and decision to repatriate by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and the UN Secretariat's failure to recommend an intervention during the first weeks of the Rwandan genocide. By providing theoretical foundations for treating these organizations as autonomous actors in their own right, Rules for the World contributes greatly to our understanding of global politics and global governance.","ISBN":"9780801488238","shortTitle":"Rules For The World","language":"en","author":[{"family":"Barnett","given":"Michael N."},{"family":"Finnemore","given":"Martha"}],"issued":{"year":2004}}}],"schema":""} Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules For The World: International Organizations In Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004).Week 7: Classic Studies in Compliance (Oct. 4) Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Research Design Meeting ADDIN ZOTERO_BIBL {"custom":[]} CSL_BIBLIOGRAPHY Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. “On Compliance.” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 175–205.Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?” International Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 379–406.Fearon, James. “Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation.” International Organization 52, no. 2 (1998): 296–305.Week 8: IOs and Socialization: the Case of Europe (Oct. 11) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, Special Issue, International Organizations, Autumn 2005. Read the Introduction (Checkel), Conclusions and Extensions (Johnston), Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization (Hooghe) and Getting Socialized to Build Bridges (Zürn and Checkel). Week 9: The “Softer Side” of Socialization: International Legal Networks and Regimes (Oct. 18) ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"9akTmZih","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Anne-Marie Slaughter, \\i A New World Order\\i0{} (Princeton University Press, 2004).}","plainCitation":"Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004)."},"citationItems":[{"id":1255,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":1255,"type":"book","title":"A New World Order","publisher":"Princeton University Press","number-of-pages":"368","ISBN":"0691116989","author":[{"family":"Slaughter","given":"Anne-Marie"}],"issued":{"year":2004,"month":2,"day":17}}}],"schema":""} Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004).Week 10: Domestic Politics and IO/ILs, 1: From the Inside-Out (Oct. 25)Empirical Analysis and Conclusions Meeting ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"T7CyiUwG","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Helen V. Milner, \\i Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations\\i0{} (Princeton University Press, 1997).}","plainCitation":"Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1997)."},"citationItems":[{"id":1244,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":1244,"type":"book","title":"Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations","publisher":"Princeton University Press","number-of-pages":"326","abstract":"Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that \"domestic politics matters.\" Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations.Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game--not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating--that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists--neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike--have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.","ISBN":"9780691011769","shortTitle":"Interests, Institutions, and Information","language":"en","author":[{"family":"Milner","given":"Helen V."}],"issued":{"year":1997,"month":8,"day":29}}}],"schema":""} Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1997).Week 11: Domestic Politics and IO/ILs, 2: From the Inside-Out, Revisited (Nov. 1) ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"lJqTeye5","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Michael Tomz, \\i Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries\\i0{} (Princeton University Press, 2007).}","plainCitation":"Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries (Princeton University Press, 2007)."},"citationItems":[{"id":1258,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":1258,"type":"book","title":"Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries","publisher":"Princeton University Press","number-of-pages":"330","abstract":"\"How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding todeprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.\" .","ISBN":"9780691134697","shortTitle":"Reputation and International Cooperation","language":"en","author":[{"family":"Tomz","given":"Michael"}],"issued":{"year":2007}}}],"schema":""} Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries (Princeton University Press, 2007).Week 12: Domestic Politics and IO/ILs, 3: From the Outside-In (Nov. 8) ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"oBAa9m3R","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Jon C. Pevehouse, \\i Democracy From Above: Regional Organizations And Democratization\\i0{} (Cambridge University Press, 2005).}","plainCitation":"Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy From Above: Regional Organizations And Democratization (Cambridge University Press, 2005)."},"citationItems":[{"id":1246,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":1246,"type":"book","title":"Democracy From Above: Regional Organizations And Democratization","publisher":"Cambridge University Press","number-of-pages":"268","abstract":"Since the momentous events of the late 1980s, democratic transition has been a widely studied phenomenon. Most scholars who have investigated the causes and implications of the global trend to democracy have argued that domestic politics is the leading determinant in the success or failure of transitions to democracy. Jon Pevehouse argues that international factors, specifically regional organizations, play an important role in the transition to and endurance of democracy. Domestic elites use membership of regional organizations to advance the cause of democracy since these organizations can manipulate the costs and benefits of democracy to important societal groups such as business elites or the military. Six cases (Hungary, Peru, Greece, Paraguay, Guatemala, and Turkey) examine the causal processes behind the statistical association between regional organizations and democratization. These findings bridge international relations and comparative politics while also providing guidelines for policy-makers who wish to use regional organizations to promote democracy.","ISBN":"9780521606585","shortTitle":"Democracy From Above","language":"en","author":[{"family":"Pevehouse","given":"Jon C."}],"issued":{"year":2005,"month":1,"day":13}}}],"schema":""} Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy From Above: Regional Organizations And Democratization (Cambridge University Press, 2005).Week 13: International Adjudication (Nov. 22)Paper Draft Meeting ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"d6W6PxLP","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Professor Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Emilia Justyna Powell, \\i Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and International Courts\\i0{}, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011).}","plainCitation":"Professor Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Emilia Justyna Powell, Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and International Courts, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011)."},"citationItems":[{"id":1241,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":1241,"type":"book","title":"Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and International Courts","publisher":"Cambridge University Press","number-of-pages":"280","edition":"1","ISBN":"1107004160","shortTitle":"Domestic Law Goes Global","author":[{"family":"Mitchell","given":"Professor Sara McLaughlin"},{"family":"Powell","given":"Emilia Justyna"}],"issued":{"year":2011,"month":5,"day":16}}}],"schema":""} Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Emilia Justyna Powell, Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and International Courts, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011).Week 14: Thanksgiving, No ClassWeek 15: Regime Design and Research Challenges in IOs/IL (Nov. 29) ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"obFfm7kx","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf Beth Simmons, \\uc0\\u8220{}Treaty Compliance and Violation,\\uc0\\u8221{} \\i Annual Review of Political Science\\i0{} 13 (2010): 273\\uc0\\u8211{}296; Judith Goldstein et al., \\uc0\\u8220{}Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,\\uc0\\u8221{} \\i International Organization\\i0{} 54, no. 3 (2000): 385\\uc0\\u8211{}399; Ronald B Mitchell, \\uc0\\u8220{}Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,\\uc0\\u8221{} \\i International Organization\\i0{} 48, no. 3 (1994): 425\\uc0\\u8211{}458; Miles Kahler, \\uc0\\u8220{}Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization,\\uc0\\u8221{} \\i International Organization\\i0{} 54, no. 3 (2000): 549\\uc0\\u8211{}571.}","plainCitation":"Beth Simmons, “Treaty Compliance and Violation,” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 273–296; Judith Goldstein et al., “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 385–399; Ronald B Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 425–458; Miles Kahler, “Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 549–571."},"citationItems":[{"id":263,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":263,"type":"article-journal","title":"Treaty Compliance and Violation","container-title":"Annual Review of Political Science","page":"273-296","volume":"13","author":[{"family":"Simmons","given":"Beth"}],"issued":{"year":2010},"page-first":"273"}},{"id":5518,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":5518,"type":"article-journal","title":"Introduction: Legalization and World Politics","container-title":"International Organization","page":"385-399","volume":"54","issue":"3","author":[{"family":"Goldstein","given":"Judith"},{"family":"Kahler","given":"Miles"},{"family":"Keohane","given":"Robert O."},{"family":"Slaughter","given":"Anne-Marie"}],"issued":{"year":2000},"page-first":"385"}},{"id":14336,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":14336,"type":"article-journal","title":"Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance","container-title":"International Organization","page":"425-458","volume":"48","issue":"3","author":[{"family":"Mitchell","given":"Ronald B"}],"issued":{"year":1994},"page-first":"425"}},{"id":10805,"uris":[""],"uri":[""],"itemData":{"id":10805,"type":"article-journal","title":"Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization","container-title":"International Organization","page":"549-571","volume":"54","issue":"3","author":[{"family":"Kahler","given":"Miles"}],"issued":{"year":2000},"page-first":"549"}}],"schema":""} Beth Simmons, “Treaty Compliance and Violation,” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 273–296. Judith Goldstein et al., “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 385–399. Ronald B Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 425–458. Miles Kahler, “Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 549–571.Week 16: Presentations & Dinner (Dec. 6)Final Paper Due. Additional Readings in International Law and Organizations: A Selective Bibliography ADDIN ZOTERO_BIBL {"custom":[]} CSL_BIBLIOGRAPHY A. Glenn Mower, Jr. “The Implementation of Human Rights Through European Community Institutions.” Universal Human Rights 2 (1980): 43–59.Allain, Jean. A Century of International Adjudication: The Rule of Law and Its Limits. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2000.Alter, Karen. “Who Are the Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice.” International Organization 52, no. 1 (1998): 121–149.Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. “The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699–32.Bernauer, Thomas. “The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How Do We Learn More?” International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995): 351–375.Botcheva, Liliana, and Lisa Martin. “Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence.” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2001): 1–26.Busch, Marc. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” International Organization 61, no. 4 (2007): 735–761.Caporaso, James, Jeffrey Checkel, and Joseph Jupille. “Integration Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union–Introduction.” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 1–2 (2003): 7–40.Cox, Robert. “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization.” In Approaches to World Order, edited by Robert Cox. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.Dai, Xinyuan. “Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism.” International Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 363–398.Delegation and IOs Project, n.d.Dillon, Patricia, Thomas Ilgen, and Thomas Willett. “Approaches to the Study of International Organizations: Major Paradigms in Economics and Political Science.” In The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach, edited by Ronald Vaubel and Thomas Willett, 79–99. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.Douglas, Mary. How Institutions Think. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986.Downs, George. “Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation.” Michigan Journal of International Law (1998): 319–344.Downs, George, and David Rocke. Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.Finnemore, Martha. “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy.” International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 565–97.Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen J. Toope. “Alternative Views to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and Politics.” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 743–758.Fortna, Page. “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace.” International Organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 337–372.Franck, Thomas. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.Gallaroti, Giulio. “The Limits of International Organizations: Systematic Failure in the Management of International Relations.” In International Institutions: An International Organization Reader, edited by Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.Goldstein, Judith. “International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO and the Liberalization of International Trade.” In The WTO as an International Organization, edited by Anne Krueger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.Guillaume, Gilbert. “The Future of International Judicial Institutions.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 44, no. 4 (1995): 4.———. “The Future of International Judicial Institutions.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 44, no. 4 (1995): 4.Guzman, Andrew, and Beth Simmons. “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization.” The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1, Part 2 (2002): S205–S235.Guzman, Andrew. “The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms.” The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 2 (2002): 303–326.———. “The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms.” The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 2 (2002): 303–326.Hadewych, Hazelzet. “The Decision-Making Approach to International Organizations: Cox and Jacobson’s Anatomic Lesson Revisited.” In Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations, edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, 27–41. London: Routledge, 1998.Haggard, Stephan, and Beth Simmons. “Theories of International Regimes.” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 491–517.Helfer, Laurence R., and Anne-Marie Slaughter. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” SSRN eLibrary (2005). , David, and Gayla Benarieh Ruffer. “Courts Across Borders: The Implications of Judicial Agency for Human Rights and Democracy.” Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003): 74–92.Jupille, Joseph, and James. A. Caporaso. “Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 429–44.Kapur, Devesh. Processes of Change in International Organizations. Weatherhead Center Working Paper Series, 2000.Kelley, Judith. “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements.” American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (2007): 573–588.Klabbers, Jan. “The Changing Image of International Organizations.” In The Legitimacy of International Organizations, edited by Jean-Marc Coicard and Veijo Heiskanen. NY: UNU Press, 2001.March, James, and Johan Olsen. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 943–70.Martin, Lisa. Democratic Commitments. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.———. “Interests, Power and Multilateralism.” In International Institutions: An International Organization Reader, edited by Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.———. “International Institutions: An International Organization Reader.” In International Institutions: An International Organization Reader, edited by Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.Martin, Lisa L. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.Martin, Lisa, and Beth Simmons. “International Organizations and Institutions.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsneas, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. Sage, 2002.———. “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions.” In Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, edited by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.Meyer, John, and Brian Rowan. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340–363.Mitchell, Ronald, and Patricia Kielbach. “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion and Exchange.” International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 891–917.Moravscik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovermentalist Approach.” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (1993): 437–524.———. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe.” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 217–252.Morrow, James. “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?” American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (2007): 559–572.Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Jeffrey K Staton. “Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation.” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 149–174.Powell, Walter W, and Paul J. DiMaggio. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991.Raustiala, Kal, and Ann-Marie Slaughter. “International Law, International Relations, and Compliance.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlnaes, Beth Simmons, and Thomas Risse. New York: Sage, 2002.Reinhardt, Eric. “Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 2 (2001): 174–195.Reinisch, August. “Securing the Accountability of International Organizations.” Global Governance 7, no. 2 (2001): 131–50.Rosendorff, Peter, and Helen V. Milner. “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Procedure.” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 389–400.Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. “Power Rules and Compliance.” In Democracy and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, n.d.Simmons, Beth A. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.Simmons, Beth. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” The American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 819–835.Singer, David Andrew. “Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization.” International Organization 58, no. 3 (2004): 531–565.Slaughter, Ann Marie. “International Law in a World of Liberal States.” European Journal of International Law 6, no. 4 (1995): 503–539.Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and William Burke-White. “The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law).” In New Perspectives on the Divide Between International and National Law, edited by Andre Nolkaemper and Janne Nijman, 110–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.Snidal, Duncan. “International Cooperation Among Relative Gain Maximizers.” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1991): 387–402.Talberg, Jonas. “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union.” International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 609–643.Tierney, Michael, and Catherine Weaver. Principles or Principals? Beyond Theoretical Divides in the Study of International Organizations, 2003.Vaubel, Ronald. “A Public Choice View of International Organizations.” In The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach, edited by Ronald Vaubel and Thomas Willett, 27–46. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.Voeten, Erik. “The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights.” American Political Science Review 102, no. 04 (2008): 417–433.Vogel, Brett Ashley Leeds Michaela Mattes Jeremy. “Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments”, October 2008.Weaver, Catherine, and Ralf J. Leiteritz. “‘Our Poverty Is a World Full of Dreams:’ Reforming the World Bank.” Global Governance (2005): 369–388.Weber, Steve. “Institutions and Change.” edited by Doyle Ikenberry, 1988.Young, Oran. “Comment on Andrew Moravcsik, ‘A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation’.” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 805–809. ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download