PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE



From PLI’s Course Handbook

Eighth Annual School Law Institute

#14126

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8

attorney fee awards in pro

bono cases: for the public good?

Philip D. Fraissinet

Kimberly L. Cunningham

Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP

PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE

EIGHTH ANNUAL SCHOOL LAW INSTITUTE

MAY 19, 2008

NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN PRO BONO CASES:

FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD?

By Philip D. Fraissinet and

Kimberly L. Cunningham

Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP

711 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300

Houston, Texas 77002

713-223-2300

Fax: 713-221-1212

philip.fraissinet@

kimberly.cunningham@

Introduction

Pro bono work has historically given private law firms the opportunity to provide free legal assistance to those who would not otherwise be able to afford it. However, over the past several years courts have been awarding attorneys’ fees to successful litigants who are represented “pro bono” by private law firms. This has created much controversy over whether the cases are truly being handled on a pro bono basis. The controversy is even more acute when the case is being handled by a nonprofit legal organization whose viability is dependent upon such fee awards and/or when fees must be paid by a government entity defendant, such as a public school district, often at taxpayer expense. This paper will explore the ethical, legal, and practical considerations surrounding this often controversial issue.

I. Parents Involved in Public Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1

This controversy regarding attorney fee awards in pro bono cases has become extremely heated in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Parents Involved in Public Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School District No.1.[i] In PICS, the Court determined that the Seattle Public School District’s method of using race as a tiebreaker in student assignment to over-subscribed schools was not narrowly tailored and was, therefore, unconstitutional.[ii] During the preparation and litigation of this case, the plaintiff was represented by a large private law firm on a pro bono basis. Just months after the Supreme Court’s decision, the law firm filed a petition seeking $1.8 million in attorneys’ fees[iii] pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act (“Section 1988”).[iv]

In its brief opposing the private law firm’s entitlement to attorney fees, the Seattle School District questions whether large law firms representing clients on a pro bono basis are entitled to seek substantial legal fees from the defendant when they prevail.[v] The Assistant General Counsel of the Seattle Public Schools has argued that the firm is essentially seeking $1.8 million in attorney fees from taxpayers who fund the public school system.[vi]

Proponents of the fee award argue that Section 1988 has been around for a long time to allow for legal fees in pro bono or public service cases, and that a defendant who has violated the law should not benefit merely because the case was undertaken on a pro bono basis.[vii] Moreover, since most pro bono cases are handled by nonprofit legal aid organizations or by large law firms who typically donate their winnings to nonprofit legal aid organizations, many argue that the awards are necessary to ensure that the civil rights and the rights of indigent individuals are protected.

II. Legal Authority for Seeking Attorney Fees in Pro Bono Cases

Section 1988 is the federal law entitling the plaintiff in PICS to seek attorneys’ fees and is probably the most frequently cited authority for the recoupment of attorneys’ fees in pro bono and public service cases. Section 1988 was established to prevent attorneys from shying away from civil rights cases which they may not otherwise undertake.[viii] Pursuant to Section 1988, the prevailing party in a civil rights action is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. A plaintiff need not win the entire case in order to seek attorneys’ fees. For purposes of Section 1988, a plaintiff prevails if he has succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.[ix]

Section 1988 is not the only authority by which attorney fees are sought in pro bono matters. A number of federal statutes, including, but not limited to, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), permit prevailing plaintiffs to seek reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid by the defendant.[x] Federal statutes allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees do not carve out an exception for plaintiffs being represented on a pro bono basis. Accordingly, such statutes have served as the basis for attorney fee awards in pro bono cases.[xi]

III. Ethical Issues Surrounding Attorney Fee Awards in Pro Bono Cases

The phrase “pro bono” is short for pro bono publico, which is Latin for "for the public good."[xii] Pro bono is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “being or involving uncompensated legal services performed especially for the public good.”

Thus, although there is sufficient legal authority for seeking attorney fees in pro bono matters, when considering the traditional definition of pro bono, it is easy to understand why the ethical issues regarding attorneys’ fees in such cases are unclear. A review of the ethics policies and pro bono rules governing various legal organizations and bar associations sheds some light on the subject.

A. American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rule

According to the ABA’s Model Rule 6.1 on Voluntary Pro Bono Service, every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay.[xiii] The ABA’s Model Rule encourages lawyers to devote at least fifty (50) hours of pro bono legal services, without expectation of fee, to persons of limited means or to charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental, and educational organizations devoted to the needs of persons with limited means.[xiv]

The ABA squarely addresses the issue of attorney fees in pro bono cases in the comments to Rule 6.1.[xv] According to the ABA, whether work qualifies as pro bono turns on the lawyer’s intent at the time of undertaking the project. Because Rule 6.1 requires that service be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of pro bono.[xvi] Therefore, the ABA has taken the position that an award of statutory lawyers’ fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono does not disqualify such services from qualifying as pro bono. However, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected. Moreover, the ABA suggests, but does not require, lawyers who receive fees in pro bono cases to contribute “an appropriate portion” to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means.[xvii]

B. New York Bar Association and Pro Bono Regulations

1. New York State Bar Association

The New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility (the “New York Lawyer’s Code” or the “Code”) outlines the standards of ethical conduct for lawyers in the State of New York.[xviii] According to the Code, a lawyer has a professional obligation to render public interest and pro bono legal service. The Code encourages lawyers in the State of New York to provide at least twenty (20) hours of pro bono services annually by rendering legal services at no fee and without expectation of fee to persons of limited financial means or public service organizations.[xix]

Unlike the ABA’s Model Rule, the New York Lawyer’s Code does not address the question of attorney fee awards in pro bono cases. However, like the Model Rule, the ethical focus of the Code seems to turn on the attorney’s expectation at the time he agrees to provide his services.[xx] With the widespread attention being given to laws allowing for attorney fees in pro bono cases, an attorney may find it more difficult than ever to take on a pro bono case without some minor expectation that attorneys’ fees will be recouped if he prevails.

2. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York

Beyond the principles for pro bono service outlined in the State of New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, the New York City Bar Association issued a Statement of Pro Bono Principles (“Pro Bono Principles”).[xxi] On November 30, 2005, thirty (30) of the fifty-five (55) large Manhatten law firms endorsed the Pro Bono Principles.[xxii]

The New York City Bar Association’s Pro Bono Principles recognize that pro bono service is an ethical obligation of all lawyers. All signatories to the Pro Bono Principles must commit to fifty (50) hours of pro bono service each year. Moreover, the Pro Bono Principles explicitly state:

In pro bono legal matters in which we recover or are awarded fees, we will donate the fees recovered (in excess of any disbursements incurred in connection with the matter) to a Legal Services Organization or other public service organization or will otherwise use the recovered fees to support pro bono legal activities.[xxiii]

Even assuming “disbursements” means out of pocket costs, this commitment by signatories to the Pro Bono Principles goes one step further than the ABA’s Model Rule which encourages, but does not require, the donation of attorney fees in pro bono cases. The drafters of these Principles seem to take the position that fulfillment of a lawyer’s ethical obligations to provide pro bono services and the receipt of attorneys’ fees for such work cannot co-exist.

C. Texas Bar Association and Pro Bono Regulations

The Texas Bar Association has adopted two provisions that address pro bono legal services: the State Bar of Texas Resolution[xxiv] (the “Resolution”) and Section 6 of the Preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“Section 6”).[xxv]

1. State Bar of Texas Resolution

Like the ABA Model Rule, the Resolution admonishes Texas attorneys to render at least fifty (50) hours of legal service to the poor each year or to make an equivalent contribution to an organization that provides direct legal services to the poor. Additionally, it outlines a number of actions that qualify as legal services to the poor, such as legal services to the poor without an expectation of compensation or at a substantially reduced rate.[xxvi]

Unlike the ABA, the Texas Resolution does not squarely address the ethical issue of attorney fee awards in pro bono cases. However, it does consider reimbursement of fees in its definition of legal services to the poor. The Resolution clarifies that out-of-pocket, “non-reimbursed” expenses incurred by a lawyer handling a matter qualifies as legal services to the poor.[xxvii] Use of the phrase “non-reimbursed” raises interesting ethical issues about the receipt of attorney fees in pro bono cases for Texas lawyers. For example, does it matter that the source of the reimbursement is the defendant and not the client? Must a lawyer donate such fees in order to avoid the perception that he has been reimbursed?

2. Preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct

The Preamble to the Texas Disciplinary rules of Professional Conduct, Section 6, indicates that Texas lawyers should provide free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees. According to Section 6, such service is a “moral obligation” of each lawyer as well as the legal profession generally. Like the Texas Resolution, Section 6 does not address the issue of attorney fee awards in pro bono cases.[xxviii] However, based on the aforementioned standard, a lawyer who accepts a matter on a pro bono basis, and is later awarded fees to be paid by the defendant, has still rendered “free legal services to those unable to pay,” and, therefore, fulfilled his “moral obligation.”

D. The American Lawyer

Bar associations are not the only organizations in the legal community weighing in on this issue. The American Lawyer magazine has taken a very bright line position on attorney fees in pro bono cases. The American Lawyer has been a long-time publisher of law firm pro bono rankings. In fact, the American Lawyer publishes an annual survey of the pro bono statistics of the nation’s top 100 law firms. Recently, in its article entitled “Pro Bono 2007: Drawing the Line,” the American Lawyer acknowledged the ethical dilemma that arises when private law firms receive attorneys’ fees in pro bono matters.[xxix] Accordingly, it has requested that law firms commit to donating the fees awarded in pro bono cases to legal service organizations, charitable foundations, or into an earmarked firm account to cover pro bono expenses at the beginning of cases where such fees may possibly be awarded.[xxx]

Moreover, the American Lawyer is asking firms that refuse to make this commitment to refrain from reporting such hours as pro bono hours to the American Lawyer.[xxxi] The magazine’s request may cause many law firms who look forward to the annual pro bono rankings as an opportunity to highlight their commitment to public service to rethink their position on the retention of attorney fees after prevailing in a pro bono matter.

IV. “Reasonable” Attorney Fees in Pro Bono Cases

Even when attorney fees are awarded in pro bono cases, Courts are stringent about determining what constitutes “reasonable attorney fees.” Court typically begin by using the “loadstar” method to ascertain what factors should be considered in the determination of reasonable attorney fees.[xxxii] Then, they apply a list of factors outline to decide upon a “reasonable attorney rate” and a “reasonable” amount of hours worked. This can include consideration of the fact that an attorney originally agreed to handle the case on a pro bono basis.

As previously mentioned, many courts apply the “loadstar” method of calculation to ascertain the amount of fees to be awarded. This method of calculation involves determining the reasonable hourly rate for each attorney and the reasonable hours expended, and multiplying the two figures together to obtain the presumptively reasonable fee award.[xxxiii] Courts may also use their discretion to increase or reduce the amount based on the particular circumstances of the case.

In order to determine the reasonable hourly rate and/or the reasonable hours expended, numerous courts have considered the following factors:

1) attorney rates in the marketplace;

2) the degree of success obtained[xxxiv];

3) the complexity and difficulty of the case;

4) the available expertise and capacity of the client’s other counsel (if any);

5) the resources required to prosecute the case effectively (taking account the resources being marshaled by the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics);

6) the timing demands of the case;

7) whether the attorney had an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the litigation or initiated the representation himself;

8) whether the attorney was initially acting pro bono (such that a client might be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent remuneration); and

9) other returns (such as reputation, etc.) the attorney expected from the representation.[xxxv]

The remainder of this paper will be devoted to addressing the court’s application of the abovementioned factors in pro bono cases.

A. Marketplace Rates

Ascertaining a reasonable rate entails considering the appropriate market rate for a lawyer’s services. This is often one of the most difficult tasks that a Court must undertake in computing a reasonable rate for purposes of attorney fee awards in pro bono cases. As the Supreme Court noted:

[D]etermining an appropriate ‘market rate’ for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and most services are determined by supply and demand. In this traditional sense there is no such thing as a prevailing market rate for the services of a lawyer in a particular community. The type of services rendered by lawyers, as well as their experience, skill and reputation, varies extensively—even within a law firm….The fees charged often are based on the product of hours devoted to the representation multiplied by the lawyer’s customary rate. But the fee usually is discussed with the client, may be negotiated, and it is the client who pays whether he wins or loses.[xxxvi]

However, in pro bono cases and/or cases for nonprofit legal services, there likely is no negotiation or discussion of fees, and the fees are not paid by the client. Accordingly, Courts have reached strikingly different determinations about the ‘market rate’ for legal fees in cases handled pro bono or by a nonprofit legal services organization.

1. Blum v. Stenson

Since it was decided in 1984, Blum v. Stenson has been the prevailing case on market rates for attorneys handling pro bono and/or nonprofit legal work.[xxxvii] In the original lawsuit, a private nonprofit legal aid organization brought a case on behalf of a statewide class of Medicaid recipients against the New York State Department of Social Services.[xxxviii] After a successful outcome, the plaintiffs sought attorney fees under Section 1988. The defendant argued that all fee awards under Section 1988 should be calculated according to the cost of providing legal services rather than according to prevailing market rates.[xxxix] The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief, argued that market rates reflect the level of compensation necessary to attract profit making attorneys, but that such rates provide excessive fees to nonprofit counsel.[xl]

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, approved the nonprofit attorneys’ hourly rates, and awarded them approximately $ 80,000.00 in attorneys’ fees. According to the Court, the amount of fee awards in Section 1988 cases should be governed by the prevailing market rates in the relevant community—regardless of whether the case has been undertaken by private counsel, a nonprofit organization, or on a pro bono basis.[xli] The Court even quoted the Northern District of California in the case of Stanford Daily v. Zurich, where the court held that it “must avoid…decreasing reasonable fees because the attorneys conducted the litigation more as an act of pro bono publico than as an effort at securing large monetary return.”[xlii] Courts across the nation have been using the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stenson to justify use of the prevailing market rate as the reasonable attorney rate in pro bono and public service cases, even when Section 1988 is not cited as the authority for recovery of such fees.

2. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizenship Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty of Albany

Although the Supreme Court in Stenson determined that attorney fees to nonprofit organizations or lawyers acting in a pro bono capacity should be based on the market rate in the relevant community, the Second Circuit recently went a step further and defined “relevant community” for purposes of such fee awards. In Arbor Hill, the Plaintiffs alleged and successfully established, that a legislative redistricting plan adopted by defendant Albany County after the 2000 Census violated Section 2 of the VRA.[xliii] Although the case was handled by three law firms on a pro bono basis, the Plaintiffs counsel thereafter sought an award of fees and costs totaling $483,948.64 for the work performed by the law firms in district court and on appeal before the Second Circuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e).[xliv]

The law firms representing the plaintiffs were based out of cities in the Southern District of New York where the market rates were higher. However, the case was tried in the Northern District of New York, where attorney rates are significantly lower. The District Court determined, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that the relevant community, for purposes of determining the market rate, was the Northern District of New York. Therefore, the Court determined that the market rate was $210.00 per hour—the maximum hourly rate allowed in the Northern District of New York.[xlv]

The Second Circuit has received much criticism over this decision from attorneys, reporters, and legal scholars who argue that its approach conflicts with the long-standing precedent of Stenson.[xlvi] Such critics also state that this decision could negatively impact attorneys’ willingness to handle pro bono civil rights cases. However, others argue that to the extent that courts continue to allow attorney fee awards in pro bono cases, the Second Circuit may have struck the perfect balance between lawyers’ ethical obligations and the financial concerns inherent in litigation. The Second Circuit decision perhaps makes its point of punishing wrongful defendants while not completely blindsiding them with a judgment amount beyond their reasonable anticipation.[xlvii]

B. Interested Attorney and Degree of Success Obtained

In Watson v. Giuliani, et al., a Manhatten law firm provided pro bono representation to two homeless persons who were arrested for sleeping in public places, in violation of a New York City ordinance.[xlviii] The firm had been looking for the opportunity to challenge New York’s policy of arresting homeless people sleeping in public places and, therefore, filed a class action complaint on behalf of these homeless individuals against the City of New York, then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and then-Police Commissioner Howard Safir.[xlix] However, after compiling approximately $1 million in attorney fees and expenses, the attorneys achieved only minimal success. Only one plaintiff obtained a $15,000.00 settlement while the challenged ordinance was not overturned, and the class had not even been granted certification. Nevertheless, the attorneys requested to be compensated at a rate of $300.00 per hour pursuant to Section 1988.[l]

In addition to the fact that the attorneys involved had initiated this suit and agreed to work on a pro bono basis, the Court considered the degree of success achieved in ultimately deciding to reduce the reasonable rate to $200.00 per hour.[li] The Court recognized that the pursuit of successful claims is often intermingled with claims that do not prevail.[lii] However, in this case, the attorney’s overall level of success was minimal by all accounts, and the success that he achieved was based on settled law and uncontested facts. Therefore, the Court determined that the attorney must have spent a nominal amount of time on the successful claim.[liii] The Court also noted that despite the costs and fees expended, the attorney “derives value from undertaking litigation such as this which may indeed far exceed anything [the Court] can award, such as training younger associates and the recruitment value of a strong pro bono practice.”[liv]

The Court ultimately reduced the fee request by ninety percent, but allowed the attorney to recover all of his costs, such as expenses for electronic research, fees for non-legal support, and expenses for transportation costs, since they were the types of fees typically charged to fee-paying clients. The total amount awarded was $55, 976.19.[lv]

C. Expertise and Timing Demands

Courts have used attorney fee awards to send a message to defense attorneys who complicate cases during litigation with the hope that a pro bono counsel will back down.

In LaPlante v. Commonwealth of Mass. Dept of Correction, a law firm agreed to the pro bono representation of a pro se state inmate in his action against state officials for denying him unrestricted access to the law library.[lvi] After the case was successfully litigated in the inmate’s favor, the inmate’s pro bono attorneys sought attorney fees of approximately $125,000.00.[lvii] The defendants immediately argued that the amount sought was “grossly excessive” because this was a “straight-forward access-to-court case.”[lviii] They argued that the case was “over-litigated and over-billed.”[lix]

However, the Court decided that the pro bono attorneys’ lack of expertise, coupled with the plaintiff’s time-consuming litigation tactics, justified the award of attorneys’ fees. The Court noted that it was the defendants who had in fact over-litigated the case with their unnecessary and tedious filings, to which a reasonable counsel would be compelled to respond. Additionally, the Court considered the fact that the attorneys were not experienced in Section 1983 litigation or prison litigation. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s attorneys reasonably believed that they had to research each of the defendant’s “diversionary tactics” and were justified in staffing the case with four lawyers.[lx]

Finally, given that the defendant was a public entity, the Court squarely addressed the public’s concern regarding attorney fees in such pro bono cases. According to the Court:

Civil rights cases can take substantial amounts of time. Firms—especially large commercial firms—who take cases on the Court’s pro se docket do not necessarily expect to win fees, and even if they do, they surely do not expect to be compensated for anything close to their actual time and expenses. They take the cases as a service to the Court and to the public….Nevertheless, I am mindful that the defendants are a public entity and public officials, performing an essential job at a time of strained resources. It is for that reason that I have scrutinized the bill carefully, to make certain that each and every one of the legal standards have been met.[lxi]

The Court ultimately awarded the plaintiff’s attorneys $99,981.43 in costs and fees.[lxii]

D. Size, Complexity, and Resources

As noted earlier, the issue of attorney fee awards for pro bono cases is not limited to civil rights matters. In Heng Chan v. Sung Yue Tung Corp., the plaintiffs were a group of waiters, busboys, and captains who brought a successful claim against the defendant restaurant, restaurant owners, and restaurant managers for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law.[lxiii] After being awarded $669,374.32 in damages, the plaintiffs sought an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the FLSA and the New York Labor law, which both allow prevailing plaintiffs to seek an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs.[lxiv]

Ultimately, the Court made its decision regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees based on the size and complexity of the case, as well as the necessary resources.[lxv] The defendants’ argued that the fees sought should be reduced because plaintiffs’ counsel, a large New York law firm, agreed to take the case pro bono. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the institutional resources of a large law firm were likely necessary given that this was a multi-year litigation involving multiple parties and witnesses, numerous boxes of documents, and depositions and investigations conducted in four (4) languages.[lxvi] According to the Court, most small civil rights firms or nonprofit organizations would not have been able to take on a case of this size and nature. Additionally, but for the resources of a large law firm, the legal system would not have discovered and been able to remedy what was ultimately determined to be a widespread problem in a minority community in New York. The court therefore approved a rate of $450.00 per hour for the supervising partner, $300.00 per hour for the sixth-year associate, $250.00 per hour for the second year associate who worked on the case. The attorneys were awarded $957, 710.00 in fees.[lxvii]

V. Conclusion

There is no bright line rule on whether it is “right” or “wrong” for attorneys handling pro bono or public service cases to seek attorney fees, especially in light of the pending PICS decision. Although the ABA’s Model Rule is fairly clear that acceptance of such fees does not negate an attorney’s fulfillment of his ethical obligations, the Texas and New York bar associations have devised their own standards on the issue. The courts have devised a set of guidelines that attempt to address the dilemma, but even they have been unable to come up with a one-size-fits-all remedy. Ultimately, the responsibility will lie on each lawyer to make a decision in each pro bono matter that balance his ethical, legal, and practical concerns.

-----------------------

[i] 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).

[ii] Id.

[iii] See Emily Huffter. “Billing in ‘Pro Bono’ Cases is Fodder to Ethics Debate,” Seattle Times (Sept. 22, 2007).

[iv] 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2008).

[v] Bronstad, Amanda. “Pro Bono Cases Triggers a Fee Fight,” The National Law Journal (Feb. 8, 2008).

[vi] Id.

[vii] See id.

[viii] See Christopher Dunn. “Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Only for Profiteers?” New York Law Journal (June 20, 2007).

[ix] LaPlante v. Commonwealth of Mass. Dep’t of Corrections, et al., 307 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Mass. 2004).

[x] See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2008); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(3)(2008).

[xi] See, e.g., Heng Chan v. Sung Yue Tung Corp., 03 Civ. 6048 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33883 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2007) (seeking attorney fees in a pro bono matter pursuant to the FLSA).

[xii] Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).

[xiii] American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Pro Bono & Public Service: Model Rule 6.1 Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service (2007).

[xiv] Id. at §§ (a)(1)-(a)(2).

[xv] Id. at Comm. [4].

[xvi] Id.

[xvii] Id.

[xviii] New York State Bar Association, New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility (2007).

[xix] Id. at 23-24.

[xx] Id. at 24.

[xxi] The Association of the Bar of the State of New York, Statement of Pro Bono Principles (2005).

[xxii] Thomas Adcock. “30 Firms Sign City Bar Statement Pledging Lawyers Will Log 50 Pro Bono Hours a Year,” The New York Lawyer (Nov. 30, 2005).

[xxiii] See supra note 21, at 5.

[xxiv] See Texas Bar Association, State Bar of Texas Resolution (adopted Sept. 22, 2000).

[xxv] Texas Bar Association, Preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

[xxvi] See supra note 24.

[xxvii] Id.

[xxviii] See supra note 25.

[xxix] “Pro Bono 2007: Drawing the Line,” The American Lawyer (July 2, 2007).

[xxx] Id.

[xxxi] Id.

[xxxii] See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 233 (1983).

[xxxiii] Heng Chan v. Sung Yue Tung Corp., No. 03 Civ. 6048 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33883 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2007).

[xxxiv] Hensley, 451 U.S. at 435-36.

[xxxv] See Arbor Hill, 484 F.3d 162,164 (2d Cir. 2007).

[xxxvi] 465 U.S. 886

[xxxvii] See id.

[xxxviii] Id. at 889.

[xxxix] Id. at 892.

[xl] Id. at 893.

[xli] See id. at 895.

[xlii] Id. (citing 64 F.R.D. 680, 681 (N.D. Cal. 1974)).

[xliii] See 493 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007).

[xliv] Arbor Hill, 419 F. Supp. 2d 206 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).

[xlv] See id. at 211.

[xlvi] See supra note 8.

[xlvii] See “Assessing Attorney Fees When Biglaw Works Pro Bono: Part II,” at.

[xlviii] 325 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

[xlix] Id. at 330-31.

[l] Id. at 332.

[li] Id.

[lii] Id. at 334.

[liii] Id. at 335.

[liv] Id. at 333.

[lv] Id. at 336.

[lvi] 307 F. Supp. 2d at 220-21.

[lvii] Id. at 221.

[lviii] Id. at 221.

[lix] Id.

[lx] Id. at 222.

[lxi] Id. at 222, fn. 5; 223.

[lxii] Id. at 226.

[lxiii] No. 03 Civ. 6048 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33883 (May 7, 2007 S.D.N.Y.).

[lxiv] Id. at *2.

[lxv] Id. at *8-9.

[lxvi] Id.

[lxvii] Id. at *9-12; 16.

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