Ex-Presidents and Newcomers running for presidents in ...



Expresidents and Newcomers Running for President…and Winning

Recent Elections in Latin America

Javier Corrales

Associate Professor

Amherst College

Department of Political Science

Amherst, MA 01002

413-542-2164 (w) / 542-2264 (f)

jcorrales@amherst.edu

amherst.edu/~jcorrale

April 2005

Preliminary Thoughts. Comments Welcome.

Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the Society for Latin American Studies, Universiteit Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands, April 2-4, 2004.

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This paper examines a peculiar phenomenon taking place in recent presidential elections in Latin America. Former presidents and complete newcomers are frequently running for office, often winning or, at least, coming in second. Latin Americans are exhibiting a preference on behalf of devils they know and complete strangers they don’t know.

This preference for what seems to be opposite political profiles—complete strangers or complete oldtimers—is an odd phenomenon. Electoral studies demonstrate that two crucial determinants of the vote are economics and curriculum vitae (see Alesina 1994). In moments of economic downturn, voters tend to prefer candidates with resumes that combine reliability (i.e., a candidate who has a proven record of experience in office) with some detachment from the status quo, which presumably makes him or her unencumbered by the pressure of vested interest to introduce needed reforms (see Dalton and Wattenberg 1993:207-209).

Rather than a balance between reliability and relative autonomy expected by the literature, Latin Americans seem to be prefering instead an extreme “either/or” choice. The vote for an ex-president represents a choice for extreme reliability and very little newness; the vote for a newcomer, a choice for extreme newness and very little reliability.

This trend is worrisome. It is both a symptom and a cause of political vices in the region. The participation of so many former presidents and newcomers in elections is a symptom because it is a reflection of economic anxieties, the decay of political parties, the decline of citizens’ trust in the political system, or a combination of these. It is a cause of political vices because, in order to get themselves elected, and then to govern, these candidates must often bully existing institutions. Bullying, in turns, generates a particularly virulent form of opposition, which in turn, further encourages these new caudillos to turn into bigger bullies once in office. In short, these are polarizing figures.

This is especially true of expresidents running for office. They are the modern incarnation of the traditional Latin American caudillo, or what Chevalier (1962) called Latin America’s “man on horseback ” Democratic politics has placed newer institutional and political obstacles on old-fashion caudillo politics. There are stronger constitutional restrictions on reelections and abuse of power, a generalized repudiation of excessive military involvement in politics, and stronger means for civil society to exercises checks on power. Yet, former presidents are the political actors with the most power resources to eschew these constraints. These resources include a core of supporters—or dependents, to borrow again from Chevalier (1962)—and institutional controls forged from the time they were in office to convert themselves into “impressive monuments” (see Hamill 1964). In their bid for office, they block leadership renewal within their own parties, and often, undermine democratic institutions. Former presidents end up achieving the same end as the old caudillos—perpetuation in the country’s game for the pursuit of power.

The political effects of newcomers are more complicated. On the one hand, newcomers offer the promise of political renewal, which is a welcomed change in what so many scholars, especially on the left, see as stalemated and captured democracies (see Harding and Petras 2000; Gwynne and Kay 2000). The fact that so many newcomers are doing so well electorally suggests that Latin American political systems are less impenetrable than is often argued. However, unless newcomers find strong affiliations with political parties, they end up governing in complete isolation at the top. This isolation is politically disruptive. A tug of war between the president and other political organizations ensues. To survive, both the president and the warring organizations might resort to tactics that are democratically corrosive. Newcomers offer the promise of democratic renewal, but unless supported by parties, can become harbingers of democratic decay. The paradox of newcomers is that the condition that makes possible this form of democratic renewal—decay of political parties—is the same condition that precludes newcomers, once in office, from upholding democracy.

In contrast to studies of incumbent presidents, studies of expresidents and newcomers running for office are scarce. In the 1990s, the literature on incumbent presidents underwent a boom. We now know a lot about how presidents handle economic crises, respond to economic crises, staff their cabinets, and interact with congress, their own parties, and diverse economic groups (e.g., Payne et al. 2002, Weyland 2002, Corrales 2002, Stokes 2001; Mainwaring and Shuggart 1997, Jones 1996, Geddes 1994, Smith and Acuña 1994, Shugart and Carey 1992). In the 1990s, we also rediscovered the ravages of “continuismo”—the attempt by incumbent presidents to prolong their stay in office. The vice of continuismo has been studied since 1940 (see Fitzgibbon 1940), but it has acquired recent salience as a result of the intrepid efforts by Presidents Menem in 1997-1999, Fujimori in 1999-2000, Mejía in 2003-04 and Chávez in 1999 to prolong their stay in office (Corrales 2002, DeGregori 2003, Coppedge 2003, Bobea 2004). Furthermore, we know a lot about how economics affect the electoral performance of incumbent presidents: “the higher the rate of inflation and the lower the rate of economic growth,” the greater the electoral losses of incumbents (Remmer 2003:31; see also 1993 and 1991). Furthermore, as the economic situation improves, the importance of economic voting diminishes (ibid.). Presidents have thus been studied widely in the 1990s. But former presidents attempting to make a comeback have been studied less. We have a better understanding of incumbent electoral performance, but not of who comes next. The key question is what mechanisms do expresidents employ to recapture the state.

Newcomers have received more attention than former presidents. But typically, studies of newcomers consider these as flash, exceptional phenomena—individuals with special personality traits who rise to political prominence in special circumstances. The literature treats the rise of newcomers as exceptional and episodic phenomena. This paper provides evidence that newcomers have become a more regularized phenomenon in Latin America in presidential elections. It is important to ask why.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part offers a description of the electoral phenomenon of expresidents and newcomers running for president. The second part examines some possible hypotheses that might explain why so many presidential elections feature presidents and newcomers.

The paper concludes with an examination of the political consequences of presidents and newcomers running for office. Once in office, it seems that both types of candidates encounter governability problems: increasing polarization, very low levels of popularity, and even forced resignation. The paper offers some suggestive hypotheses to explain this.

I. Newcomers and Expresidents Running for Office since the 1990s

Before describing the rise of expresidents and newcomers, I should clarify these labels. By former presidents I do not mean incumbents. Former presidents are instead individuals who were presidents during some term prior to the one in which the electoral contest is taking place.

Newcomers, on the other hand, are harder to define. The literature is ambivalent about the definition of newcomers. Sometimes, scholars propose a highly restrictive definition based on mere visibility: a newcomer is someone who had no national reputation prior to the electoral campaign. Other times, a less restrictive definition is to think of a newcomer as a person without electoral experience in national politics (e.g., a governor of a province). Each of these definitions has problems. The problem with the more restrictive definition is that it excludes people who have zero experience in professional politics but who nonetheless are well known to the nation (e.g., Chávez in the 1990s). The definition excludes people on the basis of name recognition rather than electoral experience. Since what I am interested in studying is the people’s choice for inexperience, the crucial criterion for me is lack of electoral and administrative experience, not necessarily name recognition. The reason that “lack of electoral experience” is important is that in campaigns and in office, candidates reveal much, not just about their macropolitics (where they stand on issues) but also about their micropolitics (the advisers they choose to work with, the sectors of the population that they court, their view toward alliances with other political groups). Individuals with national reputation but without electoral experience are thus real political neophytes at the national level. The first definition of newcomers would exclude these candidates, which leaves out a great number of individuals who rise suddenly despite being total enigmas in terms of their micropolitics.

The problem with the less restrictive definition is that it makes room for individuals who are active in politics, and thus, not necessarily inexperienced electorally. It would include people whose micropolitics are well known, or at least, have a track record that the press could be reveal to the public.

Since my goal is to understand the appeal of someone with a very thin political resume, I choose to define newcomers as someone who runs for president for the first time (no electoral experience) and has zero public administration experience. They need not be complete political neophytes (they might have been involved in national politics through party activity, military activity, or simply by being a national celebrity), but to qualify for my category, they must be electoral and administrative neophytes, that is, people whose micropolitics are unrevealed. This definition excludes people who were cabinet members (they have experience working for an electoral machine—the ruling party), governors in direct election and mayors in capital or large cities (they have electoral experience, in-office experience, and within-party experience). This definition of newcomer is sufficiently restrictive, but on the basis of political experience rather than national visibility. It makes room for figures with national reputation but no electoral/administrative (e.g., Chávez in Venezuela 1998) but excludes figures without a national experience with electoral/administrative experience (e.g., Collor de Mello in Brazil XXXX).

Table lists all the ex-presidents and newcomers who ran for president in Latin America since 1988 and obtained more than 10 percent of the vote. The table presents 73 presidential election results in 17 major Latin American countries. Fifty expresidents ran and obtained more than 10 percent of the vote. Expresidents have run in an average of 50 percent of all races (in which they were allowed to run). In several races, two or more expresidents obtained more than 10 percent (Argentina 2003, Bolivia 1997 and 2002, Dominican Republic 1990 and 1994). The average expresident obtained 27.56 percent of the vote. The highest vote-getter has been Leonel Fernández (Dominican Republic 2004), with 56.7 percent of the vote.

Table 1 also shows how pervasive the newcomer phenomenon is. Excluding the four races that took place right after a dictatorship (in which the number of newcomers is naturally expected to be large), newcomers obtained more than 10 percent of the vote in 17 contests, or 24.64 percent of the total. Considering that a candidate can only be a newcomer once, this number is not trivial.

In four races (Bolivia 1989, 1993, Ecuador 2003, and Uruguay 1994), newcomers and former presidents competed simultaneous.

The phenomenon of expresidents and newcomers becomes even larger if the definitions are relaxed. If you include all candidates who ran with an expresident’s family name (either a son or a nephew), the number of expresidents running increases to 38 (i.e., they participated in 52.1 percent of races). If in addition to complete newcomers one also includes candidates who had some very limited electoral experience (a non-leadership seat in Congress), the number of newcomers rises to 24 (competing in 34.8 percent of the races).

Table 2 provides further evidence of this electoral trend. It lists all expresidents and newcomers who either won the presidency or came in second since 1988.

To any student of Latin American political history, a discussion of the lasting power of former presidents—or former strongmen, for that matter—is no novelty. As Table 3 reveals, Latin America has a long history of returning presidents. Many of these returning presidents started out as dictators and then ran in democratic elections (Vargas, Batista); others were once democratically elected and then returned as dictators (Batista). What makes the persistence of this trend of returning presidents mysterious in the 1990s is that it is occurring in conjunction with the rise of newcomers. Even thought the system is becoming more open to complete newcomers, complete old-timers continue to dominate.

Remaking and Reinventing CVs

Each type of candidate comes to the electoral race with a different problem in his or her resume. In general, the ex-president comes with an impressive resume that contains many accomplishments, but very often, serious blemishes. Few administrations in Latin America are free of irregularities, and these former presidents were no exception. In the Dominican Republic, former president Joaquín Balaguer had a reputation of electoral fraud and hyper-presidentialism. In Guatemala, former president Efraín Ríos Montt was involved in genocide. In Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide faced accusations of electoral fraud, disrespect for democracy, and mobilization of mobsters. In Argentina, Carlos Menem faced accusations of corruption and obstruction of justice. In Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez faced a reputation of corruption, and Rafael Caldera, a reputation of intolerance of dissent. In Peru, former president Alan García brought the country to hyperinflation and mishandled terrorism. In Bolivia, former president Hugo Banzer was a former dictator, and Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada faced accusations of corruption. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega ran the economy to the ground, and more recently, faced family scandals and accusations of running incompetent campaigns. And yet they all manage to do well in elections and often win. Their electoral challenge consists of persuading voters to ignore their blemishes, or to think of them as insignificant in relation to the blemishes of other candidates.

The political profile of the newcomers who win the presidency is heterogeneous. They differ in how populist their electoral promises were: Fujimori, Mejía, Chávez, Toledo and Gutiérrez campaigned on the left; Pacheco and Saca, on the right.[1] They differ on whether they switched ideologies once in office: Chávez and Mejía stayed on the left; Pacheco stayed on the right; Fujimori, Toledo and Gutiérrez switched.[2] They differed on their attitudes toward parties, both during and after the campaign: Fujimori, Chávez, Toledo, and Gutiérrez ran as independents; Mejía, Pacheco, and Saca campaigned with the support of existing parties.

Yet all newcomers share one trait that distinguishes them from former presidents—a thin resume, at least in terms of experience in public office. Voters thus have little guidance as to what kind of policies the candidate will pursue. The challenge of the newcomer is therefore to persuade voters to “hire” him or her without evidence of experience. This compels these candidates to either fabricate references to the past or focus on embellishing the future, offering utopias that only they are free enough to deliver. Like former presidents, these newcomers must engage in acts of extreme makeover of the past to make themselves eligible to save the nation.

II. Explanations

Any explanation of this phenomenon must look at the two sides: the demand side—why does the electorate want expresidents and newcomers, and the supply side: what are the institutional conditions that make this a menu choice more likely to merge (see Siavelis and Morgenstern 2004). No definitive answer is offered, in part because each case is different and there are multiple factors at play. Yet, it seems that the variables economic vulnerability and political party crisis—either in isolation or in combination—partly explain this electoral trend.

A. In Case of Anxiety, Buy Insurance or Play the Lottery

One possible explanation for the presence of expresidents and newcomers in recent presidential elections is that both represent rational electoral responses to economic anxiety and political disaffection. Torcal (2003) defines political disaffection as: “the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism, and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic institutions, but without questioning the regime.” Scholars disagree about the causes of this disaffection, but they agree it is pervasive in Latin America.

When voters face acute anxieties about economics or politics, maybe as a result of a huge economic or political crisis—in the past, in the present, or in their expectations about the future—they may opt for one of two responses. One is extreme reliability. Voters would prefer to elect a character who has the most traceable, visible record possible. A former president beats other candidates in the area of reliability because, unlike others, he has a record as president. Some voters vote for this candidate because they like this record. Others vote for this candidate not necessarily because they like this record but because they prefer the “devil they know” over the “devil they don’t know.” The election of a former president is a form of purchasing insurance in the face of economic adversity.

The choice for a newcomer represents an opposite, but equally rational, response to economic anxiety. Rather than opting for that which they know, but that which they hope for. Voters are choosing the candidate who offers maximum possibility of delivering real change. In voting for a newcomer, the voter is opting for a clean slate as well as for the unknown (choosing a candidate with no record in office), based on the promise of a huge return (capacity to enact complete change due based on the idea that a newcomer is not beholden to special interest). The voter is selling jewels to do some gambling.

The appeal to the voters of both the expresident and the newcomer is thus similar. Both options offer the promise of escaping an unacceptable present. In voting for the expresident, the voter is romanticizing history. The expresident claims that the country has gone downhill since he left office. By electing him, the voter hopes to rewind history and return to better times. The strategy of the newcomer is instead to offer an escape by throwing away the status quo. The newcomer claims that no traditional politicians offers a real solution, just more of the same. In electing the newcomer, the voter hopes to liberate the country from the stranglehold of established elites. In short, both options represent escape routes, although in different directions. One is an option in favor of safe betting, the other is a form of lottery playing.

The question then becomes: why is it that Latin American voters are going for such similar type of extreme choices? Could the answer be heightened economic anxiety?

At a broad level, this hypothesis seems plausible. Although Latin America’s economic performance in the 1990s varied widely across countries and within countries (countries experienced very different degrees of economic growth, susceptibility to financial crises, and depth of market reform implementation), there is reason to believe that there was heightened economic anxiety throughout the entire region. In countries that did not experience economic growth or increased globalization (Venezuela, Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay), the presence of anxiety is explicable by the surplus of economic losers. But even in countries that did experience significant economic growth (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador), there were many reasons why citizens might have felt economic anxieties. First, even in these countries there were economic losers (see World Bank 2002: 49). In Bolivia, for instance, indigenous groups are possibly the least benefited by economic reforms; newcomers Morales and Reyes mobilized them in 2002 to bolster their candidacies. And among the winners, there might have been anxieties related to the uncertainty of the reform process and the sustainability of their economic gains. Second, rapid, external-oriented growth generates anxieties because it brings social and environmental disruptions, including very large migrations from the countryside (World Bank 2002:147). If the countries opened to markets substantially, citizens became more exposed to the volatility of markets and external financial conditions, which also generates anxiety (ibid). Thus, there are reasons to believe that Latin America in the 1990s, whether in prosperous and reforming countries or in stagnant and non-reforming countries, many citizens felt anxious about economic conditions. This might explain the general preference to buy insurance or play the lottery at election time.

The argument about economic anxiety, however, only works at a very broad level. An effort to try to predict the incidence of expresidents and newcomers based on economic performance or degree of market opening is unreliable. [Regression analysis?] . On the one hand, many elections featuring newcomers and expresidents took place in the context of very slow or declining economic activity. Yet, there are exceptions. First, among the elections featuring expresidents and newcomers, there is considerable variation of economic performance. Not all these cases occur in the context of dismal economic performance. The Dominican Republic (2000) had formidable economic performance, Ecuador (1998 and 2002) and Guatemala (1999) simply had slow growth, Argentina (2003), Peru (2000), Bolivia (1997) and Costa Rica (2002) were experiencing economic recovery. Furthermore, economic performance in the cases that don’t feature expresidents and newcomers running for office is not that much better. Likewise, there is significant variation of economic performance among these cases as well.

Could the trend be blamed on anxieties produced by too much market reform rather than simply economic crisis? Market reforms generate anxieties at two different times: in the beginning, when actors don’t know who the winners will be (Fernández and Rodrik 1991) and once underway, when the winners fear for the sustainability of their gains and the losers suffer their losses (see Gwynne and Kay 2000). Since Latin America in the 1990s became a world champion of market reforms, there is reason to agree that this was a decade of heightened anxiety. The Inter-American Development Bank has created an index of structural reforms to measure the degree that countries have advanced in market reforms in five policy areas for 19 countries (Lora 2001). The index advanced from 0.34 to 0.58 between 1985 and 1999.

Yet, there are problems with the market reform hypothesis. There is significant variation in reform progress among the two groups of cases in Table 4. The table shows various indices of reforms—the global index and the labor reform index, a subcategory of the former. Regardless of the index used, the table reveals that elections featuring expresidents and newcomers occurred in countries with different levels of reform progress.

In short, economic conditions in the region are heterogenous, but the sentiment toward the economy—widespread anxiety—might be homogenous. Plausibly, this anxiety plays a role in this general trend toward voting for expresidents or newcomers. Both seem rational choices to economic uncertainty. The sources of this uncertainty vary. In some cases, it’s the result of economic crisis, or of economic booms followed by crisis. In other cases, it’s the result of the general trend toward more market economies (characterized by more volatility, uncertainty, and the presence of losers). In other cases, it might even be the result of no reform at all, which leaves many countries with unstable macroeconomic ailments. Regardless of the cause of economic anxiety, this does not seem to be the only factor explaining this phenomenon.

B. Institutional causes: responses to party ills

The rise of former presidents and newcomers can also be the result of crises within political parties. There can be two types of party crisis: 1) intense division among party elites about how to carry out an effective survival strategy for the party; and 2) a devastating break of a traditional party-constituency link, which usually follows a major electoral defeat).[3] Each of these crises, in combination or isolation, provides opportunities for the rise of ex-presidents and newcomers alike.

1. Expresidents

Most expresidents who have tried to make a comeback have done so in the context of a crisis within their parties: an acrimonious division over policy, a huge electoral crash, or both. For instance, Pérez rose in 1988 when AD was facing a deep policy debate regarding whether or not to liberalize Venezuela’s political system (allow direct elections of governors and majors, democratize party primaries). Caldera rose in 1993 when COPEI was deeply split about how to respond to the economic and political crisis of two coup attempts of 1992 (whether to impeach Pérez or not, whether to roll back some of his economic reforms). Ríos Montt rose when his party was facing a crisis over allegations of corruption, mishandling of tax reform and economic slowdown, and the prospects of the rise of the left. In Haiti in 2000, Aristide reemerged in the context of a severe crisis in the Lavalas party (partly induced by Aristide himself) which paralyzed the previous government. In Peru 2001, García resuscitated in the context of the formidable collapse of the ruling party (Fujimori’s resignation). In Argentina in 2003, Menem rose in the context of the collapse of the ruling coalition in 2001 and a major debate within the Peronist party about the proper policy response of the economic depression of 2002.

Parties in disarray motivate expresidents to re-engage in politics. This generates one relatively minor positive outcome and at least one negative outcome. The positive outcome is that the return of expresidents normally provokes detailed discussions about policy, which is a major departure from the tradition of many Latin American parties of programmatic vagueness. The negative outcome is that it creates huge resistance within the party, with the possibility of a serious split (more later).

But why do expresidents tend to prevail, or at least play hard, in primaries? Former presidents are the party leaders with the best prospects of prevailing. First, they have the motivation. Having acted as the top leaders of the party, they have paternal instincts toward the organization, sometimes even a feeling of ownership of the party. The crisis of the party ignites these paternal/ownership instincts. They feel the compulsion to save the party. They become intensely involved in the deliberation, promoting their own position and fighting hard against strategies they disagree with. Second, expresidents have the best political assets. By virtue of having been president, expresidents have a core of loyal supporters, left over from the time they were in office. They have strong links with institutions (e.g., seats and allies in congress, connections with supreme court justices, friends in the press), and high name recognition across the country. In waging the internal wars within their party, expresidents have the resources to prevail.

The only other party leader who can match, perhaps surpass, the resources of expresidents are either other former presidents or, if the party is in office, the sitting president. Often, the sitting president will try to resist the return of an expresident (Venezuela 1988, Argentina 2003, Panama 2004); other times they will acquiesce (Haiti 2000 and Guatemala 2003). If the expresident prevails in this struggle to win the party’s nomination, he or she will face serious problems (more later).

Expresidents produce two intense forms of opposition: from within their parties, and in the opposition.

2. Newcomers with or without parties

Whereas expresidents use party crises to try to regain control of the party and stage a comeback, newcomers use party crises as an attempt to steal constituencies away. They try to capture the constituents that collapsing parties leave behind. That is why so many successful newcomers emerge following the precipitous crash of large parties: there is a new pool of voters available for political mobilization. If the collapse of parties is occurring in political contexts undergoing decentralization (e.g., where direct elections for local offices are yielding new local parties and leaderships), the barriers to entry for newcomers are even lower (Sabatini 2003). The result can be the rise of newcomers.

For instance, in Peru, Fujimori (1990) and Toledo (2000) emerged after the precipitous collapse of the ruling party, APRA and PERU2000, respectively. In Venezuela, Chávez emerged under the context of the collapse of three major parties (the ruling coalition Convergencia-Mas, AD and COPEI). In Ecuador, fragmented parties have always offered an inviting opportunity for newcomers; if there is a political crisis, the opportunities are even more inviting. Elhers, for instance, rose in the context of the impeachment crisis of President Bucaram, and Gutiérrez emerged in the context of the collapse of the Mahuad administration.

In responding to party collapse, newcomers face two strategies. They can either campaign as independents—with a demagogic, anti-party, anti-status quo discourse—or they can try to take the reins of an existing party, provided there is a viable party available. In making this decision, the economic background of the individual seems to play a role. Newcomers who come from economically privileged sectors have opted for the party option. Saca and Pacheco used existing parties to launch their campaigns. Many times, these economically wealthy men essentially impose themselves on the party by virtue of their economic resources (Saca, Pacheco, Noboa); other times, they rise within existing parties because they are being promoted by strong party leaders (General Oviedo promoted Cubas in Paraguay’s Colorado Party; Peña Gómez promoted Mejía in the Dominican Republic’s PRD). By incorporating these newcomers, parties attempt to achieve a laudable goal: give the party a face lift, and thus, reignite its electoral appeal.

In contrast, newcomers who come from non-privileged groups (Gutiérrez, Chávez, Morales), or where the party system is fragmented/volatile (Toledo, Noboa, Ehlers), or both (Fujimori 1990), tend to work outside parties and adopt the anti-party discourse.

Newcomers thus emerge via two institutional routes: as unexpected candidates of well established parties or as anti-party independents. In the former case, the rise of newcomers has a positive effect. It offers the party the possibility of leadership renewal and undermining the cartel-like stronghold of old party leaders. The newcomer seeks selective cleansing. Not everything has to be jettisoned. Only the most old-guard leaders of the party are repudiated. But insofar as the candidate chooses to work with an existing party, he or she is recognizing the acceptability of some existing institutions in the country.

In contrast, the newcomer without parties represents a more radical eradicating option. The candidate seeks to jettison not just the old guards within a particular party, but essentially everyone else in the political system. The candidate captures the proverbial “Que se vayan todos” sentiment among many voters. Voting for this candidate represents the highest degree of risk taking: it is an attempt to both get rid of everything about the present (clean slate) in favor of a complete unknown (play the lottery).

In sum, Latin Americans have been opting in favor of three escape routes from political disaffection: 1) follow the expresident back to “better times”; 2) renew their trust in the newly face-lifted party; or 3) follow the newcomer in rejecting all things actual. Option two is the most conducive to institutional renewal. But all three generate serious political troubles.

*****

To discuss: Newcomers and the Media

Millionaires, Beer Makers (Max Fernández, Bolivia 1993)

Media: TV, Radio, Sports and Salsa Singer (Palenque BOL 89, Pacheco in CTR 02, Ehlers ECU 96, Saca ELS 04, Blades PAN 94),

Newcomers through Expresidents

Bolivia/Venezuela/Haiti/Costa Rica: XP ( XP ( Newcomers

Necomers through Economic Crash

Ecuador

Newcomers through Incumbent

Peru/Argentina

Parties as filtering mechanisms of XPs and Newcomers

Uruguay/Brazil

III. After Winning…Suffer

Although there are exceptions, most elected newcomers have faced enormous political difficulties once in office. Fujimori carried out a self-coup in 1992. Chávez has generated the highest degree of political instability and polarization in Venezuela’s democratic history. Mejía, Toledo and Gutiérrez are facing extremely low approval ratings. Mejía also suffered conflicts with his own party. Toledo, Chávez and Gutiérrez are facing high cabinet instability.

Likewise, elected former presidents have encountered serious political trouble. Pérez, Aristide and Sánchez de Lozada were pushed out of office prematurely. Caldera faced enormous economic troubles and his party disintegrated toward the end of his term. In short, most newcomers and expresidents face huge governability crises. Why?

The reason for governability problems are multiple. Some are unique to former presidents; others are unique to newcomers. But they all have one thing in common. These candidates alike, once in office, become too politically disruptive.

In the case of former presidents, problems start early on. In the process of getting the nomination, they typically infuriate two political sectors. The first is a large portion of their own party. All parties have leaders who aspire to the presidency. The decision by a former president to run again creates huge political obstacles for other presidential wannabes in the party. It is harder for them to compete against a former president, because former presidents to have a stronghold over core constituencies in the party. New presidential aspirants fear that having to compete with a former president places them at a disadvantage. As a result, all former presidents start their administration with significant divisions within their own parties.

The other group that former presidents infuriate is the opposition. Imagine two possible candidates running for office from the same party: candidate A is a former president and candidate B is some other leader of the party that has never been president. The opposition is more likely to feel stronger disapproval of candidate A than B. The reason is that the former president has a clear record in office, which the opposition has thoroughly scrutinized and rejected. In contrast, candidate B has no record in office. Because the opposition does not know candidate B as well, the opposition is likely to grant the benefit of the doubt.

In short, former presidents begin their mandates with two highly infuriated sectors: elements within the ruling party and the opposition. They seldom have a comfortable honeymoon, or for that matter, a trouble-free term in office. Compare the opposition to Sánchez de Lozada to that of his successor, Carlos Mesa (himself a newcomer). Even though economically both presidents differ little (Mesa was Sánchez de Losada’s vicepresident), Sánchez faced instant, virulent opposition led by Evo Morales, forcing him to resign 15 months into his administration, whereas Mesa has enjoyed greater cooperation from Morales (with an approval rating in early January 2004 of 80 percent) (The Economist, January 22, 2004). Former presidents are cursed: they are unlikely to enjoy a comfortable and long honeymoon, which explains the early political crises in the administrations o, which explains the early political crises in the administrations of Pérez, Caldera, Aristide and Sánchez de Lozada.

Newcomers who run as independents and become presidents, on the other hand, face a different problem relative to expresidents. Unlike expresidents, they do not have an established political machine. They govern in isolation at the top. If they carry out their promises to assault “all things political,” the entire political system is likely to react apprehensively and uncooperatively.

The isolation at the top forces the newcomer to look for political pillars elsewhere. Where do they turn to? Many exploit traditionalism as a way to obtain legitimacy. Chávez has tried to arrogate for himself the title of the most legitimate heir to the country’s founding father, Simón Bolívar. Gutiérrez and Toledo have exaggerated their ideological and ethnic ties with the “autoctonous” element in their countries—indigenous or marginal groups. Ironically, independent newcomers replicate the campaign style of expresidents. They end up billing themselves as the best conduit toward a former tradition that had been lost and that only them can recapture.

However, ideology is not enough of a pillar. It does not help the newcomers solve their isolation at the top. Independent newcomers have also resorted to the military for support. Fujimori, Chávez, Gutiérrez, and Cubas did not even try to hide their ties to the military. Here lies the biggest danger to democracy posed by these newcomers. In their need to end their isolation at the top, they might dangerously involve the military in politics.

In short, independent newcomers offer the chance of renewing the political system, but also of compromising democracy.

Newcomers who run as party affiliates face the least difficult governability challenges. Compared to former presidents and independent newcomers, they are much better received by the opposition, at least at first. Their main challenge is to earn party credentials within their party, but they normally achieve this through the primaries that normally precede their rise. Their real challenge within the party emerges from the party’s old guard, which includes former presidents. Yet, political resentment by the old guard, however serious, is not that unique. All rising politicians face this challenge in their political careers, and many manage it well. If newcomers manage this problem well, they therefore can deliver two positive externalities to the system: renewal of leadership within the party, and renewal of political leadership in the country. They can satisfy the need of some voters for leadership change without imposing the risk of extreme uncertainty.

IV. Conclusion

This shows what’s good and bad about institutional measures by democracy to curtail the power of strongmen

Two views:

1. Appalled at the frequency of XPs

2. Impressed by how few make it (Bolivia, Venezuela, Haiti)

The good news is the result of the good effects of institutions

The bad news is the evidence of the limits of institutions. Institutional impediments simply provide more incentives for the resourceful to try harder

The result is that the new caudillos will keep trying, yielding two results:

1. weakening institutions, especially parties

2. polarizing

These two results are one explanation for Newcomers. We may disagree as to whether newcomers represent hope or doom for Latin America. But I hope I was able to convince you that, whichever its promise, it is a form of heavy gambling.

In deciding how to escape national crises or political disaffection in general, Latin American voters have been opting for two seemingly conflicting choices. They are either opting for a figure who is emblematic of the status quo, or at least, of the recent past (ex-presidents), or they are taking the risk of electing a figure who promises a complete break with the past (the newcomer).

However different, these choices share similarities in terms of causes and political consequences. Both choices emerge in the context of rising anxieties and even disaffection, which may or may not be caused by economic volatility or adversity. Both choices also seem to be related to troubles at the level of political parties—either significant leadership division over policy, or breakdown of a major party-constituency link.

Furthermore, if electorally successful, both choices generate governability problems. Expresidents generate intense opposition within their own parties and among the opposition. Independent newcomers face an institutional isolation at the top that leads them to exaggerate national/traditionalist ideology and resort to the military. They offer the electorate the promise of a complete break with the present, but paradoxically, end up emulating the promise of expresidents of taking citizens on a journey into the past.

See Ellner 1996 in LA Perspectives for factionalism within parties in the 1990s. I could derive the following point: All XPs produce resistance within their parties, but they deploy different ways to attack it. If XP is popular within rank and file, pushes for democratization (CAP). If XP is not popular with rank and file (Caldera), he avoids democracy or leaves.

June 6, 2005: The start of a new regime is high uncertainty. Defenders of the status quo fear the extent of losses. The change proponents fear the defenders of the status quo.

Betancourt in 1958 was the most feared person in Venezuela. He was more feared than the communists. Yet, he was a great returning XP. He spend the time doing good relations with the opposition, with the military (policy of enormous benefits), and the US (read Caballero).

End of parties end of the importance of brands in politics. Voters rely on shortcuts or brands. They don’t have time to be informed. They rely on brands. Other political actors like journalists, politicians, friends fill in their blanks with free gifts (Popkins 1991 The Reasoning Voter, Lupia and McCubbins 1998 The Democratic Dilemma, Whitman 1995, Caplan 2005,).

Also Caplan 2005 talks about his research comparing experts with regular laymen. He finds that regular laymen have systematic bias. Most notably, non-experts seriously underestimate the social benefits of the market mechanism, especially for international and labor markets

|Table 1: Newcomers and Expresidents Running for President (And Winning More|

|than 10 Percent of the Vote), 1988-2004 |

| | | |XP |XPN |LE |N |

|1 |Argentina |1989 | | | | |

|2 | |1995 | | | | |

|3 | |1999 | | | | |

|4 | |2003 |2 | |1 | |

|5 |Bolivia |1989 |1 | | |1 |

|6 | |1993 |1 | | |1 |

|7 | |1997 |2 | |1 | |

|8 | |2002 |2 | |1 | |

|9 |Brazil |1989 | | |1 | |

|10 | |1994 | | | | |

|11 | |1998 | | | | |

|12 | |2002 | | | | |

|13 |Chile |1989 | | |  |  |

|15 | |1999 | | | | |

|16 |Colombia |1990 |  | | |1 |

|17 | |1994 |  |1 | | |

|18 | |1998 |  |1 | | |

|19 | |2002 |  | | | |

|20 |Costa Rica |1990 |  |1 | | |

|21 | |1994 |  |1 | | |

|22 | |1998 |  | | | |

|23 | |2002 |  |1 |1 | |

|24 |Dom Rep |1990 |2 | | | |

|25 | |1994 |2 | | | |

|26 | |1996 | | | | |

|27 | |2000 |1 | | | |

|28 | |2004 |1 | | | |

|29 |Ecuador |1992 | | | | |

|30 | |1996 | | | |1 |

|31 | |1998 |1 | | | |

|32 | |2002 |1 | | |1 |

|33 |El Sal |1989 | | | | |

|34 | |1994 | | | | |

|35 | |1999 | | |1 | |

|36 | |2004 | | | |1 |

|37 |Guatemala |1990 |  | | | |

|38 | |1995 |  | | | |

|39 | |1999 |  | | |1 |

|40 | |2003 |1 | | | |

|41 |Haiti |1990 | | |  |  |

|43 | |2000 |1 | | | |

|44 |Honduras |1989 |  | | | |

|45 | |1993 |  | | | |

|46 | |1997 |  | | | |

|47 | |2001 |  | | | |

|48 |Mexico |1988 |  |1 | | |

|49 | |1994 |  |1 | | |

|50 | |2000 |  |1 | | |

|51 |Nicaragua |1990 | | |  |  |

|53 | |2001 |1 | | | |

|54 |Panama |1989 | | | | |

|55 | |1994 | | | |1 |

|56 | |1999 | |1 | |1 |

|57 | |2004 |1 |1 | | |

|58 |Paraguay |1989 | | |  |  |

|60 | |1998 |  | | | |

|61 | |2003 |  | | |1 |

|62 |Peru |1990 | | | |2 |

|63 | |1995 | | | |1 |

|64 | |2000 | | | |1 |

|65 | |2001 |1 | | | |

|66 |Uruguay |1989 | | | | |

|67 | |1994 |1 | | |1 |

|68 | |1999 |1 | | | |

|69 | |2004 | | | | |

|70 |Venezuela |1988 |1 | | | |

|71 | |1993 |1 | | | |

|72 | |1998 | | | |1 |

|73 | |2000 | | | | |

| | | |XP |XPN |LE |N |

| |Totals | |26 |12 |6 |17 |

| |No. of Elections |52 | | |69 |

| |% of Total |50.00 | | |24.64 |

| |% of XP + XPN |52.05 | | | |

| |% of N + LE | | | |33.33 |

| |Avg. Vote of XPs |27.564 | | | |

Costa Rica: Constitutional Court ruled in 2003 that former presidents could run again after leaving office and sitting out at least one four-year term

|XP = Expresident |

|XPN = Same Last Name as ex-President (son, nephew). | |

|LE = Low Experience (deputy in Congress, mayor of small town). |

|N = Newcomer (no electoral experience). | | |

|  | = Reelection of XP prohibited | | |

|  | = First democratic election after authoritarianism |

| |

Table 2: Expresidents and Newcomers running for office and winning or coming in second, 1988-2004

|Option 1 |Option 2 |

|Newcomers and Low-Experience Candidates |Former Presidents |

|Winners: |Winners |

|Fujimori (Peru 1990) |Pérez (Venezuela 1988) |

|Chávez (Venezuela 1998) |Balaguer (Dominican Republic 1990, 1994) |

|Toledo (Peru 2001)* |Caldera (Venezuela 1993) |

|Gutiérrez (Ecuador 2002) |Sanguinetti (Uruguay 1994) |

|Pacheco (Costa Rica 2002) |Banzer (Bolivia 1997) |

|Saca (El Salvador 2004) |Aristide (Haiti 2000) |

| |Sánchez de Lozada (Bolivia 2002) |

| |Menem (Argentina 2003)** |

| |Fernández (Dominican Republic 2004) |

| | |

|Runner-up (second place): |Runner Ups (second place) |

|Domingo Laíno (Paraguay 1989) |Banzer (Bolivia 1989, 1993) |

|Mario Vargas Llosa (Peru 1990) |Bosch (Dominican Republic 1990) |

|AlbertoVolonte (Uruguay 1994) |Balaguer (Dominican Rep 2000) |

|Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru 1995) |Paz Zamora (Bolivia 2002) |

|Guardado (El Salvador 1999) |Alan García (Peru 2001) |

|Alejandro Toledo (Peru 2000) |Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua 1996, 2001) |

|Evo Morales (Bolivia 2002) |Guillermo Endara (Panama 2004) |

|Reyes Villa (Bolivia 2002) | |

| |Fortchoming |

| |Quiroga (Bolivia 2005) |

| |Fujimori (Peru 2006) |

| |Bucaram (Ecuador) |

| |Arias (Costa Rica Feb 2006) |

| |Ortega (Nicaragua 2006) |

|Notes: |

|*Toledo was a newcomer in the 2000 elections. I included him in the 2001 elections because these occurred very shortly after the 2000 |

|elections. |

|**Menem won the first round, but decided not to compete in the second round. |

Table 3: Returning Presidents in LA since the 1930s

Argentina:

Juan D. Perón (1946-44, 73-76)

Bolivia:

Hugo Banzer (1971-78, 1997-2001)

Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952-1964, 1985-89)

Gonzálo Sánchez de Losada (1993-97, 2002-03)

Brazil:

Getulio Vargas (1930-1945, 1951-1954).

Cuba:

Ramón Grau San Martín (1933-34, 1944-48)

Fulgencio Batista (1940-1944, 1952-59)

Chile:

Colombia:

Costa Rica:

Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno (Son of XP, 1910-14, 1924-28)

José Figueres Ferrer (1948-49, 1953-58, 1970-74)

Dominican Republic:

Joaquín Balaguer (1966-78, 1986-96)

Leonel Fernández (1996-2000, 2004-present)

Haiti:

Jean Bertrand Aristide

Jamaica:

Michael Manley (1972-1980, 1989-1992)

Ecuador:

José Velasco Ibarra (1944-1947, 1952-56, 1968-72)

Mexico:

Panama:

Arnulfo Arias (1940-41, 1948-1951, 1968)

Peru:

Manuel Prado Ugarteche (1939-45, 1956-62)

Fernando Belaunde Terry (1963-68, 1975-1980)

Suriname

Désiré Bouterse (1980-88,

Ronald Venetiaan, 1991-1996, 2000- present)

Venezuela:

Rómulo Betancourt (1945-1948, 1959-1964).

Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-79, 1989-93)

Rafael Caldera (1969-74, 1994-99)

Uruguay:

Luis Battle Berres (1947-51, 1954-56)

Julio María Sanguinetti (1985-90, 1995-00)

|Table 4: Economic Conditions, Indices of Market Reforms, and Elections Featuring Expresidents and Newcomers |

|Country |GDP per capita in |GDP per capita in year |Index of Global Market |Index of Labor Reforms |

| |election year |before elections |Reforms | |

|Elections Featuring Newcomers or Expresidents | |

|Argentina 2003* |NA |-12.1 |0.616 (1999) |0.541 (1999) |

|Bolivia 1997* |2.4 |2.0 |0.705 |0.232 |

|Bolivia 2002* |-0.2 |-0.9 |0.690 (1999) |0.229 (1999) |

|Costa Rica 2002 |0.7 |-1.2 |0.557 (1999) |0.654 (1999) |

|Dom. Rep. 2000 |5.5 |2.3 |0.599 (1999) |0.626 (1999) |

|Ecuador 1996 |0.2 |0.8 |0.535 |0.671 |

|Ecuador 1998 |-0.9 |1.8 |0.536 |0.671 |

|Ecuador 2002 |1.6 |4.1 |0.528 (1999) |0.671 (1999) |

|El Salvador 1999 |1.3 |1.4 |0.566 |0.439 |

|El Salvador 2004 |NA |0.1 |0.566 (1999) |0.439 (1999) |

|Guatemala 2003 |-0.2 |-0.5 |0.592 (1999) |0.690 |

|Haiti 2000 |0.1 |1.1 |NA |NA |

|Nicaragua 1996 |2.2 |1.5 |0.580 |0.581 |

|Nicaragua 2001 |0.3 |3.6 |0.598 (1999) |0.747 (1999) |

|Paraguay 1998 |-3.2 |-0.2 |0.563 |0.595 |

|Paraguay 2003 |0.0 |-4.9 |0.566 (1999) |0.604 (1999) |

|Peru 2000* |1.4 |-0.8 |0.659 (1999) |0.661 (1999) |

|Peru 2001* |-1.4 |1.4 |0.659 (1999) |0.661 (1999) |

|Uruguay 1999 |-4.1 |3.6 |0.477 |0.238 |

|Venezuela 1998 |-1.3 |5.2 |0.514 |0.486 |

| Average | | | | |

| | | | | |

|Elections not featuring Newcomers or Expresidents | | |

|Argentina 1999 |-4.6 |2.5 |0.616 |0.541 (1999) |

|Brazil 1998 |-1.2 |1.7 |0.580 |0.698 |

|Brazil 2002 |0.2 |0.2 |NA |0.698 (1999) |

|Chile 1999 |-2.0 |1.9 |0.606 |0.679 |

|Colombia 2002 |-0.1 |-0.4 |NA |0.730 (1999) |

|Dom. Rep 1996 |5.3 |2.9 |0.441 |0.626 |

|Guatemala 1999 |1.1 |2.4 |0.592 |0.690 |

|Mexico 2000 |5.2 |2.1 |0.511 (1999) |0.304 (1999) |

|Venezuela 2000 |1.8 |-7.7 |0.514 |0.486 (1999) |

| Average | | | | |

|Notes: Bold cases are those that seem to confirm the following two hypotheses: |

|a) economic crisis (indicated by negative or near-zero GDP per capita growth rates) explains elections featuring newcomers |

|and expresidents; and |

|b) market opening (measure by an index score of 0.6 or higher) explains the elections featuring newcomers and expresidents. |

|The index ranges from 0 (no market reforms) to 1 (maximum reform). |

|Source: Economic growth rates data comes from ECLAC; Index of reform is taken from Lora (2001). |

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Notes: The decision to choose Ortega in 2005 for elections in 2006 was disputed by former mayor Herty Lewites, quien fue expulsado el pasado 26 de feb.

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[1] For Weyland (2003, 2001, 1996), populism is a style of campaigning and governing independent of economic policies: “a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (2003:1097). Knight (1998), Roberts (1995), Kaufman and Stallings (1992) argue that populism also includes economic policy—at least some form of targeted spending on key groups, which differs from traditional populism in the respect for macroeconomic stability.

[2] See Stokes (2002) for the frequency of policy switching in the 1990s.

[3] For a discussion of party adaptation, replacement and demise in Latin America, see Coppedge (2001) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999).

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