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BACKGROUND MEMO: THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE-- TOWARDS A NEW OFFSETS STRATEGYBryan M. Rupprecht, Intern, MIT Washington OfficeMay 20, 2015On November 15th, of 2014 former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Department of Defense’s new Defense Innovation Initiative. Hagel emphasized the growing threat environment, stating that America’s potential antagonists are continuing to update their militaries, and push their tactical capabilities. In the face of this growing threat he stated the importance of undertaking this initiative, “We must take the initiative to ensure that we do not lose the military-technological superiority that we have long taken for granted.” Hagel announced several key areas that would be part of the initiative, including a “long-range research and development planning program”, which would look at ways to develop the next generation of defense technologies, aimed to sustain the militaries technological edge. This Long Range Research and Development Plan (LRRDP), which was announced, by Undersecretary Frank Kendall a few weeks earlier on October 29th, is focused specifically on “high-payoff enabling technology investments that could provide an opportunity to shape key future US materiel investments [and] offer opportunities to shape the trajectory of future competition for technical superiority.” The LRRDP contains five working groups tasked with identifying key technology opportunities in their specific areas; these include: Space TechnologyUndersea TechnologyAir Dominance and Strike TechnologyAir and Missile DefenseTechnology-Driven The goal is for these working groups to be able to identify key technology areas, and then be able to move this into technology development programs within five years. Ideally, DOD hopes that this initiative will lead to the R&D opportunities that will push defense technologies into the future, while responding to the new threat environment of the 21st century.The Initial Offsets Strategy The LRRDP is based on a DOD technology push that took place in the 1970’s and 1980’s, often know as the “Offsets Strategy,” which Kendell noted in his announcement of the program. This program was launched under the Carter administration by Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Undersecretary for Defense Research and Engineering William Perry. At the time, the United States had just ended its war in Vietnam, which had led to a sharp decline in the Army’s overall fighting force capabilities. Concurrently, the United States was in the later stages of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union posing the main threat to U.S. and security tensions between co-superpowers running high. The leading problem was that the USSR had built up a large conventional force advantage in Europe, and if conflict were to break out between the two powers, would have been able to mobilize its much larger forces much faster than the U.S. and its NATO allies. Given the U.S. Army’s then weakness, the advantage in a ground war in Europe had seemingly tilted strongly to the Soviets, which would force the U.S. into an early decision after the outbreak of conflict to deploy nuclear weapons. Obviously this was an unacceptable scenarioIn order to counter Soviet ground force advantages Brown, Perry, and other defense department officials came up with the “offsets” theory. The approach looks at what strategic advantages that a potential adversary may have and then seeks to understand how these advantages can be offset by technological developments in your own military strength. In this case, because the U.S. could not practically match Soviet manpower advantage, the Defense Department asked what technological advances the U.S. military could undertake to offset this advantage. Thus DOD would apply its innovation system edge: rather than try to counter the Soviets with an equal or larger conventional military force the U.S. military would look for technology offsets to counter the Soviets.This technology-offset program was primarily led by DARPA, which was the driver for most of the defense breakthrough technology advancements of the era. Out of this initiative, which would later be known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), came three key technological advancements: stealth aircraft, precision strike capability, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Stealth aircraft, such as the F-117 and the B-2, which came out of this program, allowed the U.S. Air Force to exercise strike campaigns with limited detection from radar and other tracking devices. This offered the U.S. a major advantage in air dominance, and the results of this project were displayed in the U.S. bombing campaigns during Desert Storm. The battlefield monitoring and precision missiles and weapons that came out of the precision strike program allowed the U.S. military to make on target strikes on key targets all over the battlefield, and at the same time limit friendly and civilian casualties. Finally, the Predator and Global Hawk UAVs that came out of DARPA initiatives have been central in U.S. air dominance in subsequent years. It is clear that the DOD and DARPA initiatives to develop technological offsets to Soviet ground strengthen in Europe in the 1970’s and 1980’s were critical in establishing the defense capabilities that led to increased U.S. military dominance and technological edge. These technologies were instrumental in conflicts and missions in the later part of the 20th century, into the 21st century, through today. At the same time, potential adversaries have been making their own technological advancements, challenging U.S. military superiority and creating a new threat environment. The DOD announcements of this fall reflect a conclusion that if the U.S. wishes to maintain its military superiority and address this new threat environment it needs to undertake a development process similar to the offsets approach previously described. Defense leaders hope the newly announced Defense Innovation Initiative and the LRRDP can fill this innovation gap.Part of what made the earlier offsets strategy a success was that DOD took a careful look at the most important global security threats at the time – the threat environment - and based innovation on that assessment. It is likely that this new innovation strategy will function in a very similar way. Furthermore, it appears that current DOD leadership for this plan will see China, and it’s emerging economic and military power, as the biggest emerging future threat and requiring stronger deterrence. Part of this new threat picture will play out in cyber space. As cyber networks become increasingly more important, each side will look to exploit holes in enemy cyber networks, and look for ways to protect their own. It is likely that any military conflict between China and the U.S. would also play out on the South China Sea, making control of the sea and airspace there particularly important. A new offsets strategy will likely seek ways to deter such events. This is not to say that China is the only threat that the U.S. must respond to to assure deterrence; other potential threats include Middle East, and Russia. Looking at the full threat environments DOD is likely to encounter is essential in determining what this technology initiative will look like. With the need for new defense technologies there is also a need for research and development for these technologies. There is hope that many of these advancements could also have significant civilian applications as well; dual use development, of course, has historically served DOD well by driving down technology costs and leveraging incremental advances undertaken through the civilian economy. This paper will look at several case studies of areas with potential for defense technological advancements. It will look at the threat environment that currently exists in the particular area, the research and development opportunities in the area, and the applications of these possible developments. Areas that this paper will explore include cyber defense, air dominance, and undersea warfare. While these are not the only areas that the military is looking at for technology advances, (and there is certainly the possibility that new defense technology opportunities will arise), these are areas that will certainly be important to the immediate future of U.S. defense technology.While this paper will explore three technology areas below, another worth briefly noting is the space domain. The United States no longer enjoys unchallenged dominance in space, as other countries have developed space and satellite programs. One of the main threats in space is the growing vulnerability of satellites, especially key military satellites, which could be taken down by a space-capable enemy almost as soon as they are put up. On top of this, space is getting increasingly more littered with satellites and space junk, creating the potential for satellite accidents. In order to address this threat DOD will likely be looking for new satellite systems that are more resilient than old systems, protecting them from disruption by enemies. It will also likely be looking for satellites with increased automation and robotic abilities so a satellite can fix itself, and self-adjust to avoid accidents. Any developments that can reestablish American space dominance and increase the resiliency of satellites and related communications systems (such as GPS) will likely be of interest to DOD. In the past few years there have been numerous reports outlining what defense technology futures might look like, from both organizations within DOD and independent bodies. These are sources for the case studies below. Most of the reports coming out of DOD organizations (DARPA, DOD S&T) do not spell out specific technologies that they are looking to develop, but rather identify areas of technological need. Independent organizations (CBSA) or other independent organizations however have the opportunity to look at these areas of need and speculate on the technologies that DOD might be looking to develop in these fields. These reports have the additional insight on what defense technology futures might look like, so are also relied on in the case studies. (A summary of key reports is contained in the Appendix following the case studies.)Case Studies:1) Cyber Security:Threat:It is no secret that cyber insecurity poses a threat to not only the Defense Department, but also to industries and systems in the country as a whole. In recent years there have been numerous high profile cyber attacks on companies operating in the U.S., for example the recent Sony hack. These attacks can from a variety of sources, large or small, from low-level individual hackers to other countries, as was the case in the Sony attack by North Korea. The nation’s infrastructure is not safe from cyber attacks and, a mass attack that could shut down power grids or financial systems could pose a significant national security and defense threat. The military’s own cyber systems are at risk as well, and face hackers who either want to shut down military systems, or steal military secrets. If other nations obtain military secrets this poses a scenario in which cyber insecurity could raise threat levels in other areas, as well. There is evidence that China has been stealing U.S. military secrets, such as military technology plans, which could potentially be used to duplicate technology, or exploit weakness in it.There are a host of issues with the country’s cyber security that leave cyber networks of all types vulnerable. Computer code is inherently prone to mistakes, creating built in security holes for hackers in essentially every computer system. On top of this the ease of identifying passwords makes it easy for hackers to get into computers, with one computer giving access to entire networks. Another challenge is the lack of ability to identify sources, to track and to locate attacks. Currently cyber networks have difficulty identifying when an attack is happening, and where this attack is coming from. Without this knowledge it is difficult to stop the attack before it is too late, or to retaliate or to deter. In recent years the U.S. military and computing at large have been making the transition to using the cloud. While the cloud has the potential to be more secure than conventional data centers, the transition to cloud computing presents new cyber security issues for DOD. Potential R&D Opportunities:Attack IdentificationOne of the main technology opportunities that exists in the cyber security field is increased ability to identify attacks. If a system could be developed that could immediately identify when a computer is being attacked then it would easier to stop the attack. Moreover, if the threatened system could isolate the attacked computer from the rest of the cyber network then it would greatly limit the damage that an attack would cause, as the attacker would only have access to the information on one computer and not the whole network. DARPA has undertaking a significant amount of research in this field and has made some significant advances, although significant work remains to be done to fully realize this capability. Secure Computing SystemsThere is also a need to develop new, fundamentally more secure computer systems. These would be systems that are built without some of the architecture of our current computing systems, such as memory buffers, that make attacking these structures easier. Secondly, computing systems need fundamentally more secure identification methods; it is too easy for hackers to figure out simple passwords. What is needed is either a second form of user identification such as a physical pass card, or biometric signatory, such as a fingerprint, or passwords sent to the users phone at the time of login. While these changes may seem easy, implementing a new computing system on a mass scale is quite complicated and itself would require a significant R&D project. Cloud SecurityFurthermore, with a continuing transition to the cloud there is a need to increase cloud security. While the cloud has the potential to be more secure, since the cloud tends to be a massive data storage unit, breaking into the cloud presents a situation in which hackers can steal massive amounts of data. It is extremely important that DOD continues to make developments in cloud software, since software is often the most vulnerable part of the cloud. Identifying weaknesses in current cloud software and developing software that fixes these issues will likely be a priority for DOD. On top of this, DOD is likely looking to develop hardware for the cloud with built in security features. DOD will need cloud experts who are willing to help DOD by attacking its cloud systems in order to determine what vulnerabilities exist. With any big computing transition there is a need for new security developments; this is certainly true for the cloud. DOD will be looking for opportunities to improve cloud security. Attack DeterrenceOne of the most important steps that DOD can take in order to prevent damaging cyber attacks is to create some type of deterrent against them. It is likely that cyber systems will always remain vulnerable to attack, so creating significant deterrence to attacks may be important in limiting them. Improving attacker identification ability would be an important step in this process. Currently, it can be hard to track where highly sophisticated attacks are coming from, making it hard to take action against these attackers. In addition to attacker identification, in order to increase deterrence DOD will likely look to increase ability to make counter-offensive attacks. If the U.S. has the ability to shut down the cyber systems of adversaries, it will lessen the likelihood of future attacks, for fear of retribution. This deterrence capability may end up as an important means to limit cyber attacks. Despite the fact that DOD is working on many of these developments, society more broadly stands to gain from advances in cyber security. Many of these technologies would have applications for cyber systems held by civilians, financial institutions and multinational corporations. Just as DOD, through DARPA, made the key developments that brought us many of today’s information technologies including the Internet, it has the potential to reinvent a more secure Internet. Due to the growing cyber threat and the importance of cyber security the LRRDP will likely attempt to make advances in this area. However, cyber security does not have its own separate working group in the LRRDP, so will likely be undertaken by the “Technology-Driven Working Group”. It should be noted that cyber security issues are of interest of the other Defense Innovation Initiative technology areas, since weak cyber security poses a threat in the other areas as well. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter indicated DOD’s intent to work on cyber issues in a speech, on April 23, 2015 at Stanford University, where he called for an increase in partnerships with cyber industry leaders to solve the cyber security issues. At the same time the Department of Defense launched a new Cyber Strategy, with the three core objectives of defending DOD systems, defending the nation from cyber attacks, and providing forces with cyber support. By 2018 DOD is looking to establish 133 teams to work to achieve these objectives. 2) Air Dominance:Threat:Perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. military superiority at large is the increasing vulnerability of short and mid range military bases. In an era where potential adversaries are rapidly expanding their precision strike, drone, and submarine capabilities, platforms that were once thought to be safe no longer are. In particular, this posses a risk to continued air dominance by the U.S., since a number of established bases of U.S. Air Force and Navy, particularly close -in air bases and aircraft carriers, would be increasingly vulnerable. The fixed nature and lack of mobility of land bases, and of the vulnerability of carriers to precision strike are increasing problems Currently, most U.S. strike aircraft lack long-range capabilities without refueling, making these platforms problematic. This is particularly troubling in a potential conflict with China, which is likely to be carried out in the South China Sea. Currently, air dominance to protect regional allies and commerce in this arena would hinge in significant part on the U.S. ability to launch planes from its aircraft carriers. With potential Chinese advances in precision strike and submarine technology, these carriers may be pushed past the “second island chain” and out of attack range. In this scenario U.S. air dominance would be heavily threatened. U.S. fixed bases in the western Pacific would not be safe from Chinese precision strike capability either, as it is speculated that Chinese precision strike capability might soon may be able to stretch as far as Guam.Aircraft as well as their platforms are vulnerable, as well. In an era when aircraft sensing has significantly advanced, non-stealthy aircraft are increasingly threatened. Potential adversaries have growing capabilities to remotely detect all types of aircraft that do not have effective stealth technologies and also have the missile systems to take down non-stealthy aircraft. This makes it increasingly possible for potential opponents to deny U.S. aircraft access to their air space, and thus denying air dominance. Potential R&D Opportunities:Increase Range/EnduranceSince DOD leadership is shifting its attention to deterring the threat of China, primarily in the South China Sea, it seems likely that much of the work that is done in the area of air dominance in the LRRDP will be in solving the problems surrounding short and mid range platforms. It is likely that the traditional close support role of the aircraft carrier will diminish in the future due its growing vulnerability, although the aircraft carrier will not disappear as a aircraft launch platform. It seems likely that DOD will attempt to develop longer-range attack aircraft, because it would be particularly challenging and longer-term to make changes in the platforms themselves, although attempts to make platforms more agile must also occur.One development that seems particularly promising is that of increasing fuel efficiency, through new fuels or increasing fuel efficiency of aircraft. Traditional jet fuel limits the range of DOD fighters, which is especially an issue because increased parity in adversary air forces limits the possibilities for air-to-air refueling. Tanker planes are inherently large and cumbersome, and can be easily intercepted or taken down by enemy fighter aircraft, thus as enemy range expands, the zone in which a tanker plane can operate decreases, and so does strike aircraft range. Despite this, air-to-air refueling will remain part of air dominance strategy.For these reasons expanding the endurance of aircraft seems to be particularly important to maintaining air dominance. There are several ways that DOD could look to expand endurance. First, new fuels could give longer-range possibilities. A new fuel type could enhance DOD air dominance capabilities, and it is likely that DOD would be interested in such possible fuel alternatives. DOD could also focus on improving the fuel efficiency of aircraft. Efficiency improvements include making structural improvements to aircraft, such as improving aerodynamics and thus fuel efficiency, or lightening the weight of aircraft by finding new advanced materials. Other possible fuel efficiency improvements the Air Force is examining include new engine technologies such as Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) and Highly Efficient Embedded Turbine Engines (HEETE).Increased StealthAnother likely goal of DOD’s LRRDP Air Dominance Working Group will be increasing the stealth of aircraft, both manned and unmanned. CSBA’s report on the future offsets strategy emphasizes the need to increase the stealth of aircraft. Since a number of the DOD leaders of the LRRDP come from the same school of thought as CSBA’s founder Andy Krepinevich it seems possible that they would hold comparable views. This will lead to research opportunities in a variety of fields associated with stealth technologies, including reducing acoustics, radio waves, and emissions. Furthermore, any technology that can reduce radar cross sections will likely be of interest to DOD including, “(aircraft) shaping and design, radar energy absorbing materials, passive cancellations, and active cancellations.” Any stealth improvement (not limited to aircraft) is likely to find its way into the LRRDP.Autonomy Increased aircraft autonomy is also likely to be a part of the LRRDP, as well part of DOD’s future technology plans in general. DOD will be seeking technologies that enable current drones to stay airborne for extended periods of time, perhaps as long as weeks. This of course would require advances in fuel and fuel efficiency, as noted above, as well as communications advances. The Air Force has been looking into creating “fractioned autonomy systems”, which could allow for the further expansion of autonomy. It is clear that DOD is also interested in carrier based drones, or Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS), such as the prototype X-47B.Some of these areas could also have civilian applications as well. New fuel and fuel efficiency technologies would not only benefit military air dominance efforts but could also provide major improvements for the commercial air industry. Furthermore, advanced materials research could have applications not only for aircraft, but also for many manufacturing sectors. Increased drone technology may help to lead to new advances in civilian drones, and may provide new technologies that could increase autonomy in other technology sectors. 3) Undersea WarfareThreats:In undersea warfare, DOD will be considering the growing naval capabilities of China. As previously discussed, any conflict in East Asia would likely take place in and around the South China Sea, and effectively operating submarines in this complex environment is both challenging and important. As discussed earlier, naval strike aircraft currently rely on carriers as a main launch platform. If Chinese forces were able to establish a major undersea capability in this arena they could threaten. U.S. surface ships. Thus they would be denying the U.S. military air dominance in the process. Conversely if the United States is able to retain dominance undersea it would clear a a foothold for its surface ships, and have a greater chance at establishing air dominance.Due to improvements in both passive and active sensors submarines are becoming increasingly easier to detect and track. If the Chinese were able to detect all American submarines in this environment they would, of course, have a better chance of eliminating them, enabling naval dominance in the region. At the same time it may be important for the U.S. to establish an effective acoustics barrier, to ensure that Chinese submarines entering the open sea to attack U.S. surface ships and commercial vessels can be countered. At the same time the Chinese are working to make their own submarine fleet stealthier. Traditionally, the Chinese have relied on conventional diesel submarines which have limited endurance and so are easier to detect than current U.S. nuclear submarine types. Thus, current Chinese submarines are more tied to operations in the area off its coast, which is a poor environment for submarine detection, but have more difficulty in the open ocean further off its shores. China’s navy is working to significantly quiet its diesel submarine force. Furthermore, they are working to develop and expand their relatively small but growing nuclear submarine fleet based on Russian submarine types. Although not as quiet as the U.S. submarine fleet, China is working to significantly quiet its nuclear submarines. The U.S. has an additional problem since it has allowed its submarine fleet to shrink to below 40 boats next decade, which must also operate against worldwide threats. If the Chinese are able to expand the numbers of and advance the stealth of its nuclear submarine fleet to the point where it could effectively operate in the deep, open ocean then this will present a significant challenge to American undersea dominance, and thus threaten U.S. surface ships, and air dominace. Research Opportunities:Increase StealthWith new sensing improvements, and the possibility of growth in Chinese submarine stealth, the U.S. will likely have to counter with advances in stealth and sensing improvements. Although the current U.S. submarine fleet is quite stealthy DOD will likely still be looking for ways to further increase stealth. Possible improvement efforts may lead to research opportunities in underwater acoustics and undersea environment modeling. Despite this, underwater acoustics are a relatively mature area, and new developments in this area are expected to be modest and expensive. What may be of more interest to DOD is how subs could use both “acoustics and non-acoustics decoys and jammers”; these technologies could confuse sensors about the position of subs, lowering chances of detection. New decoy systems would create a research opportunities in areas of acoustics, computer modeling, and oceanography. Underwater SensingAs Chinese and other nation’s submarines become more stealthy, there is also a need for improvements in both passive and active sensors. Improvements in the sensing strength of both passive and active sensors would be of interest to DOD. Potentially important for undersea detection in the South China Sea would be the ability to rapidly deploy lines of sensors, across the entrances to the open ocean. These sensors would serve as a sort of trip wire that would indicate whenever an opponent submarine crossed the sensor line. DOD is currently making attempts to develop sensing systems, such as reliable acoustic path vertical line array (RAP VLA) and deep water active detection system (DWADS), but these systems could still use improvements in deployment technologies and sensing. Much of the speculation in this area is what role “big data” could play in underwater sensing. “Big data” with accompanying analytics provide potential to run complex oceanographic models to quickly identify threats in real time. It may also be possible to integrate data analytics with long range low frequency detection systems, to increase their accuracy and clarity. These sensing technologies could be key to achieving access undersea in and around the South China Sea.Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs)Like other areas of defense technology, undersea warfare will also likely trend towards autonomy and drone technologies. The practicality and usefulness of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) has been contested in part because undersea communication is so complex, but it seems DOD will be making steps to improve UUV capabilities in this technology development initiative. Since American submarines could become increasingly vulnerable in the coming years, UUVs are attractive because as active platforms and diversions they can help keep warfighters in the manned submarine safe. Along with increased safety UUVs could provide other tactical advantages. UUVs have the potential to be deployed longer than manned subs, and increased endurance could mean increase effectiveness. UUVs could help with sensing technologies: as computing systems become ever smaller, these systems could be outfitted into small UUVs, along with sensors, to make the UUV a mobile sensing unit. They could also be used as counter sensors, acting as decoys for manned subs, and sending out decoy acoustic signals. It is believed that a fleet of these UUVs could make an effective sensing system, acting as a network of sensors and decoys. Since the U.S. has allowed its submarine fleet to decline significantly in numbers, UUVs could help fill in this numbers gap by increasing the reach of existing submarines. There is also hope that these UUVs could become missile launch systems, and even one day take over significant parts of the jobs of manned subs.Although DOD will likely purse the use of UUVs this does not mean that they come without their own operational challenges. Perhaps the biggest challenge to achieving UUV capability is the communications issues; currently there are real challenges with communicating underwater with UUVs, especially from long ranges. Research that finds ways to significantly improve UUV communications could be very important for UUV capability. There is also a major issue with scaling UUVs, since they will be much smaller than traditional manned subs requiring all of their components to be smaller. If DOD wants to make UUVs with the range of capabilities of manned subs then there is a variety of scaling issues that it will face. Furthermore, many of the operational goals for UUVs, discussed previously, would require significant development to become a reality.Expanding undersea capabilities appears to be of major importance to DOD, as it could determine other outcomes in future war scenarios. It will be of particular importance in any potential tension with China, as it expands its submarine and underwater sensing capabilities. Thus DOD will likely pay particularly close attention to developing undersea warfare technologies in the Defense Innovation Initiative: the LRRDP undersea warfare has its own technology working group. DOD will likely explore extensive R&D on undersea capabilities. ConclusionBoth the Defense Innovation Initiative and its LRRDP could be key to driving development of new defense technology. There is a significant possibility that if the United State does not engage in developing new technology it could risk losing its current technological edge. This edge was built up by a long term development process, the 1980’s and 90’s offsets strategy, which enabled stealth aircraft, precision strike, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These technologies allowed America to establish conventional symmetric military dominance toward the end of 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Despite this, other countries are catching up, and this loss of technological edge may affect U.S. ability to deter future conflicts.China’s emerging military capabilities appear to be the main focus of DOD. As China expands its capability, and continues to emerge as an economic superpower with the resources to support its technology advance, DOD will be watching and seeking technological advances that could retain U.S. conventional superiority. As the world of cyber becomes more and more critical in military operations and at the same time make them more and more vulnerable, DOD will likely be looking into finding ways to improve the Cybersecurity of both DOD and national system. Air dominance will likely be key in any future conflict, and as China expands its air operations, DOD will be looking at ways to maintain its technological edge in the skies. As China continues to develop its submarine fleet and its underwater sensing capabilities, finding a way to stay ahead under the sea will likely also be a major concern for DOD.While this new technological environment may present a threat to U.S. military superiority, it also presents a major technology opportunity, as DOD looks for the technologies to enable future technological superiority in new ways. Accordingly, DOD will likely be looking for development partnerships with private industry and universities. While the main goal of DOD supported innovations will be to maintain military technological edge, these technologies may have civilian applications. For example advances in Cybersecurity could improve computer security for all, not just DOD systems. When the LRRDP working groups release technological development areas of focus with corresponding goals, this will elaborate on technologies DOD will attempt to develop. The complex process of trying to make these innovation goals a reality will then set in. If the DOD is successful in the coming year, the LRRDP and the Defense Innovation Initiative, will become the framework for the next offset strategy. It remains to be seen, of course, whether it will be as successful as the last one and provide the U.S. with the Defense technology it needs to maintain military technological superiority and corresponding deterrence capability in the 21st century Appendix Reports on the Defense Future - Summaries: DARPA, Breakthrough Technologies For National Security (March, 2015)This report is a summary by DARPA of what it sees as the defense technologies of the future that will support national security. As DOD’s leader in long-term technological advancement, DARPA’s vision of defense technology futures is particularly important. The report identifies four core missions that DARPA would need to undertake to stay on top of technology development: rethinking complex military systems, mastering the information explosion, harnessing biology as technology, and expanding the technological frontier. Most of the report does not identify specific technologies that DARPA would be looking to advance, but rather identifies challenges that it will be reacting to in these areas. Concerning “rethinking complex military systems” the report identified several areas this mission would be undertaking including, dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum, operating without GPS, air superiority, advancing hypersonic, asserting capability in space, creating maritime agility, exerting ground control, and defending against terrorism. The report went into greater detail in some of these sectors, including air dominance where it identified the importance of expanding ranges, survivability and payload of current aircraft. DARPA is seeking to develop new aircraft prototypes, which could help solve these issues. In space, the report states that new technologies would center around getting satellites into space on short notice much more cheaply (possibly including aircraft-launched satellites). At sea DARPA is looking to develop unmanned surface ships for submarine detection, unmanned submarines, and unmanned aircraft that can be launched from small carriers. The report did not go into detail on the other military system needs it had identified.The report section on “harnessing the information explosion,” focused on trying to find the best way to use new information systems. The first part of this involves trying to find a way to apply big data to track the behavior and tendencies of war-fighters of all kinds. Secondly, this entails building trust into information systems, improving cyber security to ensure that our forces can trust the information they are working with, and to ensure that our technology information is not compromised.On “harnessing biology as technology”, DARPA wants to make progress in synthetic biology (for which little detail was provided), outpace infectious diseases, and develop new neurotechnologies. On outpacing infectious disease the report states, “Among the Agency’s goals are the development of genetic and immunological technologies to detect, diagnose and treat infectious diseases with unprecedented precision and rapidity, and platforms for exploring the evolution of viruses, predicting mutational pathways and developing drugs and vaccines in advance of need.” On neurotechnologies, the report states, “Among the Agency’s goals in this domain are implantable neural interfaces for human clinical use to bridge gaps in the injured brain, help overcome memory deficits and precisely deliver therapeutic stimuli in patients with neuropsychiatric and neurological disease; and systems to provide sensor-enabled feedback from prosthetic hands to the nervous system to provide enhanced dexterity and even the sense of touch for amputees.” This report’s emphasis on the biological field sets it apart from many of the other defense reports, which do not address biology significantly.Finally, the report looks at “expanding the technological frontier,” which is essentially an “other technologies” category. One such field is finding uses for “deep’ mathematics, which may include cyber defense, big data analysis, predictive modeling, and representing, designing, and testing complex systems. In the field of chemistry, DARPA is looking to develop new materials that could change the defense technology world. In quantum physics as the report states, “DARPA is advancing quantum technologies—including precision engineering of nanoscale and quantum opto-electro-mechanical structures and precision control of cold atoms through optical cooling techniques—to bring about new capabilities in navigation and timing, chem-bio detection, communication and information processing, and metrology, and unprecedented degrees of control over the electromagnetic spectrum, critical for electronic warfare and other applications.”The report goes on to state the importance of keeping DARPA working at a high level, and highlights some of the important areas in which DARPA has made developments in the past. The report can be found at this link: . DOD Science and Technology Office (DOD S&T): Reliance 21 (January 2014)Reliance 21 is the technology development strategy for DOD S&T, DOD’s defense technology office. Unlike other reports Reliance 21 is more of a roadmap for how DOD plans to develop future technologies, rather than a set of technology development goals (although it does identify areas of technological importance). Reliance 21 is administered by the S&T Executive Committee (S&T ExCom), which is tasked with shaping and overseeing DOD’s technology development path. The stated goals of Reliance 21 are mitigating existing or emerging threats, generating affordability in the systems the department acquires and operates, and developing technology based surprise for our adversaries. S&T ExCom is in charge of administering what DOD S&T calls “communities of interest” (COI), of which there are seventeen. These groups are aimed to be crosscutting, stimulating the sharing of ideas and developments across the department (DOD). Each community of interest is led by it’s own steering group, which is in charge of producing the COI’s strategic plan. The goal of the COI’s is to produce these strategic development plans within their technology area that look ten years ou., These plans will be used to guide DOD budget decisions and program priorities. These COIs can be broken down into further sub groups as the steering committee sees fit.The seventeen COI groups are as following: Advanced electronics, air platforms, autonomy, biomedical (ASBREM), (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)), counter IED, counter WMD, cyber, electronic warfare/electronic protections, energy and power technology, engineered resilient systems, ground and sea platforms, human systems, materials and manufacturing processes, sensors and processing, space, and weapons technology. A further breakdown of these COIs is in the appendix of the report which can be found at this link: HYPERLINK "" Office of Naval Research (ONR): Naval Science and Technology (S&T) Strategy (January 2015)The ONR controls about one percent of the Department of the Navy’s annual budget, but plays a large role in determining what the Navy’s technological development will look like. This version of the report identifies that the ONR is shifting its sights to developing technologies that will help it face it’s threats in the Asia-Pacific region. The ONR reviews nine focus areas in this report, and lays out its technological development plan in each. These focus areas are as following:Assure Access to the Maritime Battlespace: The objectives under this plan include achieving and maintaining undersea dominance by, improving submarine detection, improving U.S. submarines, using data and target fusion to expand capabilities, and mine clearance from a distance. Also included is improving autonomous environmental sensing of various environments, while adapting to changing conditions. Furthermore, it includes integrating environmental predictive capabilities (weather forecasting, condition mapping) into tactical planning. Finally, improving adaptation to environment, by improving sensing and improving awareness is also of importance.Autonomy and Unmanned Systems: This focus area’s objective includes furthering human and unmanned system collaboration, creating intelligence in unmanned systems, and improving the perception and intelligent decision making of unmanned systems. The ONR is also looking to develop new platforms such as systems inspired by nature (that act like other ocean life), using nanotechnology, synthetic biology, microelectronic and photonic information, and expanding long-duration mission capabilities. Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare: Establishing dominance through improved sensing, assuring access to capabilities, and being able to control opponents’ battle space picture, are of particular importance in this area. Along with this, expanding electronic warfare capabilities, and developing advanced electronics, sensing and response techniques have been identified as important.Expeditionary and Irregular Warfare: This area includes increasing battlespace awareness through improved sensor systems and intelligence delivery, and finding ways to improve the capabilities of expeditionary operations. On top of this, this area will look at irregular threat countermeasures, such as asymmetric weapons and explosives hazards, biometric identification, tactical exploration and forensic, and electromagnetic signature management. Information Dominance- Cyber: In this focus area ONR is looking to create computing systems that can make autonomous decisions, establish network attack and defense capabilities, strengthen lines of communication, and develop new computational and information architectures.Platform Design & Survivability: This includes increasing the mobility and agility of all systems, and optimizing payload capacities. Furthermore ONR is working to increase survivability through, vehicle structures and materials, platform performance models, stealth, soft kill technologies, and automated response and recovery. Finally, this area will look at finding an affordable way to modernize naval forces, and improve at-sea and in mission resupplying. Power & Energy: The objectives of this focus area include finding efficient power and energy systems by increasing power density, improving, power conversion and distribution, creating efficient power generation, improving power storage and harvesting, and powering distributed sensors. Another objective is increasing energy security by developing alternative energy sources, and improving high energy and pulsed power architectures.Power Projection & Integrated Defense: Some objectives in this area include, developing high volume, precision, extended range firing capabilities, and integrated layered defense across the entire detect-to-engage continuum. Also included in this area is improved time-critical precision strike, and extended threat neutralization capabilities.Warfighter Performance: Under this area are objectives such as improved personnel training, integrating intelligent bio-engineered systems into the battlefield, improving solider health and survivability and developing human system design and decision support.The entire ONR Naval S&T Strategy can be found at this link: HYPERLINK "" Air Force Chief Scientist’s Office: Global Horizons (June 2013)As the introduction of the report states, “Global Horizons focuses on game changing S&T capabilities in the near, mid and far term that will advance the survivability, affordability, and effectiveness of AF global operations by leveraging global industrial sectors.” From their analysis of technology trends and global threats the report identifies a few key areas in which AF S&T programs will work. For each of these areas the report identified threats, opportunities, and potential game changing technologies in these fields. Here are the relevant research areas that the report identifies: Air:Threats: Air space is increasingly contested, congested, and constrained (costs, mandates, regulations, policy). Game changing technologies: Developing further autonomy in aircrafts, including developing autonomous decision making, increasing the speed, stealth, and swiftness of current platforms, “plug and play” armaments to allow for quicker systems upgrades, and mission specific adaptively.Space:Threats: Space is increasingly congested (space junk, increase in satellites), the increasing cost of space technology, and increased vulnerability of satellites to cyber, EW, and kinetic attacks.Game changing technologies: Disaggregated Systems and/or fractioned satellites, to spread the space network and decrease vulnerability of satellites, small/low cost launch, adaptive manufacturing in space (in space repair), modular and open architectures, autonomous space systems, and increase satellite power.CyberspaceThreats: The exponential increase in malware, increased use of the cloud, and increased cyber attacks from both state and non-state actors.Game changing technologies: Developing trusted hardware and software, increased cloud security, increased cyberspace situational awareness, and further integrating cyberspace into warfare. Enabling Technologies:Threats: System expense and vulnerability to low-cost countermeasures, and decreasing technology superiority.Game Changing Technologies: GPS denied navigation capabilities, human-machine interfaces, cold-atom-based navigation, and social forecasting tools.Manufacturing and Materials:Threats: Erosion of America’s manufacturing capability, and trends towards more agile and distributed manufacturing techniques. Game changing technologies: Advanced Manufacturing (3-D printing, etc.), digital thread, and digital twin.Logistics and Transportation: Threats: Energy inefficiency, operations inefficiency, and cyber threats.Game changing technologies: Automation of the following: delivery, material processing and handling, emergency response, protection, and surveillance. On site production (3-D printing), improved efficiency, and precision airdrop.Energy:Threats: Energy dependenceGame changing technologies: More efficient jet fuel, increased energy storage density, energy security and resilience, and efficient directed energy. The full Global Horizons Report can be found at this link: HYPERLINK "" Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA)- Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection capability (2014)CSBA is an independent think tank that examines defense policy and budgets; it is headed by former DOD office of net assessment official, Andy Krepinevich. The CBSA report is particularly important considering that Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work (as well as several other key players in DOD) worked with CSBA and Krepinevich for an extended time, and shares similar outlooks on defense technologies. This report calls for DOD to engage in what it calls “the third offsets strategy”, or the development of the next generation of defense technologies. The CSBA report opens by recapping past defense technology initiatives, including the last offsets strategy. The report begins its assessment of today’s defense technology environment by highlighting where the U.S. is failing in terms of power projection. Part of this is the operational risks that forces currently face; this includes, the vulnerability of close-in regional bases, the vulnerability of large surface ships, the vulnerability of non-stealthy aircraft, and our declining dominance in space. On top of this the report states that U.S. military forces have ever-increasing strategic risk, this includes heightened crisis instability, waning deterrence credibility and allied confidence, and increased defense costs. The report then goes into what the key pieces of a new offset strategy would be. It first identifies what it believes the two main goals of the offset strategy should be, projecting power against enemy A2/AD networks, while reducing reliance on vulnerable targets, and a shift to a strategy that emphasizes deterrence by denial and punishment. The technologies needed to do this according to CSBA are: unmanned operations (on land, air, and sea), extended-range air operations, aircraft with increased stealth, expanded undersea warfare capability, and complex systems development and integration. Another important part of the CSBA plan is integrating all of these new technologies into one joint Global Surveillance and Strike network (GSS). The goals of this GSS would be to “deter by the credible threat of denial and asymmetric punishment.” This GSS would be balanced (making use of a variety of platforms), resilient (minimum dependence on close-bases, and unreliable space platforms), responsive, and scalable (effective all over the world simultaneously). The implementation for this would hinge upon having and exploiting an unmanned operations advantage, an extended range, stealthy air operations, an undersea advantage, and competence in complex systems.The full CSBA report can be found a this link: ................
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