PHI110 Study Guide - December @ University
|PHI110 Study Guide |
|Philosophy, Morality and Society |
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| Study Period 2, 2011 |
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|Collated by December Medland. All text remains the copyright of Macquarie University. |
|Tables have been included but all other images have been removed. Please confirm any |
|dates prior to submitting work. Any errors are unintentional. No liability accepted. |
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Table of Contents
PHI110 Philosophy, Morality and Society 6
Unit Introduction 6
Unit outcomes: 7
Assessment Tasks related to Outcomes and Capabilities 9
Lecture Outlines 9
Lecture Program Calendar 10
Writing Philosophy Essays 12
Research 12
Writing 12
Format and structure 13
General Tips 13
Writing process tips 15
Plagiarism 16
Referencing 17
When You Get Your Essay Back 19
Reading List 20
Additional Readings for Lectures and Essays 22
Summary of Assessment 28
Submission of Assessment 28
Policy on Extensions 29
Grading 30
Plagiarism 30
Assessment 1 31
Assessment 2 31
Assessment 3 33
Assessment 4 33
WEEK 1 34
Steps to Follow: 34
Audio Lectures 35
Lecture 1 36
Readings 37
Readings Questions 38
WEEK 2 39
Steps to follow this week: 39
Audio Lectures 39
Lecture 3 39
Lecture 4 41
Readings 43
Review of Skills for this week 44
WEEK 3 45
Steps to follow this week: 45
Audio Lectures 45
Lecture 5 45
Lecture 6 47
Readings 48
Review of Skills for this week 50
WEEK 4 51
Steps to follow this week: 51
Audio Lectures 51
Lecture 7: Aristotle on Happiness (Eudaimonia) 51
Lecture 8: Aristotle on the virtues 53
Readings 55
Review of Skills for this week 56
WEEK 5 57
Steps to follow this week: 57
Audio Lectures 57
Lecture 9 57
Lecture 10 60
Readings 63
Review of Skills for this week 64
week 6 65
Steps to follow this week: 65
Audio Lectures 65
Lecture 11: Egoism and the Social Contract 65
Lecture 12: Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory 69
Readings 74
Review of Skills for this week 76
week 7 77
Steps to follow this week: 77
Audio Lectures 77
Lecture 13 77
Lecture 14 81
Readings 84
Review of Skills for this week 85
week 8 87
Steps to follow this week: 87
Audio Lectures 87
Lecture 15 87
Lecture 16 91
Readings 94
Review of Skills for this week 96
week 9 97
Steps to follow this week: 97
Audio Lectures 97
Lecture 17 97
Lecture 18 99
Readings 103
Review of Skills for this week 104
week 10 105
Steps to follow this week: 105
Audio Lectures 105
Lecture 19 105
Lecture 20 110
Readings 112
Review of Skills for this week 113
week 11 114
Steps to follow this week: 114
Audio Lectures 114
Lecture 21 114
Lecture 22 116
Readings 117
Review of Skills for this week 118
week 12 120
Steps to follow this week: 120
Audio Lectures 120
Lecture 23 120
Lecture 24 122
Readings 124
Review of Skills for this week 125
Week 13: Revision 125
Study Guide
PHI110 Philosophy, Morality and Society
For many of you, this will be your first unit in Philosophy. The following information will give you some idea of what to expect from a philosophy course, and offer advice about how to get the most out of your study in philosophy.
Philosophy
Philosophy is not studied much in schools so many students come into philosophy courses with only a vague idea of what to expect. Sometimes, they will have formed an understanding of philosophy (perhaps from the way the word is used in the media), which bears little resemblance to the subject as it is studied at universities. On other occasions, students find that the philosophical questions that they are most interested in are not those studied in introductory courses.
The best advice is to be patient. If you are puzzled in the early lectures, or if the issues discussed are not quite what you expected, try to put your preconceptions to one side and to engage with the questions raised. It often takes students a little while to find their feet in philosophy.
In the long run, you will discover that the best way to work out what philosophy is, is to do it — to think about the issues raised, to read the work of great philosophers, to gain some understanding of the history and tradition of philosophy, and — perhaps most important of all — to come to your own views on important philosophical questions.
This last point is important. In philosophy, we are not so much concerned with the answers you arrive at as the process by which you get there. You will find that philosophy courses are less concerned to tell you what to think than to teach you how to think for yourself. Your tutors and lecturers will ask you to reflect on your views, to give reasons for them, to take into account the views of others, and to understand and evaluate arguments. Often you will be forced to change your mind in unexpected ways. Even when you do not, you will find that you understand your own views much better.
How to be a philosophy student
You are not expected to do a lot of reading, but you will have to read very carefully. If you do the reading for lectures beforehand, you will get a lot more out of them. This is a time-consuming activity, so do not leave it till the last minute. Philosophy is very demanding, and you are not likely to understand an article on first reading. Do not despair if you are at sea to begin with. Remember that the Discussion board is the place to ask questions.
Make friends with other philosophy students via the web site. Talking about philosophy, discussing shared problems and arguing about issues you feel strongly about are very important ways of developing your philosophical ability and knowledge.
Philosophy has the reputation of being an unworldly activity. However, you will be amazed to discover how philosophical issues arise all the time in everyday discussion, politics and social life. Try to think of philosophy, not merely as a subject to be studied at certain times and then put aside, but as an aspect of life.
When it comes to the point, however, researching and writing up an assignment is when you will learn most (and discover how much you do not know). So give yourself time to do justice to yourself and your topic. Read the 'Writing Philosophy Essays' document.
Unit Introduction
This unit provides a general introduction to some of the major topics in ethics and social philosophy. Ethics or moral philosophy is the systematic endeavour to understand moral concepts and to justify moral theories and principles. What is the meaning of life and what is the ultimate good in life? How should we live? What is the nature of morality? What is a just society? What are our moral obligations towards one another, and to the rest of the natural world? Moral philosophers throughout history have pondered these 'big ethical questions', and have sought to answer them. In this unit, we will join a long tradition of moral philosophy in examining these questions and seeking answers to them.
Philosophy is not just about learning about the different theories and ideas philosophers have held, and about how these have evolved through history. It is also, very fundamentally, about learning how to think for yourself. Philosophy aims to teach you the fundamentals of good critical thinking: how to tell good arguments apart from bad ones; how to analyse arguments; how to respond to others' arguments; how to develop new and creative ideas; and how to construct arguments in support of your ideas. It also aims to teach you to how to present your ideas and arguments clearly and persuasively, so that others can understand them and be persuaded by them.
These sorts of skills have recently become known as 'generic skills'. In addition to developing your knowledge and skills in a particular academic discipline (such as philosophy), university study also aims to equip you with research, work and expression skills that will help you in later employment, whatever profession you end up pursuing. Because a central part of philosophy is about learning how to think, philosophy is especially well suited to help you acquire these important generic skills.
Here is what we hope you will have learned by the end of this unit:
Unit outcomes:
By the end of this unit, we hope that you will be able to:
1. Understand a number of different philosophical theories concerning
o the good life
o the nature of morality
o our specific moral obligations
o the nature of justice
2. Understand the merits of different social and ethical theories, along with some of the famous objections to them.
3. Critically engage with philosophical theories and arguments.
4. Explain and present philosophical theories and arguments clearly in both an oral and written form.
5. Express and defend your own ideas with clarity and rigour, and in a logical, structured argument.
6. Actively participate in group discussion.
7. Engage constructively and respectfully with the views of other students in the unit, even if you disagree with them.
Graduate capabilities
1. Discipline Specific Knowledge and Skills
Our graduates will take with them the intellectual development, depth and breadth of knowledge, scholarly understanding, and specific subject content in their chosen fields to make them competent and confident in their subject or profession. They will be able to demonstrate, where relevant, professional technical competence and meet professional standards. They will be able to articulate the structure of knowledge of their discipline, be able to adapt discipline-specific knowledge to novel situations, and be able to contribute from their discipline to inter-disciplinary solutions to problems.
2. Critical, Analytical and Integrative Thinking
We want our graduates to be capable of reasoning, questioning and analysing, and to integrate and synthesise learning and knowledge from a range of sources and environments; to be able to critique constraints, assumptions and limitations; to be able to think independently and systemically in relation to scholarly activity, in the workplace, and in the world. We want them to have a level of scientific and information technology literacy.
3. Problem Solving and Research Capability
Our graduates should be capable of researching; of analysing, and interpreting and assessing data and information in various forms; of drawing connections across fields of knowledge; and they should be able to relate their knowledge to complex situations at work or in the world, in order to diagnose and solve problems. We want them to have the confidence to take the initiative in doing so, within an awareness of their own limitations.
4. Creative and Innovative
Our graduates will also be capable of creative thinking and of creating knowledge. They will be imaginative and open to experience and capable of innovation at work and in the community. We want them to be engaged in applying their critical, creative thinking.
5. Effective Communication
We want to develop in our students the ability to communicate and convey their views in forms effective with different audiences. We want our graduates to take with them the capability to read, listen, question, gather and evaluate information resources in a variety of formats, assess, write clearly, and to use visual communication and communication technologies as appropriate.
6. Engaged and Ethical Local and Global citizens
As local citizens our graduates will be aware of indigenous perspectives and of the nation's historical context. They will be engaged with the challenges of contemporary society and with knowledge and ideas. We want our graduates to have respect for diversity, to be open-minded, sensitive to others and inclusive, and to be open to other cultures and perspectives: they should have a level of cultural literacy. Our graduates should be aware of disadvantage and social justice, and be willing to participate to help create a wiser and better society.
7. Socially and Environmentally Active and Responsible
We want our graduates to be aware of and have respect for self and others; to be able to work with others as a leader and a team player; to have a sense of connectedness with others and country; and to have a sense of mutual obligation. Our graduates should be informed and active participants in moving society towards sustainability.
8. Capable of Professional and Personal Judgement and Initiative
We want our graduates to have emotional intelligence and sound interpersonal skills and to demonstrate discernment and common sense in their professional and personal judgement. They will exercise initiative as needed. They will be capable of risk assessment, and be able to handle ambiguity and complexity, enabling them to be adaptable in diverse and changing environments.
9. Commitment to Continuous Learning
Our graduates will have enquiring minds and a literate curiosity which will lead them to pursue knowledge for its own sake. They will continue to pursue learning in their careers and as they participate in the world. They will be capable of reflecting on their experiences and relationships with others and the environment, learning from them, and growing - personally, professionally and socially.
Assessment Tasks related to Outcomes and Capabilities
|Task: |Linked Unit Outcomes: |Linked Graduate Capabilities: |
|Reading Exercise |1, 4 |1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9 |
|Essay 1 |1, 2, 3, 4, 5 |1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 |
|Essay 2 |1, 2, 3, 4, 5 |1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 |
|Participation |1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 |
Lecture Outlines
The Unit will be divided into three broad sections, with a number of different topics within each section.
The topics in the first section, 'Morality and the Good Life', address the nature of the good life and its connection with morality. Like many of us today, the ancient Greek philosophers considered happiness to be the chief good or goal in life. But what is happiness? Is it the same thing as pleasure? Or does the pursuit of pleasure harm our chances of true and lasting happiness? What is the relation between leading a good life and having a virtuous character? Is the happy life compatible with the dutiful life? Or do we have to choose between happiness and duty? We consider these issues, as they are raised by the Greek philosophers Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics.
The topics in the second section, 'Foundations of Morality', raise questions about the status of morality. Morality aspires to provide us with an authoritative guide to action. But just how authoritative are moral principles and judgements? And what is the basis of their authority? Are morals universal, or are they purely subjective or relative to particular societies and cultures? We begin this section by considering some challenges to moral objectivity posed by moral relativism and self-interest theories. We then look at several important normative ethical theories, which give us frameworks for understanding the requirements of morality, including two main universalist theories of morality, Kantianism and Utilitarianism. These theories attempt to find a non-subjective basis for morality and set out to offer systematic answers to the major normative questions of morality: How should we live and act? What principles should guide our conduct?
In the third section, 'Contemporary Problems of Morality and Justice', we focus on four contemporary issues: animal welfare; global justice; indigenous rights; and the justice claims of immigrants and refugees. We will examine how these issues can be understood in light of the normative ethical theories introduced in section two, as well as the values of liberalism and egalitarianism which are bound up with these ethical theories. We seek in this section to examine and challenge the ways in which these issues are treated in political and media discourse, and to explore how different philosophical approaches can help us to further articulate and develop our own views on them.
Lecture Program Calendar
The lecture program is as follows:
|Week |Topic |Lecture |
|PART ONE: Morality and the good life |
|1 |Introduction: What is Moral Philosophy? |1 |
|2 |What is Happiness? (1) Epicurean Ethics |3, 4 |
|3 |What is Happiness? (2) Stoic Ethics |5, 6 |
|4 |Happiness, Virtue and the Good: Aristotle's Ethics |7, 8 |
|PART TWO: Foundations of Morality |
|5 |Challenges to Objectivity (1) Cultural Diversity and Moral Relativism |9, 10 |
|6 |Challenges to Objectivity (2) Why be moral? Egoism and Self Interest Theories |11, 12 |
|7 |Kant's Ethics |13, 14 |
|8 |Utilitarianism |15, 16 |
|PART THREE: Contemporary Problems of Morality and Justice |
|9 |Animal Rights and Welfare |17, 18 |
|10 |Global Justice |19, 20 |
|11 |Historic Injustice and Indigenous rights |21, 22 |
|12 |Justice, Immigration and Refugees |23, 24 |
|13 |Revision | |
Writing Philosophy Essays
• Research
• Writing
• Submission
• Plagiarism
Writing a philosophy essay provides you with the chance to work out what you think about an important philosophical question. Sometimes, you will already know what you think (at least, you will think that you know). In this case, working on the essay will provide you with the opportunity to reflect on and clarify your thinking - and perhaps to change your mind.
It also provides you with the opportunity to learn about the views of significant philosophers and to develop your own views in critical relation with theirs.
Finally, writing a philosophy essay provides you with the opportunity to present your views in a form appropriate for public discussion. It requires you to provide reasons why others should accept your views; it also means that your views are subject to the critical scrutiny of others.
Research
For 100 and 200 level units, the major research required is reading - carefully and critically - the book, articles, etc., on the reading lists provided. You may if you wish seek other relevant material in the library, or on the web, but use it very cautiously. Be especially careful in using websites as there are many unhelpful sites about philosophy (though there are good ones too). If in doubt about its relevance or whether it is an appropriate source for an academic essay, consult your instructor.
In later undergraduate units, you will be encouraged to undertake independent research and will be given advice as to how to go about it.
Before you start reading, however, you should think carefully about the topic. Make sure you know what it means, and if possible, work out what your own - tentative - views are. If you do not find the recommended books and articles relevant, this may well mean that you have misunderstood the question. Think more about the topic, and discuss with fellow students and/or your instructor, before you proceed any further.
It is not necessary to read a lot for most philosophy essays. The Reading Lists for Philosophy Essays are usually a good deal shorter than those of other Humanities and Social Science Subjects. However it is very important to read with care and attention. Try to work out what the author is saying and what his/her reasons are. Take special care to read and consider authors with whom you disagree. Think about how you might criticise their arguments, and how they might respond to your criticisms. But also ask yourself whether an author's arguments give you reason to reconsider your own position. Think of reading as a way of entering into a dialogue with the author.
Always make notes on your reading. Even scrappy notes are useful reminders when you want to recall what you have read.
Writing
Before you start writing, draw up a rough plan of your projected essay, covering all the relevant issues. It is useful to base your rough plan on an analysis of the essay question, to make sure you will be giving a direct and relevant response to the question. To analyse the essay question, break it up into parts and think about how many tasks it sets you. Your rough plan can be based around how you will fulfil each of these tasks, approximately how much word space you will spend on each, and so on.
As you write, you will find that issues which seemed easy are more difficult than you had thought, and sometimes you will find that you want to change direction, or even your mind, as you write. It is not uncommon to discover that you need to do more reading. So it is very important to leave yourself enough time to do this. Beginning with a rough plan gives you a place to start, but expect it to be revised as you write.
When you have completed your first draft, you need to make sure that you have covered all the issues, and that it develops in a coherent fashion from beginning to end. (Often you will find that you have changed course half way through and that the early material may no longer relevant to your conclusion).
It is important to give yourself enough time to spend a day or two thinking about your first draft, and then to rewrite it for submission.
Your final aim must be to present your views so that they are comprehensible and plausible to your reader. By and large, your marker will be less concerned about the positions you adopt than with your ability to provide reasons for them. (Of course, there are some positions that are more difficult to support than others.) So, whatever view you argue for, make sure that you have provided reasons why your reader should take it seriously and that you have taken into account possible objections to it (especially those canvassed in the reading list). That you believe it is not a reason for your reader to believe it. Use argument rather than assertion, and reason rather than rhetoric.
Format and structure
All your philosophy essays should use standard essay structure:
Introduction (1 paragraph)
Body
Conclusion (1 paragraph)
The introduction should tell your reader what the piece will discuss, and what it will argue. Its main function is to let your reader know what the topic and structure will be, and what you'll conclude in answer to the questions. It should help your reader follow the whole piece through giving this information.
The body contains the details of each point discussed. The structure of this discussion will depend on what the essay question is, and what you're arguing. In general it is best to use the simplest structure you can (avoid skipping back and forth between different points). The most important thing though is to make your structure very clear to your reader. This is perhaps the hardest skill to learn in writing essays. It pays to develop it though, both in allowing you to better communicate your ideas – and usually, in allowing you to more fully understand your own views. The most important ways of doing this are the use of 'signposts' (linking sentences and direction-indicators) and using the introduction and conclusion effectively (see below).
The conclusion should reiterate your main claims: what the essay has done, and what it has shown (i.e. concluded).
General Tips
• Give yourself time to think about your essay. Good philosophy cannot be done in hurry or at the last minute.
• Have a plan, but be flexible about it.
• Give yourself time to rewrite.
• Provide reasons that will persuade others that your views are correct or plausible.
• Show that you have considered the main alternatives to your position and can criticise them effectively.
• Show that you have read and understood the views of the main philosophers who have contributed to the debate (i.e. those who appear on the reading list).
• Avoid pretentiousness. Write with a level of academic formality (avoid slang terms and phrases, for instance) but try to write as simply as is compatible with what you are trying to say. Do not try to impress your reader with inflated language and terminology.
• Most branches of philosophy have their own technical terms ('jargon'). Before you use these terms, make sure that you understand them.
• If possible, do not sit on the fence. Try to argue for a position, though taking into account its problems and the criticisms that have been made of it.
• Do not assume that your reader already knows what you are talking about. If you are talking about an author or an example, provide enough detail for someone who does not know your source to understand what you are talking about (and incidentally, to show that you know what you are talking about).
• Quote sparingly. Use quotation to illustrate your argument, not to replace it.
• Do not simply reproduce your lecture notes. Where you make use of lecture notes, provide a reference. If you use lecture material without acknowledgment, you will be guilty of Plagiarism (see below).
• Be careful about grammatical errors and typos. Proofread. Although this may seem unimportant compared to conceptual content, grammatical errors and typos can make an assessment much harder to follow overall, and obscure the points you are making.
• You may use the first person in your philosophy assessments. We find this useful in aiding clarity, since it allows you to state your ideas more directly.
• In philosophy we try to give reasons for what we say, and understand our reasons for what we think. So giving reasons for your own view, and understanding the reasons of the philosophers you discuss, will always be beneficial.
• It is very important to write as clearly as possible. As a writer, the onus is on you to make yourself clear to the reader – not on the reader to put effort into understanding your work. Think about what you are trying to say, and the simplest and clearest way to convey it. Go over your finished work several times and edit it with this in mind. In philosophy essays and assignments at this level, we are more concerned with clarity than with subtleties of style. Clarity is the more fundamental skill, and achieving clarity of writing will aid you to achieve clarity of thinking.
Bear in mind that our standards of clarity in philosophy may be higher than in other disciplines you are studying. This is because we are trying make our usual assumptions explicit, and evaluate them; and because the way philosophers use specific words might be different to our usual, everyday use of the words (and sometimes different from the way other philosophers use them, as you might notice). So it is important in a philosophy assessment to be very clear how particular words are being used. And it is important not to take any reasoning process for granted, but rather be clear about how the different claims made are related, and make that explicit.
• Avoid very long sentences. If you can't read out a sentence without taking a breath in the middle, it is too long. Have shorter, more direct sentences. This will aid clarity.
• Avoid using rhetorical questions. Rhetorical questions are often used to raise an issue without really asserting anything. They are thus sometimes a way of avoiding backing up what one says. Be careful of this use – it is better to just raise the issue straightforwardly.
• Avoid discussing what a philosopher, or yourself, "feels" regarding an issue. Discuss instead what they / you "think", "believe", or "argue". This is to do with our concern in philosophy to give reasons for what we say. If you find yourself writing, "Descartes feels that X", replace it with "Descartes thinks that X". (Then think about the reasons there may to think X.)
Writing process tips
• Make sure to answer the questions. A brilliant piece of writing that is off topic cannot be given a much better mark than an average piece that is off topic. It is worth asking yourself when you have written your draft essay whether it provides a clear and direct answer to the question. Most of the essay questions for first-year topics will ask you to do 2 or 3 different things in the essay (we do this to give you some direction as to the structure of your discussion). Make sure you have addressed all of them.
• Have just one main idea to each paragraph. The rest of the paragraph should explain it, clarify it, back it up, explain why it is interesting/significant, or perhaps link it to other main ideas. Make sure the main idea of a paragraph is clear: first make sure it is clear in your own mind, and then make sure it will be clear to your reader. If, in looking at a paragraph you have written, you seem to be saying two main things, think about whether you should split it into two paragraphs. If you find you have two different paragraphs saying much the same thing, integrate them into one. And so on. Sometimes essay writing is like doing a jigsaw puzzle: keep your structure fairly open as you write and continue to revise it as you develop and edit the essay.
• Keep your writing focused. Every point included needs to be related to the main topic of the essay (i.e. an answer to the question/s). Once you have a draft ready, edit it thinking about how each idea you discuss is related to the main point you are making in the essay. Sometimes this will be very obvious, but other times you may need to stop and consider. Once you figure this out for yourself, make sure it will be clear to a reader how you are taking it to be relevant. This may mean just stating how it is relevant, explicitly. Learning to decide what is relevant to what you want to say, and to communicate how it is relevant, are important parts of learning to write well.
• The introduction and conclusion of an essay are there to tell your reader what you're doing, and what you will be/have been arguing. This is useful for your reader to know form the start, as it will provide them with an immediate explanation for why certain points are being discussed, and where you are going to go with them. This means your reader will be able to follow your thoughts much more easily. If you can use your introduction and conclusion effectively the whole essay will communicate more clearly.
These paragraphs can actually be quite easy to write. It is often best to write them last, when you have already completed the body of an essay and know what you're going to do in it. Giving an outline of your structure, like other aspects of essay writing, can be done very directly, or in more subtle ways. We advise just being direct unless you happen to be a very good or experienced writer. A direct approach in an introduction then will look something like, "This essay will address the problem of [x]. I will first discuss [y], and then explain [z]. I will argue that [p]." (Writing such a thing can also sometimes be useful in making us clarify to ourselves what we are actually doing). The conclusion just needs to mirror this, to show how the essay has done what it said it would do.
• Use your introduction as well as 'signposts' or 'direction-indicators' in the text to reveal your structure to your reader explicitly. 'Signposting' just means using words or phrases that indicate to your reader what you are doing, and why. These help a reader see how each point connects, and how a point works in the essay as a whole: they are 'signposts' that help your reader to follow your thoughts. Some examples of signposting are:
However
But
To explain this in more detail, ...
Furthermore
To return to my above point, ....
Having established that .... , I will now ....
There are two arguments that can be given for this idea.
Firstly
Secondly (etc)
What this argument shows is that ...
A problem for this view is ....
Signposting can be done in very obvious ways, and in more subtle ways. In either case it is helpful. If you're not sure how to do it subtly, just be obvious.
• A conclusion should not introduce any new ideas or material. Often students who are new to writing philosophy essays do use a conclusion to do this; in particular, to state their own view. Whenever you are asked to state your own view as part of an essay question, make sure to do so in the body of the essay (along with giving your reasons for your view). Use the conclusion to sum up and / or restate.
(Sometimes a conclusion can also be used to connect the essay topic to some wider issue — and there are other things that sometimes 'work' in a conclusion too; there are many subtleties to writing, of course. However, having a summarising / restating conclusion will always work.)
• Ask questions if you are unsure, and be patient with yourself in developing your essay-writing skills.
Other Advice on Writing Essays
Some further advice on writing for assessments for this unit is given in two audio tracks provided on your Lecture CD. Listen to:
• PHI110 First Assessment Tips.mp3
• PHI110 Essay Writing Tips.mp3
These notes are intended to help you write philosophy essays. Macquarie University also provides a number of excellent services intended to provide support to students and to help with academic writing in general. For more information access the Writing Gateway:
Submission
• Keep a copy of every piece of written work that you submit.
• Every essay must have a cover page and a bibliography.
• Double space and leave a wide margin.
Click on the Assessment link on the Home Page for instructions on how to submit.
Plagiarism
The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971; republished 1987) defines 'Plagiarism' as
" [T]he wrongful appropriation or purloining, and publication as one's own, of the ideas, or the expression of the ideas (literary, artistic, musical, mechanical, etc.) of another."
If in writing an essay, you present material taken - either directly of indirectly - from the work of someone else and do not acknowledge this, you will be guilty of plagiarism.
Deliberate plagiarism is dishonest. It is a form of cheating and will be heavily penalised. Normally, when an essay is found to contain deliberate plagiarism it is given no marks without the opportunity to resubmit. If there is evidence of systematic plagiarism, more severe disciplinary action will be taken.
Inadvertent plagiarism is more common. Often students do not realise that they have to acknowledge material they have taken from others or do not know how to do so. However, even inadvertent plagiarism allows the plagiarist an advantage over fellow students. It also shows that a student does not know how to go about writing academic essays. It will always be heavily penalised.
The only way to avoid plagiarism is to acknowledge your sources. See the section on Referencing for information on how to do this.
Discussing and comparing your work with that of other students is an excellent idea. However, the warning against plagiarism operates here as well. Do not copy the work of other students, or present their ideas as your own. (It is perfectly legitimate to acknowledge insights gained from friends or discussions on the Discussions.)
There are borderline cases. Since most of philosophical thinking involves coming to terms with the ideas of others, it is sometimes hard to draw a line separating what you have gained from others and what you have contributed yourself. You must use your common sense, but if in doubt, err on the side of caution and acknowledge the influence and its source. This includes acknowledging any internet sites consulted for the essay.
NB: All assignments in this unit are automatically checked for plagiarism using "Turnitin" plagiarism-detection software.
For more information, read the following guidelines:
If in doubt, consult your tutor.
Referencing
The main point of referencing is satisfy the requirement of academic honesty and courtesy to the author of the ideas you are using (see Plagiarism above). It is also necessary to make it easy for your reader to locate and check your sources.
There are various conventional ways of doing this, and some disciplines show a marked preference for one convention over others. In philosophy, there is no one established convention. If you have had to learn a method of citation for some other discipline, then you are welcome to use it in philosophy.
The main thing is to learn one method and stick to it. Do not try to make up your own. Make sure you reference enough, and that you reference consistently. Some things to bear in mind:
• In general, reference whenever you are drawing on someone else's work, and whenever your reader may need to know where to look to find out more about what you are saying. There are some grey areas as to how often to reference, but it is also worthwhile to reflect on which of our thoughts do come from elsewhere. If you're unsure whether or not a citation is needed in a particular place, put one in. Always have a reference after a direct quotation.
• Please give page numbers in your references. (The exception to this is if you are making a general statement that applies to a whole work.) This is because your reader should be able to find what you are discussing in the text from your reference.
• Assignments that are not referenced sufficiently may lose marks, even if they are judged not to be plagiarising.
• If you are unsure how to reference, or what to reference, ask your tutor.
If you have not already adopted a referencing convention, then you could use the following one, which is widely used in the humanities.
Indicate direct quotation in one of two ways:
• For relatively short passage, use quotation marks.
• For longer passages (e.g. the quotation from The Oxford English Dictionary above), display the quote in an indented and separate paragraph. Do not use quotation marks.
Provide the source of the passage in an endnote or footnote.
For paraphrased material, or where your arguments draw on the work of another, you should cite the source in the same way.
At the end of the quotation or paraphrased material, put a number (superscript preferably, otherwise in brackets) after the relevant text. Usually this will be at the end of the sentence (after the full stop). This number will refer to an endnote or a footnote. Use whichever suits you (but not both). Most word processing programmes make this easy.
In the first reference to a particular work, give full details.
There are different conventions as to how this should be done for monographs (i.e. books on a single theme, usually - though not always - single authored); for chapters in edited collections; and for journal articles.
The following notes illustrate the relevant conventions:
1. Thomas Nagel, What Does it All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (NY: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 44.
2. Amelie O. Rorty, 'The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics', in Amelie Rorty (ed.) Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980): 377-394, see p. 380
3. Will Kymlicka, 'Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality', Ethics 99 (4), 1989: 883-905, see p. 883.
Please follow these examples precisely (down to punctuation marks, their position, etc.). You may however use underlining instead of Italics.
If you refer to material contained in lectures, do so as follows:
4. Robert Sinnerbrink, Lecture on Stoicism, Macquarie University, Week 2.
In subsequent references, cut out the publication details, name of collection, journal details, etc., and if you like, give an abbreviated version of the title.
Thus:
5. Nagel, What Does it All Mean?, p. 49
6. Rorty, 'The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics', p. 381.
7. Kymlicka, 'Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality', p. 884.
8. Sinnerbrink, Lectures week 2.
Avoid Latin abbreviations such as ibid., op.cit., loc.cit., etc.
At the end of the essay, provide a bibliography containing all and only those works you have referred to in the body of the essay. Do not include work you should have used, but have not.
The bibliography will reproduce the information contained in the first reference, with the following differences:
• The surname will now come first, followed by the given name(s) - reversing the order in the notes;
• There will be no brackets around the publication details for monographs and collections (these were in brackets in the notes).
The list will be in alphabetical order. A sample bibliography is provided on the following page.
A Sample Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kymlicka, Will: 'Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality', Ethics 99 (4), 1989: 883-905
Nagel, Thomas: What Does it All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (NY: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Rorty, Amelie O: 'The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics', in Amelie Rorty (ed.) Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980): 377-394.
Sinnerbrink, Robert. Lecture on Stoicism. Macquarie University, PHI110, Week 2.
If you have problems not covered by these examples, use your common sense or consult your tutor. Alternatively, you may wish to consult one of the various Style Manuals which are available in bookshops or the Macquarie Library, e.g. The Chicago Manual of Style. The Macquarie Library also has some online information:
When You Get Your Essay Back
The essay will have been given a grade (HD, D, C, P etc.). You should also receive a paragraph or so of comments, plus marginal annotations where necessary. These should point out the strengths and weakness of the essay, and give you advice as to how your essay might be improved. Bear in mind, however, the limits of what can be said in a few lines. Often there will also be general discussion of the essays on the course's discussion board, and you should raise problems there. But you should also contact the Philosophy Open Universities Australia coordinator for individual discussion if you need more advice, or have problems with the marking.
Reading List
The Essential Readings for each part of this Unit are listed below. Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
PART ONE: MORALITY AND THE GOOD LIFE
Week 1 Introduction: What is Moral Philosophy?
1. Blackburn, S. (2001). Being Good. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1-8.
Week 2 What is Happiness? (1): Epicurean Ethics
1. Epicurus. (1998) (c. 300 BCE). "'Letter to Menoeceus' and 'Leading Doctrines'". In Ethics: the Classical Readings, D. E. Cooper (ed.). Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 47-58.
2. de Botton, A. (2000). The Consolations of Philosophy. Hamish Hamilton, London, pp.56-72.
Week 3 What is Happiness? (2): Stoic Ethics
1. de Botton, A. (2000). The Consolations of Philosophy. Hamish Hamilton, London, pp.80-92.
2. Cicero. (1988) (c. 45BCE). "On Goals". In Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, B. Inwood & L. P. Gerson (eds). Hackett, Indianapolis, pp. 146-153.
3. Epictetus. (1957) (c. 108 AD). The Moral Discourses of Epictetus, E. Carter (trans.). J.M. Dent and Sons, London, pp. 21-23; 29-31; 48-49.
4. Sharples, R. W. (1996). Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Routledge, New York, pp. 100-113.
Week 4 Happiness, Virtue and the Good: Aristotle's Ethics
1. Blackburn, S. (2001). Being Good. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 112-116.
2. Aristotle. (1984) (c. 350 BCE). "Nicomachean Ethics, Book I." In The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, J. Barnes (ed). Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 1729-1742.
3. Aristotle. (1999) (c. 350 BCE). "Nicomachean Ethics, Book II (with commentary)". In Morality and the Good Life, R. Solomon & J. Greene (eds). McGraw-Hill, Boston, pp. 82-95.
PART TWO: FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY
Week 5 Challenges to Objectivity (1) Cultural Diversity and Moral Relativism
1. Benedict, R. (1993) (original 1934). "A Defense of Moral Relativism". In Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life. Sommers & Sommers (eds.). Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, pp.160-167.
2. Midgley, M. (1993) (original 1981). "Trying Out One's New Sword". In Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life. Sommers & Sommers (eds.). Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, pp. 174-179.
3. Williams, B. (1976). Morality: an Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 34-39.
4. Wong, D. (1993). "Relativism". In A Companion to Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 442-450.
Week 6 Challenges to Objectivity (2) Why be Moral? Egoism and Self-Interest Theories
1. Plato. (1993) (c. 375 BCE). "The Ring of Gyges". Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, Sommers & Sommers (eds.). Harcourt Brace, Fort Wroth, pp. 445- 450.
2. Rachels, J. (1999). The Elements of Moral Philosophy. McGraw-Hill, Boston, pp. 143-161.
3. Feinberg, J. (1995). "Psychological Egoism". In Ethical Theory, L. P. Pojman (ed.). Wadsworth, Belmont, pp. 69-80.
4. Hobbes, T. (1995) (1651). "The Leviathan". In Ethical Theory, L. P. Pojman (ed.). Wadsworth, Belmont, pp.61-69.
5. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books, New York, pp. 42-45.
Week 7 Kant's Ethics
1. Kant, I. (1998) (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor (trans.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 49-60.
2. Kant, I. (1993) (1785).Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, James W. Ellington (trans). Hackett, Indianapolis, pp. 30-41.
3. Kant, I. (1994). "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 280-281.
4. O'Neill, O. (1991). "Kantian Ethics". In A Companion to Ethics, P Singer (ed.). Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 175-185.
Week 8 Utilitarianism
1. le Guin, U. (1989). "The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas". In The Wind's Twelve Quarters. Victor Gollancz, London, pp. 277-284.
2. Bentham, J. (1994) (1789). "The Principle of Utility". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 306-311.
3. Singer, P. (1993). Practical Ethics (second edition). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.16-27.
4. Godwin, W. (1994) (1793). "The Archbishop and the Chambermaid". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 312-313.
5. Sidgwick, H. (1994). "Issues for Utilitarians". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 313-316.
6. Williams, B. (1973). "Negative Responsibility: and two examples". In Utilitarianism: For and against, J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambdrige, pp. 93-118.
7. Hare, R. M. (1989). Essays in Moral Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.330-331.
PART THREE: Contemporary Problems of Morality and Justice
Week 9 Animal Rights and Welfare
1. Aristotle. (1976) (c 350 BCE). "Animals and Slavery". In Animal Rights and Human Obligations, T. Regan & P. Singer (eds.). Prentice Hall, New Jersey, pp. 109-110.
2. Kant, I. (1976). "Duties to Animals". In Animal Rights and Human Obligations, T. Regan & P. Singer (eds.). Prentice Hall, New Jersey, pp. 122-123.
3. National Health and Medical Research Council. (2004). Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes.
o Section 1 'General principles for the care and use of animals for scientific purposes';
o Section 3.3.20 and 3.3.45 'Other Clauses'.
4. Singer, P. (1975) Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals.. Random House, New York, pp. 387-395.
Week 10 Global Justice
1. Singer, P. (1972). 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (3), 229-243.
2. Beitz, C. (2001). 'Does Global Inequality Matter?' Metaphilosophy 32 (1/2), pp. 95-112.
3. Pogge, T. (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights. Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 91-2; 94-101; 108-117.
Week 11 Historic Injustice and Indigenous Rights
1. Poole, R. (1999). Nation and Identity. Routledge, London, pp. 114-142.
2. Waldron, J. (1992). 'Superseding Historic Injustice'. Ethics, 103 (1), 4-28.
3. Sparrow, R. (2000). 'History and Collective Responsibility'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78 (3), 346-359.
Week 12 Justice, Immigration and Refugees
1. Manne, R. (2004). 'Sending them Home'. Quarterly Essay 13 (2004), 78-91.
2. Dummett, M. (2001). On Immigration and Refugees. Routledge, London, pp.4-21.
3. Gibney, M. (2004). The Ethics and Politics of Asylum. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 59-65, 229-237, 243-249.
You will find additional Readings for Lectures and Essays on the following page.
Additional Readings for Lectures and Essays
NB:
|(I) |indicates readings that provide useful introductory overviews. |
|* |indicates readings that are relatively straightforward and provide a useful supplement to the set readings for lectures and |
| |discussion. |
Section One: Morality and the good life
What is happiness? Epicurean and Stoic Ethics
Annas, J. The Morality of Happiness (Oxford University Press, 1993) Introduction, chs 5 & 7.
(I) Arrington, R. Western Ethics (Blackwell, 1998), ch. 4
de Botton, A. The Consolations of Philosophy (Hamish Hamilton, 2000) chs 2 & 3.
*Cottingham, J. Philosophy and the Good Life (Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 2.
Long A. and Sedley eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge University Press, 1987), sections on epicurean and stoic ethics.
Long, A. Hellenistic Philosophy (University of California Press, 1986).
*Prior, William J. Virtue and Knowledge (Routledge, 1991) ch. 4.
(I) Rist, J. Epicurus (Cambridge University Press, 1972).
(I) Rist, J. Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1969).
(I) Sharples, R. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (Routledge, 1996), chs 5 & 6
Aristotle's Ethics
*Ackrill, J. Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford University Press, 1981).
Annas, J. The Morality of Happiness (Oxford University Press, 1993) Introduction, chs 1 & 4.
Aristotle. Complete Works (vol 2) (Princeton University Press, 1984), Nicomachean Ethics, ch 10.
(I) Arrington, R. Western Ethics (Blackwell, 1998), ch. 10
*Bond, E.J. Ethics and Human Well-Being (Blackwell, 1996), part 3.
*Cottingham, J. Philosophy and the Good Life (Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 2.
*Fromm, E. Man for Himself (Routledge and Kegan Paul), ch. 2.
*Hutchinson, D.S., 'Ethics', in Barnes, J. ed., The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle , (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
*MacIntyre, A. A Short History of Ethics (MacMillan, 1966).
Mayo, B. "Virtue or duty?" in Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics.
Sommers, C. & Sommers, F. (eds.) (Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth).
*Prior, William J. Virtue and Knowledge (Routledge, 1991) ch. 4.
Rorty A. O., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (University of California Press, 1980) chs 1 & 2.
*Urmson, J. Aristotle's Ethics (Blackwell, 1988).
Williams, B. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana, 1985), chs 1 & 3.
Section 2: Foundations of Morality
Challenges to Objectivity (1) Cultural Diversity and Moral Relativism
*Richard Brandt, 'Ethical Relativism' in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,
(New York: MacMillan, 1967), vol. 3.
*Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: an Introduction to Ethics, (New York: Oxford UP,
1977), Chs. 5, 8. 9.
Jack W. Meiland & Michael Krausz (eds.), Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, (Notre Dame: Notre
Dame University Press, 1982). See essays by:
Gilbert Harman, "Moral Relativism Defended" (originally published in Philosophical
Review, vol. 84 1975, pp. 3-22);
Geoffrey Harrison, "Relativism and Tolerance", (originally published in Ethics, vol. 86,
1976, pp. 122-135);
David Lyons, "Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence", (originally published in
Ethics, vol 86, 1976, pp. 107-121;
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press, 1988), Ch. 18.
*J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, (Penguin, 1977), Ch. 1.
Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
(I) James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd Edition, (McGraw Hill, 1999), ch. 2.
Nicholas Sturgeon, 'Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism' in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D.
Miller, Jeffrey Paul, eds., Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1994).
*Paul Taylor, 'Ethical Relativism' in George Sher (ed.) Moral Philosophy (Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1987).
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana, 1985), ch. 9.
David Wong, Moral Relativity , (University of California Press, 1984).
Challenges to Objectivity (2) Why Be Moral? Egoism and Self-Interest Theories
(I) Kurt Baier, 'Egoism' in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
*Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Egoism and Altruism', in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (New York: MacMillan, 1967), vol. 2.
Derek Parfit, "Prudence, morality and the prisoner's dilemma", Proceedings of the British Academy, 65 (1979).
J. Harsanyi, 'Morality and the theory of rational behaviour', Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982).
(I) Will Kymlicka, 'The Social Contract Tradition' in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics , (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
*Richard Taylor, 'On the Socratic Dilemma' in Louis Pojman (ed.), Ethical Theory: Classical and
Contemporary Readings, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989).
*James Rachels, 'Egoism and Moral Skepticism' in C. Sommers & F. Sommers, Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics, (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1985).
(I) James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd Edition, (NY: McGraw Hill, 1999), Chs. 5 & 6.
• Peter Singer, 'Why Act Morally?' Practical Ethics, Ch. 10, (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1979).
*Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Egoism and Altruism', in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy , (New York: MacMillan, 1967), vol. 2.
Kant's Ethics
*Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, (Cornell UP, 1995), Ch. 4
(I) Nancy (Ann) Davis, 'Contemporary deontology' in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics,
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 205-218.
*Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, (Cambridge UP, 1996), esp. Chs. 3 & 4
*Christine Korsgaard, Introduction to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge UP, 1997)
Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, (Harvard U.P., 1993), esp. Chs. 1, 4 & 5
*Thomas E. Hill Jr., 'Humanity as an End in Itself', Ethics 91 (1980): 84-99.
*Thomas E. Hill Jr., 'Kant's Theory of Practical Reason', Monist 72, (1989), pp. 363-383.
(I) James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Ch. 10
*J. B. Schneewind: 'Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral philosophy' in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, Paul Guyer (ed.) (Cambridge U.P. New York, 1992)
*Sullivan, R. An Introduction to Kant's Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Utilitarianism
*Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 2.
(I) Philip Pettit, 'Consequentialism' in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991), pp. 230-240.
Robert E. Goodin, 'Utility and the good' in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991), pp. 241-248.
R.M. Hare, 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' in Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams
(eds.),
*J.J. Smart, 'An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics' in J.J. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against , (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 3-73.
*Bernard Williams, 'A critique of utilitarianism' in J.J. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against , (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 77-150.
Section 3: Contemporary Problems of Morality and Justice
Animal Rights and Welfare
R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals , (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980).
(I) Lori Gruen, 'Animals', Ch. 30 of Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics , (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 343 - 353.
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights , (University of California Press, 1983).
(I) Bernard E. Rollin, 'The moral status of animals and their use as experimental subjects', in Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer (eds.) A Companion to Bioethics , (Oxford, Blackwell, 1998)
*Peter Singer, Practical Ethics , (second edition), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chs. 2, 3, 4 & 5. (N.B. The first edition of Practical Ethics covers roughly the same ground, but the chapter references may be different.)
*Peter Singer, Animal Liberation , (New York: Avon Books, 1977).
There are a range of textbooks in 'Social Ethics', 'Applied Ethics' and 'Moral Problems' in the library which have sections on animal rights, and which may also prove helpful introductory reading (especially if you find difficulty getting hold of the above).
Global Justice
*Brian Barry, 'Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective' in Goodin and Pettit (eds),
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)
Simon Caney, 'Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples', Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(1),
2002: 95-123
Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism, (Oxford University Press, 1999)
David Miller, "Against Global Egalitarianism", Journal of Ethics, vol. 9, 2005: 55-79
*Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and
Reforms, (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), especially Ch. 4
*Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), especially essays by Beitz,
Pogge, Hinsch, Caney, Gosepath, O'Neill and Zaneti.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Belknap Press: Massachusetts,1971)
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Harvard University Press, 1999).
Samuel Sheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal
Thought, (Oxford University Press, 2001), Chs. 2, 5, 7.
(I) Peter Singer: One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2002),
especially Ch. 5
(I) Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality", Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(3), 1972: 229- 43.
Historic Injustice and Indigenous Rights
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78 (3), September 2000, Special Issue on Indigenous
Rights, especially articles by Duncan Ivison, Robert Sparrow & Janna Thompson.
Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton & Will Sanders, Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
*Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
Chs. 7, 8, 9
*Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Chs. 5 & 6
*Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd edition, (Oxford
University Press, 2002), Ch. 8, Section 4
(I) Ross Poole, 'Multiculturalism, Aboriginal Rights and the Nation', Ch. 4 of Nation and
Identity, (Routledge, 1999)
Justice, Immigration and Refugees
Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh
University Press, 2002)
Phillip Cole and Doris Schroeder, "Justice beyond Borders", Res Publica, 10, 107-113, 2004.
*Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees, (Routledge, 2001)
Michael Dummett, "Immigration", Res Publica, 10, 115-122, 2004
Matthew Gibney, Ethics and Politics of Asylum: liberal democracy and the response to refugees,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
*W. Maley et al. Refugees and the Myth of the Borderless World (ANU, 2002)
*Robert Manne, "Sending them Home, Refugees and the New Politics of Indifference", Quarterly
Essay, Issue 13, 2004
Charles Taylor, 'Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?)', in Alan C. Cairns et al (eds) Citizenship, Diversity and Pluralism (McGill Queen's University Press, 1999).
Summary of Assessment
The table below contains a summary of assessments for this unit. For detailed information about each assessment, click on the link in the Table of Contents for Assessment.
Assessment Tasks are to be completed offline and submitted as Word-compatible documents attached to an email and sent to the correct address. Please see the following pages for important additional information, including submission of assessments and grading.
|Task |Due |% |
|Assessment 1: Online discussion (participation) |Continuous |10% |
|Assessment 2: Text-based Reading Assignment (750 - 1000 words) |5pm (EST) Monday of Week 4 |20% |
| |20 June, 2011 | |
|Assessment 3: Essay (1200 - 1500 words) |5pm (EST) Friday of Week 8 |35% |
| |22 July, 2011 | |
|Assessment 4: Essay (1200 - 1500 words) |5pm (EST) Friday of Week 13 |35% |
| |26 August, 2011 | |
Submission of Assessment
1. Note that these submission instructions are different from the standard Macquarie OUA instructions for submission of assignments. Please read these instructions carefully and contact your tutor if you have any questions.
2. Assignments in this unit are to be submitted through this website. In the Assessment folder, after each assessment, you will see a link to a submission page. To submit your assessment task, go to that page and follow instructions provided.
3. Your assignment must be sent as a single file including the Cover Sheet, Bibliography and any Appendices.
4. To easily identify your assignment, the file should be named using the unit name, assignment number, and your student number; eg PSY130_01_30985454.doc.
5. The Cover Sheet, which you should download from the Centre for Open Education's website (), should be completed (typed) and saved as the FIRST PAGE of your assignment.
6. Your assignment will only be accepted in Microsoft Word (in the format word.doc), RTF (Rich Text Format), or Adobe PDF. Any data which is not in the above formats will not be accepted. Please note that .doc form is recommended, to facilitate the addition of marker's comments to the text of your essay.
| |TIPS |
| |Ensure you keep a copy of all assessments that you submit. |
| |Make yourself familiar with the process for submitting assessments prior to the due date. |
| | |
Submission Date and Time OUA
Assignments should be submitted no later than the due time and date. Please note that where a due time is specified, it refers to Australian Eastern Standard Time (EST) or Australian Eastern Daylight Sayings Time (EDST) in the appropriate months. Eastern Standard Time (EST) First Sunday in April, to the First Sunday in October Eastern Daylight Savings Time First Sunday in October, to the First Sunday in April Assignment items submitted after the due time and date may be subject to an academic penalty, unless an extension of time has been previously approved. Please ensure that you retain an electronic back-up copy of each assignment. While care is taken, the University accepts no responsibility for lost assignments. Problems with the retrieval of work produced on a computer will not be accepted as an excuse for the late submission of an assignment. Important: Only one file (the assignment) can be submitted.
Assignments will generally be returned within three weeks of the due date of submission, through the "Mail" function on this website. Assignment marks are final and are not open to negotiation. Do not send assignments directly to the tutor/lecturer, unless specifically requested.
Acknowledgement of Receiving Assignment
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| |Important |
| |All assignments in this unit are automatically checked for plagiarism using Turnitin plagiarism detection software. For more |
| |information on plagiarism and how to avoid it, see the Study Guide. |
| | |
Policy on Extensions
| |Important |
| |Extension requests should be made as early as possible to ouainfo@mq.edu.au |
| | |
Late submission of written work will result in a deduction of 10% of the mark awarded for each week or part of a week beyond the due date, or date to which an extension has been granted.
Extensions are granted only on grounds of illness or misadventure, and appropriate supporting documentation must be submitted. Work submitted after 3 weeks beyond the due date, or the date after which an extension has been given, will not be accepted. If you are having problems completing an assignment, please contact the tutor as early as possible.
Grading
A description of the grading for this unit is as follows:
|Grade |Range (%) |Description |
|High Distinction |85 - 100 |Denotes work of superior quality. This may be demonstrated in such areas as criticism, logical argument,|
| | |interpretation of materials or use of methodology. This grade may also be awarded to recognise |
| | |particular originality or creativity in student performance. |
|Distinction |75 - 84 |Denotes work of very high quality, showing a mature ability to digest material from a range of sources, |
| | |identify the philosophical implications of statements, use references appropriately and express your own|
| | |conclusions in a clear and concise manner. |
|Credit |65 - 74 |Denotes work of predominantly good quality, demonstrating a sound grasp of content, together with |
| | |efficient organisation, selectivity and use of techniques. |
|Pass |50 - 64 |Denotes satisfactory achievement of the unit objectives. |
|Fail |Below 50 |Denotes that a student has failed to complete a unit. |
Please see also the Grading Rubrics. The Grading Rubrics follow as PDFs.
Plagiarism
Plagiarism involves using the work of another person and presenting it as one's own. Any of the following acts constitutes plagiarism unless the source of each quotation or piece of borrowed material is clearly acknowledged.
a. copying out part(s) of any document or audio-visual material (including computer based material);
b. using or extracting another person's concepts, experimental results, or conclusions;
c. summarising another person's work;
d. in an assignment where there was collaborative preparatory work, submitting substantially the same final version of any material as another student.
Encouraging or assisting another person to commit plagiarism is a form of improper collusion and may attract the same penalties which apply to plagiarism. Opportunities and temptations for plagiarism have increased with the spread of internet access. Plagiarism is a serious threat to the teaching and accreditation process, and seriously undermines the collegial and ethical principles which underpin the work of a University
• For further information see the Study Guide>Plagiarism.
Assessment 1
Online Discussion - 10%
Continuous throughout study period.
Discussion-board participation represents a commitment to the academic environment necessary to any good philosophy course. Your mark will be based on the quality of your participation. This is not just measured by the philosophical content of your posts, but by your willingness to engage in discussion with your peers. Much of what you learn in philosophy you will learn by involving yourself in discussion and argument. So while we would like to see some well thought out responses to the topics for each week, we would also really encourage you to respond to the messages of other students, ask questions, post your thoughts and engage fully in the philosophical community. You'll find that if you make the most of the discussion facilities available, not only will you maximise your participation marks, but you will also get more out of the course in general.
Assessment 2
Text-based Reading Assignment - 20%
Length: 750 - 1000 words
Due: 5pm (EST) Monday of Week 4
Note: The purpose of this exercise is to develop your abilities to understand and analyse the structure of a philosophical argument, to reflect on the views presented in the argument, and to critically assess the reasons provided in support of these views. When explaining a position or argument, try to do so in your own words. Do not use extended quotations. For this exercise you are not expected to read widely, but should concentrate on the selected text.
The exercise is also intended to develop your ability to be succinct. Please observe the word limit. If you have any doubts about how to approach the topics, discuss them with your tutor. Make sure you have read the section on Writing Philosophy Essays in the Study Guide before you begin. You should also listen to the track PHI110 First Assignment Tips.mp3 on your CD.
Choose ONE of the following readings and answer, in your own words, questions for that reading. Students will be expected to have read the full text (e.g. the chapter or section that is relevant for the quoted passage) and to answer the questions below by drawing on the relevant context for the quoted passage. Write your assignment as one continuous essay, not as separate responses to each of the questions.
Reading 1:
Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” p. 49-50.
“you should accustom yourself to believing that death means nothing to us, since every good and every evil lies in sensation; but death is the privation of sensation. Hence a correct comprehension of the fact that death means nothing to us makes the mortal aspect of life pleasurable, not be conferring on us a boundless period of time but by removing the yearning for deathlessness. There is nothing fearful in living for the person who has really laid hold of the fact that there is nothing fearful in not living. So it is silly for a person to say that he dreads death—not because it will be painful when it arrives but because it pains him now as a future certainty; for that which makes no trouble for us when it arrives is a meaningless pain when we await it. This, the most horrifying of evils, means nothing to us, then, because so long as we are existent death is not present and whenever it is present we are nonexistent. Thus it is of no concern either to the living or to those who have completed their lives. For the former it is nonexistent, and the latter are themselves nonexistent" (LD, p. 49-50)
These remarks encapsulate Epicurus’s views on our attitudes towards death. What argument does he provide for why we should not fear death? What is the ethical purpose of this argument for how we should live our lives? Do you agree with Epicurus’s views? Why or why not?
Reading 2:
Cicero, On Goals, pp. 150.
Cicero’s account of the highest good rejects the Epicurean view that it is the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. He makes the claim that:
“since the goal is to live consistently and in agreement with nature, it follows necessarily that all wise men always live happy, perfect, and fortunate lives, that they are impeded by nothing, hindered by nothing and in need of nothing” (OG, #26).
The argument he provides is as follows:
“everything which is good is praiseworthy; but everything which is praiseworthy is honourable; therefore, that which is good is honourable” (OG #31).
“Next, I ask who can boast of a life if it wretched or even just not happy. So we can boast only of a happy life. From this it results that the happy life is, if I may put it so, worth boasting about; and this cannot properly [be said to] happen to any life but one which is honourable. So it turns out that an honourable life is a happy life" (OG #28).
What does Cicero mean by stating that our highest good is “to live consistently and in agreement with nature”? What does he mean by claiming the wise live happy lives of complete self-sufficiency? Do you find the argument he provides for equating an honourable life with a happy life convincing? Give reasons for your response.
Reading 3:
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 1734.
Aristotle observes that there are some things in life that we pursue for the sake of something else, and then there are things that we pursue just for their own sakes. The most desirable thing would be that which we only ever pursue for its own sake:
“we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every excellence we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.”
Describe Aristotle’s argument here for nominating happiness [eudaimonia] as the most complete or highest good. Why is happiness superior to the other desirable goods such as honour, pleasure, or the life of virtue? Do you find Aristotle’s argument convincing? Give reasons for your response.
NOTE: Assessments in this unit are to be submitted directly through this website, and will be automatically checked for plagiarism. Upload your assignment using the submission link in the page following this one.
Assessment 3
Essay - 35%
Length: 1200 - 1500 words
Due: 5pm (EST) Friday of Week 8
The purpose of this essay is to develop your abilities to understand and analyse philosophical texts and arguments, to reflect on a range of views relevant to the topic, and to critically assess the reasons provided in support of these views. When explaining a position or argument, try to do so in your own words. Provide reasons in support of every argument/view/judgement you present. Do not use extended quotations and always explain/expand upon any quotations that you do use. Please also ensure that you observe the assignment word limit.
If you have any doubts about how to approach the topics, or how to structure your essay, discuss these with your tutor. It may help to re-read the section on Writing Philosophy Essays in the Study Guide before you begin. You should also listen to the track PHI110 Essay Writing Tips.mp3 on your CD.
You may choose to write your essay on any one of the following questions. In writing the essay, you should draw on the relevant readings from the essential unit readings, on a selection of additional readings from the further reading list, and on the material discussed in lectures. In a philosophy essay you are also expected to present your own reasoned responses to the views discussed.
Answer one of the following questions:
1. Do you agree with the view that 'culture is the truth-maker of our moral claims and judgments'? Explain the central features of this meta-ethical theory, present one or two objections to it, and evaluate the theory in the light of these objections. Provide reasons to defend your evaluation.
2. Do you think Hobbes' social contract theory provides a compelling answer to the challenge of reconciling self-interest and morality? Explain the apparent tension between egoism and morality, and explain and evaluate social contract theory's response to it.
3. Explain why Kant claims that according to the Categorical Imperative, it is wrong to lie even to an 'enquiring murderer'. Explain the concept of the Categorical Imperative, and how Kant's answer is derived from it. Discuss whether you think the Categorical Imperative yields the correct moral answer in this case, giving reasons in defence of your view.
4. Explain Kant's distinction between acts that are right, and acts that have moral worth, using examples to illustrate the difference. Do you agree with Kant about the significance of motives and the role of duty in morality? Why/why not? Give reasons to defend your answers.
5. Explain the 'Doctrine of Swine' objection to classical utilitarianism. In your view, should utilitarianism be revised so as to avoid this objection? If not, why not? If yes, explain how it might be revised. (Be sure to provide a full explanation of the theory of classical utilitarianism in your answer).
6. Explain the difference between Act and Rule Utilitarianism. Why is Rule utilitarianism proposed as an alternative to act-based forms of the theory? Clearly describe each version of utilitarianism and explain which form you think is to be preferred, and why.
NOTE: Assessments in this unit are to be submitted directly through this website, and will be automatically checked for plagiarism. Upload your assignment using the submission link in the page following this one.
Assessment 4
Essay - 35%
Length: 1200 - 1500 words
Due: 5pm (EST) Friday of Week 13
The purpose of this essay is to develop your abilities to understand and analyse philosophical texts and arguments, to reflect on a range of views relevant to the topic, and to critically assess the reasons provided in support of these views. When explaining a position or argument, try to do so in your own words. Provide reasons in support of every argument/view/judgement you present. Do not use extended quotations and always explain/expand upon any quotations that you do use. Please also ensure that you observe the assignment word limit.
If you have any doubts about how to approach the topics, or how to structure your essay, discuss these with your tutor. It may help to re-read the section on Writing Philosophy Essays in the Study Guide before you begin. You should also listen to the track PHI110 Essay Writing Tips.mp3 on your CD.
You may choose to write your essay on any one of the following questions. In writing the essay, you should draw on the relevant readings from the essential unit readings, on a selection of additional readings from the further reading list, and on the material discussed in lectures. In a philosophy essay you are also expected to present your own reasoned responses to the views discussed.
Answer one of the following questions:
1. Explain Singer's distinction between sentience and self-consciousness, and what the distinction implies for the moral status of animals. Do you believe non-human animals have the same or a different moral status to human animals? Explain the basis of your answer.
2. In what sense can a typical approach to thinking about global justice be described as involving a 'double standard'? Do you agree with Pogge that we owe the global poor an account of why we are entitled to impose this double standard? Do you think the double standard can be justified?
3. Why might we think that historic injustices require some reparation in the present? Evaluate the reasons for this claim with reference to objections. What kind of reparation is appropriate, if any, on the basis of your evaluation?
4. Explain the difference between impartialist and humanitarian approaches to the justice claims of asylum seekers and refugees, and their implications for notions of national self-determination. In your view, which approach gives a better account of the moral basis of a nation’s obligations to provide protection to asylum seekers and resettlement to refugees?
NOTE: Assessments in this unit are to be submitted directly through this website, and will be automatically checked for plagiarism. Upload your assignment using the submission link in the page following this one.
WEEK 1
Introduction
Introductory Notes and Tasks
Welcome to PHI110, Philosophy, Morality and Society. This week is an introduction to the unit and moral philosophy.
Steps to Follow:
1. The first task for this week is to read the unit Study Guide very carefully (click on the 'Study Guide' link on the Home Page).
2. Listen to the Introductory Audio Lecture.
3. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 1 open beside you as you listen.
4. Post an introduction to yourself in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu). You could include such things as your favourite food or musical genre, where you currently live, your study history or the like.
As documented in the Study Guide, you will receive marks in this unit for your contribution to Discussions, so it is essential you become familiar with this resource early in the Study Period. More importantly, philosophy is a subject that is best done in a community of like-minded peers and a well-monitored discussion-board is a very powerful tool for building and maintaining such a learning community. Discussions is also your first point of contact with your tutor. Under no circumstances should you feel embarrassed about asking questions on the discussion-board. If you are confused, there is no doubt that others will be similarly puzzled. Finally and most importantly, ensure you respect your peers on Discussions at all times. A learning community cannot exist without respect and trust. Anyone disrespecting another is thereby damaging the learning community and, as such, they will be dealt with very harshly.
5. Ensure you can access the library and have no trouble downloading the required readings. Report any problems on Discussions as soon as they arise.
6. Read this week's essential reading (extract from Being Good by Simon Blackburn) and attempt the reading questions. The reading questions for each week are provided to help you to pick out the main points and issues raised in the readings. Answering them as you read should help you to develop your critical reading skills, and your understanding of how a text builds an argument or position. As you read and answer the questions, it will be useful to note any answers you are unsure of, and any other questions that arise. These can be posted on the board for discussion and further clarification.
7. Post your thoughts or questions on the week 1 material in Discussions.
8. Take Self-Test 1 (click on the link to Assessment on the Home Page, then on 'Self Tests' and choose the 'Week 1: What is Moral Philosophy?' self test from the list that appears). The Self-Tests are provided to enable you to monitor how well you have mastered the unit materials. The results do not count towards your marks, but the tests are an important resource that you should become familiar with early. As you can do the Self-Test as often as you like, feel free to try any others from later weeks, once you have attempted Self-Test 1.
9. Post at least one more message to Discussions, detailing your initial reactions to the unit or to others' posts.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Introductory Lecture
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 01.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
NB: Week 1 combines Lectures 1 and 2 into a single Introductory Lecture.
Lecture 1
Introduction: What is Moral Philosophy?
Lecturers: Dr. Robert Sinnerbrink, Dr. Mianna Lotz, Professor Catriona Mackenzie
To introduce the unit, each of the unit lecturers gives an overview of their section of the unit. This is followed by general introductory remarks about moral philosophy.
Unit overview
|Weeks 1-4: |Ancient Greek ethics. We focus on Epicureanism, Stoicism and Aristotle's ethics. |
|Weeks 5-8: |Meta-ethics and metaethical questions. We focus on relativism, self-interest theories, and two main kinds of|
| |universalist ethical theories: Kantianism and utilitarianism. |
|Weeks 9-13: |Practical ethical issues/social philosophy. We focus on animal welfare, global justice, indigenous rights, |
| |refugees/asylum seekers. |
Ethics and Moral philosophy
• What is ethics? Why is morality important for our understanding of society?
• 'Ethics' (from the Greek ethos, meaning habit or custom) is an inquiry into how we should live, what we should do, what kind of person we should be.
• 'Ethics' is often used interchangeably with 'moral philosophy', meaning an inquiry into the principles, justifications, or reasons that should guide our action.
• Ethics or moral philosophy can mean an inquiry into what constitutes the good life for human beings (e.g. Greek virtue ethics); or an inquiry into what makes actions morally right, just, or obligatory for us (e.g. theories of moral rules or principles).
Lecture 1 (cont.)
1. Happiness and the 'Good Life'
Philosophy means philo (love of) sophia (wisdom), love of wisdom. Greek ethics examines the questions: how do we live well? What is the “good life” for human beings?
Ethics means reflecting on this question through reason, and finding answers that we can put into practice. Different schools of Greek ethics presented different answers to the above questions:
• For the Epicureans, the good life for us is the life aiming at pleasure (of the right sort);
• For the Stoics, the good life is the life aiming at virtue (through reason) and being in harmony with nature;
• For Aristotle, the good life aims at happiness (eudaimonia), the life of rational activity.
2. Happiness and Morality
• Much moral philosophy inquires into what we mean by concepts like “right” and “wrong”, “justice” and “injustice”; it also inquires into the nature of moral duty or obligation.
• Many moral philosophers argue that we should separate questions about morality (“the right”) from questions about happiness or well-being (“the good”).
• E.g. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argued that moral philosophy is exclusively concerned with universal principles; we are moral, for Kant, not when we aim at happiness, but when we act out of a sense of our rational duty, which is universally binding on all.
3. Meta-ethics and Moral Psychology
Other questions arise when we think about the meaning of moral judgments, the kind of knowledge we can have about right and wrong, and the reality (or lack of it) that moral values have. For instance:
• What gives morality its authority? Are moral values and beliefs objectively valid? Or are they merely subjective, depending on the feelings or beliefs of the individuals who hold them?
• Are there any universal moral principles? Or are moral principles relative to particular cultures, valid in some cultures but not in others?
These questions can be described as belonging to meta-ethics (they are about the status of moral values, principles, and beliefs). Meta-ethical questions concern the epistemological status of moral claims (the knowledge we can have about morality), and the metaphysical status of moral values or principles themselves (the kind of reality they might or might not have).
Connected with these are issues in “moral psychology” - the psychological dimension of morality and our motivation to act morally. For example, can religion provide a basis for morality? Why should I be moral if it doesn’t suit me? Is it rational to act against self-interest for the sake of morality?
4. Applied Ethics and Social/Political Philosophy
Ethics is practical as much as theoretical. General moral principles often apply to concrete social problems. Consider these examples:
• The moral status of animals and the environment (animal rights, environmental ethics, climate change);
• The obligations rich nations have towards poor nations (aid, debt, redistributing wealth or assisting countries in need).
• The rights of indigenous peoples (redressing historical injustice or dispossession);
• The right and duties of states in regard to refugees (the morality of accepting/rejecting asylum seekers);
What is right response to these questions? Can we show through reasoned argument what morally appropriate laws or policies might be?
Ethics, morality, social life, and politics prove to be closely interconnected. Greek philosophers, e.g. Aristotle, therefore regarded ethics as an element of political philosophy. Philosophers today make similar claims concerning the social and political implications of moral philosophy or ethics (e.g. Peter Singer).
Philosophy must be practical, not just theoretical. The most important question, for Greek philosophers, was: ‘how should I live?’
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Reading for Week 1:
"Introduction", from Simon Blackburn (2001), Being Good. Oxford University Press, Oxford; pp 1-8.
Readings Questions
Blackburn: extract from Being Good
1. Explain in your own words what Blackburn means by the 'ethical environment'. Why would this environment be 'strangely invisible' (p. 2)?
2. What are some of the features of our current ethical environment (or climate) which Blackburn picks out (pp. 3-4)? Can you think of your own examples?
3. What does Blackburn mean by 'moralizing' (p. 3)? How is this different to seeking to understand the ethical climate?
4. Blackburn thinks we might we tend to eschew thinking about morality entirely. Do you agree that people have such a tendency? If so, why do you think they do?
5. After reading this text and listening to the first lecture, what are your thoughts about why reflecting on ethics is important? What difficulties are likely to be encountered in thinking about ethics?
Post your thoughts or questions on the Week 1 material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then click on 'Week 1').
WEEK 2
Epicurean Ethics
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 3 and 4.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 2 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 2.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 3
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 03.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 4
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 04.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 3
Overview of Lecture:
1. Epicurus’ Philosophical Views
2. Epicurean ethics: Ethical and psychological hedonism
3. Epicurean ethics is 'conseqentialist'
4. Pleasure is our "primary native good"
1. Epicurus' Philosophical Views
| |Epicurus (341-271 BCE) was one of the most influential philosophers of the Hellenistic period. He studied the philosophies of |
| |Democritus and Plato, and founded his own philosophical school (“The Garden”), a self-sufficient commune near Athens. Epicurus'|
| |ethics (like other systems of ethical thought) are shaped by his views on what the universe is like, and what we humans are. |
Epicurus’ metaphysics (theory of reality): materialist atomism. Reality consists of uncuttable bits of matter (atoms or monads) moving through empty space (the void). Bodies are collections of atoms that cohere once atoms collide (due to the ‘swerve’ or clinamen).
Gods exist (as ethical ideals) but are indifferent to human concerns. The common conception of the gods (divine providence) is false. Was Epicurus an atheist?
Epicurus’ epistemology (theory of knowledge) is empiricist: all knowledge comes from experience, i.e. perception and sensation. Natural science is important to understand reality and to dispel our fears about the cosmos and our own mortality.
Philosophy of mind: mind and body are the same (identity theory?). Mind is a particular arrangement of atoms connected with the body (an organ in the chest!); consciousness is thus destroyed once the body disintegrates at death.
This means that there is no immortal, immaterial soul. Human existence is finite; death means non-existence. But this is not something we should fear!
2. Epicurean Ethics: Ethical and Psychological Hedonism
The Good Life aims at happiness (as Aristotle argued), the highest good pursued for its own sake. The Greeks differ however on the meaning of 'happiness'. It is important to note that their view of happiness is not an ecstatic or euphoric state of mind; it is something more like a way of life. So what is this happiness? For Epicurus happiness means obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain. The Good Life is the life of tranquility (ataraxia), avoiding fear of death.
Epicurus' position is ethical hedonism. This view states that pleasure defines what is good, and pain that which is bad. Epicurus' arguments for ethical hedonism:
1. Pleasure is what human beings really value for its own sake (e.g. infants). Epicurus’ ethical hedonism is based upon psychological hedonism (a claim about what motivates us).
I ultimately am concerned with my own pleasure; all other goods (friends, etc.) are pursued for my own pleasure (egoistic hedonism). They are instrumental goods (means to other ends) that enable me to enjoy the highest good (tranquil pleasure, avoidance of pain).
2. Evidence of introspection (observing our subjective states): Pleasure and pain are immediately perceived by everyone; no further argument is needed to show that pleasure is good and pain is bad since we immediately perceive this in our own experience.
Since all knowledge derives from experience (perception and sensation), pleasure and pain are the only criteria for knowledge of good and bad.
Epicurus argues, then, for an ethical hedonism based upon psychological hedonism. He claims that all pleasures are good and all pains are bad. But this does not mean that we should pursue all pleasures and avoid all pains. Why not?
3. Epicurean Ethics is 'consequentialist'
Epicurus is an ethical consequentialist: the good is evaluated according to its pleasurable consequences, the bad according to its painful consequences. We need to judge rationally what increases pleasure and diminishes pain overall.
E.g., a present pleasure may mean a future pain (a hangover, an affair), or a present pain may lead to a future pleasure (exercise, training).
So pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain in the right way is the path to securing happiness, not the life of sensuous indulgence or gratification.
(Cf. the Cyrenaics, for whom happiness just is sensual gratification—“if it feels good, do it now, come what may!” Does this work?).
4. Pleasure is our "primary native good"
To summarise: Epicurean ethics is a form of ethical hedonism: the view that the good life is the life of pleasure and avoidance of pain, that pleasure provides the primary motivation for our actions, and that pleasure is the criterion for judging good and bad. He states:
“We speak of pleasure as the starting point and the goal of the happy life because we realize that it is our primary native good, because every act of choice and aversion originates with it, and because we come back to it when we judge every good by using the pleasure feeling as our criterion”(LM, 51).
The question is: should we pursue all pleasures or only some? How do we know which ones?
Pleasure is a bodily state that can take different forms: there are ‘moving’ or kinetic pleasures (enjoying a fine meal); and there are ‘static’ pleasures which follow the satisfaction of a desire or avoidance of a pain (the satisfied feeling after a good meal).
Pleasure is not so much a positive sensation as a diminution of pain, frustration, anxiety, etc.; it is a state of equilibrium or homeostasis (cf. Freud). Static pleasures are more long-lasting; they induce calm and tranquillity more than the agitation induced by kinetic pleasures. So we should aim at reducing discomfort or increasing static pleasure if we want to live a pleasant and happy life.
Epicurus further introduces a schema of three different kinds of desire (next lecture).
Lecture 4
Overview of Lecture:
1. Three Types of Desire (natural and necessary; natural and unnecessary; unnatural and unnecessary)
2. Reflection and the Good Life
a. Epicurus' argument against fearing death
b. Pleasure, Virtue, Justice
1. Three Types of Desire
We reduce pains and increase (static) pleasures by rationally controlling our desires.
Desires, though, are not all the same; so we need to know which desires to satisfy and which to ignore.
Epicurus distinguishes three kinds of desire:
1. Natural and necessary desires (innate and essential for human life; they give rise to pain if not satisfied, e.g. food, drink, shelter). Importantly, these include friendship, freedom, and thought.
2. Natural but unnecessary desires (innate but not essential for life; desires that do not give rise to pain if not satisfied, e.g. desire for lavish food, fine wines, a mansion). Satisfying such desires might have harmful consequences.
3. Unnatural and unnecessary desires (artificially induced desires that do not ‘naturally’ give us pain if unsatisfied, but can become cravings due to our distorted sense of what we need (e.g. desire for fame, power, wealth).) Such desires have no natural limit (unlike natural and necessary desires); they are not readily satisfied, tend to increase without limit, making us unhappy and frustrated (they can be ‘addictive’).
So if we want to be happy, we should:
|avoid (3) |[unnatural and unnecessary desires], |
|minimise (2) |[natural but unnecessary desires], and |
|satisfy (1) |[natural and necessary desires]. |
2. Reflection and the Good Life
Epicurus warns against taking his philosophy as advocating a life of indulgence (like the Cyrenaics):
“…when I say that pleasure is the goal of living I do not mean the pleasures of libertines or the pleasures inherent in positive enjoyment, as is supposed by certain persons who are ignorant of our doctrine or who are not in agreement with it or who interpret it perversely. I mean, on the contrary the pleasure that consists in freedom from bodily pain and mental agitation. The pleasant life is not the product of one drinking party after another or of sexual intercourse with women and boys or of the sea food and other delicacies afforded by a luxurious table. On the contrary, it is the result of sober thinking…” (Letter to Menoeceus’, p.51).
Intellectual reflection is thus essential to the good life.
2a. Epicurus' argument against fearing death
Rational reflection allows us to understand our desires; but also allows us to dispel our fear of death. How so? Epicurus’ argument follows from his claims about the nature of reality (atomism) and the human mind (a bodily state):
1. We commonly fear death as a future event (involving pain).
2. But consciousness exists only so long as the body exists; when the body dies consciousness too disintegrates.
3. So death cannot be an experience for me, since I will no longer be in existence when it occurs! Hence I should not fear death.
Another argument:
1. Prior to my coming into existence, I did not experience pain (since I did not yet exist).
2. Similarly, after death I shall no longer exist, so I can feel no pain.
3. Hence I should not fear death.
Rational reflection shows us that our greatest source of mental anxiety is really nothing to fear; this liberates us from anxiety and allows us to live a more pleasurable life.
2b. Pleasure, Virtue, and Justice
Epicurus also claims that virtue and pleasure imply each other:
“It is impossible to live the pleasant life without also living sensibly, nobly and justly, and conversely it is impossible to live sensibly, nobly and justly without living pleasantly. A person who does not live a pleasant life is not living sensibly, nobly and justly, and conversely the person who does not have these virtues cannot live pleasantly” (LD 5).
Yet virtue frequently seems to clash with pleasure. Prudence means acting according to one’s rational self-interest; but this can clash with other virtues (e.g. courage, honour). Doing the just thing may not be prudent (e.g. whistleblowing).
Justice, moreover, according to Epicurus, is simply a convention or agreement “not to harm or be harmed”. It confers social benefits by increasing pleasure and minimising pain for individuals (maximises utility).
Justice and injustice are evaluated according to their consequences: “Injustice is not an evil in itself. Its evil lies in the anxious fear that you will not elude those who have authority to punish such misdeeds” (LD 34). Does this exhaust the moral meaning of justice and injustice?
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 2:
Epicurus. (1998) (c. 300 BCE). "'Letter to Menoeceus' and 'Leading Doctrines'". In Ethics: the Classic Readings, D. E. Cooper (ed.). Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 47-58.
de Botton, A. (2000). The Consolations of Philosophy. Hamish Hamilton, London, pp.56-72.
NB: You may wish to check the list of additional readings in the Study Guide, or ask your tutor for suggestions on other further readings.
Readings Questions
Epicurus: 'Letter to Menoeceus'
1. According to Epicurus, the good life is a life of pleasure. What is Epicurus' conception of pleasure? How does it differ from a modern conception?
2. In contemporary usage, 'Epicureanism' is associated with a life of indulgence. How would Epicurus criticise such a life?
3. Because of the divergence between the Epicurean and modern conceptions of pleasure, the conventional characterisation of Epicurus' view of the good life as 'a life of pleasure' is often misunderstood. Can you think of a simple way to characterise Epicurus' conception of the good life that would be less subject to misinterpretation?
4. Why should death mean nothing to us, according to Epicurus? How is adopting this attitude to death supposed to affect one's enjoyment of life?
5. What does Epicurus mean by calling desires natural or unnatural? What does he mean by calling them necessary or unnecessary? Why is this distinction important for Epicurus?
Think of an example (if there is one) of a desire Epicurus would consider:
Natural and necessary
Natural and unnecessary
Unnatural and necessary
Unnatural and unnecessary
If any of these categories is empty, why?
6. Why do you think Epicurus says it is "impossible to live the pleasant Epicurean life without also living sensibly, nobly and justly and, vice versa, ... impossible to live sensibly, nobly and justly without also living pleasantly" (p.52) ?
Epicurus: 'Leading Doctrines'
7. According to Epicurus, no pleasures are intrinsically bad. Some pleasures, however, are less worthy of pursuit than others. What is wrong with those less worthy pleasures, given that they are not bad in themselves? (For example, why does Epicurus think that the 'debauchee' is not leading the good life?)
8. Why is it bad for a person to commit acts of injustice? Why can't injustice make you happy?
9. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of actually attempting to lead Epicurus' 'good life'?
de Botton: extract from The Consolations of Philosophy
Read this extract, and think again about the answers you gave to the questions about Epicurus? texts above. Refine your answers to those earlier questions if possible.
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Understand the Epicurean concept of pleasure, and why it is central to the good life
• Explain the differences between the desires Epicurus considered worth pursuing and those that he thought were not
• Understand the Epicurean concept of the good life, and the importance of self-reflection for the good life
• Understand the relationship between pleasure and virtue for the Epicureans
WEEK 3
Stoic Ethics
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 5 and 6.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 3 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 3.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Reminder:
Please check the Assessment section for details of tasks and due dates by clicking the link to Assessment on the Home Page.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 5
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 05.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 6
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 06.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 5
Overview of Lecture:
1. Problems with Epicurean ethics
2. Introduction to Stoicism
3. Epicureanism and Stoicism (Pleasure vs. Virtue)
4. The Stoic view of Nature
5. Living according to Nature / Reason
1. Problems with Epicurean Ethics
Is Epicurus’ account of justice as a convention promoting utility adequate? Is torture evil only because I experience the anxiety of fearing being caught? Can justice and injustice be reduced to utility? (Promoting the balance of pleasure over pain). Cf. the scapegoat.
We might also question other aspects of Epicurus’ ethics:
1. While the attainment of peace of mind through sober reflection may be desirable, is this an adequate account of the goal of life as a whole? What about forms of suffering that make us wiser or more compassionate? Is the life of contentment superior to the life of commitment or achievement?
2. What does Epicurean happiness have to do with demands of the moral life? Morality surely involves obligations towards the needs and interests of others, and a contribution to society that Epicurus largely rejects. Can I call myself truly happy if I live the good life while others in my community lead lives of hardship and suffering? Can personal happiness coexist morally with social injustice?
2. Introduction to Stoicism
Stoicism was the other major school of ethics in the Hellenistic period. It was founded by Zeno of Citium (331-261 BCE). The term ‘Stoic’ comes from the word “Stoa” (painted collonade) where Zeno used to teach. Zeno’s teachings were then elaborated and modified by his pupils Cleanthes and Chrysippius. Stoicism was then taken up in the Roman world, popularised by Cicero, and made famous by the personal diaries (the Meditations) of Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD). Other important Stoics included Epictetus and Seneca (senator and advisor to Nero).
Stoicism began to wane after the third century AD but was taken up again by Christian culture, combined with elements of Christian theology (Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy). Stoic themes can also be found in modern philosophers, such as Spinoza (1632-1677) and Kant (1724-1804) (even in Freud).
3. Epicureanism and Stoicism compared (Pleasure vs. Virtue)
Although individual Stoic philosophers differ, they agree that the good life is not the life of pleasure but rather the life of virtue.
But Epicureanism and Stoicism did share some convictions:
1. Like Aristotle, both schools conceived of the good life as a life lived in accordance with human nature. We therefore need to understand our own nature, as well as our place within nature as a whole (the cosmos), if we are to live virtuously.
2. Epicureans and Stoics both held that the good life is a life of contentment, of tranquility and harmony. It is the self-attuned life, in harmony with human nature and with nature as a whole.
3. The path to this self-attuned life is through the exercise of reason; understanding our nature and the nature of things in order to rationally master our passions and desires.
The Stoics differed, however, in rejecting the idea that happiness consists in pleasure. Pleasure is not our “primary, native good”; rather, virtue is what defines the good life. Pleasure is not good in itself; rather, it is something we should be indifferent towards (we can enjoy it when it is available but remain indifferent to it when we lack it). It is a ‘desirable indifferent’ (preferable but not necessary for happiness).
Like the Epicureans, this Stoic view of the good life is connected with their metaphysics and account of nature. But the Stoics had a different conception of the cosmos and our place within it than Epicurus.
4. The Stoic view of Nature
Nature must be understood as a law-governed order (kosmos) of which we are a part. Animate and inanimate beings are interconnected with each other in the whole of nature. Everything in nature is determined according to fixed, eternal laws that we can grasp through reason. How so?
Because our nature as rational beings accords with nature as a rationally ordered whole. Hence the more we understand about nature, the more we can live in harmony with ourselves.
Human beings are part of nature but there is nothing outside of nature as whole; there is no creator god outside of nature that would not be subject to its laws. The cosmos as such is divine or god-like (pantheism) and we are parts of that divine whole.
5. Living according to Nature / Reason
The good life for human beings, therefore, is a life lived in accordance with our nature and with nature as a whole. This will be a life lived according to reason, since that is what we share with the rationally ordered whole of nature (n.b. reason, not pleasure/sensation, is what connects us with nature!).
Reason endows us with the power of regarding reality from an impartial, objective point of view; it allows us to see reality as it truly is, within the limits of our finite nature (we’re human).
A rational view of reality shows us that we must distinguish what is within our power to change and what is not: some things we can control or predict, others are beyond our control.
The good life requires taking the right attitude towards the world (knowing what we can change and what we cannot), and being motivated in the right way in our actions (aiming at virtue, regardless of results).
Lecture 6
Overview of Lecture:
6. Stoic Impassivity or Indifference
7. Problems with Stoicism
6. Stoic Impassivity or Indifference
If we adopt this rational perspective, we can control our passions by adopting an attitude of impassivity or indifference. This will enable us to avoid the eruption of negative emotions such as anger, which stems from a faulty understanding of reality and a projection of our frustration on to others or onto things. Cf. weather; road rage!
The Stoic virtue of impassivity or indifference is the way we achieve happiness. We must always act according to reason: this means to be motivated by a desire to be virtuous, to understand what is within our power to change, and to adopt an indifferent attitude to what is beyond our control.
This will mean that the good life involves having the right intentions (aiming at virtue) when we act, but being indifferent about the outcomes of those actions (when we can't control those outcomes).
Many emotional reactions are understood by the Stoics as based on errors of reason (e.g. anger, grief). Reasoning correctly and facing reality will disable these reactions.
Cf. the Stoic image of the dog and the cart: a dog tied to a moving cart can fight against it, trying to change direction and getting frustrated; or it can calmly accept its condition, moving voluntarily in the cart’s direction. So long as we aim at virtue and strive to live according to our rational nature we shall always enjoy Stoic tranquility regardless of our circumstances.
7. Problems with Stoicism
(1) The ‘inhumanity’ of the Stoic sage. Stoicism counsels that we should strive for virtue, living in accordance with nature; this means overcoming the disruptive force of our emotions through reason. We should remain indifferent towards that which we cannot change or that is simply part of the order of nature (suffering, pain, death, disaster).
Is this checking of emotion plausible? Even if it is possible, is it really more virtuous to shed no tears over the loss of a loved one, to remain indifferent to his or her death? Emotions too are part of being human. The Stoic sage seems lacking in moral sensitivity.
(2) Freedom in a deterministic universe. Stoic physics holds that nature is a rationally ordered system governed by eternal and immutable laws. We too are subject to the causal determinism in nature. How then can we freely choose the attitude that we take towards events? Surely our own propensity for or against Stoicism has natural causes beyond our control (genes, personality, socialisation, etc.). So why argue that it is the right way to live?
(3) Withdrawal from the world: the Stoic sage contemplates reality from the perspective of the cosmos as a whole (cf. Spinoza). From this ‘cosmic’ perspective it makes no difference whether I am emperor or slave, we are all capable of being rationally free and living virtuously.
Is it really more rational, though, to remain indifferent to social suffering, political strife, violent conflicts? Stoic morality seems to counsel a withdrawal from the human world in order to preserve our tranquility. Can I be happy in an unjust world?
(4) Problem of Evil: how can we explain evil and suffering if nature as a whole is fundamentally rational, perfect, and good? On the Stoic view, evil is an appearance that troubles us because we do not understand the true causes of events and are thus in discord with nature (and our own nature). In reality, evil does not exist; things appear evil to us because of our relative ignorance and our failure to adopt a rational, impartial standpoint on reality. Does this account for moral evil?
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 3:
de Botton, A. (2000). The Consolations of Philosophy. Hamish Hamilton, London, pp.80-92.
Cicero. (1988) (c. 45BCE). "On Goals". In Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, B. Inwood & L. P. Gerson (eds). Hackett, Indianapolis, pp. 146-153.
Epictetus. (1957) (c. 108 AD). The Moral Discourses of Epictetus, E. Carter (trans.). J.M. Dent and Sons, London, pp. 21-23; 29-31; 48-49.
Sharples, R. W. (1996). Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Routledge, New York, pp. 100-113
Reading Questions
de Botton: extract from The Consolations of Philosophy
1. What is the source of frustrations such as anger in life, according to Seneca? Can you think of your own examples of this occurring?
2. How does Seneca think we are to overcome these frustrations? What sort of adjustment is involved? What is the role of philosophy in this process?
3. What role does the recognition of 'Fortune' play for Seneca? What sort of effect do you think repeating the Senecan Præmeditatio (p. 91) would have on you?
Epictetus: extracts from The Moral Discourses of Epictetus
4. Epictetus draws a link between the idea that we are citizens of the world, rather than of particular places, and the idea that we are 'kindred to God'. How are these ideas connected? What is their significance in the Stoic view?
5. In what sense are we fettered by the needs of living and surviving? How does Epictetus think we should respond to these fetters?
6. What do dread and a tendency to flatter in some people result from, according to Epictetus? Does his discussion alter your perspective on dread and worry?
7. Epictetus tells us that one man cannot be "rendered unfortunate by another" (p.23). Why?
Epictetus proposes a particular view of freedom: "he is free to whom all happens agreeably to his choice, and whom no one can restrain" (p. 29).
8. How does freedom differ from unrestrained or random choice?
9. Why does Epictetus think of those who are in a situation against their will as already in prison?
10. What is Epictetus proposing we should do, in seeking freedom?
Cicero: extracts from 'On Goals'
Cicero describes the honourable and good life for the Stoics as "doing everything in order to acquire the primary natural things, even if we do not succeed" (B84.20, p148)
11. What are classed as 'the primary natural things'? Why is pleasure not among them?
12. Why does having a good life not require us to succeed in our attempts to acquire the primary natural things?
13. Cicero wrote, "Since the goal of the good life is to live consistently and in agreement with nature, it follows necessarily that all wise men always live happy, perfect, and fortunate lives" (85.26, p186). Does this follow? Why or why not? What does it mean to live in agreement with nature?
14. What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of the Stoic 'good life'? How would it compare with that endorsed by the Epicureans?
Sharples: extract from Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics
15. What claim do the Stoics make about virtue and happiness? How is it a stronger claim than those made by Plato or Aristotle?
16. The Stoics see virtue as involving living according to nature. What do they take our nature to aim at? What are the roles of instinct and reason?
17. What are 'preferred indifferents'? What sorts of things are preferred indifferents, and why?
18. The Stoics think that selection of the right ends is more important than obtaining those ends. Why is this?
19. Why does the Stoic sage come to realise that the things they thought were good in themselves are not in fact so? How is this a difference in attitude?
20. What aspects of the Stoic view of humans and the universe relate to the Stoic virtue of indifference? What sort of submission is required in Stoicism?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Explain the Stoic conception of happiness
• Understand the convergences and differences between Stoicism and Epicureanism.
• Understand the importance of ‘nature’ to the Stoics.
WEEK 4
Aristotle's Ethics
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 7 and 8.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 4 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 4.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes).
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 7: Aristotle on Happiness (Eudaimonia)
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 07.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 8: Aristotle on the virtues
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 08.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 7
Aristotle on Happiness (Eudaimonia)
Overview of Lecture:
1. Introduction to Aristotle's ethics
2. Conflicting views of Happiness
3. Aristotle on Happiness [Eudaimonia]
1. Introduction to Aristotle's ethics
Plato and Aristotle
in Raphael's
"School of Athens"
Perhaps we need a middle path between Epicurean hedonism and Stoic impassivity: happiness includes complex dimensions of our rational nature (more than just pursuing pleasure or striving for virtue).
This is the path pursued by Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. After Plato (and Socrates), Aristotle is one of the most influential philosophers in history; neo-Aristotelianism remains a live option in moral philosophy today.
The text of the Ethics is a set of lecture notes that Aristotle used in his teaching at the Lyceum, the school Aristotle established in Athens where he taught from 334-323 BC. Like the other Greek philosophers, the primary object of Aristotle's inquiry is to examine the nature of the good life: this will turn out to be a life of rational activities comprising a general state of well-being where we are also able to 'do well' in life. This is 'happiness' or Eudaimonia (faring well, doing well, living well). But what are our common ideas of happiness?
2. Conflicting Views of Happiness
(1) Agreement that the highest practical good is happiness (eudaimonia)
Aristotle observes that there is widespread agreement that happiness is the highest practical good. Remember that the Greek expression eudaimonia has different connotations from the English 'happiness'. Eudaimonia is more than just a fleeting state of mind; it means 'living well' / doing well, connoting both prosperity and right conduct.
(2) Disagreement over what happiness consists in
Aristotle remarks that common opinion is divided over what constitutes happiness. So how can we know what happiness is? If we focus on specific goods, we see that there are three chief 'ends' that our actions aim toward, defining three main types of life that we can lead: pleasure, honour, wealth.
(3) Common conceptions of the good life
a. Pleasure. A common idea but we have to ask why we pursue pleasure. Taking pleasure as our sole goal is to become enslaved to our desires.
b. Honour. Another common idea but unpredictable, erratic. Honour depends on those who confer it on us. Also, people seek honour in recognition of the good they have done (an achievement); so honour is not the source of an action's goodness (e.g. the athlete).
c. Wealth. Aristotle dismisses the individual solely dedicated to the accumulation of wealth because:
A. it does not allow for freedom of action (one is constrained by what has to be done in order to increase wealth).
B. 'it serves only as a means; i.e. for attaining something more important. What could this be?
Whatever we pursue, the ultimate the goal of all our actions is happiness [eudaimonia]. It is an intrinsic good (an end in itself), not just an instrumental good (a means to an end).
3. Aristotle's Conception of Happiness (Eudaimonia)
3a. Aristotle's argument for the primacy of happiness
Having eliminated competing versions of happiness, Aristotle presents his own account of what happiness really means:
1. Aristotle begins by reiterating that we always act with an aim in view; all of our actions aim at some good.
2. If that is the case, then all of our actions, taken together, must be aiming at a highest or chief good, that for the sake of which we are ultimately acting throughout our lives.
3. This highest good must be the most complete (it is pursued solely for its own sake); and it must be the most self-sufficient (once we've acquired it we lack for nothing; there is no way of 'increasing' it by the addition of further goods).
4. This highest good is therefore happiness [eudaimonia], the highest or chief good (i.e. most complete and self-sufficient) that we aim at in all of our actions in the course of a life.
This is a teleological argument (it assumes that there is a goal [telos] for any human action, and that the ultimate end or goal is the aim of all our actions throughout our lives).
Lecture 8
Aristotle on the virtues
Overview of Lecture:
Recap of last lecture
3. Aristotle on Happiness cont.
4. Aristotle on the Virtues
5. Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”
6. Questions for Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics
3b. Aristotle's Ergon Argument
How to give substance to this notion of happiness? Aristotle presents another argument to show that happiness is the highest good: the ‘ergon’ or function argument. It rests on the idea that human beings have a distinctive “function” [ergon] that will indicate what is the good life for us.
1. Every activity is defined by a certain function that allows us to describe it as “good” or not (e.g. the good musician is one who plays well, the good doctor one who heals, etc.).
2. Human beings too must have a characteristic function that allows us to define what is good for us (just as we have organs with specific functions that define them as working well or not). What is this distinctive human function?
3.
a. The fact of being alive? We share this with plants and animals (nutrition and growth).
b. The fact that we are sentient beings capable of perception? We share this too with animals, so that isn’t distinctive to us.
c. The life of rational activity? All our activities involve reason, acting according to a rational principle. This is distinctive to human beings; it is our definitive human function or ergon (we are rational animals).
4. So the best life will be a life of rational activities undertaken with the aim of achieving excellence. Hence Aristotle’s concluding definition of happiness:
“human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with excellence, and if there is more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete” (p. 1735).
Happiness or eudaimonia is a life of rational activities in which we cultivate our abilities or capacities. It is the pursuit of excellence or virtue in those activities we engage in within our community. It encompasses many meaningful pursuits in an individual’s life, from work, family, and friendship to politics, culture, and philosophy (the highest, of course!).
4. Aristotle on the Virtues
Having outlined (in book 1 of the Ethics) what happiness means, Aristotle then asks: What is it to be a good person? His answer (sketched in book 2) is that the good person is one who has the moral virtues or excellences of character.
N.B. Aristotle’s use of virtue [arete] does not mean being moralistic or prudish; it refers to cultivating excellent character traits—the ones I require in order to be an ethical individual.
Aristotle’s “ethical virtues” are desirable character traits that dispose a person to:
a. have the appropriate kinds of feeling or emotion in response to certain situations, and to
b. habitually act in the right way, over the course of a life.
An ethically virtuous person has the appropriate kinds of feelings towards the right objects or appropriate to the circumstances. I feel joy when appropriate (when a friend does well), but not when inappropriate (a friend’s misfortune).
The same is true of a person’s actions. To have an ethical virtue is to be habituated to acting appropriately in response to the demands of a situation. Having a virtue means having the right emotional response and conducting oneself in the right way.
To have the virtue of generosity is to be habitually disposed to give freely, as appropriate to the circumstances. Generosity is the mean between extremes of profligacy (giving away everything) and miserliness (giving away nothing).
5. Aristotle's "doctrine of the mean"
For Aristotle, ethical virtues are acquired or learned traits; we aren’t just born generous, trustworthy, responsible, courageous. We have to train ourselves into acquiring the virtues: they are integrated into my character by living a certain kind of life. I only become generous through performing repeated acts of generosity; once I become habituated to performing these acts, generosity becomes a settled character trait (‘second nature’).
Take courage. The courageous person has a settled character trait of being courageous, which falls between the extremes of being reckless and being cowardly. Or temperance (self-control): someone who gratifies himself to excess is intemperate (lacks self-control), but someone who avoids all pleasures is also inappropriate (a ‘boor’ or ‘wowser’).
We should therefore aim at the mean between extremes of action and feeling in given circumstances. This is the doctrine of the mean (sometimes called the “Golden Mean”).
But hitting the target (the mean) is not easy:
1. The ethical mean is relative to the person and the situation, depending on his/her capacities, needs, aims, and circumstances. Generosity depends upon my income, what need is being met, etc. Temperance depends upon individual temperament, circumstances, bodily constitution (e.g. alcohol).
2. The appropriate emotional response to a situation varies. A ‘mild’ response can be inappropriate (e.g. to a massacre). The right response is the one made at the right time, about the right thing, towards the right people, for the right end, in the right way. This requires sound practical judgment [phronesis]. The theory of the mean, moreover, does not always work. Not every action or feeling has an appropriate mean between extremes (e.g. envy or adultery/cheating).
3. Finally, emotion and action go together in exercising our ethical virtues. The ethically virtuous person enjoys doing the right thing in response to the circumstances. If I do the right thing under sufferance, I have not got excellence of character!
6. Questions for Aristotle's Virtue Ethics
We can question Aristotle’s ethics on a number of points:
1. Is there one defining function for human beings, hence one model of the good life? Couldn’t there be a plurality of versions of the good life, where different conceptions of happiness might be at stake? How would we decide between these?
2. How variable is the list of virtues that Aristotle lists? Do virtues depend on the culture or society in which one lives? Do some virtues have moral legitimacy across different cultures?
3. Does the notion of ethics as developing the appropriate virtues exhaust what we understand by morality? What about duty and obligation in Aristotelian ethics? What do we do when moral duty or obligation clashes with the pursuit of happiness? Cf. Kant’s moral universalism/moral duty.
This raises the question whether there is an objective basis for morality. Once we question whether there is one shared notion of the good, or of the good life, we have to ask: what provides the foundation for morality?
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 4:
Blackburn, S. (2001). Being Good. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 112-116.
Aristotle. (1984) (c. 350 BCE). "Nicomachean Ethics, Book I." In The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, J. Barnes (ed). Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 1729-1742.
Aristotle. (1999) (c. 350 BCE). "Nicomachean Ethics, Book II (with commentary)". In Morality and the Good Life, R. Solomon & J. Greene (eds). McGraw-Hill, Boston, pp. 82-95.
Reading Questions
Simon Blackburn, extract from Being Good, pp. 112-116
1. Why is there a difficulty in saying that the 'intended' or natural life for humans is a life of virtue?
2. How does Aristotle 'squeeze' these together, according to Blackburn? What considerations does he give in favour of the plausibility of doing so?
3. Why could it be thought implausible that the natural life for humans is a life of virtue? How does this relate to oppression in Blackburn's view?
4. How could an Aristotelian respond? Do you think the response is plausible?
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1
5. What is the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic goals? How does Aristotle use this distinction to argue that the pursuit of wealth, for example, cannot be central to the good life?
6. Why does Aristotle think that different kinds of enquiry admit of different degrees of precision? What implication does this have for ethics?
7. What does Aristotle mean by saying that happiness is a "complete" and "self sufficient" good? (p. 1734)
8. What does Aristotle mean by saying that happiness is a feature of "a complete life"? (p. 1735)
9. How does 'happiness' differ from 'pleasure' for Aristotle?
10. What is the function of a human being? How is determining the function of a human relevant to determining what constitutes the good life? What is good about the contemplative life?
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2
11. What is a virtue for Aristotle?
12. Does Aristotle consider a good action to be more virtuous when it is a struggle, or when it comes naturally? Why? Do you agree?
13. What does Aristotle mean by saying that virtuous habits are more analogous to the arts than to the senses?
14. Aristotle illustrates his idea of the good as the mean with examples from areas not directly related to ethics, such as exercise and the consumption of food and drink, where too much or too little can be harmful. Can you think of other examples?
15. Merely doing just and temperate things does not mean a person is just and temperate according to Aristotle, but doing just and temperate things may make a person more likely to become just and temperate. Why?
16. Some actions are bad in themselves, and not only when they are excessive or deficient. What examples does Aristotle give? Can you think of other examples?
17. What does Aristotle mean by saying that the mean itself is in one sense an extreme? (See for example his discussion of courage).
18. What differences can you think of between Aristotelian virtues and modern virtues?
19. On what grounds does Aristotle say that in particular cases one of the vices (either deficiency or excess) is to be preferred over the other? How do we determine which is the more dangerous vice?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Explain how Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia differs from the Stoic and Epicurean concepts of happiness
• Understand the qualities of life that lead to eudaimonia
• Understand the Aristotelian concept of ergon, and the relevance of the human ergon to the good life
• Explain Aristotle’s concept of virtue and how virtues are acquired, and give examples of qualities of character Aristotle would consider to be moral virtues.
• Explain Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”.
WEEK 5
Cultural Diversity and Moral Relativism
Lecturer: Dr Mianna Lotz
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 9 and 10.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 5 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 5.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 9:
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 09.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 10:
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 10.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 9
Overview of Lecture:
Unit so far: specific Ancient views of ethics
Later: modern theories of ethics.
Next 2 weeks: a taste of metaethics.
• This week: Explaining and examining the relativist challenge to normative ethics “…possibly the most absurd view…in moral philosophy”! – Bernard Williams
• What is moral relativism?
• Distinguishing descriptive from meta-ethical (and normative) moral relativism
• What are the possible insights and attractions of moral relativism?
1. Two cases to get us started…
Case (i): Austrian incest case (2009) Josef Fritzl found guilty of murder, rape, enslavement, coercion and incest after locking his daughter in his cellar for 24 years and fathering seven children by her.
Case (ii): “Death by starvation of ‘girl who did not exist’ stuns Germany”
Reported by telegraph.co.uk (6 March 2005)
Consider moral claim ‘P': Starving a child to death is morally wrong
Is ‘P’ true? What makes it true? What is the status/authority of ‘P’?
These are meta-ethical questions.
(Vs. a question like 'Ought I to starve my seven-year-old daughter to death?'= a normative ethical question).
2. Preliminary point: the role of moral theory
Two tasks for normative moral theory:
i. To provide a theory of value
ii. To provide an account/criterion of right action
Standard normative ethics:
• attempt to provide systematic answers to normative ethical questions
• search for fundamental general ethical principles, applicable to all moral cases
• posit ethical principles and views of the ultimate good/value, as true and universal
I.e. If X is good, then X is good for all people, at all times
3. Moral absolutism
(Also called ‘moral objectivism’, ‘moral universalism’)
Central claim: there are absolute right and wrong answers to moral questions – absolute in the sense that they are true or false, absolutely. Moral claims thus hold true or false independently of cultural context.
Examples:
• 18th century execution for petty theft
• Stoning for adultery
4. The relativist challenge to normative ethics
Key claims of moral relativism:
i. There are NO universal and absolute moral truths
ii. The truth or falsity of a moral claim depends upon whether that moral claim is regarded as true/false by the culture within which it is made
Example 1: Sami infanticide and geriatricide (in Rachels)
Example 2: Death begets death in Melanesia (in Benedict)
Example 3: Samurai practice of tsujigiri (in Midgley)
Cultural relativists: these are moral disagreements stemming from cultural differences (correct!)
5. Interpreting relativist claims of "good" and "bad"
What is "good" just is what is "socially approved" in a given culture.
Claim: “infanticide is morally unacceptable”
=
Claim: “infanticide is morally unacceptable within my culture.”
Claim is true for me (because true in my culture) but may be false for you (because false in your culture).
• A moral claim may be true relative to culture x, false relative to culture y
• I.e. Ruth Benedict: “morality is the convenient term for socially approved habits.”
6. Distinguishing 2 possible relativist claims
(a) Descriptive cultural relativism (not a metaethical position)
Key claim: as a matter of empirical fact, different societies have different moral codes. What is regarded to be morally right and wrong is relative to culture.
But note: You can be both a descriptive cultural relativist and a moral absolutist.
(b) Meta-ethical cultural relativism
Key claim: Not only do cultures differ in their perceptions of what is morally right/wrong, there is no such thing as culturally-independent moral truth. There are no possible non-relative, universal and objective moral grounds for assessing the rival moral claims of different cultures.
So culture determines: (1) what is believed to be good and bad; AND (2) what really is good and bad.
• “Culture is the truth-maker of moral claims”
• Example: Female Genital Mutilation (FGM): may be both right (in culture x) and wrong (in culture y)
7. Summary of main tenets
(modified from James Rachels, 1999, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill: 22-23)
1. Different societies have different moral codes (descriptive claim).
2. There is no objective (moral) standard that can be used to judge one societal moral code better than another (meta-ethical claim).
Implications:
i. The moral code of our own society has no special status (other than for us). It is merely one among many.
ii. There is no universal truth in ethics (i.e. no moral truths hold for all people at all times).
iii. The moral code of a society determines what really is right for that society. If an action is considered right by a society’s moral code, then it is right (for that society).
8. Normative implications of metaethical cultural relativism?
Two suggested normative claims (i.e. ‘ought’ statements):
David Wong calls this ‘normative moral relativism’: a doctrine about how we ought respond to moral diversity.
i. It is wrong to pass judgement on the practices of other cultures
Question: Is (i) an implication of meta-ethical cultural relativism? (Shouldn’t it be itself relativised?)
ii. We must be tolerant of cultural differences, even where we strongly disagree
Question: Is (ii) an implication of meta-ethical cultural relativism? (more next lecture)
9. Possible insights/attractions of ethical relativism
a. Starts from acknowledgment of reality of moral diversity
o Seems most plausible given impact of enculturation, socialisation, huge diversity of moral views?
o What is the likelihood that your moral beliefs track the culture-independent universal moral truth?
o Question: Does the fact of widespread moral diversity and disagreement entail anything about whether there is objective moral truth? Wong (Readings): "No"
b. Moral claims don’t seem like the sorts of things that can be objectively true or false
o Compare: "there is a table there". Question: Because truth isn't obvious does that mean there is no truth?
o Compare: “The sun is at the centre of the solar system”
NB: Moral relativists don't deny moral truth (unlike moral subjectivists, moral sceptics). They just mean something distinct and specific by “truth”.
c. Nervousness about implications of absolutism in ethics, and scepticism about the notion of ‘moral experts’.
d. Perception of entailment of ethics of tolerance
o Question: Can ethical relativism prescribe tolerance? Does ethical objectivism preclude tolerance? (more next lecture)
Lecture 10
Overview of Lecture:
Focus for today: Considering the main challenges to moral relativism
1. Recap/preliminary point: relativism and moral truth
Moral relativism does NOT deny the possibility of ‘truth’ (only the possibility of culture-independent, objective truth).
Recall moral cultural relativist claims:
• There is no culture-neutral (or culture-independent) truth about what is good or right.
• "Right" can only ever mean "right for this culture".
2. Six challenges to moral relativism
Objection 1: The relativist argument is structurally flawed/invalid
What makes for a good argument?
Two conditions:
1. The premise(s) must be true
2. The conclusion must follow from the premise(s)
Consider the moral relativist argument…
Premise: Different cultures have different moral beliefs/codes;
Conclusion: Therefore, there is no objective ‘truth’ in morality.
(Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.)
Problem: Meta-ethical relativists seem to argue from empirical facts (about cultural
differences) to metaethical conclusions (about nature/status of morality).
But this is logically problematic: this sort of conclusion can’t follow from that sort of premise (despite the truth of the premise). Why?
Example: Pre-Copernican/Galileian belief in geocentric universe vs. heliocentric
Example: (in Wong) Callations vs Greeks on disposal of dead. Did the fact that people disagreed entail that there could be no objective truth of the matter?
Key points:
1. The fact that something is believed to be true, does not in itself make it true.
2. The fact that people disagree about a matter, does not in itself mean that there is no objective truth of the matter.
3. Likewise: The fact that we all agree about a matter, does not in itself establish objective truth of the matter (we could all be wrong).
David Wong: “The mere existence of deep and wide disagreements in ethics, therefore, does not disprove the possibility that moral judgements can be objectively correct or incorrect…” (p 39).
Objection 2: Problems with defining ‘culture’
(noted also by Bernard Williams)
• What counts as ‘the cultural moral view’ regarding abortion, homosexuality, polygamy/polyandry, etc?
• Problems of demarcating cultures/sub-cultures.
• There are possible responses for the relativist: ways of demarcating cultures.
Objection 3: Moral relativism is ‘moral gagging’ or ’isolationism’
Alleged normative implication of relativism: that we can no longer criticise or condemn practices of other cultures/societies as wrong.
Problem: some practices just seem wrong, and should be criticised.
Midgley’s objection (readings): 'Moral relativism is moral isolationism'.
Furthermore, moral judgement/reasoning about what is ideal and acceptable is a human necessity.
Question for Midgley: Is it really the case that a moral relativist can make no moral judgements? What kind of moral judgment can a relativist make?
Objection 4: Moral relativism is mere conventionalism
Simple test for determining what is right or wrong: Is it in accordance with moral conventions or code of one's society?
Why think that’s a problem??
Do we like the implications? Consider examples: FGM, slavery, racism.
3 problems here:
• We want to be able to evaluate societal/social convention.
• We want to be able to have substantive moral argument about cultural practices.
• We want to acknowledge that dissenting views are not necessarily evidence of mere ignorance of social codes.
Objection 5: Moral relativism is excessively conservative
Idea of moral progress becomes problematic: but aren’t some changes genuinely “for the better”? E.g. abolition of slavery, prohibition on child labour, suffrage?
But by which moral standards may we judge new ways to be better than old?
Are moral reformers/revolutionaries simply making errors about society’s morals?
Can moral criticism only have the purpose of refining/making cultural practices consistent (rather than overhauling morality/cultural practice)?
Objection 6: No entailment of tolerance
Recall earlier assumption about the alleged normative implications of moral relativism:
If there are no objective moral facts, there is no neutral position from which to judge cultural practices as unacceptable. Therefore we may not pass judgement and must be tolerant.
Results in common assumption: That moral relativism requires tolerance.
But is tolerance an entailment of moral relativism?
The problem: This looks like a principle or requirement that is intended to be universal:
i.e. “We must always be tolerant of cultural differences” (a non-relative claim).
BUT: we cannot derive a non-relative moral principle (‘be tolerant’) from a meta-ethical position that claims there are no non-relative moral principles.
Thus, for a relativist, any requirement of toleration must itself be relativised.
Result: A general principle of tolerance could only be maintained by a meta-ethics that permits general, absolute, universal principles.
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 5:
Benedict, R. (1993) (original 1934). "A Defense of Moral Relativism". In Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life. Sommers & Sommers (eds.). Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, pp.160-167.
Midgley, M. (1993) (original 1981). "Trying Out One's New Sword". In Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life. Sommers & Sommers (eds.). Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, pp. 174-179.
Williams, B. (1976). Morality: an Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 34-39.
Wong, D. (1993). "Relativism". In A Companion to Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 442-450.
Reading Questions
Benedict: 'A Defence of Moral Relativism'
1. What does 'moral relativism' mean for Benedict?
2. What evidence does Benedict use in defence of moral relativism?
3. "Mankind has always preferred to say 'it is morally good' rather than 'it is habitual' ... But historically the two phrases are synonymous" (166) Do you agree? Why or why not?
4. Does relativism about what is normal in a society really amount to relativism about what is morally good? Explain how the distinction between descriptive and normative versions of moral relativism is relevant to Benedict's methodology.
5. According to Benedict, what is right or normal in a culture is just a selection from possible behaviour traits. Does she leave room for the possibility that some selections of behaviour traits would provide 'better' moralities than others?
Midgley: 'Trying Out One's New Sword'
6. What does Midgley mean by "moral isolationism"? What considerations and arguments are usually adduced in its defence?
7. Outline and evaluate Midgley's main objections to moral isolationism.
8. What are Midgley's grounds for claiming that "moral isolationism would lay down a general ban on moral reasoning"? Are you persuaded by Midgely's arguments? Why or why not?
9. Why does Midgley think that moral judgment, including judgment of the practices of other cultures, is inescapable and necessary? Is she right? Does her view lead to intolerance? Provide reasons for your answer.
10. Provide a reasoned evaluation -- positive or negative -- of the Samurai practice of 'trying out one's new sword'. If you feel you are not in a position to evaluate this practice, explain why not.
Williams: 'Relativism'
11. Williams acknowledges that the version of moral relativism he considers is the 'vulgar and unregenerate form'. What is his characterisation of the position? Do you think this is fair to relativists? How might the views of actual relativists differ from the view Williams outlines?
12. Why is the view as he characterises it "clearly inconsistent"?
13. What kind of moral relativism is the position Williams describes? (i.e. Descriptive, normative, meta-ethical?)
14. What problem does William note with the definition of what counts as a 'society'? What does he take to be the genuinely interesting claim that could be investigated about the relationship between a society and its values?
15. What does it mean to say that what is right for a given society is to be understood in a functionalist sense?
16. What point does Williams make with reference to Bernal de Diaz's account of the visit to the Aztec sacrificial temples?
Wong: 'Relativism'
17. What is the 'argument from diversity'? Why, according to Wong, does that argument not support moral relativism "in any simple or direct way"? How does this relate to the distinction between descriptive and normative relativism?
18. What sort of argument does Wong think would best support moral relativism? What example does he give?
19. What "two universal human needs" does morality serve?
20. Is it consistent with the relativism Wong describes that some moralities are better than others? Why or why not?
21. Some people have argued that moral relativism is not tenable because a person's commitment to his or her moral beliefs (and the commitment to act on them) relies on perceiving them as corresponding to the one true morality. What is Wong's response to this objection?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material, in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Define moral relativism
• Understand the motivation behind relativism
• Distinguish between cultural, meta-ethical and normative relativism
• Understand the main challenges to moral relativism
WEEK 6
Why be moral? Egoism and Self Interest Theories
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 11 and 12.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 6 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 6.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 11: Egoism and the Social Contract
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 11.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 12: Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 12.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 11
Egoism and the Social Contract
Overview of Lecture:
1. Introduction: Plato's story of the Ring of Gyges
2. Egoism as a psychological theory
3. Does egoism entail that we are always motivated by desire for pleasure?
4. Hedonistic psychological egoism
5. Objections to psychological egoism
6. Alternative: Broad psychological egoism
7. Why might egoism (of either kind) be believed to be true?
8. Three objections to psychological egoism
9. Insights of psychological egoism?
1. Introduction: Plato’s story of the Ring of Gyges (From Plato’s Republic, Bk 1)
Two claims made by Plato’s character, Glaucon:
• If people could get away with wrongdoing, there would be no motivation to act morally.
• The undetected immoral/unjust person would be happier than the moral/just person.
Central questions for us:
• Plausibility: Are we primarily motivated by self-interest?
• If so, can morality be reconciled with self-interest?
• If morality requires us to be impartial (and other-regarding), but we are self-interested, how can we be moral?
• Why should I act morally if I can get away with acting immorally? (the ‘free-rider’ problem – next lecture)
2. Egoism as a psychological theory
(‘Psychological Egoism’)
Psychological egoism is a widely-accepted empirical thesis about human nature/ psychology. Claims:
• It is human nature to look out for/protect/promote own interests/ welfare/ happiness.
• We always act selfishly or in our own self-interest.
• Altruism is a therefore an unreasonable demand.
• We are incapable of pure altruism.
Famous 17th Century proponent:
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
3. Does egoism entail that we are always motivated by a desire for pleasure?
Not necessarily. Two versions of psychological egoism:
1. Hedonistic psychological egoism
2. Broad psychological egoism
4. Hedonistic psychological egoism
Central claim:
Human motives are self-interested AND driven by the desire for pleasure and/or pain avoidance.
Argument in support:
1. When we do what we want, or get what we want, we feel pleasure (e.g. graduation).
2. This shows it is desire for pleasure that drives all of our actions.
A convincing argument?
Consider 3 problems with Hedonistic Psychological egoism…
5. Objections to hedonistic psychological egoism
Problem 1:
That we get pleasure as a consequence of doing or getting what we want, does not establish that pleasure must be our motivation. What motivates us is the end or goal we seek.
Thought experiment: Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ (Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974: 43.) Question: Would you plug in for life? Consider:
• Is it only the experience of doing an activity we value, or the activity itself?
• Is it living a life? Being a person?
• Is it reality? (Does it matter)?
Upshot: IF we were purely motivated by pleasure, there’d be nothing objectionable about hooking up for life. If we think there is, we can’t be purely motivated by pleasure.
Problem 2:
It seems we AREable (and willing) to sacrifice pleasure, even our own individual interests, to achieve ends that are important to us. Hedonistic psychological egoism seems to conflict with empirical observations of human behaviour and motivation.
Examples: War/soldiering? Political acts of self-sacrifice?
Can these be explained by motive of pleasure?
Problem 3: The paradox of hedonism
Seeking pleasure/happiness for its own sake reduces likelihood that we will experience it.
Example: Friendship — delivers pleasure when pursued as a means/instrument for attaining pleasure/happiness? Or only when pursued as a good in itself?
Shows: Pleasure/happiness are properly understood as by-products of valuing projects as ends in themselves.
Overall conclusion: These problems undermine the plausibility of hedonistic psychological egoism.
6. Alternative: Broad Psychological Egoism
Central claim: Human motives are fundamentally self-regarding.
BUT are not driven by, or aimed exclusively at, pleasure.
That is, broad psychological egoism uses a broader account of ‘self-interest’ as preference satisfaction. We are always motivated to satisfy our own preferences (whatever they are for). Hence we are always ‘selfish’.
7. Why might egoism (of either kind) be believed to be true?
One answer: Re-interpretability of all motives.
While we may not seem constantly selfish, deeper analysis reveals self-interestedness of motives. All our apparently altruistic/benevolent actions can be accurately reinterpreted as aimed at:
• Rewards in an afterlife
• Atonement/forgiveness
• Praise/recognition, etc.
• Feeling good (Consider Hobbes’ thoughts on: charity, pity?).
Question: Even if it is possible to reinterpret all motives, does that make the reinterpretations correct?
8. Three objections to psychological egoism
(For these and others see Feinberg)
Objection 1: Psychological egoism conflates ‘self-motivated’ with ‘selfish’
Everything we do (even apparently ‘unselfish’ acts), we do because we desire to. But, being motivated by one’s own desires (i.e. acting voluntarily) does not establish that one is selfish. Why not? 4 reasons…
a. It’s a tautology (an empty truth):
Every voluntary action I perform results from my own motivations and desires. That’s what makes it my action. This shows only that it is my action, not that it is selfish action. “Selfish” isn’t synonymous with “self-motivated”.
b. We shouldn’t confuse origin with content of motives:
Whether desires/goals (e.g. donate to charity) are selfish depends on their content, not on where they come from: is my goal/motive to make myself happy? (= self-regarding, selfish). Or to make someone else happy? (= other-regarding, unselfish). Isn’t the fact that I desire to give to charity, what makes me unselfish?
c. We shouldn’t confuse consequences with aims/objectives:
That I gain pleasure/happiness from an action (if true) does not prove that I sought pleasure/happiness when I acted. Feinberg’s examples: bath-taking, piglet-saving. So: What satisfaction/peace of mind from such actions actually shows = a pre-existing desire for good of another.
d. “Selfish” should be retained as a distinctly moral concept:
Denotes prioritizing own comfort, advantage, etc., in disregard of, or at expense of, others. It is a term that serves a moral function/purpose: implying blameworthiness. We need distinctions between self-initiated/voluntary, and selfish. We can be self-interested without being selfish (e.g. family commitment?)
Objection 2: Self-interest doesn’t matter morally. It is outcomes of action, not motives, that matter
Example: giving 5% of income to charity (doesn’t matter why you give, just that you give).
Possible replies:
• Motives are not irrelevant: can be useful/informative
• E.g. for prediction, persuasion
• Motives may be more important in morality than outcomes/consequences (this was Immanuel Kant’s view – next week)
Objection 3: Psychological egoism is unfalsifiable
As an empirical thesis, it should be able to be proved true or false. Two requirements: (i) evidence/verifiability; (ii) theoretical falsifiability.
Problem: if all motives can be reinterpreted as self-interested, theory is unfalsifiable: we can find no clear, conceivable counter-examples. Recall question: does re-interpretability prove the truth of the ‘self-interest’ interpretation?
9. Insights of psychological egoism?
• Sometimes (maybe often?) our action is motivated by self-interest, maybe disguised as altruism.
• We are always inclined to at least consider our own interests.
• BUT we can sometimes discount our own interests in our goals/actions.
• There is more to human behaviour and action than self-interestedness.
Next Lecture:
• Assuming (for sake of argument) that there is some truth to psychological egoism, what does that mean for morality?
• Can we reconcile egoism and morality? Two options:
1. Ethical (normative) egoism
2. Social contract theory
Lecture 12
Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory
Central questions:
• Can morality be reconciled with self-interest?
• If morality at least sometimes requires us to be impartial (and other-regarding), can we be moral?
• If we can be moral, why should I act morally if I could get away with acting
immorally?
• The ‘free-rider’ problem in ethics.
1. Apparent conflict: morality vs. self-interest
Rachels’ ‘minimum’ conception of morality: at the very least, morality requires us to:
• take interests of others into account;
• avoid causing harm to others;
• show respect and help others whenever possible;
• be prepared to forego some advantages to ourselves, for sake of others;
• behave unselfishly at times.
But this implies:
1. we need to be capable of acting altruistically;
2. we ought sometimes act altruistically.
Is morality compatible with psychological egoism? Two possibilities…
2. ‘Ethical egoism’: A normative theory
Prescribing self-interest as proper motive for action (i.e. we ought to pursue our self-interest). Arguments for ethical egoism include:
a. Altruism is demeaning: why? (E.g. Nietzsche)
b. Acting selfishly creates a better world (a consequentialist justification).
1. epistemological reason: individuals are best placed to know their own best interests.
2. moral reason: helping others causes dependency (itself a harm).
3. Arguments against Ethical egoism
1. It cannot be generalized. It’s in your self-interest to be selfish while everyone else is altruistic (i.e. individual ethical egoism). It is self-defeating as a universal doctrine: the egoist can only successfully pursue her own interests where others are not single-mindedly doing the same.
2. It cannot provide impartial resolutions to moral conflict.
3. It is morally arbitrary: why should my interests count for more?
4. It presupposes a world of indifferent strangers, insensitive to each other’s suffering.
5. It is incompatible with ordinary notions of friendship/love.
4. Insights of ethical egoism:
1. A measure of self-interest is important: ethics should not deny its significance.
2. Self-love is important, even a virtue (but not the only one).
3. Egoism at expense of others, and altruism at expense of the self, are both undesirable.
Nevertheless, we have good reasons not to ground normative/prescriptive ethics in self-interest.
Challenge: If self-interestedness is part of human nature, how can it be reconciled with morality?
5. Alternative: Social Contract Theory
Claim: humans are self-interested, but morality actually serves our rational self-interest.
Influential advocate: 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes [1588-1679] (in Leviathan).
The question: why should we agree to be bound by moral rules, if we are fundamentally self-interested?
Hobbes’ answer:
Morality is the solution to practical problem arising for self-interested human beings:
• We desire to live well, but cannot flourish without a peaceful, cooperative social order, requiring rules (including moral rules).
• The alternative is a ‘State of Nature’: people living in continual fear/danger of violent death. In such conditions “…the life of man [would be] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” (Hobbes p. 54)
• No ‘civil society’ (i.e. no industry, agriculture, commodity-exchange, shared knowledge, arts, etc).
The ‘State of nature’ arises due to 4 facts about conditions of human life:
1. Essential quality of human need
2. Scarcity of resources
3. Essential equality of human power (by force or cunning)
4. Reality of limited altruism - even if not wholly selfish, people care much for themselves, and you cannot assume that others will set aside their interests for yours.
Result: “…a constant state of war, of one with all, that no-one can hope to win.” (Hobbes)
It is a reasonable response to: seize what you can, defend it from attack, aggression towards others.
6. Solution: A social contract – co-operation to produce/distribute essential goods
Imposes key requirements:
a. Guarantee that people will not harm one another;
b. Possibility of reliance on others to keep their agreements in division of labour.
For Hobbes:
• entails the need for a State, with system of laws & power to enforce
• creates conditions in which altruism becomes possible (Rousseau: we become different kinds of beings).
7. Summing up Social Contract theory:
Our self-interest is best served by existence of morality/moral codes and laws to enforce such codes. It is therefore rational for us to forfeit our ‘natural liberty’ in favour of moral codes/norms, so long as everyone else abides also. It is rational because we are advantaged, we gain from it.
Return to Hobbes’ questions…
• Why should I be moral?
Out of fear!
• Why should I be moral if I could further my own interests without detection and consequence? I.e. why should I not be a “free rider”?
Attempted explanation by analogy: The ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (see Rachels p.147ff)
8. The thought experiment:
Suppose you live in a totalitarian society, and one day, to your astonishment, you are arrested and charged with treason. The police say you have been plotting against the government with a man named Smith, who has also been arrested and is being held in a separate cell. The interrogator demands that you confess. You protest your innocence, you don’t even know Smith. But this does no good. It soon becomes clear that your captors are not interested in the truth; for reasons of their own, they merely want to convict someone. It becomes clear that you have the following options:
The ‘deal’ (your options):
1. If Smith doesn’t confess, but you confess and testify against Smith, you will be released. Smith will get 10 years.
2. If Smith confesses and you do not, he will go free and you will get 10 years.
3. If you both confess, you will each get 5 years.
4. If neither of you confess, there won’t be enough evidence to convict either of you. They will hold you for 1 year, and then release you. Smith is offered the same deal, but you have no way of knowing what he’ll decide.
The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’
| |You confess |You do not confess |
|Smith does not confess |Smith: 10 years, |Smith: 1 year, |
| |You: 0 years |You: 1 year |
|Smith does confess |Smith: 5 years, |Smith: 0 years, |
| |You: 5 years |You: 10 years |
What should you do?
One reasoning process:
1. 1st thought: Don’t confess (you’re innocent!). Risk: if Smith confesses, and you don’t, you’ll get 10 years.
2. 2nd thought: You should confess: If Smith doesn’t confess, you’ll go free (he’ll get 10!). This would maximize your self-interest.
3. REALISATION: Smith is also self-interested. If you both try to maximize your own interests, you’ll both decide to confess, and this NOT the best outcome overall (5 years each!)
4. Conclusion: YOU SHOULD NOT CONFESS (even though that is not in your very best possible interest).
The ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ suggests:
• Co-operation yields a better result (even if not the individually best possible outcome).
• It can be compatible with your own interests to consider others, abide by common set of values, i.e. morality.
• Attempting to exclusively maximize your own good will not produce best outcome. Overall best outcome results when every individual does not seek to maximize own interests
• Indeed, if everyone sought to maximize own self-interest the worst possible overall outcome will result and perhaps a ‘state of nature’).
• If only some pursue their own self-interest, we have morality with ‘free riders’
9. Strengths of Social Contract theory:
(See Rachels for full discussion)
It can explain:
1. Which moral rules we should regard ourselves as bound by, and how they are justified;
2. Why it is reasonable/rational for us to follow moral rules (we all benefit);
3. Idea of reciprocity (others are bound since they receive same benefits from living in society/contract);
4. Why punishment of non-abiders is justified (they violate agreement, seek to ‘free ride’ on goodness of others);
5. When we may break rules/laws (if others violate agreement; if laws don’t distribute benefits/burdens equally).
10. Challenges for you to consider:
• What about those moral obligations not plausibly described as arising from a social contract?
• Social Contract theory imposes duties/obligations on persons capable of voluntary agreement. What about our obligations towards those who can’t voluntarily participate? E.g. non-human animals, infants, children, mentally impaired, others who can’t be held responsible for their actions.
• Has Social Contract theory really explained why we should not ‘free ride’ (if we knew we could get away with it). Any Social Contract appears able to withstand some free-riding. Why, then, should I never free-ride?
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 6:
Plato. (1993) (c. 375 BCE). "The Ring of Gyges". In Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, Sommers & Sommers (eds.). Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, pp. 445- 450.
Rachels, J. (1999). The Elements of Moral Philosophy. McGraw-Hill, Boston, pp. 143-161.
Feinberg, J. (1995). "Psychological Egoism". In Ethical Theory, L. P. Pojman (ed.). Wadsworth, Belmont, pp. 62-73.
Hobbes, T. (1995) (1651). "The Leviathan". In Ethical Theory, L. P. Pojman (ed.). Wadsworth, Belmont, pp.53-61.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books, New York, pp. 42-45.
Reading Questions
Plato: 'The Ring of Gyges' from The Republic
1. Explain Glaucon's account of the origin of justice and the conclusions he draws from it about why people act justly or unjustly.
2. What role does the story of Gyges play in Glaucon's argument?
3. What reasons does Glaucon offer to support his claim that, provided it is possible to get away with injustice, the unjust person is happier and more esteemed than the just person? Are these reasons persuasive? If it were possible to get away with injustice, would there be any reason for acting justly?
4. Does Glaucon's view of justice undermine morality? Provide reasons for your answer.
5. How would you argue against a view like Glaucon's?
Feinberg: 'Psychological Egoism'
6. What is psychological egoism? How is it distinguished from ethical egoism? Is it descriptive or normative? What is psychological egoistic hedonism?
7. Explain the distinction between a selfish action, and one that arises out of one's own desires and motivations.
8. Explain the role of the story about Lincoln on p.72. Do you think it supports the egoist's case, or Feinberg's? Why?
9. What is the point of the story about Jones on p.74? What is the paradox of hedonism?
10. What two senses of 'pleasure' does Feinberg distinguish? On what grounds does he argue (contrary to psychological hedonism) that the sole motivation for action cannot be either of these forms of pleasure?
11. Why, according to Feinberg, should one's voluntary actions not be identified with selfish actions? Under what conditions should an action be considered selfish?
12. Think of examples of the sorts of actions that would normally be considered benevolent. In each case, can you think of a way the psychological egoist could describe the action in such a way that it can be seen to have arisen from selfish motives?
Can you think of any actions (real or imagined) that could not be so described by the egoist ? i.e. could there be actions that are purely benevolent, out of which the agent could not expect to gain anything at all? If not, what does this say about the theory of psychological egoism?
13. Explain Feinberg's argument for the conclusion that psychological egoism is not an empirical hypothesis, since it is not falsifiable in principle.
Hobbes: extracts from Leviathan
14. Why, according to Hobbes, is war inevitable if there is no common power to which all people are subject? What are the conditions existing in the state of nature that make war inevitable?
15. Why is the state of war of every man against every man not unjust in the state of nature?
16. What, according to Hobbes, is a 'law of nature'?
17. Why would someone agree to give up rights by agreeing to a social contract?
18. Why is government necessary?
19. Does Hobbes think the state of nature was ever a real state of the world? In what situations might such a state occur at a more local level?
20. Why, according to Hobbes, can some animals (e.g. bees) live harmoniously without enforcement of a contract, but humans cannot?
21. Why is altruism possible in a governed society, but not in the state of nature?
Rachels: 'The Idea of a Social Contract'
22. What are the two main kinds of argument Rachels identifies that could be used to support a social contract theory?
23. Under what circumstances would a situation analogous to the "prisoner's dilemma" arise? Can you think of any examples of how this might occur in real life?
24. How does a morality based on a social contract theory provide a way out of the prisoner's dilemma?
25. Rachels suggests that there are some rules of contemporary morality to which we would not be bound by a social contract morality. What are Rachels' examples? Why would these not be immoral according to a social contract theory? Can you think of any other examples?
26. How is punishment justified on a social contract theory?
27. Why does a social contract theory not demand supererogatory actions? For example, why would you not be obliged to sacrifice your own life to save five others?
28. What account can a social contract theorist give of civil disobedience?
29. Do you think it matters that the 'contract' is a fiction? Why or why not?
30. Why do social contract theories have a problem with animals and with mentally impaired humans? Do you think this objection is decisive (as Rachels seems to)? Why or why not?
Nozick: The Experience Machine
31. In what sense would the experience machine be inferior to real life? Why?
32. Nozick thinks that "Plugging into the machine is a kind of suicide". Why?
33. How does the story of the experience machine constitute an argument against utilitarianism? To which form of utilitarianism is it most relevant?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Understand the problems about morality and self-interest raised by Plato’s story of the ring of Gyges
• Distinguish between the descriptive thesis of psychological egoism, and the normative thesis of ethical egoism
• Distinguish between the hedonistic and broad forms of psychological egoism, and understand the objections to each
• Understand the moral theories that may arise out of psychological egoism: ethical egoism and social contract theory, and the objections to each.
WEEK 7
Kant's Ethics
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 13 and 14.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 7 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 7.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 13
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 13.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 14
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 14.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 13
Overview of Lecture:
1. Kant's central aims
2. Two key tenets in Kant's ethics
3. Kant on the evaluation of moral acts
4. The Categorical Imperative (The 'Moral Law')
5. Two formulations of Kant's Categorical Imperative (CI)
6. The CI allows for three kinds of moral assessment
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
• Influential late 18th century German philosopher
• Major contribution to moral philosophy contained in 3 main works:
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785);
Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy (1787);
Metaphysics of Morals (1789).
1. Kant’s central aims:
1. To provide an account or theory of the moral rightness of action (a theory of how we should determine when an act is right/wrong).
2. To provide a theory of the moral worth of action (a theory of how we should determine when a person is morally good).
Kant was a deontologist: Primarily concerned with determining which kinds of actions are required or prohibited as a matter of moral duty. That is, NOT a focus on the outcomes of action (vs. utilitarians – next week).
2. Two key tenets in Kant’s ethics
(a) Central role of reason in ethics
• Human reason as the source of moral law, and of our capacity to be autonomous.
• I.e. Practical reason: employment of reason in sphere of moral deliberation and action.
• Moral duties to be identified by rational, free persons through purely abstract process of reason – as opposed to through experience, relationship, affection (i.e. matters ‘empirical’ or ‘anthropological’).
Why was reason so central for Kant?…
(b) Intrinsic worth (‘dignity’) of human beings
Supreme value of human being based on:
1. possession of self-conscious desires and goals;
2. possession of rationality.
Generates: duty to respect rationality of persons, to regard human beings as ends-in-themselves, never solely as means to our ends (regardless of how good the consequences).
Kant’s examples: the false-promise maker; the ‘inquiring murderer’ (discussed in his essay ‘On the Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives’ in Critique of Practical Reasoning and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy)
3. Kant on the evaluation of moral acts
Three key points:
(i) Evaluating action involves evaluating the principles (‘maxims’) upon which the agent would be acting.
(Note: The moral evaluation of agents is a distinct matter for Kant. It possible to do the right action without being a morally good person. More next lecture.)
How to evaluate maxims? ! Kant devised a test of the universalisability of our actions and motives (the ‘Categorical Imperative’ – more shortly).
(ii) Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives
Kant recognized 2 kinds of moral ‘imperatives’ (‘oughts’/ ‘shoulds’)
a. Hypothetical imperatives:
o Stipulate what we ought to do in order to achieve a desired result / end.
o The action enjoined will be instrumental: i.e. a means to an end / goal that you have.
o The binding force of these obligations depends upon you having the relevant particular desires.
o So only binding on those agents with the given goal / end.
o E.g., getting up at 5am to catch early train.
b. Categorical imperatives:
o Stipulate how one must act irrespective of one’s ends / goals / desires.
o Are binding on all agents in like circumstances.
o Are binding on all rational agents because of their rationality (i.e. every rational person must accept them).
o Can be worked out wholly a priori (independent of experience/ empirical investigation), are formal truths of reason (‘Moral Laws’).
KEY POINT: For Kant, moral imperatives/duties are ALWAYS categorical: apply to everyone, universally.
(iii) Universality and impartiality of moral rules
• By definition, moral rules admit of NO exceptions (for persons or circumstances).
• Follow from rational requirements of consistency and generalisability.
• Being a moral agent means guiding one’s conduct by ‘universal [moral] laws’.
• One cannot regard oneself as special from a moral point of view.
4. The Categorical Imperative (‘The Moral Law’)
The ‘universalisability test’ for proposed action:
1. Turn the intention or motive for action into a rule for yourself (a ‘maxim’);
2. Universalize the maxim;
3. Test: Does maxim make sense universalized?
Revisit examples: false-promise making; lying. Test shows both are self-defeating if universalized.
Key question: Can our intention (maxim) be acted on by everyone, universally?
If yes, action is morally permissible
5. Two formulations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI)
First formulation
Kant’s first formulation (‘Formula of the Universal Law of Nature’): A test of our subjective motives.
‘Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’
Recap:
1. Express intended action as rule (“maxim”) for yourself;
2. Universalise the rule;
3. Test: Can you will it to be a rule for yourself and for everyone else at the same time?
Example: Linda & John and the marriage vows.
Linda is marrying John, but intends to be unfaithful to him once she has earned his trust (a species of false promise-making).
Problem: Universalisation of proposed intention would involve a ‘contradiction in the will’: Linda can intend/will the proposed action only on condition that such actions are not universally willed (and performed). This shows Linda’s proposed action cannot be universalized, and is, therefore, wrong.
Second formulation: more next lecture.
6. CI allows for 3 kinds of moral assessment
An action (X) can be shown to be:
1. ‘permissible’: if it passes CI test (i.e. can be universalized without contradiction).
Examples: telling the truth; cleaning teeth.
2. ‘impermissible’: if it contravenes CI (cannot be universalized without contradiction.
Examples: lying; false promising.
3. ‘obligatory’: if failing to do X would contravene CI.
Example: truth-telling.
(Plus ‘supererogatory’: acts that are beyond the requirements of duty.)
Next lecture:
• Autonomy and the 2nd formulation of the CI
• Kant on evaluation of agents
• Influential criticisms of Kant’s ethics
Lecture 14
So, can you lie to save your friend?
Overview of Lecture:
1. Brief recap of last lecture
2. Autonomy and the second formulation of the CI
3. Kant on the moral worth of actions
4. Five challenges to Kant’s ethics
1. Recap: 3 kinds of moral assessment
An action (X) can be shown to be:
• Permissible: if it passes CI test (i.e. can be universalised without contradiction).
• Impermissible: if it contravenes CI (i.e. cannot be universalised without contradiction).
• Obligatory: if failing to do X would contravene CI.
• Kant’s ethics also allow for the category of supererogatory acts: acts that go beyond the requirements of duty.
2. Autonomy and the second formulation of CI
Recall Kant’s concern for freedom and respect for autonomy of rational human beings. Kant’s second formulation of the CI (the ‘Humanity Formula’):
‘Act so that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’
Respect for autonomy entails the key question: Is the proposed action consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself? (See Groundwork: 35)
3. Kant on evaluation of moral agents (and the moral worth of actions)
Recall:
• Kant's ethics distinguishes between right acts and acts that have moral worth
• Result: Not all right actions have moral worth.
• What did Kant mean and why did he think that?
(i) Kant on motive of duty
Kant argued that for acts to have moral worth, they must be performed with the right motives: namely, the motive of duty. To be a good person is to have ‘a good will’:
• To act from the motive of duty;
• To act because you see that the action is your duty, is morally required.
We are required to act from duty, not just in accordance with duty.
Examples of right actions that lack moral worth (they act only in accordance with duty):
• Honest but self-interested shopkeeper
• Fading pop / TV star
So: An action may be right (because universalisable) without having moral worth, because…
a. You did not universalise it - its universalisability did not figure in your deliberations or supply your motivation to act.
b. Hence you are not motivated by the sense of duty.
In such cases the rightness of an action can be seen to be accidental or fortuitous.
(ii) Motive of duty is both necessary and sufficient for being a good person
What this means…
a. You MUST be motivated by duty in order to be a good person (motive of duty is necessary)
b. Being motivated by duty is ALL THAT IS NEEDED in order to be a good person (motive of duty is sufficient)
(iii) Reminder: How do we work out what we have a duty to do?
Use Categorical Imperative (‘test of universalisability’) to see which actions are obligatory. If failing to perform a proposed action would contravene the Categorical Imperative (i.e. NOT performing the action cannot be universalised) then we have a duty to perform the action, the action is obligatory. Example: honesty.
(iv) Different ways in which we might be unable to will that a maxim be universalised
Willing the universalisation of the maxim might be:
• Logically impossible (a logical contradiction), e.g. lying.
• Incompatible with laws of nature (a scientific contradiction).
• In conflict with our other desires (a psychological contradiction in the will - see James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy). E.g., refusing to give to charity to help the needy.
• Recap: Some actions that can be willed without contradiction: teeth cleaning, truth telling, promise keeping, helping the needy.
4. Five challenges to Kant’s ethics
Challenge 1: Why think we should we be motivated only by duty?
Why can’t inclinations (e.g. of kindness or love) give moral worth to actions, according to Kant? E.g. helping elderly cross street, visiting sick friend in hospital
Possible Kantian explanations:
1. Inclinations are (typically/essentially) egoistic?
2. Inclinations are beyond choice and control?
3. Inclinations only issue in right action as a matter of accident or circumstance.
Challenge 2. What if moral duties conflict?
Possible example: Inquiring Murderer. Did Kant have a solution? Two suggestions:
(i) We could make maxims more specific? E.g. “One ought always to lie to inquiring axe murderers”. But Kant foresaw 2 possible problems:
a. Making too many exceptions, would conflict with generality & impartiality of moral rules.
b. How to decide which sorts of conditions warrant making exceptions? How to distinguish desirable/undesirable exceptions?
James Rachels’ suggestion: universalisability test for exceptions?
I.e. Kant’s distinction between:
Perfect duties (to ourselves, to others):
• are ‘complete’ – i.e. it’s possible for us to fulfil these duties to all others, all the time. Hold for all agents in all actions with all possible others.
• E.g. Duty to refrain from false promising, coercion, violence
Imperfect duties (to ourselves, to others):
• Not ‘complete’ i.e. it’s not possible to fulfil these duties to all others, in all our actions, all the time.
• E.g., Duty to help those in need, to contribute to the happiness of others, to develop one’s talents
So we ask: Is one of the conflicting duties a perfect duty?
(ii) We could rank the duties?
Challenge 3: Is motive of duty really necessary for being a good person?
Can you not be a good person without motive of duty? Possible counter-examples: Aren’t these ‘good’ people?
1. Person who produces good consequences?
2. Naturally good (kind-hearted) person?
Reasons why Kant might object:
1. Consequences/circumstances are fickle, unreliable.
2. Naturally kind-hearted person is unreliable; Emotions are too partial; Natural kindness is not chosen but result of genetics/social conditioning, so agents themselves cannot be given credit. [NB: kindness is compatible with being a moral person, but not sufficient.]
Do you agree? Are such people counter-examples? Is moral maturity demonstrated by not needing to think about duties?
Challenge 4: Is motive of duty really sufficient for being a morally good person?
Aren’t there people who act out of duty but who we don't think are morally good? E.g.: dutiful hospital visitor; dutifully honest friend who tells you the awful truth. The Kantian moral agent seems cold/detached. Sometimes we think morality requires that we be moved by certain inclinations/emotions. !Seems to suggest duty is not always enough for morality…?
A possible Kantian response: Morality can demand action; but can’t demand emotions/feeling.
Challenge 5: Two objections from a competing moral perspective (consequentialism)
1. Contra Kant, consequences are not irrelevant to moral rightness/wrongness of action.
If one lie could save 1000 people…?
2. In fact, Kant's ethics are too minimal
Doesn’t Kant demand too little of us? That is he tells us: don’t kill (even yourself); don’t make false promises; develop your talents; help others where you can (from Metaphysics of Morals). But perhaps rather than simply ensuring we fulfil our duties (e.g. don’t tell lies), we should try instead to produces the best overall outcomes we can (e.g. attempt to save our friends from murderers).
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 7:
Kant, I. (1998) (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor (trans.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 49-60.
Kant, I. (1993) (1785).Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, James W. Ellington (trans). Hackett, Indianapolis, pp. 30-41.
Kant, I. (1994). "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 280-281.
O'Neill, O. (1991). "Kantian Ethics". In A Companion to Ethics, P Singer (ed.). Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 175-185.
Reading Questions
Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (section 1)
1. Why is a good will the only thing that can be good absolutely?
2. What is the distinction between actions in conformity with duty and action from duty?
3. Why does Kant say that a beneficent man who enjoys spreading happiness should be encouraged, but not esteemed for his actions? How does Kant's view differ from Aristotle's on this issue? What do you think is the correct moral response to such actions?
4. What is the relationship between duty and the good will?
5. Kant's categorical imperative, in one well-known formulation, is: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law of nature". Use an example to show how this could be applied in deciding on a course of moral action.
Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (section 2)
6. Kant says "the will is nothing but practical reason" (412). What does he mean by this? What is practical reason, as opposed to theoretical reason?
7. Explain Kant's distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives.
8. What does Kant mean by saying that an apparently categorical imperative, against making false promises, for example, could actually be "covertly hypothetical" (419)? What implication does this have for the empirical study of the possibility of categorical imperatives? (i.e. can we tell empirically whether the imperative behind a particular action was categorical?)
9. Why is it imperative that we treat all people as ends in themselves?
10. Explain the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations. Give examples of:
o perfect duties to oneself
o perfect duties to others
o imperfect duties to oneself
o imperfect duties to others
11. Does Kant's categorical imperative directly mandate what is to be done in a particular situation, or is it merely a basis for reflection? Explain your answer.
12. What does it mean for an agent to be 'autonomous' according to Kant?
Kant: 'On a supposed right to lie from altruistic motives'
13. Explain, in terms of Kant's moral theory, why it would be immoral to lie to a murderer about the whereabouts of your friend he is trying to murder.
14. On what grounds does Kant suggest that his claim is vindicated by legal principles? Can you think of any situations where Kant's theory would lead someone to act in a way that would leave them open to legal condemnation?
15. What does Kant mean by saying that "a lie always harms another; if not some other particular man, still it harms mankind generally, for it vitiates the source of the law itself"? Do you agree?
16. Would you lie to the murderer? Explain your answer with reference to its agreement or disagreement with Kant's view.
O'Neill: 'Kantian Ethics'
17. Explain the distinction O'Neill makes between Kant's ethics, 'Kant's ethics' and 'Kantian ethics'.
18. Why is there no conflict for Kant between the freedom required for morality and the determinism of the natural world?
19. Why might it be claimed that the categorical imperative is empty? Why is this complaint mistaken, according to O'Neill?
20. How, according to O'Neill, should we understand the moral status of actions that are in accordance with duty, but done out of inclination? What criticism is often raised against Kant on this issue?
Post your thoughts or questions on the material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Understand the significance of a good will in Kant’s conception of morality
• Understand what Kant means by “practical reason”, and how it underpins moral agency.
• Understand why Kant thinks that morality is universal, and how this is relevant to the categorical imperative
• Explain the role of the categorical imperative as a guide to morality
• Understand why Kant thought that the consequences of an action are not relevant to its moral worth
WEEK 8
Utilitarianism
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 15 and 16.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 8 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 8.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 15
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 15.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 16
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 16.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 15
Overview of Lecture:
1. Introducing utilitarianism
2. ‘Classical’ or ‘hedonistic’ utilitarianism
3. Some problems with ‘classical utilitarianism’
1. Introducing Utilitarianism
Historical context
• Early proponents: Jeremy Bentham – ‘An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation’; Henry Sidgwick – The Methods of Ethics; J.S. Mill – Utilitarianism and On Liberty.
• Late 18th and 19th centuries: a time of major social upheaval and change. Utilitarianism sought to provide an ethical foundation for, and complement to, ideas of political liberalism – ideas of equality, interests of all to count equally, etc.
• Radicalism and ‘humanism’: radical shift from ‘god’ to human welfare as basis for, and focus of, morality.
• Bentham (leader of philosophical Radicals): Rather than being about pleasing God, “morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible in this world.”
Utilitarianism as a consequentialist theory
The rightness/wrongness of actions is determined solely by reference to goodness/badness of consequences of those actions.
General consequentialist principle: Always act so as to bring about the best possible consequences.
Hypothetical scenarios:
• The ‘Runaway Train’ (a version of ‘trolley problem’)
• See also “Lifeboat dilemma”
What would the consequentialist say you should do, and why?
What kinds of consequences count as good?
Utilitarian answer: ‘good’ = ‘utility’.
• Good consequences are those that produce the greatest amount of ‘utility’.
• The Principle of Utility: Act always so as to maximize utility for all those affected by your action.
• Bentham: “the ultimate moral principle”.
• Question: What is utility? How is it measured?
Defining utility
Corresponding to different versions of utilitarianism:
a. Classical Utilitarianism: (‘Hedonistic Utilitarianism’)
o Utility = pleasure or happiness
o The balance of pleasure over pain (Jeremy Bentham)
o The balance of happiness over unhappiness (J.S. Mill - son of Scottish economist/historian James Mill, a follower of Bentham)
b. Preference Utilitarianism (next lecture): Act always so as to maximize the satisfaction of preferences
Consequences for whom? Who counts?
Classical utilitarians answer: any being capable of experiencing happiness and suffering. I.e., includes non-human animals.
Preference utilitarian answer: any being with preferences. I.e. includes human persons, maybe some non-human animals, e.g. higher primates?
Key general features of utilitarianism
a. An impartial moral theory: morality must counter our (natural?) tendency towards partialism.
o No-one’s own pleasure/happiness/pain counts for more than another’s.
b. A universal moral theory.
c. A maximizing theory: Most forms of consequentialism require us to promote as much of the good as we are able to, i.e. to maximize the good.
o Recall runaway train example.
d. Some forms of utilitarianism are aggregative (i.e. additive) e.g.…
Bentham’s ‘Hedonic Calculus’ (see Bentham reading)
For each act:
• Add up all pleasures; Add up all pains
• Subtract total pain from total pleasure
Result = net utility of the act. Repeat calculation for all available actions. Right act = act with greatest net utility. Also obligatory.
Pleasure is measurable in terms of: intensity; duration; probability, propinquity, purity, fecundity, extent.
2. Classical (hedonistic) Utilitarianism
(E.g. Bentham, Mill)
• Pleasure = the only intrinsic good (good in and of itself).
• Pain = the only thing intrinsic bad.
Things other than pleasure may be good but only instrumentally, i.e. to the extent that they bring about, ultimately, pleasure.
Example: Matthew Donelly euthanasia case (in Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, p. 99).
3. Two objections to classical utilitarianism
Objection 1: Objection to the hedonism of classical utilitarianism:
• Is pleasure the only intrinsic good? Can the goodness of all other good things be reduced to the fact that they lead to pleasure?
• Recall objections to hedonism raised by Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ (e.g. we value activity not just experience).
• Concerns about ‘narrow’ hedonistic utilitarianism (which counts all pleasures equally) are expressed in the famous ‘Doctrine of Swine’ objection…
The ‘Doctrine of Swine’ Objection
If maximizing pleasure is what makes action right (and is most important), utilitarianism seems committed to the view that (as Mill put it): ‘It is better to be a contented pig than a dissatisfied human.’
Response to the Doctrine of Swine Objection: Are all pleasures equal?
Bentham: No, but pleasure differs only in degree, not in kind / quality (e.g. sex, drugs, rock’n’roll vs. poetry, philosophy).
Mill: No, and there are differences in quality: ‘higher’ vs. ‘lower’ pleasures
“Better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill, Utilitarianism Ch 2).
Mill on happiness / pleasure:
• Pleasure as sensation?
• Happiness as a state defined by reference to human needs and interests? (Mill: “It must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being”).
>> move to happiness as ultimate/inherent good (NB: still hedonistic).
But question remains: Is happiness the only ultimate good? What about ‘goods’ that do not bring happiness? (E.g. knowledge?)
Another way to express the objection: (e.g. Rachels):
Hedonists get things the wrong way round, misunderstand the nature of happiness:
• Happiness is not the only thing sought for its own sake, with all other things (e.g. friendship) sought only as means to happiness.
• Rather, happiness is a response we have to attainment of things we recognise as good in their own right.
Suggestion: modify utilitarianism: It is the satisfaction of preferences (rather than solely happiness/pleasure) that we ought to maximize. This leads to preference utilitarianism (more next lecture).
Objection 2: The ‘replaceability’ problem
• The criticism: Utilitarianism treats people simply as units of pleasure/happiness.
• Problem: How to oppose killing of 1/some person(s) to increase happiness of several/many/overall?
• E.g.: Gilbert Harman’s ‘over-zealous’ utilitarian organ transplant doctor.
A plausible Utilitarian reply?
But all consequences (including long-term effects, all side-effects) must be counted.
• I.e. includes suffering of family, fear & distrust of medical profession, etc.
• Once ALL effects are counted in, such acts will no longer be justified on a utilitarian schema.
Is that a plausible response?
Question: Does this reply really capture what is wrong with the over-zealous surgeon’s proposal?
• I.e. it is wrong just because of bad consequences?
• Or somehow inherently wrong? More next lecture….
Lecture 16
Overview of Lecture:
1. Alternative toclassical utilitarianism: ‘Preference Utilitarianism’
2. Five objections to utilitarianism in general (including ‘replaceability problem’ from last lecture)
3. Revising utilitarianism in response to objections: Act vs. Rule utilitarianism?
1. Preference utilitarianism
(E.g. Peter Singer)
The view: The right/obligatory action is that which satisfies the most preferences of all available courses of action.
Utility consists in the satisfaction of people’s preferences (independent of whether aimed at pleasure).
• Note: A person’s preferences may be satisfied without them knowing it and without them being able to experience pleasure.
• E.g.: deceased environmentalist
• Preferences are not readily substitutable – so might avoid ‘replaceability’ problem by permitting concern for interests of individual persons?
Challenges:
Are all preferences equally worthy of satisfaction? (E.g. racist / sexist / evil preferences?)
Whose preferences will count - also all future possible preferences? Only existing?
2. Five objections to utilitarianism
(i) ‘Unworkability’ objections:
a. Quantifiability problem (for preference utilitarianism in particular): How do we quantify/measure/compare/weigh preferences?
Suggestion: distinguish between preferences for intrinsic goods (e.g. health) vs. instrumental goods (e.g. wealth); basic needs (housing, healthcare) vs. mere wants?
b. Predictability problem: We can’t always predict all consequences of actions.
Reply: We do often predict, sometimes erroneously. Utilitarianism only requires that we maximize expected utility.
c. Calculability problem: time pressures!
General reply to unworkability objections:
Suggestion: where utility is hard to calculate/we lack time, we can fall back on “the wisdom of the ages” (J.S. Mill) – ‘rules of thumb’ – about what generally produces, or is generally conducive of, utility. E.g.:
• Keep your promises
• Do not kill
NOTE: these are only rules of thumb: if following the rule obviously won’t produce best consequences in a particular situation, we are required to abandon rule, and apply principle of utility directly to our proposed action.
(ii) Justice objection:
The criticism: utilitarianism conflicts with fundamental requirements of justice.
3 examples to illustrate:
• Ursula Le Guin, ‘The ones who walk away from Omelas’.
• The race riots framing of an innocent person (from H.J McCloskey 1965, discussed in Rachels).
• York v Story (1963), ‘Peeping Tom’ version (discussed in Rachels).
The accusation: Utilitarianism permits, even requires us to trade off harms/sacrifices of some, for benefits/gains of others, for sake of common/overall good.
Problem:
• Some people’s pains can be outweighed by others’ gains.
• Sanctions ‘replaceability’ view of persons.
• In the process, justice/individual rights can be trampled (recall ‘utilitarian organ transplant surgeon’, and Godwin’s “The Archbishop and the Chambermaid").
Utilitarian response: the ‘side-effects reply’
Utilitarians defend the theory by saying:
• Once ALL effects (long-range/indirect) are calculated in, the net bad consequences of such actions will always outweigh the net good.
• E.g. effect on families (suffering, fear); setting precedents; results of action becoming publicly known; effects on institutions (law, medicine, policing, etc.).
• Therefore: utilitarianism will NOT permit the apparently ‘unjust’ acts.
• Is this a convincing reply? Will no such acts ever maximise utility? What about cases where no-one will ever know?
• Again: does this reply fully capture the wrongness of transplant surgeon’s proposed action? I.e. wrong solely because of bad consequences? Or somehow inherently wrong?
(iii) ‘Integrity’ objection
The criticism: Utilitarianism seems to require us to abandon our integrity and subordinate all to production of greatest good. Think about nature of tragic moral dilemmas:
• Sophie’s Choice (book/movie): Utilitarians say Sophie did a right thing in sacrificing her child – would Sophie agree?
• Williams: George the Chemist; Jim, Pedro & the Indians (see Bernard Williams reading).
Key point: Utilitarianism seems to make such actions unproblematic, so long as utility is maximized. But this conflicts with our intuitions: we value integrity/ commitment to moral convictions. Utilitarianism sometimes requires us to act against our deep convictions, and therefore violate our own integrity (something which we value).
The question is: should we abandon utilitarianism? Or revise our intuitions? (see J.J.C. Smart)
(iv) ‘Alienation’ objection
[Extension: Peter Railton, ‘Alienation, consequentialism and the demands of morality’]
The criticism: The requirement to maximise utility causes alienation. It must be applied to every use of our resources/time. E.g. helping 50 strangers vs. helping your spouse? Rescuing HIV medical scientist vs. mum? Utilitarianism faces difficulties recognizing special relationships.
Again: This conflicts with our intuitions/views about moral significance/value of relationships – should we abandon utilitarianism? Or revise our intuitions/ conceptions of friendship etc?
(v) The demandingness objection
The criticism: utilitarianism allows no moral distinction between action/inaction, acts/omissions (distinctions we intuitively find compelling and morally significant). This leads to the ‘Doctrine of negative responsibility’: Utilitarianism makes a person as responsible for bad consequences s/he fails to prevent, as for those s/he directly brings about.
• E.g. equal culpability for: failing to divert train to save 5 children; failing to save 5 patients; failing to prevent worse actions of others (chemical weapon making, shooting of villagers).
• But this makes it an overly demanding ethical theory: failing to achieve very best overall results = a moral failure.
Upshot: utilitarian morality requires us to be moral saints and heroes (to do the best possible).
3. Modifying utilitarianism
The form of utilitarianism we’ve considered so far is ‘Act utilitarianism’. It requires that we apply principle of utility to every individual action.
A suggested alternative (proposed by R.M. Hare’s ‘two-levelism’) is ‘Rule Utilitarianism’. In this alternative, the Principle of Utility is to be used to select those rules/policies that, when followed, generally produce most utility.
• Utility applied at higher level (to derive general rules).
• Then: individual actions are right/wrong insofar as they accord with or breach one of utility-maximizing rules.
Applying Rule Utilitarianism:
We would NOT ask: Would George maximise utility by accepting the job?
But rather questions like:
• Is utility generally maximized by defence policies involving nuclear/chemical weaponry?
• Is utility generally maximized if we give some priority to our personal relationships/moral convictions?
Principle of utility is directly appealed to only where we have no rule, or rules conflict with no basis for ranking them
Can Rule Utilitarianism avoid problems of Act Utilitarianism?
Seems to better accord with commonsense morality, intuition and psychology. But challenges to consider:
1. Does Rule Utilitarianism make morality simply rule-following?
(NB: Rule utilitarians stick to rules, even if utility not maximised in an individual situation)
2. But surely we sometimes need to make exceptions to rules in order to maximize utility. How do we do this? Presumably by appeal to the principle of utility. But then aren’t we back to Act Utilitarianism?
3. Couldn’t Rule Utilitarianism still lead to violation of individual rights? (Via rule itself, or - following from above - some exception to a rule)
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 8:
le Guin, U. (1989). "The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas". In The Wind's Twelve Quarters. Victor Gollancz, London, pp. 277-284.
Bentham, J. (1994) (1789). "The Principle of Utility". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 306-311.
Singer, P. (1993). Practical Ethics (second edition). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.16-27.
Godwin, W. (1994) (1793). "The Archbishop and the Chambermaid". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 312-313.
Sidgwick, H. (1994). "Issues for Utilitarians". In Ethics, P. Singer (ed.). Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 313-316.
Williams, B. (1973). "Negative Responsibility: and two examples". In Utilitarianism: For and against, J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambdrige, pp. 93-118.
Hare, R. M. (1989). Essays in Moral Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.330-331.
Readings Questions
Le Guin: The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas
1. Read this text now, and think about what impression you have of the society of Omelas. How do you judge the actions of those who do walk away? How do you judge the actions of those who do not?
2. Come back to this text after reading the other texts on utilitarianism, and think about what it appears a utilitarian would have to say about the society described. What implications does this have for the acceptability of utilitarianism?
3. How could a utilitarian respond?
Bentham: The Principle of Utility
4. How does the idea of pleasure and pain as "man's sovereign masters" support the view that the principle of utility is central to ethics?
5. What is the principle of utility? How is utility defined?
6. Why does Bentham think that the rectitude of the principle of utility is not (rationally) contestable?
7. What factors are relevant to the 'value' of a pleasure or pain in itself, for an individual?
8. What other two features of the act resulting in those pleasures or pains are relevant to the assessment of the action?
9. What additional criterion is relevant to the assessment of the good or bad tendency of an action with respect to a community?
10. In Bentham's calculations of overall utility, is the overall good or bad tendency of an act with respect to a community determined by working out the number people for whom it is good and weighing that against the number of people for whom it is bad; or does he weigh the total sum of resulting pleasure against the total sum of resulting pain? What difference would this make? Can you think of an example of a situation in which these different calculations would lead to different actions being endorsed as the right one?
Singer: Equality and its Implications
11. Singer notes that many of our moral attitudes have changed over the course of the 20th century, and that some of these changes are still highly controversial, but others have become almost universally accepted. What are some examples? What do you think the difference is between those areas in which changes have been resisted, and those in which they have been accepted?
12. Why should the assertion of equality of humans not be interpreted as an empirical claim about the equality of, for example, races or sexes?
13. Singer cites Rawls' suggestion that 'moral personality' is the characteristic by virtue of which humans are equal. What does this mean, and why might this criterion be considered relevant? What counterexamples does Singer offer as an objection?
14. Why does Singer believe that we should not "base our support for equality on the factual claim that differences between individuals cut across racial and sexual boundaries" (p.20)? How does Singer think the principle of human equality should instead be understood?
15. What is Singer's "principle of equal consideration of interests"? How does this principle avoid the problem about the "intelligence-based slave society" described on p.20?
16. How is the principle of equal consideration different from a principle mandating equal treatment?
Godwin: The Archbishop and the Chambermaid
17. Why does Godwin dispute the generalisability of the maxim 'that we should love our neighbour as ourselves'? Why, according to Godwin, are people not equally deserving of moral consideration?
18. Do you agree with Godwin's reason for thinking that the chambermaid should be prepared to sacrifice her life for the Archbishop's? Explain why the utilitarian would think that she should do so. Do you agree? Why or why not?
Sidgwick: Issues for Utilitarians
19. Why do animals complicate matters for utilitarians, according to Sidgwick?
20. What kind of people does he suggest pose a greater problem? Why?
21. What are the implications of this problem for population management? Why does Sidgwick think this might be considered a problem?
22. Why might it, on utilitarian grounds, "be right to do and privately recommend, under certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly" and "right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others" (p. 316) ?
Williams: Utilitarianism
23. Why is utilitarianism 'consequentialist'?
24. Why is negative responsibility a problem for utilitarians?
25. What do you think George and Jim should have done? Why? If your view differs from that endorsed by utilitarianism, what are the points about which you disagree with the utilitarian?
26. Why, according to Williams, might the utilitarian's insistence on impartiality be a problem?
27. Why does Williams think that utilitarianism makes integrity unintelligible?
28. Why does Williams believe that the utilitarian should not take into account in his or her calculations of utility any potential feelings of guilt that Jim or George might have as a consequence of killing the Indian or taking the job?
29. Why might the 'precedent effect' be relevant to a utilitarian calculation? On what grounds does Williams argue that it should not make a difference?
Hare: 'Deciding what is right', extract from Essays in Moral Theory
30. Why does Hare think it would be 'disastrous' for human beings (unlike archangels) to think in crudely act-utilitarian terms?
31. How does the position Hare describes combine act and rule utilitarianism?
32. What two levels of thinking are to be involved in moral thinking? How are they related?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Explain the main principles of utilitarianism
• Distinguish between classical utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism, and understand the problems with each
• Understand Williams’ objections to utilitarianism, based on the problem of negative responsibility and utilitarianisms’ failure to respect the connection between a person’s character and projects and their moral choices.
• Distinguish between act and rule utilitarianism, and understand how the latter avoids some of the objections that have been raised against the former.
WEEK 9
Animal Rights and Welfare
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 17 and 18.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 9 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 9.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 17
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 17.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 18
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 18.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 17
This week we turn from looking at normative ethical theories to apply utilitarianism to questions of animal welfare and rights. This is practical or applied ethics. Our main focus will be issues surrounding animal welfare, and the difference between how we treat other human animals and non-human animals. More generally we wish to look at the implications of seriously applying a philosophical theory to our own behaviour. Our reasoning about morality should be motivating for us, and change our behaviour.
Overview of Lecture:
1. Historical tradition
2. Kant on non-human animals
3. Social Contract Theory on non-human animals
4. Utilitarianism on non-human animals
5. Peter Singer's view
1. Historical tradition
Many philosophers saw non-human animals as fundamentally different to humans, in a way that meant they are deserving of different (lesser) moral status. Differences proposed as being morally relevant have included:
• that non-human animals lack human reasoning capacities;
• that they have a different sort of consciousness (or self-consciousness);
• that they do not participate in society/social contract.
• E.g.: Aristotle, Kant, Hume.
There have also been thinkers throughout history who suggested that animals have an equivalent moral status (e.g. Darwin, Bentham, Pythagoras). This has been a minority perspective. E.g. Bentham:
"The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" (Bentham, 'An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation', Ch. 17 note 122)
Consider an analogy: we accept that skin colour is not a relevant moral difference; that is, persons should not be treated differently on the basis of skin colour.
The question: is species a relevant moral difference, justifying different treatment? Or is there some feature unique to the human species that is a relevant moral difference (reasoning, language?).
Peter Singer has more recently continued this line of utilitarian thought. Singer takes utilitarianism to imply that any being with the capacity for sentience has to be taken into account in weighing up consequences of our decisions. ("Sentience" = the capacity to feel pleasure and pain).
2. Kant on Non-human Animals
For Kant, morality is dependent on reason; on human capacities for freedom and practical reasoning. Thus for him non-human animals are not moral agents (though he argues against cruelty to non-human animals on other grounds--see reading).
But: we can distinguish between moral agents and moral subjects. Kant may be right that an animal is not a moral agent: we can't really hold non-human animals responsible for their actions, as we do humans. But does that mean they are not moral subjects (not worthy of moral consideration)?
3. Social Contact Theory on Non-human Animals
On a social contract theory, non-human animals are not considered party to the contract; they are not capable of being participants in the social contract. Since they are not, the contract does not oblige us to treat them morally. This can be raised as an objection to social contract theory (similarity to the objection concerning those human animals who don't participate in the contract).
4. Utilitarianism on Non-human Animals
Utilitarianism (of the hedonistic version) has quite different implications. Since animals are sentient, they have to be taken into consideration. The capacity for pleasure and pain is something we share with animals.
The evidence
How can we know that animals suffer?
a. From behaviour: While there is no way to directly know the subjective experience of another animal (or indeed another human), we can assume that where behaviour is similar, there is similar experience. I.e., animals seem to behave as though they feel pain.
b. Scientific understanding of nervous systems of human and non-human animals: Similarities.
5. Peter Singer's view
If non-human animals are sentient, they have interests, i.e. in avoiding pain. This has moral significance. If we are being impartial, their pain or suffering should be taken into account when deciding what to do.
"The capacity for suffering--or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness--is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language or higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark 'the insuperable line' that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered happen to have chosen the wrong characteristic. By saying that we must consider the interests of all beings with the capacity for suffering or enjoyment Bentham does not arbitrarily exclude from consideration any interests at all--as those who draw the line with reference to the possession of reason or language do. The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. [...]
If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering--in so far as rough comparisons can be made--of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. So the limit of sentience ... is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by some other characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary manner. Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin color?" (Singer 1975: 8-9)
Key points:
• Equality is fundamental to Singer's approach. This equality is not a claim about animals being the same: they are not. Rather he claims they are worthy of moral consideration: they have moral equality. Counting the pain or pleasure only of humans is arbitrary and unjustified.
• Since the argument relies on sentience, the implication is that anything with interests has a right to moral consideration. A rabbit can feel pain and pleasure, so it has interests. A rock cannot, and this is why it does not demand our moral consideration.
• Singer argues that failure to recognise this moral equality is speciesist. This is analogous to racism and sexism: it is a bias based on morally irrelevant differences. As racism makes distinctions based on race, and sexism on gender, so as speciesists we discriminate unfairly on the basis of species.
"The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. ... Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species." (Singer 1975: 9)
Next lecture: What implications for practice does this have? Is there no moral distinction between human and non-human animals? What do we do when interests clash?
Lecture 18
Overview of Lecture:
1. Recap
2. What is equal consideration?
o Moral and non-moral interests
o Important and trivial interests
3. Personhood and Personal Interests
4. Singer's distinction: Sentience and self-consciousness
5. Implications of Singer's account
6. Questions for Singer
1. Recap:
• For utilitarians, any being with interests thereby has a right to have those interests considered.
• Speciesism: to give more consideration to one species than another is a form of chauvinism, analogous to racism, sexism, etc.
The challenge:
Questions for today: what exactly does according moral consideration to all beings that have interests entail? What is equal consideration?
The question Singer is raising with the notion of speciesism is whether species membership involves some morally significant difference. And if species membership itself is not morally relevant, do biological categories typically have different capacities that are of moral relevance?
This can cause some difficulties for the view in difficult cases: what do we do when the interests of morally considerable beings are in conflict?
2. What is equal consideration?
Equal consideration of interests does not necessarily imply that those interests have to be weighed equally: these are separate claims.
Why? Different species might have different kinds of interests (Nb. when reasoning about this, the reasoning must be based on capacities rather than their species membership per se, to avoid being speciesist).
Some distinctions about kinds of interests:
Moral vs. non-moral interests
E.g.:
• Moral interests: interests about welfare; suffering
• Non-moral interests: an interest in having a really good car
Conflicts of moral and non-moral interests:
Say I have a desire for a crocodile skin handbag. Here there would be a conflict between:
• My interest in having a crocodile skin handbag = not a moral interest
• The crocodile's interest in living = a moral interest
To resolve the conflict, we decide which of these interests is more important. One way to do this is to think that the moral interest should trump the non-moral interest: the crocodile's interest in living has more weight than an interest in a handbag.
We could also make distinctions about interests along other lines: these are ways of giving different interests different weightings (ranking interests).
Important vs. Trivial moral interest
We might think that some moral interests are more important than others. E.g. frog case:
The frog's interest in not suffering might outweigh an interest in testing for pregnancy (which could be met in other ways) even if both could be thought moral interests.
Consider animals used in research more generally: It's arguable that their suffering might be outweighed by the potential to lessen overall (or more important?) suffering. Whether or not we agree with that, we can see that some moral interests could be considered of more weight than others.
Thus, while we must take all interests into consideration, we might weight them differently in our consideration. (Remember though that any difference of weighting of sufferings/interests must be made on the basis of something other than species membership, at the risk of speciesism.)
What other differences are there among species that could be morally relevant? And what if there are situations where important moral interests of humans and non-humans clash?
3. Personhood and Personal Interests
Do some animals have capacities that are morally significant (apart from sentience)? What about self-consciousness, memory, capacity to make choices, anticipate the future, etc? These are the sorts of capacities that make us moral agents.
John Locke: distinguishes between a human being (a biological category), and a person (a moral category). A 'person' is not just a member of or species, but a being with a certain moral status, because they typically have certain sorts of capacities. Thus it may be that a person has some moral significance which does not necessarily attach to human beings.
There is some evidence that some non-human animals do have certain of these capacities:
• 'Smarties' test
• Theory of mind (ToM) threshold: capacity to differentiate between the content of one's own mind and that of others. Some non-human animals do pass the ToM test. (And some human beings might not).
Thus: some animals may well have some of the same or similar cognitive capacities that human beings typically have. Some human beings may also lack these capacities.
Therefore: The categories 'human being' and 'person' do not coincide. There might be non-human animals that count as persons, and some human animals that do not count as persons. Thus the distinction is not based on species (not speciesist) but on capacities.
This might provide a further basis for weighting interests: persons may have different sorts of interests than non-persons, because they have different capacities.
Both persons and non-persons can have interests of a moral kind, and require equal consideration. But, we may have grounds to think that those attaching to the persons have more weight, at least in situations where similar interests of different beings are in conflict. This might be a non-arbitrary moral difference.
4. Singer's distinction: Sentience and self-consciousness
Singer makes a similar distinction, between beings that are conscious (so sentient) and beings that are self-conscious. Both are sentient, but not all sentient beings are self-conscious.
The relevance of the distinction is that these difference capacities give rise to different kinds of interests. Self-conscious beings have a different kind of interests because:
• they have a sense of themselves as continuing through time;
• they can make plans over time; so
• they can remember and anticipate.
These differences mean that they may suffer in different senses. Singer speaks of this as meaning that self-conscious beings have personal interests in their own lives, as opposed to just interests in avoiding suffering.
Singer does want to claim that the interests of all sentient beings must be given moral consideration. But only self-conscious beings also have preferences. Self-conscious beings have preferences related to themselves as individuals. Merely conscious beings do not have preferences, though they have interests. They do not have a personal interest in their own life.
Singer thus incorporates preference utilitarianism, but also sees the capacity for pleasure and pain as morally significant on a broader level. His view is a hybrid of preference and classical utilitarianism: while we have a broad obligation to consider the interests of all sentient beings, self-conscious beings may have interests with more moral weight, in some situations (because they can form preferences). This distinction enables us to resolve some of the difficult cases.
Summary: Capacity for sentience places a creature within the sphere of moral consideration, though we can still think that its interests could be outweighed by the preferences of self-conscious beings (in some situations).
5. Implications
Singer's view leaves room for giving more weight to the interests of self-conscious beings. But the more radical claim in his account is just that of bringing non-human animals into the sphere of moral consideration. This is at odds with many of our practices.
Consider:
• Meat eating
• Factory farming
• Scientific research on animals
Does Singer's account establish that we would not be permitted to ever do these things?
Singer's analogy to human beings with reduced capacities
Animals used in experiments do in fact have greater capacities than at least some humans. E.g., chimpanzees might have more self-consciousness than some human beings with brain injuries or disabilities, or young infants.
Singer: we wouldn't experiment on disabled people or infants in experiments, though they may have lesser capacities. So, we shouldn't experiment on those non-human animals. That is, we should regard experimenting on such animals to be morally on par with experimenting on such humans. To judge whether experimentation is acceptable, then, ask whether it would be acceptable on sch a human (say a disabled infant orphan).
6. Questions for Singer
1. Does any preference count as worthy of satisfaction? Sometimes our preferences are fairly trivial. On Singer's view we're to weight preferences, but how are we to decide how to weight different preferences?
2. There seems a tension between the preference utilitarian requirement and avoiding suffering. Is the idea of impartiality with regard to avoiding suffering compatible with the idea that our ultimate obligation is to satisfy the preferences of self-conscious beings?
3. Which preferences are worthy? Which are not? Which are trivial?
4. What about other ethical concerns, such as concerns about the environment? These can clash with those of animals (e.g. culling). But since an environment has no sentience, it has no place on this framework.
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 9:
Aristotle. (1976) (c 350 BCE). "Animals and Slavery". In Animal Rights and Human Obligations, T. Regan & P. Singer (eds.). Prentice Hall, New Jersey, pp. 109-110.
Kant, I. (1976). "Duties to Animals". In Animal Rights and Human Obligations, T. Regan & P. Singer (eds.). Prentice Hall, New Jersey, pp. 122-123.
National Health and Medical Research Council. (2004). Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes.
Section 1 'General principles for the care and use of animals for scientific purposes';
Section 3.3.20 and 3.3.45 'Other Clauses'.
Singer, P. (1975) Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals. Random House, New York, pp. 1-27.
Reading Questions
Aristotle: Animals and slavery
1. Aristotle draws an analogy between the slave/master relationship, the relationship between animals and humans, and between women and men. Aristotle believes that the asymmetry in all these relationships is justified by nature and expedience. How might the same analogies be used now to draw a very different conclusion about the rights of animals, for example?
Kant: 'Duties to Animals'
2. Why, according to Kant, do we have an indirect duty, but not a direct one, to avoid cruelty to animals?
3. If you disagree with Kant's view, explain how you would argue against it. If you agree, explain your reasons.
Excerpts from the Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes
4. What assumptions about animals do the authors of this document make that would not have been accepted by Kant or Aristotle?
5. Come back to this article after reading the excerpts from Singer to follow, and think about what Singer might yet object to about the treatment permitted under this code of practice. On what grounds might he object?
Singer: 'All Animals are Equal', extract from Animal Liberation
6. Why might equal consideration of the interests of animals and humans not entail that they should be treated the same way?
7. Why should the principle of equal consideration be applied to non-humans, as well as to humans?
8. How would you explain the difference between equality and equal consideration?
9. What property is relevant to whether or not something has interests (and is therefore deserving of moral consideration)?
10. What are the implications of the principle of equal consideration for our treatment of animals, and our treatment of infants or severely retarded human beings respectively?
11. What is 'speciesism' and how is it to be avoided?
12. How is speciesism analogous to sexism or racism? What are the similarities according to Singer?
13. Does Singer advocate that we should treat animals as we now treat severely impaired humans? Or that we should treat severely impaired humans as we now treat animals?
14. Why is the question of killing significantly different from the question of inflicting pain? How can we prefer, without being guilty of speciesism, to save the life of a human instead of a non-human animal?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Understand Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests, and its implications for the rights of non-human animals
• Define ‘speciesism’
• Understand the importance of the distinction between sentience and self-consciousness for Singer’s argument
• Distinguish the respective roles of classical and preference utilitarianism in Singer’s account
• Understand the objections that have been raised against Singer’s argument, and consider your own view on these matters.
WEEK 10
Global Justice
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 19 and 20.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 10 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 10.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 19
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 19.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 20
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 20.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 19
Professor Catriona Mackenzie
Overview of Lecture:
1. Global Poverty and Inequality: Background Data
2. Global Inequality: A Humanitarian Concern or a Matter of Justice?
3. The Humanitarian Approach
1. Global Poverty and Inequality: Background Data
UN Development Reports involve 4 comparative global measures of human capabilities:
• Longevity (leading a long and healthy life)
• Knowledge (literacy and educational participation)
• Access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living
• Capacity to participate in the life of the community.
Premise of Human Development Index: income and economic growth do not translate straightforwardly into human development.
Differences between income (GDP) and human development
[pic]
From Human Development Report 2004, p.128. UNDP, New York, 2004.
Global Disparities in Human Development
[pic]
From Human Development Report 2004, p.134. UNDP, New York, 2004.
Gender Development, Gender Empowerment and Human Poverty Indices
• Gender Development Index captures inequalities in achievements between men and women.
• Gender empowerment information measures women's economic and political participation and decision-making power.
• Human Poverty Index focuses on proportion of people below a threshold level in basic dimensions of human development.
Statistics from 2004 UN Development Report
[pic]
From Human Development Report 2004, p.134. UNDP, New York, 2004.
Millennium Development Goals
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Goal 1 outlines two targets, each with its own indicators:
Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day.
Indicators:
1. Proportion of population below US $1 (PPP - parity purchasing power) a day.
2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty).
3. Share of poorest 20% in national consumption.
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
Indicators:
4. Prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age.
5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption.
Statistics from 2004 UN Development Report: Global Poverty Summary
1,100 million live below the US $1 per day poverty line; 2,800 million live below US $2 per day.
One third of deaths are caused by poverty-related diseases (starvation, diarrhoea, pneumonia, malaria, measles, tuberculosis, perinatal conditions).
Pogge: "If the developed Western countries had their proportional share of these deaths, severe poverty would kill some 3,500 Britons and 16,500 Americans per week."
Statistics from 2004 UN Development Report: Global Inequality Summary
Inequality: High income economies comprise 14.9% of population, but hold 79.7% of aggregate global income. Collective income of bottom 20% is 0.3% of aggregate global annual income.
Global inequality is growing. Income gap ratio between fifth of world's people living in richest countries and fifth in world's poorest:
|1820 |3:1 |
|1870 |7:1 |
|1913 |11:1 |
|1960 |30:1 |
|1990 |60:1 |
|1997 |74:1 |
2. Global Inequality: A humanitarian concern or a matter of justice?
Two kinds of moral arguments concerning global poverty:
1. Humanitarian argument: focuses on obligations to relieve distress and suffering. A goal-based approach – aim to relieve suffering, increase welfare, maximise good.
2. Justice-based argument: focuses on justice or injustice of global distribution and control of resources.
3. The Humanitarian Approach
Example of humanitarian argument: Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence and Morality", (1972).
• Focuses on individual responsibility for relieving suffering of others in need.
• Prevention of harm principle: "If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (p. 231).
• Comparison with saving a drowning child from shallow pool at cost of minor inconvenience to myself.
Principle takes no account of:
1. "proximity" or distance
2. Whether I am the only person who could assist or one among many millions
Objection 1: The drowning child example cannot be extended to international aid. There is a difference between the child's lack of responsibility for its plight and the responsibility of governments of poor countries for the plight of their people.
Brian Barry's response: Even if governments or the population as a whole are to some extent responsible, starving individuals cannot be held responsible for their plight.
Objection 2: In the drowning child case, the rescuer has special moral responsibilities/duties arising from proximity. However, contributing to international aid is an act of charity, not a moral duty.
Singer: We cannot draw a morally defensible distinction between duty and charity when it comes to famine relief. Giving money to famine relief is a moral duty, not an act of generosity.
Who is obliged to donate, and how much?
Objection 3: This view is too onerous and hence counterproductive.
Singer's response: Morality is demanding, but people's attitudes and expectations can and should change. Governments should provide aid but government aid is not a reason for individuals not to provide aid.
How much should we be required to give?
Singer: we should donate until we reach the level of marginal utility, i.e. I am not obliged to give at the point where giving "would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift" (p. 241).
Lecture 20
Dr. Mary Walker
Overview of Lecture:
1. Why does inequality matter? The justice approach to global poverty
2. Justice as fairness on the level of the nation state
3. A global difference principle?
4. Arguments for differing obligations across borders
5. Pogge on the 'double standard'
1. Why does inequality matter? The justice approach to global poverty
Humanitarian approach: concern is about human suffering
Justice approach: also concerns about inequality itself (injustice)
For advocates of the justice approach, the humanitarian arguments leave out concerns about inequality (cake distribution example). Extensive inequality points to the avoidability of suffering, and the unfairness (or injustice) of a very unequal distribution of goods is part of the problem to be addressed.
Three related motivations for a justice approach
a. Addressing human suffering on this scale may require addressing inequity of distribution: incorporates humanitarian concerns.
b. The nature of the current distribution of goods is morally arbitrary. Where a person happens to be born is not a morally significant feature of that person: it is not a fact about them that justifies having a greater or lesser share of goods (material or social goods). Being born in a well-to-do nation in practice does confer on us a greater share of these goods—but this is a matter of luck, not of desert (the 'natural lottery').
Note: (a) and (b) reflect the value we place on the equality of all persons. Beitz presents a set of reasons to be concerned about inequality which do not come directly from valuing equality:
c. Most of us already accept equality as a value, on the national level. Valuing equality is reflected in a number of our practices, e.g.:
o Welfare system
o Incremental taxation
o Anti-discrimination laws
o Affirmative action programs
These practices seek to ensure a more equal distribution of material and other social goods. They are all ways of supporting equality: by redistribution; or by seeking to limit or redress inequalities within our society.
Beitz: If we do accept these values on a national level, we should accept them on a global level (consistency). He argues this with regard to four values we hold, which are different to equality but which contribute to it. These are
• avoiding human suffering;
• avoiding stratified societies in which some feel inferior;
• liberty; and
• avoiding making some vulnerable to circumstance.
2. Justice as fairness on the level of the nation state
But what would a justice approach look like? Rawls' work provides a picture on the national level, which others argue is also applicable on a global level (e.g. Barry, Pogge).
Rawls argues for two principles that should govern the formation of a just society:
• Principle of Equal Liberty: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
• Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls 1971: Section 11).
The difference principle is especially controversial. What does it mean to say that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged?
Consider the cake distribution example:
We should avoid the massively unequal distribution.
But: there are also reasons to think that distribution can include some inequalities (relation to incentives to produce): a completely equal distribution would lead to inefficiency.
Thus: some inequalities in the distribution of goods seem to be justified.
Leads to the questions: Which inequalities are justified? Which should be part of a just society, and which should not?
We can view the difference principle as providing an answer: inequalities are justified when they are to the benefit of the least advantaged. In what sense are inequalities to the benefit of the least advantaged?
Doctor and sick person example: It is to the benefit of the sick person to live in a society where there are enough good doctors. A way to ensure there are enough good doctors is to provide people with an economic incentive to be doctors (i.e. reward them with a greater share). Thus the inequality of the doctor's and the sick person's shares is justified, because it works for the benefit of the sick person (the least advantaged).
Cake distribution example: Allowing some inequalities as incentives may plausibly lead to there being more to share. Even if the least advantaged members get a smaller share of a larger cake, this might be more than they would get with an equal share of a smaller cake. Thus, the inequalities work to the benefit of the least advantaged.
Notice that these views depend on the idea that people are in social cooperation with each other: role of social contract thinking in this approach to justice.
3. A global difference principle?
If the difference principle was applied on a global level, it would imply that current global inequalities are unjust: they are not to the benefit of the least advantaged.
Should the difference principle be applied on a global level? Two main reasons for thinking it should:
a. Luck and the 'natural lottery'. This implies that the boundaries of a nation, being morally irrelevant, have no bearing on our obligations to others. Thus the claims of justice are the same on us whether they come from a poor person / group in our own nation, or from a poor person / group in another nation.
b. The social contract. The difference principle relies on the assumption that people are already in cooperation with each other. Barry and Pogge argue (in different ways) that we are in cooperation with others on a global scale (especially economically) and therefore the demands of justice are global. Thus, a global difference principle should apply.
This issue, then, concerns the question of whether the obligations of justice are the same or different on the national and global levels: whether obligations differ across borders.
4. Arguments for differing obligations across borders
Why might we think our obligations to citizens of our own nation are different to non-citizens, such as the global poor?
Moral partialist reasons:
a. The social contract. In response to Barry's and Pogge's arguments mentioned above, it can be argued that economic interaction on a global scale is not sufficient to consider ourselves to be 'in contract with' those in other nations. The sense in which we cooperate socially with those in our own nation may seem to be much stronger. If we are really only 'in contract with' those in our own society, the above argument for applying a global difference principle does not apply. This can give grounds to think that our obligations to citizens are much stronger than to non-citizens of our own nation.
b. Communitarian views. Communitarian views draw on similar thoughts to the above. However, rather than focusing on social cooperation, they focus on the way that nations /other communities share a way of life, set of meanings, and identity. If our moral obligations (and moral motivation) arise from what we share in these senses with those in our own community, this can provide a justification of 'moral partialism'. That is, it might be justifiable to be partial to those in our own political community (in contrast to impartialism).
Note: (a) and (b) can be seen as more philosophically sophisticated versions of the intuition that we are morally permitted, at least, to 'look after our own first'. E.g. we might think that poverty in remote Aboriginal communities has a stronger or prior claim on our attention and resources than poverty in other nations.
Reasons related to the self-determination of nations:
c. It can be argued that nations have a right to self-determination: each nation is its own sovereign and should be able to make its own decisions about its laws and actions in the global community. To protect this right these nations' political structures and functioning should not be interfered with from outside (risk of cultural imperialism). Similarly it can be argued that to protect self-determination, nations should also not be made dependent on the help of other nations.
5. The 'double standard'
Pogge believes that most of us do intuitively accept different standards of justice on national and global levels: this is the 'double standard'. Much of the time we might not even question this difference of standards in our approach to thinking about justice and inequality on each level. He asks how the double standard could be justified, and argues that some account of why it is justified is called for.
It is important to note that on Pogge's view, we do not merely permit global inequality, poverty, and disadvantage to continue: we contribute to them through the global economic order, international laws and institutions. Rationalisations of the double standard may sometimes be just that: rationalisations that allow us to ignore our own part in global poverty.
Thus for Pogge, if we are to hold a double standard regarding national vs. global justice, we are morally obliged to provide an account of how the double standard is justified.
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 10:
Singer, P. (1972). 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (3), 229-243.
Beitz, C. (2001). 'Does Global Inequality Matter?' Metaphilosophy 32 (1/2), pp. 95-112.
Pogge, T. (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights. Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 91-2; 94-101;108-117.
Reading Questions
Singer, 'Famine, Affluence and Morality'
1. What is Singer's beginning assumption? What principle does he then introduce? Why does Singer say that the uncontroversial appearance of this principle is deceptive?
2. What reasons does Singer give to support not taking proximity into account in this principle?
3. How does Singer argue that the number of people who might help should make no difference to an individual's moral obligations?
4. What does Singer mean by saying that his argument upsets our traditional moral categories? In what way would we have to change our thinking about giving to humanitarian aid organisations if we accept his argument?
5. Describe the first objection to his argument that Singer considers in your own words. What is Singer's response to this objection?
6. Describe the second objection to his argument that Singer considers in your own words. What is his response to this objection?
7. What is the role in Singer's discussion of the quote from Thomas Aquinas? In what sense are Singer's conclusions radical?
Beitz, 'Why does Inequality Matter?'
8. Beitz identifies a problem with basing our approach to questions of global justice on an abstract concern with equality. What is this problem? Why might such an approach be thought 'naïve' (p. 97)?
9. What is the difference between direct and derivative reasons to value equality? Why does Beitz leave aside direct egalitarian reasons for being concerned about global inequality?
10. How is inequality connected to material deprivation? In what sense is material deprivation a derivative reason for being concerned about inequality?
11. What two contrasts does Beitz consider between the domestic and international contexts, regarding material deprivation and inequality? How might these contrasts suggest that our concerns in each case could differ?
12. Think of an example of a social inequality that could lead to a sense of inferiority or humiliation. Do you think your example provides a reason to object to inequality per se? Would it apply on both a domestic and a global level?
13. How could inequality result in the liberty of some being limited by the actions of others? Give an example of what this would mean on a domestic and on a global level. Do you think this provides a reason to think that inequality matters?
14. Beitz gives two examples of procedural unfairness on a global scale, concerning the UN and the World Bank (p. 108). Do you think these two examples are unfair? If so, in what does the unfairness lie? How is any unfairness a separate issue to inequality itself?
Pogge, extracts from World Poverty and Human Rights
15. What does Pogge concede regarding the contrast of the national and global economic orders? What other level of 'bonds of solidarity' do his questions on p. 95 introduce? How can such a further level of 'bonds of solidarity' alter our thinking about the national / global contrast?
16. What are the two minimal criteria for a just economic order, according to Pogge?
17. What is the point of Pogge's discussion of Subbrazil and Sub-Subbrazil?
18. How does Pogge think that most people in developed countries reconcile themselves to massive and avoidable poverty abroad? Do you agree that we so reconcile ourselves? Do you agree with his analysis of how we do so? If you think there are any other ways in which we reconcile ourselves to global poverty, try to explain them.
19. What is the effect of shifting the burden of proof onto justifying the double standard? What role does this shift have in Pogge's discussion?
20. Why would we think that the causal relation between the global institutional order and poverty is relevant to moral assessment of that order?
21. What does Pogge mean in saying that we rationalise divergent moral assessments through a double standard? How does Pogge respond to these rationalisations?
22. What is the resource privilege? What effects does this element of the global economic order have?
23. What is the international borrowing privilege? What effects does this element of the global economic order have?
24. How do the above considerations about the resource privilege and the international borrowing privilege affect your assessment of responsibility for global poverty, if they do?
25. Explain your understanding of Pogge's conclusion that "our discrepant assessments constitute covert arbitrary discrimination in favour of the wealthy societies and against the global poor" (p. 117). Do you agree? Why or why not?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Understand some of the background data about global inequalities and appreciate their significance.
• Be able to explain the difference between humanitarian and justice approaches to thinking about global justice.
• Understand Singer's utilitarian approach to thinking about humanitarian aid.
• Recognise the main ideas associated with justice approaches to thinking about global justice, and the role of concerns about equality in such approaches.
WEEK 11
Historic Injustice and Indigenous Rights
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 21 and 22.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 11 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 11.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 21
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 21.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 22
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 22.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 21
Overview of Lecture:
1. Kevin Rudd's apology
2. Compensatory Justice and the Historical Background
3. Poole on Property and Sovereignty
4. Waldron on 'Superseding historic injustice'
1. Kevin Rudd’s apology
Rudd's apology was made on February 13, 2008:
"We apologise for the laws and policies of successive Parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our fellow Australians.
We apologise especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country."
Two main reasons in response to the question ‘Why apologise?':
1. The human suffering caused by policies of successive governments demands an apology from the Australian government.
"There's something terribly primal about these first-hand accounts. The pain is searing; it screams from the pages. The hurt, the humiliation, the degradation, and the sheer brutality of the act of physically separating a mother from her children is a deep assault on our senses, and on our most elemental humanity."
2. The need to face up to, acknowledge and accept responsibility for injustices perpetrated in the past is a necessary first step to achieving genuine reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians.
Raises two related issues:
• Why is a present government/people obliged to take responsibility for past injustices perpetrated by previous governments, even though they would not condone those actions?
• How can this 'right the wrong', addressing present injustice, or help to?
2. Compensatory Justice and the Historical Background
Our concern here is compensatory justice, which deals with compensation for past wrongs that people have suffered.
This is connected to distributive justice: how are disadvantages (in terms of the social distribution of goods) in the present connected to these past injustices? How does this affect how compensation might be made now, through a redistribution of goods?
Past injustices in Australia have included massacres, expropriation of land, stolen generations: a history of dispossession, discrimination, forced assimilation, extermination.
What is the ongoing impact of these past wrongs? Among others, a significant gap in the health and wellbeing of indigenous and non-indigenous Australians.
Table 1: Comparing Life expectancy (LE) - Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples
[pic]
From Close the Gap: Solutions to the Indigenous Health Crisis Facing Australia, 2007, Oxfam Australia Policy Briefing Paper, p. 6.
3. Poole on Property and Sovereignty
Poole reminds us of the recency of these issues (and other ongoing elements):
• Aboriginal people denied citizenship until the referendum of 1967.
• Doctrine of terra nullius enshrined in law until 1992 Mabo judgment – i.e. no recognition until that time that Aboriginal people had pre-existing claim to the land, pre-existing social, legal and political structures.
• Mabo judgment recognised claims to native title but not Aboriginal sovereignty.
• Recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty would involve granting a degree of autonomy and self-determination to some Aboriginal groups, within the Australian nation; i.e. co-existence (reflected in Wik judgment of 1996 that native title can co-exist with pastoral leases).
The challenge for contemporary Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians is to engage in an ongoing process of working out just terms of co-existence, i.e. reconciliation.
Arguments for reconciliation are based on the view that historic injustices are at the centre of contemporary claims for justice by Aboriginal people.
Waldron provides a counter-argument to this claim.
4. Waldron on ‘Superseding Historic Injustice’
Waldron acknowledge the importance of some form of remembrance of past injustices (e.g. compensation, symbolic gestures such as apology). Such acts transform a society’s identity and its relationship with those that have been wronged by past policies and practices.
Also acknowledges that how a community fares "and what they can offer in the way of culture, aspiration, and morale may depend very much on the present effect of events that took place several generations earlier" (p. 7).
But he provides an argument against the claim that a judgment of past injustice requires more than merely symbolic reparations in the present (the historic injustice argument).
Two interpretations of the historic injustice argument:
First interpretation: Nozick’s counterfactual approach
If it can be shown that holdings were expropriated unjustly then the remedy is compensation that aims to change the present so that it most closely resembles what the world would be like now had the original injustice not occurred.
Waldron’s objection: Since what might have occurred after the injustice involves human choice, we cannot say with any degree of certainty how things might have turned out.
Example of aunt and Amnesty International: we can make informed guesses about what people would have chosen to do, but these are always merely guesses.
Therefore we cannot make normative decisions about rectification on the basis of "rational and informed guesses about how people would have exercised their freedom in a hypothetical world" (p. 10).
Possible reply: It is reasonable to assume that indigenous people would not have made choices that left them worse off. Therefore ‘if the injustice had not taken place, the descendants of those who suffered it would be better off than they are and descendants of those who perpetrated it would be somewhat worse off than they are’ – seems to justify transfer back to descendants what was originally taken.
Waldron’s response: Cannot rectify particular injustices without comprehensive redistribution, which may itself be unjust. (‘Contagion of injustice’)
Second interpretation: next lecture.
Lecture 22
Overview of Lecture:
1. Recap
2. Waldron: Second interpretation of the historic injustice argument
3. Kymlicka on Aboriginal Rights
4. Responses to arguments against historic injustice claims
1. Recap
First interpretation of the historic injustice argument:
• We attempt to discover how the world would have looked had the injustice not taken place, and make adjustments accordingly (Nozick).
• But, it is not plausible that we could know what the world would be like, and the adjustments required would in any case cause further injustice (the 'contagion of injustice'). (Waldron)
Thus the first interpretation of historic injustice as a basis for current reparations in terms of land rights is not plausible, according to Waldron. He offers a second interpretation:
2. Second interpretation of the historic injustice argument: Compensation remits injustices that are ongoing in the present
Difficulty is how to ensure that the entitlement that was violated survives into the present; a violated entitlement can “fade” with time (p. 15).
The most plausible justification for historic injustice claims is role of expropriated resource (e.g. land) in a person’s or community’s life. Problem is that this claim appears less credible the more time has elapsed.
Further, restitution may cause injustice to others who now use the resource, have organised lives and economic activity around premise that the resource is theirs.
Argument for this injustice claim is that changes in background circumstances (e.g. population increases, depletion of a resource etc.) may alter original entitlements.
Example of waterholes in the desert
Suppose P acquires an oasis in times of plenty. What does this entitlement entail?
• P has a right to use the resource freely and exclude others from use so long as water is plentiful in territory.
• However P also has duty to share this resource with others should water become scarce (p. 23).
• If changing circumstances mean that exclusion has negative impact on others where previously it did not, then this might provide grounds for revising entitlement.
• If water holes dry up it would no longer be justifiable for P to exclude others from using her water hole, even if initial seizure was morally wrong.
Waldron’s conclusion: Historic injustice can be superseded by circumstance. Judgments about injustice need to focus on present circumstances (e.g. present disadvantage).
Qualification: argument only applies if ‘honest attempt is made to arrange things justly for the future’, i.e. argument does not justify ongoing injustice.
3. Kymlicka on Aboriginal Rights
(Multicultural Citizenship, Ch. 6. Note 5, p. 220)
Argues: Historic property rights do not provide an argument for Aboriginal rights to self-determination.
Further, rectification of injustice by returning expropriated land would create ‘massive unfairness’ to descendants and others who have migrated (cf. Waldron’s changed circumstances argument).
Aboriginal rights (e.g. land rights) must be grounded in concerns about equality and contemporary disadvantage.
4. Responses to arguments against historic injustice claims
Ivison (‘Political Community and Historic Injustice’):
Historic injustice claims not just about expropriation of property rights, but also about violation of just terms of association between indigenous peoples and colonial state.
Past injustices inform normative structure of social and political relations between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians in the present.
Difficult to maintain a clear distinction between ‘forward-looking’ and ‘backward-looking’ justice, between present disadvantage and historical injustice, between equality and compensation.
Questions about the ongoing impact of historic injustice on social, legal, political institutions must be focus for public discussion and reasoning.
As citizens we have obligations to take responsibility for the way in which past injustices persist in present institutions.
Taking responsibility for the past is a matter of understanding ways in which processes of exclusion are bound up with the moral and political character of contemporary Australian society (appropriate response is shame).
Two ways of thinking about collective responsibility:
1. Focus on unjust benefits to perpetrators and their descendants and unjust burdens on victims and their descendants.
2. Relational approach: collective responsibility bound up with being a member of a political community, having obligations to other members of the community by virtue of that membership, including the obligation to address the way in which past injustices and wrongs shape present moral and political culture.
Otherwise legitimacy of social and political institutions which aim to address social and economic disadvantage will be questionable; social trust required for mutual coexistence in diverse communities will be lacking (p. 371).
To recognise past injustice ‘it is to initiate a process of reinterpreting the grounds of mutual interaction between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians’ (371).
Sparrow (‘History and Collective Responsibility’)
Significance of historical events is often only visible in retrospect, through historical reflection, which reveals connections, patterns among past events, and connections between past events and the present. No neat distinction can be drawn between backwards and forwards looking conceptions of collective responsibility.
Australia has not distanced itself sufficiently from its history of racial injustice for present generations to be considered exempt from responsibility. There is continuity between present practices and past practices of dispossession, extermination and assimilation.
This continuity gives rise to ‘responsibility’ on the part of present generations of Australians for our history. Our community has been shaped and defined by the past: ‘The character of our society now, the laws we live under and the landscape we inhabit, were shaped by the actions of previous generations of Australians’ (p. 354).
Cannot undo past injustices, but can transform their significance by our subsequent actions (e.g. by apology, reparations etc.) which places them in a different historical light, i.e. one in which wrongdoing is recognised and acknowledged. History becomes one of reconciliation rather than continuation of past injustice.
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 11:
Poole, R. (1999). Nation and Identity. Routledge, London, pp. 114-142.
Waldron, J. (1992). 'Superseding Historic Injustice'. Ethics, 103 (1), 4-28.
Sparrow, R. (2000). 'History and Collective Responsibility'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78 (3), 346-359.
Reading Questions
Poole, extract from Nation and Identity
1. What is the current meaning of the term 'multiculturalism', as a fact and as a value? What are the benefits of multiculturalism according to Poole? Can you think of others?
2. How does Poole take identity to be related to culture?
3. What is a 'minority culture'? What are Poole's reasons for thinking there is a need to protect minority cultures (p. 120-1)?
4. Why do we resist claims about cultural assimilation? Why do we nonetheless have to accept a requirement of some extent of assimilation, rather than the state being culturally neutral, according to Poole? Do you think he is right?
5. What important idea stands behind legal sovereignty, and the right of a nation to protect its own borders? Explain in your own words why it can be thought important.
6. What are the potential problems of ideas of national sovereignty?
7. Why does Poole think the past is morally relevant to the present?
8. What are some of the factors Poole considers to weigh into the discussion of Aboriginal land rights? If you can think of any other factors you think should be taken into account, explain why they should be.
9. What is secession? Why does Poole think Aboriginal people have a right to secession? What practical issues does this raise?
10. What do you think it could mean for indigenous Australians to have 'self-determination'?
11. Do you agree that we can have obligations that arise 'not because of what I have or would have done, but because of what I am'? Why or why not? Can you think of your own examples of such obligations?
12. What points about identity does Poole derive from the comparison with Germany and the holocaust?
13. Consider the following question now, and return to it after completing all the readings. Do you agree with Poole that we have a moral obligation to come to terms with our past? Why or why not?
Waldron, 'Superseding Historic Injustice'
14. How is remembering historic injustice bound up with identity, for Waldron?
15. Do you agree that compensations in the present for past injustices play an important symbolic role? Why or why not?
16. How does Nozick think we should respond to historic injustices? What is Waldron's objection?
17. What is the 'contagion of injustice' (p. 11-12) ?
18. What possible arguments does Waldron consider for the claim that entitlements can fade over time? Do you think any of these are good reasons?
19. What does Waldron propose to be the moral basis of a property entitlement? What implication does this have for the continuance through time of these entitlements? Which situations are most likely, on this view, to retain the entitlement over long periods of time?
20. What does Waldron mean by saying that justice is sensitive to circumstances? Why is this likely to be the case in the case of property rights? What does he mean by saying that an injustice can be superseded?
21. Waldron leaves open the possibility that past injustices relating to the expropriation of land have not been superseded by changes in circumstance. What factors could make us think it is superseded? What factors might make us think it is not?
Sparrow, 'History and Collective Responsibility'
22. In what sense can the present depend on the future, as Sparrow claims? What is the significance of extending this idea to past events?
23. How are histories and identities involved with each other in Sparrow's view? Describe their relation.
24. Why should we care about how current actions (both personal, and those of the political community we are part of) will be judged 'by history' according to Sparrow? Do you agree and why or why not?
25. In what senses are current practices continuous with those of the past, with reference to assimilation, extermination and dispossession, according to Sparrow? What is the significance of this continuity and the lack of a 'break with the past'?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Understand the different between compensatory and distributive justice
• Understand the difficulties and worries with the idea of making reparation for historic injustice, and their role in arguments against land rights claims
• Understand some responses to these arguments
WEEK 12
Justice, Immigration and Refugees
Steps to follow this week:
1. Listen to Lectures 23 and 24.
2. Have the Lecture Notes for Week 12 open beside you as you listen.
3. Read the Essential Readings for Week 12.
4. Attempt the Reading Questions (at the end of these notes) and Self-test.
5. Post your questions or thoughts about the material in Discussions.
Audio Lectures
Access the lectures from your Unit’s Study materials RESOURCE MP3 disk.
Have the lecture notes open or printed beside you.
If you are unsure of how to access the files on your Resource MP3 disk, refer to the Start Here section titled 'CD-ROM Resources' (click on the 'Start Here' link on the Home Page).
This week you need to listen to:
Lecture 23
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 23.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 24
(PLAY track PHI110 Lecture 24.mp3 on the RESOURCE MP3 disk.)
Lecture 23
Overview of Lecture:
1. Background Data
o UN Refugee Convention 1951
o Global Statistics
o Response of the developed world
2. What grounds our moral obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers?
o The humanitarian approach
o Objections to the humanitarian approach
1. Background Data
UN Refugee Convention 1951
Article 1 A (excerpt):
'…the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who:
…(2)…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.'
• The convention does not apply to those who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or non-political crimes.
• The convention applies to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin (Article 3).
• The convention entitles refugees to the same treatment as nationals with regards to rights to employment, education, and social security benefits.
Article 31: Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge
'The contracting states shall not impose penalties on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.'
Article 33: Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (“Refoulement”)
'No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.'
Global Statistics
• UNHCR Pres release 16 June 2009: 'UNHCR's annual “2008 Global Trends” report shows the number of people forcibly uprooted by conflict and persecution worldwide stood at 42 million at the end of last year amid a sharp slowdown in repatriation and more prolonged conflicts resulting in protracted displacement. The total includes 16 million refugees and asylum seekers and 26 million people uprooted within their own countries' [internally displaced people] ().
• 'The overwhelming burden of displacement is borne by developing countries… eighty percent of refugees are in the developing world'.
Response of the developed world
In the developed world (including Australia) there is a marked gap between the letter of international refugee law, as agreed in the UN Convention, and the application of that law: a form of "organized hypocrisy" (Gibney 2004, p.229).
For instance:
• Extended mandatory detention including detention of women and children;
• temporary protection visas (until 2008) limiting refugee access to employment, healthcare, social and welfare services;
• excision of territories from migration zone;
• refusing right of entry to ports (in Tampa case);
• forcible refoulement of asylum seekers; and
• current 6 month freeze on assessing claims by Afghan and Sri Lankan asylum seekers (2010);
all violate the UN Convention.
2. What grounds our moral obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers?
a) The Humanitarian approach:
We have a moral obligation (duty) to assist others in need, and to reduce suffering, if the costs to ourselves of doing so are low (cf. Good Samaritanism). This principle specifically holds between strangers.
Refugees are by definition people in need. If the country from which refuge is requested can provide that help without incurring significant cost, then the country is morally obliged to assist.
Manne ("Sending Them Home"): We have particular obligations to those in need if they specifically ask for our assistance ('ethics of proximity').
Gibney (The Ethics and Politics of Asylum): The humanitarian principle "holds that states have an obligation to assist refugees when the costs of doing so are low. This responsibility recognizes… the existence of duties that stem from membership in a single human community." (2004, p.231)
Advantages of the humanitarian approach (Gibney 2004)
It provides a clear specification of the duties of assistance to non-citizens. Priority must be given to those in greatest need, and whose needs can only be satisfied by resettlement.
The "low cost" proviso enables states to balance obligations to provide assistance to non-citizens with a state's other interests and with its obligations to citizens. The "low cost" proviso allows for flexibility and context-specific interpretation and application.
b) Objections to the humanitarian approach
Two populist objections to the humanitarian approach:
1. A policy based on compassion makes a country a 'soft touch' and encourages bogus claims for asylum.
Response: Why should the very few fraudulent claims undermine the deservingness of genuine refugees to humanitarian assistance and resettlement?
2. A policy based on compassion encourages people smuggling and 'illegal' or 'unauthorised' arrivals.
Response: It is justifiable for governments to police people smugglers. However, it is important not to conflate the rights of asylum seekers to refuge with the issue of people smuggling. Note that Article 31 prohibits contracting states from imposing penalties on refugees who enter without authorization.
The national self-determination objection
3. The humanitarian principle must be balanced against a state's other interests and obligations to citizens, including the rights of a nation state to self-determination (e.g. 'border protection', determining who enters the country and the conditions under which they do so).
Populist version of this objection: Public policy cannot be determined just by moral considerations, but also by national self-interest.
Moral partialist version of this objection: A nation state is a cultural and political community. Governments have special obligations to citizens to protect that community, including obligations to determine who can join it and who should be excluded.
Raises questions: What is the state/nation whose rights are at stake? Are there morally justifiable principles of exclusion from the state? On what grounds are people excluded?
Lecture 24
Overview of Lecture:
Recap from previous lecture
3. Citizenship, national identity and self-determination
o Dummett on citizenship and national identity
o Australian Citizenship booklet
o Three conception of citizenship
4. Moral impartialism and open borders
5. Gibney's humanitarian compromise
Recap: The national self-determination objection
See the notes for the previous lecture.
3. Citizenship, national identity and self-determination
What is the state or nation whose rights are at stake?
Dummett (On Immigration and Refugees) distinguishes different principles of exclusion/inclusion that are used by states to determine national identity:
• Religion (e.g. Israel, Islamic states, debate in the EU about whether non-Christian states can be members)
• Ethnicity (e.g. ethnic-based conflict in Fiji)
• Race (e.g. White Australia Policy; apartheid)
• Language (e.g. Quebecois Francophone identity)
Dummett on citizenship and national identity
If national identity is understood as determined by religion, ethnicity, race or language, then many people within the country will be excluded by such a definition of identity.
Two problems with exclusionary approaches to national identity:
1. Such states breed internal alienation and dissension (prudential argument).
2. Minorities ought not to be excluded in this way (moral argument).
People have a right to feel that they 'belong' in the country of which they are citizens and to be able to identify with it. They have a right not to be oppressed, discriminated against, marginalised or treated as 'second-class citizens'. These rights are grounded in the notion that justice involves recognition of the moral equality of all persons.
Dummett: Modes of national identity based on race, religion, ethnicity, inevitably generate 'second class citizens'. National identity should be shaped by ideals such as freedom, equality, and a commitment to cultural pluralism.
Australian Citizenship booklet
Australian Citizenship: Our Common Bond
Australian citizenship characterised in terms of commitment to certain core democratic beliefs:
• respect for the equal worth, dignity and freedom of the individual 'regardless of race, country of origin, gender, sexual preference, marital status, age, disability, heritage, culture, politics, wealth or religion';
• support for parliamentary democracy and the rule of law;
• peacefulness;
• tolerance;
• freedoms: freedom of speech and expression; freedom of religion and secular government; freedom of association;
• equalities: equality under the law; equality of men and women; equality of opportunity.
()
Three conceptions of citizenship
• Citizenship as legal status (involving correlative rights and duties)
• Citizenship identity (membership of a political community)
• Active citizenship (exercising social virtues, e.g. tolerance and civility, and political virtues, e.g. capacity and willingness to engage in public discourse [politics of persuasion rather than coercion])
If national identity is understood in terms of these values, is not clear how national self-determination is threatened by the humanitarian principle, as it applies to refugees and asylum seekers.
4. Moral impartialism and open borders
Dummett's anti-exclusion argument
Dummett derives an open borders policy from his arguments against exclusionary conceptions of citizenship and national identity.
• Are there any morally justifiable grounds for exclusion?
• Yes: States or peoples have a right 'not to be submerged' by migration. For example, they have a right to be protected from deliberate submergence (e.g. as a policy of a colonial state).
• However, the relevance of submergence is less clear if national identity is not based on race, religion, a single culture. In culturally plural societies, people from different races, religions and cultures can be integrated without damaging national identity.
Utilitarian impartialism and open borders
Impartialist (utilitarian, global liberal) responses to the partialist claim that states have special obligations to their citizens, and hence that it is morally justifiable for states to give priority to the interests of citizens in immigration policy:
• Utilitarian equal consideration of interests argument (e.g. Singer and Singer, "The Ethics of Refugee Policy"): Immigration policies should take equally into account the interests of all those affected. There is no moral justification for privileging the interests of citizens.
• The principle of equal consideration of interests obliges a state to accept as many refugees as it can, up to the point where accepting more would cause serious environmental harms or threaten tolerance in a multicultural society.
Liberal impartialism and open borders
Liberal Rights to Freedom of Movement: Joseph Carens ("Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders", 1987) derives the right to free movement, and hence an open borders policy, from Rawls' theory of justice. Drawing on Rawls he argues that principles of justice support a right of free movement between states.
Modern citizenship practices and state control over borders are 'feudal'; people's life prospects are determined by the morally arbitrary fact of their birth place.
In non-ideal contexts, restrictions on free movement are only justifiable on grounds of threats to public order.
5. Gibney's humanitarian compromise between partialism and impartialism
Gibney does not accept the partialist view that it is morally acceptable, on grounds of rights to political self-determination and cultural protection, for states to give moral priority to citizens.
However, the impartialist commitment to open borders is not practically feasible, as policy, in a non-ideal world. Humanitarianism is "a pragmatic and contingent accommodation to the world as we find it" (p. 235); it provides a moral framework for determining the "minimal responsibilities of [liberal] states" to refugees and asylum seekers.
What are the minimal responsibilities of liberal states?
1. To focus efforts on resettling refugees in camps by increasing significantly the intake of camp refugees.
2. To reshape the political environment at both domestic and international levels by:
i. Working to change public attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers (i.e. how the public 'counts the costs' of humanitarian policies).
ii. Promoting international cooperative schemes for sharing the burdens of resettlement.
iii. Working to address the causes of forced migration (e.g. human rights abuses, global inequality, political corruption, ethnic conflicts).
Readings
Readings are available on Macquarie University Library e-Reserve.
Essential Readings for Week 12:
Manne, R. (2004). 'Sending them Home'. Quarterly Essay 13 (2004), 78-91.
Dummett, M. (2001). On Immigration and Refugees. Routledge, London, pp.4-21.
Gibney, M. (2004). The Ethics and Politics of Asylum. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 59-65, 229-237, 243-249.
Reading Questions
Manne, extract from 'Sending Them Home'
1. What is the 'standard hypocrisy' surrounding refugee administration, according to Manne?
2. What two reasons does Manne propose for why the West has retreated from the original spirit of the 1951 Convention?
3. Why is the situation in Australia regarding refugees particularly paradoxical in Manne's view?
4. How is our treatment of asylum seekers analogous to the story of the woman in the taxi?
5. What is the relevance of the proximity of an asylum seeker on Manne's view?
6. What main two arguments does Manne present against the repatriation of refugees or asylum seekers?
7. What is your reaction to the story of Muhammed? What role does the story play in Manne's argument?
Dummett: extract from On Immigration and Refugees
8. What are some of the criteria states use to determine who may or may not become a citizen? Do you think some of these are more just than others? If so, what distinguishes just from unjust criteria?
9. Why does Dummett think the British way of teaching history, by teaching the history of a land rather than a people, is admirable?
10. Why is the customary distinction between a nation and a people circular in the context of questions about self-determination?
11. What does it mean to be, in Dummett?s phrase, ?a first-class citizen??
12. On what grounds does Dummett object to the contention that ?people have a right to be governed well, but that, granted that they are governed well, they can have no legitimate objection to whoever it is that governs them? (11) ?
13. Why does Dummett think that democracy should not just be a matter of doing what the majority wants, if a democratic system is to be founded on justice?
14. Under what circumstances, according to Dummett, might a culture be in danger of being submerged? Why is submergence unlikely for most cultures?
15. Why does Dummett believe that a nation has a right not to be submerged? To what extent should this right have implications for immigration policy?
Gibney, extract from The Ethics and Politics of Asylum
16. What is impartialism? What is partialism? Define each with reference to the claims each view makes about states.
17. What do global liberals claim about entrance policies? Name and describe one basis that may be offered in support of a global liberal view.
18. In what senses is citizenship in the modern world similar to feudal status in the mediaeval world, as Carens argues? Do you agree?
19. What do the global liberal and utilitarian positions on entrance policies have in common? What grounds for limiting entrance to a state could a utilitarian accept? What grounds for limiting entrance could a global liberal accept?
20. Why does Gibney compromise an ideal with the needs of practice? What do you think the role of ideal positions is, in a non-ideal world, with regard to this kind of issue?
21. What is the humanitarian principle? How does it allow a compromise between partialism and impartialism?
22. Gibney's second practical principle is the duty to encourage public attitudes that are more receptive to increasing refugee intake. What role do you think the government currently plays in shaping public opinion on refugees in Australia? What role do you think it should play, if any?
Post your thoughts or questions on this week's material, in Discussions (click on 'Discussions' in the left Course Menu and then on the Weekly Topic).
Review of Skills for this week
You should now be able to:
• Understand the senses in which there are disparities between the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and current policies in many Western signatories to the Convention
• Explain the difference between a humanitarian approach and a justice approach to thinking about asylum seeker policy
• Understand the argument that the right of a state to self-determination implies a right to limit entrance
• Recognise some of the claims on which policies of exclusion may rely
Week 13: Revision
This week:
There are no lectures or readings for this week. Please use the time to work on your final assessment.
You may also wish to:
• Revisit the content for any previous weeks you think need consolidation.
• Post any further questions, or thoughts about the unit overall, in Discussions.
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