BOOK CHAPTERS - UMass



Annotated Table Of Contents

Creative Model Construction in Scientists and Students:

The Role of Imagery, Analogy, and Mental Simulation

(Dordrecht: Springer, 2008)

John J. Clement (clement@educ.umass.edu)

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Fig. 15.4 Extreme case for imagery enhancement generated by subject: “It just seems to me as though it [a longer rod] would twist more…And again, now I'm confirming that.. As I bring my hand up closer and closer to the original place where I hold it, I-I realize very clearly that it will get harder and harder to twist.”

PART ONE: ANALOGIES, MODELS AND CREATIVE LEARNING IN EXPERTS AND STUDENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction: A Hidden World of Nonformal Expert Reasoning

This chapter motivates the study of nonformal methods experts use during the process of creative theory formation rather than those they display in polished articles after the fact, and describes the method of video taped think aloud protocols used in this study. The tapes capture scientifically trained experts in the act of: mentally performing imaginative spatial transformations such as deforming, cutting, and reassembling objects in novel ways; and generating creative analogies, extreme cases, explanatory models, and thought experiments. The book aims to document the fact that such methods are actually used in scientific thinking.

Section I: Expert Reasoning and Learning via Analogy

Later in sections of the book I want to argue that processes used in analogical reasoning can be centrally important for in scientific insights and other processes involved in scientific model construction, so individual analogies are the main topic of the first section of the book. Case studies are presented showing experts generating spontaneous analogies to a familiar physical system that helps them explain a target problem situationunderstand a poorly understood system. This and the next section are written at the level of describing higher order processes without a commitment to an underlying type of representation, whether imagistic, discrete-symbolic, or otherwise. Later sections provide evidence for imagistic representations.

Chapter 2: Major Subprocesses Involved in Spontaneous Analogical Reasoning:

Most previous studies of analogy focus on cases where part of the analogy is provided and the subject is left to complete or utilize the analogy. This study documents the use of spontaneous analogies, where all parts of the analogy are formed by the subject spontaneously in response to a target problem. This chapter uses examples from expert problem solving transcripts to introduce analogies as one type of non-formal reasoning. Four major subprocesses involved in the use of analogies are identified in the examples from protocols: generating the analogy, understanding the analogous case, determining whethergauging the validity of the analogy relation is valid, and applying findings from the analogy.

Chapter 3: Methods Experts use to Generate Analogies

Protocols from ten experts solving an unfamiliar physics problem are examined and a large variety of31 spontaneous analogies (31) are identified in the solutions. Associative access is the standard method for analogy generation in most models of analogical reasoning. Three methods of generating analogies are identified, listed from least common to most common: generation via principles, associations, and transformations.In contrast, in the present study the method of using a transformation of the target case was more common than generation via association. Some of the analogous cases generated via transformations are of special interest as creative novel cases that are invented by the subject rather than recalled from memory.

Chapter 4: Methods Experts use to Evaluate an Analogy Relation

Once scientists generate an analogyone generates an analogous case for a situation, how does one they know whether the analogy is valid? This chapter discusses examples of experts evaluating the validity of their analogies during problem solving. The methods they use to do this are sometimes quite creative. The standard method of evaluating analogy relationships in previous studies is to use a mapping of discrete symbolic elements between the base and the target of the analogy. One method involvesThis chapter identifies an additional a "bridging" strategy, for generatinginvolving generating a second intermediate analogy chains of analogie.s; These appear in both science and mathematics solutions and may or may not depend on mapping as the only underlying process. another involves the matching of key features. An additional section showsThe chapter also examines how these techniques were applied by Newton and a predecessor of Galileo. Ordinarily we associate creativity with hypothesis and analogy generation, but these bridging cases demonstrate that analogy evaluation can also be a very creative process.

Chapter 5: Expert Methods for Developing an Understanding of an Analogous Case and Transferring Applying Findings

In the simplest instances the subject will have direct knowledge about the source case for an analogy that is immediately accessible and sufficient to make predictions. In other instances, however, thesome cases one’s understanding of the source casebase of an analogy is insufficient and must be actively developed by the subject in order to make progress. This chapter discusses subprocesses involved in understanding the analogous case, and applying findings. It describes several possible ways of completing each of these processes.

Section II: Expert Model Construction and Scientific Insight Creative Model Construction and Scientific Insight in Experts

This section examines expert subjects in the act of model construction. The finding that analogies are a means by which key prior knowledge schemas can play a role in model construction provides an answer to the question of why expert subjects go to the trouble of using analogies difficult-to-construct analogies when the effort is high and the payoff uncertain.

Chapter 6: Case Study of Model Construction and Criticism Model Construction Cycles in Expert Reasoning

The major extended case study in this chapter concerns a subject who produces evidence of havinggoes through a significant scientific conceptual changeinsight during a solutionin modeling an unfamiliar system. It describes and illustrates a basic pattern observed in expert subjects who are successful indocuments a central method for changing their conceptual understanding of a sitdoing thisuation: -- a "model construction cycle" of model construction, criticism, and refinementgeneration, evaluation, and modification which is closely related to the hypothesis formation, criticism, and revision cycle sometimes referred to as "scientific method." However,Because subjects had virtually no access to new empirical information, these model construction evolution methods processes documented here are are largely non-empirical, in contrast to the empirical testing usually associated with scientific method. Both this and the next chapter examine how nonformal reasoning methods can combine to generate new scientific models and hypotheses.

Chapter 7: Creativity and Scientific Insight in S2’s the Case Study for S2

A powerfuln "Aha" episode is examined in order to judge whether to describe it as a "Eureka" event of extraordinary reasoning, or some weaker more ordinary form of scientific insightthinking. This chapter discusses the issue of the pace of theory change in scienceprovides an initial discussion of the role of insight and creativity in scientific thinking. The persistence of the subject's initial model and the observed tension between it and a perceived anomaly may be partially analogous to the persistence of a paradigm in the face of anomalies in science. An important function of the strategy of searching for analogous cases is that it may help the subject break away from such a persistent, but inadequate, model during an insight episode. Such a “mini-revolution” can occasionally complement the evolution cycle described in Chapter parisons are made to Darwin's methods and to Kuhn's descriptions of revolutions in science.

Section III: Nonformal Reasoning in Students and Implications for Instruction

This section focuses on the development of explanatory scientific models in instruction. Previous reports have emphasized differences between experts and novices with little attention given to processes they use in common. Evidence is presented which documentss novice students spontaneously using some of the same reasoning and learning strategies as experts during problem solving. Thus there are important similarities between experts and novices, and this finding questions the previous exclusive emphasis on differences.. Also, cCase studies of tutoring sessions are also presented where these processes are used to help students deal with deep seateddeep-seated preconceptions and develop new mental models, illustrating how important nonformal, non-empirical processes are as scientific thinking skills that should be learned by students. . It is argued that instructional approaches need to be revised so that they develop model construction skills.

Chapter 8: Spontaneous Analogies Generated Produced by Students Solving Science Problems

This chapter turns to the study of student problem solvers. Thirty-seven analogies produced spontaneously by a sample of 15 college freshmen while solving problems are analyzed. Several kinds types of analogies are identified, including personal vs. physical analogies, and invented thought experiments vs. analogies based on authority or observation. The main conclusion of this chapter is that Rreasoning by analogy appears to be is a natural form of reasoning for many beginning college students of the kind we interviewed. This suggests that analogies could be utilized in instruction to a greater extent than is currently done.

Chapter 9: Case Study of a Student Who Counters Changes And Improves His Own Misconception by Generating Inventing a Chain of Analogies

This chapter analyzes a protocol from a college freshman who is able to spontaneously correct a difficult mispreconception on his own. He does this by generating a remarkable series of analogous thought experiments and extreme cases which argue for the correct view on the basis of his other physical intuitions. In doing this, he exhibits many of the same creative reasoning patterns as those that were documented in experts in the previous sections above. The protocol provides some initial encouragement for the possibility of utilizing such reasoning patterns during instruction. The study richness of the issues surrounding this protocol suggests that rather than starting instruction with operational definitions and equations, it may be advantageous to raise a specific problem and consider analogies and intuitive arguments at a qualitative level first.

Chapter 10: Using Analogies and Models in Instruction to Deal with Students' Preconceptions (with by John Clement and David Brown)

This chapter presents case study evidence that some of the strategies experts use to overcome conceptual difficulties in problem solving can be used in instruction to overcome the conceptual difficulties of students. It presents an analysis of two taped tutoring sessions with students who are able to overcome mispreconceptions in physics through the use ofby considering and evaluating analogies and models suggested by the instructor.

PART TWO: ADVANCED USES OF IMAGERY AND INVESTIGATION METHODS IN SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS

Section IV: Transformations, Imagery And Physical Intuition In Experts And Students

This section lays groundwork for the rest of the book by examining evidence for the use of spatial transformations, imagery, physical intuitions, and imagistic simulations in protocols.

Chapter 11: Analogy, Extreme Cases and Spatial Transformations in Mathematical Problem Solving by Experts

This chapter extends several of the findings of the previous chapters from the physical domain to the mathematical/geometric domain. Special attention is given to imaginative creative spatial transformations (such as deforming, cutting, and reassembling) used by experts to transform a difficult problem into an analogous, familiar problem or to reduce the problem to much simpler cases.

Chapter 12: Depictive Gestures and Other Case Study Evidence for Mental Simulationthe Use of Imagery in Scientists and Students

Several cThis chapter attempts to identify new types of evidence for imagery use from think-aloud protocols. ase studies are presented where problem solvers make depictive hand motions during the solution. An initial set of descriptors imagery indicators from think aloud protocols, includingthat also includes certain types of (depictive) the hand motionsgestures, are presentedis developed (see Fig. 15.4 above). These can provide someProtocols are analyzed which provide evidence for the use of imagery and dynamic imagery, as well as for the importance of such processes to the solutions. Evidence suggests that two different types of knowledge are related to the motions: spatial intuitions about motions of objects, and physical intuitions, e.g. where forces exerted by objects are represented by analogy to muscular forces.

Chapter 13: Physical Intuition, Imagistic Simulation, and Implicit Knowledge

Often, the simple physical system in a source analog is so familiar that its behavior is predicted by physical intuition. In this case, no academic knowledge is needed or used to understand the source analog, and its behavior appears self-evident to the subject. This raises the question of the nature of such elemental physical intuitions. Transcript evidence is presented which supports the view that physical intuitions can be based on perceptual motor schemas that can generate and manipulate imagistic representations, and that these structures play an important role in the thinking of these subjects. Physical intuition does not refer here to some magical or unexplainable faculty that is beyond investigation. Rather, it refers specifically to qualitative knowledge about the physical world which is less formal than statements of accepted physical theory, but which nevertheless can be important for understanding. This chapter provides more evidence on the "presence and importance of imagery" question but also attempts to go beyond it by asking what generates the imagery. In contrast to some views of physics expertise, transcripts indicate that part of the knowledge used by expert problem solvers consists of concrete intuitions rather than abstract verbal principles or equations. They also suggest that such self-evaluated physical intuitions are based on perceptual motor schemas and that these intuition schemas can be used to generate predictive imagistic simulations, as a type of embodied knowledge. In some cases, implicit knowledge in an intuition schema can be tapped as previously undescribed expectations in the schema generate images that can be interrogated and described, thereby being converted to explicit knowledge. This begins toThis analysis provides an initial foundation to address the Thought Experiment Paradox, stated as: “How can findings that carry conviction result from a new experiment conducted entirely fundamental question of how people can gain new knowledge by running a mental simulation. within the head?”

Section V: Advanced Uses Of Imagery In Analogies, Thought Experiments, And Models

This section uses the findings from the previous section on imagery to analyze more deeply the more complex processes of analogy and scientific model construction. These Components discussed include the use of imagistic simulation, spatial reasoning, imagistic transformations, thought experiments, and symmetry arguments used in constructing analogies and models.

Chapter 14: The Use of Analogies, Imagery, and Thought Experiments in Both Qualitative and Quantitative Mathematical Model Construction by Experts

This chapter presents a composite dialogue of transcript excerpts that displays a surprisingly rich variety of qualitative and quantitative reasoning patterns used by experts to form aprogressively deeper and deeper understandings of a physical system. The dialogue illustrates the power of nonformal reasoning processes to gradually expand the modeling of the problem situation in five stages from initial tentative analogies and dilemmas to roughly explanatory models, then fully connected models, then geometric, and quantitative models. The methods, includeing creative spatial transformations in highly focused and creative thought experiments that help discount an original models and develop the final model causally, geometrically, and finally quantitatively.

Chapter 15: Thought Experiments and Imagistic Simulation in Plausible Reasoning

Various components and benefits ofMechanisms for thought experiments for modeling are discussed in an attempt to explain the paradoxical ability to conduct such experiments in the head with conviction, as if they were real experiments. The theory developed for processes used in untested thought experiments is supported by data on “simulation enhancement” strategies used by different subjects to improve their confidence in a thought experiment.

Previous historical work on thought experiments has hypothesized that they may play an important role in scientific discovery and evaluation. What has not been previously examined systematically are the underlying cognitive processes and the specific roles that thought experiments can play on the basis of analyses of expert think aloud protocols. In addition, the question of how thought experiments may utilize imagery, mental simulations, or mental schemas has not been sorted out. This chapter provides initial empirical grounding for a set of distinctive meanings for the concepts of 'untested thought experiment', ‘evaluative Gedanken experiment’, 'analogy', and 'explanatory model’, and an analysis of how they each depend in different ways on imagistic simulation. The theory offers a description of several sources of conviction in such experiments that addresses the thought experiment paradox mentioned above (See Fig. 15.3 below). Several aspects of this imagery based theory receive further support from the phenomenon of imagery enhancement – in transcripts where experts actually create special cases in order to enhance their imagery.

Chapter 16: An Punctuated Evolutionary Model of Investigation and Model Construction Processes

Progressive layers of expert model construction in the composite protocol in Chapter 14 are explained by a larger three-part model of the scientific investigation process., centered on model evolution (GEM) cycles of model generation, evaluation, and modification. The process can produces the five observed stages of initial descriptions, qualitative models, and quantitative modelsstages identified in Chapter 14 by coordinating the use of analogies, imagistic simulations, and Gedanken experiments. The resulting interactive process is described as an abductive and primarily evolutionary one rather than as simply inductive or deductive. A new stage, imagistic alignment for a fully connected mechanistic model, is analyzed that provides a bridge between qualitative and geometric modeling. Other passages show that many of the analogical, imagistic, modeling cycle, and thought experiment techniques used in qualitative modeling can have parallel counterparts in mathematical modeling. The investigation strategy also relies on a partially decentralized control process with modulated divergence that can account for occasional sudden insights (punctuated evolution).

Chapter 17: Imagistic Processes in Analogical Reasoning: Transformations and Dual Simulations

Using examples from expert protocols, this chapter describes the role of conserving transformations and dual imagistic simulations in the evaluationolution of analogies-- as possible alternatives to the classical mapping-based view of analogical reasoning. This includes evidence for “overlay simulations” in which the behaviors of two dynamic images are compared by overlaying one on the other. The use of imagistic transformations in generating and modifying analogies and models is also examined.

Chapter 18: How Grounding in Runnable Schemas Contributes to the Production of Flexible Scientific Models in Experts and Students

Integrating many of the previous findings in the book, the following more speculative hypothesis is proposed: a major reason that expert subjects put time and effort into risky analogical reasoning processes is to attempt to make their models runnable (dynamically imageable). Both expert and student This is done bytranscripts are examined showing subjects grounding a model in more primitive schemata or source analogues that are already runnable. They appear to transfer dynamically imageable schema elements from a source analogue to a more general model, a process termed “transfer of runnability” that contrasts with discrete symbolic inference. It is suggested that dynamically imageable models lead to a number of important cognitive and scientific benefits, and they are therefore seenthat this provides reasons to see them as central to conceptual understanding in science for both experts and students.

Section VI: Conclusions

This section summarizes findings on expert nonformal reasoning thatreasoning that can lead to scientific insights and discoveries. It also discusses the extent to which there are similar processes in students, and discusses implications for education.

Chapter 19: Summary Of Findings On Plausible Reasoning And Learning In Experts I: Basic TopicsFindings

The largest questions addressed by the this book are: How do scientistexperts develop form new theoretical models? How do creative insights occur? Basic findings from sections 1, 2, and 4 of the book in three areas that lay a foundation for answering these questions are summarized in this chapter from sections 1, 2, and 4 of the book. Experts exhibit the use of spontaneously generated analogies that can be novel and provocative; they can also exhibit more complex model construction cycles of generation, criticism, and revision that can produce both sudden insights and smoother evolutionary periods (see Fig. 21.1 below). Five different functions of analogy are identified indicating that the relationship between analogy and explanatory model construction is more complex than commonly realized. Scientific insights are real and can be documented, but some major aspects of them can be explained cognitively; for example the “evolution cycle” can break down when an expert gets “stuck” in an unproductive model but an analogy or visual transformation can help them break out of such a rut suddenly; this kind of pattern can be seen as “punctuated evolution”. More fundamentally, experts also exhibit evidence for the use of schema driven imagistic simulations where the subject imagines a case or mechanism and attempts to “run" its behavior. By manipulating imagistic representations, subjects can sometimes improve and enhance mental simulations. The processes above constitute a collection of nonformal reasoning processes that can power scientific model construction. This hidden world of qualitative and nonformal, but powerful reasoning processes contrasts with the image of scientists as abstract thinkers who use only formal logic and mathematics.

Chapter 20: Summary Of Findings On Plausible Reasoning And Learning In Experts II: Advanced Topics

This chapter summarizes findings on how the above reasoning processes and imagistic representations can interact with imagistic representations to actually construct a new theory. Processes where imagery indicators were observed are described at several hierarchical levels: 1) individual imagistic simulations; 2) nonformal reasoning operations, such as analogy, that can utilize imagistic simulation; 3) larger model construction processes that utilize the nonformal reasoning operations. The chapter builds on these findings to propose possible advantages of imagistic representations for scientific theory construction. To name just a few: images have the ability to represent multiple spatial constraints simultaneously; grounding in imagistic simulation processes at the lowest level can percolate up to provide many advantages for the expert at the higher levels of scientific model construction and application; and once higher level models become grounded in this way, they in turn can become runnable building blocks for grounding and assembling even more sophisticated theories. The chapter proposes the hypothesis that the ability to generate mental simulations is what gives qualitative scientific models their power of flexibility in application and future growth as a form of adaptive expertise.

Chapter 21: Creativity In Experts, Nonformal Reasoning, And Educational Applications

The larger question of how experts used creativity effectively is discussed. Although nonformal reasoning modes are heuristic individually weak in the sense that they, unlike deductions, are not guaranteed to work or produce truths valid inferences from givens, they can combine in powerful ways to meet the challenge of fostering both creativity and validity at the same time during model construction. Diagrams illustrating the present view of creative model construction provide an image of a considerable number of nonformal processes that must work together in order for this to succeed (e.g. Fig. 21.1, 21.2 below). Imagistic transformations and simulations expand the potential for divergent creativity greatly. But demanding precisely coherent and connected imagistic models also deepens the capacity for stringent criticism. This system can be beautifully balanced and modulated in experts, so as to provide varying proportions of divergence—volatile divergence at an early stage or focused convergence in a later stage of a solution.

The analysis of expert protocols leads to an expanded model of conceptual change processes in science. Similarities between novice and expert reasoning processes that have been documented elsewhere in the book are reviewed. Evidence indicating that these processes can be utilized in the classroom to foster the construction of qualitative models is summarized along with other evidence indicating that these processes can be utilized in the classroom. Major implications include: using mental simulation, and imagistic forms of analogy, abduction, and model based reasoning to foster conceptual change and sense-making; and using model construction cycles as central to the development of students’ scientific inquiry skills. In this view, qualitative, nonformal reasoning involving dynamic imagery plays a key role in both scientific thinking and student learning. Finally, findings are reviewed thatthe data in this book reveal some expert processes one would not expect to see in laymen, but they do not point to processes that are unexplainable. indicate that Creative theory construction in talented experts is described as lying between the ordinary and the extraordinary; in some cases it is sophisticated and remarkable, even though it can be seen as a developed skill that had its origins in natural reasoning.

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Fig. 21.1 Some major non-empirical subprocesses involved in explanatory model construction

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Fig. 15.3 Imagistic simulation process with possible benefits on the right and four origins of conviction on the left

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Fig. 21.2 A balanced system for productive creativity: how a coalition of seemingly "weak" non-formal methods can overcome the dilemma of fostering both creativity and validity during model construction major aspects of creative processes in experts are neither unnatural nor unexplainable. This leads to the conclusion that scientific thinking appears to be an extension of natural forms of reasoning. Talented experts have the capacity to alternate between playful and divergent conjectural thinking and hard-nosed convergent and critical thinking. This cycle of conjecture, criticize, and improve is somewhat reminiscent of biological evolution, but it is in many ways more intelligent than evolution, and is supplemented by strategies for “strategic” or “contained” divergence, and diagnostically guided improvement.

This means that there is a large potential for engaging students in these processes. If this can be done, one can envision courses helping students experience the power of scientific reasoning, the feeling of sense-making, and the acquisition of models that are flexible and powerful, where learning science is seen as an extension of one's natural impulse to understand and make sense of the world, rather than as an isolated academic exercise.

A variety of types of reasoning are summarized where imagery indicators were observed. For example, analogies can be generated by imagistic transformations, and explanatory models can be modified in the same way. Analogies can be evaluated via a variety of imagistic methods, as opposed to a single mapping process. And models can be run and evaluated using extended imagistic simulations. The chapter then builds on these findings to speculate on possible advantages of imagistic representations for scientific theory construction. The most advanced expert use of analogies documented here was to make possible the transfer of runnable simulations from elemental schemas to newly constructed explanatory models that then become runnable (capable of generating imagistic simulations). These efforts can be explained by hypothesizing that the ability to generate mental simulations is what gives models their power of flexibility in application and future growth.

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