Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from ...

[Pages:23]Norms,culture,and worldpolitics: insightsfromsociology's institutionalismMarthaFinnemore

W. RichardScott,JohnWVM. eyer,and Associates,eds. 1994.Institutional Environmenatnd OrganizationsS:tructuraClomplexitaynd Individualism. ThousandOaks, Calif.:Sage Publications. GeorgeM. Thomas,JohnW. Meyer,Francisco0. Ramirez,and JohnBoli, eds. 1987.InstitutionSaltructureC:onstitutinSgtate,Societya,nd theIndividual.NewburyPark,Calif.:Sage Publications. AlbertBergesen,ed. 1980.StudiesoftheModem World-SystemNe. w York: Academic Press.

Internationarl elationsscholarshave become increasinglyinterestedin norms ofbehavior,intersubjectivuenderstandingsc,ulture,identitya,nd othersocial featuresofpoliticallife.However,ourinvestigationlsargelyhavebeen carried out in disciplinaryisolation.We tendto treatour argumentsthatthesethings "matter"as discoveriesand researchinto social phenomenaas foraysinto unchartedterritoryH.owever,scholarswithinthe fieldsof internationallaw, historya,nthropologya,nd sociologyhave alwaysknownthatsocial realities influencebehavior,and each fieldhas incorporatedthesesocial constructions in differenwtaysintoresearchprograms.

Sociologistsworkingin organizationtheoryhave developed a particularly powerfusletofargumentasbouttherolesofnormsand cultureininternational lifethatpose directchallengestorealistandliberaltheoriesinpoliticalscience. Theirargumentslocate causal forcein an expandingand deepeningWestern world culturethat emphasizes Weberian rationalityas the means to both

This essaybenefitedgreatlyfromcommentsbyMichael Barnett,JohnBoli, BarryBuzan, Eva Buzsa, Lynn Eden, Ann Florini,Elizabeth Kier, FriedrichKratochwil,JeffLegro, Jonathan Mercer,JohnMeyer,JohnOdell, RichardPrice,ThomasRisse-Kappen,VolkerRittbergerJ,ames N. Rosenau,ScottSagan,YaseminSoysal,David Strang,NinaTannenwald,HongyingWang,Steve Weber,AlexanderWendt,and frommaterialsupportbythe Social Science Research Council/ MacArthurFoundationProgramon Peace and Securityina ChangingWorld.

IntemationaOl rganization50,2, Spring1996,pp. 325-47 ? 1996byThe 10 Foundationand theMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology

326 InternationaOl rganization

justice, definedas equality,and progress,definedas wealth accumulation. These worldculturalrulesconstituteactors-includingstates,organizations, and individuals-and definelegitimateor desirablegoals forthemto pursue. Worldculturalnormsalso produceorganizationaland behavioralsimilarities across the globe that are not easily explained by traditionalparadigmsin politicalscience. Because theycall these culturalnormsand rules "institutions,"theapproachhasbeen named"institutionalistb"ythoseworkingwithin it.

This essayprovidesan overviewof sociology'sinstitutionalismand explores itsimplicationfs orthestudyofworldpolitics.At theoutsetitshouldbe noted that sociologistsuse the term"institution"in verydifferenwt ays than do rational-choicescholarsor historicalinstitutionalistesm, phasizingthe social and cognitivefeaturesof institutionrsatherthanstructuraalnd constraining features.Incommensurabledefinitionms ean thatdespitesimilaritieisn labeling,these approaches-all called institutionalist-havelittlein common.In fact,rational-choicescholarsworkingon positivetheoriesofinstitutionosr the new institutionaelconomicsare not institutionalistast all in the sociological sense(and viceversa).1

Sociology's institutionalismshould interestinternationalrelations (IR) scholarsin politicalscienceforseveralreasons.First,it challengesdominant paradigmsin politicalscience directly.It providesa system-levetlheoretic frameworkwithwhichto analyzeinternationaploliticsand generatestestable hypothesesabout internationabl ehaviorthatcompetewiththose of realism and liberalism.These hypothesespredictsimilaritiesin behaviorcaused by commonglobalculturew, hererealismorliberalismwouldexpectdifferenceisn behaviorby differentlsyituatedactorswithdifferenitnterestsT. he factthat institutionalistesxplore their hypotheseswith data-intensivequantitative methodsnotusuallyassociatedwithworkon normsand cultureinIR butmuch admired by skepticsof culturalargumentsintensifiesthe institutionalists' challenge. Explanatoryclaims made by realistsand liberals must address institutionalisatlternativeisftheyare tobe persuasive.

Second,institutionalisatrgumentspeak directlyto a numberoftheoretical approachesbeingdevelopedoutsidetheconfinesof theneorealist-neoliberal debatethathas dominatedU.S. IR scholarshipI.nstitutionalisctoncernsabout theexpansionofWesternworldcultureare sharedbyEnglishschoolscholars investigatingthe expansionof the West and the natureof what theyhave termedinternationaslociety.2Institutionalistsa'rgumentsalso lead themto investigateglobalizingphenomenaand the growingpower of individualsin waysthatinvitecomparisonwiththeworkofJamesRosenau, Michael Ziirn,

1. Jepperson1991 provides an excellent discussion of the sociological understandingof institutionasnd institutionalismF.or comparisonsof thevariousinstitutionalismsse,e DiMaggio and Powell1991;and Hall and Taylor1994.

2. See Bull 1977;Bull and Watson1984;Gong 1984;and Buzan 1993.

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Ernst Otto Czempiel, and Philip Cerny.3Both the English school and globalizationscholarsmay quarrelwiththe way institutionalisttsreatthese phenomena.Englishschoolscholarsmaybe uncomfortablwe iththesweeping powerand determinismofthesociologistsa' rgumentsT. hose interestedinthe processofglobalizationand individuationmaybe putoffbytheinstitutionalists' claim thatthisprocess happens in conjunctionwith,ratherthan at the expenseof,increasingstateauthorityB. ut in bothcases thesedifferencecsan and shouldbe settledempiricallythroughcoordinatedresearch.

Third,whileit sharessome featuresof constructivisatrgumentsin political science,sociology'sinstitutionalismprovidesa muchricherand moredetailed theoreticafl ramewortkhanhasconstructivismSo.ciologistsspecifythesubstantivecontentof social structureT. hey do more than simplyargue thatsocial structurematters;theytell us what the social structureis. Institutionalists' specificationof world culture (the social structure)as having particular Westernand Weberiancomponentshas yieldedhypothesesthatcan be tested empiricallyi;ndeed,theyalreadyhave been testedin the large and growing institutionalisrtesearchprogram.

Further,the institutionalistssp' ecificationof social structureis global and all-encompassingI.t permeatesall aspects of politicaland social life in all states. Political science research on norms and culture has tended to be structuredaround specificissue-areas and thereforeargues that particular normsmatterin particularissue-areas. Constructivisthsave not made an integratedargumentabout how the various norms in differentareas fit togetherT. hislackmaybe a legacyofregimesscholarshipw, hichprovidedthe theoreticalframeworkformuchearlyresearchon norms,since regimeswere issue-specifibcydefinition.W4 ithoutsuchan argumentaboutthecontentofa systemicsocial structure,constructivismcannot provide an alternativeto systemictheories.The sociologistsclaimto have done this.As I will discuss below,constructivistins politicalscience have reason to be concernedabout theirclaims-not because theyare beingoutflankedb,utbecause thesociological specificationand researchprogrammarginalizepolitics.

Fourth,sociology'sinstitutionalismincorporatesand endogenizeshistorical changes ratherthan abstractingfromthem.The focus of most realistand liberalIR scholarsis on developinggeneralizedprinciplesof interactionthat applyregardlessoftimeand place. Theiremphasisis on thewaysinwhich,for example,Thucydides'politicsare like thoseof Metternichw, hichare in turn likethoseofHenryKissingerT. he emphasisis on whatis thesame overtime, notwhatis differenHt.istoricalchangecreatesanomaliesintheseanalyses;itis notpartofthem.Institutionalistasre interestedin developinggeneralizations about historicalchange.They emphasizethewaysin whichstates'goals and behaviorand eventheirverynaturesare deeplyshaped byprevalentpolitical

3. See Rosenau 1990;Zurn 1995;Rosenau and Czempiel1992;and Cerny1995. 4. Krasner1983,1.

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ideas and social normsof a given time in history.Further,theyofferan argumenta,lbeita sketchyone,aboutthedynamicsofthischange.

Finally,institutionalisatrgumentsabout global culturebear directlyon recentpolicydebates. Ratherthana "clash of civilizations"emergingas the fundamentadl ynamicoffutureworldpolitics,institutionalirstesearchprovides powerfulevidenceof global culturalhomogenization.S5cholarsmayquarrel abouthowto operationalizecivilizationand culture-indeed,theyare already doing so-but institutionalisths ave both an argumentand evidence to contributeto this-debate. They are less clear, however,about whatcultural homogenizationimpliesforglobal order and stabilityI. returnto thisissue below.

The firstsectionof thisarticleprovidesa briefoverviewof institutionalist argumentsand theirresearchprogramT. o clarifythenatureand implications of these argumentsI, contrastthemwithothersbetterknownto American politicalscientistsW. hilesociology'sinstitutionalismhas structuraslimilarities to ImmanuelWallerstein'sapproachand sharessubstantiveinterestswiththe English school, it is fundamentallydifferentfromboth and fromother argumentps oliticalscientisths aveencountered.6

The second halfof thisarticleexplorestheimplicationsof the sociological approachforpoliticalscienceresearch.Sociology'sinstitutionalismallowsus to ask questionsaboutfeaturesofinternationaploliticsthatare assumedawayby otherparadigms.However,some of the answersit providesare not likelyto satisfypoliticalscientistsT. he articlecloseswithsomerecommendationasbout ways in whichpoliticalscientistscan engage and challengethe sociological approachthatmightbenefitbothdisciplines.

Overviewofsociology'sinstitutionalism

Cultureand organizations

Institutionalisatrgumentds atefromthemid-1970swhena groupat Stanford Universityinterestedin cross-nationalanalyses of political and economic change began to explore the relationshipbetween formalorganizational structureasnd culture.7Prevailingtheoriesaboutbureaucraciesand organizationsheld that,indeed, culturehad littleimpacton those entities.In fact, formalbureaucraticorganizationscomprisedthe antithesisof culture;they were technical,rational,and thereforeculture-neutralT. hey transcended culture.

5. See Huntington1993;Ajami 1993; Bartley1993;Binyan1993; KirkpatrickW, eeks,and Piel 1993;and Mahbubani1993.

6. See Wallerstein1974a; 1974b;and 1980. 7. For a good discussionof the intellectualrootsof institutionaalnalysissee DiMaggio and Powell 1991.

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The Stanfordgroupchallengedthatview.Prevailingtheoriesexplainedthe rise,forma,nd spreadofformalbureaucraticorganizationisnfunctionatlerms. FollowingMax Weber,theconventionawl isdomheldthatrationalizedbureaucraticstructurews ere the mostefficienatnd effectivwe ayto coordinatethe complexrelationsinvolvedin moderntechnicalwork.Expandingmarketsand technologicacl hangescreateincreasinglycomplexmanagement asks.Bureaucraticorganizationafl ormsmustalso thenexpandtocoordinatetheseactivities acrossmoreandmoreaspectsofsocietyB. ureaucraticorganizationwas seen as the only way to divide labor, specifyresponsibilitiesa,nd institutionalize coordinationand decisionmakinginrationaland efficienwtays.

The problemwiththisviewwas thatbureaucraticorganizationshavespread evenmorequicklythanthemarketsand technologythatwerethoughtto have createdtheneed forthem.Cross-nationalanalysesof politicaland economic change,especiallyin the developingworld,made it abundantlyclear thatthe worldwas beingbureaucratizedand organizedmuchfasterthanitwas being developedeconomicallyor technologically.F8urther,the linkbetweenformal organizationasltructure-theblueprintforhowthebureaucracyis supposedto function-and the organization'sday-to-dayactivitieswas oftenveryloose. Organizationtheorisths adrecognizedthisearlier,butcross-nationaalnalysesespeciallythosedealingwithdevelopingcountries-underscoredthepoint.If bureaucraciesdo notactaccordingtotheirrationalizedformalstructurest,hen the efficiencyof rational formalstructurecannot be the reason for their proliferation.

The alternativexplanationdevelopedbyMeyerand hiscolleaguesemphasized the environmenotf theseorganizationsF. ormalbureaucraticstructures didnotspreadas a resultoftheirfunctionavlirtuesas efficienctoordinatorsof complexrelationships(theymay or may not be so) but because the wider environmenstupportsand legitimizesrationalbureaucracyas a social good. Organizationsexist,proliferatea,nd havetheformtheydo notbecause theyare efficienbtutbecause theyare externallylegitimated.9

Thisis theentrypointforculture.The contentofthisexternalenvironment is cultural.The social values thatsupportand legitimatesome organizational formsand notothers,somesocial activitiesand notothers,are culturalvalues. Culturehad gottena bad nameinsociologyformanyofthesamereasonsitgot a bad name in politicalscience. Part of the institutionalistse' lf-described missionis to reclaimcultureformacrosociology.1O0ne waytheydo thisis to make dominant Western culture the object of their study and thus to denaturalizefeaturesofsociallifethatappearnaturaland inevitabletomostof

8. The studiesinMeyerand Hannan 1979pointto thisconclusion. 9. The seminalessayoutliningthisargumentisMeyerand Rowan 1977.Earlyapplicationsofthe argumentincross-nationaclontextscan be foundinMeyerand Hannan 1979. 10. Thomaset al. 1987,7.

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us because thisis our ownculture.We are so deeplyembeddedin itthatitis hardto see beyondit.

Western-stylreationalityis not an unproblematicattributeof bureaucratic organizationsa,s mostorganizationtheoristsassume.Rationalityis a cultural value. It is associatedwithmodernityand progressand othercultural"goods" of contemporarysocial life. Ironically,people create rationalbureaucratic organizationsforotherthanrationalreasons.When facedwithsocial workto be done, people forma committeeor create a bureaucracybecause it is the appropriatesociallysanctionedwayto addressa social task;itis "the thingto do." We continueto formcommitteesand bureaucracieseven whenwe are skeptical about their effectivenessi,ndeed, even as we deride them as ineffectivaend useless in publicand politicaldiscourse.1"There is an almost ceremonialaspect to bureaucraticorganizationin modernlife.Bureaucratic rationalityis "myth"and conformancwe ithitis "ceremony"intheinstitutionalistview.12

Since JohnMeyerand Brian Rowan's articulationof thebasic argumentthat externalculturallegitimationratherthan task demands or functional needs explains much if not most of organizationalbehavior-institutional analyseshave followeddifferenptaths empiricallyT. he institutionalisatrgumentis not necessarilyinternationailn nature,and much of the workand subsequenttheorizinghavebeen donebyscholarslookingatnationaland even verylocalized phenomena.13Institutionalisths ave mapped normativeand culturalenvironmenttshatshape thebehavioroforganizationsin professions such as mentalhealth,in the artsand culture,in municipalgovernmentsi,n nationalgovernmentsa,nd in the creationofwhole businesssectors.14However,Meyerand hiscolleagueshave continuedtheirinterestin cross-national and global phenomena. In fact, the logic of the argumentthat cultural environmentosperateon organizationsat all levelssuggeststhatlocal environmentsare alwaysembeddedin largernationalor transnationaolnes. Thus,if one wereto pushinstitutionalistcholarsinvestigatinlgocalizedorganizational behaviorto specifythe originsor dynamicsof theirlocal environmentst,hey wouldhaveto look ultimatelyto globalphenomenaofthekindMeyerand his colleagues investigate.In this substantivesense, the global institutionalist argumentfsorma backdropfortheothersand logicallysubsumethem.It is this international-levealrgumentthatchallengesIR scholarsin politicalscience mostdirectlyand is thefocusofthisessay.

11. For an explorationof thisparadox in the contextof efforttso reformU.S. governmental bureaucracyoverthepastcenturys,ee Marchand Olsen 1989,especiallychap.5.

12. Meyerand Rowan 1977emphasizethisintheirtitle. 13. Amongthosewhohavebeen particularlyinfluentiaalre authorscontributintgo Powelland DiMaggio 1991.Otherinfluentiawl orksincludeScott1981;Meyerand Scott1983;and Scottet al. 1994. 14. See Meyer1994; DiMaggio 1988; McNeely 1993; Tolbertand Zucker 1983; Dobbin 1994; Suchman1994;and Dobbin 1992.

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The contentand consequences of the worldcultural environment

The worldculturethatinstitutionalistsese expandingacrossand integrating theglobeis a Westernculture.Althoughinstitutionalislitteraturecontainsno singleextendeddiscussionofeithertheoriginsor thecontentofglobalculture, thefollowingpictureemergesfromseveralsourcesoftencitedbyinstitutionalist researchers.15It has its originsin Western Christendomand Western capitalismand has spread as the West has expanded economicallyand politicallyI.n doingso ithas bureaucratizedm, arketizeda,nd individuatedthe worldinwaysthatare notexpectedor easilyexplainedbyothersocial science argumentsI.n fact,Meyerarguesthattheexpansivenatureofitsideologiesand cultureis itselfa distinctivfeeatureofWesternculturewithrootsin medieval ChristendomT. heoriesor ideologieslikethosefromtheWestthatmakeclaims about all people and all places have much more expansivepotentialthan particularizedand localized ideationalframeworklsike thatof the Balinese theater-statdeocumentedbyCliffordGeertz.16

As notedearlier,one centralfeatureofWesterncultureis thevalue itplaces on rationalityandpurposiveaction.Byrationalityin, stitutionalismtseansimply the structuringof action in termsof ends and means. Rational action,in Westernculturalterms,is notonlygood,itis natural.However,one does not havetoreadveryfarinanthropologyh,istoryo,r area-studiesliteraturebsefore discoveringthatWestern-stylpeurposiverationalityisnotso obviousornatural to non-Westerner(sor, indeed,to Westernerst,houghtheywouldbe loathto admitit).Thereare manyotherwaystostructurseocialaction,notablyinterms of roles, rituals,duties,and obligations,that are not consequentialistin a Westernrationalwaybutare effectivgeuidesto socialbehaviornonetheless.17

Progressand justice are the two ends towardwhich Western societies structuretheirrationalaction.Throughhistoricalexperiencethese twogoals have come to be definedin particularways.Progressor "success" is defined materiallyw, hichforindividualsusuallymeansincreasingwealthand forstates meansincreasinggrossnationalproduct.Justiceis usuallydefinedin termsof equality. Rational means to both these goals, in the Western cultural frameworka,re bureaucraciesand marketsC. laimsofefficienciyncontributing to increasedwealth and progresslegitimizeboth. Both locate authorityin impersonalrulesthatcan be legitimatedin termsof equality-equal access, equal opportunity.

The Westernculturalagendaofpromotingexpandinggrossnationalproduct and equalitythroughexpandingand deepeningbureaucraciesand marketshas

15. The besttreatmentasre inThomaset al. 1987and Bergesen1980. 16. See, respectivelyM, eyer,Boli,and Thomas1987,30; and Geertz1980. 17. For a discussionof alternativelogicsof action thatsupportthe institutionalisvtiew,see Marchand Olsen 1989,chap.2.

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spread to dominate global political and social life over the past several centuries.One prominentartifactof Western culturaldominance is the organizationoftheworldintoWestern-stylbeureaucraticstates.Conventional argumentsabout the rise of the modern state emphasize its functional advantagesatprovidingsecurityand extractinrgevenuetoexplainitssuccessat theexpenseofotherformsofpoliticalorganization.1T8hismay(or maynot)be trueoftheriseofthestateinEurope,butitdoes notexplaintheexpansionof Western-stylsetatesto all cornersoftheworld.The modernbureaucraticstate has become the sole legitimateformof politicalorganizationin the world; virtuallyall othershave been eliminated.Empires,colonies,feudal arrangements,and a varietyof otherformshave become extinctand, perhapsmore importantu,nimaginablein contemporarpyolitics.19

Thisis nota functionarl esultforat leasttworeasons.Extremevaluationon statehoodas the onlylegitimateformof politicalorganizationmakes many kindsof politicalconflictdifficultto resolve.It meansthatself-determination requireshavinga state.Ifyouare nota state,youare nobodyinworldpolitics, and nationalliberationgroupsunderstandthis.This createsan all-or-nothing dynamicin many conflictsthat mightbe more easily resolved if other organizationafl ormswereavailable.

Second, this valuation on statehood has created manyineffectivee,ven failed,states.Far fromhavingemergedas "lean,meancompetitorsf"romsome organizationaslelectionprocess,thestateas an organizationafl ormhas had to be imposedand,indeed,proppedup in manypartsoftheworld.The factthat hopelesslyfailed states still must be reconstructedas states ratherthan reorganizedinsomeotherway,forexampleas colonies,underscoresthestrong culturalsupportforstatehoodand theillegitimacyofotherpoliticalforms.20

Drawingon theirargumentaboutWesternculturelegitimatinbgureaucratic structuresi,nstitutionalistesxplaintheseseeminglydysfunctionaolutcomesas theresultof externalculturallegitimationratherthaninternaltaskdemands. Statesexistinmanyplacesnotbecause theyare goodatwhattheyare supposed to do (providesecurityand economicgrowthp, romoteequality)butbecause a largerworldculturesupportsthem.

The other central feature of Western culturewith importantpolitical consequencesis individualismand expandingnotionsofindividualrightsofall sorts-human rights,citizenrightsw, omen's rights,children'srights.Meyer makesa powerfuclase thatWesternculturalvalueshavecreatedtheindividual as an autonomousactor and describesthe processeswherebyattributesof individualpersonhood have become elaborated and expanded.21There is

18. See Tilly1975;and Skocpol1979.For anotherm, orerecentargumentthatemphasizes militarcyoercionandexchangdeominancsee, e Spruy1t994.

19. Fora moredetailedargumenste,e Meyer1980.Forextensiveempiricarlesearchon this phenomenosne,eStrang1991;1990.

20. Fora relateda,lbeitnoninstitutionaragl,umenotnthispointseeJackson1990. 21. Meyer1987.

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