STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA



STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE OFFICE OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

COUNTY OF DURHAM 07 SOS 2280

|HOPE TAYLOR (formerly Taylor-Guevara), |) | |

| |)) | |

|Petitioner, |) | |

| |))))|DECISION GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT |

|vs. |) | |

| | | |

|NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, | | |

| | | |

|Respondent. | | |

This case comes before Shannon R. Joseph, Administrative Law Judge, on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in support thereof, submitted 14 April 2008. On 28 April 2008, Petitioner submitted her Cross Motion and Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supporting Memorandum, and Affidavit of Hope Taylor. On 14 May 2008, Respondent submitted its Response to Petitioner’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered the arguments of the parties, matters of Record and relevant legal authority, Respondent’s and Petitioner’s Motions for Summary Judgment are now ripe for disposition.

ISSUE

Did Respondent properly assess Petitioner a late filing fee pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120C-401(e)?

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. At times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was a registered lobbyist with the North Carolina Department of the Secretary State Lobbying Division. Petitioner lobbied on behalf of principal Clean Water for North Carolina, Inc.

2. Although she has timely filed during all other reporting periods, Petitioner failed to timely file her first quarter 2007 expense report. Specifically, Petitioner did not file her first quarter 2007 expense report until 18 June 2007, approximately two (2) months after the deadline.

3. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120C-401(e) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.34(a)(2), Respondent assessed a $500 late fee against Petitioner.

4. On 15 June 2007, Petitioner submitted to Respondent for a Request for Waiver of Penalties for Delayed Filing in which she requested a waiver of the penalties for her principal and herself. Petitioner stated: “Due to the limited time I devote to legislative advocacy, I had not fully familiarized myself with all provisions of the newly implemented law, and was unfortunately operating on the assumption that the next report was due at the end of the session this year.” After this Request for Waiver, by letter dated 27 June 2007, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent maintained its assessment of the full $500 late fee.

5. Information about the reporting deadlines was publicly available on the Lobbying Compliance Division website. The Lobbying Compliance Division also produced a January 2007 newsletter which it posted on its website that recited changes in the law and stated that expense reports were due within 10 business days of the end of a quarter. The State Ethics Commission also hosted free programs for lobbyists on the relevant law in the months preceding the filing deadline at issue here. Petitioner, however, did not receive an e-mail reminder of the filing deadline under the new law, as she had under the previous law and as did other lobbyists and principals.

6. By letter dated 19 October 2007, Respondent notified Petitioner that “based upon a review of the mitigating factors of [her] case, the Department has determined that [her] late fees for $500.00 . . . will be reduced by 40%[,]” to $300.

7. On 18 December 2007, Petitioner filed her Petition for a Contested Case Hearing claiming that Respondent acted erroneously and arbitrarily or capriciously in assessing the $300 late fee.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C. R. Civ. P. 56. A movant may show that summary judgment is warranted by “(1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case is non-existent, (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense.” Losing v. Food Lion, LLC, 648 S.E.2d 261, 263 (N.C. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003)).

2. The law is clear that registered lobbyists must file quarterly expense reports “whether or not reportable expenditures are made” and that such reports “shall be due 10 business days after the end of the reporting period.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 401(a) & 402(a). When a lobbyist’s quarterly report is not timely filed, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120C-401(e) requires payment of a late filing fee. The amount of the filing fee is specified by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.34(a)(2), which terms are incorporated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120C-401(e). Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.34(a)(2) provides for a “civil late penalty” of “Fifty dollars ($50.00) per day for each day the filing is late for a report that affects only nonstatewide elections, not to exceed a total of five hundred dollars ($500.00). The section also specifies that the penalty can be waived for “good cause.”

3. There is no contest that Petitioner filed her expense report for the first quarter of 2007 over ten (10) days late, thereby triggering the maximum penalty of $500 prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.34(a)(2). Additionally, it is undisputed that Respondent initially assessed a $500 late fee pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 120C-401(e) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.34(a)(2), which Respondent later reduced to $300.

4. That Respondent did not e-mail a reminder to Petitioner or her principal of the reporting deadline does not raise any genuine issue of material fact or law sufficient to avoid summary judgment in favor of Respondent. Respondent’s assessment of a late fee against Petitioner is expressly required by law and was not erroneous as a matter of law. Further, Petitioner cites no authority in support of her contention that Respondent was responsible for directly notifying her or her principal of patently public information and applicable laws, such as the statutes at issue in this action.

5. Nor do the facts support or raise a genuine issue of material fact in connection with Petitioner’s challenge to the amount of the reduced penalty of $300 as arbitrary and capricious.

6. “The ‘arbitrary or capricious’ standard is a difficult one to meet. Administrative agency decisions may be reversed as arbitrary or capricious if they are ‘patently in bad faith,’ or ‘whimsical’ in the sense that ‘they indicate a lack of fair and careful consideration’ or ‘fail to indicate any course of reasoning and the exercise of judgment.’” Enoch v. Alamance County Dep't of Social Servs., 164 N.C. App. 233, 251, 595 S.E.2d 744 (2004) (quoting Comr. of Insurance v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 420, 269 S.E.2d 547, 573 (1980)) (quoted case omitted); see also Joyce v. Winston-Salem State University, 91 N.C. App. 153, 156, 370 S.E.2d 866, 868 (agency's determination is arbitrary and capricious “if it clearly evinces a lack of fair and careful consideration or want of impartial, reasoned decision making”), disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 862 (1988) (citation omitted).

7. Here, no evidence suggests that Respondent’s reduction of the authorized $500 to $300 was “whimsical” or “patently in bad faith”: to the contrary. Respondent’s decision indicates an exercise of its judgment to consider the context of Petitioner’s request for a waiver—that she had timely filed under the previous law and that she had not received e-mail notice, among other factors. Respondent neither erred nor acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it balanced Petitioner’s request with Respondent’s enforcement obligations and the accessibility of public information related to the applicable reporting deadlines.

BASED ON the foregoing Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned makes the following Decision and Order:

DECISION

Having reviewed the documents of record, the undersigned administrative law judge finds and so holds there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be and is GRANTED. Petitioner’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

NOTICE

The decision of the Administrative Law Judge in this contested case will be reviewed by the agency making the final decision according to the standards found in G.S. 150B 36(b), (b1) and (b2). The agency making the final decision is required to give each party an opportunity to file exceptions to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and to present written arguments to those in the agency who will make the final decision. G.S. 150B-36(a). The agency that will make the final decision in this contested case is the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State.

This the 21st day of May, 2008.

_________________________________

Shannon R. Joseph

Administrative Law Judge

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download