HEADQUARTERS, USMEDCOM



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HEADQUARTERS, CFC

Seoul, ROK

1 June 19XX

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

1. General

a. Requirements for Essential Elements of Information (EEI) for Phases I, II, III, and IV of the operation, including those of subordinate commanders,that are identified in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

b. Collection, production and dissemination efforts will be oriented toward answering the questions in these paragraphs. All organizations participating in the collection effort are requested to report information pertinent to these questions.

2. Before Implementation of the OPLAN

a. Which North Korean Army Groups have the capability and intent to disrupt the execution of phases II, III, and IV?

b. Where are North Korean Groups with the capability and intent to disrupt the execution of phases II, III, and IV located? What are their strength and military capabilities?

c. What are changes in the center(s) of gravity of groups or organizations, which are assessed as having the capabilities and intent to disrupt the execution of Phases II/III?

d. Who are the key commanders of the Army Groups, Corps’, and Divisions who might seek to disrupt Phases II, III, IV? Where are they located?

e. Are there any groups, organizations, or states external to North Korea who are likely to support DPRK military forces in their effort(s) to disrupt Phases II, III, IV?

f. What symphatizer groups, student organizations, or individuals have expressed intent to attack US citizens, other non-South Korean foreign nationals in country, or US forces entering South Korea?

g. Will the internal symphatizer paramilitary groups act autonomously or in alliance?

h. Location, size, unit designation, number, and type of weapons, leadership, and activities of the paramilitary force.

i. Existence of known Hostile Intelligence Services (HOIS) threat to include:

(1) Existence of known or possible foreign HUMINT collectors in the area.

(2) Known and possible HUMINT targets.

(3) Existence and capabilities of known or possible foreign SIGINT collectors in the area.

(4) Known or possible SIGINT targets.

(5) Existence of known or possible IMINT collectors in the area.

(6) Capabilities of each foreign IMINT collector used in the area.

(7) Known or possible IMINT targets.

(8) Existence of organized overt or covert paramilitary activities, both internal and external, whether or not they are initially assessed as hostile.

(a) Known domestic criminal organizations.

(b) Methods of operations.

(c) Possible local targets.

3. Upon Implementation of the Plan

a. Which internal groups or individuals are positioning forces or taking other measures to be able to interfere with or disrupt the success of the operation?

b. Which external states, if any, are positioning forces or taking other measures to be able to militarily interfere with or disrupt the operation?

c. What incidents or other events are occurring which indicate existence of a military threat to US forces, or persons being evacuated?

d. Location, size, unit designation, weapons, leaders, and activities of North Korea forces in the Joint Operations Area?

e. Status of North Korea military units and degree of support?

f. Type and location of any surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) or crew served weapons capable of downing aircraft?

g. Type and location of any coastal area weapons systems capable of engaging (damaging or sinking) US Navy vessels in the Joint Operations Area?

h. Location, time, and type of obstacles or barriers obviously established to impede the operation?

4. Information Requirements (IR). All commanders and agencies report, IAW unit SOPs and Service policies and directives, the following data:

a. Any information that answers Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) or IR.

b. Suspected disclosure of designated PIR or IR to North Korean forces or other unauthorized persons or groups.

c. Violation of established security procedures.

d. Friendly losses attributable to probable compromise.

e. Indicators that North Korean forces had prior knowledge of the operation.

f. North Korea force’s activity directed against otherwise well concealed friendly vulnerabilities.

g. Situations or events that suggest need to revise PIR or IR.

h. Recommended additional PIR/IR.

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