HEADQUARTERS, USMEDCOM



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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518

Seoul, ROK

1June 19XX

CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

General. This document is unclassified. It should be considered to contain sensitive information for exercise purposes only.

SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION REQUIRED DURING

PLAN PREP EXEC POST

PHASE PHASE PHASE PHASE

Operation code word NA NA NA NA

Concept of operation NA NA NA NA

Classification guidance NA NA NA NA

Date operation begins NA NA NA NA

Participating units NA NA NA NA

Employment of chemical NA NA NA NA

weapons

Employment of nuclear NA NA NA NA

weapons

Combat rescue support NA NA NA NA

Target area weather NA NA NA NA

information

Residual capabilities after NA NA NA NA

operations

HEADQUARTERS, CFC

Seoul, ROK

1 June 19XX

CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX

OPLAN SUMMARY

1. Purpose. This plan provides for USCINCKOREA, when directed, to deploy and conduct military operations in the designated JOA. The plan supports CJCS Directive 01-11-9X.

2. Conditions for Implementation

a. Politico-Military Situation

b. Statement. This summary provides military decision-makers with a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX (U). The OPLAN is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of the SOUTH KOREA contingency. This information must be updated before adopting COAs for the conduct of military operations in SOUTH KOREA.

c. (U) Legal Considerations. Operations will comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. Other legal considerations that may have an impact on the successful implementation of this plan center on the evacuation, care, and protection of noncombatant civilians and their property. Care must be taken to observe the legal rights of the many borders and neutral countries on the periphery of the JOA. Lastly, a major concern is the processing and handling of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, and other detainees. All of these groups will be handled according to appropriate conventions, laws, and regulations. The Government of SAN MARCO is responsible for long-term disposition of detainees. More detailed information is available at Annex E of the OPLAN.

3. Operations to be Conducted

a. Force Requirements. The operations envisioned require a two Corps, 6 divisions, 2 SIBs, 2 ACRs task force with supporting ground, air, naval, marine, and special operations forces with the necessary logistics and transportation support required to conduct offensive military operations, preemptive strikes, and evacuate approximately 150,000 personnel. Major forces required include, 4-Infantry Division, 2 – Armored Divisions, 2 –SIBs, and 2 – ACRs; appropriate Corps Support units , 2- Carrier Battle Groups, 2 Surface Action Group, 2 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) (SOC), 2 Amphibious Ready Groups, and 6 Composite Air Wing. Other units required include special operations, logistics, and transportation. COMUSARKO, CINCPACFLT, COMMARFORKOREA, COM7th AIR COMPONENT COMMAND AF, CINCJFC, CINCSPACE, CINCTRANS, CINCPAC, and CINCSOC provide forces and support required.

b. Deterrent Measures. Operations Security (OPSEC) will be maximized and deception operations conducted to minimize danger to friendly forces and noncombatants before commencement of movement and through all military operations in the REPUBLICS OF SOUTH KOREA or JAPAN. Staging activities will be portrayed as an emergency induced NEO operation.

c. Employment. The JTF mission will be accomplished by the rapid deployment of air, sea, land, and special operations forces into the JOA in sufficient strength to achieve the following primary objectives: (1) evacuate US citizens and designated noncombatants, (2) secure key facilities in SOUTH KOREA, and (3) conduct military operations to assist the Government of SOUTH KOREA. The operation is envisioned in five phases: (1) Prehostilities: Alert and Staging, (2) Establish Intermediate Staging Bases; (3) Decisive Combat, (4) Lodgment and Follow-Through, and (5) Posthostilities and Redeployment.

d. Deployment. CFC/JTF KOREA will establish a Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Intercomputer Network (WIN) teleconference capability and update Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) in coordination with USTRANSCOM. OPSEC and deception measures will provide cover and support deterrence of hostile activities against noncombatants.

e. Supporting Plans. Subordinate and supporting commands will provide their supporting OPLANS to CFC for review.

f. Collateral Plans. There are no collateral plans that impact on implementation of this plan.

4. Key Assumptions

a. Governments of neighboring nations will not assist US and South Korea forces in stabilizing border areas controlled by the Cartel’s paramilitary forces.

b. South Korean military forces will not be able to secure key installations, facilities, APODs/SPODs, and protect American citizens.

c.North Korean elements inside the REPUBLIC OF South Korea will continue their support of terrorism and assassinations of public officials.

d. Nations outside the region will not intervene either for or against the REPUBLIC OF South Korea with their own armed forces.

e. US air forces will be able to establish and maintain air supremacy in the Joint Operations Area.

f. The South Korean Government can provide only limited host nation support.

g. The degree of mobilization assumed to support this OPLAN: Selective Presidential Call-up.

5. Operational Constraints. Employment of US Armed Forces in the REPUBLIC of South Korea, evacuation of US citizens and other authorized nationals, preemptive strikes, and operations to protect critical US facilities may be actively opposed by insurgents and possibly their sympathizers. Military operations could be amended by ongoing actions at the State Department.

6. Time To Commence Effective Operations. Units will deploy according to the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The force listed in the Base Plan is considered the smallest force increment that can successfully accomplish the assigned tasks.

7. Command Relationships

a. USCINCKOREA is the supported CINC.

b. Supporting CINCs are USCINCJFC, USCINCSOC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCPAC, and USCINCSPACE.

c. Supporting agencies are DOS, DIA, CIA, JEWC, JDC, USIA and USAID.

d. Component Commands COCOM to USCINCKOREA.

(1) US Army, Korea (USARKO).

(2)) US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)-NAVAL GROUP COMPONENT CCOMMAND.

(3)) US Marine Forces, Korea, (MARFORKOREA).

(4) 7TH US Air Force AIR COMOPONENT COMMAND, (7th ACCAF).

(5) Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOREA).

e. Commander, Joint Task Force (COMJTF KOREA) will be designated by CINCKOREA upon implementation of this plan.

8. Logistical Appraisal. The logistical requirements of this plan are feasible with no unique needs that call for extraordinary contingency support outside the commands shown. There is no present requirement for national-level mobilization of forces, nor is any anticipated. However, a requirement for Presidential call-up of selected Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units is anticipated. In-country supply will be accomplished per Service directives and standing operating procedures. Emphasis is placed on the needs of the combat forces in Phase III.

9. Personnel Appraisal. Personnel requirements are feasible and within needs stated in the plan. Personnel qualified for overseas movement and with at least 30 days remaining on active duty will deploy according to normal Service directives, regulations, and standing operating procedures.

10.Consolidated listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. No apparent shortfalls will have significant impact on the execution of this plan. Supporting commands and agencies will ensure maintenance of capabilities to provide the necessary combat ready forces and support.

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