The relation between equity incentives and earnings ...



2010[equity incentives and earnings managementin the united kingdom]Equity incentives and earnings management in the United KingdomErasmus University RotterdamErasmus School of EconomicsRotterdam, 2010AuthorL.J.P. (John) de Vos (315695)CoachDr. Y. WangCo-readerDrs. R. van der Wal RAPrefaceThis thesis is written as the final assignment of my study Accounting, Auditing & Control at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. While writing this thesis earnings management and the incentives for CEO’s to engage in earnings management were of special interest to me. This period has come to an end with the conclusion of this thesis. First of all I want to thank my family and friends for their support during my master study. Secondly I would like to thank N. El-Haloush and R. van der Linden for their support and comments on my thesis. Finally I would like to thank Dr. Y. Wang for her support and critical review while writing this thesis. John de VosRotterdam, 2010AbstractThe past two decades have shown an enormous increase in stock-based compensation. In the light of the credit crunch, the global financial crisis and the following economic recession, variable compensation was a eyesore for a lot of people. Some companies even asked their employees to hand in their bonuses. This shows the importance of variable compensation in today’s world. The use of stock-based compensation should make managers pay more attention to share price and should provide better alignment between the stakeholders and the managers of a company. However, recent studies (e.g. O’Connell and Brendan 2004) show that the incentives coming from variable compensation are not always the right ones. A possible issue is their incentive to engage in earnings management.This paper examines the relation between equity incentives and earnings management in the United Kingdom (U.K.). Three types of compensation (i.e. fixed salary, bonus and stock-based) are distinguished. Hypothesized is that fixed salary has a negative relation and that bonus and stock-based compensation have a positive relation with discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. To test this, accrual and compensation data from FTSE listed firms is used. The accrual approach will be used in measuring earnings management and the relative size of the compensation types will be used to measure the compensation variables.The results from this research show that fixed salary has a positive relationship with discretionary accruals. For bonus compensation no linear relationship with discretionary accruals is found and for stock-based compensation a negative relationship with discretionary accruals is found. Moreover, this research has proven that low equity incentive CEO’s have significant higher mean scores of discretionary accruals than high equity incentive CEO’s. Therefore, the results seem to oppose the results of studies from Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Gao and Shrieves (2002) who all found evidence that high equity incentive CEO’s engage more in earnings management (through the use of discretionary accruals) than low equity incentive CEO’s. Table of Contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u Preface PAGEREF _Toc274485423 \h 3Abstract PAGEREF _Toc274485424 \h 41Introduction PAGEREF _Toc274485425 \h 71.1Problem statement PAGEREF _Toc274485426 \h 71.2Research question PAGEREF _Toc274485427 \h 81.3Contribution PAGEREF _Toc274485428 \h 91.4Literature PAGEREF _Toc274485429 \h 91.5Sample and methods PAGEREF _Toc274485430 \h 101.6Results PAGEREF _Toc274485431 \h 112Literature review PAGEREF _Toc274485432 \h 122.1Earnings management PAGEREF _Toc274485433 \h 132.1.1What is earnings management? PAGEREF _Toc274485434 \h 132.1.2How are earnings managed? PAGEREF _Toc274485435 \h 142.1.3Why do firms engage in earnings management? PAGEREF _Toc274485436 \h 162.1.4How to detect earnings management? PAGEREF _Toc274485437 \h 182.2Compensation contracts PAGEREF _Toc274485438 \h 232.2.1Fixed salaries PAGEREF _Toc274485439 \h 242.2.2Short-term incentives PAGEREF _Toc274485440 \h 242.2.3Long-term incentives PAGEREF _Toc274485441 \h 252.2.4Why do managers receive stock compensation? PAGEREF _Toc274485442 \h 252.3Earnings management and equity compensation PAGEREF _Toc274485443 \h 263Hypotheses PAGEREF _Toc274485444 \h 284Research design PAGEREF _Toc274485445 \h 314.1Data and sample PAGEREF _Toc274485446 \h 314.2Dependant variable PAGEREF _Toc274485447 \h 324.3Independent variable PAGEREF _Toc274485448 \h 325Data analysis and results PAGEREF _Toc274485449 \h 325.1Discretionary accruals and descriptive statistics PAGEREF _Toc274485450 \h 325.2Results PAGEREF _Toc274485451 \h 325.2.1Correlation testing PAGEREF _Toc274485452 \h 325.2.2Independent-Samples T-Test PAGEREF _Toc274485453 \h 326Conclusion, limitations and future research PAGEREF _Toc274485454 \h 326.1Research question PAGEREF _Toc274485455 \h 326.2Theoretical and empirical conclusions PAGEREF _Toc274485456 \h 326.3Limitations and directions for future research PAGEREF _Toc274485457 \h 32References PAGEREF _Toc274485458 \h 32Appendix A PAGEREF _Toc274485459 \h 32Appendix B PAGEREF _Toc274485460 \h 32IntroductionProblem statementStock-based compensation, like stock options and shares for example, has been frequently in the news the last couple of years. Despite the credit crunch, the global financial crisis and the following economic recession, a lot of companies, also financial institutions, gave their executives big bonuses. There were people who even argued that executives should hand in their bonuses, because they thought executives are responsible for the bad performances. Moreover here were companies who asked their employees to hand in their bonuses, and in the United States, the House passed legislation that significantly controls bonuses for employees of financial institutions who received support from the government’s financial rescue program. For employees who earn more than $ 250,000, a 90% surtax is granted on their bonuses. This example shows the importance of variable compensation, and especially stock-based compensation, in today’s world. The past two decades have shown an enormous increase in stock-based compensation. The most important reason why managers nowadays have relatively large stock-based compensation packages is that it should align managers’ aims with the aims of stakeholders. After two decades it seems however, that stock-based compensation has a short-term perspective. Remuneration systems are working as they were designed to do. Therefore they do not manage to align the interest of management with shareholders (O’Connell and Brendan 2004). O’Connell and Brendan argue that, in a society where CEO’s on average work four years for the same company, managers try to appease the market through a variety of devices that ensure rising short-term stock prices. With these devices they mean, among other thing, earnings management practices to ensure steadily rising earnings that appease forecasts of the market.On the other hand, Ronen and Yaari (2008) say it is difficult to make a profit in the future when the market price is only rising. Therefore, Ronen and Yaari say long-term earnings management should aim at deflating earnings. Although the opinions differ, it is, in regard to this study, assumed that equity-based compensation creates short-term incentives for managers to manage earnings.Literature divides compensation contracts for managers into three categories; fixed salaries, bonuses and stock-based compensation (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007). Gao and Shrieves (2002) say that, in contrast to salary, the size of stock options and bonuses is positively related to the use discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. According to Murphy (1999) in the eighties and nineties of the last century the main development in executive compensation was stock-based compensation.Research questionThe purpose of this thesis is to provide more insight into the relation between equity incentives (stock-based compensation) and earnings management. Besides the relation of stock-based compensation and earnings management, also the relation of fixed salary and (cash) bonus with earnings management will be investigated. While prior research on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management, which will be elaborated on more in chapter 2, mostly used United States (U.S.) data, this research investigates the situation in the European Union (E.U.). Within the E.U. this study focuses on companies based in the United Kingdom (U.K.). European countries require companies to disclose detailed information on executive compensation practices in the disclosures of the annual report. The U.K. was the first country within the E.U. where these duties were introduced (Praag 2005). Therefore, most data is available for the U.K. This leads to the following research question:What is the relation between equity incentives and earnings management in the U.K.?ContributionDuring the past years, compensation for managers and earnings management have been important topics in many debates. This research and its results are interesting for two groups. First, for the Board of Directors of firms, because they provide the compensation contracts to their top-managers. While stock-based compensation can yield positive incentives effects, prior research has already shown that equity-incentives have a negative effect on earnings management. Secondly, this study is interesting for financial reporting regulators, because they criticize managers for their focus on the short-term targets. It is expected that, with the results of this research, financial reporting regulators can respond better to earnings management and its incentives. Moreover this thesis is a contribution to the knowledge on earnings management and its relation with compensation for the academic world. It extends the growing literature that examines the relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Therefore this thesis may extent existing academic researches for stock-based compensation outside the U.S. LiteratureThis thesis is related to other papers on the subject of earnings management (e.g. Daniel et al. 2008; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Stein 1989; Dechow et al. 1995). This thesis is also related to studies on compensation contracts (e.g. Merchant and Van der Stede 2007; Murphy 1999; Gao and Shrieves 2002). These studies have shown what the different types of compensation are and how they are related to earnings management.Furthermore this thesis complements extant studies on the incentives for earnings management (e.g. Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Bauman and Shaw 2006). These studies have shown that, in general, the self-interest motivation of management is a great cause of earnings management. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found evidence that earnings are more manipulated through discretionary accruals when CEO’s total compensation is more closely tied to the value of the shares. Cheng and Warfield (2005) examined the relation between managers’ equity incentives and earnings management. They found that high equity incentive managers are more likely to sell shares in the future. This motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Moreover, Gao and Shrieves (2002) examined how the different types of compensation (i.e. fixed salary, bonuses, stock option, restricted stock, and long-term incentive plans) influence earnings management behaviour. This research extends and complements those researches by examining the relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Sample and methodsAs mentioned earlier, most research done until now, focuses on companies in the U.S. This research will focus on companies based in the U.K. because that was the first country in the E.U. where companies were required to disclose detailed information on executive compensation. Therefore most data is available for the U.K. As the sample for this thesis the FTSE 100 index is used. This is a share index of the 100 most highly capitalised U.K. companies, listed on the London Stock Exchange. This data provides a sample of about 176 entries and is spread out over two years, i.e. 2005 and 2006. Financial data that is needed of the earnings management component, and compensation data from the CEO’s that is needed for the compensation component, will be gathered from the annual reports of the companies. Like other studies (Dechow et al. 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Gao and Shrieves 2002) the accrual approach will be used in measuring earnings management. To measure earnings management the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 1995) is selected. As explained earlier, this research distinguishes three components in compensation contracts; fixed salary, bonuses and stock-based compensation (e.g. stock-options, shares). It focuses on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management, but it also tests the relation of the other two components (i.e. fixed salary and bonus) with earnings management. Because relative figures are better comparable with each other, the relative size of the compensation type will be used to measure compensation. Results The results from this research show that fixed salary has a positive relationship with discretionary accruals. For bonus compensation no linear relationship with discretionary accruals is found and for stock-based compensation a negative relationship with discretionary accruals is found. Regarding the mean scores of discretionary accruals, no significant difference is found for CEO’s with a relative high size and CEO’s with a relative low size of bonus compensation. For fixed salary a small significant difference is found between the mean scores of discretionary accruals for CEO’s with a relative high size and CEO’s with a relative low size of fixed salary. Moreover, regarding stock-based compensation, this research has proven that low equity incentive CEO’s have significant higher mean scores of discretionary accruals than high equity incentive CEO’s. Therefore, the results seem to oppose the results of studies from Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Gao and Shrieves (2002) who all found evidence that high equity incentive CEO’s engage more in earnings management (through the use of discretionary accruals) than low equity incentive CEO’s. Although the results in this thesis provide an indication on the relation between earnings management and equity incentives additional research is needed to provide a complete answer in the case of earnings management.The thesis proceeds in five chapters. The next chapter provides background information and the literature study. It describes the relevant academic literature on earnings management, compensation contracts, and the link between these two components. In chapter 3 the hypotheses are developed. The fourth chapter discusses the research design. The research design describes the sample selection and research method. In chapter 5 the results of the research are explained. In the final chapter, chapter 6, the conclusions, limitations and directions for future research are presented. Literature reviewThis section describes the background information and literature review on earnings management and compensation contracts. Paragraph 2.1 elaborates on earnings management. This paragraph will describe what earnings management is, how earnings are managed, what activity manipulation is and why firms engage in earnings management. The second paragraph will be about compensation contracts. It describes fixed salaries, short-term incentives, and long-term incentives. Furthermore it will elaborate on the fact why managers receive stock-based compensation. In the last paragraph, paragraph 2.3, the link between earnings management and equity compensation will be described. Inefficient MarketThroughout this thesis, the asymmetric information gap between the principal and the agent is discussed. This supports the notion that markets are not efficient in the strong form. According to the Efficient Market Theory (EMT) the strong form states that all information (public and private) is included in the market price. This includes that insider information (information known to management) is reflected in the share price. If this is true, the reported information would not affect the stock price, because the stock price already would reflect this information. In this scenario there would be no incentive for management to manipulate earnings. If the market was efficient in the strong form and managers reported manipulated earnings, the market would not be fooled. Managers would therefore not be able to effect their compensation (Levy and Post 2005). Earnings managementIn the light of past accounting scandals and the current world economics, the credit crunch, the subject of earnings management has been receiving great attention. In 2001 the investment world was shocked when the smartest guys in the room were caught manipulating accounts. The Enron affair bought to daylight the significant effects of earnings manipulation. Unfortunately, the Enron affair does not stand on its own. Since 2002 there has been a number of accounting scandal were earnings have been manipulated (Royal Ahold, Parmalat and more recently Satyam Computer Services).It is not always clear if firms operate outside the boundaries set by regulators. As Van der Bauwhede (2003) sais the one form of earnings manipulation is considered fraud, the other is misleading and based on misjudgements by managers. The corrupt view on the issue is revealed by managers that operate outside the boundaries set by regulators. However, earnings management operates more than often within the guidelines set by the reporting authorities. This thesis will concentrate on the later form of earnings management.What is earnings management?Healy and Wahlen (1999) state earnings management as follows:“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen 1999, 368)In this definition Healy and Wahlen use a judgement criterion, as well as the goal of earnings management. The judgement criterion implies that earnings management is an activity that is purposely undertaken by management. This judgement criterion is cited in a number of articles as moving within the boundaries set by regulators (e.g. Daniel et al. 2008; Benish 2001). This criterion implies that management does not intentionally manipulate accounts. However, it implies the use of professional discernment used by management. This discernment addresses the main challenge researches face (Beneish 2001). According to Bergstresser and Philoppon (2006) earnings management occurs, when reported income includes cash flows and changes in firm value. Cash flows are not difficult to establish, but changes in firm value requires a greater deal of management discernment.Healy and Wahlen also state the goal of earnings management. On the one hand misleading stakeholders, and on the other hand influencing contractual outcomes. In general earnings management is aimed at transferring wealth (Stolowy and Breton 2004). How are earnings managed?Financial reports convey earnings that have occurred throughout the past period. These earnings are based on cash flow plus changes in firm value (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). Whilst cash flows are easily determined, changes in firm value are more challenging. It is in determining this change in firm value that managers are granted some freedom by regulators and standard setters. The accrual account, designed by standard setters, is a common account used to manipulate earnings. Benish (2001) states that it is like that earnings management takes place in the accrual account. However the aim of standard setters was not to provide managers with a possibility for earnings management. Accruals were designed to express valuation changes that had not yet related in cash flows (Gao and Shrieves 2002). This poses the problem that not all accruals are related to earnings management. With regards to earnings management, only the discretionary component of accruals is important (Benish 2001). Based on their sales and value of assets, all firms are expected to have a certain level of accruals (Van der Bauwhede 2003). However when these accruals exceed non-discretionary levels, they could indicate to tend to manage earnings.Over the years there have been a number of methods developed to detect earnings management. Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) developed methods that were very dependent on years were no earnings management was suspected. This was the biggest weakness for these models. The Jones model (Jones 1991) and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) were created to try to eliminate the discretionary element of the accruals, by taking into consideration changes in the economic environment (Benish 2001). However like most models these models have various limitations (read for further details on the models paragraph 2.1.4). Studies have shown that changes in inventory, and accounts receivables can resemble earnings manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006; Stowley and Berton 2004).Rational minds would suggest that investors, being able to detect earnings management, would punish firms that violate the freedom granted to them by standard setters. Studies carried out by Teoh et al. (1998a, b) and Teoh and Wong (2002) suggest that investors are “na?ve” in detecting earnings manipulations, due to the asymmetric information gap. Although there are models that can predict the possibilities of earnings management, an accurate forecast remains difficult. It should be said that most researches that are carried out assume that the market is not aware of the tendency by managers to alter earnings. However according to a study by Stein (1989) investors rationally expect managers to manage earnings. As a result, in pricing stock analysts’ expect managers to manipulate earnings. The market knows it cannot prevent earnings manipulation from happening so it anticipates that earnings have been managed (Cheng and Warfield 2005). This would be consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. The share price reflexes all information, i.e. public and private. The share price therefore portrays a true view of the firm, where managed earnings are processed in the market price. Coles et al. (2006) suggest that investors are well informed and sophisticated in there awareness of earnings manipulation. Nevertheless, the transparency into incentives and account manipulation is limited. Even though models might be available, these models face limitations and can only indicate the possible use of earnings management. Activity manipulationMost studies carried out focus on account manipulation, however Roychowdhury (2006) suggest that the effects of direct account manipulation are relatively lower in comparison to activity manipulation. Activity manipulation can be characterized as a difference from normal operation with the objective to meet certain earnings targets (Roychowdhury 2006). One might argue that activities that increase earnings are only good for the firm. Roychowdhury mentions an increase in sales by means of temporary discounts. This cannot harm the interest of a firm and investors might even appreciate a certain degree of entrepreneurship to sell products that might have not been sold without a discount. However earnings manipulation is known for its short-term perspective. Therefore managers might mislead stakeholders (Stolowy and Berton 2004). Activity manipulation doesn’t support this notion because it does not mislead investors. Reported earnings by management are not incorrectly stated and do not present an untrue view of the value of the company. Earnings management through account manipulation does not always materialize and produce cash flows, therefore not benefiting investors. Cash flows change the capacity of firms to pay out dividend. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) research suggests that dividend payouts are important to investors. Further research has shown that dividend cuts are punished at the stock market (Pettit 1972; Aharnoy and Swary 1980; Gullon et al. 2002). Therefore earnings that do not materialise into cash flow, damage the cash position of the firm. Why do firms engage in earnings management?Although throughout the literature different forms of compensation are given for the existence of earnings management, Stolowy and Berton (2004) state that the why earnings management exist is to profit from the possibilities of wealth transfer. Benish (2001) distinguished between four possible motives for earnings management:Debt contracts;Compensation Agreements;Equity Offerings;Insider trading.Firms’ performance are often regulated in debt covenants. Moreover dividend restrictions are incorporated in them (Bradley and Roberts 2004). This is because the position of the debt providers is weaken by dividends that exit the firm. Through dividend payout, less cash remains in the firm to pay back the debt providers (Daniel et al. 2008). Benish (2001) summarizes studies that reveal mixed results for the use of earnings management to avoid defaults on loans. Influence debt covenants by using earnings management to avoid defaults, might have the opposite effect that firms eventually default. Some firms profit from a relatively cheap form of capital, although they may not default on their loans (Stolowy and Breton 2004). Due to higher earnings, companies could seem more profitable than in reality. Compensation contracts seem to provide more evidence for the existence of earnings management than debt contract. Extensive studies (e.g. Healy 1985; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Bauman and Shaw 2006; Ronen et al. 2006; Gao and Shrieves 2002) have shown that in general that the greatest cause of earnings management is the self-interest motivation of management. This subject will be addressed more in depth in the next paragraph. Equity offerings also offer a great opportunity to manage earnings. Managers are known to inflate earnings to receive a better price for new equity (Benish 2001). This is possible due to the information asymmetry and is consistent with the notion that management aspire to receive a relatively low cost of capital.Insider trading has also been documented (Benish 1999; Ronen et al. 2006). Benish even argues that it is expected for managers to use their insider information about earnings overstatements, to trade for their own benefit. Ronen et al. (2006) study supports recommendation to ban insider trading.How to detect earnings management?The accrual approach will be used in measuring the dependant variable, earnings management (Dechow et al. 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Gao and Shrieves 2002). Like Dechow et al. (1995), five models will be described that are used in the extant earnings management literature. These five models are the Healy Model, the DeAngelo Model, the Jones Model, the Modified Jones Model and the Industry Model. In this paragraph the models will be described.The models make use of accruals. Accruals are revenues and costs that make the difference between the profit and the cash flow of a company. They depend on accounting choices of managers, and it is therefore important to examine whether the accruals are in line with expectations. Total accruals need to be decomposed into a discretionary and a non-discretionary component. Discretionary accruals are those which cannot be explained from normal activities. Managers can influence these accruals. Non-discretionary accruals can be explained from normal activities of the company and managers can not influence them. The starting point of most models is the total accruals. The models then try to find the non-discretionary element so they can divide the accruals in the non-discretionary and the discretionary part. 1. The Healy ModelHealy (1985) uses total accruals to determine discretionary accruals. The discretionary accruals are equal to the difference of total accruals in two successive years. The assumptions Healy (1985) makes, is that non-discretionary accruals are constant. Further is assumed that systematic earnings management is occurring in every period. In this last assumptions it is that Healy’s study differs from most other earnings management studies. The sample is divided into three groups, in one is predicted that earnings are managed upwards, and downward in the other two groups. Then a comparison of the mean total accruals is made between the three groups. The model Healy uses is:NDA τ= tTA tT (2-1)Where:NDAEstimated non-discretionary accruals;TATotal accruals scaled by lagged total assets;t1,2,..T is a year subscript for years included in the estimation period;τA year subscript indicating a year in the event period.2. The DeAngelo ModelDeAngelo (1986) also uses total accruals to determine discretionary accruals. The DeAngelo Model can be viewed as an expansion of the Healy Model, in which the estimation period for non-discretionary accruals is restricted to the previous year’s observation. In the DeAngelo Model first is assumed that differences in total accruals have an expected value of zero under the null hypothesis of no earnings management (Dechow et al 1985). DeAngelo’s model further assumes that total accruals will move in the same direction as the balance total of a company. For example, when a company invest in fixed assets, this ultimately leads to an increase in total assets and therefore to an increase in the balance total. The fixed asset (investment) has to be depreciated. This will lead to an increase in (non-discretionary) accruals and therefore also to an increase in total accruals. But if an increase in total accruals not directly comes from an increase in assets then this increase is caused by discretionary accruals. This could indicate earnings management. DeAngelo’s Model is:NDA τ= TA τ-1(2-2)Where:NDAEstimated non-discretionary accruals;TALast period total accruals (scaled by lagged total assets);τA year subscript indicating a year in the event period.3. The Jones ModelIn comparison to Healy’s and DeAngelo’s Model, the non-discretionary accruals in the Jones Model (Jones 1991) are assumed to be variable. An indication of the change in total accruals due to normal activities of a company is given by the change in revenues with respect to the previous year and the value of the fixed assets. The difference between the expected and the actual total accruals could indicate discretionary accruals and therefore earnings management. The Jones model is illustrated as (Ronin and Yaari 2008):NDAt= α1 1At-1+α2 ?REVt+ α3 (PPEt)(2-3)Where:NDAtNon-discretionary accruals in year t;At-1Total assets in year t-1;?REVtChanges in revenue in year t;PPEtProperty, Plant and Equipment in year t;α1, α 2, α 3Firm specific parameters.The coefficients αχ are industry specific parameters. They estimate how different industries, with difference in capital intensity, are influenced by the variables (Assets, Revenue and PPT). Capital intensive industries, for example, will have a relatively greater PPE element than knowledge based industries. Firm specific parameters are generated using the following model, see next page, in the estimation period (Dechow et al. 1995).TAt= a1 1At-1+a2 ?REVt+ a3 (PPEt)+εt(2-4)Where:TAtTotal Accruals in year t;a1, a2, a3OLS estimates of α1, α 2, α 3.There are, however, also weaknesses in the Jones Model. Because accruals are deflated for changes in revenue the Jones Model does not take into account the ability of managers for sales-based manipulation. This is the greatest weakness of the model (Peasnell et al. 2000). These changes are considered as changes in economic activity. However Dechow et al. (1995) modified the original Jones Model to incorporate the possible changes in revenue that are discretionary.4. The Modified Jones ModelThe Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 1995) manages to incorporate the ability to detect sales-based manipulations. In the modified Jones Model, non-discretionary accruals are estimated during the event period as (Dechow et al. 1995):NDAt= α1 1At-1+α2 ?REVt-?ARt+ α3 (PPEt)(2-5)Where:NDAtNon-Discretionary Accruals in year t;At-1Assets in year t-1;?REVtChanges in revenue in year t;?ARtChanges in accounts receivables in year t;PPEtProperty, Plant and Equipment in year t;α1i, α 2i, α 3iFirm specific parameters.Like the Jones model, the modified Jones model takes place in two stages. The first stage is identical, where the estimated accruals are defined. It is important to note that for estimating the NDA, equation 2-3 will be used (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Jones 1991). Dechow et al. (1995) adopted this approach from the original Jones Model (1991). Equation 2-5 will be used when determining the actual NDA. 5. The Industry ModelThe last model which is discussed in this paragraph is the Industry Model used by Dechow and Sloan (1991). Like in the Jones Model, the non-discretionary accruals are assumed to be variable over time. Dechow and Sloan further assume that variation in the determinants of non-discretionary accruals are common across firms in the same industry. The Industry Model for non-discretionary accruals is (Dechow et al. 1995):NDAt= γ1+ γ2 medianI(TAt)(2-6)Where:NDAtNon-Discretionary Accruals in year t;y 1, y2Firm specific parameters;MedianI(TAt)Median value of total accruals scaled by lagged assets for all non-sample firms in the same two-digit SIC code. The Industry Model has two disadvantages. First, the approach only considers changes in the whole industry. It does not take firm specific circumstances into account. Therefore these possible specific non-discretionary accruals are not recognised by the Industry Model. As a result the model cannot distinguish discretionary and non-discretionary accruals in the right way. Secondly, the model only assumes a correlation between non-discretionary accruals from companies in the same industry, but it does not take correlated discretionary accruals into account. To which extent the earnings management stimulus is correlated across firms in the same industry determines the severity of this problem (Dechow et al. 1995). In this research the Modified Jones Model will be used for detecting earnings management. There are a few reasons why the Modified version of the Jones Model is used. First, as mentioned before, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1995) evaluated the ability of the models described above to detect earnings management. Their most important result was that the Modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) provides the best test to detect earnings management. It generated the fewest type II errors, which represents cases in which earnings are managed, but are identified as not. Guay et al. (1996) also evaluated the same five models. Their findings suggest that the Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model are the most effective models. Second, the most popular and best accepted model in the academic literature seems to be the Modified Jones Model. Therefore the results of this research will be better comparable to other studies when the Modified Jones Model is used. Compensation contractsAs mentioned in the previous paragraph, compensation contracts are one of the main reasons for earnings management. The contracts are derived from the issues around the agency theory. The agency theory is concerned with two problems. The first problem is that the aims of the agent (financial reporters of the company) are not in line with those of the principal (stakeholder). Secondly, it is impracticable for the principal to assess the work of the agent efficiently (Eisenhardt, 1989). Both agent and principal want to increase their wealth. The principal’s wealth increases when that of the firms increases. The wealth of the agent increases when it receives the maximum return for its input (i.e. labour). The problem occurs when the incentives for the agent to increase the value of the firm are absent, and the agent is primarily aimed at increasing its value. However, the principal can alter this problem by adding incentives to the agent in their compensation contract. These incentives can better align the ambitions of agent and principal.Before 1986 is was unusual for managers to receive stock-based compensation (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). Between 1974-1986 shareholders wealth increased with $ 1,000 for every $ 3 increase in wealth for the CEO’s (Jensen and Murphy 1990). During these years therefore, CEO’s had no incentive to increase the wealth of the firm. Incentive contracts are designed to eliminate this problem and to align the personal interests of financial reporters (managers) with those of the stakeholders (investors). Investors try to increase their return on investment, by increasing earnings within their investment. Therefore financial reporters should also try to increase true company earnings. According to Murphy (1999) compensation contract are designed to align executive interest with those of the shareholder. Literature divides compensation contracts for managers into three categories (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007):Fixed salaries;Short-term incentives; and Long-term incentivesFixed salariesAlthough fixed salaries do not have much relation to management performance, most incentives are based on fixed salary. Other elements within the compensation contract increase when salary increases (Murphy 1999). Managers that are risk obverse have a relatively larger part of fixed salary as part of their total remuneration (Murphy 1999).Short-term incentivesAn example of a short-term incentive is the annual (cash) bonus. Although bonus plan take many forms, most manager nowadays have a personal bonus plan that contains a individual performance portion (Murphy 1999). These bonus then can be achieved through predetermined targets and objectives, that can be both financial and nonfinancial measurements. In a Towers Perrin survey, 65 of the 68 sample companies using single performance measurement used accounting indicators as performance measurement. 62% of companies using multiple performance measurements used accounting indicators. Performance can be measured in a number of ways from total earnings to growth rates.Long-term incentivesLong term incentives are in particular stock options. These options are offered to management as an incentive for long term earnings at the company. In most cases these options can be exercised only over a period of time (Murphy 1999; Cheng and Warfield 2005). More importantly executive options are non-tradable. Considering these restrictions, managerial compensation contracts involve an increasingly higher degree of stock compensation. Murphy (1999) even states that stock-based compensation was most important development in executive compensation in the 1980s and 1990s. Short-term and long-term compensation are the general compensation that is spoken about when talking about earnings management. As proved in the Towers Perrin survey, a large majority of companies (91% of the total sample of 177 companies) use accounting information to measure performance. Apart from stock-based compensation managers can obtain shares by purchasing them on the open market. Core and Larcker (2002) say that some firms expect managers to own a unknown number of shares of their own company (Core and Larcker 2002).Why do managers receive stock compensation?As explained before, there is an information asymmetry between investors and managers. Managers know the truth about the (financial) performance and the situation of the company. Investors must rely on the information that is granted to them by the managers. To add value to the publicized information audit reports are designed. However, Ronen et al. (2006) claim that audit technology seems to be imperfect and managers can move within the boundaries set by regulators. Because regulators leave managers some space in the accounting rules, this creates an incentive for managers to engage in earnings management. In an extensive study on equity incentives, Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine the actions of managers that are compensated through stock options. Due to the increasing stock-based compensation in the last decades, a managers compensation largely consists of shares. This is consistent with the incentive alignment investors want to create. If stock-based compensation increase, a greater portion of manager’s wealth is invested in a relatively risky asset, i.e. company shares. Managers will adapt their remuneration package to their to an acceptable risk level, selling shares at short-term prices. Under the capital asset pricing assumptions, returns on stocks are positive and stock prices rise under normal economic circumstances. This causes short-term trading because managers need to constantly adapt their risk profile (Sivakumar and Waymire 1994; Noe 1999). As managers have relatively short-term personal incentives and investors often have a long-term incentive, this could lead financial reporter to report short-term high earnings. This short-term view could damage long-term interest for the firm and investors. This phenomenon has been researched in numerous studies (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002).Earnings management and equity compensationIt is clear that extensive studies have been conducted on the subject earnings management and compensation contracts. Compensation contract are often blamed for their steer towards earnings management. However Gao and Shrieves (2002) say that it is not the only incentive for managers to engage in earnings management. In spite of the fact that there are more incentives, the incentive coming from compensation contracts is the only form of earnings management that extracts wealth from the company (Stolowy and Breton 2004).Currently stock compensation is the biggest component in the executive compensation package. The primary reason for the introduction of this form of compensation was to eliminate the short-term orientation of executives. However in eliminating this short-term awareness, does this form of compensation create a greater incentive for managers to creatively report earnings? With managers compensation coupled to firm performance – in a form of earnings –, and current company earnings linked to stock prices, reporting managers have a seemingly increased incentive to report colourful earnings. Current earnings are based on past activities. Why are markets so possessed with passed activities? Share prices are a reflection of the present value of future cash flow. Therefore past earnings should have a very small impact on share prices. Under normal economic situations share prices increase, because analysts’ expect firms to increase their profit over the years. Put another way, if current earnings are disappointing, future revenues will be lower than expected, effecting current share prices. Therefore, current earnings give a good indication of future firm profits (Stein 1989).Studies have shown that managers are more likely to report earnings greater than the expectation of the market (investors and analyst’s), when they have a large portion of stock-based compensation. (Bauman and Shaw 2006). Share prices increase when firms beat the forecasts of analyst’s.This gives managers an incentive to increase earnings. However this study does not imply earnings management as a possible cause for these continuous surprises. Shaw nevertheless, does mention that firms have even a greater incentive to beat analysts’ forecast by small amounts. This could indicate a certain level of income smoothing. These small surprises are also documented by Cheng and Warfield (2006). Their research has shown that managers with high equity incentives, are less prone to show large positive earnings surprises.Gao and Shrieves (2002) note that income smoothing is a matter of timing. Managers that receive Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIP) have no profit in managing earnings. Gao and Shrieves found no positive nor negative relation between LTIP and earning management. This is because firms cannot manage earnings upwards continuously. This would result in exorbitant accruals, and could bring the firm into discredit. However, ensuring that higher earnings (greater than analysts’ expect) come at an optimal time for the manager, is a timing choice. Gao and Shrieves find that it is very dependent on the forms of compensation in the contract. Even though markets expect earnings to be managed, managers caught in the act, are punished by investors. Palmrose et al. (2004) say that firms lost 10% of the share price at the announcement of restatements of their earnings. Moreover, monetary fines and reputation losses are also important risk factors for firms who engage in earnings management (Karpoff et al. 2008). Disciplinary actions taken by the market towards managers is not possible, due to limited ability to withdraw past compensation. However post-restatement compensation plans are significantly lower (Cheng and Farber 2008).HypothesesAs explained in paragraph 2.2, this research considers that compensation contracts nowadays consist of three elements; fixed salary, bonus and stock-based compensation (e.g. stock options). However, the main focus will be on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management. The relation of earnings management with the other two components of compensation contracts (i.e. fixed salary and bonuses) will also be tested. By testing the relation of earnings management with all three elements of compensation data, the results for the different elements can be compared among each other. Therefore the relation of equity incentives and earnings management can be understand better. In the extant literature there is already a lot of research done on the subject earnings management. Some of these researches investigated the relation of earnings management with equity incentives. Gao and Shrieves (2002) say in their study that equity incentives gives managers an incentive that may lead to earnings management strategies for maximizing their compensation.CEO salaries are usually set on an annual basis. In a static setting, salary’s sensitivity to price movement is zero. Therefore, it seems unlikely that salaries are positively related to earnings management. Moreover, earnings management seems to be costly. As explained in the last paragraph of Chapter 2, firms lost 10% of the share price at the announcement of restatements of their earnings (Palmrose et al. 2004), and earnings management also may result in monetary fines and reputation loss. Moreover, Gao and Shrieves (2002) find in their study that salaries are negatively related to earnings management. Therefore, both logic and empirical evidence suggest that earnings management is a costly activity. It therefore seems reasonable that a manager with a relatively large amount of fixed salary, compared to the other two components (i.e. bonus and stock-based), would have an incentive to reduce the extent of earnings management, and so reduce the costs. This leads to the following hypothesis:H1: Fixed salary is negatively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management.Bonus compensation might also create incentives to engage in earnings management, because some bonus plans might contain nonlinearities (Healy 1985; Gaver 1995). Gao and Shrieves (2002) found in their study, that bonuses are positively related to earnings management. On the other hand, bonus plans are highly firm-specific, because of the structure and the pay-performance relation. This makes it difficult to predict the magnitude of the relation between bonuses and earnings management, but the expectation is a positive relation between bonus compensation and discretionary accruals. This leads to the second hypothesis:H2: Bonus compensation is positively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management.Managerial compensation frequently contains stock-based compensation to align the interest of managers and outside shareholders and reduce agency problems. The results of Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) suggest that high equity incentive CEO’s engage more in earnings management than low equity incentive CEO’s. They find that CEO’s whose overall compensation is more sensitive to company share prices, lead firms with higher levels of earnings management. Cheng and Warfield (2005) examined the link between managers’ equity incentives, arising from stock-based compensation, and earnings management. First they find high incentive managers are more likely to sell shares a year after earnings announcements. Furthermore they find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts. Their results indicate that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management. Also, Gao and Shrieves (2002) find results that indicate that the extent of stock-based compensation are positively related to earnings management. Now that the incentives for managers are so closely tied to the stock price of a firm it may have the perverse effect of stimulating managers to manipulate their earnings (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). This thesis extends the previous cited studies by examining how stock-based compensation relates to earnings management. The predicted linkage between stock-based compensation and earnings management is as follows. Assume that a manager receives a large component of his/her remuneration in the form of stock-based compensation. He/she can increase the value of that component of stock-based compensation by taking actions to reduce the exercise price. This prediction suggests an incentive for managers to engage in earnings management. If, for example, a manager expects to receive stock options, he/she can reduce current earnings through discretionary accruals. The effect could be a reduction in the exercise price of the stock options on the award date. By doing this, the manager increases the chance that the options are ‘in the money’. Therefore, the third hypothesis is:H3: Stock-based compensation is positively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management.In the next chapter the research design is described.Research design In this chapter the variables used for this research will be discussed. The approach will be similar to that of Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Gao and Shrieves (2002). In conformity with other papers that investigate earnings management, this research will make use of a field study. For this study four main variables will be used. The expectation is that the relative size of stock-based compensation will determine the extent of earnings management. Furthermore the relative size of salary and bonus will be used to see whether these variables can also determine the extent of earnings management. Therefore earnings management will be the dependant variable, and stock-based compensation, salary, and bonus will be the independent variables.First the data and sample will be outlined in paragraph 4.1. In the second paragraph the dependant variable will be described. Finally the independent variables will be discussed in paragraph 4.3. Data and sampleAs mentioned earlier in this thesis, most research done until now, focuses on companies in the U.S. This research investigates the European situation. The U.K. was one of the first countries in Europe where companies were required to report on the remunerations of their directors. Therefore this research will focus on companies based in the U.K. Listed companies on the FTSE 100 index from the period 2005 - 2006 will be used as the sample for this research. The FTSE 100 index from April 13th 2009 is used as the start of the sample selection. From the 100 listed firms on that date, 8 firms are excluded because they did not exist in 2005 and/or 2006, or because they were not listed in 2005 and/or 2006 on the FTSE 100 index. Furthermore 4 firms are excluded because there is not enough information regarding the compensation data available in the annual reports. Therefore the actual sample consists of 88 firms and 176 entries. Appendix B contains a list of all the listed firms on the FTSE that are taken into account in this study. This research focuses on 2005 and 2006 and not on more recent years because of two main reasons. First of all because the global financial crisis started in 2007. So the figures from 2007 until now are less comparable with those of 2005 and 2006. Second, there is more data available for 2005 and 2006. When the writing process regarding this thesis started, the annual reports for 2008 for most companies were not available yet. Because of these complications in more recent years, the data sample is from 2005 to 2006. All the financial data that is needed for the earnings management component, and compensation data from the CEO’s that is needed for the compensation component, will be gathered from the annual reports of the companies. Dependant variableThe dependant variable in this study is earnings management. An accruals model (the Modified Jones Model) will be used as a measure of earnings management. The Modified Jones Model takes place in two stages. The first stage of the Modified Jones Model is identical to the original Jones Model, therefore they both are described in this paragraph. The Jones ModelThe Jones model (Jones 1991) assumes that differences between cash flow and earnings are caused by the accruals. First the total accruals must be separated into a discretionary and a non-discretionary component (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). See equation 4-1 below:DAi,t=TAi,t+NDAi,t(41)Where:DAi,tDiscretionary Accruals for firm i in year t;TAi,tTotal Accruals for firm i in year t;NDAi,tNon-Discretionary Accruals for firm i in year t.Jones, in contradiction to prior research, keeps into account that accruals might change (increase of decrease) due to normal activities (non-discretionary accruals). The Jones model is preformed in two stages. In the first stage the total accruals are regressed against the changes in revenue and level of Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE). This estimates the normal accruals. The next stage, stage two, estimated regression is combined with the total accruals, changes in revenue and PPE over the event year. Deviations from the estimated regression depict the non-discretionary accruals. The Jones model is illustrated as (Ronin and Yaari 2008):NDAi,tAi,t-1=TAi,tAi,t-1=α1i1Ai,t-1+α2i?REVi,tAi,t-1+α3iPPEi,tAi,t-1+εi,t(42)Where:NDAi,tNon-Discretionary Accruals for firm i in year t;Ai,t-1Assets for firm i in year t-1;TAi,tTotal Accruals for firm i in year t;?REVi,tChanges in revenue for firm i in year t;PPEi,tProperty, Plant and Equipment for firm i in year t;εi,tError term for firm i in year t;α1i, α 2i, α 3iCoefficients for firm i.Total accruals are calculated by the difference between earnings and operational cash flow (Dechow et al. 1995):TAi,t=Earningsi,t+CFOi,t(43)Where:TAi,tTotal Accruals for firms i period t;Earningsi,tEarnings before extra ordinary income for firm i in year t;CFOi,tCash flow from operation for firm i in year t.When measuring earnings management, | TAit | will be used. The Jones model deflates all variables (ΔREV and PPT) with total assets from t-1 (beginning-of-the-year). This overcomes hetroskedasticity (Ronin and Yaari 2008). The coefficients αχ are industry specific parameters. They estimate how different industries, with difference in capital intensity, are influenced by the variables (Assets, Revenue and PPT). Capital intensive industries will have a relatively greater PPE element than knowledge based industries. Using only the standard Jones model would be short-sighted. The greatest weakness lies in the fact that the Jones model does not take into account the ability of managers for sales-based manipulation (Peasnell et al. 2000), because accruals are deflated for changes in revenue. Jones considers these changes, as changes in economic activity. Therefore Dechow et al. (1995) modified the original Jones model to incorporate the possible changes in revenue that are discretionary.The Modified Jones ModelThe model that will be used to determine the non-discretionary accruals is the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). The model finds its origin in the standard Jones Model. However, Dechow et al. (1995) have managed to incorporate the ability to detect sales-based manipulations. The modified Jones model is illustrated as (Ronin and Yaari 2008):NDAitAit-1=TAitAit-1=α11Ait-1+α2i?REVit-?ARitAit-1+α3iPPEitAit-1+εit(44)Where:NDAitNon-Discretionary Accruals for firm i in year t;Ait-1Assets for firm i in year t-1;TAitTotal Accruals for firm i in year t;?REVitChanges in revenue for firm i in year t;?ARitChanges in accounts Receivables for firm i in year t;PPEitProperty, Plant and Equipment for firm i in year t;εitError term for firm i in year t;α1i, α 2i, α 3iCoefficients for firm i.Like the Jones model, the modified Jones model takes place in two stages. The first stage is identical, where the estimated accruals are defined. It is important to note that for estimating the NDA, equation 4-2 will be used (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Jones 1991). Dechow et al. (1995) adopted this approach from the original Jones Model (1991). Equation 4-4 will be used when determining the actual NDA. Independent variableThe independent variables will be the type of compensation, for the different hypotheses. For this research, the relative size of the compensation type will be used to measure compensation. Relative figures are better comparable with each other. It is generally accepted that absolute compensation differences between managers are caused by firm characteristics.To measure the relative power of the different compensation types (i.e. stock-based, fixed salary, and bonus) an approach used by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) will be adopted. EquityFirst the EQUITY_RATIOi,t will be constructed. This ratio measures the relative size of stock-based compensation in the overall compensation of the CEO of firm i in year t, as shown below:EQUITY_RATIOi,t=STOCKi,tSTOCKi,t+SALARYi,t+BONUSi,t(4-5)Where:STOCKi,tStock-based compensation of the CEO of firm i in year t;SALARYi,tFixed salary of the CEO of firm i in year t;BONUSi,tBonus compensation of the CEO of firm i in year t.SalarySecond, the salary element of compensation will be measured. This ratio measures the relative size of fixed salary in the overall compensation of the CEO of firm i in year t:SALARY_RATIOi,t=SALARYi,tSTOCKi,t+SALARYi,t+BONUSi,t (4-6)BonusFinally, a measure for the bonus-incentives is constructed. This measure calculates the relative size of bonus compensation in the overall compensation of the CEO of firm i in year t:BONUS_RATIOi,t=BONUSi,tSTOCKi,t+SALARYi,t+BONUSi,t (4-7)When these equations are applied to the data, it defines for the different types of compensation what their relative size is. Then the relative sizes can be compared with the results of the Modified Jones Model to see how the compensation types are related discretionary accruals. In chapter 5 the results are outlined. Data analysis and resultsThe previous chapter explained the selection procedures in constructing a sample to test the hypotheses. The total collected sample consists of 88 FTSE 100 index listed firms and contains data over 2005 and 2006. In this chapter the results from the research will be described. Paragraph 5.1 will elaborate on the descriptive statistics and how the discretionary accruals by means of the Modified Jones Model are computed. Next the hypotheses will be tested using correlation testing and the independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests will be outlined in paragraph 5.2.Discretionary accruals and descriptive statisticsThis paragraph will elaborate on the discretionary accruals and descriptive statistics. First the discretionary accruals are determined. In the Modified Jones Model, the error term is the discretionary accrual for a firm. On page 34 the modified Jones model is illustrated as:NDAitAit-1=TAitAit-1=α11Ait-1+α2i?REVit-?ARitAit-1+α3iPPEitAit-1+εit(44)Where:NDAitNon-Discretionary Accruals for firm i in year t;Ait-1Assets for firm i in year t-1;TAitTotal Accruals for firm i in year t;?REVitChanges in revenue for firm i in year t;?ARitChanges in accounts Receivables for firm i in year t;PPEitProperty, Plant and Equipment for firm i in year t;εitError term for firm i in year t;α1i, α 2i, α 3iCoefficients for firm i.To calculate the error term (εit), first the coefficients (α1, α2i and α3i) have to be calculated. By means of a linear regression model the coefficients are calculated with SPSS. See table 1 below for the coefficients collected from the output of the regression model.CoefficientUnstandardized coefficients (B) α11,23α2i0,03α3i0,34 Table 1 CoefficientsThe unstandardized coefficients are used and not the standardized coefficients because the standardized coefficients are converted to the same scale so that they can be compared. This research does not compare the different variables so therefore the unstandardized coefficients are used. The output from SPSS further shows the adjusted R Square. The adjusted R Square measures the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable (total accruals scaled by assets) accounted for by the explanatory variables. For this model the Adjusted R Square is 0,485 (48,5%), which is a reasonable percentage.Now all variables are available, the error term (εit) for each of the 176 companies is determined. For the error terms (discretionary accruals) see appendix B on page 62. The error terms in appendix B only concern absolute values. Even though earnings management involves both positive and negative values of accruals, it does not matter whether the value of the error term is positive or negative for this study. This is because the magnitude of discretionary accruals is important, not whether the effect is positive or negative. Now that the error terms (discretionary accruals) are determined, the descriptive statistics over the data that is used in this research can be computed.From the 1st of January 2005 all listed European Union companies are required to comply to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Therefore the data from 2005 and 2006, which is used in this research, is comparable. For this reason the descriptive statistics for the data of 2005 and 2006 are calculated and presented as one dataset.For the descriptive statistics the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for the years 2005 and 2006 together are computed. The descriptive statistics are computed for the error term (discretionary accruals), the accrual data and for the compensation data. The compensation data consist of three different types of compensation; fixed salary, stock-based compensation and bonus. For the descriptive statistics, see table 2 on the next page. The statistics in table 2 show that, concerning the compensation data, fixed salary has the highest mean (0,41) with respect to stock-based compensation (0,31) and bonus compensation (0,28). Further stock-based compensation has the largest standard deviation (0,23). See table 2 on the next page for detailed information about the descriptive statistics. Results As described in Chapter 3, the hypotheses in this research is are:Fixed salary is negatively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management.Bonus compensation is positively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management.Stock-based compensation is positively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management.To test the hypotheses, first a correlation test will be performed in paragraph 5.2.1 to obtain understanding about the strength of the relationship between the different types of compensation and discretionary accruals. Furthermore an independent-samples t-test will be performed, see paragraph 5.2.2, to test whether there is a significant difference in mean scores of discretionary accruals for each of the compensation types. StatisticsError term Accrual dataCompensation dataDiscretionary accruals(1) (2)(3)Fixed salaryStock-basedBonusMean0,160,240,100,330,410,310,28Median0,110,190,060,200,370,350,26Std. deviation0,170,210,280,390,210,230,17Minimum0,01-0,19-0,450,000,040,000,00Maximum1,101,363,132,941,000,880,82 Table 2 Descriptive statistics(1) = Total accruals (earnings before extraordinary income + cash flow from operation) divided by total assets(2) = (Changes in revenue minus changes in accounts receivable) divided by total assets(3) = Property, plant and equipment divided by total assetsCorrelation testingThrough correlation testing the strength and the direction of the linear relationship between two variables can be determined. The Pearson Product-Moment Coefficient (Pearson’s r) is used to determine the correlation. It can take on values from -1 to +1. The sign out the front indicates whether there is a positive or a negative correlation. A positive correlation means that as one variable increases, so does the other and a negative correlation means that as one variable increases the other decreases. The size of the absolute value provides an indication of the strength of the relationship. Pearson’s r is +1 or -1 in the case of a perfect positive (increasing) or negative (decreasing) linear relationship. If Pearson’s r is 0, then there is no linear relationship (uncorrelated). Different authors suggest different interpretations for the outcome from the correlations test. Cohen (1988) suggests the following guidelines:Weak correlation:r = 0,10 to 0,29Moderate correlation:r = 0,30 to 0,49Strong correlation:r = 0,50 to 1,00This rule of thumb is widely used in the extant literature. Therefore these guidelines are used as a guidance for the interpretation of the results in this research. Caution needs to be exercised in interpretation of the results from correlation testing. A correlation test only determines the strength of the linear relationship, not whether there is a causal relationship or not.As explained in paragraph 4.3, the compensation variable consists of three types of compensation; fixed salary, bonus compensation and stock-based compensation. The different types of compensation are compared for their correlation with discretionary accruals. For the 88 companies that are subject in this research, the compensation data consists of these three types of compensation for the years 2005 and 2006. That means 176 data entries. See table 3 on the next page for an overview of the results of the Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Test. GroupPearson’s rSign. (1-tailed)NFixed salary0,140,03176Bonus compensation 0,030,37176Stock-based compensation- 0,150,02176 Table 3 Correlation test overall resultsFirst, the Pearson’s r is analyzed. The results in table 3 show a positive weak correlation (between 0,10 and 0,29) with discretionary accruals for fixed salary. Regarding bonus compensation almost no linear relationship with discretionary accruals is found. These two variables seem uncorrelated. Furthermore, table 3 shows a negative weak correlation with discretionary accruals for stock-based compensation. This means that when stock-based compensation increases, discretionary accruals decreases.Next, the significance level (one-tailed) is assessed. The significance level indicates how much confidence can be obtained from the results. As a cut-off for this research results below 0,01 are considered highly significant, results between 0,01 and 0,05 are considered significant, results between 0,05 and 0,10 are considered less significant and results above 0,10 are considered insignificant. The correlation test is performed one-tailed, because the direction of the relationship is predicted in the hypothesis (positive or negative relation). In this case therefore, the results for fixed salary and stock-based compensation are statistical significant because the p-values are below 0,05. The results for bonus compensation however are insignificant (p-value of 0,37).In summary, the results seem to make clear that there is a positive linear relationship for fixed salary and a negative linear relationship for stock-based compensation. The more CEO’s remuneration package consists of fixed salary, the larger (positive linear relation) the discretionary accruals in the annual reports. Further, the more CEO’s remuneration package consists of stock-based compensation, the smaller (negative linear relation) the discretionary accruals in the annual reports. Yet, the strength of both correlations is weak. The results therefore reject H1 and H3 because it was suspected that fixed salary would have a negative relation and stock-based compensation would have a positive relation with discretionary accruals. For bonus compensation a positive correlation with discretionary accruals was hypothesized. However no linear relationship with discretionary accruals is found, therefore H2 is also rejected. Nevertheless, caution should be exercised in the interpretation of the results. Correlation provides an indication that there is a linear relationship between two variables. It does not indicate that one variable causes the other. The correlation between two variables (A and B for example) could be due to the fact that A causes B, that B causes A, or that an additional variable (C) causes both A and B. Even when there seems to be a clear cause and effect relationship, a correlation alone is not sufficient evidence for a causal relationship. So from the results in this paragraph only conclusions about the strength and the direction of the correlation are justified. Independent-Samples T-TestThe second test in this research about the relation between earnings management and variable compensation is the t-test. A t-test is used to examine whether the mean for two groups deviate from each other. There are two t-tests to compare the group means:Independent-Samples T-Test, for comparison of two independent groups;Dependent-Samples T-Test, for comparison of two dependent groups.In this research the independent-samples t-test is used because the research is about two independent groups. For this purpose the data for each type of compensation is subdivided into three groups. On the one hand group 1 (CEO’s with a relative large size of fixed salary, bonus compensation or stock-based compensation), and on the other hand group 2 (CEO’s with a relative small size of fixed salary, bonus compensation or stock-based compensation). Group 1 and group 2 both consist of data for 60 CEO’s. For example group 1 from fixed salary consists of the 60 CEO’s with the largest relative size of fixed salary, and group 2 of the 60 CEO’s with the smallest relative size of fixed salary. The 56 CEO’s in between those 2 groups are excluded for the independent-samples t-test. This group of CEO’s is excluded because in this research the group with the highest relative size of the different types of compensation is compared to the group with the lowest relative size. Therefore the ‘middle’ group has no function and it is excluded from this research. The independent-samples t-test will examine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between the two groups. In this research this means whether there is a statistically significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between group 1 and group 2 for each of the three different compensation types. For example the independent-samples t-test examines whether there is a statistically significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between group 1 and group 2 for fixed salary. Two important assumptions are made regarding the results. The first assumption is about the results of Levene’s test of equality of variances. This tests whether the variance of scores for the two groups is the same. The outcome determines which of the t-values SPSS provides is the correct one to use. If Levene’s p is above 0,05, then equality of variance is assumed. The top row of the output from SPSS will be used. If Levene’s p is below 0,05, then it is assumed there is not equality of variance. In this case the results from the second row of the output will be used. Secondly, SPSS’s output shows the significance level two-tailed. For this research one-tailed significant levels should be determined because the direction of the relationship is predicted in the hypotheses. Therefore the two-tailed significance level from the output of SPSS is divided by two to compute the one-tailed significance level. Like for the correlation test the same assumption about significance is being made for the t-test. Results below 0,01 are considered highly significant, results between 0,01 and 0,05 are considered significant, results between 0,05 and 0,10 are considered less significant and above 0,10 results are considered insignificant.In the next sections the results of the independent-samples t-test will be presented. Independent-Samples T-Test for fixed salaryFirst the independent-samples t-test regarding fixed salary is conducted to compare the mean scores of discretionary accruals for CEO’s in group 1 and CEO’s in group 2. The output from SPSS shows a significance level of 0,02 for the Levene’s test of equality of variances. Because this is below the cut-off of 0,05, as explained on the previous page, the results from the second line in the table, ‘equal variances not assumed’, are used. For the results of the independent-samples t-test for fixed salary, see table 4 below. Fixed salaryResultsMean Group 1 (high)0,17Mean Group 2 (low)0,13Std. deviation group 1 (high)0,20Std. deviation group 2 (low)0,10T-value1,351Significance (1-tailed)0,09 Table 4 T-test fixed salaryThe results show there is a small significant difference in the mean scores for group 1 (median = 0,17, SD = 0,20) and group 2 (median = 0,13, SD = 0,10); t = 1,351, df = 88, p = 0,09 (one-tailed). This is because the significance level (0,09) is between the cut-off of 0,05 and 0,10, mentioned on the previous page.This means a small significant difference is found in the mean scores of discretionary accruals for CEO’s with the highest relative size of fixed salary and CEO’s with the lowest relative size of fixed salary. In fact, the results make clear that for the magnitude of discretionary accruals, it does matter to which proportion a CEO is remunerated through fixed salary. The more a remuneration package consists of fixed salary, the more discretionary accruals are distinguished in the annual report. Independent-Samples T-Test for bonus compensationNext the t-test is conducted for bonus compensation. The significance level of Levene’s test of equality of variances, showed in the output from SPSS, is 0,55. This is above the cut-off of 0,05, mentioned on the previous page. This means the assumption of equal variances has not been violated. Therefore, the results from the first line of the table, ‘equal variances assumed’, are used. See table 5 on the next page for the results.Bonus compensationResultsMean Group 1 (high)0,17Mean Group 2 (low)0,17Std. deviation group 1 (high)0,17Std. deviation group 2 (low)0,19T-value0,138Significance (1-tailed)0,45 Table 5 T-test bonus compensationThe independent t-test shows no significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between group 1 (median = 0,17, SD = 0,17) and group 2 (median = 0,17, SD = 0,19); t = 0,138, df = 118, p = 0,45 (one-tailed). This is because the significance level (0,45) is well above the cut-off of 0,10 , explained on page 44. Therefore, no significant difference in the mean scores for discretionary accruals between CEO’s with the highest relative size of bonus compensation and CEO’s with the lowest relative size of bonus compensation is ascertained. This means that for the magnitude of discretionary accruals, it does not matter to which proportion a CEO’s remuneration package consists of bonus compensation. Independent-Samples T-Test for stock-based compensationFinally a t-test is conducted to compare the mean scores regarding discretionary accruals for CEO’s in group 1 and group 2 of stock-based compensation. The output from SPSS shows a significance level of 0,003 for the Levene’s test of equality of variances. This is below the cut-off of 0,05, mentioned on page 44. It means the variances for the two groups are not the same. Therefore the results from the second line of the table, ‘equal variances not assumed’, are used. For the results of the t-test, see table 6 on the next page. The results in table 6 show a highly significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between group 1 (median = 0,13, SD = 0,13) and group 2 (median = 0,20, SD = 0,22); t = -2,26, df = 98, p = 0,01 (one-tailed). In other words, CEO’s from group 2 (low equity incentive CEO’s) have a statistically significant higher mean score of discretionary accruals than CEO’s from group 1 (high equity incentive CEO’s).Stock-based compensationResultsMean Group 1 (high)0,13Mean Group 2 (low)0,20Std. deviation group 1 (high)0,13Std. deviation group 2 (low)0,22T-value-2,26Significance (1-tailed)0,01 Table 6 T-test stock-based compensationBecause there is a highly significant difference in discretionary accruals between CEO’s with the highest relative size (group 1) and the lowest relative size (group 2) of stock-based compensation, the results seem to indicate that the extent of stock-based compensation has impact on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In summary it appears that for fixed salary there is a small significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between CEO’s from group 1 and CEO’s from group 2. The more a remuneration package consists of fixed salary, the more discretionary accruals are distinguished in the annual report. These results therefore seem to reject H1 that fixed salary is negatively related to discretionary accruals. Also for bonus compensation the results reject the hypothesis (H2). It was assumed that bonus compensation is positively related to discretionary accruals. The results however show no significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals for CEO’s with a relative high and CEO’s with a relative low bonus compensation package. Therefore H2 is rejected. Regarding stock-based compensated the results show that there is a highly significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between CEO’s from group 1 and CEO’s from group 2. However, the observed relation is negative. Low equity incentive CEO’s have a significant higher mean score of discretionary accruals than high equity incentive CEO’s. Therefore the hypothesis (H3) that stock-based compensation is positively related to discretionary accruals is rejected. In the next chapter the conclusion and the limitations from this research and directions for future research are described. Conclusion, limitations and future researchIn this final chapter the conclusions to the thesis are described. To provide an answer to the research question as formulated in the introduction to this thesis, several hypotheses were developed in chapter 3. In the first paragraph of this chapter the research question is answered. Secondly, in paragraph 6.2 the theoretical and empirical conclusions to the thesis are described. The final paragraph, paragraph 6.3, discusses the most important limitations of the methodology used and gives directions for future research.Research questionIn this thesis the relative size of fixed salary, (cash) bonus compensation and stock-based compensation on the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management is examined. The purpose of this thesis is to give insight into the relation between equity incentives (stock-based compensation) and earnings management. The findings enhance the understanding of the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management. After introducing the topic, formulating the purpose of this research and the research question, the relevant academic literature on earnings management, compensation contracts and the relation between earnings management and stock-based compensation is reviewed. Subsequently, three hypotheses were formulated, which were empirically tested in order to come to an answer on the research question:What is the relation between equity incentives and earnings management in the U.K.?In summary, it can be concluded that, based on this research, evidence is found that stock-based compensation has a negative relationship with discretionary accruals. Further this research has proven that low equity incentive CEO’s have significant higher mean scores of discretionary accruals than high equity incentive CEO’s. This rejects the hypothesis that stock-based compensation is positively related to discretionary accruals.Theoretical and empirical conclusionsThere are three hypotheses, based on the review of the relevant academic literature, which are tested in this research. Some results of this research support findings in the academic literature, most findings however oppose the academic literature. The first hypothesis states that fixed salary is negatively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. Gao and Shrieves (2002) found in their study that salary is significantly negatively associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (scaled by asset size). The results in this research seem to be oppose the findings of Gao and Shrieves. From the results it appears that fixed salary has a weak positive relationship with discretionary accruals. Furthermore it appears that there is a small significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals between CEO’s with a relative high and CEO’s with a relative low size of fixed salary as part of their total remuneration package. The more a remuneration package consists of fixed salary, the more discretionary accruals are distinguished in the annual report. Therefore the first hypothesis is rejected. The second hypothesis states that bonus compensation is positively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. Healy (1985) and Gaver (1995) found that bonus compensation might also create incentives to engage in earnings management. Further Gao and Shrieves (2002) found that bonuses are positively related to earnings management intensity. The results in this thesis oppose the findings in the academic literature because no (or a very weak) positive relationship between bonus compensation and discretionary accruals is found. Moreover, no significant difference in the mean scores of discretionary accruals is found for CEO’s with a relative high and CEO’s with a relative low size of bonus compensation. Therefore the second hypothesis is also rejected. The final hypothesis states that stock-based compensation is positively related to the use of discretionary accruals as a tool for earnings management. The results show a weak negative relationship between stock-based compensation and discretionary accruals. Moreover, it appears from the results that low equity incentive CEO’s have significant higher mean scores of discretionary accruals than high equity incentive CEO’s. Therefore, the results seem to oppose the results from studies from Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Gao and Shrieves (2002). These studies all found evidence that high equity incentive CEO’s engage more in earnings management (through the use of discretionary accruals) than low equity incentive CEO’s. The findings in this research suggest the opposite and therefore the third hypothesis is rejected as well. Further research is needed to test to which extent fixed salary, bonus compensation, stock-based compensation and the use of discretionary accruals are really related to earnings management.Limitations and directions for future researchThere are various limitations to this research that should be taken into account. The first limitation to this study lies in the use of the Modified Jones Model, which was presented by Dechow et al. (1995). Some studies have criticized the predictive accuracy of the modified Jones model (e.g. Guay et al. 1996). It is possible that the model is misspecified and imperfectly distinguish discretionary from non-discretionary accruals. The dependent variable can contain a non-discretionary component as a possible consequence of this measurement error, although the approach seems to be consistent with standard practice in the earnings management literature.Secondly, the research focuses on listed firms in the United Kingdom. Non-listed firms, which in general are smaller firms, have also incentives to manage earnings. Therefore it is a limitation that the results might not be generalized to non-listed firms and to other countries. Finally the data that is used in this research is from 2005 and 2006. This could be a limitation because it is a short period of time in which the firms are investigated. The results could be influenced by other factors (e.g. changes in laws and regulations) than earnings management only.The limitations mentioned above form directions for future research. First, the study could be extended by controlling for firm specific parameters (e.g. firm size, industry). Secondly, this study focussed on the relationship between different types of compensation and discretionary accruals. However, no assurance is provided on the extent of earnings management. Future research is needed to determine to which extent the results in this study can be explained as a result of earnings management. 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Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie, mei 2003: 196-204.Appendix ASummarization of the empirical findings of prior research.Author(s)YearTitle paperJournalObject of studySample (sample size, country, research period)MethodologyResults#1Cheng Q., D.B. Farber2008Earnings restatements, changes in CEO compensation, and firm performanceThe Accounting ReviewCompensation contracts of CEO’s following an earnings restatement.The sample size of this study is 289 restatements from the period of 1997 to 2001 from companies who are listed at the NYSE, the AMEX or the Nasdag.For each restatement firm compensation data is collected. First the pre- and post-restatement levels of restatement firms' CEO option grants is compared to calculate the change in option grants around restatements. Then this change is compared to the change in option grants for control group over the same period. Furthermore, there is examined whether the reducting in option-based compensation leads to improved performance.Restatement firms, compared to control firms, reduce the proportion of CEO’s total compensation that is option-based following a restatement. Thus, restatements firms are likely to view reducing option-based compensation as an important means of reducing their agency problems. Furthermore, the authors find evidence of improved operating performance following the reduction in option-based compensation. #2McAnally M.L., A. Srivastava, C.D. Weaver2008Executive stock options, missed earnings targets, and earnings managementThe Accounting ReviewWhy managers miss earnings targets. This paper uses two distinct samples: one with quarterly data and one with annual data. The quarterly dataset includes 54,934 firm-quarter observations from 1992 to 2005 and the annual dataset includes 7,916 firm-years from the same period. To test whether missed earnings targets are unassociated with subsequent stock-option grants, there is determined whether the value of option grants following a missed quarterly earnings target is different from the value of grants that follow no misses. Firms that miss earnings targets have larger and more valuable subsequent grants and firms are more likely to miss earnings targets just before large CEO option grants. Furthermore, the likelihood of missing earnings targets for firms that manage earnings downwards increases with stock-option grants.#3Cheng Q., T.D. Warfield2005Equity incentives and earnings managementThe Accounting ReviewThe relation between equity incentives and earnings management.All firm-years with data on CEO's stock-based compensation and ownership available from the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database for the period 1993 to 2000. First the relation between equity incentives and future trading is reported. Second results on the impact of equity incentives on the probability of meeting or just beating analysts' forecasts are investigated. Last, there is investigated whether managers sell more after earnings management. High equity incentive managers are more likely to sell shares in the year after earnings announcements and have a higher incidence of meeting or just beating analysts' forecasts. Overall, the study suggest that stock-based compensation can lead to incentives for earnings management.#4Barton J.2001Does the use of financial derivatives affect earnings management decisions?The Accounting ReviewAssess the extent to which managers trade off derivatives and discretionary accruals to control earnings volatility.The sample consists of 304 nonfinancial, nonregulated Fortune 500 firm's from 1994 to 1996. A set of simultaneous equations that captures management’ incentives to maintain a desired level of earnings volatility through hedging and managing accruals are estimated. Derivatives are measured using notional amounts and discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model. Firms holding derivative portfolios with large notional amounts have lower absolute level of discretionary accruals. The results suggest that the magnitude of notional amounts and discretionary accruals are endogenous. Managers smooth their firms’ earnings by adjusting the volatilities of cash flow and accruals. #5Daniel N.D., D.J. Denis, L. Naveen2008Do firms manage earnings to meet dividend thresholds?Journal of Accounting and EconomicsWhether firms manage earnings to meet dividend thresholds. The sample consists of 1500 firm's listed in the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database for the period 1992 to 2005. First, the non-discretionary and discretionary components of total accruals are estimated. Second, regressions are estimated separately for each two-digit SIC industry for each year. Finally, the dollar valuesof discretionary and non-discretionary components are obtained by multiplying the values calculated aboveby the firm’s lagged assets.Dividend-paying firms tend to manage earnings upward when their earnings would otherwise fall short of expected dividend levels. This earnings management behavior appears to significantly impact the likelihood of a dividend cut. The findings imply that managers treat expected dividend levels as an important earnings threshold.#6Bartov E., P. Mohanram2004Private information, earnings manipulations, and executive stock-option exercisesThe Accounting ReviewTo determine whether the ability of top-level executives to time stock-option exercises exist.The sample consist of 1,322 firm-years (1,218 firms) over a period from 1992 to 2001 from the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database.The matched pair design is used to match a firm-year with abnormally high exercise with a firm that in the exercise year has normal exercises but is otherwise similar.Abnormally positive stock price changes in the pre-exercise year turn abnormally negative after the exercise. Overall, the private information used by top-level executives to time abnormally large exercises follows from earnings management so as to increase the cash payout of exercises.#7Ashley A.S., S.S.M. Yang2004Executive Compensation and Earnings PersistenceJournal of Business EthicsInvestigates the effect of earnings persistence on the type or form of executive compensationFirms followed in time from 1993-1998. In total 6,924 firm years. Additional control variables are size, tenure horizon, age and industry effects.Total accruals scaled by total assets as a measure of earnings persistence. Firms with a high earnings persistence are expected to use earnings for management compensation. Firms with a low earnings persistence are expected to use cash flow from operations for management compensation.Firms with high earnings persistence tend to be larger in size, report higher earnings, lower stock returns and use more cash compensation to reward executives. This in accordance with expectations. Reason, high earnings persistence firms are larger and therefore can afford to diversify activities, making them less vulnerable to market changes. Firms with smaller earnings persistence tend to reward management with equity -based compensation, i.e. stock options.#8Bauman M.P., K.W. Shaw2006Stock option compensation and the likelihood of meeting analysts' quarterly earnings targetsReview of quantitative finance and accountingThe relation between stock options employed in a firm's executive pay plan and the firm's propensity to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts.2,513 firms top 5 executives from the years 1992-2002. Earnings per share is set off against analyst forecast (MEET) and if difference is between 0 and 1 cent per share (SHARE).Firms that employ higher amounts of stock option compensation in their top executive pay schemes more frequently meet or beat analysts' quarterly earnings targets, and more frequently report small earnings surprises, than firms with lower stock-based compensation.#9Roychowdhury,S.2006Earnings management through real activities manipulationJournal for Accounting and EconomicsContributes to the literature on earnings management by presenting evidence on the management of operational activities. Prior literature focuses more on detecting abnormal accruals.All firms in COMPUSTAT between 1987 and 2001 that have sufficient data available for the calculations needed. Data is analyzed is taken from annual figures. In total 17,338 firms year spread over 3,672 firmsBased on the model of Dechow, normal levels for CFO, production costs and discretionary expenses are attained for each firm. Deviations from normal levels are termed abnormal. These firms are stated suspect firms. The three different categories are to establish weather or not there in differences in the managerial decisions or operational activities, rather that reported activities. The results complement existing literature on earnings management. Methods have been developed to detect real activity manipulation in large samples. The paper also detects activity manipulation around earnings threshold, particularly the zero threshold. Furthermore, insights are given into the factors of activity manipulation.#10Coles J.L., M. Hertzel, S. Kalpathy2006Earnings management around employee stock option reissuesJournal for Accounting and EconomicsExamines earnings management around the cancellation and subsequent reissue of executive (and other employee) stock options.159 firms that undertook an option exchange program over the period 2001 through the second quarter of 2002. 54 made an public announcement of the exchange program.To establish earnings management, the standard Jones model has been used. To ensure that earnings changes are not due to actual firm performance. Total accruals and discretionary accruals are examined prior to reset date.Evidence of abnormally low discretionary accruals leading up to the option reissue date is evident. Thus, even in a setting where investors are aware of the incentives to manipulate stock price, it appears that managers still attempt to manage accruals to their own benefit. The market doesn't seem to respond to abnormally low discretionary accruals. #11Kothari S.P., A.J. Leone, C.E. Wasley 2005Performance matched discretionary accrual measuresJournal for Accounting and EconomicsTest whether a performance-matcheddiscretionary-accrual approach is well specified and powerful at estimating discretionary accruals.All firm-year observations from the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual, and Research files from 1962 through 1999. All firms that don't have sufficient data to compute the Jones model are excluded.Estimate for the performance-matched Jones model discretionary accrual is made. Similarly estimates for the performance-matched modified-Jones model discretionary accrual is done. Both estimates are compared. Compared to the standard model used to find earnings management, the discretionary accrual approach seems to have a better effect. However the writes do state that it is not possible to uses this method in all circumstances. This in mind the Jones and modified Jones model are easier and more practical.#12Balachandran B., K. Chalmers, J. Haman2008On-market share buybacks, exercisable share options and earnings managementAccounting and FinanceThe association between earnings management and exercisable option holdings for buyback firms.138 Australian on-market buy-back firms from 1996 to 2003. Earnings management is analyzed using a variation of the cross-sectional modified Jones model. Discretionary current accruals is used as the measure for earnings management. Multiple regression analysis is used to test the association between discretionary current accruals and exercisable options and option exercises.Findings suggest that firms’ motivations for announcing share buybacks are related to firms’ compensation policies. Overall, the evidence provides support for the proposition that earnings management and on-market buyback announcements are mechanisms to ‘drive up’ share prices to increase the cash payout of share option exercises.#13Ronen J., J. Tzur, V. Yaari2006The effect of directors’ equity incentives on earnings managementJournal of Accounting and Public PolicyExamines the effect of insider trading by directors on the likelihood of earnings management, on the value of the firm and on the stock price.Not applicable Not applicable Incentive packages contribute to motivating directors to tailor incentives for effort-averse managers. At the same time, they also induce directors to tacitly collude with managers in pernicious earnings management.#14Erickson M., M. Hanon, E.L. Maydew2006Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?Journal of Accounting ResearchExamines whether the empirical evidence supports the claim that equity incentives are positively associated with the probability of accounting fraud50 firms that are both accused of fraud by the SEC and for which compensation data is available from 1996 to 2003. Further, 100 matched sample firms who are not accused of fraud and an unmatched sample which contains 13,033 firm-year observations on ExecuComp.A variety of equity incentive measures is estimated to compare accused firms with matched and unmatched samples of firms that are not accused of fraud. The analysis reveals no consistent evidence to support the conclusion that the probability of accounting fraud is increasing in the sensitivityof executives’ total equity or vested stock and stock option-based wealth to changes in stock prices. Also, managerial exercises of stock options and managerial stock sales are not significantly higher for fraud firms than for nonfraud firms. #15Core, J.E., W.R. Guay, D.F. Larcker2003Executive equity compensation and incentives: a surveyEconomic Policy ReviewTo synthesize the broad literature on equity compensation and executive incentives.Not applicable - literature reviewNot applicable - literature reviewNot applicable - literature review#16Bergstresser D., T. Philippon2006CEO incentives and earnings managementJournal of Financial EconomicsExamines whether firms with CEO's whose overall compensation is more sensitive to company share prices have higher levels of earnings management.Data from the Compustat and and Compustat Executive Compensationdatasets.Overall accruals measures is derived from the income statements of the firms. Both the Jones model and the Modified Jones model are used to estimate nondiscretionary accruals. Finally, the relation between earnings manipulation and the power of CEO equity-based incentives is calculated. Managers whose overall compensation is more sensitive to company share prices lead companies with higher levels of earnings management. Periods of high accruals coincide with unusually significant option exercises by CEOs and unloading of shares by CEOs and other top executives.#17Baker T., D. Collins, A. Reitenga2003Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management IncentivesJournal of Accounting, Auditing & FinanceExamines whether the use of stock options relative to other forms of pay influences discretionaryaccrual choices around option award dates.168 firms with 1,100 firm-year observations from 1992 to 1998 from The Wall Street Journal annual compensation survey.Earnings management is modeled as a function of relative option pay and several control variables. For the earnings management construct, discretionary accruals are computed using the modified Jones model on cross-sectional data. Finally, a number of control variables are included. The analysis provides strong evidence that the discretionary accruals component of annual earnings is influenced by relative option compensation. Managers who receive large option awards appear to make income-decreasing accrual choices as a means of decreasing the exercise price of their awards. #18Gao, P., R.E. Shrieves2002Earnings Management and Executive Compensation: a Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary?Journal of Financial EconomicsIdentify firm specific factors that influence the extent of earnings management, with a focus on managerial contracts.The executive compensation information is obtained from the Standard and Poor’sExecuComp database, which reports components of compensation for CEOs of 1,500 U.S. firms from 1992 to 1999. The authors use an estimate of discretionary current accruals as a proxy for earnings management. A modified version of Jones model is used to distinguish between discretionary and nondiscretionary components. The role of eachof the major compensation components: salary, bonus, restricted stock, options and long-term incentive plans is considered in this study.The amounts of current year stock option grants are reliably positively related to earningsmanagement intensity. The most important result of this study is that compensation contract design does influence earnings management. Appendix BA list of firms from the FTSE 100 index that are taken into account in this study and the corresponding error-terms (discretionary accruals) for 2005 and 2006 for each company. FTSE 100 index on April 9th, 2009:#Company nameError-term 2005Error-term 20061Admiral Group0,1535885720,2425391312Alliance Trust (The)0,0773526620,2125363113Amec0,0217060240,0722938864Amlin0,0881857720,038420775Anglo American0,0238681410,1857964936Antofagasta0,6517013821,1039862427Associated British Foods0,0465763130,0217862328AstraZeneca0,4222655540,5442855079Autonomy Corporation0,5183799360,05469284310Aviva0,0186568660,01648794611BAE Systems0,1076225560,02361097112BG Group0,2374466570,29910400713BHP Billiton0,2833377190,33035317714BP0,1423096230,14871040115BT Group0,1020160360,07283499816Balfour Beatty0,0390966350,04965089317Barclays0,0145943240,01785802218British Airways0,1069313280,07398714819British American Tobacco0,2402566530,22106314620British Land Co0,1056621680,12785502521British Sky Broadcasting Group0,5462394250,55733224822Bunzl0,0912579760,12764117123Cable & Wireless0,0272850180,0970462524Cadbury0,1321151820,05785243825Cairn Energy0,0468352360,12963437526Capita Group0,1696206790,19550731827Centrica0,1570855560,05258705828Cobham0,0707106150,09537228629Compass Group0,0410586430,05361544730Diageo0,2217645140,21072035131Foreign & Col Invest Trust0,1880823630,07471096332Friends Provident0,0155576840,03501509433G4S PLC0,0200063560,04503237334GlaxoSmithKline0,4480126390,35380675#Company nameError-term 2005Error-term 200635HSBC Holdings plc0,0190422520,06885862336Hammerson0,2468101510,26992234937ICAP0,1528942160,09834313938Imperial Tobacco Group0,293985690,29727886539InterContinental Hotels Group0,001616930,01722486340International Power0,1268619850,06568248441Intertek Group0,0397909640,04051519742Invensys0,2629186990,12003348243Johnson Matthey0,0148120830,0431965544Kazakhmys0,2860071990,83095786645Kingfisher0,0229022670,09113368546Land Securities Group0,3034575170,14164440347Legal & General Group0,0116959230,01804968148Liberty International0,0789094730,12271832349Lonmin0,0690478940,3287410850Man Group0,1502586970,10952416651Marks & Spencer Group0,1350973960,10049411452Morrison (Wm) Supermarkets0,8296621540,29319844253National Grid0,0891795530,06752866554Next0,5924177320,4194154255Old Mutual0,0292711390,09535093256Pearson0,1355232590,08778184257Pennon Group0,2135856760,29345301758Petrofac0,0185022040,29477696459Prudential0,0086471340,01798581760RSA Insurance Group0,0260249050,02029365261Randgold Resources0,4412989370,13935255462Reckitt Benckiser Group0,3640503630,38043864263Reed Elsevier0,1736493960,16032606664Rexam0,0523326370,02947811465Rio Tinto0,352148320,45726967166Rolls-Royce Group0,1010239090,18839682467Royal Bank Of Scotland Group0,0225166410,02866458668Royal Dutch Shell A0,2368623070,18779994269SABMiller0,2418592650,14086163570Sage Group0,2102261310,16024175871Sainsbury (J)0,1293593990,15479996672Schroders0,0797015710,11169743273Scottish & Southern Energy0,008476270,0378820274Serco Group0,0329834570,04189196175Severn Trent0,1637634060,18863826276Shire0,012111220,08941547277Smith & Nephew0,0949080160,19412701678Smiths Group0,1186177840,053819397#Company nameError-term 2005Error-term 200679Standard Chartered0,0902352980,05369454680Tesco0,028426350,0423909781Tullow Oil0,0598560830,15156821182Unilever0,1833672470,17786379783United Utilities Group0,1916407130,18553255984Vedanta Resources0,0915029440,09863646785Vodafone Group0,0111505010,05368484486WPP PLC0,0933950510,06712653387Whitbread0,1877830510,20270675788Xstrata0,1563107060,095739119 ................
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