Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

The Absurd Author(s): Thomas Nagel Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 20, Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 21, 1971), pp. 716-727 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: . Accessed: 19/08/2012 01:08 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. .

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The formerstands as valid onlyifwe can findcriteriaforassigning a differenltogicalformto 'allegedly'than to 'compulsively'.In this case, the criteriaexist: 'compulsively'is a predicate,'allegedly' a sentenceadverb. But in countlessothercases, counterexampleasre not so easily dismissed.Such an example,bearingon the inference in question,is

Otto closed the door partway ThereforeOtto closed the door

It seems clear to me that betterdata are needed beforeprogress can be made in this area; we need much more refinedlinguistic classificationsof adverbial constructionsthan are presentlyavailable, ifourevidenceconcerningvalidityis to be good enoughto permit a richerlogical theory.In the meantime,Montague's account stands: thereis no reasonto thinka morerefinedtheory,ifit can be produced,should not be obtainable withinthe frameworkhe has given us.

RICHMOND H. THOMASON

Yale University

M THE ABSURD * OST peoplefeelon occasionthatlifeis absurd,and some feel it vividly and continually.Yet the reasons usually offeredin defense of this conviction are patently inadequate: they could not really explain why life is absurd. Why thendo theyprovidea natural expressionforthe sense that it is?

I

Considersome examples. It is oftenremarkedthat nothingwe do now will matterin a millionyears. But if that is true,then by the same token,nothingthatwillbe the case in a millionyearsmatters now. In particular,it does not matternow that in a millionyears nothingwe do now willmatter.Moreover,even ifwhat we did now weregoing to matterin a millionyears, how could that keep our presentconcernsfrombeingabsurd? If theirmatteringnow is not enough to accomplishthat, how would it help if they mattereda millionyears fromnow?

Whetherwhat we do now will matterin a millionyears could make the crucial differencoenly if its matteringin a millionyears dependedon its matteringp, eriod.But thento deny thatwhatever

* To be presentedinan APA symposiumonThe MeaningofLife,December29, 1971.Co-symposiastwsillbe RogersAlbrittonand WilliamRichardsonn; either oftheirpapersare availableat thistime.

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happens now will matterin a millionyears is to beg the question against its mattering,period; for in that sense one cannot know that it will not matter in a millionyears whether(forexample) someone now is happy or miserable,withoutknowingthat it does not matter,period.

What we say to convey the absurdityof our lives oftenhas to do withspace or time: we are tinyspecksin the infinitevastnessof the universe;our lives are mereinstantseven on a geologicaltime scale, let alone a cosmic one; we will all be dead any minute.But ofcoursenoneof theseevidentfactscan be what makeslifeabsurd, ifit is absurd. For suppose we lived forever;would not a lifethat is absurd if it lasts seventy years be infinitelyabsurd if it lasted througheternity?And if our lives are absurd given our present size, why would they be any less absurd if we filledthe universe (eitherbecause we werelargeror because theuniversewas smaller)? Reflectionon our minutenessand brevityappears to be intimately connectedwiththesense that lifeis meaningless;but it is not clear what theconnectionis.

Anotherinadequate argumentis that because we are going to die, all chains of justificationmustleave offin mid-air:one studies and worksto earn money to pay forclothing,housing,entertainment,food,to sustainoneselffromyear to year,perhapsto support a familyand pursuea career-but to what finalend? All of it is an elaboratejourneyleadingnowhere.(One will also have some effect on other people's lives, but that simplyreproducesthe problem, fortheywilldie too.)

There are several replies to this argument.First, life does not consistof a sequence of activitieseach of whichhas as its purpose some later memberof the sequence. Chains of justificationcome repeatedlyto an end withinlife,and whethertheprocessas a whole can be justifiedhas no bearingon the finalityof these end-points. No furtherjustificationis needed to make it reasonable to take aspirinfora headache, attend an exhibitof the workof a painter one admires,or stop a child fromputtinghis hand on a hot stove. No largercontext or furtherpurpose is needed to prevent these acts frombeingpointless.

Even if someone wished to supply a furtherjustificationfor pursuingall the thingsin lifethat are commonlyregardedas selfjustifying,that justificationwould have to end somewheretoo. If nothingcan justifyunlessit is justifiedin termsofsomethingoutside itself,whichis also justified,thenan infiniteregressresults,and no chain of justificationcan be complete. Moreover,if a finitechain of reasonscannot justifyanything,what could be accomplishedby

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an infinitechain,each linkof whichmustbe justifiedby something outside itself?

Since justificationsmust come to an end somewhere,nothingis

gained bydenyingthat theyend wheretheyappear to,withinlifeor by tryingto subsumethe multiple,oftentrivialordinaryjustifications of action undera single,controllinglifescheme.We can be satisfiedmore easily than that. In fact, throughits misrepresentationofthe processofjustificationt,heargumentmakesa vacuous demand. It insiststhat the reasonsavailable withinlifeare incomplete,but suggeststherebythat all reasonsthatcome to an end are incomplete.Tlis makes it impossibleto supply any reasons at all.

The standardargumentsforabsurdityappear thereforeto failas arguments.Yet I believe they attemptto expresssomethingthat is difficulto state, but fundamentallycorrect.

II

In ordinarylifea situationis absurdwhenit includesa conspicuous discrepancybetweenpretensionor aspirationand reality:someone gives a complicatedspeech in supportof a motionthat has already been passed; a notoriouscriminalis made presidentof a major philanthropicfoundation;you declare yourlove over the telephone to a recordedannouncement;as you are beingknighted,yourpants fall down.

When a person finds himselfin an absurd situation, he will usually attemptto change it, by modifyinghis aspirations,or by tryingto bringrealityintobetteraccord withthem,or by removing himselffromthe situationentirely.We are not always willingor able to extricateourselves froma position whose absurdityhas become clear to us. Nevertheless,it is usually possible to imagine some change that would remove the absurdity-whether or not we can or willimplementit. The sensethatlifeas a wholeis absurd arises when we perceive,perhaps dimly,an inflatedpretensionor aspirationwhichis inseparablefromthecontinuationof humanlife and whichmakesits absurdityinescapable,shortofescape fromlife itself.

Many people's lives are absurd,temporarilyor permanentlyf, or conventionalreasons havingto do withtheirparticularambitions, circumstances,and personal relations. If there is a philosophical sense of absurdity,however,it must arise fromthe perceptionof somethinguniversal-some respectin whichpretensionand reality inevitablyclash forus all. This conditionis supplied, I $hallargue, by the collision between the seriousnesswith which we take our lives and the perpetual possibilityof regardingeverythingabout whichwe are seriousas arbitrary,or open to doubt.

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We cannot live human lives withoutenergyand attention,nor withoutmakingchoiceswhichshow that we take some thingsmore seriouslythan others.Yet we have always available a pointof view outside the particularformof our lives, fromwhichthe seriousness appears gratuitous.These two inescapable viewpointscollide in us, and that is what makes lifeabsurd. It is absurd because we ignore the doubts that we knowcannot be settled,continuingto live with nearlyundiminishedseriousnessin spite of them.

This analysisrequiresdefensein two respects:firstas regardsthe unavoidabilityof seriousness;second as regardsthe inescapability of doubt.

We take ourselvesseriouslywhetherwe lead seriouslives or not and whetherwe are concernedprimarilywithfame,pleasure,virtue, luxury, triumph,beauty, justice, knowledge,salvation, or mere survival. If we take otherpeople seriouslyand devote ourselvesto them,that only multipliesthe problem.Human lifeis fullof effort, plans, calculation, success and failure: we pursue our lives, with varyingdegreesof slothand energy.

It would be differenitfwe could not step back and reflecton the process,but weremerelyled fromimpulseto impulsewithoutselfconsciousness.But humanbeingsdo not act solelyon impulse.They are prudent,theyreflectt,heyweighconsequences,theyask whether what theyare doing is worthwhile. Not only are theirlives fullof particular choices that hang together in larger activities with temporalstructure:theyalso decide in the broadesttermswhat to pursueand what to avoid, what the prioritiesamong theirvarious aims shouldbe, and what kindofpeople theywant to be or become. Some men are faced with such choices by the large decisions they make fromtime to time; some merelyby reflectionon the course theirlives are taking as the product of countlesssmall decisions. They decide whomto marry,what professionto follow,whetherto join the CountryClub, or the Resistance; or theymay just wonder why they go on being salesmen or academics or taxi drivers,and then stop thinkingabout it aftera certain period of inconclusive reflection.

Althoughthey may be motivatedfromact to act by those immediateneeds withwhichlifepresentsthem,theyallow the process to continue by adheringto the general systemof habits and the formoflifein whichsuch motivleshave theirplace-or perhapsonly by clingingto lifeitself.They spend enormousquantitiesofenergy, risk, and calculation on the details. Think of how an ordinary individual sweats over his appearance, his health,his sex life,his emotionalhonesty,his social utility,his self-knowledget,he quality

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