In addition to the nuclear weapons assigned to US military ...



Submission to the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States

Summary

US nuclear posture and strategy have for 50 years shaped the nuclear forces of the UK.

Decisions on the direction of US posture and strategy will determine future UK nuclear capabilities.

There is a need for an evaluation of the impact that US support for the UK nuclear programme will have on US security and on the prospects for disarmament and non-proliferation.

UK nuclear forces are primarily assigned to NATO. However nuclear weapons no longer hold a clear role in alliance strategy.

UK nuclear weapons are unlikely to be allocated to important targets in any joint nuclear plan.

The sharing of US information, material and equipment with the UK nuclear programme undermines confidence in the Non-Proliferation regime and increases the risk of nuclear technology falling into dangerous hands.

The US Government has not sought any assurance that UK nuclear weapons would never be used against US assets.

The UK Government may only be able to afford to renew its nuclear forces if planned expenditure on conventional forces is reduced.

The US should not encourage and facilitate the upgrading and enhancement of the UK’s nuclear forces.

The UK should be persuaded to take steps which would reduce nuclear risks, for example taking submarines off patrol and storing warheads on shore.

US support for UK nuclear forces

Since 1958 decisions on the US nuclear programme have shaped the capabilities of British nuclear forces.

No thermonuclear weapon of a truly British design has ever been deployed. The British hydrogen bomb tested in 1958 was never weaponized. The secondaries in Red Snow, WE177, UK Polaris and Chevaline warheads were all based on American designs.[1] The current UK Trident warhead is of Anglo-American origin.

The US supplies vital components for each UK Trident Re-entry Body / Warhead. These include the Re-entry Body case, Neutron Generator and most of the Arming, Fuzing and Firing system. This means that the US can determine the number of warheads in the UK arsenal.

The US also controls how many Trident missiles are in the Royal Navy inventory. The UK does not own specific missiles. They are withdrawn from a common pool. A particular missile can be deployed on a British submarine for 10 years, return to Kings Bay for maintenance, and then be loaded onto a US Navy submarine.

The US provides software for the fire control systems on British submarines and computer models for the shore-based target planning system at Corsham in Wiltshire. This software defines the capabilities of the Trident system.

The US supplied geodetic data for the British Polaris system and continues to produce critical data for UK Trident. The Applied Physics Laboratory of John Hopkins University assesses the capabilities of the British system. Without this ongoing support the force would be significantly less accurate.

There are procedures in place today which govern how strategic targeting data can be passed from STRATCOM to the UK Liaison Office in Omaha, the Corsham targeting centre and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in London.[2] So it is likely that specific targets can be allocated by STRATCOM to UK warheads in a NATO attack plan. The de-conflicting of such a joint plan can be carried out only at STRATCOM and not in the UK or at SHAPE.

With regard to infrastructure, Aldermaston provides some assistance to the US nuclear effort. It is a sounding board, out-with the two design laboratories, for exchanging ideas. There are niche areas of expertise, such as in hydrodynamics, where Aldermaston may have made a particular contribution. However the relationship is far from equal. If Aldermaston closed tomorrow the impact on US capabilities would not be significant. However the British design and production facilities would quickly run into insurmountable problems if Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia stopped providing their assistance.

The enhancement of the UK’s nuclear capability

In December 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W Bush agreed that the UK would participate in the Life Extension programme for the Trident D5 missile.[3]

In March 2007 Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, acknowledged that the UK would modify existing warheads to incorporate the Mk4A Arming, Fuzing and Firing System designed by Sandia National Laboratory.[4] The Mk4A system will improve the hard-target kill capability of the W76 warhead. It will enable the warhead to take advantage of the increased accuracy of the D5 missile over the C4 missile for which the warhead was designed.

In 2010 the Mk 98 Mod 7 Fire Control system will be deployed on British submarines.[5] This is similar to the Mod 6 which will be used on US Trident submarines. This upgrade will enhance the targeting flexibility of the UK force.

Aldermaston has a research programme to develop a warhead to replace Trident. This is understood to have similarities to the RRW project. There is no public record of a UK test of a warhead with Insensitive High Explosive. Future tests are ruled out as Britain has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. So the programme to develop a new warhead can probably continue only if it receives support from the US Laboratories, including test data and assistance with computer modelling.

If the production of a new US warhead is approved this will be a set back for moves to promote disarmament and non-proliferation. If the US then offers to assist Aldermaston with the development of a new British nuclear warhead the damage will be even greater. This will itself be a significant case of proliferation, enabling the UK to develop sophisticated weapons that it would be unable to produce on its own.

In December 2006 President Bush offered to support British plans to renew Trident and invited the UK to participate at an early stage in the program to replace the D5 missile.[6] Concept studies for the new missile, the Underwater Launched Missile System (ULMS), were discussed at three meetings of the Joint (US/UK) Steering Task Force in 2007.[7]

Decisions on the development of RRW and ULMS, and on whether to supply these technologies to the UK could shape the future of British nuclear forces for the next 50 years.

Targeting of British nuclear weapons

The Chevaline system, which was in service with the Royal Navy until 1996, had two sets of attack plans –targets in the Moscow area assigned by the UK, and targets allocated by NATO which were not in the Moscow area.[8] It is not clear how this works today. NATO has said that the alliance no longer maintains standing nuclear plans. It does have a system to rapidly generate such plans, with support from EUCOM and STRATCOM.

Sir Michael Quinlan (Permanent Under-Secretary MoD 1988-92) has suggested that the UK may no longer maintain any standing nuclear attack plans. Since 2003 the UK has deployed US-supplied systems for the rapid retargeting of Trident. However, given the vulnerability of submarine communications, it is unlikely that British submarines are sent on patrol with no target data.

In December 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair assured President George W Bush that British nuclear forces would continue to be assigned to NATO.[9] However in March 2007 Sir Kevin Tebbit (Permanent Under-Secretary MoD 1998-2005) questioned the relevance of British nuclear weapons to NATO:

“Where NATO fits into it all now is an interesting question. Preservation of NATO’s nuclear posture remains formally one of our reasons for possessing the deterrent. We say that we are still helping to defence countries who have foresworn nuclear weapons themselves, notably Germany. It is unclear how far we shall be able to emphasise this dimension as we go through the public debate in the next few years.”[10]

Most of the targets allocated by NATO to British submarine-launched nuclear weapons in the Cold War were in countries that are now members of the alliance. Recently the US has tried to encourage NATO to endorse the view that nuclear weapons have a counter-proliferation role. However this policy has rightly been criticised by other members of the alliance. NATO’s failure to support this element of US strategy reduces the significance of US and UK nuclear forces assigned to the alliance. The deployment of American B61 bombs in Europe today has been described as “a strategy in search of a threat”.[11] Just as the rationale for US nuclear forces deployed in Europe has evaporated so the reasoning behind the British nuclear capability has disappeared.

Current procedures are that targeting data can be passed to the UK only in support of NATO operations.[12] The possibility of bilateral US/UK nuclear missions was not mentioned in the White Paper on the Future of the UK Strategic Deterrent published in December 2006.

Systems are in place to enable STRATCOM to assign targets to British warheads. Given the technical capability of Trident and the move from a weapons-rich to a target-rich environment in US/Russian nuclear planning it might be thought that the UK force could make a significant contribution to attack plans. However British Prime Ministers have repeatedly emphasised that they, and they alone, can authorise the launch of British nuclear missiles. This veto means that STRATCOM cannot be sure that targets assigned to British warheads will be destroyed. The consequence of this will be that STRATCOM will not allocate any important targets to the UK force. British warheads would be largely superfluous in any NATO or bilateral plan.

Military or political value ?

In questioning the rationale for US nuclear forces in Europe a RAND study in 2003 said:

“The purpose of United States tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe is political and not military”.[13]

It added that those who are responsible for these forces on the ground ought to be told clearly if they have a political or a military purpose. If they only have a political role then aircrews could spend less time on nuclear training and more on conventional training.

If asked “what is the role of UK nuclear forces in US nuclear posture, strategy and policy ?” a possible answer is that they provide no military contribution but they are of political value. However if UK nuclear forces serve only a political role then what is to be lost by taking the submarines off patrol and storing their warheads on shore ? There would also be no justification for upgrading and modernising the UK Trident force.

On the other hand, if it is felt that UK forces do contribute to the nuclear posture, strategy or policy of the US, then where is this contribution assessed and evaluated ?

Non-Proliferation and the nuclear special relationship

The supply of nuclear weapons’ design information, material and components to the UK is contrary to the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear technology will only be successful if there are rigorous procedures in place to prevent exchanges of the type that take place on a regular basis from the US to the UK. Continuing with this ‘exception to the rule’ will make it harder to build the broad international support that is essential if there is to be effective regulation.

There is a similar situation with ballistic missiles. The provision of sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles to the UK does not set a good example to other nations.

In addition to the general concern that supporting the British programme sends the wrong message there is also the more specific worry that nuclear technology of US-origin could find its way into the wrong hands. There are precedents for this - in the crucial assistance that Klaus Fuchs of Aldermaston gave to the Soviet nuclear programme and in the UK’s supply of plutonium, uranium, beryllium and lithium to Israel.

Risks to the US from UK nuclear forces

The Trident force deployed in Britain is capable of launching a devastating nuclear attack on the United States. The New York area could be completely destroyed by only two 2 Trident missiles. The number of fatalities in such an attack would be between 3 and 4 million.[14]

In May 2007 the Defence Secretary Des Browne told MPs:

“the United States Administration has not sought any technical or diplomatic reassurances that UK Trident D5 missiles would never be targeted against United States assets.”[15]

In the case of the British Polaris system the procedures for authorising the launch of British Polaris missiles were known only by a very small circle of people. The US was not informed of them.[16] This may still be the case with Trident. There may be the potential for a small number of officers in the Royal Navy to launch a nuclear attack on the United States or to fire missiles at Russia, an event which would also result in nuclear devastation in America.

There is the possibility that a British Government could draw the US unwillingly into a nuclear conflict. London could be a catalyst pulling Washington into nuclear war.

UK nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. Capture of a whole weapon is only a remote possibility. But there is a real danger that crucial technology or components could fall into the wrong hands. There is also the danger that terrorists could attack nuclear weapons’ facilities in Britain or warheads in transit.

Alert Status

There is an urgent need to move towards the de-alerting of nuclear forces in order to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict.

The MoD have made progress in this area. However the current lowered alert state is non-verifiable. In July 1998 the MoD disclosed that the British Trident submarine on patrol was on several days notice.[17] This alert state can be covertly increased at any time. Arrangements may be in place for the US to monitor any change, but Russia cannot verify whether the missiles are at several days or 15 minutes notice.

A Trident missile fired from a British submarine off the West coast of Scotland at a target in Russia would have a shorter flight time than a similar missile fired from an American submarine in the West Atlantic.

Britain should be encouraged to review the alert status of its nuclear submarines. If they were taken off patrol and the warheads stored on shore then there would be a verifiable low state of alert.

This de-alerted model could be used to encourage China away from starting nuclear submarine patrols and to persuade Russia that their submarine warheads should be stored on shore.

If continuous patrols were ended then the life of Vanguard class submarines could be extended. This would remove the argument, which the MoD has presented, that they need to develop an expensive new class of submarine immediately.

Economic pressures

Given the economic problems that Britain is likely to face over the next few years it will be difficult for the MoD to pay for a replacement for Trident, build two aircraft carriers and continue with current overseas commitments. Annual expenditure on the UK nuclear weapons programme is due to double from £1.1 billion in 2003/04 to £2.1 billion in 2010/11 and then rise further in later years.[18] Britain’s ability to deploy conventional forces overseas will be reduced if financial resources are committed to upgrading nuclear forces and building a new class of submarine.

The Commission should heed the warnings of the new dangers from nuclear weapons and the call to move away from the attitudes adopted in the Cold War. British nuclear forces do not make any significant contribution to the security of the US. There are a number of ways which they increase the risks to America. Encouraging the UK to make progress towards disarmament would help to reduce the perceived value of nuclear weapons and to discourage proliferation.

John Ainslie

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[1] Records on the UK nuclear weapons programme in the National Archives.

[2] Guidance for the sanitization and distribution of Nuclear Command and Control Information to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); United Kingdom (UK) Liaison Office (UKLO); UK Strategic Weapon System Integrated Project Team; and UK Nuclear Operations and Targeting Centre in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Operations. CJCSI 3231.04E 12 August 2008. Restricted. Current list of CJSSG 15 September 2008

[3] Letters from between George W Bush and Tony Blair 7 December 2006

[4] Written Answer by Des Browne 28 March 2007, Hansard

[5] Written Answer by Des Browne 9 May 2006, Hansard

[6] Letters from between George W Bush and Tony Blair 7 December 2006

[7] Written Answer by Des Browne 3 December 2007, Hansard

[8] Defence Review: The Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, DEFE 19/208 1974, National Archives. Original classification Top Secret Articifer

[9] Letters from between George W Bush and Tony Blair 7 December 2006

[10] Sir Kevin Tebbit, Cabinets and the bomb seminar, British Academy, 27 March 2007

[11] Theatre Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The contemporary debate: Strategic Insights, Major Brian Polster USAF, September 2004.

[12] Title of CJCSI 3231.04E in current list of CJSSG 15 September 2008

[13] GC Buchan, Future roles of US nuclear forces, RAND, 2003, p26.

[14] Unpublished paper by the author on the effect of a UK nuclear attack on the US.

[15] Written answer by Des Browne 8 May 2007, Hansard

[16] Information from National Archives records.

[17] Strategic Defence Review, MoD, July 1998

[18] Written answers by Des Browne 30 October 2007 and Bob Ainsworth 3 June 2008, Hansard

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