How to Legally Travel Without a
How to Legally Travel Without a
License and Registration
Freedom Institute
Distributor of Educational Materials
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A QUESTION OF TRAVEL:
TRAVEL, LICENSE &
REGISTRATION
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DISCLAIMER
The information contained within is protected under Common Law copyright and operates under the Constitution, 13 Am Jur and the Laws of the united States of America and the Republic of Arizona, ARS 47-1207. The information is distributed by sovereign Citizens of these united States under the authority of the First Amendment Rights of the Constitution. These Rights include, but are not limited to, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the Press and the Freedom to Petition the government for a redress of our grievances for which our forefathers held so dear.
This information is offered strictly for educational and informative purposes only and does not constitute professional, legal or tax advise. The distributors herein are NOT tax protesters and agree that the income tax, when properly applied, as an indirect excise tax to the proper subjects, is both legal and constitutional.
Much of this information has been gathered over a period of years from numerous sources. Since it is presented for educational purposes only, it is up to YOU to determine the validity of any and all information presented. The author(s) do not make claims as to being an attorney, lawyer, para-legal or other type of legal counselor and neither recommends nor means to entice the reader to commit any unlawful act(s).
If there are questions which come to mind that may not be easily answered through your research of the enclosed citations, please consult the appropriate legal counsel. DO NOT attempt to "co-mingle" or "shepherdise" case law and other citations to situations which are not specifically defined within each specified volume.
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SECTION ONE:
AN INTRODUCTION
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Step By Step
Taking the Steps
Necessary for
Regaining Rights
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SOVEREIGN STATUS * RIGHT TO TRAVEL
1. Review the enclosed documentation.
2. Determine your lawful status.
3. Write letters to state authorities requesting comment on the status you have determined.
4. Keep and review all correspondence. Look up all case citations remitted to you.
5. If you are ready to make the change, send your letters of comment.
6. Notarize the enclosed Affidavit.
7. File the Affidavit with the County Clerk.
8. Place a Notice of Filing with an appropriate newspapers as required under state statute regarding public notices.
9. Send a letter Surrendering (not revoking) and declining the option of state franchise of your current Driver's license to your Department of Motor Vehicles.
10. Obtain a Copy of your Motor Vehicle Driving Record (Certified).
11. Make a copy of your current proof of insurance. Your insurance company will probably not terminate you for no longer having a state issued driving privilege license if you intend to continue having such insurance.
12. Place copies of all documents into a packet bound with blue paper background into all vehicles in which you travel. Carry your Status Card with you.
13. Notify the Governor, Director of the State Department of Motor Vehicles, and your County Sheriff of your status and intentions. Also send them notification as to your Status Card Document.
14. Learn what particular requirements are necessary for representing yourself in court. Do
not become adversarial when speaking with law enforcement agents or agencies.
15. Become truly free by increasing your knowledge. Speak often in close friends and small private groups. Seek to return to the common law and a Republican government.
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SECTION TWO:
DOCUMENTS OF
CHANGE?
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GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES
AND NOTICES
RECLAIMATION OF RIGHTS
AND CONVEYANCE
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THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
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Welcome.
This volume of literature is designed to present exculpatory information which presents questions regarding the implementation of licensing `agreements' (not considered contracts by most courts) and that of the registration of private property, generally referred to as automobiles.
The questions which you yourself should be asking, and the solution or answer you seek may be that at some point in time, your `rights' of travel were exchanged for the `privilege' of driving.
Once again, I caution you not to immediately point to some conspiracy theory by a great and powerful Oz (government), however please believe, for the moment, that well meaning persons (look up the Supreme Courts definition) have attempted to design a clear, concise method of protecting society against the evils which they perceived would only increase. Sounds good, eh?
Before Acting
Before acting on any of the information contained within this manual, please make sure that you are well prepared for the consequences of your actions. Those actions, however lawful in appearance, may not be well known to the individuals you come in contact with.
Further, your actions, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs may amount to the loss of all rights to travel in your automobile or any method of conveyance if such restriction is placed upon you by lawful judicial authority.
Definitions:
In today's wonderful world of change, it is important to look to Mr. Webster for a clarification as to the words intended in any matter. But more than that, it is portentous to seek the interpretation of the courts (and review the Dictionaries used therein) which sometimes contain very different meanings.
By way of the following pages, a certain number of definitions serve as legal contradictions to what you and I may have believed them to be. I would suggest that you seekout many of `older' dictionaries found within your archive areas of the public library, and then move to the American Law Review (ALR) of the local Legal Library.
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Helpful Notes:
If you are unaware of the changes which have taken place in the judiciary, including the federalization of all judges of the United States in 1982, then you really have your homework cut out for you. I suggest you seek the 1988 report titled, "The Courts: Sharing and Separating Powers" compiled by Rutger's University.
Further, after you have reviewed all the information contained within this manual you should' decide it necessary to obtain a copy the 1937 Book of States. Within the archives of your largest library you may find a copy... Recently, this authors research group went to the archives of the main branch of the Los Angeles Public Library wherein we found that the ONLY copy held in the Library was received on January 8, 1938 and first checked out, by anyone, August 10, 1993. Not a single person ever viewed a copy of this book for a period of more than 55 years.
This book, contains a copy of the `Declaration of Interdependence', a treaty of sorts, which prescribe how the individual States agreed to pledge your rights, life, labor, and property to an exchange of entitlements known as privileges. Your arguments will be sustained fully IF you are able to present formidable arguments regarding jurisdiction, when you couple it with the usurpation of personal rights.
Remember, DO NOT enter into the forum state. Do not reside. Do not become employed. Do not present your cast until you understand and are able to present both prosecutorial and defense arguments.
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July 4, 1993
Director John Smith Certified Mail #
Licensing and Identification Return Receipt Requested Department of Motor Vehicles
123 East Main Street
Your Capital, State
Postal Zone
ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
Mr. Smith:
The driver's license # , erroneously applied for and issued to me,
, a Citizen of , has been (returned, lost or misplaced) and I therefore SURRENDER said license, due to the use of non-disclosure and constructive fraud by the State in the issuance and 'requirement" thereof.
All other attachments, disclosed or undisclosed, are hereby surrendered, canceled and revoked by me, due to the application of fraud (See exhibit "A"). I am not involved in any taxable activity, nor am I a juristic, commercial person, as evidenced by Wills v. Michigan State Police and not a state citizen under the 14th Amendment. I am a dejure American Citizen, and thus under the Original Constitution of the united States, with full rights and privileges under the Constitution of the State of , as espoused in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 and Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43.
The driver's license is being used in a conspiracy by the State and Federal revenue authorities to establish a juristic commercial person for excise tax purposes. This is fraud, as nowhere in the application does it qualify that the acceptance of the driver's
license changes one's status for revenue purposes, and that you voluntarily waive your constitutional rights to accept a privilege which is taxable and regulatable.
The original intent of the law was only as a "certificate of competence", for the Citizen to travel in their own private conveyance. A chauffeurs license denoted a juristic, commercial person for revenue purposes. This category did not include the private individual, who has the right to travel without any type of encumbrance, nor did he have to pay tribute for the right to travel. The perversion and extension of the juristic/commercial person class to embrace each and every American Citizen, by non-disclosure, misrepresentation, entrapment as the elements of fraud, shows a criminal intent to deprive an American of his liberty, Privileges and Immunities and property for the purpose of raising a revenue for the profit of private individuals.
Under Motor Vehicle Regulations, in which consent is granted to the State in the form of power of attorney, proves conclusively that accepting or retaining the driver's license is voluntary and that it is not mandatory to commit perjury and surrender your
Citizenship. A juristic/commercial person, a Federal citizen under the 14th Amendment, or a
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common-law Citizen operating under a franchise or involved in a revenue taxable activity is required to have a commercial/drivers license. A freeborn American is not required, as the right to travel applies to him versus a privilege for the others. There is no provision in the Vehicle
Code for a "Citizen of the union of States" to obtain a license, as they are not within the intent and meaning of the Vehicle Code and do not fall within the purview of the `Drivers License Compact Act'.
Therefore, under the above guidelines, which establishes certain "facts" and imputes "knowledge", you are mandated to make the proper changes in your computer system to reflect that I, , am an American Citizen of the state of ; and not a "resident", therefore, is not within the scope of the Vehicle Code, nor am I required to have a driver's license to travel for my own pleasure and purposes, as a unenfranchised
American.
Please send me proper notice reflecting the above, so that I will not be unnecessarily harassed by any revenue officers which includes law enforcement types, who may attempt to enforce a non-existent contract upon me. Your failure to do this may cause me damage and injury, in which you will be held personally accountable and liable.
This document is hereby executed under the body of law referenced herein as the
, by service of certified mail, and as such shall be judicially noticed in any and all proceedings legal or otherwise, that may be initiated by anyone for any and all reasons.
Respectfully submitted,
Witness my hand this day of , 19
STATE OF )
ss COUNTY OF )
On this day of , in the year , before me, the undersigned,
a Notary Public in and for the State of , personally appeared
, proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the Citizen who subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed it.
Witness my hand and official seal.
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Director Mr. John Smith Certified Mail #
Vehicle Licensing and Registration Return Receipt Requested Department of Motor Vehicles
123 East Main Street
Your Capital, State
Postal Zone
ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
Mr. Smith,
Enclosed please find License Plate # , certificate of ownership (pink slip), registration, and a copy of the Bill of Sale, informing your office of my purchase of this
household good, not taxable under Article_, Section of the Constitution of the state
of and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section PPO-109.14 whereby:
"a vehicle not used for commercial activity is a "consumer good" and though a sales tax may be charged and collected at the time of its sale, it is not a type of vehicle required to be registered and "use, tax" paid of which the tab is the evidence of receipt of the tax."
Therefore, the plates and registration are hereby returned, revoked and cancelled due to the use of non-disclosure and fraud by the State of . This conveyance is my private property, and there are no 2nd or 3rd party interests in said vehicle. (See exhibit C). This vehicle is not used in commerce nor in any other revenue taxable activity. I am not a federal employee who possesses a social security number, and regulatable under the purview of the so-called 14th Amendment.
The intent of the original vehicle registration code, was that it was for the return of the vehicle, if stolen, or otherwise lost. This was so the vehicle could be properly identified as to who the owner was, and there were no other secret attachments to deprive anyone of their liberty or property. This is no longer the intent of the law, it has been perverted. It is presently being used in a conspiracy by the State to signify and denote a juristic/commercial person, a Federal citizen of the United States under the 14th Amendment, or a common law Citizen involved in a revenue taxable activity. I am none of the above described 'persons".
Under Motor Vehicle Code which establishes that accepting a certificate of ownership or registration is voluntary, and consent is given to the State in the form of power of attorney. All such power of attorney and authority over this vehicle has been revoked. (See Exhibit A). This conveyance has been and shall continue to be used for my own
pleasure and personal reasons, as a freeborn Citizen under Article IV, "U I of the Constitution of the United State of America, as espoused in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 and Van Valkenhurg v. Brown, 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43, and under the protection of the
Constitution of the State of ).
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I shall display the vehicle identification number (VIN) in the rear window, so as to properly identify my personal property, and to signify that the state has no interest in my property. Further, I shall endeavor to display an identifying number associated with the correct
filing number made with the clerk of the Common Law Court (the County Recorder) of the united States of America, so as to provide public notice to those otherwise uninformed peace officers.
Therefore, under the above guidelines, which establishes certain "facts" and imputes "knowledge", you are mandated to update your computer so that it reflects that Vehicle Identification Number(s) , is not required to be registered, and the registration requirements as established by the State for commercial revenue purposes do not apply. This vehicle is not involved in any revenue taxable activity, nor will it ever carry any "passengers' whatsoever. I may from time to time carry 'guests" of my choice.
Please send me proper notice reflecting the above, so that I will not be unnecessarily harassed by any revenue officers which includes law enforcement types, who may attempt to enforce a nonexistent contract upon me. Your failure to do this may cause me damage and injury, in which you will be held personally accountable and liable.
This document is hereby executed under Civil Code , , by service of certified mail, and as such shall be judicially noticed in any and all proceedings legal or otherwise, that may be initiated by anyone for any and all reasons.
Respectfully Submitted,
Witness my hand this day of , 19_
STATE OF ) )ss
COUNTY OF )
On this day of in the year 19-, before me, the undersigned, a Notary
Public in and for the State of , personally appeared , proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the Citizen who subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed it.
Witness my hand and official seal.
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NAME:
ADDRESS: CITY/STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
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------------------------------------------------------
ABOVE THIS LINE FOR COUNTY RECORDER USE
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'AFFIDAVIT
OF SUI/ALIENI JURIS STATUS,
RIGHT TO TRAVEL"
Comes the undersigned having declined the option of state franchise and the disabilities associated therewith, thereby instituting minimal contacts with the state, and operating Sui-Juris, does aver that no claim on this status is held by any party by way of contract or agreement entered into by me. Fully, this Affiant operates under the Law Merchant, Statute-at-large, First Congress 1789, Section 1, Chapter 8, page 52; Articles of Confederation, Article 4-3-1 1781; MC 38; Title 18, Section 241, 242, USC Title 42, Section 1983, 1985, 1986, inclusive of oath of "explicit" affirmation as directed by UCC 1-207(3)(4).
Affiant enjoying absolute unalienable liberty sustained by authority of the people as per the Bill of Rights Article X. Hereby asserting the right to unhampered use of all navigable waterways and all common law highways, roadways, and byways which are used for transportation by this Sovereign, either private, public, or commerce, anywhere in these United States. The Traveler hereby asserts and avers the governing authority of the Constitution of the United States of America pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1746(1) is judicially immune the courts of the state and the United States, and may be detained only upon sworn complaint of an injured party, as per Bill of Rights, Article IV. Rights in law are claimed, and rejects, and is not subject to the obligations in equity known as the Motor Vehicle Codes of respective states.
Affiant declares further that he is a member of `a Body of Insurgents' known to the United States as Americans as defined under Title 18 USC Section 11, `irrespective of recognition by the United States' and is therefore an 'Internationally protected person' by virtue of Title 18 USC, Section 11 16(b)4(B) may not be charged, nor held, with penalties provided under Title 18 USC, 112 for the violation of said rights, including protection required from the state.
RIGHTS GUARANTEED THE SOVEREIGN
"The Words people of the United States and citizen are synonymous terms and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our Republican institutes, form the sovereignty and hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people and every citizen is one of these people and a constituent member of the sovereignty." (Dredd Scott case)
The Siren (74 U.S. 152 (1868)) relates the opinion as delivered by Justice Field:
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"It is the doctrine of the common law, that the sovereign cannot be sued in his own court without his consent."
Eleven years later, in 1879, the court again addressed the issue of "sovereignty" in the case Hauenstein vs Lynham (100 U.S. 483). At issue was a treaty between the United States and Switzerland concerning land ownership in America by a citizen of Switzerland. Hauenstein, citizen of Switzerland, held title to property in the City of Richmond. He died and the state moved under the laws of escheat to seize the property, claiming Hauenstein could not will his property to his heirs because they were "aliens". The entire case rested on the treaty and the power of the people to make the treaty. The court stated:
"There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States; by their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established; and they had the power to change or abolish the state constitution or to make them yield to the general government and to treaties made by their authority."
In 1886, two more cases came before the Supreme Court involving the term "sovereign" In Yick Wo vs Hopkins and Woo Lee vs Hopkins (118 U.S. 356), Sheriff Hopkins had jailed Yick Wo and Woo Lee, depriving them of their personal liberty. On the issue of "sovereignty" the court stated:
"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
The cases cited above are just a few of the rulings made by the Supreme Court concerning the issue of "sovereignty." Those cases are based on Barron vs Baltimore (7 Peters 243) and later on Fairbanks vs United States (181 U.S. 283). The court in all cases said:
"Powers denied are not to be implied; they are to be obtained, if at all, from and in the same manner provided by, those who originally granted the enumerated powers, but who at the same time denied powers."
In 1909, in Kansas vs Colorado (206 U.S. 46), the court clearly recognized the three "sovereigns" in the United States as the federal government, the state government and WE THE PEOPLE.
The 10th Amendment reads as follows:
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"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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Therefore, if WE THE PEOPLE, denied the power to the general government, i.e. Congress, the power was either reserved to the people or delegated to the state. If the power was denied to the States and not delegated to the general government, i.e. Congress, the power was reserved to the people.
The sovereign remains the entity which governs his or her own rights. What does this have to do with the rights of an individual to drive? Please pay close attention to the case law presented.
CASE LAW
KENT vs. DULLES 357 U.S. 116-125
(a) the right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
(e) If a citizen's liberty to travel is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-mating functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed.
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SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA THOMPSON vs. SMITH 154 S.E. 579
6. Constitutional Law (note 82)
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Citizen's right to travel upon the public highways and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is common right.
The right of a citizen so to do is that which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety.
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7. Automobiles (note 4) Highways (note 168)
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Citizen's right to travel upon public highways includes right to usual conveyances of time, including horse-drawn carriage, and automobile, for ordinary purposes of life and business.
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8. Municipal corporations [note 703(1)]
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Citizen's right to travel upon public highways and usual conveyances in doing so is not mere privilege which city may permit or prohibit at will.
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9. Municipal corporations [note 703(1)]
City, in regulating, under police power, citizen's right to travel upon public streets, may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor prohibit one, and refuse another of like qualifications, under like conditions, to exercise it.
CHICAGO MOTOR COACH vs. CHICAGO 169 N.E. 22
8. Highways (note 165) - Legislature cannot deny citizen the right to travel on highway and transport his property in ordinary course of business or pleasure.
No state entity has the power to deny passage on the highways, byways, nor waterways, transporting his vehicles and person, and property for either recreation or business, but by being subject to local regulations i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a privilege requiring licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurance.
SHEER vs. CULLEN 481 F. 945
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed because of this Exercise of Constitutional Rights. "
11 AM JUR (1st) Const. L., Sec. 329 (Page 1135).
"Personal liberty largely consists of the right of locomotion-to go where and when one pleases-only so far restrained as the rights of others make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.
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The of the citizen to travel upon the public highway and transport his property
ugh,.4ZkUJt
thereon, by horse-drawn carriage wagon. or automobile is not a mere privilege which may he permitted or prohibited at will. BUT A COMMON RIGHT which he has under the right to life , liberty and the pursuit of happiness". [emphasis added]
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HADFIELD v. LUNDIN, 98 W 657, 168 P. 516
Justice Tolman was concerned about the state prohibiting the citizens "most sacred liberties" - the Right of movement:
'...based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has plenary control of the streets and highways, and in the exercise of its police power, may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a PRIVATE BUSINESS FOR GAIN.
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They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary right of the citizen to use the streets in the USUAL WAY and the use of the streets as a place of business, or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The FORMER IS A COMMON RIGHT; the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the LEGISLATIVE POWER IS CONFINED TO REGULATION; as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute carrier, in the prosecution of its business, as such, is not a right BUT A MERE LICENSE OR PRIVILEGE." [emphasis added]
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MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA 384 U.S. 436, 491
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"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."
ASSERTION PURSUANT TO UCC 1-207
Affiant understands the need for a law enforcement body and agrees to abide by the directives set-forth wherein the Constitution of the United States is concerned, therefore maintains an affirmation of rights on his person that bears the entire title, section, and code by which his Constitutional authority is found.
This includes a notification to public servants. Such servants, giving no credence to such authority, and by doing so, violate Titles 18 USC 241, 242 and 42 USC Sections 1983, 1985, 1986 under color of state statute, color of authority, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, and are not exempted from prosecution individually and severally.
Affiant reasserts his individual sovereign rights, including the maintenance of individual documentation with "explicit" reservation of rights under penalty of perjury;
UCC 1-207:4, The Code provides that a party may expressly preserve his rights and protect them against danger of loss by waiver or estoppel if he makes an explicit reservation of such right. (13)
The Code states an "explicit" reservation must be made. "Explicit" undoubtedly is used in place of "express" to indicate that a reservation must not only be "express" but it must also be "clear" that such reservation was intended.
The Code does not impose any requirement as to the form of the reservation, other than it be explicit. From the nature of the circumstances under which the need for making a reservation might arise it is apparent that no requirement of a writing is imposed.(19)
LOCAL STATUTORY CITATIONS AND VARIATIONS
Performance or acceptance under reservation of rights is found in agreement to UCC 1-207, inclusive of , in our state.
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"A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to perform in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as "without prejudice", "under protest" or the like are sufficient. "
SUMMATION
The state may not require a person exercising their Freeman status, under proper title, section, and code, to maintain a state issued "drivers license", vehicle registration, and forced vehicle insurance. Insurance is a contract. The state pursuant to Article _, Section _ of its Constitution as well as the United States Constitution barr the requiring the obligations of contracts in any manner.
The state may not direct its law enforcement in the willful disregard of lawful travel under the appropriate code and section without becoming party to and be responsible the violation of Constitutional Civil Rights of the Sovereign Freeman.
The state may not legislate away the Constitutional rights of individuals, nor compel sovereign citizens to give up their rights nor perform under any contract, or agreement, that I have not entered into KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, WILLINGLY, AND INTENTIONALLY.
This EXPLICIT Reservation serves NOTICE upon ALL Administrative agencies: Federal, State, Local, or intergovernmental organizations. 1)1 do not and will not accept the liability associated with and "compelled benefit" of any and all Commercial agreements. 2) That any alleged benefits that I may have received through franchise were received with EXPLICIT reservation of all my rights without prejudice.
NUNC PRO TUNC, this day of , in the year of our Lord, 199_.
I, , state that the foregoing is true in substance and in fact to the best of my knowledge and belief, and is made in good faith, and that this asseveration could be used as evidence, and that I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.
SUI JURIS
c/o ADDRESS c/o CITY AND STATE
and
ALIENI JURIS
c/o ADDRESS : c/o CITY AND STATE
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STATE OF )
ss:
CISNTY OF )
I, , a notary public for the state of , do hereby certify and affirm that the above named person(s) have appeared before me and declaring the execution thereof, being a true and correct document to the best of his/her own belief.
Sui Juris
Subscribed and sworn/affirmed to before me this ____day of______, 1993. NOTARY SEAL
Notary Public
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United States of America
CONSTITUTIONAL DRIVERS LICENSE
I, , being a sovereign citizen of the United States of America and the State of Arizona, do hereby, by this document, license myself to operate a motor vehicle, or any other mechanical device on or off the public highways anywhere in these United States and continue to exercise the privilege of this right as long as in so doing, I do not infringe upon the life. liberty. property of another person, or endanger health. morals and safety of society.
United States of America
CONSTITUTIONAL DRIVERS LICENSE
I. , being a sovereign citizen of the United States of America and the State of Arizona, do hereby, by this document, license myself to operate a motor vehicle. or any other mechanical device on or off the public highways anywhere in these United Sutra and content to exercise the privilege of this right as long as in so doing, I do not infringe upon the life, liberty. property of another person, or endanger health, morals sod safety of society.
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Recording Requested By;
And when recorded mail to:
Space Above This Line For Recorders Use
(Page 1 of 2)
CONVEYANCE
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For Consideration of Reclamation of my UNALIENABLE RIGHTS, I hereby quit claim to ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Motor Vehicle Division, all my interest in the following real property:
Certificate Of Title No.
Applied with coercion to one 19
identified by series No. , INCLUDING ALL Liens and encumbrances set forth by the ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, for the "motor vehicle" herewithin, REQUITING IT TO ABSOLUTE PROPERTY. Hereafter, presentment of Bill of Sale OR this conveyance, represent Lawfully Protected Possessions, AS PER Arizona Revised Statutes: See Section Title33, Chapter 4, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and B inclusive.
PREVIOUS CONTRACT(S) NOTWITHSTANDING.
The FREEHOLDER of this property refutes U.S. CITIZENSHIP and/or any ARIZONA (STATE) RESIDENCY STATUS. The SOVEREIGN ARIZONA CITIZEN, noted below, under Full Reservation Of ALL UNALIENABLE RIGHTS, holds ABSOLUTE POSSESSION of the aforementioned REAL PROPERTY duly REMITTED to ABSOLUTE PROPERTY. Any ONE other sovereign state Citizen in travel with this property must hold documents Authorizing the claim.
ABSOLUTE POSSESSION LAWFULLY HELD by this SOVEREIGN ARIZONA CITIZEN, under and with the FULL RESERVATION OF ALL RIGHTS, (WITHOUT PREJUDICE A.R.S. 47-1207)
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Space Above This Line For Recorders Use
(Page 2 of 2)
CONVEYANCE
State of
County of
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of 19 by personal
appearance of , who to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the Sovereign who subscribed to within the instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Witness my hand and official seal:
Notary Public
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SECTION THREE:
CASE LAW & LEGAL
DEFINITIONS
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SUPREME COURT CITATIONS
FEDERAL & STATE CITATIONS
USC CITATIONS
JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS
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CASE LAW ON DRIVERS LICENCES
CITES
SUPREME COURT
Hunnington v Attrill 146 US 657, 36 Led 1123
Powell v McCormack 395 US 486
Kilborn v Thompson 103' US 168
66 CalApp2d 870; 333 US 945
Penhallow v Doane 3 Dallas 55; Clearfield Trust Co v United States (1943) 318 US 363
Endicott v Perkins 317 US 501 (1943)
Pipe Line v Marathon 102 S Ct 2585; Cromwell v Benson 285 US 22 399 US 954; 399 US 932
Albrench v United States 273 US 1, 47 S Ct 250 71 Led 505 (1926) Cleavinger v Saxner 474 US 193, 201 (1985)
Tunstall v Brotherhood 323 US 210. 89 Led 187; Steele v Louisville & NR Co 323 US 192, 89 Led 173
Accardi v Shaugnessy 347 US 260, 98 Led 681 (1954)
Bank of United States v Planter's Bank 9 Wheaton 22 US 904 6 Led 24 Doolan v Carr 125 US 618
United States v Hensley, 469 US 221, 83 Led2d 604 United States v Cortez, 449 US 411, 416
Chisholm v Gilmer 299 US 99
299 US 623
Harlow v Fitzgerald (1982) 457 US 814
United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1, 8
Deleware v Prouse (1979) 440 US 648, 59 Led2d 660 Brown v Texas (1979) 443 US 46; 61 Led2d 357
Almeida-Sanchez v United States (1973) 413 US 166
cert derided 83 S. Ct 1891, 374 US 840, 10 Led2d 1060 US v Mendenhall (1980) 446 US 544, 557, 64 1 Led2d 497 Wong Sun v US (1963) 371 US 471, 487, 9 Led2d 442
Schneckloth v Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 219, 36 Led2d 854, 93 S Ct 204 Bumper v North Carolina (1968) 391 US 543, 548, 20 Led2d 797, 88 S Ct 1788 Sailer v Leger 403 US 365, 29 Led2d 534
331 US 549, 91 Led 1666, 67 S Ct 1409
Federal, 34 US 969
Board of Trade v Olsen 262 US 1; 29 ALR2d 1051 US v Darby, 312 US 100, 165
Crutches v Kentucky, 1891, 141 US 57, Led 640
Butz v Economou 438 US at 508 (1977) & 511-15; Pacific Tel v Kuykendall 265 US 196
Allen v Railroad Comm tit Ca., 179 Cal 68; Cert denied 249 US 601 Owen v City 445 US 622 (1980)
- - -
Crandall v Nevada 73 US 35 Fairbanks v US, 181 US 294, 300
Zee Toys v County of Los Angeles (1978) 85 CalApp3d 763 Affd 449 US 1119, 69 Led2d 106, 101 S Ct 933
California v Byers 402 US 424, 430-431, 29 Led2d 9
Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 453, 83 Led 888; Connally v General Construction 269 US 385, 391; 70 Led 322
Winters v New York, 333 US 507, 524-525
West's Ann Rev 8 Tax Code PP 6203,6204; Union Oil of California v State Board of Equalization, 386 P2d 496, 60 Cal2d 441, appeal dismissed, 84 S Ct 1629, 377 US 404, Led2d 495
Crandall v Nevada 73 US (6 Wallace) 35 (1868) Prior to 14th Admendment Kent v Dulles 357 US 116 (1958); Reaffirment in Zemel v Rusk 33 US I Edwards v Calif 314 US 160 (1941)
271 US 583, 589 (1924)
257 US 529, 532 (1922)
180 US 452 (1901)
333 US 426
Meyer v Nebraska 262 US 390, 399
US v Wong Kim Ark 169 US 649, 654
Doolan v Carr, 125 US 618
Williams v Fears, 179 US 270; Pinkerton v Mich. 573
112 US 580, 598, 599, (1884)
Whitney v Robertson, 24 US 190, 194 (1888)
Able v US 362 AT 246
Aiuppa v US 338 US F2d 146
See v Seattle 387 US 541
Camara v San Francisco 387 US 523
342 US 554, per Black
Albrecht v US 273 US 1, 8
Stone v Miss. 101 US 818, 25 Led 1079
Payne v Kansas 248 US 112; 240 US 342; 177 US 183
US v Washington DCDC 1965, 249 F Supp 40; affirmed 401 F2d 914, 130 US App DC 374 Henderson v City of NY 92 US 259, 271 (1875); Nebbia v NY 291 US 501 (1934) "No thing is gained in the argument by calling it POLICE POWER'
Katz v US (1967) 389 US 351
Mock v Davies 344 US 840
Moore v City East Cleveland 431 US 494 (1977)
US v Lacher 134 US 624
Federal 34 US 969
US v Lovett 328 US 303, 90 Led 1252
Tutan v US 270 US 568, 578 (1927)
Lockard v Los Angeles 33 Cal2d 533; Cert Denied 377 US 939
San Francisco v Johnson 3 Cal3d 937; Cert denied 401 US 1012
Endicott v Perkins, 317 US 501 (1943)
Chimel v Cal (1969) 395 US 752
- - -
US v Lee, Pa, 1982, 455 US 252, 71 Led2d 127 Holloman v Life Insur. 192 Supreme Ct 454 Almieda-Sanchez v US (1973) 413 US 266 Miranda v Arizona, 1966, 384 US 436, 444 Rogers v City of Richmond 357 US 200
Board of Trade v Olson, 262 US 1; 29 ALR2d 1051
FEDERAL
United States v Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F2d 1392 United States v Thomas, 863 Fd2 622, 625
Mugler v Kansas 123 US 661
Pashal v Perdue 320 F Supp 1274
Joyce v US 474 F2d 215
Rosemond v Lambert 469 F2d 416
Lantana v Hopper 102 Fd2 188
Chicago v New York 37 F Supp 150
United States v Hernandez-Alvarado 891 Fd2 1414 United States v Robert L., 874 Fd2 701, 703
Merritt v Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739
Monroe v Pape, DC, Illinois 1963, 221 F Supp 635 Asis v US 568 172d 284
Aiuppa v US 338 F2d 146
US ex rel Brooks v Clifford 409 Fd2 700, 706 US v Oregon etc 180 t2d 483
US v Southern etc, DC Cal 162 F 412, Affd 171 F 360 Schlegel v Bebout 841 F2d 937, 942 (9th. cir 1988)
Arguello v Cross 88 F Supp 107; 83 CA2d 153; 71 CA2d 759; Virginia Rwy v System, 84 F2d 641, 650
22 Federal 701, 703 (D Oregon 1885)
Chicago v Collins 51 NE 907; Freeburg v Dawson 274 F 240 127 Indiana 109; 26 NE 560, 561 (1891); 194 So 569, (1940) 22 F 701, 703 (1985)
Monroe v Pape,, DC Ill. 1963, 221 F Supp 635 United States v Evans 574 F2d 352 (1978)
Weeks v US 216 F 292
Dawson v Hillsborough County, DC Fla, 1971, 322 F Supp 286 Cannon v US 19 F2d 823
Monroe v Pape DC Ill. 1963, 221 F Supp 635 US v Independant Meat 32 F Supp 317
US V Choate 576 F2d 165; cert denied 439 US 953 Crain v Krehbiel 443 F Supp 202
- - -
Rupley v Johnson, 1953, 120 CA2d 548, 261 P2d 318
Operator-Kramer v Haley 439 P2d 1968, 573, 574
Cavitt 47 Ca2d 698, 118 P2d 846
Hahn v Kelley 34 C 391; Belcher v Chambers 53 C 635; Thaxter v Finn 178 C 270, 173 P 163 Brown v Campbell 100 C 635, 35 P 433
First National etc v Eastman 144 C 487, 77 P 1043
Smith v Chin Chew 81 CA 704; 254 P 599
California Casket v McGinn 10 CA 5, 100 P 1079
Cohen v Barrett 5 C 195; Clary v Hoagland 6 C 685; Dillon v Dillon 45 CA 191, 187 P 27 Mendoza v Small Claims Court 49 C2d 668, 321 P2d 9
Rescue Army v Municipal Court of Los Angeles 28 C2d 460, 171 P2d 8; Palermo etc v Railroad Comm 173 C 380, 160 P 228
Scott v Pacific etc 140 CA2d 173, 249 P2d 1039
Southern Pacific v Superior Court etc 27 CA 240; 150 P 397
Fitzpatric v Sonoma County 97 CA 588; 276 P 113
Newlove v Mercantile etc 156 C 657; 105 P 971
Jackson v McGilbray 148 P 703, 705; 166 P 1077-1078
Mosher V. Hines 154 P2d 372, 373
Vickich v Superior Court 105 Ca 587, 288 P 127
Independent etc v Railroad Comm. 70 CA2d 816; 161 P2d 827
So. Pacific v Spring etc 173 C 291; 159 P 865
Wuest v Wuest 53 CA2d 339; 127 P2d 934, 937
Leymel v Johnson 105 CA 694; 288 P 858, 860
People v Vermillion (1916) 30 CA 417, 418; 158 P 504
People v Nunn (1944) 65 CA2d 188, 191-192; 150 P2d 476
Orloff v LA Turf Club (1947) 30 Cal2d 110, 112; 180 P2d 321
Masgai v Public Service CommPenn 136 P2d 426, 434
Abelliara v District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal 2d 280, 287-88; 109 P2d 942 Weber v City etc 97 P2d 667, 669
Meadoe v Sp. Ct. Los Angeles County (1963) 381 P2d 648; Cal2d 610 Gurrero in re 69 Cal 88; 10P 261; Pacific Etc v Conrad 168 Cal 91; 141 P 916 Endler v Schutzbank 68 Cal2d 162; 65 CR 297; 436 P2d 297
Whitwell in re 98 Cal 73; 32 P 870
Laurel Hill c San Francisco 152 Cal 464; 93 P 70; affirmed 216 US 358; 54 Led 515; 30 S Ct 301;
Foley in re 172 Cal 744; 158 P 1034; Mares in re 75 Ca2d 798; 171 P2d 762; McCoy in re 10 CA 116; 101 -P 419;
Sonora v Curtin 137 Cal 583; 70 P 674; Merced County v Fleming 111 Cal 46; 43 P 392; State v Stevenson 465 P2d 720 (1976)
State v Gardiner (1949) _210 P2d 855, 94 CalApp2d 431
Blumenthal v Larson 79 CalApp 726, 730, 732; 248 P 681, 251 P 241
Coach Corp v City of Oswego 215 NYS 159, 163; Cope v Flanery 234 P 845, 849; 70 CA 738
- - -
US & Utah v Daniels 22 P 159
State v Eberhard 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011 State v Tagmi (1925) 195 Cal 522; 234 P 102 Kramer v Haley 439 P2d, 1968, 573-574 State v Eberhart, 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011 State v Albertson, 1970, 470 P2d 300 Hawaii v Brown 651 P2d 488 State v Eberhard 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011
Losier v Sherman, 157 Kan_ 153,; 183 P2d 272, 273; State v Magee 224 P 1028, 1031 ALR 142
NORTHEAST
Zugravu v O'Brien 196 NE 664
Kaindel 104 NE2d 619, 621 Keplinger v Lord 192 NE 549, 550 People v Mitchell 148 NE 242, 243 People v Briggs 20 NE 820; 114 NY 56 People v Trull (1978) 380 NE2d 1169
Ridgeway v City Akron, Ohio App 42 NE2d 724, 726 131 NE2d 682
- - -
NORTHWEST
- - -
Yound v Madison County 115 NW 23
State v Chicago & Northwest RR, 108 NW 594 Young v Madison County 115 NW 23 State v Johnson (1981) 301 NW2d 625, 628 McCullough v Colfax County 95 NW 31
- - -
SOUTHWEST
- - -
Carey etc v Sisco 64 SW2d 430
State ex rel 134 SW2d 132, 133
Bank of Commerce v Senter 260 SW 144, 147 Ex parte Schutte 42 SW2d 252 City of St. Louis v Bouckaert 185 SW2d 886 State v Graves 352 Mo 1102, 183 SW2d 46, 54 Ford v Ellison 287 Mo 683, 230 SW 637, 640
- - -
SOUTHEAST
Sands v Holbert 93 W. Va 574, 117 SE 896, 899 State v Mitchell, 7 SE2d 567
Thompson V Smith 154 SE 583
Eastern etc v Grave's etc 52 SE 837, 838 Inter-City v Harrison 157 SE 673, 676
SOUTH
Victor v Lewis La App; 157 So 293, 295
Fuller v City 152 So 666
Ham. NP 239; Railway Co v State, 23 Fla 546; 3 So 158, 11 Am St Rep 395
A
Commonwealth v Leeswing 5 A2d 809
City of Pittsburgh v Kane A2d 887
State v Castelli 101 A 476
Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass of Newark, 134 NJ Eq. 98, 34 A2d 292, 294 Duncan v Lumbermen's Mutual 91 NH 349, 23 A2d 325, 326 State v Insley 20 A 1031
Garden Courts v Hartnett 65 A2d 231
ARKANSAS
Martin V State 32 Ark 124
CALIFORNIA
Bixbey v Pierno, 4 C3d 130
Use- People v Chambers(1972) 7 Cal 3d 666, 672 Ex pane Sing Lee 96 Cal 354
Escobedo v California 35 Cal2d 870
606 Cal (1936)
- - -
GEORGIA
Hennington v Georgia 1896, 41 Led 166 37 Georgia Law Journal 73,74 (1948)
FLORIDA
State v Allen 83 Fla 655
KANSAS
Gleason, 32 Kansas 245 Gleason 32 Kansas 245
MISSOURI
Schultz v Merchant's Insurance Co 57 MO 336
NEVADA
Ex Parte Whitle 15 Nev 146
OHIO
Balard 43 Ohio 340
Davis v State 38 Ohio St 506 99 Ohio App 165
Balard, 43 Ohio 340
NEW JERSEY
(Tiedeman's Limitation of Police Power secs 85, 195; State v New Jersey, 47 NJL 286; common v Robertson 5 Cush 438; Austin V Murray 16 Pick 121
- - -
NEW YORK
3 NY2d 148
Heafy, 247 AppDiv 277, 285 NYS 188, 193;
Jones v State, 167 NYS2d 536
Matter of Jacobs 98 NY 108; 50 Am Rep 636, Earl J
3 NY2d 148
Daurizo v Merchants 274 NYS 174
Waterloo etc v Village etc 193 NYS 360, 200 AppDiv 718; Colonial
Town of Pompey v Parker, 1976 385 NYS2d 959
Harper v Remington Arms 280 NYS 862
US v Cook 17 Wallace 174
Arch Cr PI 15th Ed 43
Arch Crim P1 15th Edition PP 43
Fuches, 47 Yale L J 540
25 Yale L 1658
I Am Jur2d PP 26
ILLINOIS
Vissering v Annunzio 1 Illinois2d 108 PP 27 Alton V Kirsch 68 111261; 25 CJ p1182 n 60
- - -
42 USC 1983
Bank of Boston v Jones, 4 UCC Rep Serv 1021, 236 A2d 484
UCC PP 9-109.1, .14, PP 109. (2)
Barnes 11 UCC Rep Serv 679 (Me Ref 1972)
Thus under UCC PPO-109.14, a vehicle not used for commercial activity is a "consumer goods"and though a sales tax may be charged and collected at the time of it's sale, it is not a type of vehicle required to be registered and "use tax" paid of which the tab is the evidence of receipt of the tax.
Rave 7 UCC Rep Serv 258 (DC Conn Ref 1969)
Cook v Steams 11 Mass 533, 537 (1814)
I Blackstone's Commentaries 86
State v Chambers 93 NC 600
56 P2d 602 Collier & Wallis
11 Am Jur PP329
Thompson v Smith, 155 Va 367
Haver v Yaker, 9 Wall 32, 35, (1869)
Foster v Neilson, 2 Pet 253, 314 (1829)
Kurtz v Capital, 61 A2d 470
31 U. of Fla. Law Review
US v Chadwick, 1977, 97 S. Ct 2476, 53 Led2d 538
State v Chambers 93 NC 600
US v Hartwell 3 Clifford 221
Gibbons v Ogden 9 Wheaton 1, 211
1 Am Jur 2d #32
1 Atk 21, 46; Cowp 340; 1 Leach CrCas 64; 1 Ry&M 77
R Micr2d 140
- - -
425.
The Word `Person'
The word "person" in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings. See e.g. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dept. of Justice (1979) 612 F. 2d 417,
- - -
Definition:
- - -
Verb - To go from one place to another. To make a trip. To pass over a public way for the purpose of business, convenience, or pleasure. To make use of a way as the occasion may require legitimately.
[Ballentine's Law Dictionary]
25 Am J 1st High § 427
Caddo Electric Cooperative v. Rollinper, 285 p 2d 200
55 ALR 2d 172
Noun - A Constitutional Right under the Fifth Amendment to the united States Constitution. The act of Taking a trip.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500, 12 L Ed 2d 992, 84 S Ct 1659 Ex pane Archy, 9 Cal 147, 164
To travel is to pass or make a journey from place to place, whether on foot, on horseback, or any conveyance. Traveling is an act of making a journey; change of place; passage. The word "traveling," as used in some penal statutes, may have a narrow meaning; but in order to maintain an action against a city or town for a defect in a highway, one need be a traveler only in the general sense above indicated.
Hendry v. North Hampton, 72 NH 351, 56 A 922 A person is still "travelling" while delayed for a short time by an unforseen accident. Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal 147, 164
(a) the right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
(e) If a citizen's liberty to travel is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed.
Kent V. Dulles, 357 US 116-125
- - -
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA THOMPSON vs, SMITH, 154 S.E. 579 6. Constitutional Law (note 82)
Citizen's right to travel upon the public highways and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is common right.
The right of a citizen so to do is that which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety.
7. Automobiles (note 4) Highways (note 168)
Citizen's right to travel upon public highways includes right to usual conveyances of time, including horse-drawn carriage, and automobile, for ordinary purposes of life and business.
8. Municipal corporations [note 703(1)]
Citizen's right to travel upon public highways and usual conveyances in doing so is not mere privilege which city may permit or prohibit at will.
9. Municipal corporations [note 7030)]
City, in regulating, under police power, citizen's right to travel upon public streets, may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor prohibit one, and refuse another of like qualifications, under like conditions, to exercise it.
CHICAGO MOTOR COACH vs. CHICAGO, 169 N.E. 22 8. Highways (note 165)
Legislature cannot deny citizen the right to travel on highway and transport his property in ordinary course of business or pleasure.
- - -
11 AM JUR (1st) Const. L., Sec. 329 (Page 1135).
"Personal liberty largely consists of the right of locomotion-to go where and when one pleases-only so far restrained as the rights of others make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.
The right of the citizen to travel anon the public highway and transport his properly thereon by horse-drawn carriage. wagon. or automobile. is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will. BUT A COMMON RIGHT. which he has under
the right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness". [emphasis added]
HADFIELD v. LUNDIN, 98 W 657, 168 P. 516
Justice Tolman was concerned about the state prohibiting the citizens "most sacred liberties" - the Right of movement:
"__.based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has plenary control of the streets and highways, and in the exercise of its police power, may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a PRIVATE BUSINESS FOR GAIN.
They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary right of the citizen to use the streets in the USUAL WAY and the use of the streets as a place of business, or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The FORMER IS A COMMON RIGHT; the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the LEGISLATIVE POWER IS CONFINED TO REGULATION; as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute carrier, in the prosecution of its business, as such, is not a right BUT A MERE LICENSE OR PRIVILEGE." [emphasis added]
SHEER vs. 1 ...N, 481 F. 945
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed because of this Exercise of Constitutional Rights."
- - -
LICENSE
A personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on land without possessing any estate or interest therein, and is ordinarily revocable at will of the licensor and is not assignable.
Lehman v. Williamson, 35 Colo. App 372, 533 P 2d 63, 65
The permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, a tort, or otherwise not allowable.
People v. Henderson, 391 Mich. 612, 218 N.W. 2d 2, 4
In Arizona, the use of the highways of this State is a RIGHT which all qualified citizen possess subject to reasonable regulations..."
Campbell v Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P2d 685
To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession (acquisition) of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of the right
Crutches v Kentucky, 1891, 141 US 57, 35
Licenses are for the conduct of a business, profession, occupation, the exercise of such when they are a privilege. Licensing is in the nature of a special privilege. Licensing is in the nature of a special privilege entitling licensee to do some thing that he would not be entitled to do without a license.
San Francisco v Liverpool, 74 Cal 11
3
- - -
The object of a license is to confer a right which does not exist without it.
Inter-City v Harrison, 157 SE 673, 676
A license is merely permission to due that unlawful under common law, or is made so by some ordinance or statute, including the one authorizing or requiring the license.
22 Federal 701- 703 (D Oregon 1885)
A right which is free and open to all is not the subject of a license. or a tax.
Chicago v Collins, 51 NE 907 Freeburg v Dawson, 274 F 240
License tax is not a charge for enjoyment of privilege bestowed by state. It is an unconstitutional attempt to regulate a privilege which exists apart from the state authority, when it is guaranteed the people by the Constitution. Supra COLLINS
The use of the common highways for travel and transportation is not a mere privilege but a fundamental right.
Escobedo v California, 35 Cal2d 870
We hold that the enforcement of the act against the defendant, would deprive him of his rights under the Federal Constitution.
Pacific Tel v Kuykendall, 265 US 196
So long as one uses his property for private purposes and does not devote it to public use, the public has no interest in it and no voice in its control.
Associate Pipe v Railroad Comm, 176 Cal 518
- - -
Regulations, Fees, Taxes .... may not be applied to natural person using common highways as it is in derogation of common right of public to use highways as an avenue upon which vehicles for transportation of goods, passengers, freight and traffic of all kinds may be freely moved, having due regard for rights of others, while this, or other provisions of statute, should be fairly, liberally construed to promote the effect the evident purpose for which it was intended, care should be exercised not to unduly extend its effect.
Young v Madison County, 115 NW 23
Lastly, a comment as to the specifics involved regarding research of the position that License and tax in relation to the use of one's personal and private property which bear further investigation.
"The state and its municipalities are prohibited from violating substantive rights Owen v City, 445 US 622 (1980), among which are the right to travel free of license, fee, tax, within the interstate (Crandall v Nevada, 73 US 35) and it cannot by any power do that which is expressly prohibited by any other power, that is taxation, eminent domain, licensing, as a matter of law (US & Utah_ v Daniels, 22 P 159) nor may it do indirectly (Fairbanks v 11S, 181 US 294, 300)."
"The power of the legislative branch of government to regulate commerce is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection or advancement; to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety; to foster, protect, control, and restrain. (Virginia Rwy v System, 84 F 2d 641, 650) It is also the power to prescribe prohibitory regulations. US v Darby, 312 US 100, 165"
"The Constitution declares to be a public utility or service which is subject to the control by the state, all private persons that own, operate, control, or manage a line of system for the transportation of people or property; the legislature has defined such terms as 'common carrier' and 'public utility' but, the Constitutional and statutory definitions are construed as applying only to enterprises in which property, in fact, is devoted to public use. They must not be given of an attempt to impress with a public use, property not so devoted".
Allen v Railroad Comm, 179 Cal 68; Cert denied 249 US 601
- - -
"Where a private occupational statute exists, as here, of which the intent is regulation of private commercial occupations, the particular agency enforcing that private statute, shall
not apply it by trickery and deceit, and threat and misrepresentation, to persons who are not noticed by the statute as persons regulated and taxed, nor should it permit any party to do so, in violation of a persons right to stay out of a compelled contract, when he is not a person subject to the statue, unless clearly with its words".
State v Eberhard, 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011
Unrestrained conduct. A special privilege, not a right common to all. The privilege conferred by a public body on a person for the doing of something which otherwise he would not have the right to do.
33 Am Jlst Lic § 2
Permission to exercise a right or privilege which has been subject to regulation.
Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 NY 249, 72 NE 2d 697 1 ALR 2d 1160
Streets and Highways: A permit to use street is a mere license revocable at pleasure. The privilege of using the streets and highways by the operation thereon of motor carriers for hire can be acquired only by permission or license from the state or its political subdivisions.
Lanham v. Forney, 196 Wash. 62, 81 P 2d 777, 779
- - -
SOVEREIGN
Definition:
A ruler; a king; the supreme power in a government. A gold coin of Great Britain equivalent to the value of one pound.
[Ballentine's Law Dictionary]
To the Constitution of the united States the term "sovereign" is totally unknown. There is one place where it could have been used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have announced themselves as "sovereign" people of the united States: But, serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration."
Chisolm v. Georgia, (US) 2 Dal] 419, 454, 1 L Ed 440, 455
"The Words people of the United States and citizen are synonymous terms and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our Republican institutes, form the sovereignty and hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people and every citizen is one of these people and a constituent member of the sovereignty."
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393;
U.S. v. Rhodes, I Abbott 39;
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 74;
Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43;
U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649;
K. Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 239; et. al.
The Siren (74 U.S. 152 (1868)) relates the opinion as delivered by Justice Field:
"It is the doctrine of the common law, that the sovereign cannot be sued in his own court without his consent."
- - -
CITIZEN
The Original Constitution for the United States of America (1787) refers to Common-Law Citizens of the Several States in the Preamble, in Article IV. Section 2. Clause 1, and in numerous other sections, always the word Citizen is with a capital "C" when referring to this class of Common-Law Citizen, as a "Citizen of the United States".
In contrast, the so-called 14th Amendment utilizes a small "c" to distinguish this class of citizen whose status makes them subject to the jurisdiction thereof, as a statutory "citizen of the United States".
It was never the intent of the so-called 14th Amendment to change the status of the Common-Law Citizens of the several States.
People v. Washington, (1869) 36 C. 658, 661;
French v Bather, 181 U.S. 324;
Mackenzie v. Hare., 60 L.Ed. 297; et.al..
The case law surrounding the 13th and 14th Amendments all ring with the same message, "These amendments did not change the status of Common-Law Citizenship of the white Citizens of one of the several States". This goes to the crux of the controversy, because under the so-called 14th Amendment, citizenship is a privilege, not a "Right".
American and Ocean Ins Co. Y. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Cook v. Tait, (1924) 265 U.S. 37.
"I doubt that there is a judge in full possession of all his faculties, would rule that the 14th Amendment was properly approved and adopted".
State v. Phillips, (1975) 540 P.2d. 936; Dyett v. Turner, (1967) 439 P.2d. 266.
- - -
RESIDENT
Nevertheless, as long as the courts hold the position of the validity of the 13th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the united States:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "[T ] he constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the *109 forum State." Burger King Cam. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), quoting International Shoe Co V, Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Most recently we have reaffirmed the oft-quoted reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), that minimum contacts must have a basis in 'some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' Burger King„ 471 U.S., at 475, 105 S.Ct., at 2183.
"Jurisdiction is proper... where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State." Ibid., quoting McGee v. International Life Insurance Co„ 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957) (emphasis in original).
Applying the principle that minimum contacts must be based on an act of the defendant, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)
The due process of law clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which state has no contacts, ties or relations.
International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154
- - -
In the Constitution and laws of the United States the word "citizen" is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of 'a citizen of a State or of the United States. It is also used in section 1 of Article XIV of the amendments to the Constitution which provides that " . . " But is also sometimes used in popular language to indicate the same thing as resident, inhabitant, or person. That it is not so used in section 5508 in the Revised Statutes (Crimes Against the Elective Franchise and Civil Rights of Citizens) is quite clear . . . . Here the doubtful word is "citizen" and it is used in connection with the rights and privileges pertaining to man as a citizen, and not as a person only or an inhabitant. For these reasons we are satisfied that the word citizen, as used in this statute, must be given the same meaning it has in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and that to constitute the offense which is provided for, the wrong must be done to one who is a citizen in that sense.
Baldwin v. Franks (1887) 120 U.S. 678, 30 L.C.P.Co. 766, 770-771.
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e
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Definition:
One of the Uniform laws; a compilation of principles formulated through the joint effort of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Laws Dealing with most aspects of commercial transactions.
[Ballentine's Law Dictionary] 15 Am J2d Com C § 1
One of the Uniform Laws drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute governing commercial transactions (including sales and leasing of goods, transfer of funds, commercial paper, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, investment securities, and secured transactions). The U.C.C. has been adopted in whole or substantially by all states.
[Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition]
Uniform Statutes: Statutes drafted by a commission on Uniform Laws, or by a committee appointed by State Boards of Commissioners for promoting Uniformity o Legislation, and recommended to the legislatures of the various states for adoption, the purpose being to provide statutes on the subjects involved which, upon being adopted as recommended, will render the statutory provisions and rules uniform in terms an operation throughout the country. Published in the Uniform Laws Annotated.
[Ballentine's Law Dictionary] 50 Am J1st §§ 40, et seq.
Uniform Laws or Acts: Laws in various subject areas, approved by the Commissioners on uniform state Laws, that are often adopted, in whole or substantially by individual states; their purpose being to make the laws on various subjects uniform throughout the states. Examples are the Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act; Uniform Partnership Act; and the Uniform Commercial Code.
[Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition]
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COMMENTARY
This writer concludes, from the definitions below, that a court of record is e court which must meet the following criteria:
1. keeps a record of the proceedings
2. the tribunal is independent of the magistrate (judge) 3. proceeding according to the common law 4. power to fine or imprison for contempt 5. generally has a seal
Note that a judge is a magistrate and is not the tribunal. The tribunal is either the sovereign himself, or a fully empowered jury (not paid by the government)
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 425, 426 COURT.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The person and suite of the sovereign; the place where the sovereign sojourns with his regal retinue, wherever that may be.
CLASSIFICATION
Courts may be classified and divided according to several methods, the following being the more usual:
COURTS OF RECORD and COURTS NOT OF RECORD. The former being those whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled, or recorded, for a perpetual memory and testimony, and which have power to fine or imprison for contempt. Error lies to their judgments, and they generally possess a seal. Courts not of record are those of inferior dignity, which have no power to fine or imprison, end in which the proceedings are not enrolled or recorded. 3 BI. Comm. 24; 3 Steph. Comm. 383: The Thomas Fletcher, C.C.Ga., 24 F. 481; Ex pane Thistleton, 52 Cal 225; Erwin v. U.S.. D.C.Ga., 37 F. 488, 2 L.R.A. 229; Heininger v. Davis, 96 Ohio St. 205, 117 N.E. 229, 231.
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A "court of record" is a judicial tribunal having attributes and exercising functions independently of the person of the magistrate designated generally to hold it, and proceeding according to the course of common law, its acts and proceedings being enrolled for a perpetual memorial. Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo.App. 220, 175 S.W. 227, 229; Ex pane Gladhill, 8 Mete. Mass., 171, per Shaw, C.J. See, also, Ledwith v. Rosalsky, 244 N.Y. 406, 155 N.E. 688, 689.
Webster's New Practical Dictionary, 386 (1953)
G. & C. Merriam Co., Springfield, Mass.
MAGISTRATE
A person holding official power in a government; as: a The official-of highest rank in a government (chief, or first, magistrate). b An official of a class having summary, often criminal, jurisdiction.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1103 MAGISTRATE
Person clothed with power as a public civil officer. State ex rel. Miller v. McLeod, 142 Fla. 254, 194 So. 628, 630.
A public officer belonging to the civil organization of the state, and invested with powers and functions which may be either judicial, legislative, or executive. But the term is commonly used in a narrower sense, designating, in England, a person intrusted with the commission of the peace, and, in America, one of the class of inferior judicial Officers, such as justices of
the peace and police justices. Martin v. State, 32 Ark. 124; Ex pane White, 15 Nev. 146, 37 Am.Rep. 466; State v. Allen, 83 Fla. 655, 92 So. 155, 156; Merritt v. Merritt, 193 Iowa 899, 188 N.W. 32, 34.
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The word "magistrate" does not necessarily imply an officer exercising any judicial functions, and might very well be held to embrace notaries and commissioners of deeds. Schultz v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 57 Mo. 336.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1602, 1603
SUIT
Old English Law
The witnesses or followers of the plaintiff. 3 Bl. Comm. 295. See Secta. Modem Law
A generic term, of comprehensive signification, and applies to any proceeding by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. See Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 375, 23 L. Ed. 449; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 464, 7 L.Ed. 481; Syracuse Plaster Co. v. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corporation, 169 Misc. 564 7 N.Y.S.2d 897.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1677
TRIBUNAL
The seat of a judge; the place where he administers justice. The whole body of judges who compose a jurisdiction; a judicial court; the jurisdiction which the judges exercise. See Foster v. Worcester, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 81.
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Webster's New Practical Dictionary, 707 (1953)
G. & C. Merriam Co., Springfield, Mass.
TRIBUNE
1. In ancient Rome, a magistrate whose special function was to protect the interests of plebeian citizens from the patricians.
2. Any defender of the people.
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PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
1) This is a meeting to determine whether or not the charges brought should be seen through to trial.
The Prosecution will tell you if a "deal" is contemplated and what material the state intends to use against you.
At this point in time, you are to present a copy of the motion you intend to rely on for your defense. A copy is to be presented to the prosecutor, in addition to those filed with the court. All motions should be filed with the court at least ten (10) days prior to the conference of hearing.
PI LA DING
1) This is the time for objections of material facts, matters of law, and jurisdictional issues. If you intend NOT to plead, then you must follow certain procedures:
a. When asked if the Defendant is present; "Is my accuser present?" (Do Not say yes.)
b. When asked to plead guilty or not guilty; "Your honor I cannot plead, I do not understand whether the charges apply to me or not."
c. "Your honor, I cannot plead in this case until I understand the jurisdiction of this court and the nature of the charges."
Your judge may, at this point become frustrated, or may plead on your behalf. If this is the case:
d. "I object your honor, to any pleading which is now made on my behalf without my consent, and now ask that this court make a judicial determination as to whether or not a judge can sit in his official capacity as a judge in this case, and act as Defense Counsel over the objections of Defendant."
If the justice says yes, he has made a reversible error. If he says no, then you return to the original position of jurisdiction and attempt to determine what kind of court you are defending yourself within.
Should nothing, or rather something happen and you find yourself overruled and going to trial, you may begin to have fun.
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TRIAL
Welcome to the arena. This is your forum for the fight, and you must be prepared to take on the opponent. Rehearse your facts and ready your witnesses, if you have them.
a. Begin with an objection to the proceedings; "Your Honor I object to these proceedings and move that this court dismiss the actions pending on the grounds of denial of due process." (restate your original objections from the earlier proceedings)
b. Introduce your motions (unless previously filed) and ask that the court rule on your motions.
c. If you are ruled against; "Your honor, at this point in time, I ask the court to further recognize, for the record, my objection to proceeding on the facts of the case, without the "law" issue being resolved."
d. Once the judge recognizes your objection but intends to proceed anyway; 'At this time, your Honor, I now inform the clerk of the court that I continue these proceedings in 'Forma Pauperis'.
e. Then fight with the facts.
f. If the case is decided against you, and after the statement of such by the judge, but prior to the imposition of fines, et. cetera; "Your Honor, I object."
The Judge may tell you that you cannot object - don't be bullied. Immediately interject:
g. "Your Honor, at this time I execute my right of Allocution in this matter, and inform this court that, if it proceeds further in this matter, without the original issue of 'law' being determined, 1 will have no choice but to file a Writ in the Nature of Error against this Honorable Court."
Most times, not even the judge understands the full measure of your statements. Do not fret and go to the next step.
h. After sentence or fine imposition, the judge will ask you if you will be paying on this day or whether you need time; "Your Honor, you accepted my status of "Forma Pauperis" which removes me from any commercial liability or imposition of fine and therefore your imposition is invalid, and in effect a Judicial error." If pressed, simply state that you will be paying no fine today.
The Judge will then give you time. Your are ready to file your writ.
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PROCEDURES FOR SENTENCING
1. The justice will generally call the calendar, then when your turn comes will ask you if you are ready to for the court to pass sentence.
You should answer no, then state:
Your Honor, to this time I exercise my right of "Allocution" in this matter and submit to the court my appeal action and for the record inform the Clerk of the Court that this Appeal has been prepared in the form of a "Writ in the Nature of Error".
2. The Justice may say that you may not present an appeal until sentence has been passed...
Your Honor, According the the Rules of Court governing Traffic Violation Cases, I may present this action after judgement, whether sentence has been passed. Further, once the Appeal has been filed, sentence may not be imposed until the Appeals process has been concluded.
3. Stick to your guns... so to speak. If the Justice still expects to pass sentence, let him. You may file suit later for a further denial of rights.
Once the Justice has concluded the hearing, you will be given paperwork regarding your appeal. Immediately file your paperwork. If, and only if, the Justice has passed sentence, you are to file your "Stay of Execution" paperwork in addition to your appeal.
4. Prepare for the next round.
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JUDICIAL NOTICE - LIABILITY OF THE COURT
COMES NOW the defendant, appearing specially and not generally, for the sole purpose of respectfully notifying this Honorable Court that the Court may become personally liable for the results of this case. Attention is called to the following:
"An exception to the rule of judicial immunity exists which is founded on a distinction between excess of jurisdiction and the absence of all jurisdiction ... where an act is done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction and this is known to the judge there is no immunity.
Johnson v MacCoy, 278 F2d 37 (9th Cir., 1960); Kenny V. Fox, 232 F 2d 288 ... Rhodes Y. Houston; 202 Fed Supp. 624
An earlier case stated this liability in a slightly different way:
"Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter, any authority exercised is usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible."
Bradley v. Fisher; 13 Wall 335, 352
Defendant further states that he has never knowingly volunteered or waived any personal jurisdiction in the instant matter .
Therefore, the defendant hereby provides Judicial Notice that should he ultimately prevail in his jurisdictional arguments, he may hold this Honorable Court personally liable, as the above cases indicate he is entitled, for the results of this instant case.
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SECTION[ FOUR:
PREPARING FOR
COURTROOM FUN
[pic]
COURT FILINGS MOTIONS:
SUMMONS
SUBPOENA
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
JUDICIAL NOTICE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
NO POWER TO LICENSE
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IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT,
TRAFFIC DIVISION
The State of Arizona ) CASE NO.
Plaintiff, )
vs. )
Accused. ) SUMMONS
v. )
BADGE# )
Officer )
SUMMONS
THE STATE OF ARIZONA TO THE ABOVE THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT:
You are hereby summoned and required to appear and defend against the third-party complaint in the above entitled action the above entitled court, within 20 days, exclusive of the day of service of this third-party summons upon you if serve( within the State of Arizona, or within 30 days, exclusive of the day of service, if served without the State of Arizona and you are hereby notified that in case you fail to do so judgement by default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the third-party complaint. There is also served upon you herewith a copy of the complaint of Plaintiff, which you may but are not required to answer.
The name and address of the parties counsel in this action are:
PLAINTIFF: COUNTERCLAIMANT
Prosecutor:
Address:
City/State:
Dated: / /
Municipal Court Judge
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YOUR NAME:
YOUR ADDRESS:
CITY, STATE:
POSTAL ZONE/CODE: Telephone Number:
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IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT,
TRAFFIC DIVISION
The State of Arizona ) CASE NO.
Plaintiff, )
vs. )
Accused. ) COUNTERCLAIM
)
BADGE# )
Officer )
COUNTERCLAIM
I. JURISDICTION.
Comes the above named Counterclaimant, within 10 days of the complainant by , Badge Number charging a violation of and counterclaims pursuant to Rule 13
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. CASE.
The officer violated 18 United States Code § 112 in that, while armed, he did accost, seize, and detain the
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3
counterclaimant and require the counterclaimant to make a False indorsement as a condition of release from said illegal detention upon an instrument issued by the State of Arizona,
purportedly called a traffic ticket (complaint).
He accomplished this fraudulent assault by illegally imitating an emergency vehicle when in fact there was no emergency (the State of Emergency was abolished by the United States Congress in 1976).
These acts of the Counterdefendant did render him liable to the Counterclaimant in invasion of Privacy, Warranty, battery, and treason.
The officer has no immunity for these acts as the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 2, Section 31 of the Arizona Constitution operate is waivers of immunity here.
IV. FACTS.
Counterclaimant is an internationally protected person (18 USC 112) who is neither a resident, nor [c]itizen, of the State of Arizona, nor the United States. As such Counterclaimant has no °minimal contacts" which are a made with the State of Arizona by defendant, which the Supreme
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Court concludes is dispositive per Asahi Metal Industry Co.. Ltd v. Superior Court of California_, (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 107
S. Ct. 1026; Burger King Cornoration v. John Rudzewicz, (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174; World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, (1980) 444 U.S. 286. 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L Ed 2d 490; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S Ct. 154, 90 L Ed 95; Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) 433 US 186.
V. ARGUMENT.
As a stateless person, Counterclaimant's right of travel is guaranteed by United Nations treaty, to which the United States is a signatory (United Nations Declaration of Rights).
The great State of Arizona is a "country" within the meaning of 18 United States Code § 11, and Counterclaimant is a member of a band of insurgents, within the State of Arizona, known to the United States as "Americans".
As such Counterclaimant is a member of a foreign government and qualifies for protection from the State of Arizona as "any other representative" of said band of insurgents [18 USC 1116 (b)4(B)] and is entitled to "special protection" from the State of Arizona.
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VI. RELIEF SOUGHT.
WHEREFORE, counterclaimant demands judgement against the officer as follows:
a. Damages in the amount of $1,000; and
b. Suspension of the Officer's Driver's License
c. Such other relief as this Honorable Court may grant.
VII. ATLTERNATIVE RELIEF.
Alternately, Counterclaimant requests this case be transferred to the nearest United States District Court for enforcement of sanctions against the Officer/Counterdefendant.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: Sui Juris Pro Per
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Copy Served and/or mailed to the Counterdefendant, and Prosecutor with the original mailed to the Court on this the day of
1993.
The Court:
Counterdefendant:
Prosecutor:
Officer:
Dated: , Sui Juris Pro Per
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NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
Pro Per (This is to be attached to
the Subpena duces tecum)
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE STATE OF
FOR THE COUNTY OF
STATE OF ) Case No.:
Plaintiff, )
vs. )
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
SUBPENA DUCES TECUM
Accused )
AFFIDAVIT
The Accused submits this affidavit in support of a subpena duces tecum. The Accused has been informed and believes that the District Attorney has in his possession the following items which are crucial to the
outcome of this case. The District Attorney is required to bring into court the following:
1. All evidence in the possession of the People of the State of California that establishes that the Accused is a U.S. citizen under the 14th Amendment.
///.
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2. All evidence that the Accused is involved in intra-state or inter-state traffic.
3. All evidence that the Accused is involved in any type of commercial activity.
4. All evidence that establishes that the Accused is not a Citizen of California as defined in the Constitution of California (1849).
5. All evidence that establishes that the Accused is a "creature of statute".
Dated: Respectfully Submitted,
, Sui Juris
Pro Per
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on this day of July. 1993, to the following:
The Clerk of the Court: The Honorable Judge: The Prosecutor:
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THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK
- - -
NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
Pro Per
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE CITY OF
COUNTY OF , THE STATE OF
STATE OF ) Case No.
Plaintiff, )
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
Vs. )
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE
Accused. )
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE
COMES NOW Defendant , and hereby moves
this Honorable Court for an Order continuing the trial currently set for the day of , 199_, at
hours, stating AS GROUNDS THEREFORE: (USE YOUR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES)
1. The Accused, , is obligated to participate in the defense of the charges acted upon by agents of the state in another matter at the trial of that case which
is set to begin the day of , 199_.
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2. The Accused is attempting to secure counsel in this specific instance, but is obligated to complete defence of the above referenced action prior to addressing this specific action.
3. After reviewing his trial calendar Judge
suggested that the undersigned move to continue this case.
4. The motions filed contemporaneously herewith, and particularly the motions relating to discriminatory prosecution, may well require additional discovery and further hearings which will necessarily delay or obviate the need for the trial of this case.
5. On , the undersigned is scheduled to begin a two week trial of a complex civil fraud case, thus inhibiting the likelihood of a solid positive defence. It is imperative that the undersigned be permitted to prepare for trial during the week between the trial and the current matter appearing before this Honorable Court.
6. This request is made in the interest of justice and will not prejudice any party. Defendant waives his right to speedy trial insofar as necessary to permit this Motion for Continuance to be granted.
///
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WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for a continuance of the trial date to a time after , and any other appropriate relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of
19
Sui Juris
Pro Per
- - -
THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK
- - -
NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
Pro Per
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE CITY OF
COUNTY OF , THE STATE OF
STATE OF ) Case No.
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
TO DETERMINE THE LAW; AND
vs. )
OBJECTION TO ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSION OF LAW ADVANCED
Accused. ) BY THE STATE. TO: PLAINTIFF'S AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That on the day of
199_, at the hour of ___ hours a.m., or as soot
thereafter as the matter can be heard, in Department
of the above entitled court, Accused Citizen,
will move the court to make an at-la, determination as to which conclusion of law is valid. Dated: Respectfully submitted,
Sui Juris
Citizen of California
Pro-Per
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NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE:
POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
Pro Per
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE CITY OF
COUNTY OF , THE STATE OF
STATE OF ) Case No.
Plaintiff, )
POINTS OF OBJECTION IN
vs. )
SUPPORT OF MOTION RE:
CONCLUSION OF LAW ADVANCED
Accused. ) BY THE STATE.
POINTS OF OBJECTION
Comes now the Accused/Citizen , (hereinafter referred to as the Accused), appearing specially and not generally to motion the court to make an AT-LAW determination as to the correct conclusion of law that is valid in this court room.
It appears that the State of California has made a conclusion of law that anyone who enters its corporate territory has lost his God-Given Rights, guaranteed as unalienable by the and National Constitutions, as well as that of Federal Statute 96-1211; which declared the Holy Bible to be the law of the land in the year of the Bible
- - -
1983, and upon entering this corporate territory, the statutes and ordinances of the State are the supreme law; upon which civil statutes, criminal actions may be brought, wherein the only due process is the right to be heard upon the letter of the statutes.
The Accused Citizen , OBJECTS to that conclusion of law, having made a contrary conclusion of law that the God-Given Rights guaranteed as unalienable by both Constitutions carry with him wherever he travels, within any one of the several States (50); and before any criminal action can be levied against him, a corpus delicti or a verified complaint from a damaged party must be in evidence for any court to recognize a criminal jurisdiction over the Accused Citizen.
The Accused Citizen does not want
to be unfair to the State of , and if the above conclusion of law can be improved upon, he will gladly give
the State of (30) days to make such improvement. However, upon failure to make any improvement,
the conclusion of law attributed to the State of
by the Accused Citizen will, by tacit procuration, becomes the State's precise conclusion of law to which the Accused Citizen objects. Before the State can move foreword, this controversy at law must be settled by an At-Law/ Article Ill Court, acting under the Judicial Power, to make a legal determination
- - -
1
between the State of 's conclusion of law and
that of the Accused +Citizen.
Dated: Respectfully submitted,
- - -
, Sui Juris
Citizen of California
Pro-Per
- - -
NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
IN THE CITY OF MUNICIPAL COURT,
IN THE COUNTY OF ,, STATE OF
The State of ) CASE NO.
Plaintiff, )
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
vs. )
DEMAND TO ENJOY ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL OF CHOICE
Accused. )
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:
Now comes the accused, a Citizen of Arizona, and appears specially and not generally herein, and demands this court to recognize his right to enjoy the assistance of Counsel or co-Counsel of his choice who is not a member of the State Bar Association and who is not a licensed attorney for the following reasons:
1. That the Constitutional guarantee of right to "assistance of counsel" is not qualified.
2. That the Constitution of the State of Arizona, ordained and established by the People, for their protection, shall not be superseded or amended by any act of the Legislature or by anything in the Constitution or laws of any C+-n+=
- - -
3. That the accused has the Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel of choice, to sit by him, and advise him while proceeding In Propria Persona. people v. Hill, (1969) 70 C2nd 678, 76 Cal Rptr 225, 452 P2nd. 329, cert denied 406 U.S. 971; people v. Zamora, (1944) 66 Cal. App. 2nd. 166, 152 P. 2nd. 180.
4. That within the unambiguous language of the Constitution, "assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense," does not restrict it to any State Bar Associations.
5. That the accused refuses to waive any Constitutional Rights or immunities in order to assert another.
6. That the Right to Counsel has been deeply embedded in true American tradition since the foundation of this Republic and has been most recently set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. State of California.
Therefore, the Accused moves the court to grant- this demand for the right of assistance of Counsel or co-Counsel, whichever the Accused wishes to have, to insure him of a fair trial and in the interests of justice, more fully set forth in the attached brief in support of the absolute right to unfettered counsel.
- - -
The Accused Citizen of this State reminds the Court that He has never voluntarily entered a plea before the Court, has not granted jurisdiction over the Person, and continually challenges the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter and its capability to effect a remedy in this case.
In addition, if the court fails to notify this Citizen of "Rights Sua Sponte" or those declared or demanded by this Citizen, the Court of its own volition denies itself jurisdiction.
Oral argument demanded.
Dated: Respectfully submitted,
Sui Juris
Citizen of Pro Per
- - -
NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE:
POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
IN THE CITY OF MUNICIPAL COURT,
IN THE COUNTY OF , STATE OF
The State of ) CASE NO.
Plaintiff, ) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
vs. ) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO ENJOY ASSISTANCE OF
Accused. ) COUNSEL OF CHOICE
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I
THE WILL OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER
The United States Constitution is the will of the people clearly set down for their agents, elected and appointed, to follow. No law supersedes the U S Constitution and only those in "pursuance of it may stand. Even treaties must be "in pursuance" of the Constitution. "We the people.. do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America." Preamble to the United States Constitution (1789). In establishing this government, the People said that: "This Constitution and the laws ... made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the land;..." Article VI Section 2,
United States Constitution.
1
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And they also commanded that: "...All ...judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution;..." Article VI, Section 3, United States Constitution.
To close the Courts to all but licensed attorneys is clearly the will of the bar associations, not of the People,. Use of the word "counsel" rather than attorneys denotes the will of the Sovereign Power which cannot be lawfully overridden. "In the united States, Sovereignty resides in the people who act through the organs established by the Constitution" Chisholm v Georgia, 4 Dall 419, 471; McCulloch v Maryland, Wheat 316, 404,405; Yick Wo v Hopkins, 11* U.S 356, 370: "...the congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the People to override their will as thus declared." Ferry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).
The People declared their will as to the rights of the Accused in all criminal prosecutions in the Sixth Amendment and the right of the Accused to "enjoy the "assistance of counsel was purposely couched in the common law term "counsel" so as to include those friends upon who the accused may depend for advice and protection. In a speech by Judge Learned Hand at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington D C., May 11, 1929, entitled "Is There Common Will?" in speaking of
- - -
judges, he said: "He is not to substitute even his
gesture will for theirs: otherwise it would not be 'common will' which prevails, and to that extent, the people would not Govern.
"The accused has the right to be foolish as well as wise, and this liberty is his to do with as he pleases. To deny him his freedom of choice in this matter of counsel, is to unduly interfere with the defense, and constitutes a denial of the will of the people, for where the courts authority is derived, and a substitution in lieu thereof is being used---that of the "will of attorneys". "Bills of rights are, in their origin, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince." Hamilton. Federalist Papers. No. 84. The right to have a "friend" plead ' one's case or to assist. one in court, is a Common Law right secured in the Sixth Amendment.
"History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain Common Law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government."
Dell v Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 816 (1947)
U.S.D.C. -So. Dist. Calif.
Our forefathers spoke and wrote in the vernacular of the Common Law and "counsel" was the word they choose. The facts are conclusive on this point, and the record supports this contention Interpretation of the word "counsel" to mean attorney only is a departure from the safe guards of the Bill
of Rights.
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"The Bill of Rights was provided as • barrier to protect the individual against arbitrary exactions of... legislatures (and courts ... it is the primary distinction between democrat and totalitarian way.
In Re Stoller, Supreme Court of Florida, en banc, 36 So.
2ed. 443, 445 (1948).
More recent confirmation of constitutional rights of the Accused says:
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491 (1968). Even though the Miranda decision referred to the Fifth Amendment right in toto, the above stated principal is of
general application, wherein the word "rights" is not qualified.
II
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In Tarlowski, Supra, the court said, in suppressing evidence at the request of Tarlowski; "When a federal official's interference with the right of free association, takes the form of limiting the ability of a criminal suspect to consul with and be accompanied by a person upon whom he relies on for advice and protection, he gravely transgresses. For these reasons, the motion to suppress must be granted. "It was in this case that Tarlowski was denied the counsel of an accountant, not of a lawyer. The accused has a right under the First Amendment to freely associate with who he pleases in
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his defense and in its preparation and presentation, so long as such is respectful, with decorum and lack of contempt for orderly rules for procedure which do not deprive one of constitutional rights. To deny this right is to also deny his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process, which is actually a guarantee of fundamental fairness.
III
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES The First Amendment states, in part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting ... the right of the people ... to petition the government for redress of grievances."
Defendant asks, "How can I maintain my maximum right to petition for redress of grievances if that person who I choose to speak for me is not permitted to do so?". If congress passes a statute requiring a Federal Court to abide by a statute of the State in which it sits, and said statute of a State purports to make it a crime for a defendant to be represented by a non-attorney, then congress has effectively not only done what the Constitution does not authorize, but it has done what is expressly forbidden. If such is the case, congress has made a "law frustrating the right of the People, and the Accused therein, "to petition for redress of grievances". Of what use is the right to petition for redress of grievance if the Accused is personally handicapped to the extent that he needs assistance in his petitioning, and yet
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the Accused is limited by a bar association,
or a State, or a court who says that a competent "friend" cannot be permitted to speak for the petitioner because said "friend" has not been brain washed in certain approved law schools where deprivation of the petitioner's Constitutional Rights, are taught, although set forth in plain and unambiguous language in the Constitution itself, was not "settled doctrine". The "licensed" attorneys and attorney-judges say that "the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is".
What if the congress passes a law saying that any bureaucrat can rape any layman's wife and the Supreme Court says "yes, that's perfectly in harmony with the Constitution."
Then are we the People to stand for it, who gave the said authority now, what should the People do, who have such a congress and such a Supreme Court. Are the lower court judges brave enough to challenge it, or are they "bound to follow the higher court judges"?
And where is the member of the bar, the "licensed" attorney, who now steps forward and announces that the Supreme Court is mistaken. Where does his license go to now, who is going to permit him to appear in court if he doesn't buckle down and stop rocking the establishment?
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obviously, an extreme example has been used; but it is significant Laymen would not have to stand for such nonsense. "Licensed" attorneys---who knows? That laymen should be subjected to a drifting and unstable constitution--which happens to what some justices "think it is, at the moment"--can be very frustrating, and that a jury cannot hear "counsel" not beholden to such damnable floating doctrine is indeed a denial of the right to petition (effectively) for redress of grievances. To preserve justice, to preserve the semblance of a fair trial and an impartial jury, let the Accused petition for redress of grievances, to the jury, through "counsel" of his choice who is not beholden to a corrupt and degenerate system which has perverted the very law by which it pretends to rule and which it pretends to protect and uphold.
The Accused believes that true religion guarantees freedom of choice, or freedom to choose, and elect, and to select, taking the responsibility of the consequences of said choices. The Accused further believes that he has the right to help others, and in turn, to be helped by those willing to voluntarily answer his call for assistance. In this case, he particularly means in the court room where a hostile government is violating its own law and trampling upon the rights of the sovereign people, which its officers are sworn
to protect.
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When all the mighty force of all powerful government is arrayed against a lone individual who has the courage to join on the government's inequities, said individual should be
entitled most of all, to the protection of his religious convictions and rights.
Under the First Amendment, the right of conscience and the right to believe; as long as the same does not trample upon the rights of another, is the number one right protected by government. In pertinent part, the First Amendment states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."
The Accused's religious conviction, again, calls for freedom from oppression and freedom from sole stifling special interest legislation slapped on a freedom loving individual on behalf of self-serving perpetrators of special advantages to the legal profession at the expense of the long suffering victims of the same legal profession, compete like men with the counsel the Accused needs for his defense, and for the proper exercise of his religious rights, chief among which is the freedom of choice which does not trample upon the rights
of another.
8
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IV
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
The Accused's right to equal protection of the laws is guaranteed through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment:
"The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees to each Citizen the equal protection of the laws and prohibits a denial thereof by any Federal official.
Bolling v Sharpe, 32 U S 497
The Accused asks the court to take judicial notice of an article from Newsweek, September 2, 1974, which tells how a layman, James Yeager, handled the legal problems of 3,500 clients. The same paragraph also speaks of "his most recent court appearance which took place in Atlanta. It describes how "Yeager paced the courtroom floor, as he addressed the jury, Mr. Yeager is engaging in the practice of law, which is his right as a layman, or laymen, to assist him in his defense, if they so desire. To deny this motion is start giving prisoners more rights than to a Citizen. Such inequity before the law is intolerable. Said article mentions various others who have adopted law as an advocation and goes on to mention in the article a Mr. Green, another former inmate now on parole, and says that "Green is a familiar face in the Boston courtrooms, where he maintains his legal activities by submitting amicus briefs for other felons". I would be interested to know if Mr. Green and Mr. Yeager, like Mr. Jefferson and James are also black men, and if therefore, constitutional rights are
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Where does the Accused go, who does not wish to be defended by an Officer of the Court. To use the power of the court to force the defense into using an Officer of the Court
at the defense table offends the sensibilities of the accused to the very core. The Accused may wish to voluntarily select an attorney among his counsel, but this Accused believes that he should not be forced to do so. The Accused is simply seeking freedom of choice in the matter of whether he has no counsel and represents himself or uses legal counsel (attorney), mixed counsel (attorneys and laymen), or lay counsel only.
The "stealthy encroachments" upon the Accused's right to counsel not licensed by the bar is a result of a monopoly of the legal establishment, both in and out of government, State and Federal, to protect their "price fixing"; to maintain artificially high legal fees: to educate the chosen few in law schools maintained largely a public expense; to protect attorneys from competition from those who know that attorneys have perverted the Constitution and let the people. at the mercy of a swarm of bureaucrats with endless attorney promoted regulations and laws which make the exercise of natural and constitutional secured rights "crimes", wherein, the attorney controlled government can prosecute the Sovereign Citizen and force him into the waiting, out-stretched arms of their attorney brotherhood, who will "advise" and "defend" him for
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a considerable fee.
Little wonder that people are fed up with the profession when it is full of licensed "Haldemans, Erlichmans, Mitchells, and Deans." Little wonder why many people almost vomit when contemplating that which attorneys have done to this once mighty, powerful, and independent Republic.
Legal fees come too high for most average Citizens. Yet the same average Citizen cannot turn to laymen who may be well versed in the necessary legal area and this restricts the courts to attorneys and those who can afford one. Laymen who cannot afford attorneys must suffer along as best they can. It is as unjust a system of justice as one could conger up. Of course some persons can qualify for a public defender. This is like being alone in a pit of cobras and someone comes along and wants to throw in another cobra. Under those circumstances, what is needed is a mongoose, counsel of choice not another cobra. Perhaps the STAR CHAMBERS weren't so bad after all.
V
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The Accused has not only the right to speak for himself, but also to speak through who he pleases. This is inherent in the First Amendment right of freedom of speech. It is also
13
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self-evident, as a part of the Natural RIGHT DOCTRINE, and among those rights called inherent and unalienable outlined in the Declaration of Independence, which antecede all government, and which are natural or God-given, rather than government-given rights. The Accused points out that he does not claim any attorney-given rights, but demands that his God-given natural rights not be infringed upon, and call the courts attention to the fact that the Holy Bible, upon which the Accused bases all his determinations has been accepted as the "Law of the Land" pursuant to Federal Statute #96-1.211., in the "Year of the Bible" 1983. This fundamental right of freedom of speech has been referred to previously, but the Accused wishes to set it out separately to emphasize it to the court and herein refer again to United Mine Workers v Illinois Bar Association, Supra, NAAC v Button. Supra, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, Supra, in support of said right. It is indicative that the words of the First Amendment embraced freedom of speech, and not just freedom "to speak", and while the Accused does not wish to prolong this brief by a detailed discussion of the difference, he simply wishes to bring to the court's attention that there is a difference, and its application is obvious.
VI
DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF COUNSEL WOULD RESULT IN CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The Accused's request for the court to recognize his
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right to non-attorney counsel, in lieu of, or in addition to, attorney-counsel, would mean that the court would have to rule during trial on a motion regarding the Accused's right to non-attorney assistance, including that of assistant spokesman. If the honorable court has in the past ever been a member of any bar association, or is a presently a member of a bar, or has close friends or associates connected with a bar association, then the Accused finds it difficult to see how the court could possible render any unprejudiced and impartial ruling on the Accused's motion regarding his right to non-attorney counsel. It appears to the Accused that the court would find itself at variance with its own standards, mainly on the Cannons of Judicial Ethics, No. 29 which state: "judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved." If he has a personal litigation in the court of which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should, of course, refrain from any judicial act in such controversy. It is apparent to the Accused that the denial of his motion herein will call for thinking, on the part of most reasonable persons, that the denial was based at least in part, on a conflict of interest, and upon a hardship of the case meaning upon the unfortunate bar associations.
Granting the motion, however, could not be interpreted as
being in conflict of interest, but rather despite personal
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interest and in favor of fairness, due process, and the justice to which the Sovereign State Citizen of this Republic is entitled under the Constitution.
VII
FEDERAL COURTS ENFORCEMENT OF PRACTICE OF LAW
STATE STATUE IS CIRCUMVENTION OF
FIRST, NINTH, AN TENTH AMENDMENTS
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States says:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people."
The power to abrogate the rights mentioned herein, heretofore, has not been delegated to the United States or any state through the Constitution. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States constitutes a delegation of power to the court to thwart and frustrate the following rights: freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of petitioning for redress of grievances, of due process, of right to contract, and of equal treatment under the law. Therefore, the foregoing assumed as true, the "power remains with the people, who are the Sovereign in this country as heretofore pointed out.
Therefore, the Accused retains the power for his choice of his spokesman in court, "anything in the constitution or
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the laws of any state to the contrary not withstanding." Regardless of California's statutes or any arbitrary
law making, it cannot invalidate the natural rights of the Accused protected by the Constitution. Said pretended right to "regulate the "practice of law must fall or recede when put along side the Accused's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, with due process, freedom of speech, and contract, as heretofore pointed out. It is impossible to delegate to another that which the delegator himself does not possess
The Accused does not have the right to compel the inadequate representation of another, and therefore, this Accused is powerless to delegate such a tyrannical power to a legislature, whether or not controlled by attorneys or a bar association.
To summarize the foregoing, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the State of California and its courts from restricting the Accused's right for a non-attorney spokesman in court. Such power is not given the State in either the United States or State Constitutions.
Therefore, in civil cases, the legislature has usurped, at the prodding of attorneys, the so called right in instituting a statute prohibiting a defendant, in a prosecution against him by his government, from relying upon
17
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18
preferred spokesman of trusted confidence. In criminal cases there is no valid reason, statute, or court ruling that can alter the fundamental right of counsel, and the
courts in denying said spokesman are arbitrarily usurping the Accused's right.
The Ninth Amendment reserves all non-enumerated rights. They are not to be denied or disparaged, though not enumerated. The mention and enumeration of the right to counsel under the Supreme authority cannot be construed to deny or disparage the right to said counsel being an non-attorney, or a non-member of a bar association licensed to only plea bargain and lose.
It would appear that any decent person would have no difficulty agreeing with the above, and that any other ruling would be indeed frivolous, and without constitutional
authority.
To further clarify, the imposing of restriction on the Accused counsel violates and circumvents the Accused's Fifth Amendment rights In addition, it imposed cruel and unusual punishment upon the Accused by forcing him to seek legal assistance, when and if he needs it, from those he either does not trust or cannot afford.
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CONCLUSION
Any denial of counsel is an attempt to accomplish that which is specifically prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The rights set down therein says nothing about only "court approved counsel", and is in no way qualified. The US Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Milwaukee, 27? U.S 713, 715, that if a statute is a part of an unlawful scheme to reach a prohibited result, "...the statute must fail...". This was upheld again in McCallen v Massachusetts, 27? U.S 620, 630. Legislators, neither Federal or State, may restrict the courts to "attorneys only" in order to effectively deny counsel to any defendant who evidences a desire to be represented or assisted by a "friend" in preference to a "attorney"; What cannot be done by the front door cannot be lawfully done by way of the back door.
Legislators who pass laws do not have to be attorneys nor do those who execute the law i.e., sheriffs, governors, presidents, etc. Even the justices of the Supreme Court need not be licensed attorneys. To exclude the people from defending their "friends" in the courts turns said courts into a playground for the legal establishment, and is a blatant violation of the Accused's right to counsel, due process of law, and equal protection under the law. Mr. Justice Brandeis said:"Discrimination is the act of treating differently two persons or things under like circumstances. National Life
19
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20
Insurance Company v. U. S., 277 U.S. 508 , 630. As far back as 1886, the Supreme Court was concerned with the unjust and illegal discriminations which were running rampant. The court
frowned upon law administered with a "unequal hand"." ... so as to practically make unjust and unequal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is till within the prohibition of the Constitution." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Supra. Therefore, the courts cannot be the exclusive territory of the legal "elite" core but must be open to all the Sovereign People alike, on an equal basis. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments also prohibit the denial of counsel of choice. No where has the Accused or his predecessors delegated such restrictive power to the United States or to the States, and if the court would closely examine the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, it will find that the right to counsel of choice, such as the Accused herein claims, is also secured in the penumbra of these amendments, particularly the Ninth with is protected in the states, speaking of controlling constitutional law as opposed to mere statutory law, Chief Justice Marshall said: "Those then, who controvert this principal, that the Constitution is to be considered, in court as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution and see only the law." And the court concluded that:
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"This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176.
The United States Supreme Court also pointed out in this decision that in declaring what should be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself was first mentioned and "...not the laws of the United States generally... ".The attorneys who sit in our state legislatures and our congress have no right to pass laws which infringe or abolish our rights under the Constitution of the United States and such unconstitutional laws which propose to do so must be declared null and void Miranda v Arizona, Supra, Page 491 and not binding upon the courts.
In support of the Accused motion for Counsel of Choice respectfully submitted this day of , 199_.
, Sui Juris
Pro Per
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THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK
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NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
IN THE CITY OF MUNICIPAL COURT
IN THE COUNTY OF , IN THE STATE OF
The State of ) CASE NO. < >
Plaintiff ) NOTICE TO SUPPRESS NOTICE/SUMMONS FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS
vs. ) & DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL DUE TO NO FOUNDED SUSPICION OF A CRIME EXISTED AT
Accused ) TIME OF STOP
Comes now the Accused in the instant case, claiming all of his rights under the united States Constitution.
"The first issue to be determined by this court is whether the police officer's was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for if it was not, the Fourth Amendment violation might infect any purported consent..." 3M v Mendenhall, (1980) 446 US 544, 557, 64 Led2d 497; Wong Sun v US, (1963) 371 US 471, 487, 9 Led2d 442
Police officers stopping a vehicle under guise of alleged Vehicle Code violations and color of uniform are acting outside the scope of duty as police officers and violate the Fourth Amendment restraints imposed on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, to the harm
of the people stopped.
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"The Fourth Amendment forbids stopping a vehicle even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants unless the police officer has a founded suspicion of criminal conduct". United States v Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F2d 1392
"Founded suspicion must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop". United States v Thomas, 863 Fd2 622, 625
"In evaluating whether founded suspicion exists, the totality of the circumstances should be considered". United States v Sokolow, 490 Us 1, 8; United States v HernandezAlvarado, 891 F2d 1414
"Founded suspicion exists when the officer is aware of specific articular facts, that, together rational inferences draws from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the person to be detained has committed or is about to commit a crime". United States v Cortez, 449 US 411, 416; Unites States v Robert L., 874 F2d 701, 703
"The United States Supreme Court has defined and limited investigative detention. Any restraint of a person for the purpose of checking identification and asking questions of detaining him or her briefly while obtaining, is such a detention; it comports with the Fourth Amendment only when based on articular facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that. the person has committed a criminal offense. The mere
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"The Fourth Amendment forbids stopping a vehicle even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants unless the police officer has a founded suspicion of criminal conduct". United States v Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F2d 1392
"Founded suspicion must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop". United States v Thomas, 863 Fd2 622, 625
"In evaluating whether founded suspicion exists, the totality of the circumstances should be considered". United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1, 8; United States v HernandezAlvarado, 891 F2d 1414
"Founded suspicion exists when the officer is aware of specific articular facts, that, together rational inferences draws from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the person to be detained has committed or is about to commit a crime". ,* -! -s - , 449 US 411, 416; Unites States v Robert L., 874 F2d 701, 703
"The United States Supreme Court has defined and limited investigative detention. Any restraint of a person for the purpose of checking identification and asking questions of detaining him or her briefly while obtaining, is such a detention; it comports with the Fourth Amendment only when based on articular facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that. the person has committed a criminal offense. The mere
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NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
IN THE CITY OF MUNICIPAL COURT,
IN THE COUNTY OF , STATE OF
The State of ) CASE NO. < > Criminal
< > Civil
PLAINTIFF, )
vs )
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
ACCUSED )
Comes now the Accused in the instant case, claiming all of his Rights under the Common Law and waiving none of them at any time, and does demand that the following documents and items, as necessary and imperative evidence to the defence, be brought forward on the day of the trial:
1. Police radar unit which was used in this case.
2. Calibration log for this radar unit.
3. Tuning fork assigned to this radar unit.
4. Certificate of calibration for this tuning fork.
5. Certificate of calibration for the above radar unit.
6. FCC type acceptance for the radar unit.
7. Maintenance records on the radar unit for the past 12 months.
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8. Any and all Manufacturer's data concerning corrective or preventative maintenance or modifications on this radar unit.
9. Records or bulletins used by officer's in the operation of or related to the operation of such radar unit.
10. Copy of the FCC license to operate the radar unit.
11. Certificate from N.O.A.A. (National Weather Service) showing weather conditions on the day and time of the alleged crime. Specifically - all data as it pertains to the occurrence or absence of any Sub-Refractive or Super Refractive layers between the surface and ten (10) meters.
12. Diploma and/or certificate of proficiency in the proper use of this particular type of radar pertaining to the arresting officer, including the number of hours of actual classroom instruction.
13. Examination and test scores, if any, of the use, operation, and other information needed to receive the diploma and/or certificate.
14. Any and all documents pertaining to the standards of design and operation from the State Legislature concerning the use of police radar in this State.
15. Certificate of authorization to carry out the duties of a police officer, in
County, signed by the County Sheriff the only Common Law police officer in the County.
16. Statute at law allowing police (peace) officer to enforce State traffic statutes.
17. Engineering and traffic study of street where police officer was monitoring a speed trap.
Respectfully submitted,
Sui Juris
Pro Per
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presence with someone who has outstanding arrest warrant is not sufficient". United States v Hensley. 469 US 221, 83 Led2d 604
In an unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held, "A demand for identification is an intrusion on the interest prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and requires a reasonable suspicion_. based on articular facts relating to the person or his or her conduct, in order to be lawful.
(3) When police officers, with or without arresting an individual, detain the individual for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they perform a seizure of person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
that the defendant's conviction requiring identification upon a lawful police stop was improper, the police officer's stopping the defendant's First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of The united States Constitution when the police officer has no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged or had been engaged in criminal conduct". Drown v Texas, (1979) 443 US 46; 61 Led2d 357
"A person driving an automobile cannot be stopped to see if he or she is licensed to drive unless there is reasonable suspicion the person has engaged in criminal conduct". Delaware v Prouse, (1979) 440 US 648, 59 Led2d 660
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Justice Broussard, United States Supreme Court in ruling against roving stops cited Almeida-Sanchez v United States, (1973) 413 US 166, which stated:
"Court rejects the argument that driving is a persuasively regulated activity subjecting motorists to roving stops. Court explains that a roving stop of a motorist was unreasonable, a driver was not in the same position as the gun manufacture or liquor distributor who had in effect consented to the inspection by entering heavily regulated industry"
COMMON HIGHWAY.
"A road to be used by the community at large for any purpose of transit or traffic". Ham. NP 239; Railway Co v State, 23 Fla 546; 3 So 158, 11 Am St Rep 395
(Thus, the motorist using the "common highways" without the commission of a crime is not the subject of investigation/supervision and arrest by "police officer/law enforcement officer/traffic officer.)
"Officer outside his jurisdiction believing probable cause for arrest existed, such circumstance was same as that of private citizen arrest". People v Alvarado , (1962) 208 CalApp2d 629; cert denied 83 S. Ct 1891, 374 US 840, 10 Led2d 1060
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"Where peace officer acting as private citizen was authorized to arrest person who committed a public offense in his presence the seizure was legal".
Mala prohibita are not public offenses. Under Vehicle Code, that person within jurisdiction of Department of Motor Vehicles has agreed, unknowingly, that certain violations of code would carry penal penalties. A citizen's arrest without the commission of a public offense is a false arrest unless citizen can justify the arrest.
"In as much as the search/arrest conducted was without a warrant, the prosecution has the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. If prosecution relies on consent, which constitutes an exception". Schneckloth v Bustamonte, (1973) 412 US 218, 219, 36 Led2d 854, 93 S Ct 204
Therefore, the Accused asks this court to suppress the compliant and dismiss all charges.
Dated: Respectfully submitted,
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, Sui Juris
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THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK
- - -
NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
In the City of Municipal Court
In the County of , State of
The State of ) CASE NO. < > Civil
< > Civil
PLAINTIFF, ) < > Criminal
< > Criminal
vs )
NOTICE AND DEMAND TO DISMISS STATE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO LICENCE, TAX, OR FEE OF
ACCUSED. ) PRIVATE PERSON OR PRIVATE PROPERTY
DEMAND TO DISMISS
COMES NOW the accused in this case to move the court to dismiss the charges against this person due to the lack of jurisdiction over this private person or his private personal property.
The State, having responded to Accused's Demand for Dismissal, has included cites that enhance Accused's motion.
In Campbell v Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P2d 685 (1971), The Arizona Supreme court stated the following:
"In Arizona, the use of the highways of this State is a RIGHT which all qualified citizen possess subject to reasonable regulations..."
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The power to regulate commerce does not extend to the power of licensing the individual and thereby taking a 'RIGHT' and changing it to a 'PRIVILEGE'.
"To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession (acquisition) of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of the right Crutches v Kentucky v Kentucky, 1891, 141 US 57, 35
So, the power to regulate commerce does not reach to the individual by a need for license/permit/franchize as a license only grants the privilege of doing some act not permitted.
"Licenses are for the conduct of a business, profession, occupation, the exercise of such when they are a privilege. Licensing is in the nature of a special privilege. Licensing is in the nature of a special privilege entitling licensee to do some thing that he would not be entitled to do without a license" San Francisco v Liverpool. 74 Cal 113
"The object of a license is to confer a right which does not exist without it". Inter-City v Harrison, 157 SE 673, 676
"A license is merely permission to due that unlawful under common law, or is made so by some ordinance or statute, including the one authorizing or requiring the license". 22 Federal 701. 703 (D Oregon 1885)
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"A right which is free and open to all is not the subject of a license". Chicago v Collins, 51 NE 907; or a tax. Freeburg v Dawson, 274 F 240
"License tax is not a charge for enjoyment of privilege bestowed by state. It is an unconstitutional attempt to regulate a privilege which exists apart from the state authority, when it is guaranteed the people by the Constitution". Supra COLLINS
"The use of the common highways for travel and transportation is not a mere privilege but a fundamental right". Escobedo v California, 35 Cal2d 870
"We hold that the enforcement of the act against the defendant, would deprive him of his rights under the Federal Constitution". pacific Tel v Kuykendall, 265 US 196
"So long as one uses his property for private purposes and does not devote it to public use, the public has no interest in, it and no voice in its control".
Associate Pipe v Railroad Comm, 176 Cal 518
"Regulations, Fees, Taxes .... may not be applied to natural person using common highways as it is in derogation of common right of public to use highways as an avenue upon which vehicles for transportation of goods, passengers, freight and traffic of all kinds may be freely moved, having due regard for rights of others, while this, or other provisions of statute, should be fairly, liberally construed to promote the effect the evident purpose for which it was intended, care should be exercised not to unduly extend its effect".
Young v Madison County, 115 NW 23
"The Constitution declares to be a public utility or service which is subject to the control by the state, all private persons that own, operate, control, or manage a line of system for the transportation of people or property; the legislature has defined such terms as 'common carrier' and 'public utility' but, the constitutional and statutory definitions are construed as applying only to enterprises in which property, in fact, is devoted to public use. They must not be given of an attempt to impress with a public use, property not so devoted".
Allen v Railroad Comm, 179 Cal 68; Cert denied 249 US 601
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"Where a private occupational statute exists, as here, of which the intent is regulation of private commercial occupations, the particular agency enforcing that private statute, shall not apply it by trickery and deceit, and threat and misrepresentation, to persons who are not noticed by the statute as persons regulated and taxed, nor should it permit any party to do so, in violation of a persons right to stay out of a compelled contract, when he is not a person subject to the statue, unless clearly with its words".
State v Eberhard, 179 P 853; 246 P2d 1011
"The state and its municipalities are prohibited from violating substantive rights Owen V City, 445 US 622 (1980), among which are the right to travel free of license, fee, tax, within the interstate (Crandall v Nevada, 73 US 35) and it cannot by any power do that which is expressly prohibited by any other power, that is taxation, eminent domain, licensing, as a matter of law (US & Utah v Daniels, 22 P 159) nor may it do indirectly (Fairbanks v US, 181 US 294, 300)"
Dated: Respectfully submitted,
,, Sui Juris
Pro Per
- - -
- - -
NAME:
ADDRESS:
CITY: STATE: POSTAL ZONE:
Telephone Number:
IN THE CITY OF MUNICIPAL COURT
IN THE COUNTY OF IN THE STATE OF
The State of ) CASE NO. < >
Plaintiff )
NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
vs. ) FOR DISMISSAL DUE TO MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Accused )
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
COMES NOW defendant, , and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order dismissing the above captioned action for malicious prosecution, stating AS GROUNDS THEREFOR:
1. The standards for determining whether defendant has established a prima facie case of impermissible discriminatory prosecution are most recently articulated by our United States Supreme Court in Wayte v. United States, 105S.Ct. 1524 (1985):
...although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not "unfettered.' selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is... subject to constitutional constraints.' [Citation
omitted]. In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be
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deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," [citations omitted] including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights [citation omitted]. It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards. [citation omitted]. Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
"'[d]iscriminatory purpose' ... implies more than-intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker... selected or reaffirmed particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." [citations omitted]. Wayte,
supra at 1531-32.
2. The investigative agents' reports referring this case for criminal prosecution unequivocally admit that the reasons for criminal prosecution are defendant's (a)advocacy of his beliefs that the officer/prosecutor's involved has violated his and others' rights in the freedom of movement and travel within the 50 Union of states, in association with others -who share these beliefs; (b) his activities with those others by which those beliefs are disseminated; and (c) his participation in filing with the County Recorder's office (the Clerk of the Common Law court) and individual actions, including lawsuits to protect his rights to privacy and freedom of association.
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These declarations are neither dissonant nor unique for they speak the universal language pervading the judicial authorities. They affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation founded upon the Christian faith. These are not individual sayings or declarations of private persons, they are organic utterances. They speak the voice of the entire people. I quote Chief Justice (1801-35) John Marshall who wrote that since the American people were entirely Christian then:
"It would be strange indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, and did not often refer to it, and exhibit relations with it." Josepth Story and the American Constitution. J. McCellan, at pg. 139, Oklahoma Univ. Press (1971) (Letter of John Marshall to Jasper Adams, May 9, 1833)
Likewise, Justice Story (1810-45) commented extensively upon the National Faith and its embodiment in the First Article of Amendment:
"How far any government has a right to interfere in matters touching religion, has been a subject much discussed by writers upon public and political law... The right and the duty of the interference of government, in matters of religion, have maintained by many distinguished authors, as well those, who were the warmest advocates of free governments, as those, who were attached to governments of more arbitrary character. [1) Indeed, the right of a society or government to interfere in matters of religion will hardly be contested by any persons, who believe that piety, religion, and morality are intimately connected with the well being of the state, and indispensable to the administration of civil justice. The promulgation of the great doctrines of religion, the being, and attributes, and providence of one Almighty God; the responsibility to him for all our actions, founded upon moral freedom and accountability; a future state of rewards and punishments; the cultivation of all the personal, social, and benevolent virtues; -these never can be a matter of indifference in any well ordered community. [1] It is, indeed, difficult to conceive, how any civilized society can well exist
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3. The motion filed contemporaneously herewith seeks disclosure of criteria utilized to determine whether criminal prosecution is appropriate based upon the Accused assertion of personal and unalienable rights, within this territory of the Great State (Territory) of , associated with the free exercise of religion (Article 1. Bill of Rights. the Constitution of the united States, whereby:
The organic law completely embodied these principles for it was wholly based upon the same authority that taught them, id est, the Christian Bible.
"Christianity, general Christianity, is and always has been a part of the common law of Pennsylvania; not Christianity with an established church, tithes and spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men." Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 11 Sergeant & Rawles Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reports 400.
"The people of this State, in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice, and to scandalize the author of these doctrines is, not only in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order. The free, equal and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion, whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious subject is granted and secured, but to revile, with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole community is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound by any expressions in the constitution, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama, and for this plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines of worship of those impostors." The people v. Ruggles, 8 Johnson New York Common Law Reports 290, at pgs. 294 & 295.
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without them. And at all events, it is impossible for those, who believe in the truth of Christianity, as a divine revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of government to foster, and encourage it among all the citizens and subjects. This is a point wholly distinct from that of the right of private judgment in matters of religion, and of the freedom of public worship according to the dictates of one's conscience" Commentaries. Story, supra, Vol. III, pgs. 722 & 723.
"Now, there will probably be found few persons in
this, or any other Christian country, who would deliberately contend, that it was unreasonable, or unjust to foster and encourage the Christian religion generally, as a matter of sound policy, as well as of revealed truth. In fact, every American colony, from its foundation down to the revolution, with the exception of Rhode Island, (if, indeed, that state be an exception,) did openly, by the whole course of this laws and institutions, support and sustain, in some form, the Christian religion; and almost invariably gave a peculiar sanction to some of its fundamental doctrines. And this has continued to be the case in some of the states down to the present period, without the slightest suspicion, that it was against the principles of public law, or republican liberty. (1) Indeed, in an republic, there would seem to be a peculiar propriety in viewing the Christian religion, as the great basis, on which it must rest for its support and permanence, if it be, what it has ever been deemed by its truest friends to be, the religion of liberty. Montesquieu has remarked, that the Christian religion is a stranger to mere despotic power... Massachusetts, while she has promulgated in her Bill of Rights the importance and necessity of the public support of religion, and the worship of God, has authorized the legislation to require it only for Protestantism. The language of the Bill of Rights is remarkable for its pointed affirmation of the duty of government, essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality; and as these cannot be generally diffused through the community, but by the institution of the public worship of God, and of public instruction in piety, religion, and morality; therefore, to promote their happiness and to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the people of this Commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature with the power to authorize, and require, and the legislature shall from time to time authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, & c., &c. to make suitable provisions at their own expense for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality, in all cases where such provisions shall not be made voluntarily.' Afterwards
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there follow provisions, prohibiting any superiority of one sect over another, and securing to all citizens the free exercise of religion.
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the amendment to it, now under consideration, the general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity. ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship.
An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation. [1] ...
But the duty of supporting religion, and especially the Christian religion, is very different from the right to force the consciences of other men, or to punish them for worshipping God in the manner, which they believe, their accountability to him requires . . . Mr. Locke himself, who did not doubt the right of government to interfere in matters of religion, and especially to encourage Christianity, at the same time has expressed his opinion of the right of private judgment, and liberty of conscience; in a manner becoming his character, as a sincere friend of civil religious liberty. 'No man, or society of men,' says he, 'have any authority to impose their opinions or interpretations on any other, the meanest Christian; since, in matters of religion, every man must know, and believe, and give an account for himself.' [2]..." Commentaries, supra, Vol. III, at pg. 724 & 727.
And Justice Story goes on to say that the First Article of Amendment sanctioned Christianity only and none other:
"The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, must less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among christian sects,' and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cuts off the means of the religious persecution, (the vice and pest of former ages,) and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days of Apostles to the present age."
Commentaries. Story, supra, Vol. III, at pg. 728.
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Christianity, as the embodiment of the laws of God, was, and is, of the common law of both England and the American Republic.
"It appears to have been long perfectly settled by the common law, that blasphemy against the Deity in general, or a malicious and wanton attack against the Deity in general, or a malicious and wanton attack against the Christian religion individually, for the purpose of exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is indictable and punishable as a temporal offence ... Lord Mansfield says, 'The eternal principles of natural religion are part of the common law; the essential principles of revealed religion are part of the common law; so that any person reveling, subverting, or ridiculing them, may be prosecuted at common law...' "
The State v. Chandler, 2 Del. 553, 556-57 (1837)
"It was a part of the common law 'so far that any person reveling, subverting or ridiculing it might be prosecuted at common law,' as Lord Mansfield has declared; because, in the judgment of our English ancestors and their judicial tribunals, he who reveled, subverted or ridiculed Christianity, did an act which struck at the foundation of their civil society, and tended by its necessary consequences as they believed, to disturb that common peace of the land of which (as Lord Coke had reported) the common law was the preserver . To sustain the soundness of their opinion, their descendants point us to the tears and blood of revolutionary France during the reign of terror, when infidelity triumphed and the abrogation of the Christian faith was succeeded by the worship of goodness of reason, and they aver that without this religion no nation has ever yet continued free. They insist too, that all history demonstrates that no nation without the light of their common law, has been able to preserve any system of rational and well regulated liberty." Ibid, at 557-558.
"Long before Lord Hale decided that Christianity was a part of the laws of England, the Court of Kings Bench had gone so far as to declare, that 'in almost all cases, the common law was grounded on the law of God, which it aid was causa causans,' and the court cited the 27th chapter of numbers, to show that their judgment on a common law principle in regard to the law of inheritance, was founded in God's revelation of that law to Moses."
Ibid, at 561.
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"What then are the well established principles of the common law applicable to the present case? The Distinguished commentator on the laws of England informs us, that upon the foundations of the law of nature and the law of revelation, all human laws depend, 1 B1. Com. 42. The municipal law looks to something more than merely the protection of lives, the liberty, and the property of our people. Regarding Christianity as part of the law of the land, it respects and protects its institutions; and assumes likewise to regulate the public morals and decency of the community."
Bell v. The State, 1 Swan (Tenn) 42, 44 (1851)
"Every system of law known to civilized society generated from or had as its component one of three well known systems of ethics, pagan, stoic, or Christian. The common law draws it subsistence from the latter, its roots go deep into that system, the Christian concept of right and wrong or right and justice motivates every rule of equity. It is the guide by which we dissolve domestic frictions and the rule by which all legal controversies are settled."
Strauss v. Collins, 9 Ga 223, 237 (1851)
"By the Common Law and by the Bible, which is the foundation of the Common Law..."
Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 223, 237 (1851)
Christianity defined the limits of the Republic and expressed the morality and justification upon which it was predicated, as a natural genetic expression of the race that comprised it.
"But beyond all these matters no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people. This is historically true. From the discovery of this continent to the present hour, there is a single voice making this affirmation. The commission of Christopher Columbus, prior to his sail westward, is from "Ferdinand and Isabella, by the grace of God, King and Queen of Castile,' etc., and recites that 'it is hoped that by God's assistance some of the continents and islands in the ocean will be discovered,' etc. The first colonial grant, that made to Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584, was
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from 'Elizabeth, by the grace of God, of England, France and Ireland, queen, defender of the faith,' etc.; and the grant authorizing him to enact statues for the government of the proposed colony provided that 'they be not against the true Christian faith now professed in the Church of England.' The first charter of Virginia, granted by King James, I in 1606, after reciting the application of certain parties for a charter, commenced the grant in these words; 'We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of, their Desires for the Furtherance of so noble a work, which may, be the Providence of Almighty God, hereafter tend to the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were recognized as the people or citizens of a state, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English Government; and who declared their independence, and assumed the power of Government to defend their rights by force of arms.
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument."
Dred Scott v. Sanford, supra, pg. 407.
"We give both of these laws in the words used by the respective legislative bodies, because the language in which they are framed, as well as the provisions contained in them, show, too plainly to be misunderstood, the degraded condition of this unhappy race. They were still in force when the Revolution began, and are a faithful index to the state of feeling towards the class of persons of whom they speak, and of the position they occupied throughout the thirteen colonies, in the eyes and thoughts of the men who framed the Declaration of Independence and that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that inter-marriages between white persons and Negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between the free negro or mulatto and the slave, but this
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stigma, of the deepest degradation, was sized upon the whole race.
We refer to these historical facts for the purpose of showing the fixed opinions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen of that day spoke and acted. It is necessary to do this, in order to determine whether the general terms in the Constitution of the United states, as to the rights of man and the rights of the people, was intended to include them, or to give to them or their posterity the benefit of any of its provisions.
Then let us return to the second RIGHT, the practice of a right of unregulated travel, 11 AM OUR (1st) Const. Law, Sec 329, Page 1135:
"Personal liberty largely consists of the right to locomotion - to go where and when one pleases - only so far as restrained as the rights of others make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.
The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highway and transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, BUT ?. COMMON RIGHT, which he has under the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
KENT vs. DULLES 357 U.S. 116-125
(a) the right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
(e) If a citizen's liberty to travel is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed.
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SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
THOMPSON vs. SMITH 154 S.E. 579
6. Constitutional Law (note 82)
Citizen's right to travel upon the public highways and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is common right.
The right of a citizen so to do is that which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety.
7. Automobiles (note 4), Highways (note 168)
Citizen's right to travel upon public highways includes right to usual conveyances of time, including horse-drawn carriage, and automobile, for ordinary purposes of life and business.
8. Municipal corporations [note 703(1)]
Citizen's right to travel upon public highways and usual conveyances in doing so is not mere privilege which city may permit or prohibit at will.
9. Municipal corporations [note 703(1)]
City, in regulating, under police power, citizen's right to travel upon public streets, may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor prohibit one, and refuse another of like qualifications, under like conditions, to exercise it.
CHICAGO MOTOR COACH vs. CHICAGO 169 N.E. 22
8. Highways (note 165) - Legislature cannot deny citizen the right to travel on highway and transport his property in ordinary course of business or pleasure.
HADFIELD v. LUNDIN, 98 W 657, 168 P. 516
Justice Tolman was concerned about the state prohibiting the citizens "most sacred liberties" - the Right of movement:
"...based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has plenary control of the streets and highways, and in the exercise of its police power, may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a PRIVATE BUSINESS FOR GAIN.
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They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary right of the citizen to use the streets in the USUAL WAY and the use of the streets as a place of business, or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The FORMER IS A COMMON RIGHT; the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the LEGISLATIVE POWER IS CONFINED TO REGULATION; as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute carrier, in the prosecution of its business, as such, is
not a right BUT A MERE LICENSE OR PRIVILEGE."
4. On information and belief, criminal (and civil) cases are not brought for reasons associated the free exercise of a Constitutional Right, particularly when the presumed offense was previously dismissed by the prosecutor on the day of
19_, under Case Number
5. Accordingly, defendant has demonstrated that he has been selected for criminal prosecution because of his belief and participation in constitutionally protected activities and for no other reason. Defendant has filed contemporaneously herewith a motion to supplement this motion with a detailed analysis of pertinent cases and discovery materials.
WHEREFORE, defendant states that the cause of fairness and justice and the spirit and intent of the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, State Rules of the Superior Court, Municipal and Justice Courts, Local Rules as applicable, and the Constitution of the United States of America, can only be served if this Court grant this motion dismiss for malicious prosecution, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of 199_
Sui Juris
Pro Per
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SECTION FIVE:
WHERE IT STARTED,
WHERE YOU BEGIN
[pic]
THE 1937 BOOK OF STATES
THE DECLARATION OF
INTERDEPENDENCE
THE VA LL OF THE
SOVEREIGN POWER
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*
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THE BOOK OF THE STATES
VOLUME II
BOOK ONE 1937
In Two Parts
1. Intergovernmental Cooperation a. 2. A Handbook of the States
Published by
The Council of State Governments
DREXEL AVENUE AND 58TH STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
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What's Where in This Volume
THIS book can be of full value to you, only if you know what it contains. Therefore, we ask that you run your eye over the following brief table of contents.
Part 1.
Intergovernmental Cooperation
1. p. 1 to p. 72-An Introduction. A History. An organization.
2. p. 73 to p. 121-Reports on work in the field of intergovernmental cooperation during 1935-1937.
3. p. 122 to p. 145-Organizations in the field of government.
Part 2
.4 Handbook of the States
1. p. 155 to p. 217-Rosters of the chief elective officers. Forty rosters, each devoted to one subject such as agriculture, conservation and taxation, giving the name of the chief official in each state.
2. p. 221 to p. 283-A roster of the legislators. Standing Committees in reach state. And comparative information about each legislature.
3. p. 287 to p. 393-48 sections of two pages each, devoted to the 48 states, preceded by tables of comparative material concerning the states.
After you have memorized the preceding synopsis, you will really "reduce this book to your possession" by reading the more detailed table of contents in the following pages-after which you will be well prepared for spending ten minutes thumbing through all of this volume.
The Council of State Governments hopes that you will enjoy it; the Council knows that it can be useful to you.
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THIS BOOK
is cordially dedicated to Governors or the 48 STATES:
Bibb Graves M. Clifford Townsend Robert LeRoy Cochran Robert E. Quinn
Rawleigh C. Stanford Nelson G. Kraschel Richard Kirman, Sr. Olin D. Johnston
Carl E. Bailey Walter A. Hurman Francs P. Murphy Leslie Jensen
Frank Finley Merriam Alfred B. Chandler Basalt Giles Haft, n Gordon Browning
Teller Ammons Richard W. Leche Clyde Tingley James V. Allred
Wilhur Lucius Cross Lewis O. Barrows Herbert H. Lehman Henry Hooper Blood
Richard C. McMullen Harry Whinna Nice Clyde R. Hoey George D. Aiken
Fred P. Cone Charm F. Hurley William Linger George Campbell Pee"
Eurith Dickinson Frank Murphy Martin L. Davey Clarence D. Martin
River. Elmer A. Sewn Ernest Whitworth Mar- Homer A. Hole
Butt h W. Clark Hugh L. White Wad Phillip Fox LaFollette
Henry Horner Lloyd C. Stark Charles Henry Martin Idle Andrew Miler
Roy E. Ayers George H. Earle
Forty-eight men, whose duties, as chief executives of the
peat sovereignties which they direct, require
acumen, fidelity and enterprise.
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By HENRY W. TOLL., Executive Director
THE compilation of material in this volume has been made by Miss Phyllis Opper, with the editorial assistance of Miss Margaret Ann Casmon, office manager. Miss Virginia Savage, Mr. Ray Nagle and Mr. Leo Seybold, as well as other members of the staff of the Council of State Governments have assisted in the editorial work, and have otherwise contributed to the production of the book.
In the Foreword of Volume I it was stated that, "this volume is nothing but a lick and a promise. It is the beginning of a periodical publication which may eventually become a very useful reference book"
This volume is also but another lick on the way toward that promise. The book contains two parts, (1) a history and a report of work in the field of Intergovernmental Cooperation, and (2) a handbook of the states which combines a roster of state legislative and administrative officials with comparative tables and data about the state laws, research agencies, publications and planning boards. A second book is being published which will contain proceedings of the various interstate meetings held during the biennium 1935-37.
With the continued cooperation of the state officials who so- courteously supplied us with the material which made this book possible, it is our hope that future editions may be expanded until each volume appears as four complete books: (1) The Biennial Report on Intergovernmental Cooperation; (2) The Roster of Administrative and Legislative Officials; (3) The Handbook of the States; (4) The Proceedings. When that time comes we feel that this book may be of real service to government officials and students of government We hope that this volume is a step in that direction.
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Table of Contents
Dedication vii
Foreword ix
PART 1
Intergovernmental Cooperation
PAGE
Chapter I 1
Introduction.
Chapter II 5
The Executive Committee of The Council of State Governments.
Chapter III 7
What The Council of State Governments Is.
Chapter IV 8
History of The Council of State Governments.
Chapter V 14 Chronological History of the Development of the American Legislators' Association and The Council of State Governments.
Chapter VI 27
The Central Secretariat of The Council of State Governments.
Location and Facilities . . . . 27
Staff 29
Services 27
Chapter VII 34
Finances.
Chapter VIII 37
State Government, the Monthly Publication of The Council of State Governments.
Chapter IX 39
The Governors' Section of The Council of State Governments.
Chapter X 41
The Secretaries of State Section of The Council of State Governments.
Chapter XI 44
The Attorney-Generals' Section of The Council of State Governments.
Chapter XII 47
Commissions on Interstate Cooperation.
Membership of the Commissions--by State $2
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PACE
Chapter XIII - 60
Report of District No. 2 Secretariat.
Chapter XIV 67
The General Assembly.
Chapter XV 69
Looking Forward from the Assembly.
Chapter XVI 73
Interstate Commissions.
Chapter XVII 76
The Interstate Commission on Conflicting Taxation and The Tax Revision Council.
The Interstate Commission on Con- Membership of The Commission and
flicting Taxation . . . 76 The Council 84 The Tax Revision Council . . . 78,
Chapter XVIII 86 The Interstate Commission on Crime.
States Contributing 88 Membership of The Commission . 89
States in Which Model Crime Bills Sub-committees of The Commission . 92 Have Been Passed 88
Chapter XIX 95
The Interstate Commission on the Delaware Basin.
Budget . 98 Committee Organization . . . . 100 Membership of The Commission . 99
Chapter XX 102 The Interstate Commission on Social Security. Membership in The Commission . - 104
Chapter XXI 105 The Interstate Commission on the Ohio Basin. Membership in The Commission . . 107
Chapter )MI 108
The Interstate Commission on Council Development.
Committee on Operations . . - 108 Committee on Finances . . - . 110 Chapter XXIII 111
The American Legislators' Association.
Chapter XXIV
114
The Governors' Conference.
Chapter XXV 118 The National Association of Secretaries of State.
Chapter XXVI 121 The National Association of Attorney-Generals.
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PAGE
The American Municipal Association 122
the American Public Welfare As
sociation 123
the American Public Works Associa
tion . . . 123
The American Society of Planning
Officials . . . 124 The Civil Service Assembly . 125
the Governmental Research Associa
tion 126
VA=
Motor Vehicles (Licensing and Registration) 102
Old Age Assistance 194 Parka . . 195
Parole 197
Personnel 198
199
Planning Highway Patrol . . . loo
Principal State Controlled
Institutions of High Education 202 Public Instruction 203
Public Works 205
Railroad and Public Utility Regulation . . 207
Taxation 210 Unemployment Compensation . 211 Vocational Education . . . . 214 Welfare . . . . 215
Workmen's Compensation . 217
Chapter XXVIII .
Other Organizations in the Field of Government.
Chapter XXIX 146
A Bibliography of Bibliographies.
PAGE
Chapter XXVII 122
The NGO Group
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The International City Managers' -
Association 126 Municipal Finance Officers' Associa
tion 127 National Association of Assessing Of
ficers . 128 National Association of Housing Of
ficials . 129 Public Administration Clearing House 129 Public Administration Service . . 130
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PART 2
A Handbook of the States
Chapter I 153
A Directory of Administrative Officers.
1. In the Officers' Cabins in 1937 155
2. The Governors: Names, Terms, Inauguration Dates 156
The Governors' Aides 157
Salaries and Mansions of the Governors 158
Veto Powers of the Governors 159
3. The Secretaries of State: Names, How Selected, Terms, Salaries 160
Functions of the Secretaries of State . . 161 4. The Attorney-Generals: Names, Terms, Manner of Election, Private Practice,
Number of Assistants 163 5. Administrative Officials Performing the Following Functions:
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P
Agriculture 165 Basking . 167 Budget . . 168
Conservation 170
Corporations . 171
Employment Services . 172
Equalization of Assessments . . 174 Tab and Game .
Forestry 177
Health 178 Highways . I80 Insurance . . . . 181
Judiciary 183 Labor a . . . 184
Library (Archives and History) 183
Library (Law) . . 197
Library (State) . . 188 liquor Control 180
]fines 191
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'
Alabama 796
Arizona . . 300
302
California 304
Colorado 306
Delaware . . . 310
312
Gerona 314
Idaho 316
Illinois 315
Indiana 320
Iowa .. . 322
Kansas 324
Kentucky .. . . . 326
Louisiana 326
Maine
Maryland 332
Massuchtuetts 334
Michigan. . . . 336
Minnnesota . . . 336
Mississippi . . 340
Missouri 342
Montana 344
PACE
Nebraska 346
Nevada 346
New Hampshire 330
New Jersey, 332
New Mews 354
New York 356
North Carolina 3S8
North Dakota 360
Ohio . 362
364
Oregon 366
Pennsylvania 366
Rhode island 370
South Carolina 372
South Dakota . . .. . 374 T . 376
Teas . . . 373
Utah . . 370
Vent - . . . . 362
Virginia 334 Washington . . 366
West Virginia 389
Wisconsin 39C
Wyoming . . 397
PAGE
Chapter II 219
The Legislatures.
1. Official Names of Legislative Bodies 221
2. Legislative Officers in 1937 222
3. Legislative Sessions 223
4. Legislative Reference Services 224
5. Standing Committees 225
6. Number, Terms and Party Affiliation of the Legislators 248
7. Salaries and Compensation of the Legislators 249
8. The Legislators 250
Chapter III z85
The States.
1. State Figures 287
Gross Area Density
Rank in Nation Number of Counties
Population Number of Cities over 10,000 population Rank in Population
2. City Facts 286
Capital City Largest City
Population Population
Rank in State Location of State University
3. State Manuals 289
4. Counties and Constitutions 290
S. Dates of Adoption of New State Taxes 291
6. Agencies Administering Certain State Taxes 292
7- Drivers' License Laws 294
8. 1 Wing on the Ballot 295
9. State Blue Sky Laws 296
10 Union Members 297
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THE WILL OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER
The United States constitution is the will of the people clearly set down for their agents, elected and appointed, to follow. No law supersedes the U S Constitution and only those in "pursuance of it may stand. Even treaties must be "in pursuance" of the Constitution. "We the people.. do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Preamble to the U S Constitution (1789). In establishing this government, the
People said that: "This Constitution and the laws ... made in pursuance thereo
f ... shall be the supreme law of the land;..." Article VI Section 2. U. S. Constitution.
And they also commanded that:" ...All ...judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution;..." Article VI. Section 3. U. S. Constitution.
To close the Courts to all but licensed attorneys is clearly the will of the bar associations, not of the People,. Use of the word "counsel" rather than attorneys denotes the will of the Sovereign Power which cannot be lawfully overridden. "In the united States, Sovereignty resides in the people who act through the organs established by the Constitution" Chisholm v Georgia, 4 Dall 419, 471; McCulloch v Maryland, Wheat 316, 404,405; Yick Wo v Hopkins, 11* U.S 356, 370: "...the congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the People to override their will as thus declared." Perry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).
The People declared their will as to the rights of the Accused in all criminal prosecutions in the Sixth Amendment and the right of the Accused to "enjoy the "assistance of counsel was purposely couched in the common law term "counsel" so as to include those friends upon who the accused may depend for advice and protection. In a speech by Judge Learned Hand at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington D C., May 11, 1929, entitled "Is There Common Will?" In speaking of judges, he said: "He is not to substitute even his gesture will for theirs: otherwise it would not be 'common will' which prevails, and to that extent, the people would not govern." The accused has the right to be foolish as well as wise, and this liberty is his to do with as he pleases. To deny him his freedom of choice in this matter of counsel, is to unduly interfere with the defense, and constitutes a denial of the will of the people, for where the courts authority is derived, and a substitution in lieu thereof is being used---that of the "will of attorneys". "Bills of rights are, in their origin, reservations of
rights not surrendered to the prince." Hamilton. Federalist Papers. No. 84. The right to have a "friend" plead one's case or to assist one in court, is a Common Law right secured in the Sixth Amendment.
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"History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain Common Law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government." Bell v Hood, 71 F. Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C.- So. Dist. Calif.
Our forefathers spoke and wrote in the vernacular of the Common Law and "counsel" was the word they choose. The facts are conclusive on this point, and the record supports this contention Interpretation of the word "counsel" to mean attorney only is a departure from the safe guards of the Bill of Rights.
"The Bill of Rights was provided as a barrier to protect the individual against arbitrary exactions of... legislatures (and courts... it is the primary distinction between democrat and totalitarian way.
In Re Stoller, Supreme Court of Florida, en banc, 36 So. Zed. 443, 445 (1948).
More recent confirmation of constitutional rights of the Accused says:
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 491 (1968).
Even though the Miranda decision referred to the Fifth Amendment right in toto, the above stated principal is of general application, wherein the word "rights" is not qualified.
II
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In Tarlowski, Supra, the court said, in suppressing evidence at the request of Tarlowski; "When a federal official's interference with the right of free association, takes the form of limiting the ability of a criminal suspect to consul with and be accompanied by a person upon whom he relies on for advice and protection, he gravely transgresses. For these reasons, the motion to suppress must be granted. "It was in this case that Tarlowski was denied the counsel of an accountant, not of a lawyer. The accused has a right under the First Amendment to freely associate with who he pleases in his defense and in its preparation and presentation, so long as such is respectful, with decorum and lack of contempt for orderly rules for procedure which do not deprive one of constitutional rights. To deny this right is to also deny his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process, which is actually a guarantee of fundamental fairness.
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III
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES The First Amendment states, in part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting ... the right of the people ... to petition the government for redress of grievances."
Defendant asks, "How can I maintain my maximum right to petition for redress of grievances if that person who I choose to speak for me is not permitted to do so?". If congress passes a statute requiring a Federal Court to abide by a statute of the State in which it sits, and said statute of a State purports to make it a crime for a defendant to be represented by a non-attorney, then congress has effectively not only done what the Constitution does not authorize, but it has done what is expressly forbidden. If such is the case, congress has made a "law frustrating the right of the People, and the Accused therein, "to petition for redress of grievances". Of what use is the right to petition for redress of grievance if the Accused is personally handicapped to the extent that he needs assistance in his petitioning, and yet the Accused is limited by a bar association, or a State, or a court who says that a competent "friend" cannot be permitted to speak for the petitioner because said "friend" has not been brain washed in certain approved law schools where deprivation of the petitioner's Constitutional Rights, are taught, although set forth in plain and unambiguous language in the Constitution itself, was not "settled doctrine". The "licensed" attorneys and attorney-judges say that "the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is".
What if the congress passes a law saying that any bureaucrat can rape any layman's wife and the Supreme Court says "yes, that's perfectly in harmony with the Constitution."
Then are we the People to stand for it, who gave the said authority now, what should the People do, who have such a congress and such a Supreme Court. Are the lower court judges brave enough to challenge it, or are they "bound to follow the higher court judges"?
And where is the member of the bar, the "licensed" attorney, who now steps forward and announces that the Supreme Court is mistaken. Where does his license go to now, who is going to permit him to appear in court if he doesn't buckle down and stop rocking the establishment?
Obviously, an extreme example has been used; but it is significant Laymen would not have to stand for such nonsense. "Licensed" attorneys---who knows? That laymen should be subjected to a drifting and unstable constitution--which happens to what some
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justices "think it is, at the moment"--can be very frustrating, and that a jury cannot hear "counsel" not beholden to such damnable floating doctrine is indeed a denial of the right to petition (effectively) for redress of grievances. To preserve justice, to preserve the semblance of a fair trial and an impartial jury, let the Accused petition for redress of grievances, to the jury, through "counsel" of his choice who is not beholden to a corrupt and degenerate system which has perverted the very law by which it pretends to rule and which it pretends to protect and uphold.
The Accused believes that true religion guarantees freedom of choice, or freedom to choose, and elect, and to select, taking the responsibility of the consequences of said choices. The Accused further believes that he has the right to help others, and in turn, to be helped by those willing to voluntarily answer his call for assistance. In this case, he particularly means in the court room where a hostile government is violating its own law and trampling upon the rights of the sovereign people, which its officers are sworn to protect.
When all the mighty force of all powerful government is arrayed against a lone individual who has the courage to join on the government's inequities, said individual should be entitled most of all, to the protection of his religious convictions and rights. Under the First Amendment, the right of conscience and the right to believe, as long as the same does not trample upon the rights of another, is the number one right protected by government. In pertinent part, the First Amendment states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."
The Accused's religious conviction, again, calls for freedom from oppression and freedom from sole stifling special interest legislation slapped on a freedom loving individual on behalf of self-serving perpetrators of special advantages to the legal profession at the expense of the long suffering victims of the same legal profession, compete like men with the counsel the Accused needs for his defense, and for the proper exercise of his religious rights, chief among which is the freedom of choice which does not trample upon the rights of another.
IV
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
The Accused's right to equal protection of the laws is guaranteed through the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment:
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"The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees to each citizen the equal protection of the laws and prohibits a denial thereof by any Federal official. Bolling v Sharpe, 32
U S 497
The Accused asks the court to take judicial notice of an article from Newsweek, September 2, 1974, which tells how a layman, James Yeager, handled the legal problems of 3,500 clients. The same paragraph also speaks of "his most recent court appearance which took place in Atlanta. It describes how "Yeager paced the courtroom floor, as he addressed the jury, Mr. Yeager is engaging in the practice of law, which is his right as a layman, or laymen, to assist him in his defense, if they so desire. To deny this motion is start giving prisoners more rights than to a citizen. Such inequity before the law is intolerable. Said article mentions various others who have adopted law as an advocation and goes on to mention in the article a Mr Green, another former inmate now on parole, and says that "Green is a familiar face in the Boston courtrooms, where he maintains his legal activities by submitting amicus briefs for other felons". I would be interested to know if Mr Green and Mr Meager, like Mr Jefferson and James are also black men, and if therefore, constitutional rights are for only black men.
In both United Mine Workers v Illinois Bar Association, 38; U S 217, and NAACP v Button, 37- U.S 415, and also in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, 37 U S (1964), it was held that a State may not pass statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law or to interfere with the right to freedom of speech, secured by the First Amendment.
The Accused is entitled to equal protection of the laws and that includes his right to speak through whom he pleases, when he pleases. The only reasonable condition is that the decorum of the court and the rules not in conflict with individual rights be maintained: otherwise there can be no valid denial of this inalienable and legal right.
The Accused has agreed to this, and has every intention of obeying the proper rules and maintaining the decorum of the court. To do otherwise is unthinkable, the Accused herein also believes that it is vital to his defense to seek whatever assistance he has confidence in, and that if he decides to be assisted by either licensed or unlicensed counsel, he has the right to do so.
If the Accused believes that a combination of both may be to his advantage, to deny this right would constitute an unreasonable arbitrary interference with his defense, by denying him his constitutional right to freely associate with who he chooses; to his freedom of speech; to his freedom to petition for redress of grievances; and for his religious right of conscience and freedom of choice, without which religion is worth but little.
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The Accused also asks the court to take judicial notice that other defendants in criminal cases are allowed to plan their defenses minus interference by the courts, and the Accused herein claims that same right.
Surely we cannot have special laws for attorneys and special grants of privilege to them as a class, which are denied all other Citizens.
The constitutional prohibition on titles of nobility in Article I. Section 9. Clause 8, is violated when : "attorney" becomes a title of special privilege. i.e. "nobility". We must all have equal access to the courts. Presently, only those attorneys have access to the courts when the courts approve and as a result, all "approved attorneys are considered officers of the Court"
Where does the Accused go, who does not wish to be defended by an Officer of the Court. To use the power of the court to force the defense into using an officer of the Court at the defense table offends the' sensibilities of the accused to the very core. The Accused may wish to voluntarily select an attorney among his counsel, but this Accused believes that he should not be forced to do so. The Accused is simply seeking freedom of choice in the matter of whether he has no counsel and represents himself or uses legal counsel (attorney), mixed counsel (attorneys and laymen), or lay counsel only.
The "stealthy encroachments" upon the Accused's right to counsel not licensed by the bar is a result of a monopoly of the legal establishment, both in and out of government, State and Federal, to protect their "price fixing"; to maintain artificially high legal fees: to educate the chosen few in law schools maintained largely a public expense; to protect attorneys from competition from those who know that attorneys have perverted the Constitution and let the people at the mercy of a swarm of bureaucrats with endless attorney promoted regulations and laws which make the exercise of natural and constitutional secured rights "crimes", wherein, the attorney controlled government can prosecute the Sovereign citizen and force him into the waiting, out-stretched arms of their attorney brotherhood, who will "advise" and "defend" him for a considerable fee.
Little wonder that people are fed up with the profession when it is full of licensed "Haldemans, Erlichmans, Mitchells, and Deans." Little wonder why many people almost vomit when contemplating that which attorneys have done to this once mighty, powerful, and independent Republic.
Legal fees come too high for most average Citizens. Yet the same average Citizen cannot turn to laymen who may be well versed in the necessary legal area and this restricts the courts to attorneys and those who can afford one. Laymen-who cannot afford attorneys must suffer along as best they can. It is as unjust a system of justice as one could conger up. Of course some persons
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can qualify for a public defender. This is like being alone in a pit of cobras and someone comes along and wants to throw in another cobra. Under those circumstances, what is needed is a mongoose, counsel of choice not another cobra. Perhaps the STAR CHAMBERS
weren't so bad after all.
V
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The Accused has not only the right to speak for himself, but also to speak through who he pleases. This is inherent in the First Amendment right of freedom of speech. It is also selfevident, as part of the Natural RIGHT DOCTRINE, and among those rights called inherent and unalienable outlined in the Declaration of Independence, which antecede all government, and which are natural or God-given, rather than government-given rights. The Accused points out that he does not claim any attorney-given rights, but demands that his God-given natural rights not be infringed upon. This fundamental right of freedom of speech has been referred to previously, but the Accused wishes to set it out separately to emphasize it to the court and herein refer again to United Mine Workers v Illinois Bar Association, Supra, NAAC v Button, Supra, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia State Bar, Supra, in support of said right. It is indicative that the words of the First Amendment embraced freedom of speech, and not just freedom "to speak", and while the Accused does not wish to prolong this brief by a detailed discussion of the difference, he simply wishes to bring to the court's attention that there is a difference, and its application is obvious.
VI
DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF COUNSEL WOULD RESULT IN CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The Accused's request for the court to recognize his right to non-attorney counsel, in lieu of, or in addition to, attorneycounsel, would mean that the court would have to rule during trial on a motion regarding the Accused's right to non-attorney assistance, including that of assistant spokesman. If the honorable court has in the past ever been a member of any bar association, or is a presently a member of a bar, or has close friends or associates connected with a bar association, then the Accused finds it difficult to see how the court could possible render any unprejudiced and impartial ruling on the Accused's motion regarding his right to non-attorney counsel. It appears to the Accused that the court would find itself at variance with its own standards, mainly on the Cannons of Judicial Ethics, No. 29 which state: "judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved." If he has a personal litigation in the court of which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should, of course, refrain from any judicial act in such controversy. It is
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apparent to the Accused that the denial of his motion herein will call for thinking, on the part of most reasonable persons, that the denial was based at least in part, on a conflict of interest, and
upon a hardship of the case meaning upon the unfortunate bar associations. Granting the motion, however, could not be interpreted as being in conflict of interest, but rather despite personal interest and in favor of fairness, due process, and the justice to which the Sovereign State Citizen of this Republic is entitled under the Arizona Constitution.
VII
FEDERAL COURTS ENFORCEMENT OF PRACTICE OF LAW
STATE STATUE IS CIRCUMVENTION OF FIRST, NINTH, AND TENTH AMENDMENT:
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United states says:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people."
The power to abrogate the rights mentioned herein, heretofore, has not been delegated to the United States or any state through the Constitution. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States constitutes a delegation of power to the court to thwart and frustrate the following rights: freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of petitioning for redress of grievances, of due process, of right to contract, and of equal treatment under the law.
Therefore, the foregoing assumed as true, the "power remains with the people, who are the Sovereign in this country as heretofore pointed out.
Therefore, the Accused retains the power for his choice of his spokesman in court, "anything in the constitution or the laws of any State to the contrary not withstanding." Regardless of Arizona statutes or any arbitrary law making, it cannot invalidate the natural rights of the Accused protected by the Constitution. Said pretended right to "regulate the "practice of law must fall or recede when put along side the Accused's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, with due process, freedom of speech, and contract, as heretofore pointed out. it is impossible to delegate to another that which the delegator himself does not possess
The Accused does not have the right to compel the inadequate representation of another, and therefore, this Accused is powerless to delegate such a tyrannical power to a legislature, whether or not controlled by attorneys or a bar association.
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To summarize the foregoing, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the State of Arizona and its courts from restricting the Accused's right for a non-attorney spokesman in court. Such power is not given- the State in either the United States or State Constitutions.
Therefore, in civil cases, the legislature has usurped, at the prodding of attorneys, the so called right in instituting a statute prohibiting a defendant, in a prosecution against him by his government, from relying upon a preferred spokesman of trusted confidence. In criminal cases there is no valid reason, statute, or court ruling that can alter the fundamental right of counsel, and the courts in denying said spokesman are arbitrarily usurping the Accused's right.
The Ninth Amendment reserves all non-enumerated rights. They are not to be denied or disparaged, though not enumerated. The mention and enumeration of the right to counsel under the Supreme authority cannot be construed to deny or disparage the right to said counsel being an non-attorney, or a non-member of a bar association licensed to only plea bargain and lose.
It would appear that any decent person would have no difficulty agreeing with the above, and that any other ruling would be indeed frivolous, and without constitutional authority.
To further clarify, the imposing of restriction on the Accused counsel violates and circumvents the Accused's Fifth Amendment rights In addition, it imposed cruel and unusual punishment upon the Accused by forcing him to seek legal assistance, when and if he needs it, from those he either does not trust or cannot afford.
CONCLUSION
Any denial of counsel is an attempt to accomplish that which is specifically prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The rights set down therein says nothing about only "court approved counsel", and is in no way qualified. The U S Supreme Court held, in Miller v Milwaukee, 27? U.S 713, 715, that if a statute is a part of an unlawful scheme to reach a prohibited result, "...the statute must fail...". This was upheld again in McCallen v Massachusetts, 27? U.S 620, 630. Legislators, neither Federal or State, may restrict the courts to "attorneys only" in order to effectively deny counsel to any defendant who evidences a desire to be represented or assisted by a "friend" in preference to a "attorney"; What cannot be done by the front door cannot be lawfully done by way of the back door.
Legislators who pass laws do not have to be attorneys nor do those who execute the law i.e., sheriffs, governors, presidents, etc,
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Even the justices of the Supreme Court need not be licensed attorneys. To exclude the people from defending their "friends" in the courts turns said courts into a playground for the legal establishment, and is a blatant violation of the Accused's right to counsel, due process of law, and equal protection under the law. Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "Discrimination is the act of treating differently two persons or things under like circumstances. National Life Insurance Company v. U. S., 277 U.S. 508 , 630. As far back as 1886, the Supreme Court was concerned with the unjust and illegal discriminations which were running rampant. The court frowned upon law administered with a "unequal hand"." ... so as to practically make unjust and unequal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is till within the prohibition of the Constitution." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Supra. Therefore, the courts cannot be the exclusive territory of the legal "elite" core but must be open to all the Sovereign People alike, on an equal basis. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments also prohibit the denial of counsel of choice. No where has the Accused or his predecessors delegated such restrictive power to the United States or to the States, and if the court would closely examine the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, it will find that the right to counsel of choice, such as the Accused herein claims, is also secured in the penumbra of these amendments, particularly the Ninth with is protected in the states, speaking of controlling constitutional law as opposed to mere statutory law, Chief Justice Marshall said: "Those then, who controvert this principal, that the Constitution is to be considered, in court as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution and see only the law." And the court concluded that:
"This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176.
The United States Supreme Court also pointed out in this decision that in declaring what should be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself was first mentioned and "...not the laws of the United States generally... ".The attorneys who sit in our state legislatures and our congress have no right to pass laws which infringe or abolish our rights under the Constitution of the United States and such unconstitutional laws which propose to do so must be declared null and void, Miranda v Arizona, Supra, Page 491 and not binding upon the courts.
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