Subject: Analysis of the situation in Syria, October 2011



Subject: Analysis of the situation in Syria, October 2011

Introduction: This analysis covers Situation (I), Pillars of Support (II), Key Opposition Stakeholders and their Allies (III), List of potential issues in the campaign (IV), Potential for Syrian conflict to turn violent and its grave consequences (V). It serves as an outline of the state of conflict in Syria as of mid October 2011 and is based on academic analyses and English language news sources published in the summer and fall of 2011.

Brief Analysis:

October 15th marks the 7-month anniversary of Syria’s uprising. Its participants share the goal of overthrowing President Bashar al-Assad, whose family has been in power in Syria for over forty years. Although the opposition’s original concrete demand, the removal of the 39-year emergency law, was granted in April 2011, grievances remain: high levels of unemployment and corruption, a poor civil rights record, and oppression of freedom of speech. The Assad regime has been on the defensive since the spring, warning that no protesting would be tolerated after the lifting of the emergency ban.

The regime has been losing domestic and international support since late summer 2011. This is a direct result of numerical and strategic gains within the opposition and a weak, though moderately successful international backlash against Assad’s use of violence – according to the UN, around 2,700 civilians have died in the seven months of the uprising. As of fall 2011 the opposition has united under the banner of the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). It consists of 230 opposition leaders, and in late August, called for international assistance. Tens of thousands of officers have defected from the regime’s security forces and have regrouped under various banners, including the international Free Officers’ Movement. The United States, Britain, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and, surprisingly, Iran have all publically condemned Assad, and the transitional governments of Egypt and Libya have officially recognized the Syrian National Council as the sole leaders of the Syrian people.[1] International sanctions have been slowly imposed and only executed by the United States and other countries with relatively few economic interests in Syria. In response to the aforementioned pressures, the regime has only intensified its use of force against protesters, who continue to nonviolently protest despite extremely high physical risk.

The Assad regime is aware of its slipping stronghold and is taking measures to retain the few allies that remain. In August the President appointed a Christian cabinet member in a move to preserve Christian loyalty to the regime. High-ranking army officials will almost certainly stay loyal to the regime; although many of their forces have defected, the officials themselves would face trial for their crimes and likely death at the hands of the regime if they were to abandon Assad at this point. According to a defected security officer, each squadron is backed by another squadron whose job it is to shoot security forces if they refuse to shoot at civilians. The Assad regime has shown that it will do whatever it can to hold on to its control of security forces in Syria.

Unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the Syrian opposition originated in rural areas and has not yet completely spread to Damascus and Aleppo, the main cities. This is because the rural populations are the most disenfranchised as a result of Assad’s neoliberal economic policies, whereas the middle class has been growing in urban areas. The majority of the opposition’s activities have occurred in the cities of Homs, Hama, Daraa, Idlib, Oamishli, and the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo, while more symbolic acts such as high-level resignations and anti-regime publications have occurred in cities. Syria’s elite business community, which is an extremely important pillar over which Assad shakily remains in power, is largely located in Damascus and Aleppo. They operate symbiotically: in exchange for protection of their minority status as Christians, some business elites provide loyalty to the Assad regime and are interested in its stability. Sunni business elites back the regime in exchange for the protection of their special economic interests. However, the whole business community is strongly dependent on neighbors such as Turkey, who has threatened economic sanctions on Assad. This pillar is the most vulnerable and a key point of focus for the opposition.

As of October 2011 the Syrian opposition is in a precarious situation: if Assad refuses to step down voluntarily, protesters will likely continue to be killed and assaulted in huge numbers, the opposition will continue to militarize, and at some point the international community will get involved. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran could use a fractured Syria as a battlefield for their own proxy wars. The opposition, for the most part, is attempting to discourage foreign military intervention while encouraging nominal support and sanctions from international bodies. Some activists few a Libya-like outcome favorably because it would lead to a complete overhaul of the government, while a peaceful process might not be as thorough. A commitment to nonviolence and the belief that only Syrians themselves can successfully see through a revolution is still a popular opinion, though it may be waning in the face of the regime’s extreme and prolonged pattern of violence.[2] The opposition must continue to consolidate its powers and present the impression of political and religious unity, as the first act of sectarianism could split the movement irreparably. The opposition should also incorporate diverse tactics, especially those of deconcentration, including non-cooperation campaigns. This would increase participation by making it safe for minority groups and fence-sitters to contribute, while also hitting the regime economically.

I: Situation

Key Elements of Actual Situation (Political, Socioeconomic, International, and Military)

Political

1) Opposition is currently on the offensive; Assad regime and security forces are on the defensive. On October 9th, the Syrian government warned countries not to recognize the Syrian National Council, and threatened to take “strict measures” against any who did.[3]

2) Regime occasionally introduces reforms to appease the opposition, a fact that has helped maintain the loyalty of foreign governments interested in maintaining the status quo in Syria (Russia, China, and Iran). However, Assad has largely broken his promises to neighboring nations to implement reforms and negotiate with protesters. The opposition has clearly stated that it accept nothing less than resignation from Assad.

3) Assad has virtually no populist support; his only remaining supporters are wealthy business owners, those who fear retribution upon defection, and prominent minority leaders – Alawi and Christian - who fear that Islamists would trample minorities in a post-Assad Syria.

4) Assad, via his brother Maher, has direct control over security forces and is aware that this is his only remaining stronghold. As a result, the regime claims that opposition “rebels” are the sole committers of violence. Armed opposition ambushes have increased in number in the past month, giving legitimacy to Assad’s claims.

5) International perception of the Syrian opposition is changing in light of recent coalition building and united statements demanding Assad’s resignation. Even mainstream news sources such as CNN are reporting that the opposition is “getting its act together.”[4] This perception will likely lead to more concrete support from other countries. The Syrian Diaspora is playing a critical role in the spread of information. Pressing challenges for the SNC include developing a shared vision of the future state, coming up with a transition plan, and winning political support inside Syria.

6) Assad lifted a ban on social media in late spring, making the spread of information relatively simple despite state control of official media. Using technology and know-how from the Iranian regime, Assad’s forces tend to track the sources of posts on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

b) Socioeconomic

1) Unemployment: In 2009, 3.5 million out of the 21 million total Syrians were jobless, or 17% of the population. The concentration of unemployment in rural areas contributed significantly to the beginning of public unrest.

2) Damascus business community: consists of 200 nouveau riche who were chosen by the Assad administration. A large number of these businessmen are involved in Syria’s two largest private holdings firms, Souria and Cham. As usual, the middle-class business community has much vested in stability. They tend to be a nationalistic group that distrusts the international community; the more local the opposition movement, the more likely they are to be on board.[5]

3) Aleppo business community: is the center of Turkish investments. Aleppine businessmen have hired private militias to protect their involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering. In early August Turkish Prime Minister Ergodan condemned the Assad regime and warned them that they were making a “big mistake,” which sent a message to these business owners in large cities.

4) Oil sector: Syria’s reliance its neighbors for gas oil and diesel imports far outweighs any advantage it may have in the oil exports sector. Its oil is considered low quality but is purchased in small quantities by various European countries, and it is said that 20% of the military’s budget comes from these exports.[6] 30% of overall revenue comes from oil production, which makes it an effective target for sanctions because they would harm the regime, not the general population.

c) International

1) Sunni battle for political space: emerging Turkey and long-term player Saudi Arabia unite in supporting the opposition. 74% Sunni majority in Syria almost guarantees a new ally for Turkey and Saudi Arabia post-Assad.

2) Shia battle for political space: After the U.S. war in Iraq effectively opened up the Eastern Mediterranean to neighboring influence, Iran began to renew the Shia project in the Middle East. Syria, with its access to the Mediterranean Sea, significant Shia population, and complex ties in the region, would be an invaluable asset to Iran in its political efforts.

3) Iran: Traditionally a strong ally of the Assad regime, Iran has been sending Syria and the international community mixed messages in terms of its loyalties. Although President Ahmadinejad called for Assad to have negotiations with protesters in early September, the Iranian administration is alleged to be simultaneously providing the regime with additional security forces. The opposition forces, consequently, are strongly anti-Iran and anti-Hezbollah; when the leader of Hezbollah pledged his support for the Assad regime, protesters burned his picture in the street.[7] Members of the Iranian government reportedly met with leaders of the Syrian opposition in a European city in September.[8]

4) Turkey: Has been the strongest international ally of the opposition since the uprising began and welcomes refugees across the border. Anatalya hosted a conference in May 2011 for 300-400 opposition activists to consolidate. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Ergodan publicly criticizes Assad for failing to implement promised reforms,[9] and offered the opposition an office on Turkish soil.[10] To pressure the regime, Turkey has threatened economic sanctions but has not yet implemented them. If the sanctions are introduced, Turkish business elites will likely resist them because the elites rely on trucking routes through Syria in order to transport their goods to the Gulf countries, and they have established trade ties with Syrians. Members of Syrian minorities, especially Kurds, assume that Turkey wants to increase the role of the Muslim Brotherhood inside Syria, so they fear Turkey’s strong support of the opposition.

5) The EU: is in a position of extreme efficacy in the Syrian uprisings. Syria received 4.1 billion dollars from the EU for its oil exports in 2010. Energy sanctions from the EU could easily cripple the Syrian economy, as much of the security forces’ budget comes from exports to Europe.

6) Russia and China: A combination of oil interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and a categorical refusal to support Western-backed initiatives in their sphere of influence has proven an obstacle in the establishment of UN sanctions that would harm the Assad regime. Russia has a military base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, a strategic position that would surely be monopolized by the toppling of Assad. On September 14th Syrians staged a “day of anger” in protest of Russia’s conduct in the UN. In early October, Russia and China used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block a set of sanctions on Syria, effectively stifling the international community’s ability to act multilaterally and putting pressure on Turkey to lead sanction efforts. As of mid October, Russian and Chinese diplomats are calling for Assad to implement promised reforms in a timelier manner. Local protestors are increasingly burning Russian and Chinese flags.

7) The Arab League: On October 16th, Syria narrowly avoided suspension from the Arab League, a measure that would have required the support of two thirds of the body’s 22 member nations. Instead the Arab League called for a dialogue between the opposition and Syrian officials to be held in Cairo by October 31st, and a mandatory ceasefire. If talks and the ceasefire do not occur in the next fifteen days, there will be an emergency meeting of the Arab League.

d) Security Forces

1) State security and intelligence forces are known as the mukhabarat. This is an umbrella for many apparatuses, including State Security (Amn al-Dawla), Political Security (Amn al-Siyasi) and Military Security (Amn al-Askari).[11]

2) There is a danger of tribal violence. According to a defected soldier, “Arab and Kurdish tribes in DeirEzzor [northeastern Syria] and Bukamal [eastern Syria] are allied and likely to fight back against the regime's incursion.”[12] Despite many opportunities over seven months of struggling, this has not happened yet on a large scale.

3) Syria’s military is conscription-based and largely Sunni. Therefore individuals likely feel relatively low levels of loyalty to the Assad regime; they continue to fulfill orders because they are threatened with death.

4) The regime partitions the army into smaller units so there’s less of a chance of mass defection.

5) Maher al-Assad is the symbolic and literal head of the Syrian military. Has shown no signs of dwindling loyalty to his family’s regime.

6) Regime intelligence has been focusing on YouTube videos uploaded by protesters that showcase violence perpetrated by the regime. So far investigators have been able to use face recognition technology to identify members of the opposition and perform raids on their neighborhoods and homes. The opposition is currently working on new technologies to blur all faces and further obscure their locations on the Internet.[13]

II: Bashar al-Assad’s Pillars of Support

(Key Institutions and Organizations Supporting the Regime)

1. Security forces/secret police: Iranian security forces are said to be aiding the Assad regime.[14]Shabbiha, or the Syrian civilian militia, are generally underemployed or unemployed men who the regime hires on a day-by-day basis to commit acts of violence that the professional security forces are unwilling to commit.[15] The leaders of shabbiha are said to be cousins of Assad. A special set of security forces is often present at protests; they stand behind the regular security forces and shoot those soldiers who are unwilling to shoot at protesters. Regime blames protesters for starting violence.

2. Alawis: enjoy privileged status under the Ba’ath regime although they are a minority in Syria. In order to get Alawis outside of the regime on the side of the opposition, it is incredibly important to present at least an illusion of religious unity and avoid sectarianism at all costs.

3. Army generals (especially Alawis): tens of thousands of soldiers have defected and are in hiding.[16] They maintain a symbolic organization called the Free Officers Movement. Those that remain loyal to Assad are officers that are close to the regime and fear retribution for crimes they have already committed.

4. Elite business community: International sanctions have already begun to pressure the business community but are moving slowly. The United States has established stiff economic sanctions and has frozen the assets of many Syrian individuals, but Syria’s neighbors in the Middle East and Europe have been unwilling to take harsh measures. Businesses in Syria’s range of influence are using loopholes to gradually pull back from their ties as opposed to a sudden and more influential cutting of ties. Russia and China continuously block UN efforts to craft widespread sanctions on Syria because of their own economic, energy-based interests in the region.[17] Turkey, the Gulf, and the members of the Arab League are the actors that could have the biggest effect if they decide to implement sanctions.

Individuals:

Maher al-Assad - commander in chief of the Syrian military, Bashar’s brother

Ali Mamlouk - leader of the General Intelligence Service

Rami Makhlouf - businessman who finances some regime activities. Owns a telecommunications company, Syriatel, and Syria’s only private newspaper. Extremely unpopular, but recently announced divestment from his business ventures in order to donate the money to charity.

Abd al-Fatah Qudsiyah - head of Military Intelligence

Fawwaz and Mundir al-Assad - regime coordinators for shabbiha militia[18]

III: Key Players and Potential Allies

In early October the opposition presented an official new umbrella organization, the Syrian National Council (SNC) consisting of 230 opposition leaders in the general assembly. It has 75 core members, 29 executive council members, and 7 members of the presidential committee. Half of the members are dissidents inside the country, and the other half are observers within the Syrian diaspora.[19] Its main strategic goal is to increase the international pressure on Assad to step down, and it also has a plan for a transitional government.[20] The SNC is in favor of international measures to protect the Syrian people, such as international monitors, but has not advocated external military intervention. It consists of almost all opposition and minority groups, including the Damascus Declaration group, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Kurdish factions, and the Local Coordination Committees.

Radwan Ziadeh describes three types of nonviolent opposition activists in Syria: traditional leaders who have been active since 2001’s Damascus Spring,[21] street-level local activists, and an online-based organizational corps, often within the overseas diaspora, that creates headlines. This is an incomplete list of some known Syrian activists.

Traditional opposition leaders:

• Hassan ‘Abdel-‘Azim and ‘Abdel-Majid Manjuna, leaders of the Arab Socialist Union party.

• Riad Turk, George Sabra, Omar Qashash, and other leaders of the People’s Democratic Party.

• Riad Sayf in Damascus, who was, until his resignation at the end 2010, the Secretary-General of the Damascus Declaration. Most prominent inside leader of the SNC.

• Samir Nashar in Aleppo, Najati Tyara in Homs, Nawaf al-Bashir in Dayr al-Zor, and other members of the Damascus Declaration in different provinces.

Emerging street-level leaders (most of whom are currently in hiding or detention):

• Ayman Al-Aswad, Adnan Al-Mahamid, Mohamed Al-Ammar, and others in Dar‘a;

• Walid Bunni in Al-Tal;

• Moa‘taz Murad and Osama Nassar in Dariya;

• Anas Airot and Anas Elshogry in Banias;

• Ahmed Maaz Al Khatib and Yasser Elaytie in Damascus;

• Montaha Al-Atrash in Suwayda; and

• Said Salam, Dana Jwabrah, and Suheir Atassi who played a role in organizing the first peaceful demonstration outside of the Syrian Interior Ministry.[22]

• Riad Seif – Former Syrian MP detained a number of times by the Assad regime

Diaspora:

• Mouhja Kahf – Poet at the University of Arkansas

• Najib Ghadbian – Kahf’s husband, a political science professor at the University of Arkansas

• Ausama Monajed – Director of the Strategic Research and Communication Centre

• Osama Kadi – Co-founder and president of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies, based in Washington, D.C.

• Ammar Abdulhamid – Director of the Tharwa Foundation; prominent Western spokesperson for the opposition, based in Maryland; author of the Syrian Revolution Digest blog

• Radwan Ziadeh – Founding director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies; executive director of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies, based in Washington, D.C. Head of the SNC foreign relations office.

• Burhan Ghalioun – Professor of Oriental Studies at the Sorbonne in Paris

• Abdurrazzaq Eid – Member Elected to Consultative Council at Antalya meeting

• Amr Al-Azm – Member Elected to Consultative Council at Antalya meeting

• Ghassan Mifleh – Member Elected to Consultative Council at Antalya meeting[23]

• Burhan Ghalioun and Muhammad Riyadh al-Shaqfa (general supervisor of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood), exile leaders of the Syrian National Council as of 3 October

Religious and ethnic minorities are crucial potential allies in the Syrian conflict, as they account for 26% of the population and are quite influential in certain arenas. However, the Assad regime encourages fears of an outcome similar to Iraq’s, in which the fall of a dictator led to civil war between religious sects. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion of the late 1970s, in which the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to rally the Sunnis into a violent sectarian battle with the Alawi, eventually leading to civil war, remains in the national conscience. For these reasons religious minorities are extremely wary of becoming involved in the conflict.

The Alawi, whose beliefs are represented and protected by the regime, are loyal to Assad but recognize that they have not received many concrete benefits in exchange for their loyalty. They tend to view the opposition as an uneducated mass supporting an international conspiracy against Assad.[24] The next largest religious minority is the Christians, who constitute 10% of the population and have a somewhat weaker loyalty to the Assad regime. They tend to work in white-collar occupations and live in urban areas, making their populations quite concentrated and easily accessible. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Islamists were free to exercise influence in Iraq, causing much harm to the Christian community and forcing them to flee – many of them to Syria. Christians in Syria fear a similar outcome post-Assad. A more likely potential ally is the Druze population, some groups of which have supported the regime and others, the opposition. Although they only make up 3% of the population, they are influential in the southwestern part of Syria and in Golan Heights, the areas where they are concentrated. 10% of the population identifies as the Kurdish ethnic minority, most of them religiously Sunni. They face routine harassment by the Syrian government, so are relatively experienced dissidents and have familiarity with organizing themselves for political causes. They have already openly supported the opposition by attending marches. On October 7th a prominent Kurdish opposition leader was assassinated in his home, bringing over 50,000 mourners together in a march in the northeast.[25] Now senior figures in the Kurdish community are calling for its 1.7 million members to join the civilian uprising against Assad.

IV: List of issues with potential to be exploited in the campaign

1) Education: student groups and universities have played a relatively small role in the Syrian uprising. In order to reach urban areas and affect the Syrian business class, the opposition needs to create alliances with students in Damascus and Aleppo. Rural areas do not have access to post-secondary education opportunities, which is another issue that can be targeted.

2) Violent abuses: the opposition has been successfully and consistently recording acts of violence committed by the Assad regime and posting them on YouTube in order to attract international attention. These efforts could be improved by providing English translations of important conversations that take place on camera.

3) Social media: the actual struggle is being mirrored by a virtual one: the fight for control of online space. While the Syrian opposition has proved itself highly capable of organizing via twitter, blogs, and facebook, a pro-regime “Syrian Electronic Army” has arisen and caught many activists, co-opting their accounts and using them to catch even more activists.[26]

4) Business: again, the business community is a crucial ally. The majority of businesses are small and medium firms that employ many workers, and their support for Assad is already waning. They could play a fundamental role in boycotts and strikes. In order to attract the loyalty of the business community, the opposition must assure business elites that it will protect their interests in a post-Assad Syria.

5) Failed reforms: in order to convince withholding countries that Assad’s proposed reforms are merely attempts to appear more moderate and prolong the conflict, the opposition must clearly articulate Assad’s past failures and specific reforms it plans to enact in post-Assad Syria.

6) Public servants, workers, and minorities: the middle class in Syria is suffering as a result of sanctions and a sluggish economy, not to mention the stress and health problems caused by an escalating violent conflict. Unemployment hovers around 30%. The opposition must rally these populations. The General Federation of Trade Unions is the blanket union organization and is controlled by the Ba’ath regime, but it has protested for better safety tools in the past, showing that this organization is capable of contesting the regime.

V: Potential for Syrian conflict to turn violent and its grave consequences

September 2011 was a strategically important month for the Syrian opposition; international attention and the pressure to unify from within resulted in relatively successful coalition building. The opposition’s ability to react quickly to pressures and to respond to demands shows its versatility. In reaction to the opposition’s newfound success, the Assad regime escalated its violent tactics, thus isolating itself globally and nearly ensuring an eventual overthrow. These two forces – the Assad regime and the seven-month-old nonviolent movement – have been constantly consolidating, leaving space for new phenomena to arise. Small but coordinated groups of Sunni militant fighters along with newly-formed armies of defected soldiers have sprung up, acting as the voice of those who support a violent uprising – a number that is relatively small but growing.

Although various members of the diaspora and domestic Syrian officials have publicly supported a turn to violence,[27] these groups of army deserters and militant fighters pose by far the primary threat to the largely nonviolent struggle. The strategy of the Free Syria Army (FSA) is unclear, along with the degree of command and control it has over armed factions. It is currently claiming to employ solely defensive actions, only firing on regime forces when they shoot at protesters and helping civilians find evacuation routes. On October 11th, the commander of the FSA declared an operation against loyalist armies in its stronghold in the Idlib province, which has led to some bloodshed.[28] The SNC’s treatment of the FSA will be a crucial development – in order to avoid association with violence, the SNC must find a way for the army defectors to occupy themselves productively, avoiding violence.

Smaller brigades, ten or eleven of which have gained significant influence in their respective regions, have begun to respond violently to the regime’s provocations. The Khaled Bin al-Walid Brigade and the Salahedin Victory Brigade are two of the most prominent, and have ties to the Free Officer’s Movement and the Free Syria Army. Around 700 members of the loyal Syrian security forces have died at the hands of these groups.[29] If these groups were to unite and officially embrace a violent struggle, it would signal the end of the nonviolent opposition’s success.

Independent groups of Sunni militant fighters have begun to infiltrate the Syrian borders, taking the struggle into their own hands. These are the same fighters who opposed the U.S. in Iraq and Qaddafi in Libya, and are likely extremely skilled. These militant fighters offer nothing but complications – they will perpetuate acts of violence and will confuse the existing structure within the opposition. An increase in their numbers could lead to uncoordinated attacks and increased nationalist sentiment – and will send the crucial minorities and fence-sitters to the sidelines.

So far, the nonviolent opposition movement has survived these threats to its principles. The SNC continues to reiterate its nonviolent stance in the media, condemning the militarization of the opposition, and continues to use nonviolent tactics despite the regime’s increasing hold on its space. As the possibility of a violent revolution becomes more real, the conversation switches from a practical one to an ideological one, shifting from the streets to the Internet and international conference halls. Once the nonviolent movement loses control of what happens on the street, the revolution will be in the hands of the relatively unorganized violent groups, and the country will likely slide into civil war. Already the political situation is starting to look like civil war, with the kidnapping of the SNC leader’s niece[30] and dozens of civilians dying every day.

The nonviolent opposition under the leadership of the SNC must try to minimize daily acts of violence perpetrated by fellow anti-regime activists and ensure that its victories are properly publicized. In order to maintain momentum, the opposition should introduce new types of nonviolent tactics that require huge numbers of people, such as domestic boycotts and strikes. These low-risk, widespread tactics brought the South African anti-apartheid movement to a head in similar conditions: an experienced and strictly nonviolent opposition movement in the face of a government that continues the use of oppressive measures, while the international community is wary to get involved.

Further reading:

The Syrian Opposition: A Strategic Analysis. By Carol E.B. Choksy and Jamsheed K. Choksy. Prepared for Small Wars Journal, September 2011.



The Syrian Opposition: Political Analysis with Original Testimony from Key Figures. By Michael Weiss and Hannah Stuart. Prepared for the Henry Jackson Society, summer 2011.

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[1]"Libya NTC Recognizes Syrian National Council, Closes Syrian Embassy." Naharnet. 10 Oct. 2011. Web. .

[2]Shaddid, Anthony. "Syria’s Protesters, Long Mostly Peaceful, Starting to Resort to Violence." The New York Times. 16 Sept. 2011. Web..

[3]Bakri, Nada. "Syria Demands That Nations Reject Opposition Council and Protect Its Embassies." The New York Times. 9 Oct. 2011. Web. .

[4]Labott, Elise. "Syrian Opposition Working to Unify, Get Its Act Together – CNN Security Clearance - Blogs." CNN Security Clearance - Blogs. 17 Aug. 2011. Web. .

[5]Slim, Randa. "Where's Syria's Business Community? - By Randa Slim | The Middle East Channel." The Middle East Channel | FOREIGN POLICY. 5 Aug. 2011. Web. .

[6] "Factbox: Syria's Energy Sector." . Reuters, 14 Aug. 2011. Web. .

[7] Weiss, Michael, and Hannah Stuart. "The Syrian Opposition: Political Analysis with Original Testimony from Key Figures." The Henry Jackson Society, 2011. Web. .

[8] "Iran News Round Up September 2, 2011." IranTracker. 2 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[9] "Syrians Rally against Russian Support for Assad's 'killing Machine'" The Daily Star. 14 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[10] Seibert, Thomas. "Erdogan Set to Cut All Turkey's Ties with Syria." The National, 27 Sept. 2011. Web.

[11] "BBC News - Syria Country Profile." BBC News - Home. Web. .

[12] Weiss, Michael. "My Interview with a Defected Syrian Soldier; Plus, More Leaked Syrian Documents – Telegraph Blogs." Telegraph Blogs. The Telegraph, 9 Aug. 2011. Web. .

[13]Nachawati, Leila. "The Assads versus YouTube." AJE - Al Jazeera English, 19 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[14]Knickmeyer, Ellen. "Syria Military Officers Shed Light on Regime's Crackdown." Los Angeles Times. 9 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[15] "Syria Unrest: Who Are the Shabiha?" BBC, 17 Aug. 2011. Web.

[16]"My Interview with a Defected Syrian Soldier; Plus, More Leaked Syrian Documents – Telegraph Blogs." 

[17] Dixon, Hugo. "Can Non-violent Struggle Bring down Syria’s Assad?" Analysis & Opinion | Reuters. 01 Aug. 2011. Web. ;

Richter, Paul, and Henry Chu. "EU Sanctions on Syria Oil and Gas Industry Come with Loopholes." Los Angeles Times, 15 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[18] "The Syrian Opposition: Political Analysis with Original Testimony from Key Figures."

[19] "Syrian Opposition Unites in New Council." AJE - Al Jazeera English. 15 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[20] "The Syrian Opposition: Political Analysis with Original Testimony from Key Figures." See Page 16

[21]Scheer, Bander. "Bashar Al-Assad and the ‘Damascus Spring’." Zeytun | Academic Exchange between the Netherlands and the Middle East. 24 Mar. 2010. Web. .

[22]Ziadeh, Radwan. "The Syrian Revolution: Emerging Leaders." Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East 1 (2011): 43-45. Print.

[23] "The Syrian Opposition: Political Analysis with Original Testimony from Key Figures."

[24] Rosen, Nir. "Assad's Alawites: An Entrenched Community." Al Jazeera English. 12 Oct. 2011. Web. .

[25] Blomfield, Adrian. "Thousands of Kurds Could Awaken Against Syrian Regime." The Telegraph. 9 Oct. 2011. Web. .

[26] Amos, Deborah. "Pro-Assad 'Army' Wages Cyberwar In Syria : NPR." NPR. 25 Sept. 2011. Web. 11 Oct. 2011. .

[27] For a list, see: Choksy, Jamsheed K., and Carol E.B. Choksy. "The Syrian Opposition: A Strategic Analysis." Small Wars Journal. 29 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[28] "Syrian Revolution Digest." Web. .

[29] Rosen, Nir. "Syria: The Revolution Will Be Weaponised." AJE - Al Jazeera English. 23 Sept. 2011. Web. .

[30] Amos, Deborah, and Ray Suarez. "As Violence in Syria Escalates, Will Many 'Fence Sitters' Back Opposition?" PBS: Public Broadcasting Service. 3 Oct. 2011. Web. .

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