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Table of Contents

***CP – Neg 2

1nc CP – Generic 3

**Solvency 4

solvency – Generic Catch-all 4

Solvency – Trust 7

A2: Launch Capabilities 10

A2: Entities List = No Solvency 11

A2: ITAR = No Solvency 13

A2: Indo-China Mod 14

A2: Rising Expectations 17

A2: Delay 18

**Say Yes 19

Say Yes – SPS 19

Say Yes – ASATS 25

Say Yes – Mars 27

Say Yes – Solar Sails 28

Say Yes – Moon 29

** CP Aff Answers 31

Theory Helpers 32

Say No – Generic 33

Say No – Lack of Trust 35

Say No – Moon 39

Say No – SPS 40

Say No – Weaponization 42

Say No – Moon 42

Say No – Launches 43

Solvency Deficits – Delay 44

CP Links to Ptx 45

Internal Link Turn – CP Crushes Future Relations 46

Rising Expectations Turn 53

Indo-China Relations Mod 55

Indo-China Ext – Coop Kills Relations 57

Heg DA Links 58

***India Relations Disad/Net Benefit 58

1NC Shell 59

**Uniqueness 65

India Space Program - Yes 66

Indo-US Cooperation Now 66

Indo-US Relations High 68

Indo-US Relations High - Brink 69

Indian Military 70

China India Relations High 71

**Links - Generic 72

2NC – Turns Case 72

Unilateral Action Link 72

Technonationalism 75

Lunar Links 77

SBSP Links 82

Weaponization Link 84

Militarization Link 84

Mars Links 86

ASATs Links 87

Space Coop Key to Relations 88

A2 Plan Increases Cooperation 91

A2 Cooperation = Normal Means 91

**Internal Links/Impacts 92

Relations Key to Stability 92

Relations Solve Stability - Ext 93

Relations Key to Free Treade 94

Indo-Pak War Mod 94

Prolif Mod 96

China War Mod 97

Democracy Mod 99

Indian ASATS Mod 99

A2: Turn- US-India space co-op bad 100

**Aff Answers 104

Non-Unique - MoonRise 104

Non-Unique - Restrictions 104

Non-Unique: Afpak 105

Non-Unique-Other Issues 105

Relations Resilient/Inevitable 106

Relations Doesn’t Solve the Impact 110

Relations Not Intrinsic 110

Impact Turn: India Militarization 111

***CP – Neg

1NC CP – GENERIC

TEXT – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROPOSE [THE AREA OF THE PLAN] IN A JOINT WORKING GROUP WITH INDIA. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATE BILATERAL COOPERATION OVER [THE PLAN] IN NEGOTIATIONS. THE RESULTING BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BASED ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP.

Empirically Joint working groups foster cooperation over space – they’ll say yes

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 2007 *U.S. governmental agency, press release [, “U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation,” February 28th 2007]

Following up on the commitments made under the U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership to expand joint work on civil space programs, the Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation (JWG) held its second meeting in Washington, DC, on February 27-28, 2007. Mr. Jeff Miotke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science, Space and Health, and Mr. Michael O'Brien, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations, led the U.S. delegation, and Dr. R. R. Navalgund, Director, India Space Research Organization (ISRO) Satellite Applications Centre, led the Indian delegation. The Chairmen of the Joint Working Group expressed their satisfaction at the strengthening relationship between the U.S. and India in civil space activities. This relationship is founded on the deep appreciation of each side for the other's achievements and capabilities in the development and application of space technologies, and their conviction that their partnership in civil space is both natural and of mutual benefit. Space activities lead to advances in prosperity, security and knowledge, and they offer a vision of progress that inspires young people around the world. The Chairmen noted that these benefits compel both sides to deepen their cooperation in civil space, and to provide for the widest possible dissemination of the scientific knowledge gained through their efforts in space. The Joint Working Group engaged in a broad range of discussions and endorsed the following conclusions: Space exploration and research will enable dramatic advances in knowledge of the basic nature and dynamics of our planet and the universe around it. Successful international cooperation in space research proceeds from the understanding that scientific information should be shared as widely and quickly as possible to enable its fullest use for research purposes in the interests of the public good. The two sides look forward to India's Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission in March 2008, which will greatly increase our knowledge of Earth's natural satellite. NASA and ISRO have agreed upon cooperative programs for this mission that will further both countries' goals for space exploration, and will set the stage for future cooperation. Space exploration is a source of inspiration and discovery in which many nations of the world have chosen to partake. The U.S. has set for itself a Vision for Space Exploration. NASA has invited opinions from India and other countries to define a strategy that details how Lunar exploration fits into the broader global effort to explore space. Additional opportunities for cooperation exist in the field of space science, including astrophysics, robotic exploration of the solar system, and the investigation of the relationship between the Earth and the Sun. Earth observation data and information yield a broad range of societal benefits. The U.S. and India, through cooperation between their technical agencies, including NOAA, NASA and the USGS for the U.S. and ISRO for India, have embarked upon a number of collaborative activities in the application of Earth observations and look forward to continued collaboration in this area. One area that Earth observations can be applied to is disaster management. The Earth and its inhabitants are vulnerable to long-term processes and sudden events, from climate change to natural disasters, without regard to national boundaries. Space observations play a vital role in developing an understanding of these vulnerabilities and mitigating their consequences. The two sides look forward to future launches of U.S. and Indian satellites that will improve global Earth observations and provide opportunities for further cooperative projects. Plans are being made to establish a ground station in India for the U.S. National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and to investigate potential collaboration on medium resolution land-imaging systems. One area for further collaboration is the possible use of Indian Resourcesat data to address expected gaps in data from U.S. Landsat satellites. Additional activities, including collaborations between U.S. and Indian scientists and coordination of observations from U.S. and Indian spacecraft, are under consideration. In additional to bilateral cooperation, international multilateral fora serve as important areas for discussion and policy coordination on a range of issues. These range from the wide-ranging deliberations of the Group on Earth Observations and the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, to specialized forums on spacecraft standards and protocols, to avenues for coordination and planning for space missions and scientific research. Continued progress is being made in promoting interoperability among existing and future U.S. and Indian civil space based positioning, navigation, and timing systems to create a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). A joint statement detailing areas for future joint work in GNSS was adopted by the JWG. The two sides exchanged information on a range of space and other policy issues and noted the ongoing efforts to conclude new bilateral agreements designed to open up new opportunities for cooperation. At the end of the session, the JWG received information from U.S. and Indian commercial groups on ways and means to promote commercial ties in the space sector. In order to strengthen the relationship between the U.S. and India in civil space cooperation, the Joint Working Group continues to serve as a useful mechanism to endorse proposals for enhanced cooperation, promote understanding of government policies and procedures, and facilitate collaboration by addressing issues promptly. The two delegations have identified the next steps that need to be taken by each side and have agreed that the next meeting will take place in India in early 2008.

**Solvency

SOLVENCY – GENERIC CATCH-ALL

US AND INDIA SHOULD COOPERATE IN SPACE ON A CODE OF CONDUCT, LAUNCH COSTS, LUNAR EXPLORATION, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND SPACE DEBRIS; THIS WOULD BRING IN OTHER NATIONS TO COOPERATE- IT WORKED BEFORE

Inderfurth and Mohan, 09 (Karl I. and C. Raja, * professor at George Washington University and a former assistant secretary of state for south Asia affairs, 1997-2001 and ** Indian academic, journalist and foreign policy analyst. He is currently Strategic Affairs Editor of the Indian Express, New Delhi, ‘‘Put Space at the Heart of U.S.-India Relations”, Financial Times, 11/22/09, ) AFL

President Obama will receive Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Tuesday for the first official state visit of his administration, a visit befitting India’s emergence as a major global actor. It also signals America’s commitment to a strong partnership. For more than a decade, the US-India relationship has been deepening. This visit provides the chance to focus on a big idea that could lift relations to a higher orbit – literally. Mr Obama and Mr Singh should unveil a long-term bilateral initiative to work together to secure the threatened common spaces of our planet – our global commons – including the seas, atmosphere, outer space and the digital domain. The two leaders should underscore this by launching a major venture in outer space. The Obama administration and Singh government are both in their first year of tenure and have the political capital to push through a major advance. A similar moment in July 2005 led to the launch of a challenging civil nuclear initiative and its passage against great odds in both capitals. Today, the conventional wisdom is that the two leaders will not match the scale of the nuclear bargain and should limit themselves to consolidating recent gains. We disagree. They should aim higher and focus on strategic co-operation in outer space. They can bring lasting benefits to national space programmes and lay out the framework for an international code of conduct in outer space. Besides influencing a range of international issues, from energy security to global warming, space co-operation could define a new template for the management of the global commons. As Washington looks for new partners in the management of the global commons, India is a natural choice. After the end of the Soviet Union, the US has had no real peers in outer space. Today as the US reviews its civilian and military space objectives amid shrinking resources, there is a broad consensus within the space community that Washington needs enduring partnerships, both bilateral and multilateral, in outer space. What does Delhi bring to the table? As a rising space power with real and potential technical skills, India can help the US pursue more ambitious goals in outer space and at a lower cost. India’s contribution to advances in outer space are impressive, such as the discovery of water molecules on the surface of the moon by its lunar explorer, Chandrayaan-1. The US partnered with India on this mission, with two Nasa payloads on board. Four broad areas of bilateral space co-operation present themselves. First, advanced launch technologies. The greatest limitation on space-ventures is the cost of launching objects into space. The two countries should partner in basic scientific research, such as advanced materials and combustion science that could enable a new generation of spacecraft, while avoiding the proliferation of dangerous ballistic missile capabilities. Second, lunar exploration and beyond. With interest in both countries for exploring the moon and its resources, the US and India should exploit synergies between their moon programmes and consult on an ambitious human exploration of the moon and inter-planetary space. Lunar resources could be used to lower the costs of sustaining human and robotic outposts beyond the earth. Third, climate change. The two countries should use the massive American and growing Indian space assets for earth observation to provide comprehensive and credible assessments of climate change. Fourth, space governance. The US and India should work to forge a consensus on limiting space debris, improving “space situational awareness” for avoiding hazards, and ensuring unhindered operation of the space assets of all nations. Creating a new voluntary code of conduct in outer space could mark the start of an effort to bring order to the global commons. An Obama-Singh space initiative could become the defining feature of an expansive US-India collaboration, especially in science and technology. It could also create the basis for securing our global commons and offer incentives to other major powers to join this vital undertaking.

The CP solves, India has the capabilities, and cooperation has been empirically successful

Sutaria and Haté 08 *Krishna Sutaria is a former research intern with the South Asia Program at CSIS **Vibhuti Haté is a Research Associate with the South Asia Program at CSIS [, November 7th 2008, “Starry Eyes or Serious Potential? – The Rise of India’s Space Program]

The landmark success of India’s moon launch in October 2008 has all eyes set on the Indian space program. India’s space program produces both satellites and launchers. The development-oriented missions of educational communications and remote sensing that were the program’s mainstay are now supplemented by plans for human space flight and hopes for a significant share of the US$2.5 billion commercial launch industry. The United States has resumed space cooperation with India, and is hoping to extend this more fully to the launch area. India’s strategic thinking has expanded to encompass a defensive role for its space capabilities. This is yet another manifestation of India re-positioning its position in the global power game. To the Moon and Back: On October 22, 2008 Chandrayaan-I, India’s first unmanned spacecraft, was launched on a two year mission to the moon from the Satish Dhawan space centre at Sriharikota spaceport near Chennai. After orbiting the earth twice Chandrayaan-I will fire towards the moon, taking five and a half days to complete its journey. There are eleven instruments on board, five indigenous and six under international cooperation from the United States, the European Space Agency (ESA) and Bulgaria. The spacecraft will orbit the moon studying the topography and mineralogical content of the lunar surface. Even as Chandrayaan-I successfully begins its journey to the moon, plans are already underway for Chandrayaan-II, the follow up mission in 2011-2012 that will land on the moon with a lunar orbiting spacecraft and a land rover. Anticipating the success of its first Moon mission, Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has already signed an agreement in 2007 with Russian space agency Roskosmos to make Chandrayaan-II a joint mission. ISRO will manage the lunar orbiter, while Roskosmos manages the rover.

Solvency – Trust

INDIA TRUSTS THE US- SPACELAB MISSION 3 BEGAN NEW ERA OF PARTNERSHIP

Indian Embassy ‘9 [February 6, 2009, Embassy of the Republic of India, Washington DC, USA- ; WBTR]

Apart from the operational missions of IRS and INSAT, ISRO has also initiated dedicated space science missions such as SROSS-C for atmospheric studies and AstroSat mission for astronomical observation in UV and X-rays. Anuradha, an Indian experiment for cosmic ray studies was part of NASA’s third Spacelab mission. As a first step in planetary exploration, Chandrayaan-1, for remote sensing of the moon from 100 km lunar polar orbit was initiated. Data obtained from this mission will improve our current understanding of the origin and evolution of the Moon. American cooperation in India's first unmanned lunar mission, Chandrayaan-I, which was successfully launched from Shriharikota on 22nd October, and inserted into Moon’s orbit on 8th November, marks the beginning of a new era of trust and partnership between the two countries in the field of space exploration. The mission to the moon carries two NASA payloads - a Miniature Synthetic Aperture Radar to map ice deposits in the moon's surface and a Moon Mineralogy Maper to assess mineral resources of the Moon The inclusion of two US Instruments on this spacecraft has provided further fillip to Indo-US cooperation in the space arena. India, along with seven other countries, has signed a landmark agreement with the United States (NASA) to carry out lunar exploration. The agreement was signed at American space agency NASA's Ames Research Centre on 28th July 2008. ISRO is also planning a second version named Chandrayaan-2 to land a motorized rover on the moon in 2011/2012. The strides that the US and India can make together as partners in space will advance tele-medicine, tele-education, and disaster preparedness and management which in turn help development of mankind in a global perspective.

Indinan Prime Minister trusts the US after Pres. Obama’s visit to India

Science Insider ’10 [9 November 2010 Science Insider Magazine Obama Visit Boosts India-U.S. Science Ties by Pallava Bagla,

obama-visit-boosts-india-us-scie.html; WBTR]

******* CORRECTION NOTE: This item has been corrected, 11 November. It originally read that a bilateral "Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Center" would receive $1 million a year each from the United States and India for the next 5 years. That figure is $5 million.

New Delhi—President Barack Obama's unprecedented 3-day visit to India, which ended today, yielded a bumper crop of diplomatic agreements on topics including disease surveillance, agricultural research, clean energy, and monsoon forecasting. In addition, NASA and the Indian space agency began talks on joint human space flight. And the United States agreed to relax certain export controls affecting Indian defense and space facilities. At a special session of the Indian Parliament yesterday, Obama spoke of U.S.-India ties as an "indispensable and defining relationship of the 21st century." He acknowledged India's contributions to science and backed India's demand for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. "This is a manifestation of the growing trust and confidence" between the two countries, said Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who added that he was gratified that the United States will support India's membership in export-control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a cartel created in 1974 to restrict global trade in nuclear technology after India conducted a nuclear explosion. To foster cooperation in public health, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will team up with the Indian ministry of health in a regional disease detection center in New Delhi. It will carry out surveillance on emerging diseases and help in early detection of tropical disease outbreaks. No budget has yet been announced for this 5-year effort. In agriculture, Obama announced that India and the United States will jointly support R&D to usher in an "evergreen revolution," a model for sustaining food security for the world. India will host the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership involving the United States. Among other things, according to a joint statement, the center will "strengthen global nuclear security and address threats of nuclear terrorism." A bilateral "Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Center" with $5 million a year each from the United States and India for the next 5 years will develop new ways to harvest solar energy and tap shale gas, among other goals. To understand the monsoon better, the United States will provide about $600,000 for a 5-year computer modeling effort that will also help set up a "monsoon desk" at the National Centers for Environmental Prediction in Camp Springs, Maryland, said Jane Lubchenco, administrator of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The two countries aim to work together in predicting the 2011 monsoon season

NSSP builds trust and overall relations

Borman 4 *Mathew S. Borman is a reporter for the Hindu, a newspaper based in India [, October 2nd, 2004, “NSSP: U.S., India interests in action”]

In the article entitled, "India, U.S. & Trade in Technology" (The Hindu, September 27), Mr. R. Ramachandran argues that the recent announcement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh on Phase One of the U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative has been "hyped" and lacks substance. Mr. Ramachandran misunderstands both the purpose and the impact of this important initiative. The United States and India share a range of common interests, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and facilitating high-technology trade. The NSSP turns these interests into significant and concrete actions, which will be taken through a series of reciprocal steps that build on each other, consistent with each country's laws and international obligations. Completion of Phase One of the NSSP represents an important change in U.S. export licensing policy for dual-use items. India's Phase One actions regarding enhanced export controls and use of U.S.-origin items in accordance with U.S. requirements have enabled the United States to address three significant export policy issues: * Removing the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) headquarters from the Department of Commerce's Entity List; * Reducing the licensing requirements for exports to the ISRO subordinates remaining on the Entity List by approximately 80 per cent by removing such requirements for EAR99 and "999" items exported to those facilities; and *Applying a "presumption of approval" for all dual-use items subject to multilateral and unilateral controls, except those controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, for export to the "balance of plant" portions (non-reactor related end users) of nuclear power facilities which are currently under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (Tarapur 1 & 2 and Rajasthan 1 & 2). * Each of these policy changes is substantial. * Removing the EAR99 and "999" licence requirements is anticipated to eliminate the need for approximately 25 per cent of all licence applications for U.S. exports to India. This change will facilitate further cooperation between U.S. companies and India's civilian space programme, by eliminating the time and uncertainty of such requirements. The current high volume of such licence applications (about 250 in fiscal year 2004) demonstrates the value that the Indian civilian space programme places on obtaining these U.S. products. The ease of obtaining the affected items, including parts and components, will enhance India's civilian space programme. * Indian government officials have long sought removal of the ISRO headquarters from the Entity List because of the critical role that ISRO plays in India's economic development. In addition to the substantive impact of this change, the removal of the ISRO headquarters from the Entity List sends a strong political signal to exporters to be more positive about business opportunities with the entire ISRO organisation. * Facilitating the use of U.S.-origin items not controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) if intended for export to the "balance-of-plant" portions of safeguarded facilities will open opportunities for U.S. and Indian collaboration in the Indian civilian nuclear power sector. It should be noted that the licence review policy for these transactions was misprinted in the September 22 Federal Register notice. A second Federal Register notice was published on Wednesday, September 29, to clarify that the "presumption of approval" is for all items other than those controlled multilaterally for nuclear proliferation reasons (i.e., controlled by the NSG) for use in the "balance of plant" activities at facilities which currently are safeguarded. As such, licence applications for exports of items unilaterally controlled by the United States such as turbines to the "balance of plant" portions of these facilities will be accorded a "presumption of approval."

Specifically the NSSP built trust within the ISRO

Ollapally 4 *Deepa M. Ollapally Senior Fellow at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, at The George Washington University. was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College from 1991-1995, and then Associate Professor from 1995-1997. She has been a visiting professor at Bryn Mawr College and Georgetown University [, April 2004, “U.S. India Relations: Ties That Bind?”]

An important segment of the government that seems to share this view, taking a long-term approach, is the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). The ISRO’s interest extends well beyond immediate cooperation with the U.S. to what is termed the “next generation of space exploration” in which India could offer both cost and technology advantages, something the Americans are now believed to understand. 38 India has already captured approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the global market for remote sensing data for civilian applications. For space technology cooperation, the ultimate “test” from the Indian side is whether an Indian launch vehicle would be allowed to carry an American-built satellite. The optimists say that nothing can be ruled out in the future, especially if market forces determine American policy.

A2: Launch Capabilities

CP SOLVES, INDIA HAS THE CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY TO LAUNCH SATELLITES

Sutaria and Haté 08 *Krishna Sutaria is a former research intern with the South Asia Program at CSIS **Vibhuti Haté is a Research Associate with the South Asia Program at CSIS [, November 7th 2008, “Starry Eyes or Serious Potential? – The Rise of India’s Space Program]

Satellites and Systems - Nuts and Bolts of India’s Space Program: While ISRO is the main developer of launch and satellite systems, it maintains two separate agencies and corresponding classes of satellites, the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) for communication, television broadcasting and meteorological studies, and the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS) for resources monitoring and management. The two existing satellite launch vehicles, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) are used to place IRS and INSAT class satellites in the required orbits. The PSLV is the space program’s workhorse. The most important function of the PSLV is its ability to launch IRS satellites into sun synchronous orbits. Before PSLV, this kind of launch was commercially viable only from Russia. The PSLV had its first successful launch in 1996, three years after its initial introduction. Since then, it has continued to have successful launches - the latest count puts the PSLV at 9 consecutive and 11 total successful launches out of 13 attempts - making it popular with ISRO. The standard version of the PSLV has the capability to launch 1,600 kg to 622 km in a sun synchronous orbit, but with a strapon booster the PSLV can increase that payload to 1,800 kg. ISRO continues to work on improving the efficiency and increasing the payload of their favorite launch vehicle. The GSLV is a heavier rocket used to launch INSAT satellites primarily into geostationary orbits and can carry heavier payloads for greater distances than its polar counterpart. GSLV had its first successful launch in 2001, followed by a second operational launch in 2004.

A2: Entities List = No Solvency

NO BARRIERS, THE ISRO WAS REMOVED

Sutaria and Haté 08 *Krishna Sutaria is a former research intern with the South Asia Program at CSIS **Vibhuti Haté is a Research Associate with the South Asia Program at CSIS [, November 7th 2008, “Starry Eyes or Serious Potential? – The Rise of India’s Space Program]

Money, Money, Money - India’s Scientific Powerhouse: Today, ISRO is complementing development oriented projects like EDUSAT with commercial ventures. ISRO anticipates new revenues from the highly lucrative satellite industry, which includes broadband Internet Protocol (IP) services, defense and military applications, and leasing options to telecommunication providers. Although ISRO, a relative newcomer to space exploration, has a much shorter list of commercial ventures than its counterparts in the United States and Europe, it has made impressive strides. In April 2007, the PSLV conducted its first commercial launch of a foreign satellite for the Italian Space Agency, AGILE, for US $11 million. Then, in January 2008, the PSLV launched an Israeli satellite, TECSAR, followed by another successful launch in April 2008 of ten satellites on the same launch vehicle. April’s launch broke the record of maximum satellites launched simultaneously by any international space program; a record previously held by Russia at eight satellites in a single launch. Antrix, ISRO’s marketing arm, has been selling Indian products and services to global customers, thereby increasing ISRO’s market share in space services. For financial year 2006-07, it clocked in revenues of approximately US$ 1.36 billion from leasing transponders, selling remote sensing images and launching other countries’ satellites. Senior ISRO officials have admitted that they hope to corner 10 percent of the global space market within the decade. This will put it in competition with the United States, Russia, China, and the European Space Agency in offering commercial space services. Reaction from Washington: The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) statement released by President Bush in 2004 paved the way for U.S. - India cooperation in the area of civilian space programs. Subsequently, in 2005, the U.S. Department of Commerce eliminated several licensing restrictions associated with nuclear-related exports and re-exports to India and also removed six Indian entities, including three ISRO organizations, from the United States’ “Entity List” of organizations and individuals banned from any commerce with the United States on nonproliferation grounds. Some ISRO organizations still remain on the Entity List, but the signature of a space cooperation agreement in June 2005 and the presence of two U.S. instruments on board Chandrayaan-I represent a major breakthrough in U.S.-Indian space cooperation. The U.S. and India have negotiated, but not signed, a Technology Safeguards Agreement and have been discussing a Commercial Space Launch Agreement, which in turn would further facilitate technology transfers and space cooperation between the two countries.

No more barriers the ISRO was removed

Kline 06 Jennifer Kline is a Contributor at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies [, “U.S.-India Space Cooperation High Despite Lingering Proliferation Concerns” July 20th 2006]

These changes led the United States to remove ISRO headquarters from the U.S. Department of Commerce Entity List, identifying foreign organizations of particular proliferation concern. The list was designed to "inform the public of entities whose activities imposed a risk of diverting exported and re-exported items into programs related to weapons of mass destruction." [16] Three additional ISRO subsidiary entities were removed from the Entity List in July 2005, and ISRO is currently petitioning to have the crucial Vikram Sarabhai Space Center, the Liquid Propulsion Systems Center, and the Satish Dhawan Space Center removed from the list in order to facilitate their receipt of additional high-tech American exports. [17]

A2: ITAR = No Solvency

A2 ITAR = No Solvency

Garretson 2010 – former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. Previously the Chief of Future Science and Technology Exploration for Headquarters Air Force, former Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Service Academy Research Associate, recipient of the National Space Society’s (NSS) Space Pioneer Award

Peter A. Garretson “Sky’s No Limit: Space-based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership”

A frequent concern encountered in structured discussions was the obstacles posed by the MTCR and ITAR.6 Do these, in fact, pose an insurmountable obstacle? They do not. There is currently a strong current suggesting ITAR may get a re-look to become more permissive with respect to space cooperation. But even if there is no change, ITAR is not a prohibition, just an onerous procedure for approval, which can be navigated by a dedicated, expert cadre. It is also possible that if policymakers are convinced that the success of larger ends is at stake, that special legislation (like the Counter Terrorism Technical Support Organisation7 ) or an executive order could streamline some types of technical interchange. An example exemption already exists for COMSAT.8

A2: Indo-China Mod

CHINA PERCEIVES NAVAL CONTAINMENT NOW

Kaplan 10 Robert Kaplan is a Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security [“The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs]

Thanks to this favorable situation on land, China is now free to work at building a great navy. Whereas coastal city-states and island nations pursue sea power as a matter of course, doing so is a luxury for historically insular continental powers such as China. In China's case, this might be a luxury that is fairly easy to acquire since the country is as blessed by its seaboard as by its continental interior. China dominates the East Asian coastline in the temperate and tropical zones of the Pacific, and its southern border is close enough to the Indian Ocean that it might one day be linked to it by roads and energy pipelines. In the twenty-first century, China will project hard power abroad primarily through its navy. That said, it faces a far more hostile environment at sea than it does on land. The Chinese navy sees little but trouble in what it calls the "first island chain": the Korean Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, Japan (including the Ryukyu Islands), Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia. All except for Australia are potential flashpoints. China is already embroiled in various disputes over parts of the energy-rich ocean beds of the East China Sea and the South China Sea: with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and with the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands. Such disputes allow Beijing to stoke nationalism at home, but for Chinese naval strategists, this seascape is mostly grim. This first island chain is, in the words James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College, a kind of "Great Wall in reverse": a well-organized line of U.S. allies that serve as a sort of guard tower to monitor and possibly block China's access to the Pacific Ocean. China's answer to feeling so boxed in has been aggressive at times. Naval power is usually more benign than land power: navies cannot by themselves occupy vast areas and must do far more than fight -- namely, protect commerce. Thus, one might have expected China to be as benevolent as other maritime nations before it -- Venice, Great Britain, the United States -- and to concern itself primarily, as those powers did, with preserving a peaceful maritime system, including the free movement of trade. But China is not so self-confident. Still an insecure sea power, it thinks about the ocean territorially: the very terms "first island chain" and "second island chain" (the second island chain includes the U.S. territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands) suggest that the Chinese see all these islands as archipelagic extensions of the Chinese landmass. In thinking in such a zero-sum fashion about their country's adjoining seas, China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued for sea control and the decisive battle. But they do not yet have the blue-water force to apply it, and this discrepancy between aspirations and means has led to some awkward incidents over the past few years. In October 2006, a Chinese submarine stalked the USS Kitty Hawk and then surfaced within a torpedo's firing range of it. In November 2007, the Chinese denied the USSKitty Hawk carrier strike group entry into Victoria Harbor when it was seeking a respite from building seas and deteriorating weather. (But another carrier, the USS George Washington, did make the visit to Hong Kong in 2010.) In March 2009, a handful of PLA navy ships harassed the U.S. surveillance ship the USNSImpeccable while it was openly conducting operations outside China's 12-mile territorial limit in the South China Sea, blocking its way and pretending to ram it. These are the actions not of a great power but of a still immature one.

Fears of encirclement are overblown – China knows US wouldn’t jeopardize economic dependence

Rajan 09 (9/24/09, DS, director at the Chennai Centre for China Studies, “China worried over US-India military cooperation,” )

The fact that the party's top theoretical mouthpiece has found the article suitable for its publication is itself significant, notwithstanding the disclaimer given that the opinions do not reflect Qiu Shi's views and are those of the writer. The following are important to note: The Qiu Shi article has mostly concentrated its attack on the US, accusing it of using India to restrict 'third countries'. The People's Republic of China was not specifically named, but the term 'third countries' may allude to China also. There has been no direct criticism of New Delhi in the write-up, indicating a cautious line towards India. A careful reader could however discern the underlying deep Chinese suspicions in the analysis over India's attitude vis-a-vis China. In 2007-08, the topic of US-India collusion as part of Washington's regional strategy, had prominently figured in Chinese media comments, particularly targetted against the 'Alliance of Democracies' concept, the India-US-Japan joint military exercise and the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. After some lull, the theme appears to be surfacing again now, for example following the article in question, a People's Daily signed analysis (September 15) has charged that 'the US is tipping the balance between China and India, wooing India away from Russia [ Images ] and China and feeding India's ambition to match China force for force by its ever burgeoning arms sales to India'. More such comments may follow. A probable explanation to the Chinese media's harping again on the topic can be that despite a visible improvement in China's ties with the US and India in a contemporary sense, fears in strategic terms, to be more precise on containment of China by the US with the help of allies like Japan [ Images ] and a partner like India, seems to continue unabated in China. The same appears to be getting reflected in some of the current media comments in China. Chinese media pronouncements can be understood better, if a close look is given at China's relations with the US as well as India in the framework of two contexts -- contemporary and strategic. Regarding the first, it can be noticed that the character of Washington-Beijing ties has undoubtedly changed now especially due to the former's financial dependence on China, brought out by the global crisis; symbolising the same are activation of mechanisms like bilateral strategic and economic dialogues and a softening of US posture towards China on key irritants, for example the US now considers that issues like the economy and climate change will take precedence over points of friction like human rights and Tibet. On its part, China is making suitable responses, for example it has expressed its willingness 'to work with the United States from a strategic and long-term perspective, to enhance dialogue and exchanges, build up mutual trust and cooperation, respect and accommodate each other's core interests and properly handle differences and sensitive issues' (Hu Jintao-Obama talks, London, April 1). Positive changes have occurred in Sino-Indian relations also; the two nations are now looking at the same beyond the border dispute, recognising the global character of their ties and witnessing a big momentum in economic and trade links. On the other hand, the corresponding picture from a strategic point of view remains complex and less promising. China continues to be wary of US intentions in the Asia-Pacific region including in South Asia; demonstrating the same are the authoritative Chinese statements, for example, Beijing's latest Defence White Paper has described the 'increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific' as China's 'security concern'. On emerging US-India ties, Beijing may have been irked by the assertion made by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates at a conclave in Singapore that there is a genuine convergence of US-India interests and that his country would look towards India as a partner for providing security in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The Qiu Shi article appears to be more categorical than other Chinese media comments in conveying a message: The US-India 'unified strategy' on all major regional issues is possible and that may change the strategic situation in South Asia. This shifts the focus on indications to China's possible counter moves in the future. Mention of India's ambition to maintain its hegemony over the Indian Ocean and South Asia no doubt has precedence. However, the fact that the party journal has carried the same necessitates an examination of it from the point of view of policy perspectives emerging in China to deal with such ambition. Overall, Chinese media comments had been saying that India, as a sovereign nation with a nationalistic population, will not succumb to American pressures on it to join the US camp against China and instead will continue its friendship with China; but such views do not find a place in the write-up of the party organ. Is it an inadvertent omission or indications of China's doubts on this account?

A2: Rising Expectations

WE CONTROL UNIQUENESS – EXPECTATIONS ARE HIGH NOW AND IT WILL COLLAPSE RELATIONS IN THE STATUS QUO WITHOUT CONSULTATION

Perkovich 10 (11/4/10, George, vice president for studies and director of the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Obama in India,” )

There are unrealistic expectations. U.S.-India relations were on a positive trajectory from the middle part of the Clinton administration onward—and this was a very good thing. The success of American Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama and Indian Prime Ministers Rao, Vajpayee, and Singh basically helped the two countries on a positive trajectory. And then what happened in the Bush administration with the U.S.-India nuclear deal was that the positive trajectory spiked—it was like injecting amphetamines into a runner. So, it spiked up and that was seen as a good thing. And it was seen as a good thing in India, but inevitably it came back down to the normal trend line, which is positive. But as it comes down from the spike there are people in India and the United States who say the relationship is falling, Obama hasn’t paid enough attention to it, and so on.

Speed in which relations turned make high expectations non-unique

Shukla 09 Ajai Shukla: retired officer of the Indian Army, and one of the best known Defence Correspondents in India

India's unrealistic expectations Ajai Shukla / New Delhi December 1, 2009, 0:24 IST

The improbable speed with which Washington has warmed to New Delhi has created unrealistic expectations. In 1971, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were describing Indians as “bastards” and “aggressive goddam people”; and referring to Indira Gandhi as an “old witch” and a “bitch” in turn. That said as much about Nixon and Kissinger as about US-India relations but, still, it was only a decade ago that India faced full-frontal sanctions from Washington after the nuclear tests of 1998. In less than a decade that relationship has flowered, yielding a defence framework agreement in 2005 and the civil nuclear agreement last year.

A2: Delay

NO DELAY—FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION ALREADY EXISTS

Hindustan Times 8 (February 3, 2008 “India and NASA sign agreement for future cooperation in space exploration” lexis)

Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and NASA have signed a framework agreement establishing the terms for future cooperation between the two agencies in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The agreement was signed on February 1, 2008, at the Kennedy Space Center's visitor complex by NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and ISRO Chairman G. Madhavan Nair. According to the framework agreement, the two agencies will identify areas of mutual interest and seek to develop cooperative programs or projects in Earth and space science, exploration, human space flight and other activities. "I am honored to sign this agreement with the India Space Research Organization. This agreement will allow us to cooperate effectively on a wide range of programs of mutual interest," said Griffin. "India has extensive space-related experience, capabilities and infrastructure, and will continue to be a welcome partner in NASA's future space exploration activities," he added. The agreement replaces a soon-to-expire agreement signed on Dec. 16, 1997, which fostered bilateral cooperation in the areas of Earth and atmospheric sciences. In addition to a long history of cooperation in Earth science, NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization also are cooperating on India's first, mission to the moon, Chandrayaan-1, which will be launched later this year.

No delay—Past negotiations prove

PTI 9—Press Trust of India Newspaper (May 23, 2009 “N-deal: India seeks speedy negotiations with US” )

India today sought speedy negotiations of reprocessing arrangements, as well as liberalisation of the export licensing procedures, to move forward the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. “This deal is very high on our priority. We are conscious of the fact that it was the US government which did the heavy hitting, if I may use a cricketing metaphor to get this deal through,” said India’s new Ambassador to US Meera Shankar said, stating that India was committed to move forward on the deal. “We would very much like to move forward in a concrete way with agreements for building nuclear reactors with US assistance in India,” Shankar said at a reception hosted in her honour by the US-India Business Council (USIBC). This was her maiden public engagement after presenting her credentials to President Barack Obama yesterday. “We are looking at the speedy negotiations of reprocessing arrangements to facilitate this process,” said Shankar, acknowledging the presence of leaders of the US nuclear industry who are anxious to convert the nuclear deal into business agreements. Both sides have agreed to commence this process and have identified their nodal points. “So we expect to pursue this very expeditiously,” she added.

No delay—more cooperation means less delay

Nadu 11—Tamil, writer for The Hindu, India’s national paper (Jan 28, 2011 “NASA, ISRO collaboration, a positive sign in space research” )

RAMANATHAPURAM: Ethiraj Venkatapathy, Chief Technologist, Space Technology Division, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) said here on Thursday that the NASA's intended joint collaboration with Indian Space Research Organisation and the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) was a positive sign in space research. While delivering a lecture at Syed Ammal Engineering College here on Thursday, he said as a senior scientist of NASA, he was happy to know the announcement by the Unites States for intensive cooperation with ISRO for fostering space research. It would facilitate the agencies to remove or reduce restrictions on sharing data or undertaking joint research.

**Say Yes

SAY YES – SPS

INDIA WOULD ACCEPT THE DEAL – THEY HAVE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION OVER SPACE BASED SOLAR POWER. CP IS KEY TO BUILD TRUST AND REDUCE BUREAUCRATIC FRICTION – PLAN ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SOLVE***

Garretson 2010 – former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. Previously the Chief of Future Science and Technology Exploration for Headquarters Air Force, former Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Service Academy Research Associate, recipient of the National Space Society’s (NSS) Space Pioneer Award

Peter A. Garretson “Sky’s No Limit: Space-based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership”

Firstly, India is the only major state where a Head of State has not only suggested space solar power as a goal for its space agency, but also expressed an interest in international cooperation. Second, as already noted above, there is considerable momentum in the Indo-US strategic partnership, with key components–space, energy, climate change, high tech, aviation, and dualuse strategic technologies and defence cooperation–already in place with vibrant dialogue. Third, India’s need for power and development is acute, likely considerably more acute than other potential partners which makes it potentially a more motivated partner, and a linked effort also promises a tremendous ultimate market potential. Fourthly, the success of space solar power will depend partly on low-cost manufacture. In the time frame when space solar power will come of age, perhaps 15 years in the future, even as other manufacturing and labour markets age and face decline, India is projected to be in the midst of its demographic dividend, with the largest working age population of any country on earth.4Finally, and significantly, in a breakthrough project like space solar power where an international regulatory framework is required, the influence of a historically normative power representing the developing world and its equities is a powerful enabler, and without such a partnership a go-it-alone attitude might find the environment and the markets considerably less permissive. Further, the case for technical cooperation with India is quite strong. As already remarked, over the course of nearly a decade, there has been significant momentum to the technical cooperation aspect of the Indo-US strategic partnership and we have finally put in place all the necessary precursor elements for institutional research and development. Cooperation today is principally at a low level because bureaucracies still are not familiar with each other,5 and trust is earned incrementally over time. In the course of this research, there was no indication that there was reason to doubt that such trust and familiarity will be the natural course.

Only Joint US-India development of SBSP makes it effective; India is willing to cooperate now

Space Politics ’10 [Space Politics US and India in space (and space solar power?) November 7, 2010 at 9:52 am ; WBTR]

President Obama is currently in India, where he is expected to formally announce on Monday the removal of the Indian space agency ISRO from a US list that restricts exports of some sensitive technologies. The Entity List, as it is formally known, specifies additional requirements for items beyond what’s already required under export control regulations. Currently ISRO and four organizations within it are on the list, requiring a “case-by-case review” for any item on the Commerce Control List for export to those organizations. That restriction dates back to sanctions placed on India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests in the late 1990s. That move isn’t unexpected: it had been anticipated for weeks in both the US and India. In a Wall Street Journal op-ed on Thursday, former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, writing with another former State Department official, R. Nicholas Burns, called on both the White House and Congress to “liberalize U.S. export controls that have an impact on India, including by removing the Indian Space Research Organization (the Indian equivalent to NASA) from the U.S. ‘Entity List.’” However, that appears to be the limit of space-related progress in the president’s visit: Indian media reported last week that it’s unlikely a commercial satellite launch agreement will be completed in time. Such an agreement would make it easier for US-built commercial satellites, or satellites with US-built components, to be launched on Indian vehicles. A few people, though, are seeking much grander visions of US-Indian cooperation in space. At a press conference in Washington on Thursday, American and Indian officials announced the creation of Kalam-NSS Energy Initiative to promote the development of space-based solar power (SBSP) in the two nations. The near-term goal of the initiative is to arrange a bilateral meeting of Indian and American experts on the topic in May in Huntsville, Alabama, in conjunction with the International Space Development Conference (ISDC), the annual conference of the National Space Society (NSS). The effort might be dismissed as a minor effort of a few people to promote what’s widely considered a fringe topic, but it does have the backing of a prominent individual on the Indian side: former president A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who participated in Thursday’s press conference by phone from India. Kalam spoke of the need to increase energy production to meet the needs of a modernizing India, without going into details about how the two countries might cooperation in SBSP beyond holding a joint meeting. Asked if the topic might come up in the meeting between President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Singh in New Delhi, Kalam suggested that it should instead be presented at a future meeting of G8 or G20 nations. Also unclear is what India would bring to the table in terms of its role in developing a SBSP system. Asked what unique capabilities India could offer, Kalam discussed the development of what he called a “hyperplane”, a reusable spaceplane concept, something he said India could cooperate with the US and other nations on. (Given the difficulties any nation has had in developing RLVs, and the challenges India has faced in even building a cryogenic upper stage for its GSLV expendable rocket, jumping ahead to a “hyperplane” may seem a bit of a stretch.) T.K. Alex, director of the ISRO Satellite Centre and the Indian lead of the Kalam-NSS Energy Initiative, said later at the press conference that India could also contribute in the development of high-efficiency and lightweight solar cells. NSS CEO Mark Hopkins suggested a different role for India, saying that “a combination of American technology and the ability of India to do a lot of low-cost manufacturing” could be essential to any future success of SBSP.

Bilat over SPS solves

Garretson 2010 – former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. Previously the Chief of Future Science and Technology Exploration for Headquarters Air Force, former Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Service Academy Research Associate, recipient of the National Space Society’s (NSS) Space Pioneer Award

Peter A. Garretson “Sky’s No Limit: Space-based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership”

This paper sought to evaluate space-based solar power, a highly scalable, revolutionary renewable energy technology, in the context of the Indo-US bilateral strategic partnership, and determine if US and Indian interests and amities were sufficiently aligned to allow forward motion on such a project, and if so, what would be an actionable form for policymakers. It is the conclusion of the researcher that SBSP does appear to be a good fit for the US domestic, Indian domestic and bilateral agendas, and there is adequate political space and precursor agreements to begin a bilateral programme, should policymakers desire it. Given that SBSP appears to fit the articulated Indian criteria for suitability of energy source and to offer a better long-term energy security solution, and that the evaluation of the current energy-climate situation is so unhopeful, with a lack of promising and scalable solutions emerging, a no-regret, due-diligence effort in space-based solar power seems a justified and strategic1 investment. An actionable, three-tiered programme, with threshold criteria/goals, has been proposed, moving from basic technology and capacity building to a multi-lateral demo, and ultimately to an international commercial public-private-partnership entity to supply commercial power in the 2025 timeframe. The launch of such a potentially revolutionary programme can begin with a simple statement exchanged between the two heads of state or articulated in a joint statement.

CP solves: encourages cooperation best, promotes private involvement, and accrues tech spinoffs

Rajagopalan, 11 (Dr. Rajeswari Pillai, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. “Space Based Solar Power: Time to Put it on the New US-India S&T Endowment Fund?”, 4/2/2011, ) AFL

With the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami that hit Japan on March 11, isn’t it time for India and the US to make serious commitments to Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP)? Japanese crisis has triggered worldwide re-thinking on the feasibility of pursuing nuclear energy to meet growing global energy demands. This has kick-started a debate also in India not only on the safety of nuclear plants but also on other energy options. It is time that India and the United States and the countries around the world looked at an often-overlooked option: SBSP. The idea of harnessing SBSP as an option originated in the United States some 40 years ago. But it has not been pursued with vigour for a variety of reasons, including possibly the influence of nuclear lobbyists. In simple terms, SBSP is described thus by Lt. Col. Peter Garretson of the US Air Force: "In this concept, very large satellites, the largest ever constructed, made up of kilometers of solar cells, would collect the Sun’s energy where there is no night, and convert it to radio-waves to be beamed to special receiving antenna farms on the ground (called rectennas) about the size of a small airport. The energy is sent in the form of a low energy beam at about 1/6th the intensity of normal sunlight that falls on earth. But because it is a low-energy, non-ionizing wavelength, it is not as dangerous as sunlight with its high energy ultraviolet rays. At the rectenna, the energy is reconverted and sent via the existing electrical grid. Such satellites would necessitate a fleet of re-useable space planes, and as a consequence of economies of scale, reduce the cost of space access a hundred fold, enabling many other applications.2 It is estimated that one kilometre-wide band of geo-synchronous earth bit can produce solar flux to match as much as the total amount of energy produced from all the different recoverable oil reserves on Earth. The idea was promoted by none other than Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam first at the Aeronautical Society of India (AeSI) and later again at a press conference in Washington DC last year. The initiative is now titled as the Kalam-NSS (National Space Society) Energy Initiative. The Kalam-NSS initiative is an India-US partnership taken up by individuals with long-term expertise in the space realm. Some of the key people involved are, in addition to Dr. Kalam, Mark Hopkins, CEO of the US-based National Space Society and John Mankins, President of the Space Power Association and a veteran of NASA. On the Indian side, there seems to be some official involvement due to the involvement of Dr. T.K. Alex, who is the Director of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Satellite Centre, Bangalore and leader of the Chandrayan-I project. Speaking in New Delhi in November last year, Dr. Kalam said that "by 2050, even if we use every available energy resource we have, clean and dirty, conventional and alternative, solar, wind, geothermal, nuclear, coal, oil, and gas, the world will fall short of the energy we need by 66%. There is an answer. An answer for both the developed and developing countries. This is a solar energy source that is close to infinite, an energy source that produces no carbon emissions, an energy source that can reach the most distant villages of the world, and an energy source that can turn countries into net energy exporter."3 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the worldwide demand for primary energy increases by 55 per cent between 2005 and 2030 - 1.8 per cent hike per year on average; and for India, the demand is expected to more than double by 2030, growing at 3.6 per cent rate per year.4 With energy demand growing rapidly, the SBSP option offers huge opportunities. Such an option will also be reportedly a cleaner energy option. This option would also significantly augment India’s capabilities in the space domain, which will have far-reaching positive spin-offs in the ever-changing security environment in Asia. This will bring the much-desired focus on the question of technology transfer between India and the US, Japan and Israel. India has looked at this option for quite sometime. In 1987, the first bit of work was undertaken looking at advanced space transportation system design concepts for cost-effective space solar power. Recently, ISRO is reported to have done some exercise looking at the feasibility of this option and examined three specific configurations. Thereafter, ISRO is believed to have welcomed an International Preliminary Feasibility Study.Unlike terrestrial solar and wind power plants, SBSP is available throughout the year, in huge quantities. It can also reportedly work irrespective of conditions that are a problem for other alternative energy sources such as cloud cover, availability of sunlight, or wind speed. What has prevented the SBSP from becoming a real option? Is it the enormous cost involved in developing the option or is it an option that never got the popular attention due to the multiplicity of departments involved? Proponents argue that the cost of SBSP should not be compared to the direct costs involved. The cost-benefit analysis needs to be done on a different scale, including the direct and indirect cost of global warming and climate change. Otherwise, the costs of developing this technology may seem exorbitant. What are the options to meet this cost? Are the Indian and American governments and private sectors willing to make significant investments on the R&D of this technology? The US-India Agreement to establish an S&T Board and an Endowment to carry out research (July 20, 2009) appears to be an ideal basis for new research and development on SBSP. SBSP seems like an ideal candidate because this fund seeks to finance projects on a broad spectrum of issues of mutual benefit such as biotechnology, health and infectious diseases, advanced materials and nanotechnology science, clean energy technologies, climate science, basic space and atmospheric and earth science among others. The US side of funding for the Endowment is reported to come from the US S&T "Rupee Funds" established in the 1980s to encourage and fund bilateral S&T projects.5 However, for the SBSP per se, there appears to be interest among the private sector companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman and on the Indian side, Tatas have shown interest in exploring this option. While this can potentially be an excellent case for public-private partnership, the initiative has to come from the government. India’s foray into space and its space policies have had strong civilian and developmental roots and accordingly the government needs to place the SBSP within its overall national space policy. India’s decision to pursue SBSP will have multiple impact -clean energy, clean environment, advancement in the space arena with technology transfer as a given between India, US and Japan.

The CP solves India has the technology and the willpower

Dinerman 9 *Taylor Dinerman is an author and journalist based in New York City [, “Should the U.S. and India cooperate on space solar power?” Taylor Dinerman, June 8th 2009, Published in the Space Review]

If the US has a serious medium-term need for a very large new source of clean energy, India needs it even more. While there is a lot of talk about terrestrial solar, wind, and geothermal power as alternatives to coal—which seems to be currently politically unacceptable—or nuclear—which has its own set of political problems but whose greatest drawback may simply be the length of time it takes to build new power plants—space solar power (SSP) may be the only alternative that could be made to work before the major global electricity demand crisis hits, around the year 2050. In Washington lots of people have complained that the Obama Administration has so far not given the India-US relationship the attention it deserves. Others are waiting to see if this relatively new team is going to follow up on the progress made by both the Clinton and the George W. Bush Administrations in building a real friendship between the two democratic giants. The one area in which there seems to be movement on, though, is a “renewable energy partnership”. From India’s standpoint the government does take the energy problem very seriously. While they connect it with the question of climate change, they have made it clear that they are not willing to inflict economic pain on their people in order to appease those in the West who are demanding that they cease their current drive to climb out of mass poverty in the name of the environment. Former External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee made this clear when he spoke at the Asia Society in New York last year and said, “It is therefore completely one sided to target countries like India, whose emissions though modest are rising, but fail to bring to account those who have been responsible for more than 70% of the accumulated emissions in the atmosphere.” Recognizing the potential weakness of a case based strictly on the question of climate change, Mukherjee was wise enough to add that “even if there were no climate change arguments, considerations of energy security alone would require a medium to long term strategy of implementing a strategic shift from fossil fuels to non fossil fuels.” He called for a “major R&D effort to develop applications that that can provide convenient, cost effective large scale applications of solar energy.” Any analysis of the potential of terrestrial solar energy in India or elsewhere runs up against the awesome size of the future demand for power. Photovoltaic panels on rooftops and solar water heaters all make excellent small-scale contributions to the solution, but they cannot by any stretch of the imagination fulfill the requirements of a huge growing economy like India’s. Only SSP, which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, year after year, can hope to meet this need. Fortunately both India and the US have space programs and technologies that could, if developed together and possibly with other interested nations such as Japan, bring SSP systems into service sometime late next decade or the early 2020s. With its commitment to develop a new low cost reusable spaceplane, the India Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is already working on one of the key technologies needed for an SSP system. Indian participation in both private and public SSP programs should be welcomed by the US. Ehe US government should make an effort to facilitate this by helping with visas and work permits for qualified Indian scientists and engineers. Recent moves towards reforming the notorious International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) should include ensuring that SSP systems are covered by the Department of Commerce regulators rather than by the State Department, which has gained such a sorry reputation in this area.In the near term the new Indo-US renewable energy partnership would seem to be the right place to start this collaboration. Together the partners can identify what will be needed in the way of technological and scientific investments over the next decade in order to make SSP a reality. India has lots of talent that can be committed to this effort and so does the US. In fact, the kind of ambitious idealism that we saw at NASA during the Apollo years could be engendered by this goal. Safe, clean, abundant energy from the Sun is not an impossible dream. The technology has not been perfected and the need for new, low-cost Earth-to-orbit transportation systems is as urgent as ever, but there are no requirements for any scientific breakthroughs. The Space Solar Power Study released by the US National Security Space Office (NSSO) in October 2007 found that since the 1977 “Reference” study, there had been: (a) improvements in PV [photovoltaic] efficiency from about 10% (1970s) to more than 40% (2007); (b) increases in robotics capabilities from simple tele-operated manipulators in a few degrees of freedom (1970s) to fully autonomous robotics with insect-class intelligence and 30–100 degrees of freedom (2007); (c) increases in the efficiency of solid state devices from around 20% (1970s) to as much as 70%–90% (2007); (d) improvements in materials for structures from simple aluminum (1970s) to advanced composites including nanotechnology composites (2007) The 2007 NSSO study showed just how far the technology had come and why space solar power is now a more viable alternative for very large-scale power generation than ever before. India and the US are natural partners in the development of this technology and the opportunity provided by the planned renewable energy partnership is a perfect place to begin.

Say Yes – ASATS

CP SOLVES – INDIA AND US CAN COOPERATE ON ASAT DEVELOPMENT

Samson 11 (5/9/11, Victoria, Washington Office Director for the Secure World Foundation, “India and space security,” )

Indian participants commented often that they cannot let themselves be left out of an international regime like India was with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): they believe (probably rightfully so) that if India had tested a nuclear weapon prior to the NPT, the country would have been grandfathered in as an official nuclear weapon state. As it was, there was quite a lot of resentment from the Indian participants that their country was being held accountable to a treaty that it had never signed. Along those lines, the Indian participants seemed interested in developing an ASAT before the international community decides (whether formally or informally) to ban them. The discussion of space and security is still tied to terms used to discuss nuclear weapons, at least within Indian policy circles. So when one talks about “responsible space behavior,” the Indians look at it from a proliferation perspective: their take is that since no one is proliferating space technology unduly, no one is acting irresponsibly. Alternatively, they raised the idea several times that, outside of the Chinese ASAT test, no one has acted irresponsibly in space since the Cold War ASAT tests held by the United States and the then-Soviet Union. This logic brings home the need for the international community to develop some sort of accepted definition of what responsible space behavior is, and why it helps space powers like India to be part of that discussion. Several Indian participants likened an ASAT program to a nuclear weapons program: you develop it without testing it, but you have it on hand just in case the international security environment changed and you needed it. But when asked what particular scenarios merited the use of an ASAT, no one had an answer. Also, very telling was a statement by a former foreign secretary, Kinwal Sibal, who said that “India perceives itself as a victim of geopolitics rather than an actor who provokes negative reaction.” This attitude surfaced several times over the course of the conference and was used to explain why their ASAT program should not be of concern to others. As for the United States, there was curiosity expressed by conference participants about how sincere the United States is about the international cooperation pushed for in its National Space Policy. They are looking for concrete examples that the United States is serious about reaching out to other space powers. Several participants, Indian and otherwise, said that they felt that the United States was in a decline and that would affect India’s security calculus.

US and India have capability for bilateral ASATs – Indian ability matching China’s

Brown 10 (1/22/10, Peter, staff writer for the Asia Times Onlinem “India targets China's satellites,” )

"With its early support of the former US president George W Bush's ballistic missile defense program and its current drive to develop anti-ballistic missile/anti-satellite capability, New Delhi is determined not to make the same mistake twice," added Gupta. "If and when globally negotiated restraints are placed on such strategic defensive systems or technologies - perhaps restraints of some sort of ASAT testing/hit-to-kill technologies - India will already have crossed the technical threshold in that regard, and acknowledgement of such status [will be] grand-fathered into any such future agreement." After watching China's moves since the highly controversial satellite shootdown which China undertook in January 2007, India has now openly declared its desire to match China. "There is no reason to be surprised. India is anxious to be seen as not lagging behind China - ergo - if China has an ASAT program, India can do it, too. That's all there is to it." said Uzi Rubin, a defense consultant and former head of Israel's missile defense organization. China was not specifically mentioned by V K Saraswat, director general of India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), when he announced at the 97th Indian Science Congress earlier this month that India had begun to develop an anti-satellite capability. He declared that India is "working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time, we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets." There is no doubt as to the identity of the "enemy" in question. "The Indians are engaged in a major active missile defense program which, because of the technological affinity between missile defense and ASAT, could eventually grow up to the latter," said Rubin. "India, like all countries with their own space assets, is aware that ASAT is a double-edged sword and that if they embark on a program, they will legitimize the Chinese program and endanger their own national satellites." As for Saraswat's statement - "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites" - Rubin almost downplays it entirely. "His is quite a tepid statement, I wouldn't make much of it," said Rubin. On the other hand, Subrata Ghoshroy, research associate in the Working Group in the Science, Technology, and Global Security Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has met senior former India Space Research Organization (ISRO) officials who were eager to let it be known that India has the capacity to respond. "There are growing ties between ISRO and the Indian Ministry of Defense and the two are beginning to feed off each other," said Ghoshroy. What Saraswat did was, in effect, to inject a powerful destabilizing element into the South Asian strategic equation at a time when the US is determined to do everything in its power to bolster regional stability. When US Defense Secretary Robert Gates planned his trip to India this week, the last thing Gates probably expected to contend with was the possibility that New Delhi might be accelerating its timetable for the development of an ASAT weapon. Writing in the Times of India in advance of his visit, Gates made no mention whatsoever of space, anti-missile activities or ASAT weapons in particular, although there are certainly space-related items on the agenda. What Gates avoided entirely was any mention of the US acting as a solid partner and supporter of India's ASAT program. While that might well be the case, it could be argued that in the interest of regional stability, the US might at least be rethinking how it will proceed in these matters in light of mounting concerns over the situation in Pakistan where China obviously enjoys significant leverage. China's decision this month to proceed with a well-publicized test of its midcourse missile interceptor technology - just a few days after Pradeep Kumar, India's Defense Secretary, departed from Beijing - certainly has sent a strong message, while doing the US a favor in terms of providing the US with a timely excuse for allowing India to go ahead with its plans. However, the US cannot have it both ways in the end. Courting India as a favored client for major arms purchases one moment, and as a strategic hedge against China, and then trying to promote regional stability the next moment is not a very coherent way to make meaningful progress in South Asia. The dilemma for the US is considerable. Saraswat was quite careful in his choice of words, and went out of his way this time to assure any interested parties, including Gates, that no actual ASAT tests were now planned by India. Saraswat has good reason to be very careful about his choice of words. A day after the US Navy cruiser USS Lake Erie shot down an errant US spy satellite in February 2008, for example, former Indian president APJ Abdul Kalam - one of the key players in India's nuclear and missile programs - told reporters at a DRDO-sponsored International Conference on Avionics Systems in Hyderabad that India has, "the ability to intercept and destroy any spatial object or debris in a radius of 200 kilometers. We will definitely do that if it endangers Indian territory". Saraswat, on the other hand, was less specific at the time. And while seeming to agree with Kalam's statement, he did not do so with absolute certainty. "It is just a matter of time before we could place the necessary wherewithal to meet such requirements," Saraswat said. "We can predict and can always tackle such challenges."

Say Yes – Mars

INDIA WANTS TO GO TO MARS WITH US

Smith 04—Marcia, a Specialist in Aerospace and Telecommunications Policy, Resources, Science Congressional Research Service at Library of Congress, in a testimony to the Committee on Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space (April 27, 2004 “INTERNATIONAL SPACE EXPLORATION” lexis)

In 2003, India announced plans to launch a robotic spacecraft to the Moon in 2007 and is inviting other countries to participate. India is offering to fly 10 kilogram payloads from interested countries for free. Canada, Germany, Russia, Israel, Europe, and the United States reportedly have expressed interest. The United States and India renewed cooperation in scientific areas, including space exploration, after the United States lifted sanctions imposed in 1998 following India's nuclear weapons tests. The head of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), G. Madhavan Nair, has stated that the robotic lunar probe, Chandrayaan-1, is only the first step in India's space exploration plans. India's President Kalam and Prime Minister Vajpayee also have made supportive statements not only about robotic missions, but about eventual human space flights to Mars.

India is interested in Mars

Morris 06—Jeffery, writer for Aviation Week & Space Technology (December 4, 2006 “India to Mars” lexis)

India is beginning to define its first Mars orbiter for launch as early as 2013 on its geosynchronous space launch vehicle. The small spacecraft, costing only about $70 million excluding the booster, would carry instruments to research the Martian atmosphere and subsurface, possibly including a radar. The mission's main significance at this point is probably India's intent to do it, rather than its explicit scientific goals. With this project, India joins China in defining new Mars exploration for Asia (AW&ST Nov. 27, p. 53). "Mars is emerging on our horizon. The geostationary launch vehicle can take a payload to Mars and our Deep Space Network can track it all the way," G. Madhavan Nair, the chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization told The Hindustan Times. "There is a lot of interest in Mars. The missions of the U.S. and the European Space Agency have given us some interesting data. Let us see what [additional value] our mission can bring."

Say Yes – Solar Sails

INDIA ALREADY INTERESTED IN SOLAR SAILS—SAY YES

Business Line 05 (August 11, 2005 “KALAM OUTLINES AGENDA FOR INDIAN SPACE MISSIONS” lexis)

India missed out on the first industrial revolution, but now has the opportunity to be a part of the next by joining the exclusive club of nations that are working to establish industry on the Moon and Mars, he emphasised According to Mr Kalam, eight possible missions that could be a part of India's space programme till 2030 include launching manned missions to the Moon and Mars and the establishment of an industrial base in space, development of cost-effective space transportation systems using hypersonic reusable vehicles, harnessing space energy for power and drinking water, developing a solar sail for inter-planetary missions and using space technology for integrated disaster management

Say Yes – Moon

BOTH COUNTRIES SUPPORT COOPERATIVE LUNAR MISSIONS-EMPIRICS

Kline 06 [Jennifer Kline is a Contributor at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies [, “U.S.-India Space Cooperation High Despite Lingering Proliferation Concerns” July 20th 2006, ]

In an environment colored by the controversy surrounding the U.S.-India nuclear agreement and by difficult continuing negotiations over a bilateral agreement to permit India to launch third-country satellites containing U.S. components or technology, the U.S.-India initiative on lunar exploration stands out as a potential breakthrough in high-technology collaboration between the two countries. [21] In November 2005, the U.S. Department of State signed two Technical Assistance Agreements (TAAs) - the relevant U.S. export licensing documents authorizing two U.S. scientific instruments to be carried as payloads on the Indian Chandrayaan-I Lunar Mission. The two U.S. instruments are the M3 (Moon Mineralogy Mapper) and the MiniSAR (Miniature Synthetic Aperture Radar). The scope of the experiments conducted and the sharing of responsibilities and data collected on this mission were determined in the MOUs signed on May 9, 2006. [22] Michael Griffin, Administrator of NASA, has strongly endorsed the NASA-ISRO rapprochement symbolized by the Chandrayaan-I agreement. Griffin reportedly stated at a press conference following the May 9 MOU signing ceremony that "he was sorry about the U.S. sanctions on some ISRO units and that he would use his good offices to lift the sanctions." [23] Despite Griffin's encouraging words, both Indian and American parties remain "cautious about the political implications of this warmth vis-à-vis the sanctions," illustrating the limitations of NASA's ability to expedite fundamental changes in U.S. space-cooperation policy. [24] Indeed, even Griffin acknowledged that differences between the United States and India in this sphere have "more to do with concerns over proliferation than anything else," reflecting residual concerns in Washington about Indian misuse of space technology for military purposes that NASA will find hard to dispel. [25]

** CP Aff Answers

Theory Helpers

LITERATURE BASE DOESN’T EXIST FOR BILATERAL INDIA COOPERATION – ERR AFF ON THEORY

Garretson 2010 – former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. Previously the Chief of Future Science and Technology Exploration for Headquarters Air Force, former Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Service Academy Research Associate, recipient of the National Space Society’s (NSS) Space Pioneer Award

Peter A. Garretson “Sky’s No Limit: Space-based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership”

To arrive at its content and conclusions, this paper has employed several distinct research methods. This was required in part because there is no existing literature discussing organisational design for bilateral/ multilateral development of space solar power or significant previous discussion, or anything so ambitious and long-term in Indo-US relations. The researcher began the paper with fairly substantial knowledge of the topic of SBSP and US technical and industrial capabilities and methods, but with very little knowledge about Indo-US relations and Indian attitudes, priorities, organisations, capabilities, policies and methods of tackling relevant problem sets. Three principal research methods were employed. The first was targeted interviews of key individuals in relevant agencies regarding policies, outlook and important stakeholders and organs relating to the Indo-US bilateral relationship. The second was a review of official statements and documents relating to the Indo-US bilateral relationship, and of Indian government documents relating to the problems that SBSP seeks to address. The final method was a series of interactive presentations across a broad sampling of Indian society and bureaucracy where the researcher presented the general topic of SBSP, and took questions and comments from the audience to access attitudes, reactions, concerns and suggestions.

Say No – Generic

SAY NO – INDIA WOULD BE AFRAID OF BEING SEEN AS DEPENDENT

Broniatowski et al. 06 [David Broniatowski S.B. and S.M. in Aeronautics and Astronautics, S.M. in Technology and Policy, all from MIT. at MIT pursuing a Ph.D. in Engineering Systems; G. Ryan Faith independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS), Vincent Sabathier senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program. “The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration” By D. A. Broniatowski, G. Ryan Faith, and Vincent G. Sabathier.

cooperation.pdf

International cooperation inserts an element of programmatic dependence into the architecture of a system, requiring that all partners deliver what they promised on time and within the agreed-on parameters. These concerns give rise to the dictum that international cooperation is best for a nation when its partners are not on the system’s “critical path” (i.e., the nation’s partners’ contributions are not required to complete the system; instead, they merely present an additional noncritical capability). For example, the ISS has two partners on the “critical path” for crew transport and station resupply—the United States and Russia. Other nations, such as European Space Agency (ESA) member states and Japan, currently provide modules whose absence would not prohibit the station as a whole from functioning. This approach would suggest that, from a programmatic standpoint, there is little incentive to cooperate with a nation that cannot contribute a unique capability or that is not able to provide an existing capability at a lower cost than can be domestically produced. For example, a programmatic basis for cooperation between the United States and Japan is that the Japanese Kibo module is provided to the United States for free on a no-exchange-of-funds basis. In return, the United States is flying the module and attaching it to the ISS. This paradigm removes strong incentives for nations to collaborate since the noncritical-path nation (e.g., Japan) depends entirely on the goodwill of the critical-path nation (e.g., the United States). On the other hand, the critical-path nation (the United States) may operate independently and therefore view cooperation under this paradigm as providing extraneous benefits that, although desirable, can be dispensed with in an emergency. As such, the benefits of maintaining the critical path within the purview of one nation are clear—by preventing multiple participants from participating in this area of the architecture, coordination costs are reduced. A nation will not be “held hostage” by the policy, schedule, or budgetary difficulties of its partners. Too many cooks spoil the broth.

India says no- they see the CP as only making them counter China

AFP, 08 (American Free Press- international news source, “India wary of being US card in China play: analysts”, 9/14/08, ) AFL

The US push to end India's status as a nuclear pariah was partly motivated by a desire to counter China's rise, but New Delhi does not want to get sucked into a US-Sino power play, analysts say. "India does share many US concerns regarding China," said Anupam Srivastava, director at the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia. But New Delhi has conveyed "in very clear terms from the outset that it is not interested in being drawn into any such balance of power games in Asia or outside," Srivastava told AFP. Washington spearheaded efforts that resulted this month in the Vienna-based Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) lifting a global ban on trade with India, despite New Delhi's refusal to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NSG waiver followed the striking of an India-US pact on civilian nuclear cooperation in 2005 between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush which still requires Congressional approval. The financial incentives are obvious, with the United States expecting to be rewarded with a major slice of India's civilian nuclear energy market -- estimated to be worth tens of billions of dollars. But there are also geopolitical considerations. Building India as a counterweight to China was "at least part of the motivation among some of the (US) decision-making circle," said Michael Quinlan from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. For decades, India had close relations with the former Soviet Union despite its official policy of non-alignment during the Cold War years. But New Delhi recrafted its foreign policy after launching market reforms in 1991, focusing on improving ties with Washington -- a process that culminated in the nuclear deal. Former Indian diplomat K. Shankar Bajpai said Washington's support for the pact and the NSG waiver had been lent with the expectation of exacting some leverage in return. "Specifically, the US sees a strong India as an asset in a world in which China is the second world power," Bajpai said, while adding that India had its own firm ideas about the role it should play. "One can accept American help in becoming strong without ganging up against China," he said. India has its own set of concerns regarding its relations with its giant neighbour and economic rival -- ranging from a festering border dispute to fierce competition in securing energy sources to fuel their fast-growing economies. India has also been upset by perceived Chinese moves to "checkmate" its own rise -- allegedly supporting arch-rival Pakistan with arms and economic aid and reportedly trying to block the NSG waiver last week, Indian officials say. While India may baulk at the idea of being a counterweight to China, it knows it can reap certain strategic benefits from a closer relationship with the United States. According to Srivastava, India-US collaboration in areas like counter-terrorism and maritime security are aimed at circumscribing "Chinese latitude and propensity for actions that could undermine economic or security equations across Asia". India will continue to expand economic ties with China, but security relations "will remain disputed," he said, while at the same time New Delhi's policies will become "more convergent" with Washington's in security and technology areas. Indian analyst C. Uday Bhaskar said India's entry into the global nuclear trading club had introduced "a certain degree of strategic equipoise" into Asia. "Clearly till now, China has been the major power in unipolar Asia," Bhaskar said, adding many countries in the region were keeping a wary eye on Beijing. "The wariness stems from the lack of clarity over how China is going to behave as it becomes even more powerful," he said.

India wants to be independent – they will say no

Cohen and Xacier 5/26/11 *Stephen P. Cohen, a former professor, conducts research on South Asian political and security issues.\ **Constantino Xavier is a Portuguese Fulbright scholar and Ph.D. candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,

U.S.-India Relationship on the Rocks? | More Stephen Cohen, Constantino Xavier | May 26, 2011

It was good while it lasted. But the United States needs to move on and recognize that India’s commitment to strategic autonomy is a fundamental constraint to further improvement in bilateral relations. New Delhi wants to take it slowly because it is wary of becoming another Japan, a client state. It is this grand concern with self-reliance—and not technical or other factors—that led to India’s surprising decision last month to exclude two American contenders, Lockheed and Boeing, from an $11 billion contract for one hundred and twenty-six fourth-generation fighter jets—India’s biggest defense purchase ever. New Delhi’s preference for two European jets (France’s Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon), while excluding Swedish and Russian contenders along with the American F-16 and F/A-18, came as a rude shock to those who had banked on surging U.S.-India defense and security relations. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India purchased $223 million worth in military equipments from the United States in the last five years—twice as much as in the preceding twenty years. Both countries also held over sixty joint exercises and military exchanges since 2000 and set up a new counterterrorism dialogue that included unprecedented levels of intelligence sharing after the 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai. Defense analysts jumped in immediately to offer possible explanations for the American defeat. Some underlined the fighters’ different performance during high-altitude tests in the Himalayas, along with other technical factors, including speed and radar systems, which may have given the European fighters an advantage. Others privilege political reasons—including pockets of anti-Americanism in the Indian air force—as well as a government plagued by corruption scandals, which may have limited its capacity to make a decision on more than purely objective criteria. Another explanation highlights the controversies involving the quality of previous purchases from the United States, especially that of the USS Trenton, a 1971 amphibious transport dock on which an explosion killed five Indian navy personnel in 2008. While each of these factors may have played a role, they ignore the most fundamental reason: India’s concern for strategic autonomy in the event of another war with Pakistan and its attempt to maintain a balance in its lineup of military suppliers. Washington may well have promised New Delhi the world, but in the end India will always fear that its actual combat capacity in such critical moments could be severely affected by relying exclusively on American technology, supplies and support. This sensitivity and mistrust is aggravated by the fact that the United States is also the major supplier to the Pakistani air force, having in recent years transferred thrity-two F-16 variants and several air-to-air missiles and P3C Orion surveillance aircrafts to Islamabad. New Delhi also justifiably sees Washington as overly stringent on end-use monitoring; Washington would never have allowed these planes to be fitted with nuclear warheads and play a role in India’s nuclear deterrent. In contrast, reports indicate that the Eurofighter offered access to significantly more advanced technology as well as the possibility of assembly in India. This indicates to what extent India remains committed to self-reliance, not only in terms of production, but also operability—the nightmare of 1965, when the United Stated cut off Indian access to crucial military supplies at the height of another Indo-Pakistani crisis, is still fresh in the minds of many Indian strategists. The decision should therefore be seen as one privileging diversification, diffusing the risk of excessive reliance and dependence on a single partner. American experts implicitly acknowledged this Indian concern by speculating in recent months that India might split the order among two or three different suppliers, perhaps an American, a European and a Russian one. But they ignored the specific cyclical way India diversifies, rotating among different suppliers. In recent years, Russia, the United States, Israel and even Brazil were able to secure important contracts from the Indian air force, but (excepting Britain) European countries have remained largely absent from its acquisitions basket. From this perspective, the Eurofighter Typhoon is particularly attractive as it is developed by a consortium including not only habitués Britain and Germany but also newcomers Spain and Italy.

Say No – Lack of Trust

INDIA DOESN’T TRUST THE US – FEAR OF COOPERATION BEING ONE SIDED, SPECIFICALLY IN SPACE

Center for Nonproliferation Studies 06

Date Created: July 20, 2006 U.S.-India Space Cooperation Reaches New Heights, Despite Lingering Proliferation Concerns By Jennifer Kline

The Chandrayaan project notwithstanding, concerns of this kind continue to constrain U.S. space-related exports to India, making some Indian analysts skeptical that the new U.S.-India space cooperation agreement will result in significant high-technology transfers from the United States. One editorial writer noted, for example, that: An effort by Boeing and ISRO to jointly build satellites for the international market collapsed, largely on account of onerous U.S. licensing procedures...Another area of friction is commercial satellite launches, which Washington is able to control because many satellites contain critical U.S.-made components. ISRO has reportedly lost a commercial launch contract as a result of uncertainty over securing American clearances. [32] Fears have also been voiced that expanded cooperation will lead to U.S. interference in Indian scientific programs. [33]

US proposals receive heavy skepticism

Kronstadt, 8 - Specialist in South Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division (K. Alan, “India-U.S. Relations,” August 12, 2008)

Some Indian analysts, wary of U.S. intentions in pursuing bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, believe the initiative may be cover for a broader effort to cement India’s cooperation in a number of non-energy-related areas, such as defense trade and New Delhi’s relations with Iran. From this perspective, the U.S. government repeatedly “shifted the goalposts” to forward its own (veiled) nonproliferation goals. 140 India’s influential communist parties, whose Left Front provides crucial support to the Congress-led ruling coalition in New Delhi, have focused their ire on geopolitical aspects of the civil nuclear initiative. In late 2006, the leader of India’s main communist party declared the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal “not acceptable” as it would “seriously undermine India’s independent foreign policy.” Previously, the Left Front had called India’s two IAEA votes on Iran a “capitulation” to U.S. pressure. 141 Indian leftists thus have been at the forefront of political resistance to India’s becoming a “junior partner” of the United States. Equally stinging and perhaps more substantive criticism came from several key Indian scientists, whose perspectives on the technical details of the civil nuclear initiative are considered highly credible. India’s nuclear scientific community, mostly barred from collaboration with international civil nuclear enterprises as well as direct access to key technologies, has worked for decades in relative isolation, making its members both proud of their singular accomplishments and sensitive to any signs of foreign “interference.” Many viewed the enabling legislation passed by the U.S. Congress as being more about nonproliferation and less about energy cooperation. They considered it both intrusive on and preclusive of their activities. The major criticisms of existing plans for U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation made by Indian commentators (and at times by the Indian government) are summarized as follows: ! India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was being codified into a bilateral obligation through a clause that would allow the United States to reclaim any supplied nuclear equipment if India were to test a nuclear device; ! India was being denied nuclear reprocessing technologies warranted under “full cooperation;” ! India was not being given prior authorization to reprocess spent fuel; ! India was not being given assurances that it will receive uninterrupted fuel supplies in perpetuity; and language on securing India’s assistance with U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining weapons of mass destruction would limit New Delhi’s foreign policy independence

Any cooperation is purely symbolic India doesn’t trust us and we don’t trust them

Bidwai 4 * Praful Bidwai is a reporter at Anti- [, October 7th 2004, “U.S. and India: Unequal Allies Uneasy Partners]

NEW DELHI – Four years ago, they exuberantly declared they were "natural allies," being two of the world’s biggest democracies. Last year, they vowed to pursue their "strategic partnership" and their campaigns against "terror" with full gusto. And now, the United States and India have re-designated their relationship as an "evolving partnership, based on mutual confidence and concern." If this sounds like the addition of a qualifying note of caution, in keeping with a slight downgrading of the lofty rhetoric about Indo-U.S. relations, then that is not too far off the mark as far as ground realities are concerned. Although the U.S. and India have announced "the beginning of a new era of cooperation and trust," they are still somewhat uneasy partners. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held their first-ever meeting as heads of government on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 21. By all accounts, the one-hour long breakfast meeting was successful: the joint declaration said the Indo-U.S. bilateral relationship "had never been as close as now." In some sense, this is true. The U.S. recently – just four days before the Bush-Singh meeting – lifted sanctions on the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) under the Department of Commerce’s Entity List imposed soon after India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The two governments announced completion of Phase I of what they call the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP) initiative, launched last January. The U.S and India have recently held four major army and air force joint exercises, including one in Alaska and another in a cold desert in northwestern India. They are about to commence two major naval exercises off the Kerala coast, in which U.S. nuclear-propelled and nuclear-weapons-bearing warships are expected to participate. The two governments have been sharing intelligence with each other. India has emerged as a major potential buyer of U.S.-made armaments, including the Orion submarine surveillance airplane and the Hercules C-130 transport aircraft. This has added a new dimension to India-U.S. relations, which have recently acquired a strong commercial content thanks to the outsourcing of computer software development and especially information technology-enabled services such as call centers and medical transcription. In general, relations between the two countries have substantially improved since former president Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000. However, in some respects, the U.S.-India "partnership" has more symbolic than real strategic value. It is strongly influenced by the "Pakistan angle" in India’s foreign and strategic policies. And there is competition and contestation in the relationship, as well as cooperation. For instance, although the U.S. lifted ISRO from the "Entity List," the major importers of equipment for India’s space program are seven agencies under the space agency. These have not been removed from the list, although procedures for imports have been simplified, with "presumption of approval" for all items not controlled for "nuclear proliferation" reasons. The U.S. has delinked India’s military space program from its military program to facilitate "cooperation" (read, U.S. exports) in the civilian component. But NSSP, whose second phase is meant to start in mid-October, will not resolve ticklish disputes over imports of "dual-use" (military as well as civilian) technologies. Already, Washington has given indications of its tough stance on any nuclear non-proliferation-related issue. On Sept. 29, it imposed sanctions on two former chairmen of the Nuclear Power Corporation (which builds India’s atomic power plants) on the mere suspicion that they might have helped Iran’s nuclear programs. One of them has never been to Iran, and the other visited it once, reportedly only to "observe" the installation of a Russian nuclear power reactor of a type India is itself planning to import. The U.S. has accepted India (and Pakistan) as a de facto nuclear-weapons power but won’t do so legally. Owing to its own laws, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the obligations imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the U.S. cannot grant India the same nuclear and missile status as that of the recognized nuclear powers. Says former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott: "Right now the U.S. and India may feel that they are moving in the same direction, but their destination could be different. I am particularly worried about NSSP. There is this great fixation in India with NSSP, but it is going to set Indians up for a great disappointment. . . . (If) we equate NSSP to a thermometer, then it could register fever at times in Indo-U.S. relations. The two red zones are nuclear technology and ballistic missile technology." Talbott says India and the U.S. are not opening a new chapter, they are merely turning over a new leaf in the same chapter – aiming for incremental growth, not a quantum jump. In particular, Talbott, in a comment on CNBC television, warned that the United States is unlikely to share any part of the advanced technology pertaining to ballistic missile defense ("Son of Star Wars"), which the U.S. is deploying at a limited level – despite public protest and at the risk of greatly heightening the global nuclear danger. In May 2001, India became the first nation, even before the U.S.’ own NATO allies, to welcome Bush’s announcement on implementing the ballistic missile defense (BMD). Many Indian policymakers saw this warm, unreserved welcome as an opportunity to acquire the high technology and equipment needed for India’s nuclear-military programs and fulfill its own BMD ambitions. Critics saw India’s support as "collusive" and compromising the national interest. Yet, none of this has gained New Delhi special leverage against Pakistan within the triangular relationship the two have with Washington. India’s growing strategic proximity to the U.S. coincided with the period, especially post-Sept. 11, 2001, when Washington greatly needed – and received – Pakistan’s help against al-Qaeda. Pakistan’s geographical location as Afghanistan’s neighbor, and its proximity to Iran, is of great significance for Washington. Washington has mounted pressure on President Pervez Musharraf to choke off support to Islamic militants in Kashmir. But the United States also realizes that if Musharraf is pushed too far, he could lose domestic support and be replaced by someone Washington does not trust. From the Indian point of view, this puts limits on the extent to which Pakistan’s support to the separatist militancy in Kashmir can be reduced. Pakistan, for its part, cannot influence Washington enough to get India to make major concessions on Kashmir. (India, too, counts as a friendly state for the U.S.) All that the United States can do, and has done, is to encourage the two neighbors to talk to each other and "facilitate" their dialogue, without overt mediation. The Indians are not entirely happy with Washington’s role in the South Asian region. In particular, they are suspicious of its growing presence next door in Nepal, where U.S. advisers are believed to be encouraging the king to use military force against Maoist insurgents. Recently, the U.S. State Department hired a Bulgarian aircraft to deliver arms and ammunition to fight "terrorism" in Nepal. The plane stopped in Ahmedabad in India for refueling amidst reports that it had been "detained" by the Indian authorities. New Delhi was acutely embarrassed by the episode and tried to minimize it as a "scheduled stopover," although its security agencies reportedly inspected the aircraft for its "objectionable cargo." Washington claimed this cargo was a "diplomatic consignment" meant for "training and equipping the Nepalese anti-terrorist police unit." India sees Nepal, with which it has a porous border, as its zone of influence. The episode only highlights the grossly asymmetrical Indo-U.S. relationship, which the former government of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee tried to play down for six years partly because of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party’s ideological affinity for Washington – which goes back to the Cold War days. The Singh government says it will return to its commitment of a multi-polar world and to the policy of non-alignment. If this happens, occasional divergences and tensions between Washington and New Delhi are likely to grow. A smooth "natural" partnership does not seem to be in the cards.

No trust- Pakistan alliance

Ollapally 4 *Deepa M. Ollapally Senior Fellow at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, at The George Washington University. was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College from 1991-1995, and then Associate Professor from 1995-1997. She has been a visiting professor at Bryn Mawr College and Georgetown University [, April 2004, “U.S. India Relations: Ties That Bind?”]

On Iraq, the Pentagon in particular had put a great deal of stock in securing Indian participation, and was apparently confident of India’s acquiescence. Indeed, if one were to go by the opinions of key mainstream Indian security analysts and some officials in New Delhi, there seemed to be a surprising amount of support for sending the troops, as long it was under United Nations command, though there seemed to be some leeway even for that requirement. India’s refusal was interpreted by some American policymakers as evidence that India could not be counted upon. In the case of the MNNA, India’s resentment had to do with both substance and style. As former Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Lalit Mansigh saw it, “In a strategic partnership, there should be an element of trust. I am afraid that there was a perception that this was breached when after talks in India, within 48 hours, we were surprised by the announcement of Pakistan becoming a major non-NATO ally…So this has left a certain bitterness in the mouth.” 4

Zero trust-India sees the NSSP as a gambit and a double standard

Ollapally 4 *Deepa M. Ollapally Senior Fellow at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, at The George Washington University. was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College from 1991-1995, and then Associate Professor from 1995-1997. She has been a visiting professor at Bryn Mawr College and Georgetown University [, April 2004, “U.S. India Relations: Ties That Bind?”]

In contrast, the skeptics have a long list of concerns and an even longer memory. The major criticism of the NSSP is that it provides no substantive movement forward, and that expectations of increased flow of dual use goods into India’s civilian space and nuclear activities, are highly misplaced. 39 In fact, Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, does not see the NSSP as being particularly useful for developing India’s civilian nuclear power technology, unlike the NSSP’s proponents. 40 The modifications to U.S. export licensing policies are dismissed by many as cosmetic, pointing out they are to be reciprocal for India’s “implementation of measures to address proliferation concerns and to ensure compliance with U.S. export controls.” 41 Moreover, the relaxation amounts to a presumption of approval only for dual use items not controlled for proliferation reasons. On the most important issue for space cooperation–i.e., the export of U.S. satellites, subsystems and components–critics note that there seems to be a blank. Given that U.S.-made systems dominate the satellite market, India is prevented from entering the launch service market despite lower costs since a launch from India would require a license for reexport by the customer, which is usually denied. The bottom line from the skeptics is that “you cannot expect trust from someone you are still targeting.” 42 Many hark back to the U.S. decision to discontinue supplies of low-enriched uranium for India’s Tarapore atomic power plant after 1974, despite the existence of an Indo-U.S. agreement that had the force of an international treaty. 43 Some are also deeply concerned that the U.S. will now target Indian scientists, thus “moving up the value chain.” 44 Their belief is that technology denial can only work up to a point in the new knowledge economy, hence innovative sanctions against intangibles are likely to be developed, adding yet another layer of distrust between India and the U.S. As far as this group is concerned, the fundamental American goal of ensuring asymmetry in technology, including full spectrum dominance, will continue to dictate U.S. policies. This goal will lead the U.S. to try and put a ceiling on scientific development elsewhere. The defense technologists and scientists at least, believe that as in the earlier period, the U.S. will only be able to slow down India, but not stop it in new arenas. Many Indian analysts and policymakers are incredulous at what is seen as continuing American double standards in the region on protecting sensitive nuclear technology. (This is a view shared by both skeptics and supporters.) The American sanctions on two Indian scientists for allegedly assisting Iran is a case in point. The U.S. appears to believe that Indian scientists are valuable to would-be proliferators because they represent the only pool of talent outside the nuclear weapon states familiar with “the start up stage” of nuclear weapons and missile programs. 45 As far as India is concerned, its track record on not passing sensitive technology and information over the past decades is above reproach. In the words of a former Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.

Say No – Moon

US WON’T DO LUNAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA- JUST BACKED OUT- AND INDIA IS PISSED

Laxman, 11 (Srinivas, writer for FirstPost.world, “US abandons joint unmanned Moon Mission, ISRO upset”, 5/26/11, ) AFL

In a major setback to India’s lunar programme, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on Tuesday offloaded this country from a joint unmanned mission to the moon designated as MoonRise. The offloading comes six months after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President Barack Obama announced the strengthening of Indo-US space collaboration in a joint declaration in New Delhi in November 2010. MoonRise, as well as another NASA mission to Venus, were rejected in favour of a flight to an asteroid called the “Origins Spectral-Interpretation-Resource-Identification-Security-Regolith-Explorer”,’ in which the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro) is not involved. The MoonRise plan envisaged Isro partnering with Nasa’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) which was announced by Isro chairman K Radhakrishnan in New Delhi on 12 February 2011. The tie-up was given the go-ahead by the Space Commission. At a media meet after the commission meeting, Radhakrishnan said: “We will have to send a Chandrayaan-1 like probe that will orbit the moon for about four-to-five years. The 400-500 kg satellite around the moon could carry some scientific experiments of Isro,’’ he said. He said that the proposal was an outcome of Indo-US space cooperation announced during the visit of President Obama in November 2010. India’s contribution to the MoonRise project would have been about $150 million. As a part of this lunar project, NASA had asked Isro to build an orbiter for providing communication between the rover operating on the lunar surface and the ground stations. Isro had even initiated preliminary studies on the project, and exchange of information was in progress between Isro and JPL when the project was scrubbed on Tuesday. According to those in the know, Isro’s involvement has more than technical significance. If the project had materialised, it would have underlined a change in Indo-US security relations. Until now US labs and companies were prohibited from exchanging technologies with Isro in an attempt to limit their use for military purposes. It was a sample return mission, which means Nasa would have brought back samples from the moon for analysis. MoonRise would have focused on the giant South Pole Aitken Basin located on the far side of the moon. Though Isro officially declined to comment on the rejection, other space agency officials expressed disappointment at Nasa’s decision, calling it a serious setback to India moon dreams. They were shocked at Nasa’s decision because it has come six months after Manmohan Singh and Obama announced the strengthening of Indo-US space collaboration in a joint declaration in New Delhi. Isro and Nasa had collaborated in India’s maiden mission to the moon, Chandrayaan-1. There were two Nasa payloads on this mission, the Moon Minerology Mapper and Mini-Sar. Nasa was hoping to participate in Chandrayaan-2, too—a joint Indo-Russian venture. But, as of now Isro has no plans of including foreign participation other than Russia. The rejection by Nasa of Isro’s participation in MoonRise could not have come at a worse time for Isro because the Chandrayaan-2 flight has been delayed because of uncertainties in the rocket, the three-stage Geo Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). Originally, it was slated for liftoff in 2012. It got postponed to 2013 and is now tentatively scheduled for 2014. “Even this date is uncertain because we are having a lot of problems with the GSLV,’’ a top Isro official said.

Say No – SPS

INDIA’S FOCUS IN SPACE IS SECURITY NOT ENERGY- SPS ISN’T A PLACE THEY WANT TO COOPERATE ON

Lambakis ‘1 [Steven Lambakis, Ph.D in Int’l Politics, National security and international analyst specializing in space power and policy studies, Specialist at National Insitute for Public Policy, On the Edge of the Earth, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2001, 155; WBTR]

For India, a country more than 1,222,000 square miles in area hosting a population approaching one billion, space offers unique vantage points for dealing with a number of national problems, including military operations and intelligence collection of activities in neighboring China and Pakistan, land use, resource management, weather forecasting, and communications. Indian officials acknowledge that the same satellite technologies used to improve the prosperity, education, and health of the Indian people will be available for military use.48 When in July 1980 it launched the Rohini 1 satellite aboard its satellite launch vehicle (SLV), India became the seventh country capable of placing an object in orbit. The priorities of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) are remote sensing and telecommunications, capabilities that will be developed to the greatest extent possible indigenously and through the exploitation of foreign technologies, personnel, and international research and development collaboration. The Indian Resources Satellite (IRS) series of spacecraft images service national needs and are available commercially. India also has launched remote-sensing satellites to scan surrounding oceans to assist fishing, study temperature variations, and provide other oceanographic data. It plans to launch a next-generation series of imaging satellites with improved resolution and may develop whole new imaging satellite systems (Cartosats and ResourceSat). India's IRS-IC carries a panchromatic camera having a 5.8-meter resolution (versus SPOT's 10meter resolution), and it, like the other imaging satellites, may be diverted to military missions, such as monitoring Pakistani and Chinese missile developments and movements.49 The Indians have a very large commercial remote-sensing program and from time to time have sold imagery data to competing remote-sensing programs. India has more than a half-dozen ground imagery receiving stations and plans to establish additional stations in Argentina, Australia, Nigeria, and the Philippines.

Say No – Weaponization

ISRO SAYS NO TO WEAPONS

Times of India 08 [India, US should move forward on space cooperation: ISRO Chief” Jan. 31st 2008, ]

Washington: India on Thursday said though its understanding with the United States at the political front is good but there is a need to expedite the process of moving forward on the issues of space cooperation and space commerce. "At the political level there is a good understanding. In 2005, our Prime Minister visited here and with President Bush agreed to strengthen the relations in space cooperation, space commerce and so on. We are trying to move forward on this," Chairman of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) G Madhavan Nair said. Nair was participating in a seminar on "Global Space Agenda" under the aegis of the Space Initiatives of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) a top think-tank in Washington DC. "There are positive signs and there are negative signs," he remarked going on to make the point that recently there was success with Raytheon on GPS but with "another" company on semiconductor fab, the export control regulations kicked in. "There are pluses and minuses. But we have to be patient... we have to convince," the ISRO chief said adding "the process is rather slow and I wish it was faster". Brushing aside the apprehensions that military programmes could siphon funds out of the ISRO, he said "right from its inception, ISRO has been working on the peaceful application of outer space. There can be no weaponsiation of outer space. That has been our stand."

Say No – Moon

INDIA HATES LUNAR MINING

Cook 99—Kevin, law student at Gerogetown (Spring, 1999 in the Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, “The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a Workable Moon Treaty” lexis)

Unlike the indirect reference to the Common Heritage doctrine in the Outer Space Treaty, paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Moon Treaty explicitly designates the moon and its natural resources as part of the Common Heritage of Mankind. By reference, the other provisions of the Moon Treaty, especially the international regime outlined in paragraph 5 of Article 11, give form and substance to the Common Heritage concept. n128 Within Article 11, there is an important distinction made in paragraph 2, which states that the moon is not subject to national appropriation. n129 Elsewhere in the same Article are references to both the moon and its natural resources. The absence of the reference to "natural resources" in paragraph 2 suggests that only the moon itself is not subject to national appropriation, implying that its natural resources may be available for appropriation. n130 Further, the addition of the phrase "in place" in paragraph 5 has created the impression that it was intended to allow the removal of resources. n131 One commentator, Reynolds, also notes that the prohibition on national appropriation leaves the question of private appropriation [*667] unsettled; not being explicitly forbidden by the Treaty, it appears that such private appropriation may be permissible. n132 As with the Outer Space Treaty, such treaty language raises more questions than it answers. Paragraph 5 of Article 11 requires the establishment of an international regime to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon. n133 Some opponents of the Treaty worry that the requirement to develop an international regime only on the verge of exploitation amounts to an effective moratorium on development of outer space resources, n134 even though the Treaty's authors rejected a proposal from India for an explicit moratorium on exploitation of lunar resources. n135 In part because of concerns with the concurrent negotiations on UNCLOS, the United States took the position on the Moon Treaty that the Common Heritage principle meant only that access to Common Heritage territory would be available to all, but that the Moon Treaty did not empower a legal regime to regulate activities in Common Heritage areas. n136 The underlying U.S. concern was that the Common Heritage doctrine would result in the developer of lunar resources losing control over those resources to the international regime, a condition which would discourage development by private enterprise or U.S. government agencies. n137 Additional U.S. concerns were raised by the "rational management" and "equitable sharing" provisions in paragraph 7 of Article 11; this language furthered the perception that the Treaty mandated a transfer of wealth and technology from the industrialized space-faring nations to the less-developed countries. n138 Again, the Treaty hints at an international regime to govern space development and suggests that benefits must be shared equitably, but the Treaty fails to clarify these vague requirements.

Say No – Launches

COOPERATION FAILS – US WON’T COOPERATE ON PROVIDING INDIAN LAUNCHES

Speier 06 (March, Richard, 25 years in government at the Office of Management and Budget, the Arms Control and Disarm-ament Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, “ U.S. Space Aid to India: On a "Glide Path" to ICBM Trouble?” )

The United States should not cooperate either with India’s space launches or with satellites that India will launch. India hopes that satellite launches will earn revenues that will accelerate its space program, including rocket development. U.S. payloads for Indian launches, such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project, risk technology transfer and invite other states to be less restrained in their use of Indian launches. The United States should resume discouraging other states from using Indian launches, while encouraging India to resume the practice of launching satellites on other states’ space launch vehicles. Given the frequent reports of Russian cryogenic rockets being used in the Surya, the United States should work with Russia to ensure that Russian space cooperation with India does not undercut U.S. restraint. Because there is no meaningful distinction between India’s civilian and military rocket programs, the United States should explicitly or de facto place ISRO back on the “entities” list of destinations that require export licenses.[23] In addition, Congress should insist that the administration explain its red lines regarding space cooperation with India. If these lines are not drawn tightly enough, Congress should intervene.

Solvency Deficits – Delay

TECH TRANSFERS MEAN MASSIVE DELAYS, CAN’T SOLVE THE AFF

Aubrecht 9 *Dr. Richard Aubrecht is vice Chairman of the Board and Vice President of Strategy and Technology Incorporate [, December 10th 2009 “DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE DIRECTION AND FUNDING FOR NASA: WHAT WILL THEY MEAN FOR THE U.S. AEROSPACE WORKFORCE AND INDUSTRIAL BASE?”]

A2. Involving foreign nations in the space program can be beneficial. With the Space Station, foreign nations developed high-level modules that had relatively few and well-defined interfaces to the Station. These modules could be developed mostly with their own in country technologies. Therefore, there was not a significant amount of leading edge USA-based technologies needing to be transferred. This model is not likely to be applicable to the Constellation Program because it is a highly integrated system. In this case, there would have to be a very significant amount of technology transfer to the foreign suppliers for them to design their modules and components. With the current export control regulations, processes, and resources, the program delays would be intolerable.

Negotiations take forever

Times of India 08 [“India, US should move forward on space cooperation: ISRO Chief” Jan. 31st 2008, ,]

WASHINGTON: India on Thursday said though its understanding with the United States at the political front is good but there is a need to expedite the process of moving forward on the issues of space cooperation and space commerce. "At the political level there is a good understanding. In 2005, our Prime Minister visited here and with President Bush agreed to strengthen the relations in space cooperation, space commerce and so on. We are trying to move forward on this," Chairman of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) G Madhavan Nair said. Nair was participating in a seminar on "Global Space Agenda" under the aegis of the Space Initiatives of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) a top think-tank in Washington DC. "There are positive signs and there are negative signs," he remarked going on to make the point that recently there was success with Raytheon on GPS but with "another" company on semiconductor fab, the export control regulations kicked in. "There are pluses and minuses. But we have to be patient... we have to convince," the ISRO chief said adding "the process is rather slow and I wish it was faster". Brushing aside the apprehensions that military programmes could siphon funds out of the ISRO, he said "right from its inception, ISRO has been working on the peaceful application of outer space. There can be no weaponsiation of outer space. That has been our stand."

CP Links to Ptx

CP LINKS TO POLITICS, POLITICIANS ARE SCARED OF TECH DIFFUSION, SAPS OBAMA’S CAPITAL

Hauser and Walter-Range 8 *Marty Hauser is VP of research and analysis for the Space Foundation **Micah Walter-Range is a research analyst for the Space Foundation [, August 5th, 2008, Published on the Space Foundation’s website]

The control of space exports under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations is a contentious issue that pits national security concerns against the desire to cooperate with foreign entities for purposes of profit or scientific research. By working together, it should be possible to create a regulatory environment that protects militarily critical technologies and technical expertise, while allowing commerce and international partnerships to flourish and the space industry to prosper. The difficulty lies in overcoming the arguments of parties on both sides who have become entrenched in their positions and who are more willing to recount the injustices or misdemeanors of the past than to work toward a better future. To succeed, it will be necessary to muster the political will of the Executive Branch to oversee the necessary alterations in the regulatory process, and the cooperation of the Legislative Branch with regard to adjusting the laws to allow the State Department more latitude in terms of determining the trustworthiness of end-users. The space industry must also play a role in the process and it will need to make solid information available to policymakers so that any policy changes will be helpful and well-reasoned.

Internal Link Turn – CP Crushes Future Relations

Internal Link Turn – CP Crushes Future Relations

US COOPERATION WITH INDIA ON SPACE COLLAPSES RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE – DUAL USE TECH

Speier, 06 (Richard, private consultant on nonproliferation and counterproliferation issues. Speier spent more than 25 years in government at the Office of Management and Budget, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, “US Space Aid to India: On a Glide Path to ICBM Trouble”, March 2006,

) AFL

In the weeks leading up to this month’s presidential visit to India, the U.S. nonproliferation community has been preoccupied with one facet of President George W. Bush’s push to bolster ties with New Delhi: his proposal for enhanced U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation. Another element, however, also deserves close scrutiny: proposals, largely unexamined, for greater space ties. Given India’s reported ICBM development, these plans could destabilize international relations and potentially even threaten the United States. The Bush administration risks repeating in India the same errors that previously allowed damaging U.S. space technology transfers to China. The Glide Path U.S. officials have described both the nu clear and space cooperation agreements as part of a “glide path” that it has charted to improve relations with India. A glide path is the gentle course that an airplane follows as it descends to a safe landing. If the plane encounters an unexpected development, it can divert, regain altitude, and change its course. Because India has been developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them, U.S.-Indian technology relations have for many years remained up in the air, not heading for a safe landing. As then-Secretary of State Colin Powell told The Washington Post in October 2003, the “glide path” was seen as “a way of bring ing closure” to a debate over three issues that had plagued U.S.-Indian relations. “There was a basket of issues that they were always asking us about called, well, we called it—we nicknamed it, ‘The Trinity,’” Powell said. “How can we expand our trade in high tech areas, in areas having to do with space launch activities, and with our nuclear industry?” Powell also said that U.S. officials wanted to “protect certain ‘red lines’ that we have with respect to proliferation, because it’s sometimes hard to separate within space launch activi ties and industries and nuclear programs, that which could go to weapons, and that which could be solely for peaceful purposes.”[1] Nearly two years later, in July 2005, Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached an agreement on space that was said to have accomplished these goals. New Delhi got what it wanted when the two leaders resolved to “build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena .”[2] Washington won India’s agreement to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. Yet, the agreement falls short on several grounds. First, it does nothing about India’s long-range missile development. As the 2005 deal was being negotiated, reports per sisted that India was preparing to produce an ICBM based on its massive Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV). Second, depending on its precise form, the MTCR agreement could provide a shield against sanctions for some Indian exports to countries such as Iran —as U.S. law largely exempts certain types of MTCR adherents from U.S. missile proliferation sanctions. Third, India has expressed an interest in exporting missile technology (said to be below the MTCR threshold) to many countries. The White House and Congress urgently need to reconsider this deal. The Surya President John F. Kennedy was once asked the difference between the Atlas space launch vehicle that put John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas missile aimed at the Soviet Union. He answered with a one-word pun: “Attitude.” The established path to a space launch capability for China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States was to adapt a ballistic missile as a space launch vehicle. India turned the process around, adapt ing a space launch vehicle as a ballistic missile. In the 1980s, India adapted a space launch vehicle, the SLV-3, to become the Agni medium-range ballistic missile. In keeping with India’s practice of describing nuclear and missile programs as civilian until their military character cannot be denied, India originally claimed that the Agni was a “technology demonstrator.” The Agni program now consists of three missiles with ranges, respectively, of approximately 700, 2,000, and 3,000 kilometers. For nearly two decades, reports have indicated that India sought to use a simi lar tactic to develop an ICBM.[3] It appears, though, that India may have officially begun the ICBM project (commonly known as the Surya, although sometimes also known as Agni IV) in 1994.[4] Reports cite various dates, perhaps because the project has had several decision points. Reports generally agree that the Surya program will result in several different missiles with ranges from 5,000 to 20,000 kilo meters.[5] It is widely claimed that the Surya will have the option of a nuclear payload, and sometimes the claim is made that the payload will consist of multiple nuclear warheads. Reports also generally agree that the Surya will be a three-stage missile with the first two stages derived from the PSLV’s solid-fuel rockets. India obtained the solid-fuel tech nology for the SLV-3 and the PSLV from the United States in the 1960s.[6] India is said to be planning for the third Surya stage to use liquid fuel and to be derived either from the Viking rocket technology supplied by France in the 1980s (called Vikas when India manu factured PSLV stages with the technology) or from a more powerful, Russian-supplied cryogenic upper stage for the Geosynchro nous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), which is an adaptation of the PSLV. If the Surya uses PSLV rocket motors, as is most frequently reported, it will be an enor mous rocket with solid-fuel stages 2.8 me ters (about nine feet) in diameter and a total weight of up to 275 metric tons. This would make it by far the largest ICBM in the world, with a launch weight about three times that of the largest U.S. or Russian ICBMs. There appears to be no literature on Indian plans to harden or conceal the Surya launch site, which would be difficult to do because of the missile’s size and weight. If a cryogenic third stage is used, the launch process will be lengthy. This means that the Surya is likely to be vulnerable to at tack before launch, making it a first-strike weapon that could not survive in a conflict. Indeed, the Surya’s threatening nature and its pre-launch vulnerability would make it a classic candidate for pre-emptive attack in a crisis. In strategic theory, this leads to “crisis instability,” the increased incentive for a crisis to lead to strategic attacks because of each side’s premium on striking first. The one report of a mobile ICBM based on a combination of PSLV and Agni technology makes more military sense.[7] Yet, as described below, it entails other serious concerns. Why would India want the Surya? Its reported ranges suggest the answer. •A 5,000-kilometer Surya-1 might overlap the range of a reported 5,000-kilometer upgrade of the Agni missile.[8] Surya-1 would have only one advantage over such an upgraded Agni: a far larger payload with the ability to carry a large, perhaps thermonuclear warhead or multiple nuclear warheads. India has no reason to need a missile of this range for use against Pakistan. The missile’s range is arguably appropriate for military operations against distant targets in China: the range from New Delhi to Beijing is 3,900 kilometers; the range from New Delhi to Shanghai is 4,400 kilometers; and the range from Mumbai to Shanghai is 5,100 kilometers. •An 8,000-to-12,000-kilometer Surya-2 would be excessive for use against China, although the distance from New Delhi to London is 6,800 kilometers; to Madrid, 7,400 kilometers; to Seattle, 11,500 kilometers; and to Washington, D.C., 12,000 kilometers. In 1997, an article based on information from officials in India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) or higher levels of India’s defense establishment stated flatly, “Surya’s targets will be Europe and the U.S.”[9] •A 20,000-kilometer-range Surya-3 could strike any point on the surface of the Earth. Indian commentators generally cite two reasons for acquiring an ICBM: to estab lish India as a global power and to enable India to deal with “high-tech aggression” of the type demonstrated in the wars with Iraq.[10] Because there is no obvious reason for India to want a military capability against Europe, there is one target that stands out as a bull’s-eye for an Indian ICBM: the United States. The reported 12,000-kilometer Surya-2 range is tailor- made to target the United States. India ’s Export History and the MTCR The United States now might have dimin ished leverage if India decided to export missile technology to countries such as Iran , given that certain types of MTCR agreements tend to provide a shield from U.S. sanctions.[11] India historically has had a close relation ship with Tehran.[12] Indian entities have supplied sensitive military technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-re lated items to Iran. In diplomatic talks, the United States and Israel have urged India to cool this relationship, specifically in areas of military and energy cooperation and with respect to deliberations on Iran’s nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency.[13] Additionally, the United States has imposed sanctions on several Indian firms and individuals for providing the militarily sensitive and WMD-related items.[14] Nonetheless the Indian-Iranian relationship is strong. In January 2003, then-Iranian President Mohammad Khatami joined Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam to watch Agni missiles roll by in the Indian Republic Day parade; and the two presidents signed a strategic accord providing India with access to Iranian bases in an emergency in return for Indian transfers of defense products, training, maintenance, and military mod ernization support.[15] This relationship is strongly supported by India’s left wing, and India cannot seem to extricate itself.[16] Even if the current ruling party could disentangle itself from Iran, the underlying political support for Iranian ties might lead a future Indian government to resume the relationship. Aside from Iran, Indian entities have engaged in WMD-related transfers to Libya and Iraq,[17] India appears to be seeking new customers. India’s DRDO has aspirations to export missiles—said to be below the MTCR threshold at present—to “many African, Gulf and South-East Asian coun tries,” subject to government approval.[18] Analysis The possibility of an Indian ICBM illustrates short-sightedness on the part of India and the United States. In seeking to become a global power by acquiring a first-strike weapon of mass destruction, the Indian government may be succumbing to its most immature and irresponsible instincts. The U.S. government, by offering India the “Trinity” of cooperation, is flirting with counterproductive activities that could lead to more proliferation. If India completes the development of an ICBM, several consequences can be antici pated. Other countries will acquire an incentive to launch pre-emptive attacks against India in times of crisis, especially if the ICBM is of PSLV dimensions and, consequently, is easily targeted. India’s military funds will be diverted away from applica tions that would more readily complement “strategic partnership” with the United States. Tensions and dangers in Asia will rise. Indian and U.S. foreign relations are also likely to suffer. An Indian ICBM would breed confusion and anger on the part of India ’s friends in Europe and the United States . That would likely spark a backlash against India that will hinder further co operation in a number of areas. India’s acts will serve as a goad to other potential missile proliferators and their potential suppliers to become more unrestrained. To be sure, arguments can be—and have been—made in favor of such cooperation. Robert Blackwill,[19] Bush’s first ambassador to India, has contended that the value of a strategic alliance with India exceeds what some have dubbed “theological” concerns about proliferation. One can point out that India has already developed nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles, so continued resistance to such proliferation is futile. Some claim that India has not necessarily made the final decision to develop and ICBM. And Blackwill and others will say that in any case, India is our friend so we need not worry about its strategic programs. India has already developed nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles, but supplier restraint can slow down India’s missile progress and make such missiles more expensive and unreliable, perhaps delaying programs until a new government takes a fresh look at them and considers de-emphasizing them. Apart from the technical assistance that the United States is considering supplying, the relaxation of U.S. objections to foreign use of Indian launch services will augment the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) budget for rocket development.[20] Moreover, India has a long way to go to improve the performance of its missiles, and it has a history of using nuclear and space launch assistance to do just that. Some areas in which India can still improve its missiles are: 1) Accuracy. For a ballistic missile, accuracy deteriorates with range. India’s ICBM could make use of better guidance technology, and it might obtain such technology through high-technology cooperation with the United States . 2) Weight. Unnecessary weight in a missile reduces payload and range or forces the development of massive missiles, such as India’s PSLV-derived ICBM. India is striving to obtain better materials and master their use to reduce unnecessary missile weight. [21] 3) Reliability. India ’s space launch vehicles and medium-range missiles have suffered their share of flight failures. Engineering assistance in space launches could unintentionally improve India’s missile reliability, as was dem onstrated with the incident of unapproved technology transfers to China through launches of U.S. satellites.[22] 4) Multiple warheads. India ’s reported interest in missile payloads with multiple nuclear warheads means that certain elements of satellite technology could be diverted to military use. Deliberate or inadvertent transfers of technology associated with dispensing and orienting satellites could, as in the Chinese case, make it easier to develop multiple re-entry vehicles. 5) Countermeasures against missile defenses. Assistance to India in certain types of satellite technology, such as the automated deployment of structures in space, could aid the development of penetration aids for India’s long-range missiles. Given that the United States is an obvious target for an Indian ICBM, such countermeasures could help counter U.S. missile defenses. Even if India’s missile programs were not materially aided by U.S. space launch cooperation, other countries might fill the gap. France and Russia, India’s traditional and less-restrained rocket technology suppliers, are certain to want a piece of any space action. It is true that India has not necessarily made the final commitment to develop an ICBM, but many steps have been taken to this end. Even if India has no current intention to develop the Surya, intentions (and ruling parties) can change. Unwise U.S. space cooperation would facilitate India’s final steps toward an ICBM. It is true that India is our friend and “strategic partner,” at least at the present time. History raises questions whether such friendship would continue through an adverse change in India’s ruling party or through a conflict with Pakistan. India’s interest in an ICBM, which in many ways only makes sense as a weapon against the United States, raises questions about whether the friendship is mutual. More over, nonproliferation policy is often directed against programs in friendly nations. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa , South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine are all friendly states for which the United States has attempted to hinder WMD and missile programs without un dermining broader relations. An exception for India is certain to be followed by more strident demands for exceptions elsewhere. Is the space launch component of “friendship” worth a world filled with states with nuclear-armed missiles? India ’s missile program has evolved over more than four decades. The history of proliferation demonstrates the difficulty of holding to a strong nonproliferation policy over years, let alone decades. There will always be temptations to trade non proliferation for some bilateral or strategic advantage of the moment. In the current situation, India may have outnegotiated the United States . After India’s 1998 nuclear-weapon tests, the United States imposed sanctions and then gradually lifted them. In nuclear and rocket matters, this was not enough for India. Once the United States began easing up on India, the United States kept easing up. The United States professes to be hold ing to its “red lines”—Powell’s words—in whatever kind of cooperation it is considering. Yet, the world needs to know where these lines are when it comes to space launch cooperation. It is one thing for the United States to provide launch services for Indian satellites. It is another for the United States to use or help improve India’s ICBM-capable rockets. Are the red lines firm or flexible? Is the glide path a slippery slope? These questions lead to a number of recommendations. Recommendations Under the July 2005 joint statement, the United States and India committed themselves to closer space ties. This does not require, nor should it encourage, U.S. cooperation on India’s ICBM pro gram directly or indirectly. In fact, the United States has already taken a step in the right direction by offering to launch Indian astronauts in upcoming space shuttle missions and to involve them to the fullest extent in the International Space Station. The United States should do more to encourage India to launch its satellites and science packages on U.S. and foreign launchers by making these launches more affordable. The United States also should be forthcoming in offering India access, as appropriate, to the benefits of U.S. satellite programs, including communications, earth resource observation, and exploration of the cosmos. India , in fact, has some of the world’s best astrophysicists and cosmologists. It is in our interest, as well as the world’s, that we welcome these Indian experts into the search for basic answers about the universe. We should make the data from the Hubble telescope and similar systems available to Indian scientists and encourage them to become full partners in its analysis. On the other hand, there are some critical cautions to be observed. 1) Do not be naive about the nature of India’s program. After more than two decades of reports about India’s interest in an ICBM, includ ing reports from Russia, statements on India ’s ICBM capability by the U.S. intelligence community, and the firing of an Indian official after he publicly described the Surya program, there should be no illusions. The reports consistently state that India’s ICBM will be derived from its space-launch vehicle technology. The United States should not believe that it is possible to separate India’s “civil ian” space-launch program—the incubator of its ballistic missiles—from India’s military program. The United States would be the primary target of an Indian ICBM, which would be used to protect India from the theoretical possibility of “high-tech aggression.” The U.S. intelligence community should resume its semi-annual unclassified report ing to Congress on India’s nuclear and missile programs, which was discontinued after April 2003. 2) Do not assist India’s space launch programs. The United States should not cooperate either with India’s space launches or with satellites that India will launch. India hopes that satellite launches will earn revenues that will accelerate its space program, including rocket development. U.S. payloads for Indian launches, such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project, risk technology transfer and invite other states to be less restrained in their use of Indian launches. The United States should resume dis couraging other states from using Indian launches, while encouraging India to re sume the practice of launching satellites on other states’ space launch vehicles. Given the frequent reports of Russian cryogenic rockets being used in the Surya, the United States should work with Russia to ensure that Russian space cooperation with India does not undercut U.S. restraint. Because there is no meaningful distinc tion between India’s civilian and military rocket programs, the United States should explicitly or de facto place ISRO back on the “entities” list of destinations that require export licenses.[23] In addition, Congress should insist that the administration explain its red lines regarding space cooperation with India. If these lines are not drawn tightly enough, Congress should intervene. 3) Review carefully any cooperation with India’s satellite programs. India is reportedly developing multiple nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles. If India develops an ICBM, the next step will be to develop countermeasures to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Certain satellite technologies can help India with both of these developments. The United States should review its satellite cooperation to ensure that it does not aid India inappropriately in the technologies of dispensing or orienting spacecraft, of automated deployment of structures in space, or of other operations that would materially contribute to mul tiple warheads or countermeasures against missile defenses. 4) Stop using cooperation in dangerous technologies as diplomatic baubles. India is the current example of a broader, dysfunctional tendency in bilateral relations to display trust and friendship by opening up the most dangerous forms of cooperation. The United States should not fall further into this trap with India or with any other state. India needs many other forms of eco nomic and military cooperation more than it needs nuclear and space technology. If India insists on focusing technology co operation in these areas, the United States should interpret that it as a red flag. The U.S. removal of technology sanctions imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear tests was an adequate and perhaps exces sive display of friendship. Further tech nology cooperation should be limited to areas that do not contribute to nuclear weapons or their means of delivery. Conclusion A primary target of an Indian ICBM would be the United States. The technology of an Indian ICBM would be that of a space launch vehicle, either directly via the PSLV or indirectly via the Agni, which is based on India’s SLV-3. The United States should not facilitate the acquisition or improve ment of that technology directly or indirectly. In this matter, U.S. clarity and restraint are what the world and India need. The United States needs to divert from the present glide path and reorient itself and India onto a more produc tive course of cooperation. It would be a cruel irony if, in the hope of becoming strategic partners, we became each other’s strategic targets.

Cooperation with India on launches is bad- would allow Iran to develop ICBMs to target the US, tanking overall cooperation with India

Sokolski, 07 (Harry, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization, “Negotiating the Obstacles to US-Indian Strategic Cooperation”, pg. 10-11, ) AFL

Restrict satellite launch cooperation with India to activities that avoid transferring even “safeguarded” MTCR-controlled know-how until New Delhi clearly ends its military and high-technology cooperation with Iran. Iran and India previously have discussed cooperation in space launch vehicle (SLV) technology. SLV technology, however, is interchangeable with intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. If there should be any revelations that India has helped Iran develop long-range missiles that could threaten North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the United States, this news would seriously undermine European and American public support for high-technology and defense cooperation with India generally. Meanwhile, the prospects that India will cut off its military-to-military cooperation with Iran in the near term is not very high. But, then, neither is India’s need to develop its own satellite launch vehicle or ICBM. The former is cost ineffective as compared to launching satellites off other nations’ existing space launch vehicles, and the latter is provocative militarily and self-defeating regarding sound relations with Pakistan and China. As long as the United States is eager to uphold and strengthen the MTCR, it would be wise do nothing to undermine its strictures against member states sharing satellite integration and satellite launch technology as it did in the commercial space satellite launch cooperation with China in the l990s. The latter was supposedly “safeguarded.” However, the effectiveness of such safeguards is limited and such protections are virtually useless if the recipient has a strong incentive to cheat. Here, careful, routine congressional oversight of the U.S. export licensing process regarding space-related transfers to India is the first order of business. Under no circumstances should the United States undermine existing MTCR restrictions for India or tolerate others doing so as the United States did in the case of China. On the other hand, the United States and other satellite launching nations can and should provide their launch services to India without discrimination and cooperate in space science ventures whenever possible. Until India demonstrates tight missile technology controls over its private and public entities (something it has so far failed to do in the case of Iran) and clearly severs its military and strategic cooperative ties with the Revolutionary Iranian government, the United States should oppose the sharing even of “safeguarded” space launch vehicle technology with New Delhi.

India won’t want future cooperation—ban prevents effective cooperation

Hindustan Times 8—newspaper in India (April 30, 2008 “ISRO worries over US restrictions” lexis)

Bangalore associated with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is worrying the scientists. In an exclusive interview, the chairman of ISRO G. Madhavan Nair in Bangalore on Tuesday has said that the ban on some of the sister concerns by US was a cause of worry and wants to take up the issue with US. After the successful launch of ten satellites from one space vehicle, India plans to launch Chandrayaan-1, the satellite system to the moon in the third quarter of this year. Madhavan Nair said: "We are definitely making an attempt to improve our relation with the US space agency, NASA. I have already established a good contact with Michael Griffin, Chief of NASA." He said that the effort had helped in bringing two instruments on board the Chandrayaan-1. However, Madhavan Nair said that the ban on some of the sister concerns by US was a cause for worry. He said: "Normally the US system has got many checks and balances within them and that takes lot of time to get through the hurdles. Yes I think even today the fact that some of the ISRO units are under the entity list, that's not a happy situation so we have expressed to them also and I hope it will improve in time to come." Madhavan Nair said that ISRO is going to launch its space vehicle GSLV using India's indigenous cryogenic engine by the end of 2008. "As far as cryogenic stage is concerned we have fully qualified it on the ground. Close to 7000 seconds of testing has been done on that and we have full confidence on the performance of the engine., April 30 -- Even though the Indo - US cooperation has given impetus to joint space research, the ban on some of the concerns.

Rising Expectations Turn

COOPERATION WITH INDIA CREATES UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS – US CAN’T MANAGE FUTURE RELATIONS

Sinha and Dorschner 10 -*Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Wisconsin-Madison AND **First Secretary for Economic Affairs at U.S. Department of State (January 2010, Aseema and Jon, “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?*”, )

Paul Kennedy and other scholars have drawn parallels between the world order dominated by the British Empire and the current state of affairs. Kennedy attributes Britain’s decline to its squandering of economic power and dominance to fund ever greater military entanglements and expansion. It has become commonplace to point to U.S. military involvement in Iraq and the draining impact of the American ‘‘war on terror’’ as indicators that the U.S. is replicating the British pattern, condensed into a much shorter period. By this view, it is a question not of whether but when the ‘‘Pax Americana’’ will come to an end.46 While most regard a transition to a multipolar world order as inevitable, it remains unclear as to how this transition will take place and whether it will be a violent transition marked by confrontation or a peaceful one characterized by cooperation. While most Indian foreign policy experts and members of the Indian power elite share this assessment, they view a return to a multipolar world as a long-term goal rather than an imminent possibility. There is a broad consensus that multipolarity is destined to return, with India as one of the natural poles. In India the argument therefore usually centers not on whether unipolarity will come to an end, but when. Indian analysts subsume this belief in the inevitability of Indian participation as a pole in a restored multipolar system under their conviction that India must always act in its own best interests. Since the current unipole (the U.S.) will remain dominant for the foreseeable future, they argue that India should therefore cultivate close ties with the unipole during its period of dominance, which will continue over the medium term. During this period India will continue to gain strength so that it will be prepared for the day when U.S. power recedes and multipolarity returns. While India is a rising nation eager to play an expanded role on the world stage consistent with its growing economic, political, and military status, it is also patient and willing to wait until the world order shifts. In the interim, India will continue to cultivate close ties to the world hegemon. Seen in this light, India’s participation in the BRIC process is a concrete manifestation of its interest to increase its participation on the world stage and its prestige in the international community. Following a remarkable rise from an impoverished former British colony to a major world player,47 India now stands ready to assume a greater international role. However, the country is only beginning to break out of the bounds of a regional power and assert its role on the world stage within the confines of a unipolar setup. It is aware that it will take time for this transition to take place. In the interim, India will continue to determine its course of action in international affairs by cultivating its relationship with the sole remaining superpower, the U.S.

Bilateral cooperation creates unrealistic expectations – Bush confirms it tanks relations

Perkovich 10 (11/4/10, George, vice president for studies and director of the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Obama in India,” )

There are unrealistic expectations. U.S.-India relations were on a positive trajectory from the middle part of the Clinton administration onward—and this was a very good thing. The success of American Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama and Indian Prime Ministers Rao, Vajpayee, and Singh basically helped the two countries on a positive trajectory. And then what happened in the Bush administration with the U.S.-India nuclear deal was that the positive trajectory spiked—it was like injecting amphetamines into a runner. So, it spiked up and that was seen as a good thing. And it was seen as a good thing in India, but inevitably it came back down to the normal trend line, which is positive. But as it comes down from the spike there are people in India and the United States who say the relationship is falling, Obama hasn’t paid enough attention to it, and so on. But the reality is that it was an unsustainable spike. When the countries come back down it feels different, but they are coming back down to what is still a very positive trend line. The more normal thing is to have this positive trend line and the relationship has little ups and downs. For instance, India passes a law that frustrates the United States and there’s a little down. And vice versa. But you won’t see these big spikes one way or the other.

Indo-China Relations Mod

Turn-the CP is perceived as encirclement, this destroys indo-sino relations

Garver and Wang 10 *John W. Garver is a professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology **Fei-Ling Wang is a Professor at The Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta. Dr. Wang received his B.A. and Master of Law from Anhui Normal University, Beijing Institute of International Relations, and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pennsylvania. [, Sep. 29th 2010, Published in the Journal of Asian Security]

Joint India-US military exercises of all types burgeoned throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century: joint naval exercises, air combat and warfare, command post exercises, high-altitude operations, and (according to the US ambassador to India) exercises in covert warfare. 20 India conducted a few joint military exercises with China, but there was a great asymmetry of the Indo-US and Indo-China military relations. Sino-Indian interactions were mostly talks, dialogues, and declarations of principles. Indo-American interactions were far more substantive, involving the enhancement of Indian military capabilities: joint research and development efforts, space and missile defense, transfer of advanced dual use technology and some weapons systems, nuclear energy, operational training of forces, and so on. Indo-US military cooperation was institutionalized in June 2005 when the two countries signed a New Framework for the Defense Relationship laying out a ten-year program of expanded military cooperation, including joint research and development, in space and other high-tech areas. This agreement along with the nuclear cooperation agreement that began to move forward about the same time seem to have been the “straw that broke the camel's back” for Beijing. Chinese analysts made clear China's view that Indian alignment with the United States against China, as judged by Beijing, would spoil Sino-Indian relations. Former Chinese ambassador to India Zhou Gang argued in 2004 at a conference on Sino-Indian relations and Asian security convened by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Central Liaison Department, that the United States was trying to use India to contain China and that this “will have negative impact on Sino-Indian relations.” 21 By 2009, an analyst from China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) wrote that to elevate Sino-Indian relations, India needs to “increase trust and decrease suspicion at the level of Sino-Indian strategic dialogue” regarding “third party factors of the 2008 US-India nuclear agreement and US-India space cooperation.” 22

Draws in other major powers – goes global and nuclear

Jeremy Kahn (writer for Newsweek) October 2009 “Why India Fears China”

The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides. Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority. Already Beijing has launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at undercutting Indian sovereignty over the areas China claims, particularly the northeast state of Arunachal Pradesh and one of its key cities, Tawang, birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and home to several important Tibetan monasteries. Tibet ceded Tawang and the area around it to British India in 1914. China has recently denied visas to the state's residents; lodged a formal complaint after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the state in 2008; and tried to block a $2.9 billion Asian Development Bank loan to India because some of the money was earmarked for an irrigation project in the state. All these moves are best understood in the context of China's recent troubles in Tibet, with Beijing increasingly concerned that any acceptance of the 1914 border will amount to an implicit acknowledgment that Tibet was once independent of China—a serious blow to the legitimacy of China's control over the region and potentially other minority areas as well. The reports of Chinese incursions can be read as a signal that it is deadly serious about its territorial claims. The exact border has never been mutually agreed on—meaning one side's incursion is another side's routine patrol—but the Chinese have clearly stepped up their activity along the frontier. The Indian military reported a record 270 Chinese border violations last year—nearly double the figure from the year before and more than three times the number of incidents in 2006, says Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic studies at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Noting that there was a reported incursion nearly every day this summer, Chellaney says this amounts to "a pattern of Chinese belligerence." In June the People's Daily criticized recent moves by India to strengthen its border defenses and declared: "China will not make any compromises in its border disputes with India." It asked if India had properly weighed "the consequences of a potential confrontation with China."

Indo-China Ext – Coop Kills Relations

INCREASING US-INDIA SPACE COOPERATION ANGERS CHINA AND RISKS AN ARMS RACE

Brown, 09 (Peter J., freelance writer from the state of Maine, USA, who specializes in the global satellite arena, “India and the US Build Stronger Ties in Space”, 8/7/09, ) AFL

Rajagopalan points out that although ISRO represents the civilian side of Indian space research, the level of advancement has created a certain amount of wariness, and raised potential fears of a possible shift underway at ISRO involving its role in direct support of military space programs. And while China has not responded to the signing of the TSA - or the EUMA - per se, any strengthening or streamlining of relations between India and the US will not be taken lightly. "Beijing will maintain a strict watch on India's advancing defense/space technological ties with the US, Israel or the European countries. As one of the Chinese internal studies brought out, China will continue to undertake various measures to maintain its current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership [the United Nations Security Council], and [participation in] the nuclear club, [while retaining] its important diplomatic advantages through its special relationships with India's neighboring countries," said Rajagopalan. Greater India-US cooperation in space will likely intensify the competition between India and China over the coming years. If India's space sector suddenly surges ahead as a result, this will do more than lightly annoy Beijing. "[While] high-technology trade and interaction with the US has an inherent sensitivity and strategic component built into it, it [also] signals that Washington is keen to expand and deepen its strategic ties with India," said Gupta. "And further, to the extent that Beijing remains under de facto high-technology embargoes initiated by the West, [US space cooperation with India] signals that strategic cooperation in highly sensitive sectors continues, at minimum, to remain weighted against Chinese interests."

Heg DA Links

Unilateral space action is key to Heg

Stone 5/16/11 – Christopher Stone is a space policy analyst and strategist who lives near Washington DC. Collective assurance vs. independence in national space policies by Christopher Stone Monday, May 16, 2011

As the US current space policy notes, every nation has the right to access and use space. Each nation has the right to develop its own nationally-focused “unilateral” space policies that serve to advance their vital interests in security, prestige, and wealth as the baseline for any international cooperation they choose to support. Failure to invest in bold, ambitious space efforts with a national tone (in all sectors) in space will not only hurt the US space industry, but will harm our nation’s ability to advance its global interests in space, impact our traditional vital interests of independence and achievement, and threaten the very preeminence that we have labored so hard to achieve over the past fifty years. If our goal is the advancement of a global exploration program in space, then fine, but the US needs to observe that other nations and partnerships such as the EU and Russia appear to be taking an alternate path toward increased domestic space capabilities and expanded infrastructure for national interests. They are pressing ahead with their goals to step into the vacuum of leadership that the US is allowing through the shutdown of US programs, abandoning capabilities, and allowing the loss of large numbers of skilled space workers. Our next space policy and strategy, while including international efforts of mutual benefit, should focus on advancing American capability and enable a long range strategy for exploration and enhanced military capabilities in space, just as our friends the Europeans are pursuing.

Equal Partnerships should not define US policy

Steinberg ‘1 [Gerald Steinberg Prof of Political Studies @ Bar Illan U, “If the US leads, the world will follow”, Jerusalem Post, September 21, P. Lexis; WBTR

Instead of time-consuming negotiations and diplomatic coalition building, President Bush, as the leader of the world's only superpower needs to demonstrate his determination and power through clear action. This does not mean that long-standing allies such as NATO (including Turkey) and partners such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and even Russia and China should be ignored. Consultation and cooperation are important, but the US must also provide an unambiguous lead. Those states that are serious about anti-terrorist policies will follow, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and many other Arab and Islamic countries which are themselves threatened by fundamentalist Islamic terror.

***India Relations Disad/Net Benefit

1NC Shell

US is in the very early stages of Indo-US space cooperation now – its not established but trending that direction

Deccan Herald 6/21/11 *Newspaper, Online Issue [, “U.S. to Enhance Space Cooperation with India]

"By and large, we are looking to India as a great up and coming space-faring nation to work with us," Peter Marquez, Director of Space Policy, at the National Security Council, told reporters at a conference call after the White House unveiled the new National Space Policy. The new policy is designed to strengthen US' leadership in space and putting emphasis on greater cooperation with India in this field. "We see that there's great potential there and we would love nothing more to continue to build upon the great foundation we have with India and expand that cooperation," Marquez said. Despite the fact that the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is in the entities list, NASA collaborated with ISRO through the Chandrayan-I that detected water on the moon. India has demanded that ISRO be removed from the entities list that poses a major hurdle in the space co-operation between the two countries. Marquez said US President Barack Obama has discussed with the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on issues related to space cooperation between the two countries. "Cooperation with India is vitally important to as we go forward in a variety of areas -- not just in the civil space -- you know, in NASA area where we have had cooperation, but also in the climate change and earth observation area," he said. "We will look for greater cooperation there. We do understand there may be areas in national security where we're going to have discussions with India," he said in response to a question. Meanwhile, a senior Administration official said the United States consulted with several countries including India on its new space policy. "I think we're in the early stages right now, but we look very much forward to beginning a dialogue with India and other emerging space nations," the official told reporters. In a statement after the White House unveiled the basic contours of the new space policy, Obama said, "This policy is about the boundless possibilities of the future." "That is why we seek to spur a burgeoning commercial space industry, to rapidly increase our capabilities in space while bolstering America's competitive edge in the global economy", he said. He said the administration is proposing improved observation of the earth, to gain new insights into the environment and the planet. Another senior Administration official noted that there has been a healthy dialogue with India already and the goal would be to continue that. "So with respect to specific programmes or what have you that we might consider, that's something that we would need to discuss."But I think the idea is to build in the foundation that already exists," he said in response to a question.

Plan crushes U.S. credibility and kills relations, only vigorous cooperation sends a signal of strong u.s. indian relations

Rendleman and Faulconer 10 *James D. Rendleman is a retired Colonel of the USAF, J.Walter Faulconer is **J. Walter Faulconer is the new business area executive for civilian space at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel. [, “Improving International Space Cooperation”]

Diplomatic prestige. Cooperation provides opportunities for a nation to demonstrate its international leadership and technical prowess. For example, India has used its recent launches to host payloads from a number of international partners. South Korea is leveraging Russian launch technology to attempt space launches of satellites all in support of its dream to become a ―top ten‖ space fairing nation. Table 2 illustrates when each member of the "space launch club" joined. Russia and China launch satellites for much of the global space-faring community. Ultimately, support for cooperation and collaboration increases when the perceived utility and diplomatic prestige derived from cooperation increases. In general, the more countries participate, the higher will be the utility. Nevertheless, not all countries are equal, and their individual utility value depends on world politics. For example, the utility of having Russia join the [International Space Station (ISS)] program increased significantly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, when relations with a new Russia were at the forefront of United States foreign policy. To the extent that a symbol of cooperation with a given nation is valuable, utility will be delivered. As such, Indian participation in joint space exploration would send a strong signal to the world of good U.S.-Indian relations. This would simultaneously increase Indian prestige by demonstrating their technological prowess. Similarly, Chinese participation in joint space exploration would signal growing cooperation between the two nations...These diplomatic incentives may come at a cost for the cooperating nations; for example, China would likely have to make concessions in the form of more stringent technology export controls and/or better observance of human rights standards. If space exploration is successfully used as a diplomatic tool to exert such “soft power,” its utility increases in proportion to the degree that it is successful in implementing a policymaker’s agenda.26 A demonstration of the utility of diplomatic prestige gained from space cooperative endeavors can be seen in the Apollo-Soyuz space link-up (1975) and Space Shuttle Mir docking (1995) missions, though not for reasons contained in the public pronouncements by the participants Their true and complex diplomatic utility was not made apparent for many years. As described by James Oberg: “It was the very heights of the Cold War,” (Apollo astronaut) Stafford recalled, “with thousands of nuclear weapons aimed at each country.” Then from outer space a streak of sanity appeared: “Yet both superpowers had great accomplishments in space, so we decided to work together.” Only with the Soviet program at a standstill did Moscow agree to fly a joint orbital mission. Its fallback position was that if it couldn’t be Number One in space, it could at least pose as the equal partner of the new Number One, the United States. It was better than letting on how far behind its space program had fallen.27 Political sustainability. International cooperation has the peculiar, wonderful, and sometimes wasteful capacity to increase the political will to sustain and fund space programs and associated budgets. As noted, cooperation provides a space fairing state the basis to draw on additional resources when its own are not adequate to achieve desired space goals and visions. Cooperation also enables a program to weather attempts to be reined in even when faced with contentious and devastating cost-growth or budget realities (which most space programs invariably face). Thus, within the United States, a program often wins a bit of sanctuary from cancellation threats or significant budget reductions to the extent that Congress and the administration feel compelled to not break, stretch, or withdraw from international agreements. Political good will is generated by funding these programs. To find an example of the power of this good will, one only need look to the politics surrounding NASA’s manned programs. Money has been allocated to the program even when the perceived justification for its expansive program has collapsed. Now the new internationalist U.S. President doesn’t care much for the NASA manned mission, and has even less understanding of its science mission. In any event critics concede that the President sees value in the votes its engineering and contractor community represents, key especially in vote rich states such as Florida which serve as a nexus for manned U.S. launches. Similarly, some reason the political and diplomatic integration of Russia into the ISS program may well have saved the ISS and Space Shuttle programs from cancellation.28 Once cooperation has commenced, canceling a program becomes inconsistent with political sustainability as long as the utility cost associated with the loss of diplomatic benefits and the negative effects on reputation of terminating an international agreement is larger in magnitude than the utility cost that must be paid to maintain the system… The corollary to this is that there is a high cost to be paid by any nation that chooses to unilaterally withdraw from an existing cooperative endeavor. This cost comes in the form of damage to the departing nation’s reputation or credibility. In general, any unilateral action sends a signal that the actor is an unpredictable and therefore an unreliable and possibly disrespectful partner. This tends to sabotage the possibility of future cooperation. As such, there is a long-term benefit to maintaining cooperation, even when the immediate cost may seem to call for terminating it.29 If significant cooperation has never occurred, its commencement is thought to be a defining event, delivering specific political rewards and diplomatic utility. This is why the recent pronouncements on space cooperation made by President Obama and Chinese officials during his November 2009 visits are being watched with special interest. The same attention is being paid to the overtures made with the Indian government and its space community.

Space policy is key - tanks relations and heg – ensures global escalatory conflict

Correll 06 - national security consultant with Science Applications International Company, served in the United States Air Force in a wide variety of research, development and space assignments., Ph.D in Physics from UT-Austin

Randall Correll “U.S.-India Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown” 2006 Astropolitics Vol. 4, Iss. 2, EBSCO

The new strategic partnership between the United States and India has the potential be the turning point around which a new geopolitical balance of power will form. A key element in this partnership— U.S.-India space cooperation—will most likely become the defining relationship for space cooperation around which other space-faring nations will posture their international space cooperation strategies. To the Indian space program, partnership with the United States will be the jewel in the crown of their space cooperation activities. In a reciprocal manner, cooperation in space with India will sparkle with opportunity for the United States. The central position of India in the Asian continent—its burgeoning economic growth and its wealth of human capital— will be crucial assets in achieving U.S. objectives in space and in broader objectives in global security. India is the second most populous nation, and the world’s largest democracy. It is undergoing rapid economic growth and is already a nuclear power and space faring nation. India also is facing many challenges. ‘‘Despite impressive gains in economic investment and output, India faces pressing problems such as the ongoing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, massive overpopulation, environmental degradation, extensive poverty, and ethnic and religious strife.’’1 ‘‘Privatization of government-owned industries has proceeded slowly, and continues to generate political debate; continued social, political, and economic rigidities hold back needed initiatives.’’ As the world enters the 21st century with its revolutionary global economy and the threat of transnational terrorism, U.S.-India relations are transforming:2 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush today declare there resolve to transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership. As leaders of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and the rule of law, the new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace throughout the world. It will enhance our ability to work together to provide global leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest. This bold new course for U.S.-India relations was first initiated in November of 2001 when President Bush and PrimeMinister Vajpayee committed their countries to a strategic partnership.3 In January 2004, they furthered their commitment by itemizing specific areas of cooperation in their agreement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP): civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade.4 This new imperative provides an opportunity to expand U.S.-India space cooperation to include not only civil and commercial space activities but also space cooperation for common security and defense. To best auger the way forward, U.S. policy makers must first understand the strategic context for both nations, understand the current state and upward trajectory of the Indian space program, and then consider cooperative activities that extend beyond traditional military operations to include the broad spectrum of security affairs such as building common interest, providing disaster response, supporting peacekeeping operations, and enabling the growth of freedom and democracy. 160 R. R. Correll Strategic Context During the cold war, U.S.-India relations were often strained; India was leaning towards the Soviet sphere and often at odds with the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India has migrated back towards the west, which has likewise been more receptive. Most significantly, ‘‘in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, India took the immediate and unprecedented step of offering to the United States full cooperation for counterterrorism operations. The offer reflected the sea change that has occurred in recent years in the U.S.-India relationship, which for decades was mired in the politics of the Cold War.’’5 This relationship has recently become of great strategic interest to the United States, which views India as a natural ally in promoting democracy, freedom, prosperity, and security in the region. This new strategic context for U.S.-Indian cooperation in space is aptly expressed by the Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, in his remarks of December 21, 2005 to an audience in Washington, D.C.:6 Indo-U.S. relations are at a crossroads. We have two clear choices before us. One is the road that we have traveled before—one that will maintain the status quo and the distance between our two democracies. The other, not without its challenges, recognizes the enormous changes of the last decade, appreciates the resulting opportunities, and is prepared to depart from established positions to realize a genuine strategic partnership. Its realization could make Indo-U.S. ties one of the principal relationships of the international system. Notice that Foreign Secretary Saran used the word ‘‘crossroads.’’ This newly envisioned strategic partnership is not yet firmly established. It will take a vigorous program of engagement with cooperative efforts and tangible results to establish a firm and vital foundation. Engagement in cooperative activities builds common interest resulting in enhanced security. It provides an important complement to arms control, which in itself is a limited form of engagement. Where arms control restricts, cooperative programs and activities build an active bond of shared effort and common purpose extending far beyond the diplomatic corps. U.S.-India Space Partnership 161 Vogue descriptions of the flattening of the world’s economy7— which alludes to the fact that the information age technology has broken through traditional barriers to participation in the global economy—typically feature India as representative of the new world order. But even as the geocommercial landscape is shifting and leveling, the ‘‘flat world’’ metaphor should not be used to intimate that the balance of power between nations and alliances will be neutralized. As large, less-developed nations grow in economic and national power, the existing powers will be threatened and possibly weakened. Regional rivals will emerge where formerly global superpowers dominated, and new conflicts and tensions will arise. It is quite likely that the increasing activity of space-faring nations will make space less secure in the near term. Already certain states and transnational groups have engaged in the jamming or highjacking of satellite communications, intent on blocking or broadcasting propaganda and strategic messages. Yet once this space infrastructure is integrated into the security apparatus of strong international partners, the peace and security of the world should be significantly enhanced. India’s star is rising. It is the challenge of U.S. and Indian leadership to assure that their two great nations will never be far from a harmonious conjunction regarding world affairs. The Indian space program provides a convenient starting point for the United States to cultivate this relationship.

Multiple hotspots go nuclear

Robert Kagan (Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund) 2007 “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September,

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

**Uniqueness

India Space Program - Yes

INDIA’S SPACE PROGRAM IS RAPIDLY EXPANDING – IT SPILLS OVER INTO OTHER AREAS OF DIPLOMACY

Wax 2009 - Washington Post Foreign Service writer

Emily Wax - November 4, 2009 “India's space ambitions taking off”

"It's such an exciting time in the history of India's space program," said G. Madhavan Nair, a rocket scientist and the outgoing chairman of the national space agency, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). "More and more bright young Indian scientists are calling us for jobs. We will look back on this as a turning point." The ascendancy of India's space program highlights the country's rising ambitions on the world stage, as it grows economically and asserts itself in matters of diplomacy. Politicians once dismissed the space program as a waste. Activists for India's legions of poor criticized additional funding for the program, saying it was needless decades after the American crew of Apollo 11 had landed on the moon. Now, however, the program is a source of prestige. Last year, India reached a milestone, launching 10 satellites into space on a single rocket. Officials are positioning the country to become a leader in the business of launching satellites for others, having found paying clients in countries such as Israel and Italy. They even talk of a mission to Mars.

Indo-US Cooperation Now

INDIA WANTS TO HEAVILY COOPERATE WITH THE US OVER LUNAR MISSIONS

Chavan* and Tellis** 2010 - *Member of Indian parliament, Minister of State for Science &

Technology and Earth Sciences & Vice President of CSIR, **senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former Department of State senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Former senior policy analyst at the RAND corporation

Ashley Tellis and Shri Prithviraj Chavan June 23, 2010 “Prospects and Challenges for U.S.–India Technology Cooperation”

Space: Building on its first moon orbital mission, India’s Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) would like to closely cooperate with NASA on a second moon mission, as well as on sending an Indian into space and on basic space research, such as remote-sensing technology.

US-India joint cooperation on space now

The White House Office of Press Secretary November 8, 2010 Fact Sheet on U.S. - India Space Cooperation

President Obama and Prime Minister Singh agreed to scale up joint U.S. - India space collaboration. They recognized a natural partnership exists between India’s dynamic human enterprise and the U.S. storied history of space exploration. In addition, they noted that their respective private sectors would be significant force multipliers in any effort to advance joint space exploration. The leaders pledged to build closer ties in space exploration and earth observation through a Joint Civil Space Working Group meeting to be held in 2011. In addition to our rapidly expanding bilateral cooperation, the United States welcomes India’s increasingly active participation in multilateral fora on space cooperation, including the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) and the intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations (GEO).

Space Co-op happening now

ANI 11—Asia News International

(Jan. 28, 2011. “US hoping to become 'close partner' of India in space exploration” lexis)

New York, Jan. 28 -- A senior official of the Obama administration has said that United States is hoping to become 'close partner' of India in space exploration. The removal of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from the Commerce Department's Entity List is an indication that Washington will no longer treat India's space program as a target, but as a close partner in space exploration, said Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs. Addressing a gathering at the Syracruse University earlier this week, Blake said that the possibilities of cooperation between the United States and India in space, to advance scientific knowledge and human welfare, are without boundaries and limits. Paraphrasing former ISRO Chairman Madhavan Nair words that India's space program can only be successful when it can produce benefits ' material change -- for Indian citizens, Blake said: 'Indian farmers will see the fruits of our collaboration as U.S. and Indian space scientists work together on climate and weather forecasting for agriculture, navigation, resource mapping, research and development, and capacity building.' 'Our experts have developed enhanced monsoon forecasting that will begin to transmit detailed forecasts to farmers, beginning with the 2011 monsoon season. India also is an emerging leader in earth observation, with the second highest number of earth observation satellites in orbit. American fishing fleets could increase their catch thanks to the collection of tidal data as part of this initiative,' he added. 'We are seeking additional ways to collaborate on future lunar missions, the international space station, human space flight, and data sharing. I hope that our private sectors will now have the opportunity to develop new avenues of cooperation in the space realm and build on our achievements to further improve the livelihoods of our populations, Blake said.

Lifted the ban in January – ripe for cooperation

O'Donnell 4/11/11 Frank is a Researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He holds an MSc (Distinction) in Strategic Studies from the University of Aberdeen and an MA (Honors) in International Relations and Middle East Studies from the University of St Andrews. India's Space Ascent Gains New Boost

Speaking before the Indian Parliament in November 2010, US President Barack Obama outlined his policy of "forging deeper cooperation with 21st century centers of influence - and that must necessarily include India." Noting space collaboration as an area ripe for expanded collaboration, the joint statement by Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their determination to "transform bilateral export control regulations and policies to realize the full potential of the strategic partnership between the two countries." To fulfill this objective, nine institutions critical to Indian space and defense technology development were removed from the US Department of Commerce "Entity List " in January. This list restricts commerce in space, nuclear, chemical and biological technology with certain organizations. The Commerce Department also reallocated India to an export control category exclusive to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) "adherent" states. These revisions ease the path for exporters to obtain licenses for transfer of space technology to India, although individual licenses may still be denied. The granting of "MTCR adherent status" particularly signifies a growing US perception that India takes seriously concerns regarding global proliferation and sensitive technology transfers. These actions provide new opportunities for American agencies and firms to assist India in the evolution of its space program, including supporting Indian goals of mastering advanced rockets, deploying an expanded satellite fleet, and building international commercial launch capacity.

India wants to work with the US on space—Anti-satellite weapons prove

PTI 09—Indian newspaper called the Press Trust of India (March 24, 2009 “India willing to work with US on anti-satellite weapons” Lexis)

India, which is one of the few countries in the world to have significant space capabilities, is willing to work with the US to develop anti-satellite weapons, a top diplomat has said. "This is an area of convergence on which we would be happy to work together with the US and contribute to a multilateral agreement," Shyam Saran, Prime Minister's Special Envoy, said in his address to the Brookings Institution. Saran was referring to the recent announcements made by the US President, Barack Obama, about his intention to join multilateral efforts to prevent military conflict in space and to negotiate an agreement to prohibit the testing of anti-satellite weapons. India welcomes this, he said. "We have a large number of communications and resource survey satellites currently in orbit. Although this does not fall strictly within the nuclear domain, the need to ensure the peaceful uses of outer space, is important for nuclear stability and international security," Saran said. In 2007, China had destroyed one of its own defunct satellites with a ballistic missile, sparking global concerns. In February last year, a US Navy ship too launched a missile that hit a dying spy satellite.

Indo-US Relations High

RELATIONS GOOD WITH INDIA NOW

PTI 10—Indian newspaper called the Press Trust of India (June 29, 2010 “Obama unveils new space policy, to enhance cooperation with India” lexis)

Looking to India as a "great" up and coming space-faring nation, the US said its newly announced space policy attached "vital" importance to enhance cooperation with that country. "By and large, we are looking to India as a great up and coming space-faring nation to work with us," Peter Marquez, Director of Space Policy, at the National Security Council, told reporters at a conference call after the White House unveiled THE new National Space Policy. The new policy is designed to strengthen US' leadership in space and putting emphasis on greater cooperation with India in this field. "We see that there's great potential there and we would love nothing more to continue to build upon the great foundation we have with India and expand that cooperation," Marquez said. Despite the fact that the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is in the entities list, NASA collaborated with ISRO through the Chandrayan-I that detected water on the moon. India has demanded that ISRO be removed from the entities list that poses a major hurdle in the space co-operation between the two countries. Marquez said US President Barack Obama has discussed with the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on issues related to space cooperation between the two countries. "Cooperation with India is vitally important to as we go forward in a variety of areas -- not just in the civil space -- you know, in NASA area where we have had cooperation, but also in the climate change and earth observation area," he said. "We will look for greater cooperation there. We do understand there may be areas in national security where we're going to have discussions with India," he said in response to a question. Meanwhile, a senior Administration official said the United States consulted with several countries including India on its new space policy. "I think we're in the early stages right now, but we look very much forward to beginning a dialogue with India and other emerging space nations," the official told reporters. In a statement after the White House unveiled the basic contours of the new space policy, Obama said, "This policy is about the boundless possibilities of the future." "That is why we seek to spur a burgeoning commercial space industry, to rapidly increase our capabilities in space while bolstering America's competitive edge in the global economy", he said. He said the administration is proposing improved observation of the earth, to gain new insights into the environment and the planet. Another senior Administration official noted that there has been a healthy dialogue with India already and the goal would be to continue that.

Relations improving now, but not certain

Ferster 10 (11/8/10, Warren, Space News, “United States, India Pledge Expanded Civil Space Ties,” )

The United States and India will expand cooperation in civil space as part of a broader initiative to promote stronger strategic, economic and security ties between the two countries, the White House announced Nov. 8. The announcement came during U.S. President Barack Obama’s official state visit to India for talks with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the first stop on the U.S. leader’s Asian tour. As part of the deal, key centers of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), along with Indian defense research agencies, will be taken off the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List. Doing business with organizations on the Entity List requires a special license, and the inclusion of ISRO has long been a barrier to Indo-U.S. ties in space. According to a fact sheet posted on the White House website, four ISRO centers will be removed from the Entity List: Liquid Propulsion Systems Center, Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant, Sriharikota Space Center and Vikram Sarabhai Space Center. Among the defense research organizations removed from the list is the Missile Research and Development Complex. “The removal of these Indian entities from the Entity List is expected to facilitate trade and cooperation in civil space and defense to enable the two governments to focus on addressing other outstanding barriers that hinder expanded bilateral high technology trade,” the fact sheet states. In addition, the United States will “realign” India in its export control regime for so-called dual-use items “to reflect India’s status as a strategic partner, effectively treating India similarly to other close allies and partners.” In civil space, Obama and Singh agreed to build closer ties in exploration and Earth observation. India has long had a robust Earth observation satellite program and in 2008 launched its first planetary mission, the Chandrayaan-1 lunar orbiter, which carried multiple NASA-supplied scientific instruments. The two nations also will continue a dialogue on cooperation in human spaceflight. Although India has yet to send astronauts into space, it has designed and tested relevant capabilities including an orbit and re-entry capsule. Possible cooperative projects in Earth observation include a “joint weather and climate forecasting project to predict the impacts of climate variability on agriculture,” validating data from India’s Oceansat-2 satellite and the upcoming Indo-French Megha-Tropiques precipitation measuring mission, and long-term cooperation in land imaging, the fact sheet states. The two sides also will explore ways to preserve security in the sea, air and space domains, the fact sheet said. The latest agreements follow a 2004 framework accord between the United States and India called Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, which emphasized three areas of cooperation: civil nuclear energy, civil space and high-technology trade. Removing ISRO from the Entity List was stated as a goal when that agreement was announced. Despite India’s significant space capabilities, particularly in Earth observation, cooperation with the United States has been slow to materialize over the years, in part because of U.S. objections to India’s 1998 nuclear tests. But there has been a thawing trend in recent years. In 2009, the United States and India signed a technical safeguards accord permitting U.S. civil-government payloads to launch aboard Indian rockets. For several years, the two sides have been negotiating an agreement that would permit U.S. commercial space hardware to launch aboard Indian rockets, but there was no mention of that deal in the latest White House announcement.

Indo-US Relations High - Brink

NOW IS KEY – RELATIONS ARE AT A CROSS-ROADS, PLAN DISRUPTS MOMENTUM

Das 11 – Premvir, former Director General, Defence Planning Staff, and member of the National Security Advisory Board (May 1, 2011 AMB)

For more substance to be given to the relationship, a larger overview of national interest is needed. If a multipolar Asia is what India wants and a unipolar continent is what China seeks, then the US becomes a very important factor in our calculus. Its interests in Asia are enormous and it cannot let China assume a hegemonic role. Without ‘using’ the US, it is not possible for India to secure the Asia that it wants. On another plane, none of its global aspirations can be met without the proactive support of the US — seats in the Security Council, on the high table of world trade, in groups controlling nuclear technology or in several other multilateral forums, fall in this category. The real question is whether a close engagement impacts adversely our relations with other countries — for example, Russia, Iran and Myanmar, even China, our core interests in South Asia and, indeed our concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan. These cannot be easily brushed aside but close scrutiny will show that while all these are manageable by us, the larger canvas is not. In sum, close relations with the US are critical to India’s rise, first as an Asian power and then as a global player of consequence. If this is true, then defence cooperation between the two countries must be taken a few notches further. Its contours can be four-fold. One, the existing military interfaces and acquisitions should be progressed apace, even if an American company does not get the contract for 126 aircraft for the Air Force, as seems likely; there will be more military procurements on line. Two, both countries should be in sync on India’s interests in the Indian Ocean region and act in a manner that will sustain them; a permanent Chinese naval presence, possible only through base facilities in littorals, acts to the detriment of this position. Three, maritime forces of both countries must act together in the campaign against piracy in the Indian Ocean. Finally, India must be prepared to render military assistance in ‘out of area’ contingencies; on its part, the US must take punitive measures against acts of terrorism against India originating, even sponsored, from Pakistan. We are at a crossroads. If we take the right road, defence cooperation will gather momentum and to our advantage. If not, it will soon run out of steam, to our detriment.

Indian Military

INDIA RISING MILITARILY IN SPACE

Maj Jeffrey W. Bogar 10, *USAF Student, Air Command and Staff College Maxwell AFB, Alabam

“The Rise of India as a Space Power” February 2010 High Frontier Volume 6, Number 2

At first glance, India’s space program appears to have a foundation of non-military uses designed specifically to enhance technological development and grow the domestic economy. However, given its relationship with antagonistic neighbors, the increased exploitation of space for national security purposes by India appears to be on the rise. Utilizing intra-governmental relationships and fostering international partnerships enables India to transition a commercial space program to a militarized one. Cooperation between the ISRO and India’s Defense Research and Development Organization increased significantly after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test. India’s leadership acknowledges the force enabler that space systems provide, and therefore supports an increase in dual-use technology development with both military and commercial applications. 7 Additionally, India seeks to establish its own Aerospace Command, modeled after the North American Defense Command of the US and Canada. Although intended to prevent attacks from space and certainly signaling their willingness to tackle large military space projects, the development will take years to complete, making it an insignificant factor in any near-future conflict scenarios. 8 Finally, India recently entered into several military partnerships, including one with Israel jointly developing a Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite and sharing missile defense technology. 9 A 2005 agreement between India and Russia acknowledged the desire for cooperation on advanced technology, fostered a partnership on India’s use of GLONASS, and signaled a transition from a supplierclient relationship to one of joint development. 10 Each new relationship breeds additional force enhancement capability to India’s military establishment.

India is bringing ASATs now: security

IPCS 10 -- Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. 7 January 2010 WILL INDIA PREPARE FOR SPACE WAR? Radhakrishna Rao Freelancer, Bangalore



The technological capabilities for an anti satellite device, expected to be realized before 2015, will be evolved under India’s home-grown missile defence shield. Saraswat also revealed that a fourth interceptor missile test, slated for September this year would aim at bringing down an “enemy missile” at an altitude of 120-140-km. According to strategic analysts, the Indian missile defence shield is intended to protect key parts of Indian territory from the ballistic missiles originating from China and Pakistan.” Developing the anti satellite kill vehicle is the most critical aspect because the satellite signatures and the ballistic missile signatures are different” said Saraswat. Going ahead, he remarked that “What is needed is technology to track the movement of enemy satellites, for instance, before making a kinetic kill. We are trying to build a credible deterrence capability.” At the same time Saraswat made it clear that such an anti satellite device “will not be tried out in real life conditions unless there are exigencies.”

China India Relations High

CHINA-INDIA RELATIONS IMPROVING – MIL TO MIL EXCHANGE PROVES

Space Wars 6/21 China seeks better military ties with India by Staff Writers Beijing (AFP) June 21, 2011

China said Tuesday it hopes to boost military cooperation with India as the two Asian powerhouses resume defence ties that were frozen for a year over a visa dispute. An Indian military delegation arrived in the Chinese capital on Sunday for a six-day visit that is expected to include a trip to the restive northwestern region of Xinjiang, Indian officials have told AFP. "The military exchange is an important part of China-India relations," foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a regular briefing. "China would like to make considerable effort with the Indian side to enhance exchange and cooperation between the two militaries."

India wants to work with US now

IANS 10-- Indo-Asian News Service

(June 4, 2010 “India, US vow to cooperate on terror” lexis)

Washington, June. 4 -- With US President Barack Obama according relations with "responsible global power" India "highest of priorities", the two countries have vowed to work together to meet the challenges of 21st century. Pledging cooperation over a broad spectrum ranging from counter-terrorism to trade, they agreed as strategic partners to "continue to consult each other closely on regional and global developments and remain sensitive to each other's interests." "They confirmed that global institutions of governance should reflect contemporary realities and enhance effectiveness, in order to meet the challenges of the new century," said a joint statement issued after the first ever India-US strategic dialogue. The strategic dialogue had helped lay the groundwork for Obama’s visit to India in early November for the fourth substantive bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, it said pledging to "intensify discussions on how to further deepen and broaden their cooperation". External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who led the strategic dialogue, expressed their shared view that the dialogue "and the bilateral mechanisms therein provide an important platform for strengthening the US-India partnership, offering a strategic vision for enhanced future cooperation". In addition to advancing global security and stability, both recognized that their two countries had enormous opportunities to deepen their cooperation in trade and investment, science and technology, infrastructure investment, environmental sustainability, climate change mitigation, energy security, education, agriculture, food security, healthcare and empowerment of people, it said. The joint statement noted that Obama "welcomed" the Indian delegation and emphasized his commitment to strengthening the growing US-India partnership. The India-US strategic dialogue "is propelled by the dynamic momentum achieved in the their relationship over the last decade and is in pursuance of the global strategic partnership for a better world" that Manmohan Singh and Obama reaffirmed during their meetings in November 2009 and April 2010 in Washington. Clinton and Krishna also "pledged to deepen people-to-people, business-to-business, and government-to-government linkages between the world's oldest and largest democracies, for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the promotion of global peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity."

**Links - Generic

2NC – TURNS CASE

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS KEY TO BUILD POLITICAL WILL TO SUSTAIN LONG-TERM FUNDING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, THE LINK ALONE IS A LINK TURN TO THE AFF

Rendleman and Faulconer 10 *James D. Rendleman is a retired Colonel of the USAF, J.Walter Faulconer is **J. Walter Faulconer is the new business area executive for civilian space at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel. [, “Improving International Space Cooperation”]

Political sustainability. International cooperation has the peculiar, wonderful, and sometimes wasteful capacity to increase the political will to sustain and fund space programs and associated budgets. As noted, cooperation provides a space fairing state the basis to draw on additional resources when its own are not adequate to achieve desired space goals and visions. Cooperation also enables a program to weather attempts to be reined in even when faced with contentious and devastating cost growth or budget realities (which most space programs invariably face). Thus, within the United States, a program often wins a bit of sanctuary from cancellation threats or significant budget reductions to the extent that Congress and the administration feel compelled to not break, stretch, or withdraw from international agreements. Political good will is generated by funding these programs. To find an example of the power of this good will, one only need look to the politics surrounding NASA’s manned programs. Money has been allocated to the program even when the perceived justification for its expansive program has collapsed. Now the new internationalist U.S. President doesn’t care much for the NASA manned mission, and has even less understanding of its science mission. In any event critics concede that the President sees value in the votes its engineering and contractor community represents, key especially in vote rich states such as Florida which serve as a nexus for manned U.S. launches

Unilateral Action Link

The US pledged to a full embrace of Indian space cooperation establishing norms of cooperation – but if cooperation falls through India will adopt contradictory policies

Johnson-Freese 2011- professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College

Joan Johnson-Freese “The U.S.-India Space Partnership: Who Gets What?” May 18

On Jan. 31, 2011, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, Robert O. Blake Jr., told the Indian press that the United States is hoping to become India's "close partner" in space exploration. Blake's comments reflected a major tenet of the Obama administration's 2010 National Space Policy (NSP): partnerships in space exploration with more nations. Although the global future in space may well be characterized by countries both cooperating in some areas and competing in others --what some have called "coopetition" -- U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon has been clear that Washington wants a "full embrace of India" on space matters. While this is a laudable objective that recognizes the increasingly globalized nature of space technology, it raises two very important questions. First, what does the United States want from its partnership with India? And second, what kind of behavior in space is Washington willing to accept from India within that partnership? Successful partnerships require that both sides feel they will benefit. They also require that all sides accept shared norms of behavior. Consider the case of China: America has shunned space cooperation with China because of its repressive political system, a lack of mutual trust and a widely shared uncertainty in Washington about China's military objectives in space. And when China tested an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) in 2007, becoming only the third nation in the space age to achieve such a capability, the United States and the rest of the world strongly criticized Chinese actions. India is a different case, particularly since U.S.-Indian relations lack the many decades of ideological and military hostility that shaped America's early relationship with the People's Republic of China. But questions remain over India's objectives in space. While there is a significant amount of information available about Indian activities in space, from launch vehicles to satellites, there is relatively little analysis concerning India's motivations and aspirations. Here, New Delhi's declaratory policies are generally consistent in rhetoric, but often contradictory with the substance of Indian space policy.

Perceived unilateralism kills relations

Curtis 07 – Lisa Curtis analyzes America's economic, security and political relationships with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other nations of South Asia as a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation.

India's Expanding Role in Asia: Adapting to Rising Power Status Published on February 20, 2007 by Lisa Curtis

The extent to which India will associate itself with U.S. power and global policies is still a subject of debate within the Indian strategic community. A majority within India's policy elites envision India becoming a major pole in a multipolar world.[3] They are skeptical of perceived American unilateralism and therefore believe that India must maintain its strategic autonomy through an extended strategic neighborhood, including East and Southeast Asia and, to some extent, the Middle East. The leftist par­ties on which the current Congress-led government relies to stay in power are particularly skeptical of close U.S.-India ties and believe that India should prioritize relationships with Third World countries, in part to create solidarity against perceived U.S. unilateralism.

Unilateral US exploration hurts Indian relations – devalues US cooperative power

Broniatowski, et. al, 06 – professor of something (2006, David, fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Human Space Exploration Initiative, G. Ryan Faith, and Vincent G. Sabathier, “ The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration,” 2006, )

The ISS program, along with most international civil space endeavors, carries with it an element of diplomatic cachet and control. The participation of other nations in the program increases the diplomatic influence of participating nations and, therefore, the diplomatic utility derived from cooperation. In general, the more countries participate, the higher will be the utility. Nevertheless, not all countries are equal, and their individual utility value depends on world politics. For example, the utility of having Russia join the ISS program increased significantly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, when relations with a new Russia were at the forefront of United States foreign policy. To the extent that a symbol of cooperation with a given nation is valuable, utility will be delivered. As such, Indian participation in joint space exploration would send a strong signal to the world of good U.S.-Indian relations. This would simultaneously increase Indian prestige by demonstrating their technological prowess. Similarly, Chinese participation in joint space exploration would signal growing cooperation between the two nations. The use of the ISS for a partnership between either of these nations would drastically increase its utility to those who support friendly relations. On the other hand, those who oppose closer U.S. relations with India or China are likely to oppose their entrance into the ISS program or into any other joint space exploration program. These diplomatic incentives may come at a cost for the cooperating nations; for example, China would likely have to make concessions in the form of more stringent technology export controls and/or better observance of human rights standards. If space exploration is successfully used as a diplomatic tool to exert such “soft power,” its utility increases in proportion to the degree that it is successful in implementing a policymaker’s agenda. Similarly, the departure of a particular nation (or, if the United States chooses to cease participating, of all nations) will reduce U.S. utility to the extent that the aggregate symbol of cooperation is valued.

Unilateral space policy tanks Indian relations – breaks down cooperative policy

Inderfurth 11 (April 2011, Karl, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, “Hearing the Stone Mason’s Chisel and Hammer,” )

In little more than a decade, there has been a remarkable transformation in U.S.-India relations, initiated, supported, and advanced by the leadership of both countries and— this is an important and all too rare point to be able to add—with overwhelming bipartisan support in this country from Democrats and Republicans. During this period, the U.S. and Indian governments have launched an expanding number of forums to promote our economic and commercial relations, agreed to an unprecedented accord on civilian nuclear cooperation, taken our military ties and defense trade to a new level, and announced partnerships to address energy security, climate change, food security, and women’s empowerment issues. There will be a first-ever U.S.-India Education Summit this spring. And the two sides have agreed to scale up joint civilian space collaboration, including space exploration, a step that could lift our bilateral relations to a higher orbit—literally. Indeed, the pace of progress between Washington and New Delhi has been so rapid, and the potential benefits to both U.S. and Indian interests so substantial, that India is now seen as being one of the most important strategic partners for the United States in the twenty-first century. To date, the symbolic and public centerpiece of the new U.S.-India partnership has been government-to-government interaction. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, working closely with their Indian counterparts, have moved our two countries from a posture of being “estranged democracies” to truly “engaged democracies.” And they have addressed what former Indian national security adviser Brajesh Mishra once referred to as the three “litmus tests” of our new relationship, namely civilian nuclear cooperation, space cooperation, and high-tech, dual-uses transfers. I would add a fourth “litmus test”—whether the United States would publicly support India for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Today all of those boxes are being checked. Our respective governments have certainly done their part, and will need to continue doing so. But today the greatest potential for expanding the U.S.-India relationship lies in our private sectors, including business-to-business relations, nongovernment organizations and institutions, and people-to-people ties. And it is here that the core mission of the recently established CSIS Wadhwani Chair in India-U.S. Policy Studies resides, namely to be a key player, and catalytic agent, for unlocking the full potential of the U.S.-India relationship. The Wadhwani Chair will serve as an independent platform in Washington from which to assess major policies and strategic issues in the relationship between India and the United States. A special emphasis of the Chair’s agenda will be key U.S.-India economic development issues, with the purpose of developing new options for top policymakers in both countries to accelerate economic development. The benefits to be derived from focusing on these issues are important for all involved. And for India there is a special immediacy, one fully recognized by its leadership. To move to the next stage of its national development, India will need to facilitate and promote efforts by the government, private sector, and nonprofits to address the problems of the significant population that has not been included in India’s recent, remarkable economic and information-technology advances. The ability to have impact in both countries will be further enhanced by the partnership envisioned by CSIS with the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), a leading Indian research institute that has already established an impressive track record of promoting pragmatic policies conducive to India’s economic growth and development. From Bowles to Singh Some four decades ago, Chester Bowles, one of a long line of distinguished former U.S. ambassadors to India, lamented in an oral history interview that one U.S. administration after another “ignored a major nation which is going to have in the future a very big impact on the world. But I was never able to persuade the White House and the State Department of its key importance.” The late Ambassador Bowles may rest in peace. The United States has now fully recognized the role India is playing, and will play, in the world today. To quote President Obama from his November speech to India’s parliament: “In Asia and around the world, India is not simply emerging; India has emerged.” But this does not mean that the remarkable progress that has been made in transforming the U.S.-India relationship can be placed on autopilot. Much work and attention will be needed to build a secure and sustainable future for two of the world’s great, multiethnic democracies, a point lyrically made to me in a recent exchange with former Indian minister of external affairs Jaswant Singh. Agreeing with me that our two countries have traveled a long way together in a short period of time, he added: “But the ‘house is far from built and in any event the sound of a stone mason’s chisel and hammer must continue to reverberate in this mansion.’ Time to open the toolbox.

Technonationalism

TECHNO-NATIONALISM ENSURES INDIA MISPERCEIVES THE PLAN

Johnson-Freese 2011- professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College

Joan Johnson-Freese “The U.S.-India Space Partnership: Who Gets What?” May 18

Indians also argue that space activities, both civilian and military, are purely part of a natural evolutionary process along the path to development. This allows India to pursue a nationalistic space race in Asia, and especially with China, while at the same time flatly declaring that there is no Asian space race, and specifically not with China. This "techno-nationalism" involves the recognition that technological achievement generates strategic influence in areas from economics to power politics and provides a reservoir of that elusive magic called "prestige," however broadly defined. It is a powerful motivator for human spaceflight programs and other high-visibility space efforts. Again, it is hard for Americans to be overly critical of such notions. Soviet scientists were crestfallen when an American civilian planted the U.S. flag on the lunar surface -- which was exactly what Washington intended when it sent three men to land on the moon in 1969. China, too, has been anxious to cash in on the image of technical prowess it displayed after it became only the third nation in nearly 60 years of space exploration to achieve human spaceflight capabilities. Predictably, the Indians deny any desire for a techno-nationalist competition with China or anyone else. More disturbing is that some Indians seem to hold the view that the whole notion of an Asian space race was created by the United States so that the American aerospace industry might sell its products to all sides.

The aff is perceived as ‘space squatting’ – ensures techno-nationalism, causing conflict

Prasad and Variar 2011 – Research Associates at the Observer Research Foundation

Kailash Prasad and Akhilesh Variar “Regional space security concerns may force India to reassess military space policy, say experts” February 5, 2011

Based on the size, scope and maturity of its programmes, India is one of the six global space players. The other five are the United States, Russia, China, Japan and Europe. All are connected in complex relationships that are sometimes competitive, sometimes cooperative. Eight countries in the region, from the Middle East to Eastern Asia, have active space programmes. Israel, India, China and Japan have both satellite building and launching capabilities. On a multilateral platform, India has played an active role in the deliberations of the technical and legal sub-committees of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS), Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), Asian Association for Remote Sensing (AARS) and other international bodies. India has active collaboration with the NASA, ESA and Russian space agencies and to a lesser extent with some others. Prospects for cooperation between India and the US in the space domain were said to be huge given the technical expertise in India. The potential for collaboration is real after India and the US signed the Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) in July 2009. However, there are still hurdles in the form of Commercial Space Launch Agreement (CSLA) which is yet to be signed by India. As such, the Asian region has established and emerging space players and scope exists for enlarged cooperation. Beijing has been the driving force since 1992 for an Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). Seven countries have been the members so far: Bangladesh, China, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand. Subsequently, in 1993, another group was formed – the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) – with 31 countries as participants, including India, China, Pakistan, the United States, Russia and Canada. On the conflict front, techno-nationalism was said to be a major factor as national power is perceived to be enhanced through space-based technological achievement. It was also seen to acquire a prestige tag with actual and significant strategic value -- political, economic and military. With both China and India taking pride in the independent development of much of their indigenous space efforts, a conflict potential was inherent. Delivering the valedictory address, Congress Member of Parliament Manish Tewari asked the international community to create a global space coordinating agency that allows and defines parameters for deployment and regulation of satellites. Mr. Tewari said "We must agree to a just allocation of orbital space amongst the existing players with more than a fair share available for emerging developing countries from Africa and Asia. The proceedings of this space conference highlight the urgency with which the polity and the research community needed to study the area of space security", he said, adding that harnessing the resources and opportunities that space has to offer will certainly generate new complexities in international relations. "We must learn from the follies of the Industrial Age where we left too little for the poor and the weak regions and countries. We can not usurp their right to orbital real estate and we must not allow Space squatting either. Rules must be framed and rights must be secured. Obligations must be charted", the national spokesperson of the ruling Congress Party said. Introducing a sense of urgency for creating an international regime for space’s regulated and well directed exploration and its use, Mr. Tewari said "The one more waits, the more crowded it gets up there and the potential for conflict rises". He stressed that for policymakers and scientists in India, space offers a new frontier of co-operation and suggested more similar conferences so as to facilitate informed discourse in various policymaking circles.

Lunar Links

INDIA BILATERAL LUNAR PROGRAM IS THE LINCHPIN OF COOPERATION

AAAS 2/16/11 American Association for the Advancement of Science India May Join U.S. MoonRise Mission by Pallava Bagla on 16 February 2011.

India hopes to join the United States on a sample return mission to the moon, according to K. Radhakrishnan, chair of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). He announced that India's policy group, the Space Commission, decided on 12 February to give the go-ahead for work on a possible contribution to MoonRise, a U.S. effort to land a probe on the moon's surface, scoop up 1 kilogram of material, and return it to Earth for analysis. India would provide an orbiter similar to its observation satellite Chandrayaan-1, which in 2009 helped clinch evidence of water's presence on the moon. The new Indian instrument would circle the moon for a few years and aid in communications and imaging. ISRO hopes to invest $38 million on developing this 400 to 500 kg instrument, which would travel into space on a U.S. Atlas rocket. The mission leader, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, is planning for a launch in 2016, but has not yet selected the MoonRise instruments. The goal is to learn more about the geology and origins of the moon. According to NASA, the mission will "focus on the giant South Pole-Aitken (SPA) basin on the far side, which lies between the moon's South Pole and Aitken crater. ... The SPA basin is the oldest, deepest observable impact basin on the moon and ranks among the largest recognized impact structures in the solar system," (shown in the image). ISRO's involvement has more than technical significance: It would underline a change in Indo-U.S. security relations. Until recently, U.S. labs and companies were prohibited from exchanging technologies with ISRO, in an attempt to limit their use for military purposes. But the two countries have been moving closer in recent years, and barriers have been coming down. In November, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President Barack Obama met in New Delhi and agreed to become strategic partners. The countries may be ready to join hands on a major space mission.

Unilateral lunar mining development hurts Indian relations – sparks mining moon rush

Carswell 02 (4/18/02, Bill, Space Daily, “The Outer Space and Moon Treaties and the Coming Moon Race,” )

The race would not be a sprint, like the cold war race to the moon, but rather a marathon. The goal of the instigator would be to use lunar resources to build solar power satellites to help develop rural and isolated population centers. The race would begin when other spacefaring nations decide not to let the instigating country take an uncontested lead in the technologies and capabilities associated with a massive space power capability. Unlike the moon race of the 1960s, which had national prestige as a goal, this phenomenon will more resemble the California gold rush. Just as the California gold rush happened spontaneously once the riches of gold were discovered in the mountains of California, so too will the moon rush happen spontaneously once a profitable business model is developed for using lunar resources to support the development of large-scale solar power satellite systems. Inevitably, at some point in this process the legal ramifications of the Outer Space and Moon Treaties will become issues. The "Outer Space Treaty" is the governing United Nations document for international, state-sponsored space activities. Nearly all of the UN member nations have ratified this treaty. Another treaty, the "Moon Treaty," has also been opened for signature by the United Nations. However, due to its provisions prohibiting the ownership of natural real estate in space, the treaty was virtually ignored by the world community. Only nine countries have ratified it and just five others have signed it. The cold shoulders it received from the primary spacefaring nations have all but sealed its fate as an irrelevant document in the larger scheme of space development. Both of these treaties, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, have generated much discussion and speculation regarding the impact they might have on space, especially lunar, development. The problem with these discussions is that once an organization decides, for whatever reason, to begin extracting, processing and using or selling the lunar regolith, for example, it's very unlikely that either of these treaties will influence that decision. The following scenario illustrates this point. China presents an interesting example for a lunar development scenario. China is not a third world country when it comes to their space program capabilities. They are very close to being able to put a human in orbit, and as Jane's Online reports, they are aggressively moving to be able to do just that. Furthermore, China has evidenced its willingness to invest in other space activities. Lunar Enterprise Daily recently reported that Chinese President Jiang Zemin has made the first official announcement of his country's intentions to build human-attended space stations. Another recent report in a SpaceDaily article on Xynergy Corporation's plans to demonstrate space-to-earth power beaming states, "China has agreed to purchase a power plant (solar power satellite) system of its own upon completion of the CSPIE's (Corporate Space Power Industries and Electric, Inc., a Xynergy partner) first successful demonstration. China has a special interest due to its environmental problems." If China does decide to undertake space-to-earth power beaming, the scenario could easily have them capitalizing on lunar resources to accomplish their goals. After the first demonstration with Xynergy they would have to begin looking at the economics of large-scale activities. Clearly, at this point it makes sense to start using lunar materials for space activities. Four separate studies, two funded by NASA and two funded by the Space Studies Institute, agreed that "at least 90% of solar power satellites could be built from nonterrestrial materials at great reduction to overall system cost." Obviously many technical challenges remain to be overcome before that much of the system can be manufactured in space and it must be acknowledged that the cost estimates in these studies were carried out based strictly on mass consideration without regard to technology development and production costs. However, it would be reasonable to start with the processing of lunar regolith into crude structural support materials for the photovoltaic farms, or using lunar water for station-keeping fuel. These would be very simple processes taking very little in the form of on-orbit sophistication. As these processes matured and the infrastructure needed to support them properly were developed, more complicated processing techniques could be employed, such as manufacturing photovoltaic cells from lunar regolith. Once these space power and lunar resource utilization activities have begun, other countries will feel compelled to match those efforts. The response of the United States is an example worth considering. When a credible effort is undertaken to begin using the resources of the moon to develop a significant power collection and transmission capability in space, the United States will respond for several reasons. The first is that its general public general public will feel threatened. The public likely will not understand the intricate details of the technical and political issues, but it will be afraid of the idea that another nation might capture and control "the high ground." The military will rightfully fear that any state with control of that much power in space is a force to be concerned about. They will demand that the United States build its own power farms in space as well. Finally the entrenched, established business communities will finally develop a credible economic model based on real cost numbers and be driven by the profit motive to join the effort. Other nations are also likely to join the fray as well. Japan, according to press reports, is already planning a solar power satellite demonstration project. The next space race, the moon rush, will have begun. And this time it will be here to stay. Where do the Outer Space and Moon treaties fit into all of this? The Moon Treaty doesn't, really. Realistically it's a meaningless document that isn't going to deter the majority of the spacefaring nations from using lunar resources. The European Space Agency may have a problem with it since France has signed the treaty and both The Netherlands and Austria actually went so far as to ratify it. A 1996 paper by Dr. Hanneke L. van Traa-Engelman of The Netherlands acknowledges that lunar activities could become an important factor in commercial space development and suggests that the Moon Treaty needs to be reassessed. Van Traa-Engelman believes that particular attention needs to be paid to the Moon Treaty's article XI provisions that the moon is the common heritage of mankind and that an international regime should be established to govern the exploitation of the moon when such activities become feasible. These are precisely the reasons why most countries refused to accept the Moon Treaty. But with three member countries having ratified or signed it, the European Space Agency may have a problem participating in the moon rush when it finally takes place. Most space-faring nations, however, have ratified the Outer Space Treaty, including The Russian Federation, the United States and China. But even with these ratifications in place the treaty may have little effect on attitudes toward lunar development. As evidenced by its actions in the International Space Station program The United States in particular seems willing to abrogate international treaties and agreements when they become inconvenient. But, if one assumes for the sake of argument that all member states will make a conscientious effort to abide by the letter, if not the spirit, of the Outer Space Treaty, what might be the implications? According to some analysts, such as Glenn Harlan Reynolds , the Outer Space Treaty doesn't impose any egregious restrictions on the commercial development of the moon. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation, not private appropriation of lunar resources. In fact it was this very loophole, according to Reynolds, that was the main driver behind the drafting of the Moon Treaty. If this is the case then it appears that the Outer Space Treaty presents no real impediment to lunar resource utilization by commercial entities. But there are those who disagree with this analysis. Virgiliu Pop cogently sums up the arguments of that opposing camp, concluding that for a private appropriation of land to survive it must be endorsed by a state, but that state endorsement of a private appropriation is interpreted legally as a form of state appropriation and is therefore disallowed by the Outer Space Treaty. Therefore, in order for a private appropriation to succeed, according to Pop, the state that is sponsoring, and more importantly protecting, the landowner must abrogate the Treaty. But Pop does not discuss the scenario of a private appropriation by an organization not seeking the endorsement, and therefore the protection, of a sovereign state. Many companies have, over the years, sent expeditions to the far corners of the world without state-sponsored protection. It seems reasonable that someday a company will decide to accept the risk of sending an expedition to the moon without state-sponsored protection, especially since the moon has no hostile populations to threaten an excavating crew. It is easy to envision a scenario in which a forward-looking, space-faring and developing country like China, or maybe even India, undertaking a lunar development activity and sparking the next great space race, the moon rush. The Moon Treaty is no impediment, and the Outer Space Treaty is acknowledged as debatable on the issue of private appropriation of lunar materials. With low-cost space-to-earth solar power beaming projects already on two drawing boards, the time seems to be rapidly approaching when the use of lunar materials for space power satellite construction will become a reality. The biggest obstacle to these lunar activities will not be the legal issues behind the Outer Space and Moon Treaties, but the materials processing capabilities that have yet to be demonstrated.

India dislikes Lunar Mining—Violates Treaty

Adam 05—David, Writer for the Guardian (October 24, 2005 “G2: Ideas: Briefing: Property rights on the moon” lexis)

One small step for a man, perhaps, and one giant leap for a lawyer. Property rights on the mineral-rich moon - or for that matter Mars, Pluto or Alpha Centauri - remain something of a murky issue. So much so that the US National Academies of Science will hold a special meeting on Wednesday to clarify the issue. Space Settlement: Homesteading on the Moon will discuss the policy implications of a lunar colony and whether privately funded missions should be allowed to play a role. Behind the (fake) lunar title deeds for sale over the internet, there is a serious issue. The wonderfully named United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, which governs, well, outer space, is clear. Its 1967 Outer Space Treaty says no nation can claim ownership of any celestial body (including the moon) and that all nations must agree to their peaceful use. The UN says that private expeditions count as national activities and are covered by the treaty, which has been signed by all the major players. Lawyers disagreed and a second agreement - the 1979 International Moon Treaty - was drawn up to explicitly ban private ownership of lunar real estate. It received much less support and, to date, only France, India and the less than dominant space nations Guatemala, Peru and Romania have bothered to sign. Klaus Heiss, director of the Washington space advocacy group High Frontier, who is speaking on Wednesday, says this means that those able to afford it can build and own their own des res on the moon. "The UN is just playing King George at the time of the American revolution thinking they can tell everyone else what to do. They can't," he says.

Unilateral manned missions wreck Indian relations – perceived break in cooperation

Rendleman and Faulconer 10 - *Retired Air Force Colonel AND **Director of Space Exploration at Lockheed Martin (2010, Perspectives on Improving United States International Space Cooperation,” )

Significant political good will is often generated by funding these programs. To find an example of the power of this good will, one only need look to the politics surrounding NASA’s manned programs. Money has continued to be allocated to the program even when the perceived justification for a substantial or expansive manned program has collapsed. Similarly, some argue the political and diplomatic integration of Russia into the ISS program may well have saved the ISS and Space Shuttle programs from cancellation. 19 The pressure to continue international cooperative efforts is often tremendous: Once cooperation has commenced, canceling a program becomes inconsistent with political sustainability as long as the utility cost associated with the loss of diplomatic benefits and the negative effects on reputation of terminating an international agreement is larger in magnitude than the utility cost that must be paid to maintain the system… The corollary to this is that there is a high cost to be paid by any nation that chooses to unilaterally withdraw from an existing cooperative endeavor. This cost comes in the form of damage to the departing nation’s reputation or credibility. In general, any unilateral action sends a signal that the actor is an unpredictable and therefore an unreliable and possibly disrespectful partner. This tends to sabotage the possibility of future cooperation. As such, there is a long-term benefit to maintaining cooperation, even when the immediate cost may seem to call for terminating it. 20 Of course, if significant cooperation has never occurred, commencement of a new or improved relationship is thought to be a defining moment, delivering specific political rewards and diplomatic utility. This is why the pronouncements on space cooperation made by President Obama and Chinese officials during his November 2009 visits have been watched with special interest. The same attention is being paid to the overtures made with the Indian government and its space community.

SBSP Links

SBSP is emerging as key cooperation ground for US and India

Jha 10 U.S.-India Space Cooperation Could Power Ties BY SAURAV JHA studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. | 25 OCT 2010

Space-based solar power (SBSP) may soon emerge as one of the leading sectors of strategic cooperation between India and the U.S., with a recently released report (.pdf) authored by U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Peter A. Garretson making the case for it being the next focus of the growing partnership. There are a number of reasons why SBSP may emerge as the hub for strategic industrial coordination between the two countries. First, neither country can meet its energy needs through existing clean-energy technologies, including nuclear power, and various technological advances over the past few decades have made space-based solar power a more realistic possibility. Second, the Obama administration wants to build on the foundations of bilateral relations laid by the Bush administration, and space cooperation presents an increasingly attractive option for doing so.

SBSP is a key point of convergence

Jha 10 U.S.-India Space Cooperation Could Power Ties BY SAURAV JHA studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. | 25 OCT 2010

Indo-U.S. collaboration is currently characterized by a slew of agreements -- some substantial, others rudimentary -- running on parallel tracks. SBSP could be a point of convergence, as it is an area where significant complementarities between the two countries exist. The two most important are India's edge as a low-cost manufacturer for future SBSP components and its cheap satellite-launch capability. Indeed, NASA may soon begin to outsource a significant chunk of low-Earth-orbit launches to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). India's attractiveness to U.S. policymakers lies in its promise for reducing costs and increasing returns. Even as NASA has shifted its focus to large, expendable launchers, ISRO continues to back re-usable launch-vehicle technology, which it believes can significantly reduce the cost of satellite launches -- a crucial condition for the sustainability of commercially deployable SBSP. The Chandrayaan mission also demonstrated India's orbit-transfer capability -- a central technical component for geo-stationary and mid-Earth-orbit SBSP concepts.

SBSP defines US-Indo relations

Jha 10 U.S.-India Space Cooperation Could Power Ties BY SAURAV JHA studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. | 25 OCT 2010

SBSP has already been explicitly identified at the highest levels of the Indian government as a strategic priority. With commentators in both countries identifying the dovetailing of space and energy cooperation as the "next big thing" in Indo-U.S. relations, there are now signs that the push on both sides is lining up with all of these circumstantial "pull" factors. There is an expectation that Obama's visit will see movement on removing controls on the sale of high-tech items as a prelude to an agreement on space cooperation, with an SBSP component as a prominent focus. SBSP allows India to keep its space program focused on developmental priorities, such as energy access, while pushing the technological envelope further than ever before. Studies show that SBSP is feasible, but its ultimate deployment will require an unprecedented bilateral effort. That effort could drive an Indo-U.S. partnership that, in Obama's words, would define the 21st century.

The unilateral action of the aff is a radical departure expectations of cooperation that are critical to relations

Jha 10 *Saurav Jha studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. He is a consultant at a private energy company in India [, “U.S.-India Space Cooperation Could Power Ties,” October 25th 2010, published in the world politics review]

SBSP has already been explicitly identified at the highest levels of the Indian government as a strategic priority. With commentators in both countries identifying the dovetailing of space and energy cooperation as the "next big thing" in Indo-U.S. relations, there are now signs that the push on both sides is lining up with all of these circumstantial "pull" factors. There is an expectation that Obama's visit will see movement on removing controls on the sale of high-tech items as a prelude to an agreement on space cooperation, with an SBSP component as a prominent focus. SBSP allows India to keep its space program focused on developmental priorities, such as energy access, while pushing the technological envelope further than ever before. Studies show that SBSP is feasible, but its ultimate deployment will require an unprecedented bilateral effort. That effort could drive an Indo-U.S. partnership that, in Obama's words, would define the 21st century.

Unilateral action on SPS tanks Indian relations – perceived abandon of energy cooperation

Dinerman 09 (6/8/09, Taylor, researcher for the Hudson Institute and regular contributor to the Space Review, “Should India and the US cooperate on space solar power?” )

If the US has a serious medium-term need for a very large new source of clean energy, India needs it even more. While there is a lot of talk about terrestrial solar, wind, and geothermal power as alternatives to coal—which seems to be currently politically unacceptable—or nuclear—which has its own set of political problems but whose greatest drawback may simply be the length of time it takes to build new power plants—space solar power (SSP) may be the only alternative that could be made to work before the major global electricity demand crisis hits, around the year 2050. In Washington lots of people have complained that the Obama Administration has so far not given the India-US relationship the attention it deserves. Others are waiting to see if this relatively new team is going to follow up on the progress made by both the Clinton and the George W. Bush Administrations in building a real friendship between the two democratic giants. The one area in which there seems to be movement on, though, is a “renewable energy partnership”. If the US has a serious medium-term need for a very large new source of clean energy, India needs it even more. From India’s standpoint the government does take the energy problem very seriously. While they connect it with the question of climate change, they have made it clear that they are not willing to inflict economic pain on their people in order to appease those in the West who are demanding that they cease their current drive to climb out of mass poverty in the name of the environment. Former External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee made this clear when he spoke at the Asia Society in New York last year and said, “It is therefore completely one sided to target countries like India, whose emissions though modest are rising, but fail to bring to account those who have been responsible for more than 70% of the accumulated emissions in the atmosphere.” Recognizing the potential weakness of a case based strictly on the question of climate change, Mukherjee was wise enough to add that “even if there were no climate change arguments, considerations of energy security alone would require a medium to long term strategy of implementing a strategic shift from fossil fuels to non fossil fuels.” He called for a “major R&D effort to develop applications that that can provide convenient, cost effective large scale applications of solar energy.” Any analysis of the potential of terrestrial solar energy in India or elsewhere runs up against the awesome size of the future demand for power. Photovoltaic panels on rooftops and solar water heaters all make excellent small-scale contributions to the solution, but they cannot by any stretch of the imagination fulfill the requirements of a huge growing economy like India’s. Only SSP, which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, year after year, can hope to meet this need. Fortunately both India and the US have space programs and technologies that could, if developed together and possibly with other interested nations such as Japan, bring SSP systems into service sometime late next decade or the early 2020s. With its commitment to develop a new low cost reusable spaceplane, the India Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is already working on one of the key technologies needed for an SSP system. Indian participation in both private and public SSP programs should be welcomed by the US. The US government should make an effort to facilitate this by helping with visas and work permits for qualified Indian scientists and engineers. Recent moves towards reforming the notorious International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) should include ensuring that SSP systems are covered by the Department of Commerce regulators rather than by the State Department, which has gained such a sorry reputation in this area. Safe, clean, abundant energy from the Sun is not an impossible dream. In the near term the new Indo-US renewable energy partnership would seem to be the right place to start this collaboration. Together the partners can identify what will be needed in the way of technological and scientific investments over the next decade in order to make SSP a reality. India has lots of talent that can be committed to this effort and so does the US. In fact, the kind of ambitious idealism that we saw at NASA during the Apollo years could be engendered by this goal.

Weaponization Link

India wants multilateral anti-weaponization – that’s the opposite of the plan

Saran 09 – Ambassador Shri Shyam Saran was India’s Foreign Secretary, and before that served as India’s Ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar, High Commissioner to Mauritius, Joint Secretary in the Prime Ministers Office, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo, and Counsellor in the Indian Embassy in Beijing.

Address by Shri Shyam Saran, SEPM at the Brookings Institution 23/03/2009 Address by Shri Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of Prime Minister at Brookings Institution , Washington (23 March 2009) Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement: Expectations and Consequences.

India is one of a handful of countries with significant space capabilities. We have a large number of communications and resource survey satellites currently in orbit. Although this does not fall strictly within the nuclear domain, the need to ensure the peaceful uses of outer space, is important for nuclear stability and international security. We welcome President Obama’s intention to join multilateral efforts to prevent military conflict in space and to negotiate an agreement to prohibit the testing of anti-satellite weapons. This is an area of convergence on which we would be happy to work together with the U.S. and contribute to a multilateral agreement.

Militarization Link

NEW DELHI HAS OPENLY OPPOSED MILITARIZATION OF SPACE

Asia Times 4/16/11 Apr 16, 2011 Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist.

In a parliamentary statement clarifying its position on the militarization of space, New Delhi has said, "India is strongly opposed to any attempt to place weapons in space or conducting any unconventional weapons tests in space as it would pose a perennial threat to all space systems regardless of their use for civilian or military purposes."

Indian officials pushing anti-militarization

Asian News 1/19/11 Asian News International/, Jan. 19 “India Urges Strengthening Outer Space Treaty” Thursday, Jan. 20, 2011

The former head of India's air force yesterday called on the international community to amend the international Outer Space Treaty to further prohibit the militarization of space, Asian News International reported (see GSN, July 14, 2010). "India would like to appeal to [the] international community to see what holes must be plugged" in the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, retired Air Marshal S. Krishnaswamy said in a speech at a New Delhi symposium on outer space. "We also need a strong policing force in the U.N. If somebody crosses the line, we need to bring [them] down quickly," he told the audience. Member nations to the treaty "undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." "The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties to the treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes," according to Article 4 of the agreement. "The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited." However, the treaty by implication permits some military operations such as the movement through space of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Krishnaswamy said. "The authors of the treaty have left some gaps in the treaty. And probably with a sense of purpose. After all, law is very clever," he said. Additionally, the pact fails to adequately the deployment of conventional weapons in space, according to the former air chief said. "The treaty also allows testing of all weapons in space and floating military bases," Krishnaswamy said. "There is no ban on antisatellite, antimissile weapons as the treaty says outer space is free for all nation states." "We all should get together and work for peaceful use of space," he argued.

Mars Links

INDIA WANTS TO GO TO MARS NOW

Ramachandran 07—writer for Asia Times (Sudha, Apr 19, 2007, “India sets its sights on Mars” )

BANGALORE - India's space scientists are reaching out further into the universe. Even as an unmanned mission to the moon is readying for launch, and a manned mission to space awaits final approval from the government, they are already eyeing the next destination - Mars. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is willing to launch a mission to Mars if it gets a green light from the government, its chairman Madhavan Nair, told reporters in Bangalore last week. "Our scientific community has come out with an outline of a mission to Mars. If the proposal is interesting, we will pursue it," Nair said. "We can undertake a mission to Mars within five years of the government's approval. If the project is given the go-ahead now, we will be in a position to launch the mission to the red planet by 2012," Nair, who is also chairman of the Space Commission, an apex policymaking body on space matters, said. Nair's statement came in response to questions from the media on India's Mars strategy in the context of China recently announcing a joint mission with Russia to Mars in 2009. Under an agreement signed by Russia and China a little more than a fortnight ago, the Russian spacecraft Phobos Explorer will carry a Chinese satellite to Mars, where the latter will probe the Martian space environment. But the ISRO denies that the interest in a Mars mission has been prompted by the Chinese-Russian move to this planet. "India's space program has always been determined by its own development goals, interests and priorities," S Krishnamurthy, ISRO's spokesman, told Asia Times Online, ruling out that India is in a space race with other countries or that its space program is influenced by what other countries do. India's space program is on a roll. Preparations for an unmanned moon mission, Chandrayaan-I, are on in full swing. The ISRO has begun assembling the moon craft that will lift off in March 2008. And it is pushing forward with regard to sending a human into space as well. After getting a nod from the Indian scientific community for a manned space mission, the ISRO is working on the project proposal which it will submit for government approval later this year. In January, the ISRO demonstrated expertise in re-entry technology that is central to sending a manned mission when it brought back safely to earth an orbiting capsule. This is complex technology that only a few countries, the United States, Russia, France, Japan, China and now India, have. And if India succeeds with its manned space mission it will join an exclusive club including Russia, the US and China that have sent humans into space. India has impressive capabilities in launch vehicles and satellites. Until a recent failed launch of the geo-synchronous launch vehicle, the ISRO had a string of successful launches to its credit. It has put some 45 satellites in orbit to date. In the area of Earth Observation, the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite system is the world's largest constellation of satellites in operation. ISRO scientists are confident that they have the technological expertise to fulfill India's space dreams, whether with regard to the unmanned space mission, the manned mission to space or the Mars mission. "A mission to Mars might seem a distant dream at this juncture but it is not impossible given our considerable expertise and experience," a retired ISRO scientist told Asia Times Online. "An India-made rocket like the GSLV [geo-synchronous launch vehicle] can carry over 500-kg payload and reach Mars without a hitch," Nair had pointed out last week. Like its mission to the moon, the mission to Mars will come in for sharp criticism from sections within the country on the grounds that this is a hugely costly indulgence as India confronts serious problems of poverty, illiteracy and malnutrition. But India's robust economic growth in recent years means it can afford its space and defense programs, counter others. Besides, the ISRO's projects are implemented with small budgets. Its total budget is said to be one-twentieth of that of America's National Aeronautical and Space Administration. Years of technology sanctions imposed on India following its explosion of a nuclear device in 1974, prompted its scientific community to look for economical and indigenously developed technology. Krishnamurthy points out that missions to the moon or Mars are not at the cost of the ISRO's other programs that have developmental applications. "The moon mission, for instance, involves an investment of only Rs600 million [US$14 million] per year over five years, just 2% of ISRO's total budget," he said, stressing that the priority of other programs will not fall as a result of the headline-grabbing moon or Mars missions. Besides, the ISRO isn't a research organization that simply consumes funds. It has yielded concrete results, contributed to development priorities such as education and healthcare, generated profits and is a commercial success. The financing of its dreams isn't fully dependent on government largesse. The ISRO's growing commercial success - India builds and launches satellites that are 40% cheaper than its European and US competitors - is meeting a large part of its rising expenditures. They might be increasing dramatically - its projected spending for fiscal 2008 is the highest in recent years and 29% more than budgeted for in the previous financial year - but so is its revenue. Antrix, the ISRO's commercial arm, expects a 30% growth in revenue for the year ending March 2008.

India dislikes extraterrestrial colonies—‘67 and ’79 treaties prove

Adam 05—David, Writer for the Guardian (October 24, 2005 “G2: Ideas: Briefing: Property rights on the moon” lexis)

One small step for a man, perhaps, and one giant leap for a lawyer. Property rights on the mineral-rich moon - or for that matter Mars, Pluto or Alpha Centauri - remain something of a murky issue. So much so that the US National Academies of Science will hold a special meeting on Wednesday to clarify the issue. Space Settlement: Homesteading on the Moon will discuss the policy implications of a lunar colony and whether privately funded missions should be allowed to play a role. Behind the (fake) lunar title deeds for sale over the internet, there is a serious issue. The wonderfully named United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, which governs, well, outer space, is clear. Its 1967 Outer Space Treaty says no nation can claim ownership of any celestial body (including the moon) and that all nations must agree to their peaceful use. The UN says that private expeditions count as national activities and are covered by the treaty, which has been signed by all the major players. Lawyers disagreed and a second agreement - the 1979 International Moon Treaty - was drawn up to explicitly ban private ownership of lunar real estate. It received much less support and, to date, only France, India and the less than dominant space nations Guatemala, Peru and Romania have bothered to sign. Klaus Heiss, director of the Washington space advocacy group High Frontier, who is speaking on Wednesday, says this means that those able to afford it can build and own their own des res on the moon. "The UN is just playing King George at the time of the American revolution thinking they can tell everyone else what to do. They can't," he says.

ASATs Links

UNILATERAL ASAT DEPLOYMENT TANKS INDIAN RELATIONS

Guiney 08 (May 2008, Jessica, CDI Research Analyst, “India’s Space Ambitions: Headed Toward Space War?” )

Recent debates on India’s need to refine and test a “satellite killing” capability have emerged since the U.S. decision to shoot down a faulty spy satellite on Feb. 20, 2008. Pointing to the history of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which India lost out on a “legitimate holder” status, Sreeram Chaulia opined that the time to test an ASAT capability is now, before any treaties or regimes present restraints. 24 This is significant considering the Feb. 22, 2008 statement by former president, and missile engineer, Abdul Kalam, that India already possesses the ability to “intercept and destroy any spatial object or debris in a radius of 200 km.” 25 Another influential name in India’s missile program, V.K. Saraswat, the chief controller of DRDO, also noted putting the necessary technology in place would be “just a matter of time.” The strategic decision of whether India will follow the lead of China and the United States in demonstrating ASAT capabilities is one that puts the political leadership’s goal of ensuring the peaceful uses of outer space to the test. Even before the Chinese ASAT test, the chief of the Indian Air Force, S. Krishnaswamy, stated, “Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapons platforms in space and killer satellites.” 27 The psychological elements of prestige in missile and nuclear technology have long been noted in India. While the civilian nature of India’s space program has traditionally been its pride, the ability to demonstrate technological advances and expertise may also be a consideration for Indian leadership calculating a path forward now that both the United States and China have demonstrated ASAT capabilities. India’s overall policy remains one emphasizing the peaceful uses of outer space. Historically, New Delhi has sought to promote establishing cooperative uses of outer space, and strengthen the international norms and legal regimes regarding the use of space. In an April 2007 address to an IAF seminar focusing on aerospace power in tomorrow’s world, Minister of External Affairs Shri Pranab Mukherjee noted that “recent developments show that we are treading a thin line between current defense related uses of space and its actual weaponization,” and pointed out India’s interest in ensuring outer space remains free from weapons. In his address, he noted the important role of satellites in military efforts, as well as the important potential of “soft power” partnerships utilizing space for cooperative disaster-management, and common threats such as nonstate actors or natural disasters. 28 This emphasis on India’s longstanding interest in peaceful uses of outer space stands in direct conflict with IAF’s push for space weapons.

US ASAT deployment angers India

Lewis 04 (July 2004, Jeffrey, postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy (CISSM), “ What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios,” )

It is important to understand that there is another, more likely “inevitability” involved if the United States pursues these capabilities, that is: other nations almost assuredly would, too. Although Russia and China have declared a moratorium on ASAT testing, it would be irresponsible for either state not to acquire their own deterrent to potential U.S. ASAT attacks. Russian and Chinese ASATs may, in turn, be a reason (or, perhaps, just an excuse) for states such as India to follow suit. Still other countries – and this includes North Korea and probably Iran – that have the desire, but not yet the skills, would then be able to “draft” in the wake of the big powers through espionage, declassification and, perhaps, the black market. The point is this: once the United States has gone down the ASAT road, there likely won’t be an option of negotiating a ban on ASATs or discouraging the proliferation of legitimate dual-use technologies such as microsatellites. As we have learned with nuclear and missile proliferation, once the genie is out of the bottle, it is out for good.

Space Coop Key to Relations

KEY TO RELATIONS

Correll 06 - national security consultant with Science Applications International Company, served in the United States Air Force in a wide variety of research, development and space assignments., Ph.D in Physics from UT-Austin

Randall Correll “U.S.-India Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown” 2006 Astropolitics Vol. 4, Iss. 2, EBSCO

Space cooperation could play an important role in the new U.S.India strategic partnership. The space capability developed through this partnership would provide important tools for securing the peaceful comity of nations and peoples. The highest levels of government of both nations have already set the course. It merely remains for the space communities in the United States and India to develop specific cooperative programs that are affordable, effective, and mutually beneficial. The Indian space program is rapidly developing world-class capabilities and presents itself as a worthy partner. The U.S. space program, while experiencing difficulties in their modernization programs, should be able to provide innovative ideas for fruitful collaboration. Despite these propitious circumstances, there are potential obstacles. Many of these relate to the legitimate problems of cost, security and risk. But the biggest obstacle might simply be bureaucratic intransigence and inertia. If these can be overcome, the opportunity is here now, for the United States and India each to add an important new jewel to their crown of international space cooperation.

Cooperation on exploration, satellites, and commercial ventures are critical to closer ties with India

Speier 2k6 * Richard Speier is a private consultant on nonproliferation and counterproliferation issues. He spent more than 25 years in government at the Office of Management and Budget, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, during which he helped negotiate the Missile Technology Control Regime. [, “U.S. Space Aid to India: On a “Glide Path” to ICBM Trouble?” Richard Speier, March 2006 in Arms Control Association’s website]

Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell told The Washington Post in October 2003, the “glide path” was seen as “a way of bringing closure” to a debate over three issues that had plagued U.S.-Indian relations. “There was a basket of issues that they were always asking us about called, well, we called it—we nicknamed it, ‘The Trinity,’” Powell said. “How can we expand our trade in high tech areas, in areas having to do with space launch activities, and with our nuclear industry?” Powell also said that U.S. officials wanted to “protect certain ‘red lines’ that we have with respect to proliferation, because it’s sometimes hard to separate within space launch activities and industries and nuclear programs, that which could go to weapons, and that which could be solely for peaceful purposes.”[1] Nearly two years later, in July 2005, Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached an agreement on space that was said to have accomplished these goals. New Delhi got what it wanted when the two leaders resolved to “build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena .”[2] Washington won India’s agreement to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.

Space cooperation key to bilateral relations

Sabathier and Faith 2008 *Vincent G. Sabathier is a senior fellow and director of the Human Space Exploration Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. G. **Ryan Faith is program manager for the Human Space Exploration Initiative at CSIS.

India's Space Program

President Bush’s 2006 visit to India sparked many discussions and agreements on previously taboo subjects, including both civilian nuclear and space programs. The increasingly close cooperation between India and the United States in space, such as the cooperation on lunar exploration and global positioning systems, is seen as a demonstration and validation of the effort to strengthen the U.S.-India bilateral relationship.

US-India space cooperation increases relations

Sabathier* and Faith**2008 - *a senior fellow and director of the Human Space Exploration Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, **program manager for the Human Space Exploration Initiative at CSIS

Vincent G. Sabathier and G. Ryan Faith “India’s Space Program” January 25, 2008

Q4: In what ways are India and the United States cooperating on space initiatives? A4: Indian cooperation on space has been robust globally. India’s first lunar mission, Chandrayaan-1, to be launched this April, will carry one American and five European scientific payloads. Further, India will be cooperating very closely with Russia on the lander and rover portions of its next lunar mission, Chandrayaan-2. India appears to have had more success in recent years in its cooperation with countries other than the United States. President Bush’s 2006 visit to India sparked many discussions and agreements on previously taboo subjects, including both civilian nuclear and space programs. The increasingly close cooperation between India and the United States in space, such as the cooperation on lunar exploration and global positioning systems, is seen as a demonstration and validation of the effort to strengthen the U.S.-India bilateral relationship.

A2 Plan Increases Cooperation

NORMAL MEANS IS THE US SNUBBING INDIA – EVEN IF THEY COOPERATE THE PROCESS WILL POISON THE WELL – ENSURES BACKLASH, INDIA PERCEIVES ITS SPACE POLICY AS THE ‘CROWN JEWEL’ OF ITS OVERALL AUTONOMY

Garretson 2010 – former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. Previously the Chief of Future Science and Technology Exploration for Headquarters Air Force, former Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Service Academy Research Associate, recipient of the National Space Society’s (NSS) Space Pioneer Award

Peter A. Garretson “Sky’s No Limit: Space-based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership”

There remains at the time of writing a significant amount of scepticism on both sides regarding the degree to which India and the US can and will engage in meaningful technical cooperation in meaningful dual-use technology like space.1 Asymmetrical Capability Discussions with policymakers and implementers on the US side see the obstacles principally in terms of structural and asymmetric capability. First, they complain of an understaffed and under-empowered, and often opaque bureaucracy, where few people even have the authority to schedule a meeting, that pushes decisions upward and is often “unwilling to sign paper” that sets up the mechanisms that are required to provide US agencies freedom of action. Second, they complain that their perception of Indian desires for cooperation often sounds more like one-way transfer, or “give us stuff,” where the US seeks a trade off that is equal or better. The US also often requires significant end-use monitoring to make sure its huge investment and technological edge is not compromised by reverse engineering or passing the technology on to others.Technology Control Regimes (ITAR & MTCR) Discussions with policy-makers and implementers on the Indian side base their scepticism chiefly on what they see as the US’s own self-defeating technology control regimes, specifically the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR),2 which governs civilian satellite and launch, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),3 both of which, it is felt, impede meaningful cooperation and are not particularly effective in preventing proliferation but are quite effective in losing business for the US. India also has concerns that it could relax its stance on autonomy and become dependent on US technology only to come under sanctions or a technology control or denial regime at some later time. India also has active technical partnerships with other technically advanced countries that it has strong incentives to preserve. Further, both the US and India protect their strategic (meaning dualuse) industries like launch and satellite manufacture, and India in particular sees its space programme as a crown jewel of autonomy. Each domestically has a stake in not becoming interconnected and interdependent.

A2 Cooperation = Normal Means

COOPERATION WITH INDIA IS NOT NORMAL MEANS

Moltz 2006 - associate professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey

James Clay Moltz

The presentation by Dr. Correll explored the still relatively untilled soil of possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in space. While noting past U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation, Dr. Correll urged rapid expansion of U.S. space ties with India as a means of cementing the bilateral relationship and developing a valuable new cooperative partner. He suggested such specific areas of cooperation as communications satellites, military-to-military ties, robotic Moon missions, and ground tracking (including possible use of Indian ground stations to correct ‘‘drift’’ in U.S. Global Positioning System satellites). Dr. Correll argued that—if properly managed—space cooperation could become the ‘‘jewel in the crown’’ of the emerging U.S.-Indian strategic partnership. Today, he lamented, there is little evidence of dynamic U.S. proposals in this area

**Internal Links/Impacts

RELATIONS KEY TO STABILITY

RELATIONS KEY TO ASIAN STABILITY

Richard L. Armitage et al. 10 (President, Armitage International, Co-Chair) R. Nicholas Burns (Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard University, Co-Chair) Richard Fontaine (Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security) Natural Allies A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations

A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia. The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership. Our recommendations are based on the belief that a stronger and more prosperous India will allow for a more vibrant U.S.-India relationship and that the United States should encourage and facilitate India’s rise as a full stakeholder in the international community.

Global nuclear war – most probable scenario

Jonathan S. Landay (national security and intelligence correspondent for the Contra Costa Times) March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts” Lexis

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. And Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. And while Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

Relations Solve Stability - Ext

INDIAN RELATIONS ARE CRITICAL TO ASIAN STABILITY.

Blackwell 03, (Robert D., ambassador, January 27, 2003, )

Peace within Asia -- a peace that promotes freedom and prosperity - will be advanced by the transformed US-India relationship. Within a fellowship of democratic nations, the United States and India would benefit from an Asian environment free from inter-state conflict --- including among the region's great powers -- open to trade and commerce, and respectful of human rights and personal freedoms. President Bush says it succinctly, "We seek a peaceful region where no power, or coalition of powers, endangers the security or freedom of other nations; where military force is not used to resolve political disputes." Achieving this paramount goal requires the United States particularly to strengthen political, economic, and military-to-military relations with those Asian states that share our democratic values and national interests. That spells India. A strong US-India partnership contributes to the construction of a peaceful and prosperous Asia and binds the resources of the world's most powerful and most populous democracies in support of freedom, political moderation, and economic and technological development. Even as the US and India together support peace, prosperity and liberty in this part of the world, Asia remains an area wracked by the cancer of international terrorism. During the past decade, more familiar ethnic, nationalist, and separatist terrorist groups have been joined by new organizations with murderous ideological motivations. These newer terrorist organizations, which attract recruits by perverting great religious traditions, embody a lethal threat to both India and the United States. Their worldview propels them to conduct deadly attacks to inflict mass, indiscriminate casualties among innocents. Both the United States and India are principal victims of this new and more dangerous kind of terrorism. If you visitors to India doubt this, take a look at the bullet holes still evident at the Indian Parliament from the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on that incandescent symbol of Indian democracy. Other nations may fade in the marathon war against terrorism. India and the United States will be there together at the finish - when we win.

Relations consolidate U.S. Leadership in asia

Schaffer 2 [Teresita, Director, South Asian Program, CSIS, “Building a New Partnership with India,” THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 25 n. 2, 2002, p. 31+, LN.]

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

Relations Key to Free Treade

INDIA RELATIONS GOOD – FREE TRADE AND ECONOMY

Tellis 10 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former Department of State senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Former senior policy analyst at the RAND corporation

“Obama in India Building a Global Partnership: Challenges, Risks, Opportunities” October 28, 2010 Ashley J. Tellis

There are two reasons why a continued effort to deepen the partnership with India is warranted despite current uncertainties. The first is that India’s strategic direction is already evolving towards greater convergence with the United States. In the present hiatus, it is easy to lose sight of this fundamental fact. The last two decades, for example, have clearly demonstrated that India has moved away from a closed economy characterized by self-reliance and import substitution to a progressively more open market system where acceptance of international interdependence and specialization across national boundaries is creating more opportunities for American trade and investment than ever before. India’s national security policy displays a similar evolution: The Indian military today is steadily leaving behind its traditional insularity and its customary subcontinental gaze in favor of enhanced cooperation with foreign militaries aimed at playing a larger role in producing regional stability. This transformation has resulted in a dramatic shift from sole reliance on Russia for major military end-items to new Western sources of supply where the emerging commercial and strategic opportunities for the United States are both significant and growing. Finally, India’s foreign policy is itself changing. Although India’s quest for “strategic autonomy” 7 will remain perennial—befitting a country with its large size, proud history and great power potential—the reflexive anti-Americanism of the Cold War era has been effectively displaced by a growing conviction that engaging the United States remains vitally necessary for the success of India’s larger national interests. On all counts then, sustaining the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations promises to provide important payoffs to the United States in the here and now—as is already evident from the growing private ties between the two countries. That changes in official policy lag behind the expansion of societal cooperation is not surprising; this has always been the case in U.S.-Indian relations. More importantly, however, the current lethargy in effecting policy change in India will not be permanent because policy stagnation invariably precipitates crises and nothing forces the transformation of public policy in New Delhi like the prospect of an emerging calamity

Indo-Pak War Mod

TIES PREVENT A SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR WAR

Dugger 02, (Celia W., journalist, “Wider Military Ties with India Offer U.S. Diplomatic Leverage,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 10, 2002, p. A1, LN)

Military cooperation between India and the United States has remarkably quickened since Sept. 11, with a burst of navy, air force and army joint exercises, the revival of American military sales to India and a blur of high-level visits by generals and admirals. The fledgling relationship between American and Indian military leaders will be important to Mr. Rumsfeld in talks intended to put to rest fears of war between India and Pakistan. "We can hope this translates into some influence and trust, though I don't want to overstate it," a senior American defense official said in an interview on Thursday. "I don't want to predict this guarantees success." The American diplomatic efforts yielded their first real gains on Saturday when India welcomed a pledge by Pakistan's military ruler to stop permanently the infiltration of militants into Kashmir. India indicated that it would soon take steps to reduce tensions, but a million troops are still fully mobilized along the border -- a situation likely to persist for months -- and the process of resolving the crisis has just begun. India has linked the killing of civilians in Kashmir to a Pakistan-backed insurgency there and has presented its confrontation with Pakistan as part of the global campaign against terrorism. India itself made an unstinting offer of support to the United States after Sept. 11, and Washington responded by ending the sanctions placed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. With that, the estrangement that prevailed between the world's two largest democracies during the cold war, when India drew close to the Soviet Union and the United States allied with Pakistan, has eased. India, for decades a champion of nonalignment, seeks warmer ties with the United States in hopes of gaining access to sophisticated military technology and help in dealing with Pakistan. From the start of President Bush's term, some influential officials in his administration saw India as a potential counterweight to that other Asian behemoth, China, whose growing power was seen as a potential strategic threat. But since Sept. 11, the priority has been terrorism.The United States is hoping its deeper military and political ties with India will give it some measure of leverage to prevent a war between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear holocaust and would play havoc with the hunt for Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The military relationship has certainly accelerated in recent months. "We've moved from crawling to walking and we're preparing to run," said an American military official. American warships have been docking in the Indian cities of Bombay, Cochin and Madras. The first major sale of military equipment to India -- $140 million of artillery-finding radar made by Raytheon -- has been approved by Congress. Aircraft engines, submarine combat systems and helicopter parts are in the pipeline. In the largest-ever joint ground and air operations, American and Indian paratroopers jumped last month from the same aircraft over the city of Agra. Later this year, for the first time, Indian troops will venture to the United States for exercises in Alaska. American and Indian naval ships are jointly patrolling the Strait of Malacca to protect commercial shipping, while the number of Indian military officers training in the United States has jumped to 150 this year from 25 in 1998. A parade of military brass has been marching through each other's capitals. "The current level of military to military cooperation between our nations is unprecedented," Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said upon arriving in New Delhi in February.

Indo-Pak war causes extinction

Fai 1 – (Dr. Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council, “India Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir,” 7/8, Washington Times, )

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

Prolif Mod

U.S./INDIAN COOPERATION CRITICAL IN CHECKING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Ayoob 2k, (Mohammed, Distinguished Professor, International Relations, Michigan State University, “India Matters,” THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 23 n. 1, Winter 2000, p. 27+, LN.)

This is an area in which serious differences have existed and continue to persist in Indian-U.S. relations. However, as a result partly of the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh dialogue and partly of its new status as a declared nuclear weapons power, India has moved closer to recognizing the validity of U.S. concerns about global nuclear proliferation. On its part, following the Indian nuclear tests, the United States has demonstrated increasing appreciation of the Indian security concerns that led New Delhi to go nuclear in May 1998. Washington also seems to have realized that these concerns had to do more with China than with Pakistan and that they cannot be alleviated as long as the issue of Chinese nuclear and missile capability that Indians find threatening is not seriously addressed. India's self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing has further helped improve the atmosphere surrounding the Indian-U.S. dialogue on nuclear proliferation. Recently the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the CTBT, and there is no immediate prospect for the resurrection of its ratification. Therefore, the major source of friction between New Delhi and Washington in the nonproliferation arena seems to have lost most of its relevance for the immediate future. In fact, the Indian position is now almost identical to the U.S. policy of voluntary adherence to the CTBT enunciated by President Clinton in the wake of the Senate's refusal to ratify the treaty. However, in the long run, an understanding between the United States and India is essential for a credible nuclear nonproliferation regime to survive the shocks from the South Asian tests of May 1998. India, having for all practical purposes acquired the status of a nuclear weapons power, has clearly developed a vested interest in limiting further horizontal proliferation and in augmenting its already tight controls over the export of nuclear-related material and technology to nonnuclear countries. Its voluntary adherence to the main provisions of the CTBT as well as to the export control provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signals this clearly. India shares these objectives with the United States, and they provide a strong basis for future cooperation between the two countries in the nuclear nonproliferation arena. Washington has also begun to realize that India, unlike some other nuclear aspirants such as North Korea, is a responsible member of the international community with a large and relatively self-reliant technological infrastructure capable of producing sophisticated nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This being the case, it is in the U.S. interest that India be co-opted into the nonproliferation regime rather than treated as a pariah, because the latter would undermine the residual credibility of the NPT regime. However, Washington is also concerned that this co-optation be accomplished without unraveling the entire NPT structure. The principal objective of the Indian-U.S. dialogue seems to be to square this circle while protecting the integrity, as far as possible, of the initial positions adopted by both sides. This task is difficult but not altogether impossible. With patience, goodwill, and diplomatic creativity, the two sides are more than likely to succeed in crafting a formula that both New Delhi and Washington can live with until the world becomes used to India's nuclear status. The attempt to find such a formula is, however, by definition a joint venture and, therefore, likely to strengthen rather than damage Indian-U.S. relations.

The impact is extinction

Victor A Utgoff 2002 (Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis) Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

China War Mod

India Relations are key to preventing a China-Taiwan War

Gobarev 2K *Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute [Cato Policy Analysis #381, "India as a World Power: Changing Washington's Myopic Policy", 9/11/2000, Victor M Gobarev]

What would such a policy win for the United States? America would get a strategic partner of the highest caliber. Most important, such a policy would dramatically shift the global, geopolitical, and geostrategic balance in favor of the United States. The geopolitical balance in Asia would be especially tilted in America’s favor. India could help the United States contain expansionist threats from China to maintain order vand stability in East and Southeast Asia. In addition, America would move further from the brink of nuclear confrontation with China over the Taiwan issue and other potential sources of friction. China would be less able to contemplate a confrontation with either its neighbors in East Asia or with the United States if Beijing had to worry about India’s response. Benefits to U.S. national security interests would occur on a global scale if the United States and India became strategic partners. Most notably, there would be no chance for an anti-U.S. Russia-India-China alliance. Preventing that outcome alone would be a huge geopolitical success for the United States. Further, effectiveness of U.S. intelligence and special operations against major international terrorist groups located in Afghanistan and Pakistan would significantly increase thanks to direct U.S.-Indian cooperation.

That draws in the US causing extinction

Straits Times 2K [June 25, “No one gains in war over Taiwan”]

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO -THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase: Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Democracy Mod

RELATIONS KEY TO GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Ayoob 2k – distinguished professor of international relations at Michigan State University (Mohammed, Winter 2000, The Washington Quarterly, accessed via Project Muse)

Furthermore, the recent emphasis in U.S. rhetoric on creation of a "democratic community of states," itself based on a popularized version of the "democratic peace" thesis, can be expected to aid in improving Indian-U.S. relations. The two states crucial to legitimizing the idea of a global democratic community are obviously the world's largest democracy (India) and the world's most powerful democracy (the United States), and their partnership is essential for the idea to be taken seriously. 3 If democracy and human rights are to inform U.S. foreign policy making in any substantial fashion in the coming decade, Washington's relations with New Delhi must inevitably move to a higher plane of understanding and cooperation.

Extinction

Diamond, 96 (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, “1. Why Promote Democracy?” wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm )

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Indian ASATS Mod

ANYTHING OTHER THAN FULL COOPERATION FROM THE US WOULD THREATEN INDIAN SECURITY AND CAUSE ASAT DEVELOPMENT.

The Space Review ’11 [May 9, 2011 India and space security, by Victoria Samson, takeaways from “Space, Science, and Security: The Role of Regional Expert Discussions,” held in New Delhi, India, from January 19–21, 2011, , WBTR]

The discussion of space and security is still tied to terms used to discuss nuclear weapons, at least within Indian policy circles. So when one talks about “responsible space behavior,” the Indians look at it from a proliferation perspective: their take is that since no one is proliferating space technology unduly, no one is acting irresponsibly. Alternatively, they raised the idea several times that, outside of the Chinese ASAT test, no one has acted irresponsibly in space since the Cold War ASAT tests held by the United States and the then-Soviet Union. This logic brings home the need for the international community to develop some sort of accepted definition of what responsible space behavior is, and why it helps space powers like India to be part of that discussion. Several Indian participants likened an ASAT program to a nuclear weapons program: you develop it without testing it, but you have it on hand just in case the international security environment changed and you needed it. But when asked what particular scenarios merited the use of an ASAT, no one had an answer. Also, very telling was a statement by a former foreign secretary, Kinwal Sibal, who said that “India perceives itself as a victim of geopolitics rather than an actor who provokes negative reaction.” This attitude surfaced several times over the course of the conference and was used to explain why their ASAT program should not be of concern to others. As for the United States, there was curiosity expressed by conference participants about how sincere the United States is about the international cooperation pushed for in its National Space Policy. They are looking for concrete examples that the United States is serious about reaching out to other space powers. Several participants, Indian and otherwise, said that they felt that the United States was in a decline and that would affect India’s security calculus.

Causes Indo-Pak war – goes nuclear

Lewis 2004 - postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program at the Center for International and Security Studies

Jeffrey Lewis July 2004 “What if Space Were Weaponized?

Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios”

Perhaps more importantly, the risk of Pakistani ASAT attacks would create the same escalatory incentives for India that the United States faces in the second scenario. U.S. war games suggest that future conflicts in South Asia may not be very stable.72 A contractor who has conduct more than two dozen war games for the Pentagon and other military-planning centers told the Wall Street Journal that the India-Pakistan scenarios usually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons “within the first 12 ‘days’ of the war game.” “It’s a scary scenario,” said one participant. Anti-satellite weapons would reinforce the strong escalatory dynamic that many war games have revealed. For example, war games that quickly escalate to nuclear use are often restarted to allow the Indian side to reconsider some of the moves that lead to Pakistani escalation. The Indian side, however, generally learns the opposite lesson and attempts a “lighting strike” to destroy the Pakistani nuclear stockpile. When asked if the Indian Armed Force could really execute a preemptive strategy, one participant noted, “Probably not, but they believe they could.”

A2: Turn- US-India space co-op bad

YOUR TURNS ARE WRONG- US-INDIA SPACE COOPERATION WOULDN’T SPILLOVER TO WEAPONS

Bommakanti, 08 (Kartik, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Are MIRVs and Satellite Integration and Dispensation Mutually Inclusive? An Analysis of India’s Capabilities”, 4/10/08, ) AFL

Given the dual-use nature of space technology, what can one make of the claims that increased civilian space cooperation between the United States and India will result in transfer of technology that may bring integration and delivery capabilities warheads into India’s arsenal? The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is poised to send two instruments aboard India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in 2008. Raising concerns about India-U.S. civilian space cooperation, one analyst, Jennifer Kline, reached the suggestive conclusion that technical “know-how” about satellite integration capabilities will enable India to MIRV its ballistic missiles: This point is often regurgitated and incidentally became one reason for suspending American commercial satellite launches from Chinese space launch vehicles in the late 1990s. Just as there was no substantive reason for suspending cooperation with China then, there is nothing to be concerned about current or expanded India-U.S. space cooperation either. A brief retrospective would help clarify some issues. In 1998, controversy erupted in the United States over the telecom giant Motorola’s alleged transfer to China of the Iridium Smart Dispenser. Motorola’s Smart Dispenser releases multiple satellites into orbit, which some alleged enabled the Chinese to develop a MIRV capability.12 But as the House Select Subcommittee report on China’s space and missile forces, also known as the Cox report, noted in 1998, “The PRC [People’s Republic of China, or China] has demonstrated all of the techniques that are required for developing a MIRV bus, and that the PRC could develop a MIRV dispensing platform within a short period of time after making a decision to proceed.”13 This statement is reinforced by two additional facts. As early as 1981, China had dispensed three satellites from a single platform which gave “it an incipient multiple-warhead capability.”14 Secondly, Motorola did not transfer design information of the Iridium dispenser; instead, the company laid out specific technological parameters based on which Chinese engineers developed through indigenous effort a satellite dispenser to Motorola’s needs.15 The obvious conclusion one immediately derives is that China already wielded the technological precursors for the development of a MIRV capability and no real net technology transfer actually accrued to China’s MIRV development program. As China expert Michael Swaine noted in 1998, “Among those who look at Chinese military capabilities, there’s a fairly strong degree of skepticism about the extent to which China’s relationship with U.S. commercial satellite makers has resulted in significant advances in its long-range military missile capabilities.”16 This applies to India as well. The technical fallacy is that the two NASA instruments will be fixed to one of the satellites. As Subrata Ghoshroy, a former analyst with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), has pointed out: Thus the concern that NASA’s engineers might transfer “tacit” knowledge in efforts to mate two lunar instruments with India’s PSLV, which would enable India’s space engineers to learn warhead-missile integration techniques, does not stand the test of technical evidence. In the analysis to follow, we will explore why more substantive issues would help qualify the syllogistic and misleading argument that satellite integration would automatically lead to a MIRV capability. Some media reports suggest India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has already initiated tentative efforts to develop a MIRV capability for India’s Agni-III intermediate range ballistic missiles. Note that the launch of India’s Chandrayaan moon mission that would carry two of NASA’s instruments isn’t scheduled until June or July of this year.18 This would pretty much refute the allegation that Indian engineers would spin off information from its civilian space sector to its missile program. Nevertheless, even if one were to dismiss this position as unverifiable and assert that the DRDO’s quest to develop MIRVs could still in some way be assisted through American transfers in the realm of civilian space cooperation, it does not square with the fact that several countries have launched their instruments and satellites from Indian boosters and that India has had the capacity to integrate and dispense multiple satellite payloads since 1999. The European Space Agency (ESA) is launching its own instruments aboard the same Indian Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) that would host NASA’s M3 and Mini-SAR instruments. Additionally, in 1999, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) launched three satellite payloads, the IRS-P4, and two foreign microsatellites (the Korean KITSAT-3 and Germany’s TUBSAT) simultaneously on a single PSLV rocket.19 In May 2005, India launched the Cartosat-1 and Hamsat satellites from another version of the PSLV. In January 2007, ISRO went one step further, simultaneously launching the satellites, India’s CARTOSAT-2, Indonesia’s LAPAN-TUBSAT and Argentina’s PEHUENSAT-1 and the Space Recovery Experiment-1 (SRE-1) Capsule.20 In April 2007, India registered its first successful commercial launch on a PSLV C8 – the 352-kilogram Italian satellite AGILE along with a non-commercial 185-kilogram craft known as the Advanced Avionics Module (AAM) in order to “test advanced launch vehicle avionics systems like mission computers, navigation and telemetry systems.”21 As recently as Jan. 28, 2008, the C10 version of the PSLV launched an Israeli spy satellite.22

US and India cooperation good- solves high launch costs and international ASAT prevention

O’Donnell, 11 (Frank, Researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. MSc (Distinction) in Strategic Studies from the University of Aberdeen and an MA (Honors) in International Relations and Middle East Studies from the University of St Andrews, “India’s Space Ascent Gains New Boost”, ISN, 5/11/2011, ) AFL

Indo-American space collaboration will also aid India in its quest to attain global commercial launch hub status - and the prestige and strategic advantages brought with it. Important steps have already been made in this direction. ISRO performed its first commercial launch in April 2007, carrying the Italian AGILE satellite aboard a PSLV rocket. Additional commercial initiatives include the launch of the Israeli Polaris military reconnaissance satellite, and nanosatellite launch services for customers including Algeria, Denmark, Germany, and Japan. However, Washington and New Delhi are still to conclude a long-discussed Commercial Space Launch Agreement which would permit India to launch American commercial satellites, or those employing US technology, in direct competition with American launch enterprises. India's full entry into the US domestic commercial launch market will now become a core issue in bilateral discussions as the range of space cooperation efforts widen. India's expanding space infrastructure is likely to accelerate rival space programs and heighten their status as an element of regional strategic competition. Pursuing an expansive space program, Beijing is constructing a massive rocket production facility . Chinese officials announced intentions on 3 March to build the world's largest rocket, with a lift capacity of 130 tons, for a manned moon landing campaign. Pakistan is also developing a communications satellite with Chinese financial support, although it is yet to field an indigenous satellite launch vehicle. Sino-Indian strategic competition threatens to extend to rival anti-satellite (ASAT) programs, intended to eliminate or disable adversary satellites and so deny access to space-based services including communications, navigation, surveillance, and targeting. China conducted an ASAT physical interdiction test in 2007, destroying a weather satellite with an SC-19 missile and generating substantial amounts of long-lived space debris. An SC-19 also served as the interceptor in a Chinese ballistic missile defense test in 2010, illustrating an emerging dual role for China's "hit-to-kill" rocket program. The most recent US annual estimate of Chinese military capabilities notes the existence of programs for the development of additional ASAT tools including particle beam, laser and high-energy microwave options. New Delhi is also seeking to develop ASAT technology, as illuminated by a "Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap" published by the Ministry of Defense in 2010. In its overview of defense technology development plans, the report included "development of ASATs for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both LEO (low earth orbit) and geo-synchronous orbits", along with additional measures to harden satellites against potential attack. Furthermore, following a successful missile interception test in March, the chief of the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization highlighted advances in India's ballistic missile defense program with regard to their potential contributions to ASAT capabilities. While Beijing should remain the principal focus of US efforts to restrain anti-satellite technology competition, US diplomats should also seek to engage their Indian counterparts on this topic. This approach would support the goal, outlined in the US National Security Space Strategy , of a "safe space environment in which all can operate with minimal risk of accidents, breakups, and purposeful interference." More broadly, Washington should aim to encourage a regional consensus opposing the utilization of "hit-to-kill" technologies against satellites, an area of potential competition; it is also one which poses risks to all states with satellites in orbit: the resulting debris cannot be directed away from neutral or "friendly" equipment. This initiative could branch into discussions of alternative ASAT options, including targeted beams, jamming or the maneuvering of one satellite into another, with the aims of reducing the role of ASAT technologies in regional military strategies and raising the political costs of their development and use. In particular, such an engagement strategy would encourage a Sino-Indian understanding of shared risks and responsibilities regarding the protection of space assets, while providing a basis for broader efforts to manage their strategic competition. The relaxation of export controls by the US has opened up the possibility for close cooperation in advancing India's space exploration and commercial launch campaigns. As new collaboration initiatives expand the range of bilateral space discussions, US diplomats should seek to encourage India away from the targeting of satellites by "hit-to-kill" technologies. This point should also serve as a central theme for dialogue with China, and impressed as a core American expectation of responsible behavior among its global space-faring partners. As India continues its space rise, this opportunity to advance crucial space security objectives should not be squandered.

**Aff Answers

NON-UNIQUE - MOONRISE

CANCELING MOONRISE PROVES THE DA IS NON-UNIQUE AND THE LINK IS DENIED

First Post 5/26 Srinivas Laxman US abandons joint unmanned Moon Mission, Isro upset May 26, 2011 #ISRO #Moon Struck #MoonRise #Nasa #Obama

In a major setback to India’s lunar programme, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) on Tuesday offloaded this country from a joint unmanned mission to the moon designated as MoonRise. The offloading comes six months after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President Barack Obama announced the strengthening of Indo-US space collaboration in a joint declaration in New Delhi in November 2010. MoonRise, as well as another Nasa mission to Venus, were rejected in favour of a flight to an asteroid called the “Origins Spectral-Interpretation-Resource-Identification-Security-Regolith-Explorer”,’ in which the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro) is not involved. The MoonRise plan envisaged Isro partnering with Nasa’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) which was announced by Isro chairman K Radhakrishnan in New Delhi on 12 February 2011. The tie-up was given the go-ahead by the Space Commission. At a media meet after the commission meeting, Radhakrishnan said: “We will have to send a Chandrayaan-1 like probe that will orbit the moon for about four-to-five years. The 400-500 kg satellite around the moon could carry some scientific experiments of Isro,’’ he said. He said that the proposal was an outcome of Indo-US space cooperation announced during the visit of President Obama in November 2010. India’s contribution to the MoonRise project would have been about $150 million. As a part of this lunar project, Nasa had asked Isro to build an orbiter for providing communication between the rover operating on the lunar surface and the ground stations. Isro had even initiated preliminary studies on the project, and exchange of information was in progress between Isro and JPL when the project was scrubbed on Tuesday. According to those in the know, Isro’s involvement has more than technical significance. If the project had materialised, it would have underlined a change in Indo-US security relations. Until now US labs and companies were prohibited from exchanging technologies with Isro in an attempt to limit their use for military purposes.

Non-Unique - Restrictions

ITAR AND MTCR MEAN NO CHANCE OF RELATIONS (ESPECIALLY ON SPS)

Jha 10 U.S.-India Space Cooperation Could Power Ties BY SAURAV JHA studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. | 25 OCT 2010

Among the remaining pitfalls to further cooperation, restrictive U.S. controls on high-tech exports -- which target India more than any other major nation besides Pakistan and China -- represent the most significant. Specifically, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) represent the greatest areas for concern. Garretson's report touches on these issues with regard to SBSP, asserting that an exception could be made in the case of ITAR along the lines of similar arrangements in the past. According to Garretson, India would still have to sign the MTCR, in order to assuage U.S. concerns over nonproliferation and intellectual-property rights, given that any SBSP partnership will involve the transfer of cutting-edge technologies. However, India already complies with these regulations to a greater extent than some existing MCTR members do, so an India-specific agreement could be possible. Interestingly, a new report from the Center for New American Security argued that meaningful cooperation on SBSP requires the immediate removal of ISRO from the U.S. Entity List, which designates targets of proliferation concerns (.pdf). Policy heavyweights Karl Indefurth and Raja Mohan also recently advocated for making space the focus not only of the impending Obama visit, but of U.S.-India relations. And U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu stated (.pdf) that the U.S. will prioritize "the partnership between the two countries to advance clean energy, drawing on India's world class science resources," during Obama's visit.

Non-Unique: Afpak

AFPAK REGION IS BIGGEST ISSUE

Sekhon and Purushothaman Oct 31, 2010 * Senior Fellow ** Junior Fellow

ORF Issue Breif “The Obama Visit: Issues and Challenges” Dr. Harinder Sekhon and Ms. Uma Purushothaman

The Afpak region will probably be the biggest challenge for Indo-US relations in the future. Afpak presents an area of strategic convergence between the two countries. Both India and the US have a common interest in countering terrorism emanating out of the region and in stabilizing this area. But, despite claims of cooperation in this area, very little has been done. India has sent considerable aid to Afghanistan, but the US and India can do a lot more together. India could contribute by helping train manpower and invest in more development projects. Meanwhile, India is concerned about Pakistan’s refusal to crack down on home-grown terror outfits, US military aid and arms transfers to Pakistan which will in all probability be used against India as well as strengthen the Pakistan army—and its overdependence on Pakistan in Afghanistan. India also has concerns about the US’ strategy of engaging the Taliban, US’ exit strategy from Afghanistan and the US perception of the role that Pakistan will have in the future in Afghanistan. 3

Non-Unique-Other Issues

OTHER ISSUES SWAMP RELATIONS

Sekhon and Purushothaman Oct 31, 2010 * Senior Fellow ** Junior Fellow

ORF Issue Breif “The Obama Visit: Issues and Challenges” Dr. Harinder Sekhon and Ms. Uma Purushothaman

India would like the US to make a more concrete statement on India’s aspirations for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council if the US’ claim of India being an “indispensable partnership” is to be taken seriously here in India. A statement on this would generate an enormous amount of goodwill in India and create tremendous momentum in Indo-US ties. The US could also start negotiations to make India a part of non proliferation regimes in the nuclear field like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. It should further stop exhorting India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state. It should also support India’s inclusion in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the International Energy Agency. Higher education is another area with great potential for cooperation though this will obviously not be at the government-to-government level. India aims to triple enrollment in higher education by 2020 and needs foreign investment in this sector to build more colleges and universities. India and the US could work together to create centres of excellence building on the Obama-Singh knowledge initiative. Steps have already been taken for expanded cooperation in this area through the establishment of the Indo-US Education Council. Another area which is important from the perspective of India’s growth imperative is health. India’s health sector needs to be expanded so that all citizens, particularly those in rural areas, get access to medical facilities and medicines. This requires huge expenditure which India cannot afford at the moment. The US can help India by investing in the health sector in India, providing cutting-edge technologies and medicines and in collaborating in joint research to find cheaper and better medicines and technologies. The two countries could also collaborate in developing space-based solar power as an alternative energy source. The challenge of climate change requires that India and the US, though they were on opposing sides during the Copenhagen Summit, work together to use energy more efficiently and also to invent and distribute green technology to reduce emissions.

Relations Resilient/Inevitable

RELATIONS RESILIENT—TOO MANY TIES

IANS 10-- Indo-Asian News Service

(June 4, 2010 “India, US vow to cooperate on terror” lexis)

Both recalled that the "India-US partnership rests on the firm foundation of common ideals as well as security and economic interests," the statement said. "The guiding principles upon which both nations were founded - democracy, mutual respect, individual liberty, rule of law, and an appreciation for the strength we derive from being pluralistic societies - make the India-US bond strong, resilient, and uniquely important for building a peaceful, prosperous, inclusive and sustainable world." The high-powered Indian delegation included Human Resource Development Minister Kapil Sibal, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia and Minister of State for Science and Technology Prithviraj Chavan. Clinton was joined by Commerce Secretary Gary Locke, Federal Bureau of Investigtion (FBI) Director Robert Mueller, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, President's Advisor for Science and Technology John Holdren, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah and Deputy National Security Advisor Michael Froman among others.

Relations resilient

Overdorf 11— Jason, covers India for GlobalPost and has a frequent contributor to the Far Eastern Economic Review, and has degrees in English literature and creative writing from Columbia University, Washington University and Boston University

(April 29, 2011 “Outgoing US ambassador says India ties will survive jet debacle” )

Outgoing US ambassador Timothy J. Roemer (jokingly) scotched rumors that he's resigning to run for president and downplayed speculation that India's decision to oust Boeing and Lockheed Martin from the competition for the $10 billion multi-role combat aircraft would be a blow to Indo-US relations. Speaking at a meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in New Delhi, Roemer said, "We respect Indian procurement process but we are deeply disappointed... But I am forever an optimist and positive," according to the Indian Express. "No single issue can decide the Indo-US relation. Our partnership is resilient and global in nature. It will make us inextricable in coming decades." Earlier, local media reported that Roemer had communicated his decision to resign to his Indian counterparts before it was announced that the US companies had been eliminated from the multi-role combat aircraft competition, following some speculation (twitter, mostly) that his lobbying failure in the jet deal played a role in his decision to head home.

Indo-US strategic alliance is resilient – 6 reasons

Garretson 2010 – former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. Previously the Chief of Future Science and Technology Exploration for Headquarters Air Force, former Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Service Academy Research Associate, recipient of the National Space Society’s (NSS) Space Pioneer Award

Peter A. Garretson “Sky’s No Limit: Space-based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership”

Despite the concerns of sceptics, the Indo-US strategic partnership seems to rest on very sound fundamentals that are not likely to change over several decades. First, is a shared cultural history in colonialism, with the attendant struggle for freedom, and the important influence of the enlightenment thought, British political organisation, commerce and trade routes and prominence of the English language in matters of science, state-craft and commerce. Second, the significant and growing bilateral trade. Third is the asymmetric but aligned economic needs–where India needs investment today to maintain a high rate of growth for development and cohesion, and the US is looking for high growth places to invest, and places that provide both a market for its own goods and a costcompetitive manufacturing base to manufacture the ideas it conceives and finances. Fourth is the large and politically active diaspora that is actively seeking to build closer ties. Fifth is a shared interest in limiting the damage of those extremists that undermine pluralism and sew extremism and violence. Finally, both wish to take part in the the economic rise of a vibrant Asian market where a normative rule set prevails that allow all members to benefit from the use of global commons and work on collective problems and human security is possible. Within this framework, both nations see the need to make space for and engage China as it evolves as a responsible stakeholder with greater transparency, but to ensure that accommodation takes place respecting important equities of themselves and their neighbours, and is free of any element of coercion.

Relations inevitable – 8 common interests

Tellis 07 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former Department of State senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Former senior policy analyst at the RAND corporation

CHAPTER 8 Gauging U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation Edited By Henry D. Sokolski, Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM INDIA AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER? Ashley J. Tellis

These links are only reinforced by the new and dramatic convergence of national interests between the United States and India in a manner never witnessed during the Cold War. Today and for the foreseeable future, both Washington and New Delhi will be bound by a common interest in: • Preventing Asia from being dominated by any single power that has the capacity to crowd out others and which may use aggressive assertion of national self-interest to threaten American presence, American alliances, and American ties with the regional states; • Eliminating the threats posed by state sponsors of terrorism who may seek to use violence against innocents to attain various political objectives, and more generally neutralizing the dangers posed by terrorism and religious extremism to free societies; • Arresting the further spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies to other countries and subnational entities, including substate actors operating independently or in collusion with states; • Promoting the spread of democracy not only as an end in itself but also as a strategic means of preventing illiberal polities from exporting their internal struggles over power abroad; • Advancing the diffusion of economic development with the intent of spreading peace through prosperity through the expansion of a liberal international economic order that increases trade in goods, services, and technology worldwide; • Protecting the global commons, especially the sea lanes of communications, through which flow not only goods and services critical to the global economy but also undesirable commerce such as drug trading, human smuggling, and WMD technologies; • Preserving energy security by enabling stable access to existing energy sources through efficient and transparent market mechanisms (both internationally and domestically), while collaborating to develop new sources of energy through innovative approaches that exploit science and technology; and, • Safeguarding the global environment by promoting the creation and use of innovative technology to achieve sustainable development; devising permanent, self-sustaining, marketbased institutions and systems that improve environmental protection; developing coordinated strategies for managing climate change; and assisting in the event of natural disasters.

Relations inevitable – disagreements won’t matter

Tellis 07 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former Department of State senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Former senior policy analyst at the RAND corporation

CHAPTER 8 Gauging U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation Edited By Henry D. Sokolski, Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM INDIA AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER? Ashley J. Tellis

Third, that there are no differences in vital interests, despite the tensions in the competing grand strategies, which would cause either party to levy mortal threats against the other or would cause either country to undercut the other’s core objectives on any issue of strategic importance. These two realities—informed by the convergence in interests, values, and intersocietal ties—provide a basis for strong practical cooperation between the United States and India. They are realities that do not define U.S. bilateral relations with any other major, continental-sized, state in Asia. The fact that the United States and India would never threaten each other’s security through the force of arms—and have never done so historically despite moments of deep disagreement—provides an enormous cushion of comfort in the bilateral relationship because it insulates policymakers on both sides from having to confront the prospect of how to manage the most lethal threats that may otherwise be imagined. U.S. relations with neither Russia nor China enjoy any comparable protection. Therefore, even when U.S.-Indian relations may be confronted by profound disagreement, these altercations would be no better and no worse that those arising with other friends and allies. This reality in effect, then, bounds the lowest limits of the relationship: While disagreements between friends and allies are never desirable, they at least hold out the reassurance that these disputes will not end up in violent conflict and that by itself provides an opportunity for exploring some reasonable “positive sum” solutions.

India will never abandon the US—key to strategic interests

Das 11 – Premvir, former Director General, Defence Planning Staff, and member of the National Security Advisory Board (May 1, 2011 AMB)

For more substance to be given to the relationship, a larger overview of national interest is needed. If a multipolar Asia is what India wants and a unipolar continent is what China seeks, then the US becomes a very important factor in our calculus. Its interests in Asia are enormous and it cannot let China assume a hegemonic role. Without ‘using’ the US, it is not possible for India to secure the Asia that it wants. On another plane, none of its global aspirations can be met without the proactive support of the US — seats in the Security Council, on the high table of world trade, in groups controlling nuclear technology or in several other multilateral forums, fall in this category. The real question is whether a close engagement impacts adversely our relations with other countries — for example, Russia, Iran and Myanmar, even China, our core interests in South Asia and, indeed our concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan. These cannot be easily brushed aside but close scrutiny will show that while all these are manageable by us, the larger canvas is not. In sum, close relations with the US are critical to India’s rise, first as an Asian power and then as a global player of consequence. If this is true, then defence cooperation between the two countries must be taken a few notches further. Its contours can be four-fold.

India will never abandon the US—economic reasons

Schaffer 10-Teresita, Ambassador and director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (October 2010 “U.S.-India Initiative Series the United States and India 10 Years Out” )

India and the United States have transformed their relationship in the past 20 years. Looking ahead a decade or more, this trend is likely to continue. The two countries can expect strong economic ties and a lively security relationship, including increased defense trade and especially stronger cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Economic issues will remain important drivers of Indian foreign policy. Cooperation on the global scene will have ups and downs, but the two countries will gradually find more areas where they can work together. As India’s international trade encompasses more sophisticated and knowledge-based products, India will pursue economic interests that do not necessarily dovetail with those of the developing countries as a group. India-Pakistan relations are likely to remain brittle. India will continue to see China as its major strategic challenge. Over the next decade, India will become more comfortable with a higher international profile – but slowly, and with considerable nervousness about the risks involved in departing from its comfort zone focused on the nonaligned movement. The “wild cards” most likely to produce real discontinuities in U.S.-India ties relate to the domestic coherence and international behavior of Pakistan and China, to international conflict involving Iran and to changes in the global distribution of power over the next decade. In addition, externally driven changes in climate or technology could limit India’s economic growth and in the process make India a much more inwardoriented country. Looking behind this broad-brush projection, it is instructive to take apart the elements of continuity and change, and to see what lessons these hold for policymakers. Growing Economies, Expanding Linkages India’s economic growth after 1990 was one of the most important factors in transforming U.S.-India relations. This economic growth had two consequences, both of which are likely to continue through the next decade: It led to an increasingly large and vibrant U.S.-India economic relationship, and it put economic success – trade, investment and securing energy supplies – at the heart of India’s foreign policy and strategic calculus. Projections for India’s economy over the next five years consistently foresee growth rates of upwards of 8 percent, possibly higher. Even if India’s economic expansion falls somewhat short of these levels, one can expect economics to remain one of the drivers of U.S.-India relations, and a very positive one. In the next decade, trade will continue to grow as a share of India’s economy. The United States will remain one of India’s top three trading partners, and probably the largest when one includes services and information technology trade as well as goods. India’s economic growth will make it an increasingly important partner for the United States, though its share of U.S. trade will not be as impressive (about 1.4 percent of U.S. trade in 2009; even dramatic growth will leave it well short of the top tier). The geography and composition of India’s trade will be increasingly diverse. India has already begun implementing free-trade areas with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Korea, and will negotiate one with Japan. With each new trade opening, the next one will become slightly easier, and India will approach the next multilateral trade negotiation with more flexibility and a greater expectation that it can benefit from global trade liberalization. A free-trade agreement with the United States is conceivable toward the end of this period, but only if the U.S. economy picks up enough to counteract the politics of getting such an agreement enacted by the U.S. Congress.

Relations Doesn’t Solve the Impact

HOLD IMPACT CARDS TO A HIGH THRESHOLD: RELATIONS AND COMMON INTERESTS DOESN’T MEAN THEY WORK ON IT OR SOLVE IT

Tellis 07 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. Former Department of State senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Former senior policy analyst at the RAND corporation

CHAPTER 8 Gauging U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation Edited By Henry D. Sokolski, Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM INDIA AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER? Ashley J. Tellis

It would not be an exaggeration to say that for the first time in recent memory Indian and American interests in each of these eight issue-areas are strongly convergent.10 It is equally true to assert that India’s contribution ranges from important to indispensable as far as achieving U.S. objectives in each of these issue-areas is concerned. That does not mean, however, that the United States and India will automatically collaborate on every problem that comes before the two countries. The differentials in raw power between the United States and India are still too great and could produce differences in operational objectives, even when the overarching interests are preeminently compatible. Beyond the differentials in raw power, bilateral collaboration could still be stymied by competing national preferences over the strategies used to realize certain objectives. And, finally, even when disagreement over strategies is not at issue, differences in negotiating styles and tactics may sometimes divide the two sides.

Relations Not Intrinsic

DA ISN’T AN OPPORTUNITY COST OF THE PLAN – SEVERAL OTHER MECHANISMS SOLVE INDIA RELATIONS

Armitage et al, 10 (Richard L., *President of Armitage International, R. Nicholas Burns, **Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics at Harvard University, Richard Fontaine, ***Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security, “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of US-India Relations”, October 2010, ) AFL

In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List. These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power. U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include: Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power. Strengthening an open global trading system. • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms). • Countering terrorism and violent extremism. • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources. • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime. • Promoting democracy and human rights. • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Impact Turn: India Militarization

SPACE RELATIONS LEAD TO INDIAN SPACE WEAPONIZATION AND MILITARIZATION. WE ARE SUPPLYING INDIA WITH THE MEAN

Matthew Hoey and Joan Johnson-Freese 10 Matthew Hoey is the director of the Military Space Transparency Project. Joan Johnson-Freese is a professor at the Naval War College. They are both contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus. India: Militarizing Space with U.S. Help November 3, 2010 India says that its space program is for peaceful purposes. The United States agrees. They're both wrong.

India, not surprisingly, says that its space program is for “peaceful” purposes only. The parallels between India’s nuclear program development and its current space program development, however, suggest otherwise. Former Indian President Abdul Kalam was a key developer and explicator of India’s nuclear and missile programs, as well as its current space vision. His definition of “peaceful” provides India considerable latitude. Kalam once stated that, “In the 3,000-year history of India, barring 600 years, the country has been ruled by others. If you need development, the country should witness peace, and peace is ensured by strength. Missiles were developed to strengthen the country.” This philosophy of peace through strength also provides the rationale for developing a wide range of new and emerging space technologies with far-reaching military applications. India considered its nuclear program peaceful right up to and including its 1974 test. Now, India considers its expanding space program peaceful as well. Despite contrary indications, Washington is apparently also willing to do so. India’s space program dates back to the launching of its first sounding rocket in 1963. Recently, however, the character of the Indian program has changed dramatically from utilitarian to more far-reaching. India is developing capabilities, including human exploration of space and expanded utilization of many dual-use technologies, to enhance its geostrategic position. This dual-use space technology can be used not just for military force enhancement but potentially for space weapons as well. Though most Indian politicians profess that India is not pursuing space weapons, some blur the lines. In February 2007, for example, Indian Defense Minister A.K Antony stated that, “It may be difficult to demarcate distinctly between peaceful and military uses. However, we have always advocated peaceful use of technology. Thus, we are of the view that weaponization of space must be discouraged.” The Indian military is not so circumspect and in fact at times directly contradicts the politicians. An alarming 2000 report titled “Military Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space” caused waves within official circles but drew little international attention, probably due to its lack of availability outside of India. Perhaps most controversial was its suggestion that India could deploy a directed-energy weapon, such as a particle beam weapon, in space by 2010. At the time of publication, the paper’s author, V. Siddhartha, was an officer on special duty in the secretariat of the scientific advisor to the defense minister. The paper is testament to, at the very least, a longstanding interest within the Indian military of deploying not only a space-based laser, but also a kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) system. Although India clearly has not deployed an ASAT system that utilizes directed energy technology to date, Siddhartha’s forecast of India having the potential to develop an ASAT system still appears officially supported. In January of 2010 Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Director General V K Saraswat stated at the 97th Indian Science Congress that, "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites.” All the while Indian officials continue to heavily lobby the United States to remove export restrictions on DRDO and ISRO, with a continuingly favorable reaction from the United States. Perhaps most clearly and most recently, the Indian ministry of defense published a document that serves as a technological roadmap for the Indian military’s future to the year 2015. This Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap confirms the pursuit of a formal anti-satellite program, stating “development of ASAT for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both LEO and GEO-synchronous orbits” as a goal for 2015. Not only is the United States not speaking out against such Indian efforts, it has become more accommodating in providing the technology to accomplish them. Meanwhile, international attention continues to focus on China’s military space activities and, given China’s overt ASAT test in 2007, rightfully so. But shortly after China’s satellite shoot-down, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a joint press conference where Singh declared; “Our position is similar in that we are not in favor of the weaponization of outer space.” This was just one day after then-Indian Air Force (IAF) chief Shashi Tyagi had stated, “As the reach of our air force is expanding, it has become extremely important that we exploit space, and for it you need space assets.” India’s contradictory intentions concerning its space program are hard to miss, yet Washington seems intent on doing so.

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