SET THREE TRUE/FALSE - Quia



SET THREE TRUE/FALSE

PHILOSOPHY 165: EPISTEMOLOGY

SPRING 2009

Kevin Kyeong

Prof. David Ring

3/19/09

SET #3 – Epistemology (Phil. 165) True/False

Questions:

1. According to Jack Crumley, for any belief we might have as a result of introspection, we might have also arrived at that belief by means of a basic or non-inference belief.

2. According to Jack Crumley, we can be mistaken about whether introspection is a direct process.

3. According to David Hume, beliefs are only possible with sensations, but sensations are possible without beliefs.

4. Churchland asserts that in a hypothetical situation where a person has no felt pain due to neural damage for fifty years, the person would be able to instantly discriminate and identify all newly recovered sensations with infallible accuracy.

5. Cēterus paribus means that “with other things different.”

Kevin Kyeong

3/19/09

SET #3 – Epistemology (Phil. 165) True/False

David Ring

Questions:

1. According to Jack Crumley, for any belief we might have as a result of introspection, we might have also arrived at that belief by means of a basic or non-inference belief.

False, Crumley actually states that as a result of introspection, we might have arrived at that belief by means of an inference. [Objections to Incorrigibility by Jack Crumley]

2. According to Jack Crumley, we can be mistaken about whether introspection is a direct process.

True, and to quote Crumley himself, “we can be mistaken about whether introspection is a direct process.” [Objections to Incorrigibility by Jack Crumley]

3. According to David Hume, beliefs are only possible with sensations, but sensations are possible without beliefs.

False, actually it's “beliefs are possible without sensations, sensations are possible without beliefs.” [Lecture Notes]

4. Churchland asserts that in a hypothetical situation where a person has no felt pain due to neural damage for fifty years, the person would be able to instantly discriminate and identify all newly recovered sensations with infallible accuracy.

False, actually Churchland states that such a situation that a person would be able to instantly discriminate and identify all newly recovered sensations with infallible accuracy is implausible. [Matter and Consciousness by Paul Churchland on the ICT]

5. False. Quite to the contrary, cēterus paribus actually means “with other things the same.”

Jason Higgins

Set 3 True/False Questions &Answers

1.The incorrigibility thesis is a direct phenomenal belief can be false.

False, “Incorrigibility Thesis: A direct phenomenal belief cannot be false.” [ #16, Section 4.1, 2]

2.The incorrigibility thesis has a number of significant limitations.

True, [ #16, Section 4.1, 6]

3All direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible.

False, “The first is that most phenomenal beliefs are not direct phenomenal beliefs, so most phenomenal beliefs are still corrigible. The most common sort of phenomenal belief arguably involves the application of a pre-existing phenomenal concept (either a relational phenomenal concept or a standing pure phenomenal concept) to a new situation, as with the beliefs typically expressed by claims such as 'I am having a red experience' or 'I am in pain'. These are not direct phenomenal beliefs, and are almost certainly corrigible.

There are also cases in which a direct phenomenal concept is applied to a quality (or an experience) other than the one that constituted it, as when one forms a direct phenomenal concept R based on a quality instantiated in the left half of one's visual field, and applies it to a quality instantiated in the right half. These are also not direct phenomenal beliefs, and are again almost certainly corrigible.” [ #16, Section 4.1, 6]

4.The incorrigibility thesis suffers from the problem that direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible because they are trivial.

False, “The analogy fails, however. The trivial beliefs in question are (almost) cognitively insignificant: they are (almost) a priori, containing (almost) no cognitively significant knowledge about the world. This is reflected in the fact that they hardly constrain the class of a priori epistemic possibilities: they are true of (almost) all such possibilities, considered as hypotheses about the actual world. (Two-dimensionally: these beliefs have a epistemic intension that is (almost) conceptually necessary.) A direct phenomenal belief, by contrast, is cognitively significant: it heavily constrains the class of a priori epistemic possibilities, and is false in most of them (considered as actual). For example, Mary's direct phenomenal belief, on leaving her room, is false of all worlds (considered as actual) in which the subject is not experiencing phenomenal redness. (Two-dimensionally: the epistemic intension of a direct phenomenal belief is conceptually contingent.) So direct phenomenal beliefs, unlike the beliefs above, are entirely nontrivial.” [ #16, Section 4.1, 25]

5.Justification thesis is when a subject forms a direct phenomenal belief based on a phenomenal quality, then that belief is “prima facie” justified by virtue of the subject's acquaintance with that quality.

True,[ #16, Section 4.2, 13]

Set #3

Epistemology True/False

Spring 2009

Easton Snow

1. According to David Chalmers all the standard counterexamples to the ICT appear to involve the application of pre-existing phenomenal concepts such as pain, hot, red etc.

2. Using the argument of rapid changing experiences and how the corresponding direct phenomenal concept must lag behind is a viable counterexample to the ICT according to David Chalmers.

3. In Bailey’s book Privacy and the Mental the ICT is defined as; a person’s beliefs about their mental states cannot be corrected.

4. Bailey also holds that it is logically possible to have mental phenomenon without introspective awareness of its content.

5. Chalmers introduces the problem that the ICT and direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible because they are trivial.

Epistemology Spring 2009 True/False Set #3

Easton Snow

1. According to David Chalmers all the standard counterexamples to the ICT appear to involve the application of pre-existing phenomenal concepts such as pain, hot, red etc.

True. “It is plausible that all the standard counterexamples to incorrigibility theses fall into classes such as these, particularly the first. All the standard counterexamples appear to involve the application of pre-existing phenomenal concepts (pain, hot, red experience)” (Chalmers 4.1).

2. Using the argument of rapid changing experiences and how the corresponding direct phenomenal concept must lag behind is a viable counterexample to the ICT according to David Chalmers.

False. “one might consider a case in which a subject's experience changes very rapidly, and argue that the corresponding direct phenomenal concept must lag behind. In response to these attempted counterexamples, the most obvious reply is that these cannot truly be counterexamples, since the truth of the incorrigibility thesis is guaranteed by the definition of direct phenomenal belief” (Chalmers 4.1).

3. In Bailey’s book Privacy and the Mental the ICT is defined as; a person’s beliefs about their mental states cannot be corrected.

True. “I have introduced the incorrigibility thesis as the thesis that some person’s beliefs about his current mental condition (logically) cannot be corrected” (Bailey 100).

4. Bailey also holds that it is logically possible to have mental phenomenon without introspective awareness of its content.

True. “it is only necessary to show that it is logically possible that a mental phenomenon exist independently of an introspective awareness of its content” (Bailey 99).

5. Chalmers introduces the problem that the ICT and direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible because they are trivial.

True. “It might be thought that the incorrigibility thesis suffers from another problem: that direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible because they are trivial. After all, beliefs such as I am here or this is this are (close to) incorrigible, but only because they are (almost) trivial” (Chalmers 4.1).

Zeila Ross Joanne Edrial

Epistemology

3/19/09

Set 3 T/F Questions

1. One can be mistaken about the identity of one’s own sensations.

2. The body isn’t necessary when talking about pain.

3. Experience does not entail knowledge.

4. According to the traditional view, it is possible to believe, “It seemed to me that I was in considerable pain, but I was mistaken.”

5. Crumley believes that introspection is not an infallible source of belief about the contents of our own minds.

Zeila Ross Joanne Edrial

Epistemology

3/19/09

Set 3 T/F Answers

1. One can be mistaken about the identity of one’s own sensations.

A: True. Sensation has determinate identity conditions. If an object has determinate identity conditions, the nit’s always possible to have a false belief about it. [Lecture Notes 3/12]

2. The body isn’t necessary when talking about pain.

A: False. The body is necessary because it is the cause of the pain. In other words, if there was no body, then it wouldn’t be possible to “feel” anything. [Lecture Notes 3/17]

3. Experience does not entail knowledge.

A: True. David Chalmers agrees with the belief that knowledge requires concepts, but experiences don’t require concepts. Experiences play a role in justifying knowledge, and they play a role in partly constituting the beliefs that qualify as knowledge, in combination with other cognitive elements. As a result, just having experiences doesn’t necessarily mean there is knowledge. [Chalmers 4.4]

4. According to the traditional view, it is possible to believe, “It seemed to me that I was in considerable pain, but I was mistaken.”

A: False. The traditional view states that one cannot be mistaken about one’s own judgments on his own mental state. “The mind is transparent to itself, and things in the mind are, necessarily, exactly what they ‘seem’ to be.” [Churchland 75]

5. Crumley believes that introspection is not an infallible source of belief about the contents of our own minds.

A: True. Crumley theorizes that if “introspection is a source of belief, and is having a belief requires the use of concepts, and if using concepts involves a risk of misusing or misapplying concepts,” then introspection is not infallible. [Crumley 109]

Chase E. Smith(34) Set Three

David Ring.

Epistemology

1. According to Jack Crumley, introspection is direct and therefore incorrigible.

2. According to Jack Crumley, recognizing and describing are two distinct acts; therefore it is possible to misdescribe something and still not be mistaken about the nature of your sensation.

3. Churchland argues that self knowledge is not important in of itself, but rather because it helps a persons understanding of the external world.

4. Churchland claims that expectation effects have no influence over our perception.

5. Churchland argues that the reality appearance reality distinction is perfectly acceptable

\

Chase E. Smith(34) Set Three

David Ring.

Epistemology

1. According to Jack Crumley, introspection is direct and therefore incorrigible.

False. “ Suppose introspection is [not direct]. Suppose that on at least some occasions, what goes on is something like an inference, an inference that is hidden from us. Such unconscious inferences do occur. The troublesome point for the infallibillist is that it seems possible for these to cases to go undistinguished.” (An introduction to Epistemology, p.2)

2. According to Jack Crumley, recognizing and describing are two distinct acts; therefore it is possible to misdescribe something and still not be mistaken about the nature of your sensation.

False. “For me to characterize the sensation as being of a certain type requires that I have discriminating beliefs about what qualifies as an instance of being of a certain type” (An introduction to Epistemology, p.3). This means that in order to even be able to describe something, you must have some determinate identity conditions; otherwise you wouldn’t be able to classify it as whatever it may be. Further more, this means that because there are determinate identity conditions, it is possible for you to get them wrong. This makes the distinction of recognizing from describing seem unlikely.

3. Churchland argues that self knowledge is not important in of itself, but rather because it helps a persons understanding of the external world.

True. “ the capacity for self-knowledge could conceivably be selected as the incidental concomitant of the capacity for knowledge generally, and it might be selected for specifically if it happened to enhance in some way the brain’s capacity for external knowledge” (Matter and Consciousness, p. 2)

4. Churchland claims that expectation effects have no influence over our perception.

False. “The reality of expectation effects provides us with a recipe for producing almost any misidentification you like, whether of external things, or of internal states” (Matter and Consciousness, p.3.)

5. Churchland argues that the reality appearance reality distinction is perfectly acceptable.

False. “ Do we really know enough about the mechanisms of introspection to insist that nothing mediates the sensation and the judgment about it? Granted, there is no intermediary that we are aware of, but this means nothing, since on any view there must be much f the mind’s operation below the level of introspective detection. Here is another possible source of error” (Matter and Consciousness, p.3.)

Set #3- True/False Epistemology

Rachael Konves

March 19, 2009

1. According to David Hume, you cannot have a sensation without a cause.

2. If you have a 1st direct experience where you see the color red and call it a “red” experience, you can have a 2nd experience where you see purple and call it “red” since purple and red are similar looking.

3. You can never have a false belief about something that has determinate identity conditions.

4. The infinite regress problem refers to misrecognizing the determinate identity conditions for an object every time you see it.

5. Those who follow the Traditional View believe that sensations are direct and not through other sensations.

Set #3- True/False Epistemology

Rachael Konves

March 19, 2009

1. According to David Hume, you cannot have a sensation without a cause.

False; Hume believes you can have a sensation without a cause, which would lead to misbelief meaning you could be corrected.

2. If you have a 1st direct experience where you see the color red and call it a “red” experience, you can have a 2nd experience where you see purple and call it “red” since purple and red are similar looking.

False; two experiences can only be called the same thing if they have the same exact properties.

3. You can never have a false belief about something that has determinate identity conditions.

False; it is always possible to have a false belief about something that has determinate identity conditions; it is not possible to have a false belief about something that does not have determinate identity conditions, such as the fountain of youth.

4. The infinite regress problem refers to misrecognizing the determinate identity conditions for an object every time you see it.

False; the infinite regress problem refers that to have a sensation x, you have to sense that you are sensing x, and sense that you are sensing that you are sensing x, so on and so forth (for infinity).

5. Those who follow the Traditional View believe that sensations are direct and not through other sensations.

True; they believe that if sensations were not direct, you would have the infinite regress problem.

Andrew P. Ortolani

Epistemology

T/F Questions Set #3

T/F:

1. Suppose Jack and Jill are on a hill. Jack correctly believes that both Jill and he are on a hill; however, it seems to Jill that Jack and she are on a mountain. According to the Incorrigibility Thesis (ICT) both Jack and Jill are correct.

2. According to David Chalmers most phenomenal beliefs (that are not direct phenomenal beliefs) are corrigible.

3. According to David Chalmers although direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, subjects are not incorrigible about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief.

4. According to the Incorrigibility Thesis (ICT), a delusional individual who believes he is super man is in fact superman.

5. I believe I am experiencing hot, when I am in fact experiencing cold. Upon reflection I realize that I was actually experiencing cold. My belief in the hot experience is incorrigible, according to Paul M. Churchland.

Andrew P. Ortolani

Epistemology

T/F Questions Set #3

T/F:

1. Suppose Jack and Jill are on a hill. Jack correctly believes that both Jill and he are on a hill; however, it seems to Jill that Jack and she are on a mountain. According to the Incorrigibility Thesis (ICT) both Jack and Jill’s beliefs are in fact incorrigible.

A: True. According to the Incorrigibility Thesis, if Jill believes P based on her perceptions, and Jack believes S bases on his, neither can be mistaken about their belief, whether it is wrong or right.

2. According to David Chalmers most phenomenal beliefs (that are not direct phenomenal beliefs) are corrigible.

A: True. “The first is that most phenomenal beliefs are not direct phenomenal beliefs, so most phenomenal beliefs are still corrigible.” (Q: 16)

3. According to David Chalmers although direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, subjects are not incorrigible about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief.

A: True. “A final limitation: although direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, subjects are not incorrigible about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief.” (Q: 16)

4. According to the Incorrigibility Thesis (ICT), a delusional individual who believes he is super man is in fact superman.

A: False. According to the Incorrigibility Thesis, if I believe P based on my own perceptions, then I cannot be mistaken about P; however, that does not make P true.

5. I believe I am experiencing hot, when I am in fact experiencing cold. Upon reflection I realize that I was actually experiencing cold. My belief in the hot experience is incorrigible, according to Paul M. Churchland.

Set Three T/F Questions

Taylor Hamby 3/19/09

Phil 165 Dr. Ring

1. One objection to the ICT proposes that most of our beliefs about what we are thinking and feeling are results of introspection. Any belief caused by introspection, might also be caused from inference, and said inference could be false. Therefore our introspection is not always incorrigible.

2. Infallibility is a pillar of rationalistic theory.

3. “I exist” is an incorrigible statement.

4. The traditional view and modern foundationalism are one in the same.

5. Although direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, I am not incorrigible in thinking that I am having a direct phenonmenal belief.

Set Three T/F Questions

Taylor Hamby 3/19/09

Phil 165 Dr. Ring

1. One objection to the ICT proposes that most of our beliefs about what we are thinking and feeling are results of introspection. Any belief caused by introspection, might also be caused from inference, and said inference could be false. Therefore our introspection is not always incorrigible.

TRUE. This theory was proposed by Keith Lehrer. [Crumley reading, p. 107t]

2. Infallibility is a pillar of rationalistic theory.

FALSE. Infallibility is part of foundational theory. “A standard claim of the strong foundationalist is that we have infallible access to the contents of our own mind.” [Crumley, p. 106b]

3. “I exist” is an incorrigible statement.

TRUE. According to Pojman, it is impossible to prove “I” doesn’t exist. “A belief is incorrigible for someone S if and only if it’s not possible to show that person that he or she is mistaken. Examples of this would be appearance statements, such as …. “I exist.” [Pojman, p.101m]

4. The traditional view and modern foundationalism are one in the same.

FALSE. The traditional view and classical foundationalism are one in the same. “We call the traditional view-that we may have infallible noninferential knowledge upon which all other knowledge is based-classical foundationalism.” [Pojman p.101b]

5. Although direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, I am not incorrigible in thinking that I am having a direct phenonmenal belief.

TRUE. “Although direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, subjects are not incorrigible about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief. For example, if I am not thinking clearly, I might misclassify a belief involving a standing phenomenal concept as a direct phenomenal belief.” [The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, Chalmers 4.1]

Chelsea Tieu

March 19, 2009

Philosophy 165

True/False Set 3

1. According to David Chalmers, if a phenomenal belief is not a direct phenomenal belief, then it is corrigible.

2. Paul Churchland believes that we know enough about the mechanisms of introspection to know that our own direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible.

3. Internalism stresses having reasons for one’s beliefs that ground or justify those beliefs.

4. According to David Chalmers, an individual can never be wrong about a direct phenomenal belief or about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief because they are the ones that are having it.

5. You are repeatedly burned by a hot iron, on the twentieth trial, an ice cube is pressed against your back and you state that you are in pain but later change your mind. Paul Churchland argues that this sensation was pain after all, because if you took it to be pain, and if it felt painful to you, then it really was pain.

Chelsea Tieu

March 19, 2009

Philosophy 165

True/False Set 3

1. According to David Chalmers, if a phenomenal belief is not a direct phenomenal belief, then it is corrigible.

True. Chalmers states that (non-direct) phenomenal beliefs usually involve the application of a pre-existing phenomenal concept to a new situation, as with the beliefs typically expressed by claims such as ‘I am having a red experience’ or ‘I am in pain’ and are certainly corrigible. Chalmers reading section 4

2. Paul Churchland believes that we know enough about the mechanisms of introspection to know that our own direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible.

False. Churchland argues that we do not know enough about the mechanism of introspection to insist that nothing mediates the sensation and the judgment about it. There is no intermediary that we are aware of, but states that again this is an argument from ignorance. Churchland reading 77

3. Internalism stresses having reasons for one’s beliefs that ground or justify those beliefs.

True. According to Louis Pojman, internalism stresses having reasons, being able to access those reasons, being able to recall them from memory, to cite them when questioned, and to use them as premises in arguments. Pojman 136

4. According to David Chalmers, an individual can never be wrong about a direct phenomenal belief or about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief because they are the ones that are having it.

False. Chalmers argues that although direct phenomenal beliefs are incorrigible, subjects are not incorrigible about whether they are having a direct phenomenal belief. Chalmers reading section 4

5. You are repeatedly burned by a hot iron, on the twentieth trial, an ice cube is pressed against your back and you state that you are in pain but later change your mind. Paul Churchland argues that this sensation was pain after all, because if you took it to be pain, and if it felt painful to you, then it really was pain.

False. Churchland states that because you recover from your misidentification and reverse your judgment, you did not feel pain, but mis-desribed it, arguing that this disproves the incorrigibility thesis. Churchland reading 77

Danh Phan

Set 3: Philosophy 165

1. By way of introspection, one can be a victim of a false impression (of an impression) or a misleading sensation (of a sensation).

2. Introspection is fundamentally the same as any form of external perception.

3. Brains have been the beneficiaries of natural selection because of the internal world.

4. When you are expecting one taste-sensation and are fed another sensation that is similar, the mistake is called expectation effects.

5. Bailey believes that the incorrigibility thesis states that a belief is incorrigible if the believes can’t be corrected.

Danh Phan

Set 3: Philosophy 165

1. By way of introspection, one can be a victim of a false impression (of an impression) or a misleading sensation (of a sensation).

False, one can not introspectively comprehend a sensation by way of another sensation, “as a result, one cannot be the victim of a false impression or a misleading sensation.” (Churchland, p. 75)

2. Introspection is fundamentally the same as any form of external perception.

False, as introspection is “fundamentally different from external perception” and is mediated by sensations and is known only indirectly and problematically. (Churchland, p. 75)

3. Brains have been the beneficiaries of natural selection because of the internal world.

False, brains were selected because they conferred an advantage of providing individuals who possess them with “knowledge and control of the external world… Brains have been the beneficiaries of natural selection precisely because of that feature.” (Churchland, p. 76)

4. When you are expecting one taste-sensation and are fed another sensation that is similar, the mistake is called expectation effects.

True, according to Churchland, an orange-expectant subject fed lime sherbet may confidently identify her taste-sensation as being of the kind produced by orange sherbet only to react identification immediately upon being given genuine orange. “Mistakes of this kind are called expectation effects.” (Churchland, p. 77)

5. Bailey believes that the incorrigibility thesis states that a belief is incorrigible if the believes can’t be corrected.

True, “I have introduced the incorrigibility thesis as the thesis that some of a person’s beliefs about his current mental condition (logically) cannot be corrected.” (Bailey, Privacy and the Metal, p. 127)

Don Le

Epistemology 165

Tues./Thurs. - 11:10

Set 3 True/False

Questions

1. According to the Crumley reading on Quia, a standard response to the objection of one having a sensation of purple but actually not having a sensation of purple and actually rather having a sensations of a type of indigo is that one is not mistaken about the nature of one sensation; that one has only misdescribed it.

2. According to the Churchland reading, introspective judgement about a person's sensation are infalliable and corrigible.

3. The Incorrigibility Thesis is defined as a direct phenomenal can or cannot be false.

4. David Chalmers, states in his reading on the Incorrigibility Thesis, that the Incorrigibility Thesis has no limitations.

5. The term, Ceteris Paribus, is defined by Dr. Ring as “all things are equal.”

Don Le

Epistemology 165

Tues./Thurs. - 11:10

Set 3 True/False

Questions/Answers

1. According to the Crumley reading on Quia, a standard response to the objection of one having a sensation of purple but actually not having a sensation of purple and actually rather having a sensations of a type of indigo is that one is not mistaken about the nature of one sensation; that one has only misdescribed it.

True. According to the Crumley reading on “Objections to Incorrigibility”, a standard response to the objection to that claim is that one has not mistaken the nature of one's sensation but instead have misdescribed it. The assumption that underlies the response is that there is a difference between recognizing that one has a certain sensation and describing it as being a certain type. The recognition would then be held to be infallible and that one's description has simply been in error. [Q] Jack Crumley reading

2. According to the Churchland reading, introspective judgement about a person's sensation are infalliable and corrigible.

False. Introspective judgement about one's sensations are actually infalliable and incorrigible. As stated in the Churchland readings, it is logically impossible to be mistaken about one's sensations and that the mind recognizes itself before the external world. [Q] Churchland (76-77)

3. The Incorrigibility Thesis is defined as a direct phenomenal can or cannot be false.

False. As stated in the Chalmers reading, the incorrigibility thesis is defined as a direct phenomenal cannot be false. “A direct phenomenal concept by its nature picks out instances of an underlying demonstrated phenomenal quality, and a direct phenomenal belief identifies the referent of that concept with the very demonstrated quality (or predicates the concept of the very experience that instantiated the quality), so its truth is guaranteed.” [Q] Chalmers - Section 4.1

4. David Chalmers, states in his reading on the Incorrigibility Thesis, that the Incorrigibility Thesis has no limitations.

False. The Incorrigibility Thesis has rather a number of limits in place. Such as the thesis iteself does not yield incorrigibility in virtue of content and also that the majority of phenomenal beliefs aren't direct phenomenal beliefs, therefore they are still corrigible. [Q] Chalmers

5. The term, Ceteris Paribus, is defined by Dr. Ring as “all things are equal.”

True. According to class discussions, Dr. Ring defined the latin term, Ceteris Paribus, as all things being equal. Meaning that if we drop a pen and its hit the ground due to the pull of gravity, that if we attempt the exact same procedure the second time that the result should remain the same. [Class Discussion]

Chelsea Serrano

18 March 2009

Philosophy 165: Epistemology

David C. Ring

Set #3

1. Churchland states that perception whether inner or outer is a learned skill.

2. Churchland say that all perceptual judgments are just introspective ones.

3. Fale contends that it is a mistake to understand infallibility as the logically impossible mistake.

4. Crumley states that a standard claim of strong foundationalist is that we have infallible access to the content of our mind.

5. Crumley states that one might object on the grounds that no clear cut line separates recognition from description.

Chelsea Serrano

Set #3

1. Churchland states that perception whether inner or outer is a learned skill.

True, perceptions are learned though out life and get better and depend on the people, although most of your perception is gain in your early childhood years. (Quia- Paul Churchland pg 74 paragraph 1)

2. Churchland say that all perceptual judgments are just introspective ones.

False, All perceptual judgments aren’t all introspective ones but they are also theory laden’s. The network argument can give the basic idea behind this claim. (quia- Paul Churchland pg 79 paragraph 4)

3. Fales contends that it is a mistake to understand infallibility as the logically impossible mistake.

True, he construes infallibility as a kind of self evidence (Quia- jack Crumley pg 109 paragraph 3)

4. Crumley states that a standard claim of strong foundationalist is that we have infallible access to the content of our mind.

True, one cannot be mistaken about what one is thinking about, sensing, Desiring wishing, etc. (Quia- Jack Crumley pg 106 paragraph 5)

5. Crumley states that one might object on the grounds that no clear cut line separates recognition from description.

True, one might say that one must have some belief about the nature of the sensation. One must also be able to describe or characterize then sensation and that’s when error arises. (Quia – Jack Crumley pg 108 paragraph 5)

Caitlyn Mayer

Philosophy 165

Tues/Thurs 11:10-12:35

Set 3

Questions:

1. A human’s second thread for pain is incorrigible.

2. According to the indirect realists, this directness is an illusion; we are in fact directly aware of experiential intermediaries, and we perceive the extra mental world only indirectly.

3. Pain is all perceived through ones person own experiences.

4. The appearance/reality problem states that anything you imagine will happen to your body.

5. Pain is only a sensory or perceptual experience.

Caitlyn Mayer

Philosophy 165

Tue/Thurs 11:10-12:35

Set 3 Answers

1. A human’s second thread for pain is incorrigible.

True: The definition for incorrigibility is someone who believes in a proposition and it is impossible to show that person that he or she is mistaken. The person may be mistaken, but no one can demonstrate it. An example is I believe that I am experiencing a red appearance, no one can prove that I am not experiencing it- even though the object that I am perceiving is a different color. (Pojman glossary)

2. According to the indirect realists, this directness is an illusion; we are in fact directly aware of experiential intermediaries, and we perceive the extra mental world only indirectly.

False: We are aware of not the thing in itself, the object that is perceived and causes the idea to arise in our mind, but only the idea or representation of the object. We are directly aware of the idea but in as much as the object is the cause of the idea, we may e said to be indirectly aware of the object. (p. 68)

3. Pain is all perceived through ones person own experiences.

False: Feeling pain, one is perceiving something extra mental. Feeling pain normally involves perceiving something in the same sense in which one perceives a red apple when one sees it in good light. (Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 3.1)

4. The appearance/reality problem states that anything you imagine will happen to your body.

False: The example of the frat boy explains this problem. He thought or his appearance was that he was going to feel hot. He originally did but then thought about it again and realized he was never hot. So his appearance didn’t actually happen to his body. It was a hallucination. (p. 104)

5. Pain is only a sensory or perceptual experience.

False: One of the central difficulties for any perceptual/representational view of pain is to explain why, if feeling pain is genuinely perceiving tissue damage in a body part, we report its experience rather than the tissue damage. (Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 4.3)

Melissa Younker

Philosophy 165

Dr. David C. Ring

Spring 2009

Set 3: T/F

1. A direct phenomenal belief is always incorrigible.

2. Crumly objects the ICT by expressing that we may arrive at a belief through inferences that are based on false grounds and therefore introspection is not an infallible process.

3. According to Churchland, when you have a sensation you can never recognize that sensation directly, and you could be mislead or mistaken about the sensation.

4. According to Crumly, description and recognition of a sensation are very similar and must come together in application to form a belief.

5. Pain can only be experienced because it has been caused by the occurrences of pain.

Melissa Younker

Philosophy 165

Dr. David C. Ring

Spring 2009

Set 3: T/F Answers

1. A direct phenomenal belief is always incorrigible.

True. David Chalmers states that the truth of the ICT is a direct result of the definition of a direct phenomenal belief. (The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Beliefs: 4.1 Incorrigibility)

2. Crumly objects the ICT by expressing that we may arrive at a belief through inferences that are based on false grounds and therefore introspection is not an infallible process.

True. “…for any belief we might have as a result of introspection, we might also have arrived at the belief by means of an inference. Now, if such beliefs are arrived at via inference, then the inference may be based on a mistaken or false premise or, indeed, be merely a faulty inference.” (Objections to Incorrigibility: p. 107)

3. According to Churchland, when you have a sensation you can never recognize that sensation directly, and you could be mislead or mistaken about the sensation.

False. Churchland’s traditional view is that when you have a sensation you always have it directly, otherwise we would have the infinite regress problem (sensation of a sensation, of a sensation… etc.) Furthermore, you can never be false about your sensations because if you are having them directly then they are incorrigible and infallible. (Matter and Consciousness: p. 75)

4. According to Crumly, description and recognition of a sensation are very similar and must come together in application to form a belief.

True. Introspection is a source of beliefs about the contents of our own minds and having a belief about something requires having concepts and applying those concepts. “If recognizing a sensation is a belief, then recognizing involves describing or applying concepts. In this view, having a belief ineluctably involves this descriptive or identifying component.” (Objections to Incorrigibility: p. 108)

5. Pain can only be experienced because it has been caused by the occurrences of pain.

False. Churchland explains that pain can be mediated by a second-order, and other things can cause the judgment of a pain experience. For example, you are anticipating a feeling of extreme hot but then you are exposed to a feeling of extreme cold. You could at first mistake the cold feeling for extreme heat. (Matter and Consciousness, p. 77)

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