The Importance of Mine Countermeasures to the Strike ...



The Importance of a Rapid Mine Clearing Capability to Shock Action

An earlier article focused on the importance of shock action. One means the enemy has of defeating such attacks, is the use of mines.

There was an incident in Northern Ireland in which a train was highjacked and abandoned in a siding. The area was cordoned off...but nothing was found, a mystery. Six months later another train was highjacked, it was abandoned at the same siding. It happened that the pilot flying the incident commander to the scene was the same one who had been called out on the previous occasion. He was about to set down, when he suddenly realised and pulled back the 'stick'...sure enough, that's where the mine was! (There HAD been a purpose for the first incident.)

An Australian tank hit a mine in Vietnam, an APC driving forward to assist, hit another...the Iroquois landing to collect the wounded set off a third (placed adjacent to the site of the anticipated LZ and initiated by wind turbulence). The helicopter was destroyed. Something had undoubtedly been learnt...just not by the 'good' guys!

If someone of reasonable intelligence, without any background of 1ATF operations in Vietnam, looked at a map showing the location and timing of mine incidents involving Australian AFVs ... they would be incredulous. The same stretches of road, time and time and time again!!

Is this a case of Australian soldiers being stupid? Most definitely NOT...it's a case of Australian soldiers being incredibly brave. They were ordered to take the risks. Why didn't they just go off-road ... they had tracked vehicles after all? They were told that there wasn't time! They protested that the mine risk was almost 100% ... they demanded a direct order. They got it! They suffered.

Time will always be a paramount factor in the conduct of operations. Going off-road through the jungle will take too long; going off-road through the sand will take too long; reacting to the position being attacked by taking the least obvious route, will take too long. If time were to cease to be important, then everyone can simply ... wait for a drone to fly 'top cover'; wait for a remote control vehicle to drive in front; wait for satellite imagery to see if that manhole cover was there yesterday; wait for the engineers to clear ahead; or just go the long way.

The need to go the 'quick' way resulted in nearly every mine incident suffered by Australian AFVs in Vietnam. Year after year, month after month, we just kept throwing caution to the wind. Of course, if you are going to achieve shock action, be decisive and exploit an advantage, you can't afford to wait for a mineclearer (especially if you've only got one in the whole Task Force); or go off-road; or take the indirect route.

Where is all this leading? We must acknowledge that we will always be called upon to strike swiftly. This means taking risks. If the crews of Australian AFVs in Vietnam had been allowed to take 'all day' to get from A to B, mine incidents would've been reduced massively. To their credit, they accepted their orders and the risk that went with them. After forty years, however, what have we learnt?

Whatever countermine capability the Australian Army is to have, it must be provided in sufficient quantity to ensure that every element tasked to strike swiftly can clear their way. (This does not mean one mineclearer per brigade.) Of course, if the Government will not support the procurement of adequate countermine resources ... they can always just say: 'Get on with it!'

[pic]

The M1 Panther II demining vehicle is based on the Abrams main battle tank

Postscript. The 1st Armoured Regiment has a number of mine plough kits which can be fitted to any Abrams tank. Project Ningaui focuses on the resources (such as Husky 3 and Bushmasters with mine rollers) required by combat engineers to clear roads. Clearing the way for a shock action strike requires a different set of characteristics. The Panther 2 variant of the M1 Abrams tank provides such a capability.

(This article was previously published in an amended form in the RAACA NSW newsletter 'Armour')

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download