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Chapter 4MORAL VIRTUES AND ETHICAL DECISIONSAbstractVirtue ethics is an ancient subject primarily established by Aristotle and the Stoics. The ancients considered that development of personal virtue was necessary to achieve a life of “contentment,” and this is certainly relevant for the lives of modern managers, and their business interactions. This chapter distinguishes between personal moral virtues, and ethical managerial decisions. It examines the question, “Might virtuous managers still make unethical decisions?” In addition, the set of virtues required of management to implement a program of “harmony in pursuit of a moral community” is reviewed. An explanation of how this program establishes constraints on the pursuit of shareholder wealth (the profit motive) is also reviewed. IntroductionThe classical philosophy of virtue ethics avoids consideration of general moral rules. It centers ethics on the development of personal moral traits (or virtues) aimed at an ultimate purpose of pursuing a content life. These personal psychological traits were to be developed as part of a maturing process similar to the physical development of the young. This philosophy fits well within an elite ancient-institution of schooling by tutors – a philosopher tutoring a young student. Modern ethical philosophy – Kantian Enlightenment deontology and after – emphasizes “dispositions to follow” the moral rules that are established through reasoned social discourse, an essentially democratic process centered on rational reflection, and that is motivated by the notion that “we give these rules to ourselves as necessary to pursue a moral community.” These classical and modern views are joined via the notion of “disposition to follow.” In the modern view, a “disposition to pursue duty” replaces the inner traits of developed classical virtues. Some current literature (reviewed below), however, still explores managerial virtues as though they differ from managerial dispositions to pursue duty. This chapter attempts to show that the modern view poses the more effective method for analyzing management responsibility, and that the more ancient virtue-ethics view is cumbersome for this purpose. The virtue ethics view, however, is shown here to pose some definite valuable insights for management development.A brief classical philosophical reviewThe ancient ethical philosophy – Aristotelian, Stoic, and some other variations – concerns one’s life’s patterns, and the reflective choices that modify those patterns. It is argued here that this ancient philosophy has much to say to modern managers, at least those who envision an entire career devoted to business management. This ancient philosophy is centered on a person’s lifetime development of virtue, i.e., on a lifetime pursuit of a particular type of happiness that we might identify as “contentment,” which particularly involves a personal reflective-deliberation on life’s direction. Such an approach is often juxtaposed against a deontological, or rules and duty-based modern approach with its notion of moral demands that might be considered onerous. The ancient philosophy did not perceive morality as demanding or punitive, but as natural characteristics of “normal non-repressed development.” (Annas, 1993, p. 4.) It posed no disagreeable duties, but rather a worthy and desirable lifestyle. This differs from modern Kantian deontology (not necessarily the philosophy of Kant) which is typically perceived as anti-egoistic, but necessary for social functioning. Given this difference in approach, virtue ethics is shown to be relevant and applicable to the life career of the individual manager, and by extension to the interactions within, and the directions of, the managerial team. Modern reinterpretations of these virtues therefore become a most relevant aspect of business. Modern ethics, as in Kant (1797), poses a hierarchy of axioms – the categorical imperative – from which moral maxims are drawn, i.e., a “deontology.” This approach is potentially complete in addressing ethical problems, a completeness not attempted by the ancient philosophy. The modern approach poses all-encompassing views of right and wrong; whereas the ancients saw these choices as posing personal directions which either reinforce the good or flourishing life, or that harm it. To the ancients, virtues were to be developed dispositions to make right choices, i.e., a developed moral character. Note that Kant also said much about developing moral character, and this is also reviewed below as partial support for the ancient view. (See Kant, 1797, 6: 379 - 413.)It is the notion of the desirability of developing moral character, either by the individual manager in isolation, or in consort with and aided by the managerial team, that is important here. It has recently been argued, that “in consort” reduces to a disposition to pursue a moral community, a kingdom of ends in the language of Kant (1797). In isolation, pursuit of moral character would be akin to the wanderer trying to be the moral person in an immoral community, perhaps by trying to satisfy her personal conscience. Being virtuous, however, must entail more; it must entail a search for others who have at least a potential for a moral disposition, to learn from these others, and to reinforce their moral good qualities. This involves Aristotle’s friendships of virtue, a community of moral friends, with each reinforcing the other as motivated by love for the other’s good moral qualities. In Aristotle’s philosophy, this disposition, as developed over a manager’s career, should lead to a type of satisfaction, perhaps contentment, tranquility, or happiness. When one considers the modern pursuit of wealth as a possible overriding goal of management, one recognizes the inconsistency of this pursuit with the ancient view of virtue. An examination of this inconsistency is one purpose of this chapter. Another is to examine the implications of the virtuous manager as a norm for business.One ancient branch of ethics that has possible relevance for the modern disposition towards duty approach is that of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, 1993, 2-2, q123, a11). He explored a list of traits subject to the “unity theory” of development, and these should be considered virtues. These virtues include:a memory that facilitates drawing on experience,a receptiveness to advice from those with more experience,an ability to perceive possibilities for actions when they are not obvious,foresight,circumspection,constancy in ability to stick to a decision.These Thomastic virtues are similar to the duties examined by Rawls (1951) and Robinson (2017) as reviewed in section 3 below and also referred to in section 4.A brief review of some recent literatureThe current literature concerning managerial virtues indicates the necessities for their development, although there is disagreement concerning their composition. Some indicate the need for virtuous development in order to have a fulfilling (as in “better than tolerable”) work environment. Some expand upon the ancient view of virtues as those personal attributes that must be exercised as a “unity” for the “good of one’s life,” and emphasizes the need to transform the work environment to facilitate personal virtuous attributes. Fontrodona, et al (2013, pp. 563-564) explains three rationales that necessitate virtuousness in management: “Human beings not only transform their environment through their work, but they also transform themselves.Businesses create environments that can either favor or hinder this personal development of workers.Virtue ethics provides managers and business leaders with an opportunity to ask themselves what kind of people they become through their actions, and how their decisions impact the lives of others.” These rationales do not, however, suggest any actual managerial virtues in need of “unity” development. De Bruin (2013, pp. 583-595), however, does suggest a series of managerial virtues, and the business rationales for their development. This posed a complete categorization:Fairness and open mindedness leads to effective explorations of business opportunities and problems.Temperance and sobriety facilitate effective solutions to these opportunities and problems.Avoidance of “hubris,” i.e. arrogance in claiming “right” due to perceived superiority, facilitates both (i) and (ii). (A more complete listing of possible virtues is presented in section 4. Note that fairness and open mindedness are emphasized as modern virtues in section 4.)Virens, et al (2016) argues for development of virtuous managerial structures that provide:a teleological approach to business (pursuit of a final end-goal), a deliberative approach to business analysis, and a social context that provides the knowledge and reflection required for business success. These same “virtuous structures,” they argue, enable development of moral character. The personal moral characteristics to be developed by these “virtuous structures,” however, are not specified including the notion of “deliberative,” nor are personal traits specified for obtaining “knowledge or having reflective habits.”It has been recognized that there are business barriers to development of these “virtuous structures.” These “barriers” include:the anthropology of managerial relations which inhibits virtuous relations in business,the competitive nature of business which does not allow room for virtue,a modern management style that does not allow for the reflective atmosphere required to develop these structures,the wider social roles of managers that conflict with virtues.With respect to these and other barriers, there can be no doubt that there are difficulties in developing virtue, especially in business, but within the context of the pursuit of imperfect duty, Robinson (2016b, and 2017) refutes all of these points concerning barriers to virtuous development. (Note that the relation between virtue and the pursuit of imperfect duty is explored in detail below.) This literature posed an optimistic view that dispositions to pursue imperfect duty within the management team is both achievable and beneficial. The “barriers” may exist, but management might make these sufficiently weak so as not prevent a virtuous development of the management team. Whether there are barriers to virtuous development or not, Whetstone (2003) presents the results of business surveys concerning managers perceptions of necessary virtues. These surveys indicate (1) the extent that business management uses the language of virtue ethics, and (2) whether within particular organizations, a set of perceived managerial virtues were usually identified by managers. The surveys also indicate a wide dispersion of opinion as to the composition of these identified virtues. A consistent set of virtues was not identifiable from the surveys, nor were there any analyses provided as to whether any of the many traits identified by those surveyed should actually be classified as virtues. These surveys indicate that management might recognize that a set of virtues is important, but a lack of clarity exists as to what these might be.Cameron (2011) uses a classical definition of virtue, “singular attributes that represent moral excellence.” Cameron “equates responsible leadership with virtuousness,” and argues that this leadership is established on three “core assumptions:”The “eudaimonic assumption” – An inclination exists in all people towards moral goodness. The “inherent-value assumption” – Virtue is not a means to another end, but the end itself.The “amplification assumption” – Virtue is self-perpetuating as in Aristotle’s friendships of virtue approach. Note that these “core assumptions” do not specify these leadership traits. Sison (2006) did, however, add specificity to leadership virtue as based on classical notions. He specified the virtues of speech (logos), character (ethos), and emotional disposition (pathos) are necessary. These are included in the managerial nexus of imperfect duties presented in this text especially in the categories of speech (reasoned discourse), and character (affability and due diligence). These are reviewed in section 3. Attempting to provide still greater specificity, Swanton (2016, pp. 193-194) explored what she terms “productive virtues.” She argues that modern morality should be broadened beyond benevolence to include “productivity” and “creativity,” characteristics examined in Chapters 6-9 of this text. She argues that the traits that support productivity include amiability, industriousness, and toughness. Others also explore brief lists of traits that might facilitate business. These traits might be considered virtues, but the explorations of either their development or their desirability is slight. This modern “virtue literature” is best considered as playing a supporting role as compared to the “disposition towards duty” explorations reviewed in section 3.A brief comparison of two viewsThe classical explorations of virtues were rather specific about their natures, i.e., the ancient cardinal virtues were temperance, justice, courage and practical wisdom. This has not been the case with the current attempts to explore managerial virtues where the recent literature is vague about the nature of these personal characteristics. The specificity exception is de Bruin (2013) who also provided a complete categorization. This recent literature did, however, attempt to expose the benefits of virtue, but as argued here the recent literature also is deficient in not recognizing the links between modern explorations of dispositions-towards-duty and virtue. In particular, the recent contributions on the nexus of imperfect managerial duties (examined in Chapter 6) is not only specific about their nature, but also emphasizes the disposition to perform these duties. The term “disposition” essentially describes a virtue, and is so used in this duty oriented literature. Hence the modern notions of dispositions to perform managerial duty could be considered the modern managerial-virtue ethics. If this is the appropriate determination of the modern dispositional approach, then teleological issues for the firm and the manager, the possibility of duties being considered onerous, and the “unity theory” should all be explored in this context. Virtues, Rationality, and CompletenessIn the modern managerial world, one’s career as a manger may be perceived as something that happens to the would-be-executive as external forces impose decisions; that even if generally accepted behavioral norms are followed, the results have a sufficient degree of randomness that prospects for promotion and advancement are also random. Perhaps over her career, the manager wins the game, but perhaps not. The business person’s life exists within constraints largely imposed externally as if by nature, i.e., the constraints of competition, financial resources, technological development, and actual natural forces. Within these inevitabilities, the manager must rationally manage her/his career; at least we assume rationality, although as explored below, this is itself a disposition to be developed. Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school of virtue ethics, identified intelligence, courage, temperance, and justice (understood as fairness towards others) as classical categorizations of virtues. Intelligence is the developed exercise of reason, especially as it applies towards courage, temperance, and fairness. Intelligence requires this rationality to be applied towards the other three virtues or their effectiveness is undermined. The Stoic view was that these virtues could not be developed in isolation from one another since this would require an irrational lack of development of at least one. The intelligent-rational person would be incapable of developing one virtue without the others; faulty reasoning applied to one virtue leads to faulty reasoning in others. The Stoics sought the complete moral ideal of developing all virtues. Why? “The virtues are rational states, since virtue is a habit of acting on reason. Virtue is not acting in a vacuum, as in modern ethics.” (Annas, 1993, p. 51.) To the Stoics, developing all the virtues could potentially achieve the contentment sought, but it could not be achieved with one or more virtues undeveloped; hence the “unity theory” of development. For Aristotle’s eudaimonia (literally interpreted as a life that follows our guiding spirit, but that is frequently interpreted as a flourishing life) our final “contentment” comes from the worthy life choice. This cannot be achieved by materialism, although some material sufficiency is necessary for life, but this eudaimonia can be (might be) achieved by rationally based development of virtue. Life’s choices should be rational and made after periodic reflection on one’s life-as-a-whole. The ancient schools of virtue ethics recognized an instinctive tendency to think of our lives as a whole, a unity. A developed disposition to base one’s life’s choices on this reflection provides a self-containment, or assurance, that cannot be externally upset or altered. It is not the capacity to do right, but the disposition to make right choices that is essential, and this disposition provides this “self-containment.” This means that once “the disposition to make right choices” becomes a person’s character, it will not be lost. Eudaimonism is by its nature egoistic with a goal of life’s contentment. The ancients believed that the passions of youth need to be refined and developed in such a way as to interrupt Hume’s (1739) pattern of passion dictating a biased reasoning. The Stoics perceived a role for rules applied to youth, at least until a sufficient maturity allowed reflection to bring an understanding of the underlining principles of virtue ethics so that an adult can progress in becoming virtuous. This is also the foundation of virtuous management, and should also be the foundation of managerial development, i.e., an understanding of “why” the virtues are necessary enables and motivates a refinement, or development of the virtuous disposition. Without this “disposition,” a manager is not likely to consistently follow rules unless externally imposed sanctions motivate fear of the consequences of violation. When onerous consequences from violation are improbable, however, the rules would not likely be followed. This is not the case with a virtuous disposition of “self-containment.”Consider the problem of fairness in treatment of others. Simple rules can hardly apply except perhaps in a juridical application. In the managerial context, the myriad of routine interactions requires the manager to pursue fairness for its own sake as a result of her own virtuous nature, and not from some examination of a set of rules and the associated consequences of violation or gain if compliant. In this sense, fairness must become a second nature to the manager. This is the meaning of internalizing the general moral philosophy. As succinctly stated by Annas (1993, p. 101.),“The virtuous person who has knowledge does not use rules because these on their own are imprecise and undefined – they are too general to do justice to the particularities of the situations, and would lead to judge in a cruel manner.”In Kantian terms, this “to judge” requires development of the capacity of “judgement,” a disposition explored in detail later, but which can be described here as a developed disposition towards correct action. In the managerial context, however, the term “who has knowledge” is particularly germane since the acquisition and proper use of the relevant knowledge is required for this “judgement.” This is a point extensively developed below where modern interpretations of the ancient virtues, and the contexts of their exercise, are examined.The Linkage Between Dispositions-Towards-Duty and VirtueKant (1785: 402-403) posed a process for deriving the moral maxims necessary for practical application, i.e. the categorical imperative process (CIP). He claimed the CIP reflects common reasoning concerning moral principles, a reasoning captured by three formulae, each consistent with and necessitated by the other two: (1) the formula of autonomy or universal law, (2) the formula for the respect for the dignity of others, (3) the formula of legislation for a moral community. With respect to formula 1, Kant (1785, 4; 402) stated, “The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always has …” Since the three formulae are interrelated, this “common reason of men” argument applies to all three by extension. If Kant was correct, the CIP describes our common understanding as to how our ethical maims are formed. Kant’s second formula is generally interpreted as, “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other, always as an end and never as a means only.” (Kant, 1785, p. 4: 429.) This prescription can be interpreted as motivating a set of maxims we usually classify as duties although the interrelatedness of the three formulae implies that duty can be derived from each of the three. It is argued here that the deontology derived from the second formula can be viewed as based on a broad set of dispositions of character, i.e. virtues. O’Neil (1995, pp. 114-115), terms the second formula “the formula on the ends-in-itself,” and emphasizes its use as the foundation for perfect and imperfect duty. This vision of duty is particularly applicable to business which requires a set of moral rules (mostly negative rules) to function. In particular, the second formula is generally interpreted as not only establishing prohibitions against the unethical actions of theft, fraud, coercion and the like (perfect duties of prohibition), but also as recommending a degree of volitional actions (imperfect duties) that naturally involve practical limits which Kant founded in “circumstance and inclination.” (Kant, 1797, 6: 454) The linkage between these “dispositions towards duties” and “virtues of character” is established here.To establish this linkage, it is necessary to examine the motivation behind development of these virtues of character. Kant’s formula for legislating a moral community is generally interpreted as, “All maxims that proceed from our own making of law ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends.” (Kant, 1785, 4: 436 and see chapter II.) This can be viewed as the motivational formula for establishing and pursuing duty since this kingdom of ends is generally interpreted as a moral community. As reviewed by Korsgaard (1996, p. 23): The human will must be seen as universally legislative. Each of us has a will that makes laws for itself as if for everyone. Since human beings together legislate the moral law, we form a moral community: a Kingdom of Ends. … Each citizen takes his own perfection and the happiness of others as an end and treats every other as an end in itself. It is a community engaged in the harmonious and cooperative pursuit of the good.This can be used as an expression of an ideal vision for a business firm as community. The pursuit of those duties that are consistent with the second formula should be motivated by a desire to pursue a moral community. This is particularly applicable to business where laws, regulations, enforceable contracts, and numerous internal-to-the-firm rules, as well as external ethical and professional codes, are common and serve this pursuit. This nexus of maxims exist to establish business as a myriad of moral agreements within an overall social/moral institution of markets. Virtues of character are essentially developed dispositions aimed at this pursuit. Kant’s kingdom of ends formula is communal in nature, and markedly different from egoistic eudaimonism of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. If we define virtues as dispositions toward duty, then the motive for developing virtue appears to be different from the ancients. This is explored in detail below.A set of modern managerial virtues To change from Kantian deontology to an examination of virtues is an exercise in logic built around the notion of “disposition.” In the classical school, virtues needed to be developed, and the same is true of the modern dispositions that extend from Kantian ethics. The twentieth century Kantian philosopher John Rawls (1951, p. 1) posed two relevant questions applicable for our analysis: What are the virtues (dispositions) necessary for moral judgement? For the purpose of an ex post evaluation that a particular action or judgement is moral, what are the virtues that would likely lead to these actions?Rawls’ ultimate purpose was to discern rules centered on inductive logic that if violated would lead to an ex post evaluation that some decision was unethical, but he attempted to do so by elucidating two categories: competent moral judges, and considered moral judgments. He used the former as one condition for the latter, and the former is an expression of virtue. We can apply the latter to discern the rationality of our decisions, but this requires the former for what Rawls termed the “stability criteria,” as explained below.Rawls’ competent moral judges manifests four virtuous characteristics.They have a requisite degree of intelligence required for analysis of the issues at hand.They desire to be knowledgeable concerning the facts relevant for the analysis.They have a predilection to use reason, i.e. they are open-minded, they use inductive logic, and they are knowledgeable about their own potential biases. This includes not applying a prior ideology to the analysis of the facts at hand.They have the capacity and desire to consider all interests relevant to the considerations at hand.The exercise of these four characteristics constitute what Rawls terms intellectual virtue. (Ibid, p. 5) The first of these characteristics might be considered as inherited, but it might also to some degree be developed. The other three can be considered as virtues subject to development as in the ancient philosophy. To answer Rawls’ first question, we should consider the above criteria. To answer the second question, Rawls characterized considered moral judgments as manifesting four characteristics.The judge is disinterested, i.e. cannot benefit or be affected by the judgment (no conflict of interest).The judge is familiar with the relevant facts.All those affected have opportunities to present their arguments.The judgment is stable across decisions by other competent moral judges.These criteria merely express exercises in the moral dispositions of competent moral judges. They can be applied ex post to judge whether a particular decision is a reasoned one. With respect to the fourth condition, individual predilections may be counter-acted when many judgments are made in a wide variety of roughly similar cases. The reasonableness of a decision criteria can be decided by the general acceptance of those competent moral judges who have freely weighed the evidence after open discussion and criticism. This provides evidence that it can “hold its own.” These criteria can be applied to managerial decisions. For example, are these decisions made by those with conflicts of interests, or were the relevant facts rationally considered, or were decisions made on an ad-hoc basis and out-of-step with logical analysis. There is, however, one criteria for being considered a competent moral judge that might be easily overlooked in this analysis. The criteria of having a predilection to use inductive logic, especially to envision potential impacts of our decisions and the information necessary to assist in this envisioning, should be emphasized as necessary. The ability to “envision potential impacts” is an ability to exercise imagination, and this also might be subject to development through exercise.We can therefore characterize the developed dispositions of Rawls’ competent moral judges as necessary managerial virtues. As explained below, however, the categorization of the nexus of imperfect managerial duties towards friendship, discourse, and due diligence can also be used as descriptions of managerial virtues. This nexus forms most of what we typically perceive as managerial duty. The managerial virtues and dispositions towards friendshipKant and Aristotle both analyzed humanity’s natural friendships as requiring morality to survive. This notion of friendship incorporates managerial relations both internal and external to an immediate establishment. Kant’s three forms of friendship, (1) need, (2) taste, and (3) disposition (a disposition to recognize our neighbors as friends) all apply to these business relations. To be sustained, each of these categories requires that we participate in the development and enjoyment of other’s wellbeing through our morally good will, arises from our general need to overcome our unsocial nature because of our survival need for social interaction, and usually involves certain actions of reciprocity since friendship thrives on (but does not absolutely require) differences in capacities and personalities so that we naturally contribute to one another. All of these are applicable to managerial relations, and dispositions towards their fulfillment describe virtues. For example, managers should develop the disposition to enjoy the wellbeing of others, and to demonstrate the type of reciprocity that friendship thrives on.To Kant, our “duty to oneself as well as to others is to not isolate oneself but to use one’s moral perfection in social intercourse” (1797, 6: 472-473), and this affable intercourse includes business. The “byproducts” of these friendly actions are “to create a beautiful illusion resembling virtue that is not deceptive” since all understand the nature of these actions. Here Kant suggests that the illusion of the ideal is sufficient to be practical. “Affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality, and gentleness (in disagreeing without quarreling) are, indeed, only tokens; yet they promote the feeling of virtue itself by a striving to bring this illusion as near as possible to the truth. By all of these, which are merely the manners one is obliged to show in social intercourse, one binds others too; and so they still promote a virtuous disposition by at least making virtue fashionable.” (Ibid, 4: 474)Fashionable business affability is necessary for generating business efficiency. This behavior is the ideal style for managers, a style that promotes commerce; a style of amicable and efficient norms both within the firm and for external dealings. This “fashion” is tangible and evolves due to what is most effective, but is rooted in effective sociability.These “fashions” are not deceptions since it is human nature to be at least somewhat honestly social, and to adopt this “affability, courtesy, hospitality, and gentleness” for our social-business encounters as in other common encounters. They can be characteristics genuinely felt and adopted, and reinforced by business success. These characteristics, however, also have practical time and effort limitations, as with hospitality. Developing and enacting these characteristics can therefore be considered imperfect duties, but developing these characteristics fits the classic notion of developing virtues. We can term these dispositions, managerial affability virtues. The managerial virtues and dispositions towards reasoned discourseKant’s categorical imperative process (CIP) process poses maxims of imperfect duty for reasoned business discourse. The five maxims presented below were posed by O’Neill (1989, pp. 34-50) as broad principles that are particularly applicable to business management, and they are interpreted in that context, i.e. as dispositions in need of development, and therefore virtues. The first three of O’Neill’s maxims are clear specifications of imperfect duties in need of managers dispositions. The fourth specifies a perfect duty against falsehoods, but there is an imperfect duty aspect to this. For example, management has a perfect duty to try to be accurate in its business communications, although perfectly accurate might often be impossible. Hence there is an imperfect duty to be competently accurate.Managerial authority should be based on reason! “Intolerance brings unreasoned authority to bear on communication. Wherever intolerance is practiced, whether by state or church or other bodies or individuals, those whose thinking and communicating are suppressed, are silenced not by reason, but by authorities that lack reasoned vindication. When these authorities govern us the authority of reason is diminished, and our distance from a reasoned form of life and politics grows.” (O’Neill, 1989, p. 48.)A managerial disposition towards reasoned communication rather than unexplained command is a virtue. Managers should tolerate the logical reason of others!What does this disposition imply? One who adopts it,“… detaches himself from the subjective personal conditions of his judgment, which cramp the minds of so many others, and reflects upon his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others). (Kant, 1793, V, p. 294)This detachment disposition is a virtue.Reasoned argument should not be restricted!Non-reasoned argument that denigrates, mocks, or bullies, or more generally fails to respect relevant constituents, may make it difficult for some to articulate their logical argument, and hence it violates the maxim to allow others to “think for themselves.” A disposition to avoid these attributes is a virtue.Management should be disposed to reason-in-common with those affected by its policy decisions!Management cannot expect to reason correctly unless it does so in common with those affected by its policies. This disposition to “reason in common” is a virtue.Falsehoods in managerial discourse are prohibited!Falsehoods are clearly prohibited by the formula for autonomy or universal law of the CI. Falsehoods should be repugnant to virtuous management, and a disposition for accuracy is a virtue.We can term this group of developed dispositions, the managerial virtues of reasoned discourse.The managerial virtues and dispositions towards due diligenceThe disposition towards due diligence is a virtue, and business relations of virtue deteriorate without reinforcement from the due diligence efforts of those involved. These dispositions consist of the following virtues:a disposition to obtain the necessary information to make properly informed decisions, including the willingness to consider new information,a disposition to correctly apply the appropriate logically-based decision rule,a disposition to apply the proper decision despite stressful resistance,a disposition to either avoid conflicts of interest, or to acknowledge these conflicts while representing principals in fair negotiation (see Chapter 9),a disposition to exercise the “noble nature” of speaking out in a business social setting concerning ethical issues.This group of five dispositions can be termed the managerial virtues of due diligence. If we compare these dispositions to Aquinas’ virtues (see “1. Introduction” above), the similarities are apparent: the disposition to utilize experience, the disposition to envision alternative actions, the disposition towards circumspection, the determination to see decisions through were all listed by Aquinas. These are similar to the due-diligence dispositions explored above, and also the Rawlsian virtues explored above. The modern approach therefore exemplifies the ancient approach, but with modern context and language. Virtues or Dispositions?Ancient philosophers sought to identify a set of virtues they could proselytize as applicable to one’s whole life, and that might best enable the achievement of contentment (a higher state of happiness) with one’s life. These virtues were not considered onerous, but rather naturally developed traits that would lead to contentment. Reflection and revision along life’s path was considered necessary for this achievement. The modern dispositional approach towards managerial duty is complete in its categorization of traits. It also involves greater specificity than the classical cardinal virtues, although it appears to apply only to the managerial life. Perhaps this is because of the specificity. The link between the dispositional view and the virtue view was established above: the dispositional view derives from those managerial duties that stem from a communal business goal; the Aristotelian and Stoic virtue view stems from the pursuit of eudaimonia, an egoistic goal. Is there much difference in these views? The disposition-to-duty view – especially towards imperfect duties – should be motivated by the Kantian pursuit of a moral community, both within a particular business, and within the broader business community. The eudaimonia goal appears to be egoistic although one might (perhaps should) argue that pursuit of the flourishing life must include pursuit of a moral community, or the pursuit of eudaimonia would be illusory. The lessons for modern management to be taken from virtue ethics include both its “unity philosophy,” and its teleological goal. The former argues that it would be irrational to pursue some virtues but not others. Why? The final teleological goal of life’s contentment would be frustrated by a lack of some essential virtue. A similar frustration would exist if any of the managerial dispositions – or virtues – were lacking, although the frustration would apparently be the inhibition of the business goal, and not the personal goal; although given the link between them, one should argue that both would be frustrated. (This argument is presented below in more detail.)Virtues in pursuit of the eudaimonia goal are to be developed so that they are not considered as posing onerous obligations, but natural inclinations. The dispositions towards duty should also be inculcated as natural desires, and not onerous obligations. To illustrate, consider the four groupings of managerial dispositions reviewed above:the Rawlsian dispositions for competent moral judges,the Kantian and Aristotelian dispositions for managerial affability,Robinson’s managerial dispositions for reasoned discourse, andRobinson’s managerial dispositions for due diligence.These dispositions pose a complete set of managerial virtues. These specific dispositions are subsumed within de Bruin’s (2013, pp. 583-595) broad categories of managerial virtues. For management, either as individuals or as a team, to actively avoid developing any of these virtues would be to actively not pursue business as a moral community. Nor is it conceivable that management would be pursuing the individual goal of the flourishing life while not pursuing any of the four groupings of virtue. Why? Consider the Socratic dialogue Gorgias. The question asked is. “Would an intelligent individual knowingly commit evil?” Of course the answer is “No!” To commit evil is to be at war with oneself, with one’s conscience. In a similar vein, for a manager to knowingly not pursue these virtues means to not pursue a moral community within business, and this would also place the manager at war with herself. The eudaimonia goal would be knowingly frustrated, and also the communal goal would be frustrated. The teleological and unity theories therefore work together.In addition, there is an overlapping nature to these dispositions: the dispositions of due diligence overlap with those of competent moral judges, and also the dispositions of affability and reasoned discourse clearly overlap. Since this “unity” stems from the singular goal of pursuit of a moral community, it should not be surprising to perceive the commonality of these dispositions, although for examination purposes, we categorize these dispositions as separate. This overlapping also supports the unity theory as it applies to both the dispositional and virtue views.The advantages of the disposition to duty view consists of not only its specificity of duties, but also the specificity of practical limits on these pursuits. It should be mentioned that the Aristotelian and Stoic schools also drew practical limits to virtues as based on temperance and applied reason. One of the differences between the virtue ethics view and the disposition to imperfect duty view might appear to be that the latter is volitional, but the former does not admit choice among virtues; hence its unity view. This possible difference between these views, however, is only apparent but not real since it is the degree of pursuit that is at issue, and this degree has practical limits according to both views.This exploration then brings us to the fundamental difference between these two views: the personal life’s motivation of the manager. Is it to seek the egoistic life’s contentment, or the communal goal of the business community, or could both be simultaneously pursued? This is the nob that has not been extensively explored by the managerial-virtue literature. The germane questions are:Can a manager pursue life’s virtuous contentment without pursuing a moral business community?Can a manager pursue a moral business community without pursuing life’s virtuous contentment?The purely logical answer to the second question is, “Yes!” For example, one can violate Kant’s second formula by avoiding duty to oneself. A manager, for example, could sacrifice a content family life by totally pursuing business relations. The answer to the first question is, “No!” A manager who does not pursue a moral business community must also sacrifice the benefits of a virtuous life, i.e., contentment. Not pursuing a moral community would violate Kant’s third formula. The practical answer to both questions is, however, that the pursuit of both the business communal goal and the eudaimonia goal depends on the personal characteristics of virtue (dispositions), as pursued in “unity.” If a manager has these dispositions, then both these pursuits become integrated natural actions. ................
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