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AT: Fusion Adv
Fusion reactors are decades away at best and extracting Helium-3 might be too difficult
Wylie, 4 (2/1/2004, Margie, The Grand Rapids Press, “Moon has no fast answer to energy needs ; In theory, moon rocks could be a cheap source of electricity. In practice, the technology is decades away,” , JMP)
Mining the moon might supply the Earth with clean fusion energy someday, but not any time soon. The top few feet of the moon's surface, called the lunar regolith, contains about 1 million metric tons of helium-3, a near- perfect fuel for nuclear fusion. Rare on Earth, the gas is an isotope, or variant, of the same helium that floats party balloons.
Just "one ton of helium-3 could produce anywhere from one to 10 million times the electricity of a ton of coal," said Gerald L. Kulcinski, director of the Fusion Technology Institute at University of Wisconsin-Madison, which has been researching helium-3 fusion since 1986.
A mere 30 metric tons, roughly one space shuttle load, could fill the United States' electricity needs for a year, said Harrison H. Schmitt, a former Apollo astronaut and chairman of Interlune- InterMars Initiative, a company that promotes commercializing moon resources. (A U.S. ton equals 2,000 pounds; a metric ton equals 2,204.62 pounds.)
But while the gas might someday prove a valuable power source, "nobody's running out to the grocery store for helium-3 to fuel their reactors," said Glen A. Wurden, a fusion researcher at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, N.M.
Scientists haven't yet figured out how to generate fusion power with materials much easier to use -- and more readily available on Earth -- than helium-3. And even once astronauts are on the moon, extracting the gas from rocks could prove a task equal to Hercules shoveling out the Augean stables.
Fusion, the process that fuels the sun, is the holy grail of nuclear energy. It smashes together atoms to release energy, rather than splitting them apart as modern fission reactors do. Fusion has the potential to produce power that releases no greenhouse gases and creates little or no radioactive waste. But in more than 50 years' research, scientists have been unable to create a fusion reaction that puts out more energy than goes into starting or sustaining it.
Helium-3 based fusion reactors impossible to achieve – tough to burn
Schirber 8 freelance science writer in Lyon, France (Michael, , “How Moon Rocks Could Power the Future”, August 13th, , MBIBAS)
Tough to burn
Burning helium-3 requires higher initial energy than burning hydrogen isotopes. This is why ITER is not considering helium-3 as a possible fuel at this time.
However, Kulcinski's group works on a different method — called inertial electrostatic confinement (IEC) — for achieving fusion reactions. Instead of using magnetic fields to confine a very hot plasma like ITER plans to do, IEC works by accelerating nuclei towards each other with electric fields.
Kulcinski and his collaborators have managed to sustain nuclear fusion in their small prototype system. The company Emc2 Fusion is also working on a similar design.
However, all of these IEC demonstrations, at least for now, require much more input energy than they can deliver. Most researchers agree that helium-3 is unlikely to be the first fuel used in fusion reactors.
"One should never say never — it may come to pass that helium-3 could become an important source of energy in the coming century," Spudis said. "That time has not come yet. And I suspect that it is still some time off."
Fusion research has been slashed
Day, 7 (11/12/07, Dwayne A., The Space Review, “Exploding Moon myths: or why there’s no race to our nearest neighbor,” , JMP)
It’s no secret that delusions are more satisfying than reality, but these theories are outlandish. Nobody who pushes them has bothered to check even basic facts or ask simple questions. For starters, if the United States is truly interested in helium-3 for fusion power, how come the American government is spending so little money on fusion research? Fusion research budgets were slashed after the Cold War, and have been anemic ever since, in effect demonstrating what little faith the US government has in the potential of fusion power. (This raises a corollary for space enthusiasts: if you really believe that the Moon has potential as a source of fusion power, you should support dramatic increases in the Department of Energy’s budget for fusion research, possibly even taking the money from space exploration to fund it.)
--- XT: Fusion Reactors Decades Away
Pure Helium-3 reaction decades away --- high heat, atoms difficult to fuse and lack of advanced containment systems
Wylie, 4 (2/1/2004, Margie, The Grand Rapids Press, “Moon has no fast answer to energy needs ; In theory, moon rocks could be a cheap source of electricity. In practice, the technology is decades away,” , JMP)
Most of today's fusion research uses the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium, which fuse at relatively low temperatures, about 100 million degrees, Wurden said. But deuterium and tritium mixtures release about 80 percent of their energy in the form of fast neutrons, which produce radioactive waste.
A helium-3 and deuterium mix gives off much fewer fast neutrons, but requires about four times the temperature to react. A pure helium-3 reaction, on the other hand, would produce zero radioactive waste at the cost of even higher temperatures.
And heat's not the only problem. Helium-3 atoms are about 10 times harder to fuse together than tritium and deuterium and so require more advanced containment systems than we know how to build today, said Wurden, who is the Los Alamos program manager for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fusion Energy Sciences.
"Nobody questions that helium-3 is a great fuel," Wurden said. "The problems are it's on the moon and we haven't even built a reactor good enough for a simple deuterium-tritium fuel mix." Even if the physics weren't so difficult, mining helium-3 would present challenges.
While the isotope is relatively abundant on the moon, it still occurs at only 50 parts per million, said Alan Binder, director of the Lunar Research Institute in Tucson, Ariz., which advocates commercializing the moon's resources.
That means shoveling 20,000 metric tons of regolith into 700-degree ovens to boil off one metric ton of the precious isotope, which must be sorted out from regular helium and other naturally occurring elements, like hydrogen and oxygen. Of course, there's also the expense of transporting it back to Earth.
But Binder doesn't expect miners to fly to the moon for the express purpose of bringing back the isotope. Instead, he said, helium-3 would be harvested as a byproduct of building and maintaining a lunar settlement.
Schmitt predicted the gas could be returned to Earth for under $1 billion a metric ton. Kulcinski adds that, if it sold for $4 billion a metric ton, helium-3 would still be a good energy value: "That's the equivalent of paying $28 a barrel for oil." Last year, crude oil prices averaged $26.60 per barrel, based on figures from the U.S. Department of Energy.
Fortunately, there is time to sort the issues out.
Kulcinski predicts fusion power in 30 to 40 years. Wurden is more pessimistic: "Frankly, fusion reactors are still a 50-year thing."
Fusion reactors won’t be developed for 50 years
Irvine, 6 (12/18/06, Dean, “Mining the moon for a nuclear future,” , JMP)
What makes helium-3 so attractive as an alternative future fuel source is its environmentally friendly credentials, as it does not produce radioactive waste.
However, while mining helium-3 from the moon will be one challenge, extracting energy from it is another, as it relies on nuclear fusion, rather than fission used in today's nuclear reactors.
Scientists have been working to prove nuclear fusion works but much of it still remains theoretical. It is thought to be at least 50 years from being proven to work on a large scale.
Fusion power is 50 years away
Williams 7 (Mark, MIT Technology Review “Mining the Moon”, August 23rd, , MBIBAS)
Could He3 from the moon truly be a feasible solution to our power needs on Earth? Practical nuclear fusion is nowadays projected to be five decades off--the same prediction that was made at the 1958 Atoms for Peace conference in Brussels. If fusion power's arrival date has remained constantly 50 years away since 1958, why would helium-3 suddenly make fusion power more feasible?
Fusion reactors are decades away
Lasker, 6 (12/15/06, John, “Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel,” , JMP)
NASA's planned moon base announced last week could pave the way for deeper space exploration to Mars, but one of the biggest beneficiaries may be the terrestrial energy industry.
Nestled among the agency's 200-point mission goals is a proposal to mine the moon for fuel used in fusion reactors -- futuristic power plants that have been demonstrated in proof-of-concept but are likely decades away from commercial deployment.
At least 50 years away
Lasker, 6 (12/15/06, John, “Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel,” , JMP)
While still theoretical, nuclear fusion is touted as a safer, more sustainable way to generate nuclear energy: Fusion plants produce much less radioactive waste, especially if powered by helium-3. But experts say commercial-sized fusion reactors are at least 50 years away.
No solvency for 30 years
Whittington, space policy analyst and author of Children of Apollo, 4 (12/8/04, Mark R., USA Today, “World's next energy source may be just a moon away,” , JMP)
Lawrence Taylor, a director of the U.S. Planetary Geosciences Institute, suggested that the technology to generate energy from Helium 3 could be had in 10 years. Other scientists said a fusion reactor using Helium 3 would produce little or no radioactive byproducts and could be built safely in the heart of any city. Unfortunately, given the current level of research and development, commercially viable fusion energy is at least 30 years away.
--- XT: Not Feasible
Helium-3 based fusion is not feasible – would have to heat the nuclei to immense temperatures
Williams 7 – MIT Technology Review (Mark, “Mining the Moon”, August 23rd, , MBIBAS)
Helium-3 advocates claim that it, conversely, would be nonradioactive, obviating all those problems. But a serious critic has charged that in reality, He3-based fusion isn't even a feasible option. In the August issue of Physics World, theoretical physicist Frank Close, at Oxford in the UK, has published an article called "Fears Over Factoids" in which, among other things, he summarizes some claims of the "helium aficionados," then dismisses those claims as essentially fantasy. Close points out that in a tokamak--a machine that generates a doughnut-shaped magnetic field to confine the superheated plasmas necessary for fusion--deuterium reacts up to 100 times more slowly with helium-3 than it does with tritium. In a plasma contained in a tokamak, Close stresses, all the nuclei in the fuel get mixed together, so what's most probable is that two deuterium nuclei will rapidly fuse and produce a tritium nucleus and proton. That tritium, in turn, will likely fuse with deuterium and finally yield one helium-4 atom and a neutron. In short, Close says, if helium-3 is mined from the moon and brought to Earth, in a standard tokamak the final result will still be deuterium-tritium fusion. Second, Close rejects the claim that two helium-3 nuclei could realistically be made to fuse with each other to produce deuterium, an alpha particle and energy. That reaction occurs even more slowly than deuterium-tritium fusion, and the fuel would have to be heated to impractically high temperatures--six times the heat of the sun's interior, by some calculations--that would be beyond the reach of any tokamak. Hence, Close concludes, "the lunar-helium-3 story is, to my mind, moonshine."
Helium-3 fusion future not feasible
Whittington 11 – author of Children of Apollo and The Last Moonwalker. He has written on space subjects for a variety of periodicals, including The Houston Chronicle, The Washington Post, USA Today, the L.A. Times and The Weekly Standard. (Mark, “Harrison Schmitt's Plan to Solve the Energy Problem by Mining the Moon”, May 4th, , MBIBAS)
Of course, there are obstacles in the path of a helium 3 fusion future, both technical and political. Developing a reactor that will create more energy than it consumes to create a helium 3 fusion reaction will be daunting. Then there are the problems of developing of lunar mining techniques and a cost effective transportation infrastructure between Earth and the moon.
AT: Fossil Fuel Dependence Adv
Peak oil isn’t coming now and there’s no impact
Jaccard 5—professor at the School of Resource and Environmental Management at Simon Fraser University (Mark, “Sustainable Fossil Fuels: The Unusual Suspect in the Quest for Clean and Enduring Energy”, December 2005, , ZBurdette)
More and more people believe we must quickly wean ourselves from fossil fuels to save the planet from environmental catastrophe, incessant oil conflicts and economic collapse. This view is epitomized by the claim in one of many recent anti-fossil fuel books that “Civilization as we know it will come to an end sometime in this century unless we can find a way to live without fossil fuels.” 1
This view is misguided. This book explains why.
Those who argue that the end of fossil fuels is nigh usually start with evidence that we consume conventional oil faster than we find it, and then link this to the latest energy price spike and geopolitical conflict. What they overlook is that a peak in the production of “conventional oil” is unlikely to be of great significance given the potential for substitution among the planet’s enormous total resources of conventional and unconventional oil, conventional and unconventional natural gas, as well as coal. A refined petroleum product like gasoline can be produced from any of these other fossil fuels, and indeed it is today from unconventional oil in the form of oil sands (Canada), natural gas (Qatar) and coal (South Africa). The planet has perhaps 800 years of coal at today’s use rate and an even longer horizon for natural gas if we exploit untapped resources like deep geopressurized gas and gas hydrates. While this substitution potential does not mean that energy supply markets will always operate smoothly – prices can oscillate, sometimes dramatically, from one year or decade to the next – it suggests that we should not misinterpret periods of high prices as indicating the imminent demise of our still plentiful fossil fuel resources.
When it comes to fossil fuels, those worried about resource exhaustion find common cause with those worried about environmental impacts. But we can use fossil fuels with lower impacts and less risk.
Fossil fuels are a high quality form of stored solar energy – the result of millions of years of photosynthesis that grew plants and the animals that fed upon them, both of whose decomposing remains were trapped in sediments and eventually transformed through subterranean pressures into natural gas, oil and coal. When humans are ignorant or uncaring about the impacts of using this source of energy, they can create great harm to themselves and the environment. Open pit coalmines destroy mountains and valleys. Oil spills soil coastlines and harm wildlife. Uncontrolled burning pollutes the air in homes and cities, acidifies lakes and forests, and risks major climate disruption.
This litany of impacts and risks presents a black image for fossil fuels. However, the history of fossil fuel use is also one of humans detecting and then successfully addressing its environmental challenges. Industrialized countries are the most dependent on fossil fuels, and yet in these countries indoor air quality is excellent compared to all of human history since the discovery of fire (with a huge benefit for life expectancy), urban air quality is better in many cities than it was 100 years ago, and acid emissions have fallen in some regions by over 50% in the past 30 years.
The latest challenge is CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, the most significant of the human-produced greenhouse gases that threaten to raise global temperatures and disrupt weather patterns and ecosystems. But in the decade or so that researchers have grappled seriously with this challenge many promising solutions have appeared. Fossil fuels can be converted to clean forms of energy – electricity, hydrogen and cleaner-burning synthetic fuels like methanol and dimethyl ether – through gasification processes that enable the capture of carbon and its safe storage, most likely deep in the earth’s sedimentary formations.
There are costs. Estimates from independent researchers suggest that zero-emission fossil fuel production of electricity would increase final electricity prices by 25–50% were this technology to become universally applied. Researchers also suggest that the cost of vehicle use would increase by about the same percentage as we shifted from gasoline and diesel to primarily hydrogen, electricity and some biofuels for personal mobility. This increase, which is less than recent price jumps of electricity, gasoline, heating oil and natural gas in many jurisdictions, implies that the cost of energy would climb over the next century from its current level of 6% to about 8% of a typical family’s budget in an industrialized country – remaining much lower than what it was 100 years ago and than what it is today for a poor family in a developing country. Thus, to shift our use of fossil fuels to these zero-emission processes over the course of this century would result in real energy price increases of much less than 1% per year during the next three to five decades.
Even if we can use fossil fuels cleanly, however, we might prefer to switch to other options sooner in order to ensure that our energy system is not a house of cards that collapses when we deplete our lower cost fossil fuels. But this decision requires careful consideration of the difficulties and costs involved in forcing the switch quickly versus allowing it to occur gradually as the cost of fossil fuels trends upward in the distant future. We need to have a realistic view of the other options – the “usual suspects” of energy efficiency, nuclear power and renewable energy.
Energy efficiency has great potential according to physicists, engineers and environmentalists. There are, however, significant countervailing factors that will hinder efforts to make dramatic efficiency gains. First, efficiency gains lower the cost of energy services and therefore incite some greater use of existing technologies, and especially the innovation and commercialization of related energy-using technologies, a feedback effect that has caused energy consumption in industrializing countries to grow almost as fast as economic activity over the past two centuries. Ambitious increases in energy efficiency require a dramatic rise in the cost of energy in order to prevent the widespread adoption of the myriad of energy-using innovations commercialized every year. But, as noted, the shift to zero-emission energy supplies, whether from renewables, nuclear or fossil fuels, is unlikely to increase final energy prices by more than 25–50% from current levels. Second, the energy system itself will consume increasing amounts of energy in the process of converting lower quality and less accessible primary energy sources (unconventional oil, unconventional gas, coal, and renewables) into higher quality and cleaner secondary energy (electricity, hydrogen and synthetic fuels). The net effect is to decrease the overall efficiency of the global energy system. Third, the more than 50% increase in the world’s population over this century will happen mostly in poorer regions of the world, where energy use is minimal. Even a marginal increase in energy use by people in these countries to provide the most basic services has a profound implication for aggregate energy use at the global scale. Thus, while we should pursue energy efficiency, it is likely that the global energy system will still expand three- or four-fold over this century, especially as people in developing countries use their rising incomes to enjoy energy services that most people in wealthier countries take for granted.
Nuclear power is potentially inexhaustible, but it must overcome public fears about radiation leaks from operational accidents, waste storage and even terrorist attacks, as well as superpower concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. To make significant advances, therefore, nuclear must be substantially cheaper than its competitors for providing zero-emission energy. Most cost estimates, however, suggest that it will be cost-competitive at best and perhaps more expensive when the full costs of facility decommissioning, waste disposal and insurance liability are accounted for. The use of nuclear will grow in some regions, but for the next 100 years its share of the global energy system is unlikely to expand much beyond its current 3%. In the more distant future, developments in fusion technology or other non-radiating nuclear alternatives may expand its opportunities.
Renewable energy is seemingly inexhaustible and environmentally benign, yet many of its manifestations are characterized by low energy density, variability of output and inconvenient location. This will often require dedicated facilities for energy concentration, storage, and transmission, and these can cause significant environmental and human impacts depending on their character and scale. The dams and reservoirs of large hydropower projects flood valuable valley bottoms and impede migratory fish and animals, windpower farms can conflict with scenic, wildlife and other values, and biomass energy plantations compete for fertile land with agriculture and forestry. As the contribution of renewables grows in scale, the associated energy concentration and storage costs will become more of an issue. Even when helped by strong policies, it takes time for renewables-using innovations to achieve the commercialization and expanded production that is necessary to lower costs. Starting from the negligible market share of renewables today, and in a growing global energy system, it will be an enormous and likely very expensive endeavor to force the wholesale replacement of fossil fuels with a renewables dominated system in the course of just one century.
In anticipating the relative contribution of each of these energy options over this century, it is important not to confuse means and ends. The end is not an energy system dominated by renewables or nuclear or fossil fuels. The end is a low impact and low risk energy system that can meet expanded human energy needs indefinitely and do this as inexpensively as possible, without succumbing to cataclysmic forces at some future time. With this sustainable energy system as the goal, it is unjustifiable to rule out fossil fuels in advance of a holistic comparison that considers critical decision factors. These factors include cost, of course, but also the general human desire to minimize the risk of extreme events (like a major nuclear accident), to ensure adequate and reliable energy supplies free from geopolitical turmoil, and to sustain values, institutions and lifestyles.
Even though it will perhaps triple in size over this century, the global energy system should nonetheless reduce its environmental impacts and risks. If the costs are not too great – and they appear not to be – it can become in effect a zero-emission energy system with negligible impacts to land, air and water. And any residual, unavoidable hazards can be ones from which the system could recover within a reasonable time, either from natural processes alone or in concert with human remediation efforts.
This sustainability objective for the global energy system is achievable, and indeed we have several options. But when all of these options are compared without prejudice, fossil fuels – the “unusual suspect” – are likely to retain a significant role in the global energy system through this century and far beyond, and the transition toward renewables and perhaps eventually nuclear will be gradual. Deliberately diverting from this lowest cost path by prematurely forcing fossil fuels out of the energy supply mix may not mean as much for wealthy countries, but for the poorer people on this planet this arbitrary requirement would divert critical resources that could otherwise be devoted to essential investments in clean water, health care, disease prevention, education, basic infrastructure, security, improved governance and biodiversity preservation.
Ironically, however, clean energy – whether relying on fossil fuels or some other option – does not ensure a sustainable human presence on earth. Indeed, if the eventual, long-term costs of developing a clean energy system are as low as some of the evidence suggests, the challenges to sustainability may be even greater as humans use energy to satisfy their basic needs and seemingly inexhaustible desires for materials and living space.
AT: Resource Wars Impact
No risk of resource wars—shortages don’t trigger military confrontation
Victor 7— professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (David, Nov 14, 2007, , “What resource wars?”, ZBurdette)
Rising energy prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be headed for a spate of "resource wars" - hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas.
First is the rise of China, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs - such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals - and has already "gone out" to the world with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations.
Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world. To be sure, resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere. Fixing them requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn't a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.
Feeding the dragon
Resource wars are largely back in vogue within the US threat industry because of China's spectacular rise. Brazil, India, Malaysia and many others that used to sit on the periphery of the world economy are also arcing upward. This growth is fueling a surge in world demand for raw materials. Inevitably, these countries have looked overseas for what they need, which has animated fears of a coming clash with China and other growing powers over access to natural resources.
Within the next three years, China will be the world's largest consumer of energy. Yet, it's not just oil wells that are working harder to fuel China, so too are chainsaws. Chinese net imports of timber nearly doubled from 2000 to 2005. The country also uses about one-third of the world's steel (around 360 million tons), or three times its 2000 consumption.
Even in coal resources, in which China is famously well-endowed, China became a net importer in 2007. Across the board, the combination of low efficiency, rapid growth and an emphasis on heavy industry - typical in the early stages of industrial growth - have combined to make the country a voracious consumer and polluter of natural resources. America, England and nearly every other industrialized country went through a similar pattern, though with a human population that was much smaller than today's resource-hungry developing world.
Among the needed resources, oil has been most visible. Indeed, Chinese state-owned oil companies are dotting Africa, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf with projects aimed to export oil back home. The overseas arm of India's state oil company has followed a similar strategy - unable to compete head-to-head with the major Western companies, it focuses instead on areas where human-rights abuses and bad governance keep the major oil companies at bay and where India's foreign policy can open doors. To a lesser extent, Malaysia engages in the same behavior. The American threat industry rarely sounds the alarm over Indian and Malaysian efforts, though, in part because those firms have less capital to splash around and mainly because their stories just don't compare with fear of the rising dragon.
These efforts to lock up resources by going out fit well with the standard narrative for resource wars - a zero-sum struggle for vital supplies. But will a struggle over resources actually lead to war and conflict?
To be sure, the struggle over resources has yielded a wide array of commercial conflicts as companies duel for contracts and ownership. State-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation's (CNOOC) failed bid to acquire US-based Unocal - and with it Unocal's valuable oil and gas supplies in Asia - is a recent example. But that is hardly unique to resources - similar conflicts with tinges of national security arise in the control over ports, aircraft engines, databases laden with private information and a growing array of advanced technologies for which civilian and military functions are hard to distinguish. These disputes win and lose some friendships and contracts, but they do not unleash violence.
Most importantly, China's going-out strategy is unlikely to spur resource wars because it simply does not work, a lesson the Chinese are learning. Oil is a fungible commodity, and when it is sourced far from China it is better to sell (and buy) the oil on the world market. The best estimates suggest that only about one-tenth of the oil produced overseas by Chinese investments (so-called "equity oil") actually makes it back to the country. So, thus far, the largest beneficiaries of China's strategy are the rest of the world's oil consumers - first and foremost the United States - who gain because China subsidizes production.
Until recently, the strategy of going out for oil looked like a good bet for China's interests. But, despite threat-industry fear-mongering, we need not worry that it will continue over the long term because Chinese enterprises are already poised to follow a new strategy that is less likely to engender conflict. The past strategy rested on a trifecta of passing fads. One fad was the special access that Chinese state enterprises had to cheap capital from the government and by retaining their earnings.
The ability to direct that spigot to political projects is diminishing as China engages in reforms that expose state enterprises to the real cost of capital and as the Chinese state and its enterprises look for better commercial returns on the money they invest. Second, nearly all the equity-oil investments overseas have occurred since the late 1990s, as prices have been rising. Each has looked much smarter than the last because of the surging value of oil in the ground. But that trend is slowing in many places because the cost of discovering and developing oil resources is rising.
And the third passing fad in China's going-out strategy is the fiction that China can cut special deals - such as by channeling development assistance to pliable host governments - to confer a durable advantage for Chinese companies. While there is no question that the special deals are rampant - by some measures, most of China's foreign assistance is actually tied to natural-resources projects - the Chinese government and its overseas enterprises are learning that it is best to avoid these places for the long haul. Among the special havens where Chinese companies toil are Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Iran and Zimbabwe - all countries where even Chinese firms find it hard to assure adequate stability to reliably extract natural resources.
As China grapples with these hard truths about going out, the strategy will come unstuck. It won't happen overnight, but evidence in this direction is encouraging. China already pursues the opposite strategy - seeking reliable hosts, multiple commercial partners and market-oriented contracts - when it secures natural resources that require technical sophistication. China's first supplies of imported natural gas, which started last year at a liquefied natural gas terminal in Shenzhen, came from blue-chip investments in Australia, governed by contracts and investments with major Western companies.
With time, China will shift to such arrangements and away from the armpits of governance. At best, badly governed countries are mediocre hosts for projects that export bulk commodities, such as iron ore and raw crude oil. These projects, however, are least likely to engender zero-sum conflicts over resources because it is particularly difficult to corner the market for widely traded commodities, as China has learned with its equity-oil projects. Resources that require technical sophistication to develop tend to favor integration and stability, rather than a zero-sum struggle.
Pernicious tents
The second surge in thinking about resource wars comes from all the money that is pulsing into resource-rich countries. There is no question that the revenues are huge. OPEC cashed US$650 billion for 11.7 billion barrels of the oil it sold in 2006, compared with $110 billion in 1998, when it sold a similar quantity of oil at much lower prices. Russia's Central Bank reports that the country earned more than $300 billion selling oil and gas in 2006, about four times its annual haul in the late 1990s. But will this flood in rents cause conflict and war?
There is no question that large revenues - regardless of the source - can fund a lot of mischievous behavior. Iran is building a nuclear-weapons program with the revenues from its oil exports. Russia has funded trouble in Chechnya, Georgia and other places with oil and gas rents. Hugo Chavez opened Venezuela's bulging checkbook to help populists in Bolivia and to poke America in ways that could rekindle smoldering conflicts. Islamic terrorists also have benefited, in part, from oil revenues that leak out of oil-rich societies or are channeled directly from sympathetic governments.
But resource-related conflicts are multi-causal. In no case would simply cutting the resources avoid or halt conflict, even if the presence of natural resources can shift the odds. Certainly, oil revenues have advanced Iran's nuclear program, which is a potential source of hot conflict and could make future conflicts a lot more dangerous. But a steep decline in oil probably wouldn't strangle the program on its own. Indeed, while Iran still struggles to make a bomb, resource-poor North Korea has already arrived at that goal by starving itself and getting help from friends. Venezuela's checkbook allows Chavez to be a bigger thorn in the sides of those he dislikes, but there are other thorns that poke without oil money.
As we see, what matters is not just money but how it is used. While al-Qaeda conjures images of an oil-funded network - because it hails from the resource-rich Middle East and its seed capital has oily origins - other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers and Ireland's Republican Army, arose with funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that require huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds.
During the run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund terror networks; yet it is sobering to remember that al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil earnings were at their lowest in recent history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September 11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda's daring attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about the inability to make ends meet at home because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as driving forces for terrorism.
Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls from resources cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend to make weak states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola’s diamonds and Nigeria’s oil, which in both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian governments - such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia and Venezuela - the problem may be the opposite. A sharp decline in resource revenues can create dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry distributions discredit the established authorities.
On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is probably breeding more conflict than would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves to resources, it is the other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions and the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and productivity, that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on conflict.
Climate dangers
The third avenue for concern about coming resource wars is through the dangers of global climate change. The litany is now familiar. Sea levels will rise, perhaps a lot; storms will probably become more intense; dry areas are prone to parch further and wet zones are likely to soak longer. And on top of those probable effects, unchecked climate change raises the odds of suffering nasty surprises if the world's climate and ecosystems respond in abrupt ways. Adding all that together, the scenarios are truly disturbing. Meaningful action to stem the dangers is long overdue.
In the United States over the last year, the traditional security community has become engaged on these issues. Politically, that conversion has been touted as good news because the odds of meaningful policy are higher if hawks also favor action. Their concerns are seen through the lens of resource wars, with fears such as: water shortages that amplify grievances and trigger conflict; migrations of "climate refugees", which could stress border controls and also cause strife if the displaced don't fit well in their new societies; and diseases such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.
While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen - usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan.
But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny - the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces.
The dangers of disease have caused particular alarm in the advanced industrialized world, partly because microbial threats are good fodder for the imagination. But none of these scenarios hold up because the scope of all climate-sensitive diseases is mainly determined by the prevalence of institutions to prevent and contain them rather than the raw climatic factors that determine where a disease might theoretically exist. For example, the threat industry has flagged the idea that a growing fraction of the United States will be malarial with the higher temperatures and increased moisture that are likely to come with global climate change.
Yet much of the American South is already climatically inviting for malaria, and malaria was a serious problem as far north as Chicago until treatment and eradication programs started in the 19th century licked the disease. Today, malaria is rare in the industrialized world, regardless of climate, and whether it spreads again will hinge on whether governments stay vigilant, not so much on patterns in climate. If Western countries really cared about the spread of tropical diseases and the stresses they put on already fragile societies in the developing world, they would redouble their efforts to tame the diseases directly (as some are now doing) rather than imagining that efforts to lessen global warming will do the job. Eradication usually depends mainly on strong and responsive governments, not the bugs and their physical climate.
Rethinking policy
If resource wars are actually rare - and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors - then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed.
First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources.
Applied to China, this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources - not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets.
Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of US policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC's attempt to buy Unocal - along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets - sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely.
Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency - which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis - yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way.
The sweep of history points against classic resource wars. Whereas colonialism created long, oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets.
At the same time, much higher expectations must be placed on China to tame the pernicious effects of its recent efforts to secure special access to natural resources. Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe are three particularly acute examples where Chinese (and in Sudan's case, Indian) government investments, sheltered under a foreign-policy umbrella, have caused harm by rewarding abusive governments. That list will grow the more insecure China feels about its ability to source vital energy and mineral supplies. Some of what is needed is patience because these troubles will abate as China itself realizes that going out is an expensive strategy that buys little in security.
Chinese state oil companies are generally well-run organizations; as they are forced to pay the real costs of capital and to compete in the marketplace, they won't engage in these strategies. The best analog is Brazil's experience, where its state-controlled oil company has become ever smarter - and more market oriented - as the Brazilian government has forced it to operate at arm's length without special favors. That has not only allowed Petrobras to perform better, but it has also made Brazil's energy markets function better and with higher security.
Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices - clearly branding them the problem. There's some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect - evident, for example, in China's recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield Sudan's government. At the same time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to governments (and officials) much more transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to "Publish What You Pay", little has been accomplished. Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is strikingly rare. America is notably quiet on this front.
With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists - who in turn cause conflicts and are often seen as a circuitous route to resource wars - policymakers must realize that this channel for oil money is good for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying imported hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the US call on world oil resources is not sustainable because a host of factors - such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing regions - make it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and still-higher prices.
These problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers temper their demand. The goal should not be "independence" from international markets but a sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning wings in American politics and the industry-centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about energy supplies - as they have over the last year - then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course. Yet Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for efficiency. At this writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills, neither of which, strikingly, will cause much fundamental change to the situation.
Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and societies can be a good policy goal, but success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will find politically toxic at home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that reduce dependence on oil) while channeling the revenues into the US government treasury rather than overseas.
In short, that means a tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn't simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a serious effort to contain financial windfalls to natural-resources exporters, it would need - at the same time - to confront a more politically poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of governance in places where vacuums are worse than incumbents.
Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of regime change, serious policy in this area would need to deal with many voids.
Finally, serious thinking about climate change must recognize that the "hard" security threats that are supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse. They are good for the threat industry - which needs danger for survival - and they are good for the greens who find it easier to build a coalition for policy when hawks are supportive. Building a policy on this house of cards is no way to muster support for a problem that requires several decades of sustained effort. One of the greatest hurdles in the climate debate - one that is just now being cleared, but will reappear if policy advocates seize on false dangers - has been to contain the entrepreneurial skeptics who have sown public doubt about the integrity of the science on causes and effects of climate change.
The false logic now runs in both directions. Not only will climate change multiply threats by putting stress on societies, but a flood of articles warns of new territorial conflicts as warming opens the formerly ice-bound Arctic for exploration. Russia recently planted a flag on the seabed at the North Pole. In fact, the underlying causes of this exploration rush are ambiguous property rights and advances in undersea drilling that are unrelated to climate change. A similar pattern unfolded in the 1950s in Antarctica, which led to a standoff of territorial claims and no real harm to the region, no production of usable minerals and no resource wars.
The real dangers lie in the growing risk that climate change could be a lot worse than the likely scenarios, which could create severe and direct harm to societies that is much more worrisome than the indirect and remote risk of climate-induced resource wars. Yet politicians give more attention to imagined insecurities from climate change and rarely talk about climate as a game of odds and risk management. They talk even less about the resource war that nobody should want to win - mankind's domination of nature. For the real losers in unchecked climate change will be natural ecosystems unable, unlike humans, to look ahead and adapt.
AT: Nuclear Waste Impact
Status quo radiation is insufficient—thousands of case studies prove that increased radiation dramatically curtails premature deaths
Luckey 3—Ph.D. in biochemistry, former professor (T.D., RSO Magazine ▪ Volume 8, Number 4, “Radiation Hormesis Overview*”, , ZBurdette)
The conclusion is this: we live with a subclinical deficiency of ionizing radiation. By ignoring the scientific data in almost 3000 reports, advisory committees and government practices have caused, and are now causing, premature cancer deaths for millions of people. We need more, not less, exposure to ionizing radiation. The evidence that ionizing radiation is an essential agent has been reviewed. [8,20,21,44] A partial radiation deficiency can be remedied by safe supplementation with external or internal sources. [44,45] Data from exposed nuclear workers indicated a lifetime dose was about 5 cGy. [20,44,45] Since much of this was rapidly dissipated by excretion, fractionated, or chronic, doses of 5 cGy/y should be used. This would provide a safety factor of 200, considerably greater than that provided for several essential nutrients. Several populations have been exposed to more than 5 Gy/y for many generations. [44,45]
There is proven benefit and no known risk from low-dose irradiation. Health and increased average life-span, not risk and death, should be the guide for new recommendations and laws. With the exception of suicides and abortions motivated by fear, people do not die from low-dose irradiation. Concern for LNT and the perception of harm by regulatory agencies promotes fear of this benign environmental agent. Convincing evidence shows that safe supplementation with low doses of ionizing radiation would produce a new plateau of health.
No impact to waste – small quantities and technological advancement solves
Brand, 11 – Stewart, leading thinker about how to create an ecologically sustainable society (Winter 2011, Earth Island Journal, “Nuclear Power is Safe, Sound …and Green,” )RK
Safe storage and less waste. Nuclear power inspires in most environmentalists one particularly deep aversion. They recoil from the idea of passing on to endless future generations the deadly poison of nuclear waste. The customary rant goes: “You have to guarantee that all the radioactivity in the waste will be totally contained for 10,000 years.” Why? “Because any amount of radioactivity hurts humans and other life forms.”
What humans? The assumption seems to be that future humans will be exactly as we are today, with our present concerns and present technologies. How about, say, 200 years from now? If we and our technology prosper, humanity by then will be unimaginably capable compared to now, with far more interesting things to worry about. If we crash back to the Stone Age, odd doses of radioactivity will be the least of our problems. Extrapolate to 2,000 years or 10,000 years. The problem doesn’t get worse over time – it vanishes over time.
Small footprint. Gwyneth Cravens points out that “a nuclear plant producing 1,000 megawatts takes up a third of a square mile. A wind farm would have to cover over 200 square miles to obtain the same result, and a solar array over 50 square miles.” That’s just the landscape footprint.
More interesting to me is the comparison between coal waste and nuclear waste. Nuclear waste is miniscule in size – one Coke can’s worth per person-lifetime of electricity if it were all nuclear. Coal waste is massive – 68 tons of solid stuff and 77 tons of carbon per person-lifetime of strictly coal electricity. Nuclear waste goes into dry cask storage, where it is kept in a small area and monitored. By contrast, a 1-gigawatt coal plant burns 3 million tons of fuel a year and produces 7 million tons of CO2, all of which immediately goes into everyone’s atmosphere, where no one can control it. That’s not counting the fly ash and flue gas from coal – full of heavy metals including lead, arsenic, and mercury.
Their evidence is sensationalist – fossil fuels can kill more people in a day than all nuclear accidents ever
World Nuclear Association, no date (“Chernobyl - Myths and Reality,” )RK
The 1986 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in Soviet Ukraine - the only nuclear power accident ever to harm the public - spawned widespread fears about the safety of nuclear power. But the Chernobyl reactor had an acutely flawed design - one which would never have been allowed to be built outside the Soviet Union. It also had weak safety features that failed to guard against human error.
In contrast, the U.S. Three Mile Island accident, which harmed no one, was confined by the extensive protective systems that are now the worldwide industry standard. Reactors with Chernobyl's severe shortcomings have been eliminated or improved - and will never be built again.
Using the world's top experts, the UN has conducted exhaustive studies of the health effects of Chernobyl - beyond the original death toll of 31. Of around 4,000 thyroid cancer cases attributed to the accident, nearly all were successfully treated. Beyond this - after 20 years - there is no scientific evidence of any increase in cancer incidence at locations near or far. Theoretical projections of Chernobyl's possible long-term effects predict 4,000 late-in-life cancer deaths. Any such increase would be too small to confirm statistically.
The UN's authorative findings do not minimise the gravity of what happened at Chernobyl. But they do refute many sensationalized reports and help to place that singular event in perspective. Coal-mining accidents and gas explosions account for thousands of fatalities each year. Ironically, these deaths are so common that they generally go unreported. For example, a single mining accident killing scores of people may occur with little note, even while causing more fatalities in a day than have occurred in the full history of nuclear power.
The greatest health impact from over-use of fossil fuel comes from air pollution. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that such pollution causes nearly three million deaths each year. Medical scientists predict that the fossil fuel mortality rate will triple by the year 2025. These devastating health effects - which equate to 600 'pollution Chernobyls' each day in the near future - overwhelm even the most distorted myths about nuclear power.
--- XT: No Radiation Impact
The risk and impact of nuclear accidents is exaggerated – no major health risks
Strupczewski, 03 – A., Institute of Atomic Energy, Swierk, Poland (1/28/03, Applied Energy, “Accident risks in nuclear-power plants,” vol 75, ScienceDirect)RK
***NPP = nuclear-power plant
***TMI = Three Mile Island
***OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
1. Safety goals for nuclear power
The general safety objective for nuclear-power plants (NPPs) is to protect the individual, society and the environment by establishing and maintaining in NPPs effective measures against radiological hazards. To reach this objective, safety goals for nuclear power were established from the very beginning of its development, and made more demanding as the technology matured.
The initial qualitative targets were that no individual should bear a significant additional risk due to nuclear-power plant operation and the societal risks from power-plant operation should not be a significant addition to other societal risks [1]. They were followed by quantitative requirements, which according to US rules set the design targets so that the calculated plant core-damage frequency (CDF) should be less than 10-4 events per reactor year (R–Y) [2], and the calculated large release frequency (LRF) less than 10-6/R–Y for sequences resulting in a greater than 0.25 Sv whole-body dose over 24 h at one-half mile from the reactor.
These requirements for NPP design corresponded to the cancer risk to the people in the critical population group equal to 10-10/R–Y [3]. Presently the safety objectives developed by the US and European utilities for the new generation of NPPs include a maximum permissible CDF equal to 10-5/R–Y [4]. It must also be demonstrated that early containment failure is avoided for all risk-significant scenarios. The cumulative LRF must be less than 10-6/R–Y.
In parallel with the development of these targets, the nuclear industry and regulators in the countries leading in nuclear safety have developed the contemporary nuclear safety philosophy, which resulted in reducing risks in NPPs far below those risks typical for other power-industry branches. It places the principle ‘safety first’ as its cornerstone and includes several principles that are today the basis of NPP design and operation in all western countries.
2. Nuclear-power plant safety indicators
The progress in the safety level of NPPs is reflected in the probabilistic safety analyses (PSAs), initiated in the US in 1975 by the Rasmussen Study and systematically developed to become standard tools used for safety analysis of every NPP. The importance of PSA in the evaluation of NPP safety is due to the fact that there has been only one severe core damage accident in water-moderated reactors, namely the Three Mile Island accident in the USA in 1978, so there are no historical statistical data as for coal-mine accidents, oil-transport accidents, gas explosions or dam breaks. Minor incidents that do happen in NPPs, although they are eagerly publicized by the media, usually are far below the level at which any hazard to the plant or the public would be involved. Moreover, in view of fast improvements of NPP technology, the analysis of the safety of the plants to be built cannot be based on historical experience with the plants put into operation 20 or even 10 years ago, but must reflect the actual safety features of the upgraded new designs. PSA makes it possible to study the new design features and evaluate which of the safety improvements will bring the required safety upgrading.
The main condition for preventing massive releases of radioactivity is to maintain the reactor containment integrity, first of all in the early stage of the accident, then in the later stages when the releases of radioactivity would be less but still significant. In the middle of the 1990s, several mechanisms were considered as possible contributors to an early containment failure.
Over the last decade, the intensive research and development of the technical means of coping with severe accidents have resulted in our being able to treat these issues as resolved.
The results of several reactor-safety studies performed in Western countries show that the safety of the modern NPPs is very high. For example the German risk-study phase B [5] indicated that the frequency of core melt in Biblis B NPP was 10-4/(R– Y) and that of large radioactive releases 2.6x10-5/(R–Y). After taking into account operator actions preventing the reactor’s pressure-vessel melt-through under high pressure, the frequency of the core melt frequency was reduced to 2.6x10-6/(R–Y). Subsequent analyses performed for KONVOI plants [6] gave similar results, with absolute numbers lower due to improvements in the KONVOI type plants as compared to the Biblis B. Core-damage frequency without bleed and feed in KONVOI plants was 1.4x10-6/R–Y, and after considering the effects of operator actions in those plants, the CDF was reduced to 3.5x10-7/R–Y. These results can be considered as typical for modern PWRs.
The project for the European Pressurized-Water Reactor (EPR) assumes that the design will limit the maximum possible releases so that the following safety objectives will be reached:
1. No need for short-term (about 24 h) off-site countermeasures
2. No need for population evacuation beyond 2–3 km
3. For long-term countermeasures, limited restriction of the consumption of agricultural products for a limited period (about 1 year) in a limited area is acceptable [7].
This is the level of safety of NPPs expected as a reference base in the future. Specific designs, which have been already licensed for construction, include reactors with passive safety-features AP 600 or Advanced BWR [8], for which the CDF is below 2x10-7/R–Y. The releases of radioactivity are at least ten times smaller and the health risks are negligible.
3. Radiological effects of nuclear-power plant accidents
The level of safety of modern NPPs is surprisingly far from the mass-media picture of consequences of a nuclear accident. Actually, the only accidents with radioactive releases in NPPs were those in TMI and in Chernobyl. In TMI there was a reactor-core melt, but the integrity of the remaining barriers (reactor pressure vessel and containment) was maintained and the releases were so limited that the average effective dose to the public was 0.015 mSv [9]. The corresponding cancer risk was below 10-6 per lifetime, less than the risk due to NORMAL yearly emissions from a coal-fired power plant at that time [10], and no health effects have ever been identified. In Chernobyl, the quantities of released fission products were significant, from 100% of noble gases down to about 4% of solid fission-products. The doses in the early phase after the accident were high. In the rescue team, 28 men died in consequence of exposure to radiation and several more of those who were treated for radiation sickness died from illnesses that may have been associated with their exposure. However, as confirmed in the UNSCEAR report of 2000, there has been no statistically significant increase in the incidence of leukaemia or any other form of cancer among workers or the public (except for child thyroid cancer), nor of deformities of babies born to members of the public [11]. An increase in the incidence of occult thyroid cancer was predicted to occur after 10 years, but actually it was found already in the first year after the accident [11]. This shows that the screening effect can be largely responsible for this observed increase. Generally the occult thyroid cancer is not fatal and can be successfully treated. Although some 2000 cases of thyroid cancer are attributed to the accident, less than 10 fatal cases have been observed.
Much greater damage to health has been caused by well meaning but misguided attempts to protect and help people living near Chernobyl at the time of the accident. The evacuation of hundreds of thousands of them is now seen as an over reaction, which in many cases did more harm than good. The first reaction was to move people out. Only later, was it realized that many of them had not needed to be moved. The relocation of people destroyed communities, broke up families, and led to unemployment, depression, hypochondria and stress-related illnesses. Among the relocated populations, there has been a massive increase in stress-related illnesses, such as heart disease and obesity, unrelated to radiation.
A major factor causing distress has been uncertainty about risks and in particular belief that all radiation doses can lead to cancer, as stated in the Linear No Threshold hypothesis presently used for the purpose of radiological protection. The recent report of UNPD and UNICEF [12] confirms the above statements and acknowledges that the people living in the contaminated areas receive low doses of radiation, being less than those occurring naturally in many other parts of the world. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 taken from [13] comparing lifetime doses to people around Chernobyl with the doses in European countries including Finland and Sweden, in which the population enjoys very good health and low cancer rates in spite of the high radiation background.
According to Russian sources, medical monitoring of the clean-up staff has shown no increase of cancer rate and no relationship between the dose and the mortality. The overall mortality rate among the clean-up staff was statistically lower than the mortality rate of the control group from the public [14]. The UNSCEAR report also confirms that no radiation illnesses (with the exception of child thyroid diseases) have been found in the exposed population [11]. Thus, although it should be acknowledged that the effects of the Chernobyl accident are important, it should be also stressed that most of them are due to excessive fear motivated and politically expedient decisions, not to the radiation doses themselves.
The NPPs planned to be built are completely different from RBMKs. The negative temperature reactivity coefficient ensures that, in accident conditions, their power will decrease, not increase as in Chernobyl, the containment (which did not exist in Chernobyl) would remain intact even after severe accidents and the accidentmanagement procedures and safety-upgrading measures implemented in the NPPs would prevent such large releases of radioactivity as was the case in Chernobyl. Thus, the radiological results of Chernobyl cannot be treated as representative of nuclear accidents in NPPs. The estimates of probable releases are made for each NPP separately within PSA studies and generally show that the hazards are much smaller than for other energy sources.
4. Comparison of nuclear-power risks with accident risks due to other energy sources
The risks of electricity generation should be evaluated considering the whole cycle, from fuel mining to plant construction, to waste management and site recultivation. While in the case of the nuclear-fuel cycle, the accident risks are mostly connected with the power plant, in other fuel cycles the dominant contribution can be made by other fuel stages.
For example, in the case of coal mining, the fatality ratio in the US is about 0.1 death/million tons or 3.5 death/GW(e).a [15]. In very large regions of the world, the situation can be much worse. In China, the average value for the country was about 4.6 deaths per MT in 1997 [16] and the number of mining fatalities per unit of energy produced from coal was 17 deaths/GW(e).a. In addition to that, the accident death rate in coal-fired power plants was about 2 deaths/GW(e).a [17] and in coal transport sector 8.5 deaths/GW(e).a [17]. These numbers add up to the accidental mortality in China coal power system being equal 27.5 deaths/GW(e).a.
The number of fatalities due to severe accidents (involving more than 5 fatalities each) for the coal chain in OECD countries is 0.13 per GW(e) [19]. In non-OECD Fig countries, it is much higher. The everyday occupational hazards for the coal chain will be taken as 1.27 fatalities/GW(e).a according to [18], that is for European countries. It is seen, that the small accidents involve more fatalities than the large ones, so both numbers must be taken into account.
The differences of the safety of hydropower in OECD and non-OECD countries are most pronounced. While the fatality ratio for OECD countries is only 0.004, it is 2.187 for non-OECD countries [15]. The data on dam safety show that differences in technology and safety practices influence very much the risk of power generation from a given facility. These differences are taken into account while discussing risks of the conventional power industry and nobody discussing the safety of a dam to be erected in the twenty-first century would base its safety indicators on accidents of dams built in say 1920. In a recent ExternE report on hydropower, the authors do not include any risk due to damfailures in the overall health risks due to hydropower [18], because they maintain that the dams built in Norway provide ‘‘negligibly small risk’’. Similarly, the progress in coal-mining safety is taken into account while estimating the number of fatalities per GW(e).a.
Of course this is a correct approach. However, if we take into account the progress in dam construction before and after 1930, then the differences in NPP technology existing between RBMK reactors and LWR NPPs should be also considered. Similarly, if introducing strict regulations requiring qualified engineering supervision had a strong effect on dam safety, it is evident that the whole concept of safety culture implemented in Western NPPs has also a significant influence on nuclear-reactor safety. As the differences in design between modern PWRs and the Chernobyl RBMK are much more significant that any differences in dams erected in Norway versus those built in the USA, Italy, France etc., then following the logic accepted by EC ExternE study, the hazards due to Chernobyl should not be considered as the basis for evaluating the safety of future NPPs.
No impact – safety risks of nuclear power are less than fossil fuels
Strupczewski, 03 – A., Institute of Atomic Energy, Swierk, Poland (1/28/03, Applied Energy, “Accident risks in nuclear-power plants,” vol 75, ScienceDirect)RK
Abstract
The paper presents the results of estimates of nuclear-power plant safety based on probabilistic safety analyses and discusses the means used to decrease core damage factors, large release frequency and cancer deaths due to nuclear accidents. Estimates made for new nuclear power plants show that these risks are negligibly small. The radiological effects of the Chernobyl accident are discussed and compared with the negligibly small effects of the TMI-2 accident in the USA in 1978, the only accident with core damage that occurred in pressurized or boiling-water reactors. The accident risks in present and future nuclear-power plants are compared with the accident risks due to other energy sources. Considering the whole fuel cycle, from mineral extraction to waste management, the risks due to nuclear-power accidents are much smaller than the accident risks due to oil, gas or coal fuel cycles. This conclusion is obtained from historical data, taking into account the accidents that have really occurred over the last 40 years, and is confirmed by probabilistic safety analyses for various power industries.
--- XT: Radiation Good
The impact turn outweighs the impact
Luckey 3—Ph.D. in biochemistry, former professor (T.D., RSO Magazine ▪ Volume 8, Number 4, “Radiation Hormesis Overview*”, , ZBurdette)
The thesis is clear. There is no risk and considerable benefit from chronic, whole body exposures to low doses of ionizing radiation. The evidence shows national and international agencies promulgate harm when they severely restrict exposures to ionizing radiation. Their goal should be health.
Multiple case studies prove radiation is good for health—reduces cancer rates
Luckey 3—Ph.D. in biochemistry, former professor (T.D., RSO Magazine ▪ Volume 8, Number 4, “Radiation Hormesis Overview*”, , ZBurdette)
Evidence of health benefits and longer average life-span following low-dose irradiation should replace fear, “all radiation is harmful,” and “the perception of harm” as the basis for action in the 21 st century. Hormesis is the excitation, or stimulation, by small doses of any agent in any system. Large doses inhibit. “Low dose” is defined as any dose between ambient levels of radiation and the threshold that marks the boundary between biopositive and bionegative effects. That threshold negates the “linear no threshold” (LNT) paradigm. This overview summarizes almost 3,000 reports on stimulation by low-dose irradiation.
“Hormesis with Ionizing Radiation” presented evidence of increased vigor in plants, bacteria, invertebrates and vertebrates. Most physiologic reactions in living cells are stimulated by low doses of ionizing radiation. This evidence of radiogenic metabolism (metabolism promoted by ionizing radiation) includes enzyme induction, photosynthesis, respiration and growth. Radiation hormesis in immunity decreases infection and premature death in radiation exposed populations. Increased immune competence is a major factor in the increased average life-span of populations exposed to low-dose irradiation. “Radiation Hormesis” presented evidence for radiation hormesis in major physiologic functions of vertebrates. Evidence of radiation hormesis in reproduction emphasizes the safety of low-dose irradiation. “Low-Level Radiation Health Effects: Compiling the Data” summarizes recent papers on radiation hormesis.
During the previous decades, statistically significant evidence showed that whole body exposures of humans to low doses of ionizing radiation decreased total cancer mortality rates. This is based on information compiled from 7 million person-years of exposed and control workers in nuclear shipyard and atomic bomb plants in Canada, Great Britain and the United States. Other human experiences with unusual exposures confirm radiation hormesis in cancer mortality. A variety of external sources are beneficial. Internal sources (plutonium, radium and radon) are also effective.
There’s not enough radiation now
Luckey 3—Ph.D. in biochemistry, former professor (T.D., RSO Magazine ▪ Volume 8, Number 4, “Radiation Hormesis Overview*”, , ZBurdette)
The conclusions have both personal and national significance. Ionizing radiation is a benign environmental agent at background levels. We live with a subclinical deficiency of ionizing radiation. Low doses of ionizing radiation significantly decrease premature cancer death. Health benefits should replace risk and death as the guide for safe exposures to ionizing radiation. Safe supplementation with ionizing radiation would provide a new plateau of health.
Studies go neg
Luckey 3—Ph.D. in biochemistry, former professor (T.D., RSO Magazine ▪ Volume 8, Number 4, “Radiation Hormesis Overview*”, , ZBurdette)
EARLY STUDIES
The 1200 reports summarized in “Hormesis With Ionizing Radiation” validate radiation hormesis. [2] Statistically significant results with microorganisms, plants, invertebrates, and experimental animals demonstrated radiogenic metabolism (metabolism promoted by ionizing radiation) is an important life function. Low-dose irradiation of microorganisms induced increased respiration, enzyme induction (adaptation), metabolism, resistance to killing doses, and cell division. Chronic whole body exposures to low doses of ionizing radiation increased reproduction, growth, maturation and development, resistance to disease, resistance to lethal doses of radiation, and average life-span (Table 2). Radiation hormesis in immunity is especially important.
Be highly skeptical of their evidence—12 reasons
Luckey 3—Ph.D. in biochemistry, former professor (T.D., RSO Magazine ▪ Volume 8, Number 4, “Radiation Hormesis Overview*”, , ZBurdette)
There are several reasons why the results summarized here are opposite from those usually reported. Most epidemiologists and government agencies err by one or more of the following:
a) assume all radiation is harmful;
b) include data from low-dose participants in their control cohort;
c) have no low-dose groups in the protocol;
d) do not use available low-dose data;
e) do not report enough raw data to construct
a dose-response curve at low doses;
f) use a one dimensional formula or statistic which does not allow expression of beneficial effects;
g) ignore data that does not fit the LNT doseresponse curve;
h) distort results by the use of median instead of mean or average value;
i) interpolate between high doses and background levels to obtain fancied results to produce and support unreasonable regulations;
j) assume cell functions are not subject to
whole body activities;
k) ignore increased immune competence found in exposed organisms; and
l) ignore increased health and average lifespan while emphasizing risks and death. Criticisms of classic epidemiologic reports continue to be ignored. [43]
Radiation checks cancer
Luckey 3—Ph.D. in biochemistry, former professor (T.D., RSO Magazine ▪ Volume 8, Number 4, “Radiation Hormesis Overview*”, , ZBurdette)
HUMAN CANCER STUDIES
Recent studies have concentrated upon human cancer mortality rates. Since it accounts for over 20% of all deaths, cancer is both a family disaster and a national health problem. Total cancer mortality rates in the United States have increased (Figure 7) during the past few decades. [19] Although large doses of ionizing radiation can induce cancer, small doses of ionizing radiation reduce total cancer mortality in both animals and humans. [8,20,21] Note the ordinate for the curve in Figure 1 could represent protection from cancer; the inverse is usually used for curves showing cancer incidence, cancer deaths, or cancer death rates (as in Figure 8). Results from whole body exposures of humans to low doses of internal and external radiation are briefly summarized.
AT: Leadership Adv --- Moon Race Internal Link
No impact – the US is too far ahead to lose its lead, and asteroid missions will solve the link
Adams, 10 (11/2/10, Jonathan, Global Post “Dragon watch: China pulls ahead in moon race,” )RK
So is Asia poised to make a giant leap, past the United States, in space?
Not necessarily. Experts say both China and India still lag far behind the United States in space expertise and experience. After all, American astronauts bounded over the moon's surface more than 40 years ago. President Barack Obama himself downplayed the importance of manned moon missions earlier this year, saying bluntly "we've been there."
U.S. spacecraft and satellite technology is still cutting-edge; witness the high-tech American lunar orbiter that's now sharing the moon's skies with China's orbiter. And the United States is now aiming for a daring new stunt: landing an astronaut on an asteroid by 2025, a project dubbed "Plymouth Rock."
No moon race --- their evidence is an exaggeration
Day, 7 (11/12/07, Dwayne A., The Space Review, “Exploding Moon myths: or why there’s no race to our nearest neighbor,” , JMP)
Germany recently announced that they possibly, maybe, might launch a robotic spacecraft to the Moon. That now brings to six the number of countries with spacecraft at the Moon in development to go to the Moon, or at the very least thinking about sending a spacecraft to the Moon. The others are: China, Japan, India, the United States, and the Russians (who have lots of plans, along with an official motto: “Please send money.”)
Just what the heck is going on?
The lay press, which has only a superficial understanding of space issues, has taken notice of all this space activity and struggled to understand it. They have reached for explanations, and in the process produced several erroneous theories based upon poor understanding both of what is currently happening, and what has happened in the past regarding exploration of the Moon. These Moon Myths include:
These countries are involved in a “space race” to the Moon.
China, Japan, and India are engaged in an “Asian space race.”
The scientific community is newly interested in the Moon and driving these efforts.
There must be something on the Moon that all these countries want—helium-3, other resources, or extraterrestrials.
These robotic missions are precursors to something bigger, such as human missions.
There is practically no truth to any of these myths, but they have appeared in numerous articles and, more often, in television news segments. They are worth exploring, if only to shed a little more light on what is currently going on.
Recently China’s Chang’e-1 spacecraft entered lunar orbit. It followed the Japanese Kaguya mission. (Kaguya is the Japanese nickname for the satellite, which was previously named “Selene,” after a Greek lunar deity.) Those two missions are currently in orbit. However, a European Space Agency spacecraft named SMART-1 was there a few years ago, slowly spiraling down to a deliberate impact with the surface last year. The Indians plan on launching their Chandrayaan spacecraft next year. The United States will launch its Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter next year as well. In addition, Russia has announced plans for a lunar mission known as Luna-Glob and scheduled for launch in 2012, but their plans are tentative at best.
Assuming that the Japanese and Chinese spacecraft are still operating a year from now, lunar orbit is going to get pretty crowded. This confuses the press, who look for big picture explanations for all this interest. Here are the myths deconstructed.
A “space race” to the Moon
This is the most common myth about all the new lunar activity. That’s not surprising considering that it’s the easiest explanation and the one that reporters are most familiar with—they think that they understand space races. All that activity must be due to competition, right? It must be because all of these countries are struggling to get to the Moon first, or best, or some other competitive goal.
But it’s not really true. If you look at the stated reasons for each of these missions and apply a little filtering and some knowledge of space policy and technical capabilities, it becomes obvious that the actual explanation is much less exciting: many of these missions are happening because these countries have recently acquired the capability to go beyond Earth orbit, and the Moon is the closest—and therefore easiest—target beyond Earth orbit. That’s it. It’s that simple.
There are of course other targets beyond Earth orbit, including Mars, Venus, near Earth objects (i.e. asteroids), and comets. But these are generally out of reach for less mature space powers. The European Space Agency, which is quite mature, has mounted missions to Mars, Venus, and a comet—but no lunar missions other than SMART-1. Japan has also mounted a mission to an asteroid. But those missions require more resources and capabilities than the Moon, such as access to deep space communications and better navigation. So for countries like China and India, the Moon is an easy first step beyond low Earth orbit, but essentially their gateway to more ambitious missions beyond the Moon.
Many of the current plans for exploring the Moon were developed with little regard to what other countries are doing, and certainly not in response to them. In fact, that’s part of the problem; there’s little coordination between the participants when coordination might produce complementary data instead of redundant data. But there is some cooperation. The Indian spacecraft, for instance, will carry American and European instruments. The Russian spacecraft, if it gets built, may carry Japanese impactors intended for Lunar-A. The relevant space agencies are planning, or at least discussing, sharing their data. This is not a “space race” by any definition.
Space leadership isn’t key to heg – no need for the US to go to the moon
Logsdon, 11 - John M., Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at the Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (Spring 2011, Issues in Science and Technology Online, “John F. Kennedy’s Space Legacy and Its Lessons for Today,” )RK
No one aware of today’s government deficits and the overall economic situation can suggest that the United States in 2011 commit the type of financial support to future space efforts that Kennedy made available to carry out Apollo. Kennedy made and sustained his commitment to developing the capabilities needed to reach the Moon before the Soviet Union because doing so was clearly linked to enhancing U.S. global power and national pride in the Cold War setting of the 1960s. Today, there most certainly is no pressing national security question, the answer to which for which the answer is “go to an asteroid,” or indeed anywhere else beyond Earth orbit. Space exploration is now a discretionary activity, not a national imperative. This country’s leaders need to decide, under very difficult circumstances, whether their image of the U.S. future includes continued leadership in space exploration, and then make the even harder choice to provide on a continuing basis resources adequate to achieving that leading position.
What faces the country today with respect to the future in space is in many ways a more challenging decision than that which faced Kennedy a half-century ago. In his final months in the White House, Kennedy was prescient enough to discern one path toward a sustainable space future: making space exploration a cooperative global undertaking. In the September 1963 UN speech, Kennedy observed that “Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts … of all the world cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending some day … to the Moon not representatives of a single nation, but representatives of all our countries.” That admonition remains relevant today.
A Moon race kills U.S. dominance in space exploration
Chow 1/13/ 11 – staff writer (Denise Chow, “ The Case Against the Moon: Why We Shouldn't Go Straight Back”, , DH)
***Note --- Buzz Aldrin was the lunar module pilot on the Apollo 11 mission and second man to walk on the moon
Maintaining a reputation of leadership
In addition to his concern that sending more Americans to the moon would tie up resources that could be used to develop Mars-bound technology, Aldrin said engaging in another moon race would jeopardize the legacy of U.S. dominance in space exploration.
"Manned missions to the moon should carefully consider U.S. leadership in space as we expand human presence outward into the solar system," Aldrin said. "If we go back to the moon and get there second or third, that is not U.S. leadership.
Activities going back to the moon should be led by the U.S. – but not at the expense of leading the world in space and expansion outward."
Arguments for human exploration of the Red Planet are no less politically charged.
"Given courageous leadership, we could be on Mars by 2020. That should be our goal," Zubrin said. "To say we cannot do it is to say we have become less than the kind of people we used to be, and that is something this country cannot accept and cannot afford."
China’s space program is peaceful and doesn’t have the capability to put humans on the moon
Day, 7 (11/12/07, Dwayne A., The Space Review, “Exploding Moon myths: or why there’s no race to our nearest neighbor,” , JMP)
China is more complicated, however.
As Jim Oberg, a well-known and longtime observer of the Soviet and Russian space programs has noted, today we know far more publically about what the Chinese space plans are than we ever did about what the Soviet plans were during the Cold War. The Chinese release photographs and video of their spacecraft, talk about them at conferences and special events (see “China, competition, and cooperation”, The Space Review, April 10, 2006), and even produce PowerPoint slides on their future plans. They have made clear that their lunar robotic plans include an orbiter in 2007, a soft landing in 2012, and lunar sample return in 2017. Their human plans are slightly more obscure, but Chinese officials have stated that their goal is to conduct a spacewalk in 2008, a rendezvous perhaps by 2010, followed eventually by a small space station by 2015. They have also stated that they have no plans for landing humans on the Moon in the next decade, but might begin thinking about it only after they have conducted a sample return mission by 2017.
After Chang’e was launched, Chinese officials were even more blunt. In its November 5 issue Aviation Week & Space Technology quoted several Chinese space officials emphatically denying that they have any manned lunar plans, and all noting that China lacks the technology or the expertise to undertake such a mission. This was borne out by a peculiar observation made by a lot of people at the recent IAF conference in India: virtually no Chinese space officials showed up despite the fact that China is located right next door to India. When one of the few who did show was queried about it, he said that virtually everybody was involved with the Chang’e launch and could not attend. Certainly the launch was important to China, but so is showing off to the rest of the world at space conferences, and their lack of attendance is consistent with what the officials told Aviation Week: the Chinese simply don’t have the depth of technical experience to do much more than they are doing already.
Of course, they could be lying. But why should they? Or more precisely, why should they tell the truth about the rest of their civil space program and lie about this? Chinese officials prefer secrecy and obfuscation to baldfaced lies. They keep their military space plans secret, but they talk about their space exploration efforts quite a lot. And so far their statements concerning space exploration have been consistent with their actions, so allegations of deception require a higher standard of proof than simply a gut instinct.
Furthermore, there’s been no indication that they are lying about their lunar plans. High resolution commercial reconnaissance satellites overfly China every day. Where’s the evidence of Chinese construction of lunar rocket launch facilities, or the kinds of test facilities they will require for a lunar lander? All of the media reports that China is planning on sending humans to the Moon are based upon flimsy evidence that, when traced back to its source, quickly falls apart due to poor translation or misunderstanding of Chinese comments. For example, several years ago it was common for media sources—Agence France Press was the worst—to assume that Chinese discussions of plans for “lunar sample return” in 2017 meant “human lunar landing” in 2017. They didn’t. Members of the media claiming that
China has plans for sending humans to the Moon need better evidence than their own sloppy past articles.
--- XT: No Moon Race
No race – recent activity has been cooperative and aimed towards knowledge not control
David, 06 – senior space writer for (4/26/06, Leonard, , “Moon Race: U.S. Not Alone in Future Lunar Exploration,” )RK
An unprecedented salvo of international probes will soon shoot for the Moon, all equipped to signal that a new era of lunar exploration has begun.
If schedules hold, spacecraft from India, China and Japan will be moonbound before NASA's own Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter swings into action in 2008. Already on duty, the European Space Agency's SMART-1 is wrapping up its survey work.
In the past, having the independent wherewithal to toss a satellite into Earth orbit was a form of space status.
That's passe. Times have changed. Now the Moon is where the action is.
Great good fortune
"I find it both gratifying and exciting." said Paul Spudis, a space scientist at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel, Maryland.
Most countries are flying these lunar missions to "get their feet wet" in planetary exploration, Spudis suggested, with the Moon being close and relatively easy to get to and operate around. "So that happenstance is great good fortune for lunar science," he said.
These new data are important to quantitatively analyze the nature and state of potential resources on the Moon, viewed by Spudis as "a critical enabler to permanent human presence."
Spudis said that a load of new, high-quality data about the Moon is in the offing. Earth's next door neighbor will be globally mapped with a variety of sensors, including looks at it in wavelengths never before seen from orbit.
For instance, a U.S.-built imaging radar will be flown on India's Chandrayaan-1. This APL/U.S. Navy radar experiment will map the scattering properties of the lunar poles, determining the presence and extent of polar ice there, possibly tucked away in sunlight-shy craters.
Multi-nation payload
India's Chandrayaan-1 is planned for launch in late 2007-08 from the Satish Dhawan Space Center atop that country's Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle-XL. The satellite will be placed in orbit around the Moon and have a lifetime of two years.
Indian scientists and engineers have also designed a deep space antenna system for the country's first spacecraft to Moon. The antenna is scheduled to be erected at a site near Bangalore in Karnataka by end of 2006. When completed, the antenna and related equipment are to represent a world class facility for deep space tracking applications.
Payloads for India's lunar orbiter are being supplied by Indian experimenters, as well as from the European Space Agency (ESA), Bulgaria, and the United States. Also, a moon impact probe--which is conceived as a technology forerunner for a future lunar landing mission--is being incorporated.
The impactor would carry a high sensitive mass spectrometer, a video camera and a radar altimeter. This device will be released at the beginning of the mission, destined to hit within a predetermined location on the lunar surface. Apart from the video imaging of the landing site, the onboard mass spectrometer will try to detect possible presence of trace gases in the lunar exosphere.
Technology demonstration
Carle Pieters of the Department of Geological Sciences at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island is the principal investigator for the Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M3) outfitted on Chandrayaan-1. This state-of-the-art imaging spectrometer is provided by NASA/JPL to map the mineral composition of the lunar surface.
Pieters is enthusiastic about how the international lunar exploration initiative is proceeding.
Although science data has been slow coming out of ESA's SMART-1, "that little mission has kept the Moon in everyone's thoughts," Pieters told . "It has certainly accomplished what it set out to do ... namely, a successful initial technology demonstration at the Moon for ESA."
SMART-1 is headed for a controlled impact on the lunar surface in early September.
Healthy cross-calibration
Pieters said that everyone expects the serious remote sensing missions to begin within about a year, starting with Japan's SELenological and ENgineering Explorer (SELENE).
India and China will follow. It is too early to know, Pieters noted, whether Chandrayaan-1 or China's Chang'e I will launch first. The U.S. Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) will be the fourth in the group, she said, now eyed for launch in late 2008.
"Each of these missions brings its own strength and there is sufficient overlap among instruments to allow healthy cross-calibration," Pieters advised. "Lunar science and exploration will finally have the foundation it needs as 10s...100s of terrabytes of data are returned from all of these missions over the next five years!"
Each of the participating nations should and will take pride in their lunar success, Pieters said.
"After the first blush of data return--and it has been determined whether water exists at the poles from multiple sources--more serious results will take years to harvest. Here's where the actual competition begins. Those countries that invest most seriously in data analysis will be the real winners," Pieters emphasized.
First step
China's bid to become an explorer of the Moon is tied to Chang'e I, a lunar orbiter being prepared for launch next year. According to Luo Ge, deputy director of the China National Space Administration during a recent visit to the United States, Chang'e I is the first step in an ambitious Moon program.
Luo stated that China also intends to land a rover on the Moon's surface by 2012, followed by a robotic lunar sample return mission in 2017.
Chang'e I would roar skyward from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Southwest China's Sichuan Province. The Chinese lunar probe is based on the country's Dongfanghong III satellite platform.
China's premier lunar mission will obtain three-dimensional images of the Moon's surface and analyze the content and distribution of useful elements there.
Ye Peijian, identified as the chief designer of the country's first lunar orbiter, has been quoted in Chinese press reports that research and development of Chang'e I is moving forward smoothly. To be sent aloft by a Long March 3A rocket, the lunar orbiter is outfitted to perform a one-year mission mapping the moon's surface.
Chang'e I reportedly will carry a stereo camera system to chart the lunar surface, an altimeter to measure the distance between the spacecraft and the lunar surface, a gamma/X-ray spectrometer to study the overall composition and radioactive components of the Moon, a microwave radiometer to map the thickness of the lunar regolith, and a system of space environment monitors to collect data on the solar wind and near-lunar region.
Space movies
The SELENE robotic mission to the Moon is tagged by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) as the largest lunar mission since the Apollo program.
As JAXA's first large lunar explorer, SELENE will be dispatched from Japan's Tanagashima launch site via the H-IIA rocket in the summer of 2007, nominally in August.
SELENE consists of a main orbiter and two small sub-satellites that are released in lunar orbit. Nominal observation of the Moon for one year will start after instrument performance checks that span some two months.
Making use of 14 science instruments onboard the SELENE satellite, the entire Moon will be surveyed for information on its elemental and mineralogical composition, its geography, its surface and sub-surface structure, the remnant of its magnetic field, and its gravity field.
Also being hauled to the Moon is a high definition television camera developed by NHK, tasked to image the Earth observed from the Moon and of the lunar surface. SELENE is to relay "space movies" such as the rising Earth on the lunar horizon.
Bee-hive of activity
If indeed the launchings of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese lunar probes are successful, the serene Moon will become a bee-hive of activity. Joining in on the action is NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO).
NASA's Robotic Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP) has been formulated in response to the President George W. Bush's Vision for Space Exploration. RLEP will execute a series of robotic missions that will pave the way for eventual permanent human presence on the Moon.
LRO is first in this series of RLEP missions. Current plans call for its launch in October 2008 and is designed for at least one year of operation. Set to launch with LRO is the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) a bare-bones suicide probe that utilizes cameras and spectrometers to witness its rocket booster's upper stage slam into hydrogen-rich Shackleton Crater before plowing into the lunar landscape itself.
Filling in missing details
With all the robotic traffic hauling all that scientific gear to neighboring Luna over the next few years, could the Moon become, well, over-exposed?
"They are more complimentary than they are doubling-up," said Ben Bussey, a lunar expert at APL in Laurel, Maryland. Schedule slips, technical problems, data availability, even launch failures--there's no control over these, he said.
"So, yes, maybe we end up with lots of pictures of the same place from different missions. But I think that's better than getting none at all," Bussey told .
There's also a central thing to remember, said James Head, professor of planetary geosciences at Brown University.
Even with the Apollo lunar samples trucked back from the Moon by astronauts long ago, the armada of robotic spacecraft being readied to rocket there now will be critical to filling in missing details, Head said.
"This new wave of spacecraft will be yielding tons of detail ... a baseline for grasping how other planets work," Head said. "The Moon is a keystone to that understanding."
--- XT: No Asian Space Race
No Asian space race
Day, 7 (11/12/07, Dwayne A., The Space Review, “Exploding Moon myths: or why there’s no race to our nearest neighbor,” , JMP)
An “Asian space race”
Of course, three of these countries are Asian, leading many in the press to talk about an “Asian space race,” even if they have no data to back it up. There is no Asian space race, and just because three Asian countries are sending missions to the Moon does not mean that they are racing each other there.
Japan first launched a lunar mission in 1990. That mission had a string of bad luck. An Earth-orbiting satellite named Hiten deployed a small spacecraft named Hagoromo, which failed to reach lunar orbit. The Japanese then sent Hiten on a slow trip to the Moon, but it lacked sophisticated instruments or an imager, and has been largely forgotten. Throughout the 1990s the Japanese space agency worked on a more sophisticated follow-on spacecraft called Lunar-A, which suffered from numerous managerial and technical problems and was finally canceled early this year. Had Lunar-A not run into problems, then Japan’s lunar program would have appeared much more methodical, with regular, if infrequent, lunar probes starting seventeen years ago. Instead, the press has misinterpreted Japan’s long, if low-key, interest in the Moon as a reaction to China.
Similarly, the fact that China and India have lunar spacecraft does not represent a race between them, but the fact that their economies and technical capabilities are recently emerging. Their respective governments want to demonstrate to their own people, and also the rest of the world, that they have sophisticated capabilities, “technonationalism,” to borrow a phrase from space analyst Joan Johnson-Freese. But they’re not “racing” each other, and there is every indication that they would be pursuing the same policy even if their Asian counterpart was not.
AT: Leadership Adv --- Rare Earth Internal Link
No Impact to china monopoly
Defense News, 9 (9/21/2011 “China's Mineral Monopoly” , bs)
For now, China and the United States remain close trading partners and enjoy a symbiotic economic relationship. And should relations sour, it's not guaranteed vital trade would collapse. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union mutually benefited from trade ranging from agriculture to strategic materials.
New domestic mines solve Chinese monopoly rare earth elements
Bourzac, 10 (12/22/10, Katherine, Technology Review, “US Undermining China's Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements,” , JMP)
Full operations will start at a U.S. mine by the end of next year.
Molycorp has secured the permits and funding needed to restart production at a mine in Mountain Pass, California, that would become the first U.S. source of rare earth elements in more than a decade. The mine is one of the world's richest deposits of these elements, which are critical for making components found in a wide range of technologies. On Tuesday, the company announced that it will partner with Hitachi Metals of Japan to turn materials from the mine into high-strength magnets, which are vital in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and many other products.
China currently has a lock on the market for rare earth materials: in 2009 it provided 95 percent of the world's supply, or 120,000 tons. This concentration of supply has become a major issue in recent months, particularly after China temporarily blocked exports of these materials to Japan in September. A Critical Materials Strategy document issued by the U.S. Department of Energy last week points to the "risk of supply disruption" in the short term. Worldwide demand for rare earth elements was 125,000 tons in 2010 and is expected to rise to 225,000 tons by 2015.
The mine is a 50-acre open pit about 50 miles outside Las Vegas, surrounded by a stark landscape of red-brown mountains, Joshua trees, and the occasional cactus. Molycorp has begun draining groundwater that seeps into the bottom of the pit and removing areas of rock called "overburden" to expose a layer of bastnäsite, a mineral rich in rare earth elements. Expansion of operations will push the mine from a depth of 500 feet to 1,000 feet in the coming years.
By 2012, the revamped U.S. mine is expected to produce around 20,000 tons of rare earth materials per year. Molycorp plans to use new processing techniques that it claims are more environmentally friendly and less expensive than conventional methods.
The Mountain Pass mine used to be the world's biggest supplier of rare earth elements, but it closed in 2004, after a 1998 wastewater leak and the arrival of Chinese suppliers that offered lower prices. (One reason for the lower prices is that nearly half the rare earths produced in China are made as a by-product of iron mining.)
Molycorp expects to sell about 3,000 tons of rare earths this year, produced from ore stockpiled before the mine was closed. It is also gearing up for active mining, with financial support from an initial public offering this summer and recent investment from Japanese firm Sumimoto.
The company's total projected production could meet the current demand for rare earths in the United States. Molycorp has not disclosed who its customers will be, but CEO Mark Smith said on a tour of the mine last week that it has inked contracts to sell 25 percent of the 20,000 tons of material it expects to produce during the first year of full-scale operations, in 2012, and has letters of intent to sell the rest. "We're focused on the U.S., Japanese, and European markets," he said.
Under current permits, the company could potentially double production, to 40,000 tons a year, beyond 2012. Smith says demand is likely to exceed supply for some years to come, even if Lynas Corporation's Mount Weld mine outside Perth, Australia, begins production as expected in summer 2011. That company expects to produce 15,000 tons of rare earth elements a year by 2015.
Chinese monopoly on REE will disappear
PRC Ministry of Commerce, 6/16 (China Business News, “Rare-Earth Supplies Expected to Grow,” 6/16/11, Factiva, JMP)
Beijing, June 16 -- Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China issued the following news release:
The world's supply of rare-earth minerals will outstrip demand within five years, reversing global reliance on China's exports as more foreign players begin exploration of their own, industrial executives said.
The soaring price of rare earths will also trigger global players to cash in on the valuable minerals.
More countries with large rare-earth deposits will resume exploration after freezing it for years, which will lead to a global reallocation of the minerals, Wang Hongqian, general manager of China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Foreign Engineering and Construction Co Ltd (NFC), told China Daily.
Consequently, "the current tight-supply situation will not last," Wang said. The State-owned NFC has tapped into Guangdong province, the mid-heavy rare-earth-rich region, by teaming up with local firms.
NFC Southern Rare Earth (Xinfeng) Co, in which NFC owns 76 percent equity, received authorities' approval in May to build the world's biggest ion-type rare-earth separation project, with an annual capacity of 7,000 tons.
Rare earth is the collective name for 17 metallic elements, of which the mid-heavy types are the most valuable because of their wide uses. The metals are needed for some advanced technologies, such as smart phones, hybrid cars and missiles.
China, which supplies more than 90 percent of the minerals, adopted strict exploration and export regulations after rampant exploration caused heavy environmental pollution.
Although it is the world's top rare-earth supplier, China controls only about 36 percent of the world's deposits. Countries with large reserves, such as the United States and Australia, have yet to unfreeze exploration of the minerals.
Mining REEs is impossible – knowledge, economic and geographical barriers
Beauford, 11 – background is in archaeology, geology, and business (2/13/11, Robert, “Mining the Moon for Rare Earth Elements - Is It Really Possible?” , bs)
So, in answer to the question: Can we profitably mine the moon for REEs and ship them back to the earth to sell? No. Rare earth oxide concentrations in known lunar ores do not support it, even at the level of conjecture, and our current understanding of lunar geology does not predict the existence of substantially more enriched ore deposits. Lack of sufficiently enriched ore, however, is not the only challenge to lunar mining for export to earth. (This is an understatement of epic proportions.) Keeping the analysis, for the moment, focused on basic mining issues rather than on the challenges facing planetary colonization, it must also be observed that competitively economical transport of marketable quantities of either ore or refined metals across planetary distances is neither available with current technology, nor on the mid-term technological horizon. Imagine transporting thousands of tons of ore output from a remote mine in Canada to a processing facility in Brazil in the small passenger seat of a fighter jet, one of the least fuel efficient aircraft ever invented, while trying to maintain profitability in the mine. Now multiply that by a factor of 100,000.
--- XT: Domestic Mines Solve
Domestic mine solves dependence and undermines the Chinese monopoly
Grasso, 11 – Specialist in Defense Acquisition (3/31/2011, Valerie, “Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress” , bs)
A series of events and press reports over the last few months have highlighted the rare earth “crisis,” as some refer to it. Policymakers are concerned with the nearly total U.S. dependence on China for rare earth elements, including oxides, phosphors, metals, alloys, and magnets, and its implications for U.S. national security. The criticality and reliability of the rare earth element supply chain cuts across the manufacturing, defense, and science and technology sectors of the global economy. Some Members of Congress support development of a domestic source for rare earth elements. They view a reliable domestic supply chain as critical to maintaining existing and acquiring new defense weapons systems. Other policymakers see the existence of alternative sources for rare earth elements outside of China as a possible solution to mitigate a lack of domestic mining and manufacturing capability.
Yet the “crisis” for many policymakers is not that China has cut its rare earth exports and appears to be restricting the world’s access to rare earths, but that the United States has lost its domestic capacity to produce strategic and critical materials. The Department of Defense (DOD) is examining whether there is a supply chain vulnerability issue. DOD estimates that the United States uses about 5% of the world’s production of rare earths for defense purposes. Congress awaits the release of the overdue assessment by DOD of the rare earth supply chain. In addition to the previously required DOD assessment, Congress has also mandated that the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (P.L. 111-383), conduct a new assessment of the rare earth supply chain issues and develop a plan to address any supply chain vulnerabilities.
Reopening of domestic mine will solve dependence on China --- without any safety risk
Sutter 11 – Writes for Cnn (3/9/2011,Jacob,“The race to make the world's strongest magnet”
China has become the world leader in rare earth mining and production in part because it's more willing to put up with these risks than the United States, which faced them head-on in the 1990s. A rare earth mine now owned by Molycorp Minerals was fined in 1998 for leaking hundreds of thousands of gallons of wastewater containing low levels of radioactive material.
Molycorp's mine in the California desert, near the Nevada border, is set to reopen this year. A U.S. Department of Energy report from December says the country needs to ramp up its rare earth production in order to ensure that technology companies here maintain a supply of these vital elements.
A spokesman for Molycorp, Jim Sims, said the reopened mine and upgraded processing center will put the U.S. back in the rare earth business -- and will do so safely.
"America will have the most environmentally progressive and technologically advanced rare earth processing capability," Sims said.
Starting a rare earth element mine is an expensive, long and arduous task, however. The elements aren't especially rare in nature, but they're usually found in relatively small quantities, mixed in with other materials, which makes them both difficult and somewhat uneconomical to mine and process.
Consequently, the Department of Energy also says we should look for alternatives. And that's where the magnet researchers come in.
Local mines are sufficient to solve
Buisiness journal 11 (6/16/11, Molycorp raises funds for $781 million Mountain Pass expansion )
Rare-earths company Molycorp Inc.said Thursday that after raising $230 million in a debt offering, it has now raised sufficient funds for its planned $781 million expansion and modernization project at its Mountain Pass mining and processing site in California.
The latest offering was of 3.25 percent convertible senior notes due in 2016.
Molycorp is the largest U.S. producer of rare earth minerals, which are used in electronics and other products. The vast majority of rare earths come from China.
Its Mountain Pass mine — the only rare earth mine in the Western Hemisphere — was shut in the 1990s. The company restarted mining operations last December and plans an expansion project it calls Project Phoenix.
“Beginning next year, we expect to significantly ramp up production of 10 different high-purity rare earth oxides — light and heavy rare earths — as well as a variety of rare earth metals, alloys, and permanent rare earth magnets,” CEO Mark Smith said in a statement. “We also remain on track to emerge as the world’s lowest-cost manufacturer of rare earth oxides, which will be a particularly powerful growth driver for our downstream manufacturing operations.”
Molycorp went public in July 2010, and has seen its stock price more than quadruple since then.
Developing new mines solves
Kosich 11 – American Security Project ( 2/2/2011, Dorothy, “U.S. security think tank urges Feds to get moving on rare earths strategy” )
The American Security Project recommends the U.S. immediately stockpile rare earths, noting that Japan and South Korea already have strategic REE stockpiles. China will also begin stockpiling rare earths this year. “Even in the U.S., such stockpiles are not unprecedented,” Coppel said, adding that the U.S. used to stock rare earth metals in its National Defense Stockpile but sold them by 1998.
The project also recommends that new mines be developed. “There are several places where mining would be a worthwhile venture, including Thor Lake in Canada, which possibly contains one of the world’s largest deposits of rare earth metals.”
“Experts believe that North American mines alone could produce as much as 40,000 metric tons of rare earth metals per year, or double what the U.S. currently uses,” the report observed. “If the U.S. could develop these mines, it would have sufficient rare earths to supply its domestic needs, as well as enough to satisfy future growth in demand.”
The report also advocates international cooperative and dialogue should go a long way towards alleviating the shortage of rare earth metals. American Security Project noted the Pentagon has advocated greater cooperation among the governments, mine operators, and magnet producers who use rare earth metals.
The organization also called on the U.S. government to file a case against China in the World Trade Organization to prevent China from using illegal export quotas and manipulating the rare earths market.
Rare earth metals substitutes should also be developed by the U.S. although current research is being hampered by the lack of resources being invested in R&D. Meanwhile the Chinese government has spent millions on rare earth metal research and development.
“Developing new technologies that increase the efficiency of rare earth metals and that allow for better recycling of rare earths is another way for the U.S. to decrease its dependence on China,” the organization advised. American Security Project noted the U.S. Department of Energy is currently working on new recycling techniques for rare earths, which could “significantly lower world demand for newly extracted materials.”
The American Security Project Board of Directors includes U.S. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, several former U.S. senators, retired U.S. generals and admirals, and former U.S. governors. It is chaired by former U.S. presidential candidate and Senator Gary Hart of Colorado.
--- XT: Can’t Mine REEs on the Moon
No solvency – mining is impossible
Beauford, 11 – background is in archaeology, geology, and business (2/13/11, Robert, “Mining the Moon for Rare Earth Elements - Is It Really Possible?” , bs)
The moon is a very different place form the earth in a lot of ways. The moons gravity is about 1/6th of earth, the temperature can reach below negative 200° Celsius during the two week lunar night, there is no significant available water, the surface atmospheric pressure approaches that of the near absolute vacuum of space, the radiation environment is extreme due to the suns direct intense rays, and could be lethal in a solar storm, and micrometeorites bombard the surface at 15 kilometers per second or more at unpredictable intervals. The moon is not a hospitable place.
In addition to the extreme physical differences in potential mining environments on the moon’s surface compared to the surface of earth, there are also important geological differences to consider.
Ores are concentrations of minerals that contain profitably mineable quantities of desirable elements. Whether on Earth or on the Moon, ores form by the sorting of elements through geological processes. These typically include surface weathering, the action of hot (hydrothermal) subsurface water, or sorting by igneous processes called partial melting and fractional crystallization. ‘Igneous processes’ means any natural process that results from the melting and cooling of rocks. On the moon, the first two of these mechanisms can be eliminated. There is no water and no atmosphere, so there is no weathering. The only significant ongoing processes that are currently affecting the Moon’s surface are irradiation by the sun and bombardment by meteorites. And though there may have been small scale changes in the Moon’s rocks due to the action of subsurface water in the Moon’s early history, such action was never appreciable, due to the lack of surface water and of any continents or continental motion. Without going into too much detail, this means that any ores found on the moon must be formed by only one of the three primary mechanisms: igneous sorting processes.
The moon is about 4.5 billion years old, and for much of that time, it has been a relatively static and unchanging environment. Its igneous history is brief and limited. We thought, until very recently, that the moon’s outer layers had been frozen in a solid state for almost 4 billion years. We now suspect that limited volcanism continued on the moon until about two billion years ago. This is a brief time when compared against the geological environment of the earth, which still has pervasive volcanism and constant ongoing motion within the crust, mantle and core of the planet.
Mining is not economically feasible
Whittington 11 - author of The Last Moonwalker, Children of Apollo and Nocturne. He has written numerous articles, some for the Washington Post, USA Today, the LA Times, and the Houston Chronicle ( 4/11/2011, Mark, “Moon Express Proposes Lunar Mining Operations” , bs
No one has been on the moon since 1972. The last human-made object to soft land on the lunar surface was a Soviet built rover in the mid-1970s. U.S. President Barack Obama has specifically ruled out the moon as a destination for Americans.
All of that has not daunted Moon Express Inc., a Silicon Valley startup that intends to send rovers to prospect for metals and rare Earth minerals on the lunar surface. Moon Express has already gotten a $10 million NASA data purchase contract. In addition, the company is an entrant in the $30 million Google Lunar X-Prize. The Lunar X-Prize would dole out money to the first private group that lands an instrument package on the lunar surface, have it explore within a third of a mile of the landing site and return high definition images and video.
While Moon Express is somewhat vague about what it would do with lunar resources once they are found, the company and its founders cannot be faulted for not dreaming big, Mining the Moon, to support a settlement and to support further exploration throughout the solar system, as well as to benefit Earth has been a dream held by space enthusiasts for decades. Moon Express constitutes an attempt to translate this dream into reality.
One of the impediments to large scale mining of the moon's resources is the high cost of returning them to Earth. If practical fusion energy were to become a reality, helium 3, a substance that does not occur naturally on Earth, might be worth it at current transportation costs. But even rare earths may not achieve a cost/benefit ratio that would make mining it on the Moon profitable.
Another impediment is the lack of law governing property rights on other celestial bodies such as the moon. There is nothing in international law that forbids a private company from extracting resources from the moon. But the law is silent, so far, on rights to hold property, including land and mineral rights, on the moon. There is no mechanism to resolve disputes between private companies, such as overmining claims.
For large-scale lunar mining to take place, these questions need to be resolved by international agreement. It would also be useful to have a human presence on the moon, in the form of a lunar settlement, to be a core market for lunar mining entrepreneurs. If that settlement is to be American, a change of policy and likely a change of administration would be required.
--- XT: SQ Solves Chinese Monopoly
Other countries besides China will increasingly supply of REE
PRC Ministry of Commerce, 6/16 (China Business News, “Rare-Earth Supplies Expected to Grow,” 6/16/11, Factiva, JMP)
"More countries participating in the exploration of their own supply of rare earths will help ease the tight-supply situation and ease demand," said Chen Zhanheng, director of academic department, the Chinese Society of Rare Earths (CSRE).
According to the association, China produced 118,900 tons of rare-earth minerals in 2010, more than 30 percent higher than its planned quota.
Chen said that China's export quota will be slashed to about 30,000 tons annually in the coming years, after reaching about 35,000 tons in 2010.
According to announced production targets in other countries, a total of 60,000 tons of rare earths will be produced outside China by 2013 and 170,000 tons by 2015.
Overseas demand for rare earths has stood at an average of 50,000 tons annually in the past few years, Chen said. "Global supply of the minerals, particularly the light-type, which exists in abundant deposits overseas, will soon surpass demand, despite China's curbs on the metals," Chen said.
In addition, more profit-driven players will join in the resurgence of exploration as rare-earth prices keep surging to new heights.
The price of neodymium oxide, a type of rare earth mined mostly in China, has more than doubled since early this year to around 820,000 yuan a ton. The price is more than 11 times higher than that in December 2008.
"The surging prices, based on the anticipation of more stringent policies limiting exploration and production of rare earths in China, magnified the actual supply crunch," said Liu Minda, a non-ferrous metals analyst from a brokerage house based in Jiangsu province.
The industry will attract more profit-driven participants and eventually reverse the current tight supply, NFC's Wang said.
Apart from the domestic market, NFC will expand its overseas growth in natural resources by focusing on West Asia, North Asia, and other neighboring countries of China during the 12th Five-Year Plan period (2011-2015), Wang said.
Australia India and Vietnam will counterbalance China’s monopoly
Kovacs, 11 (Bill, “Rare Earth Elements and Our Clean Energy Future” , bs)
But China’s rare earth dominance may be shifting. Australia, India, and Vietnam are exploring their supplies. Here in the U.S., Molycorp, a Colorado-based manufacturer of rare earths, is boosting production. At present, the company produces about 3% of the world’s rare earths, with plans to produce a quarter of the total supply. Molycorp is now cleaning up the Mountain Pass Mine in San Bernadino County, California. To make the process more environmentally friendly, the LA Times reports that the company is “implementing a water recycling program, constructing an on-site natural gas power plant, and planning to work the tailings back into the surrounding landscape.”
AT: Leadership Adv --- Tech / STEM Internal Link
Spin off tech isn’t worth it
Cockell 7— Professor of Geomicrobiology with the Open University (Charles, “Space on Earth: Saving our world by seeking others”, 2007, OCRed, ZBurdette)
An argument for the settlement of space is that by spending large sums of money building space programmes, private or government, we create technologies of use to people on Earth. These spin-off technologies find their way into our homes and are of tremendous benefit to people. One of the most famous examples is scratch-resistant glass. Orginally developed to protect the visors of space helmets from the harsh conditions of space and lunar dust, scratch-resistant glass. Originally developed to protect the visors of space helmets from the harsh conditions of space and lunar dust, scratch-resistant coatings are now standard on fashionable sunglasses.
I am not particularly enthusiastic about this line of reasoning. Instead of putting $25 billion going to the Moon, it would be better to just spend one or two million dollars paying someone to make some scratch-resistant glass, if that is what you need. One could argue that many of these technologies are unexpected, and could never have been predicted prior to the space program. Thus it was useful that we did go to the Moon so that these technologies emerged.
This argument is specious. It is akin to saying that we should spend $25 billion building a giant model mackerel. In the process we will undoubtedly learn new construction methods; perhaps in the process of building scale models of mackerel we will learn new modeling techniques and we may even learn something unexpected about fish hypodynamics. But this does not support sending vast sums of money building giant mackerel. In almost any project, whatever that may be, if you spend billions you will learn something new. Similarly, spin-off technologies are not a good reason for the exploration and settlement of space.
Status quo solves STEM interest
Farmer, 9 (January 2009, Tom, Techniques, “A STEM Brainstorm at NASA,” Vol. 84, Iss. 1, mat)
"I WANNA BE AN ASTRONAUT WHEN » GROW UP" was a common refrain from children in the 1970s, 80s and 90s, and it might have given the U.S. space program leaders a false sense of security that an endless line of wellqualified workers would be waiting outside their door for years to come. The reality has been that not enough students have chosen science, technology, engineering or math (STEM) tracks in college, so it's more difficult to find the necessary engineers, chemists, programmers and pilots required to propel the space program to new heights.
However, there's good news. NASA is now well aware of the problem and has begun taking steps to remedy the situation. In conjunction with the October 2007 launching of Space Shuttle Discovery, NASA hosted an educational forum titled "Attracting Top-Performing Students to STEM Education Programs and Careers."
Fifty leading educators, students and corporate officials from across the United States were brought together for the event, including executives from Yahoo and eBay and educators from Stanford, MIT, Purdue and other universities. The goal was to discuss strategies to inspire future generations of explorers and innovators. Noted engineering advocate and author Celeste Baine also participated in the event. Since she was a child, she had viewed space exploration as somewhat of a mystery.
"It didn't seem real," Baine said. "I watched launches and it was interesting, but I never had enough information about it. I thought you had to be an aerospace engineer. Now, I see they're hiring biomedical engineers, mechanical engineers, industrial engineers. There are thousands and thousands of engineers working for NASA." Baine is personally addressing one of the most glaring needs by writing a NASA career guide, and she plans to incorporate more references to NASA in her "Engineers Can Do Anything" presentation and other educational programs she presents in schools across the country.
NASA Experience
The day before the forum, participants enjoyed a tour of Kennedy Space Center and the International Space Station exhibit in Florida. Equivalent in size to three football fields, the space station is composed of nodes, some of which Baine found fascinating in the exhibit. "I was thinking how interesting it would be to be an engineer who develops these things for a weightless environment. You could put controls on the ceiling, put things everywhere," she said. "Even the beds were vertical. Astronauts have to be strapped in to sleep." Another thought occurred to Baine as she toured the facilities and the launch pad.
"What blew my mind is that this technology was available back in the 60s. Why haven't we done more with it?" she said. "We had people walking on the moon so long ago, and we haven't come too far since then. Think of all that we can accomplish today with so many advances in technology!"
Educational Forum on STEM
NASA has its own education department and offers programs and materials for teachers, but career information is scarce, Baine says. "There are bookmarks for engineering, but it's not anything that's compelling. You've got to make students feel like they could be a part of it."
Forum members divided into groups and brainstormed ways top students could be persuaded to choose STEM-related careers. Among the ideas were summer programs and camps, competitions, more career strands, student tours of NASA sites, astronauts in the classroom, and better videos touting careers.
"I remember being stunned by what the kids had to say," Baine noted. "They gave a different perspective. A girl talked about how she was interested in space and had gotten to the point where she was making her teacher mad because she knew so much more than the teacher about living in a weightless environment. She really needed a mentor and couldn't find anyone to help her go to the next level."
In the future
NASA isn't the only entity noticing students' lack of interest in STEM careers. Baine says 38 states are considering adding engineering to their education standards, just as a few other states already have done. "I'm so happy to see that it's happening," she said. "Six states have been on board for quite some time." Another way to get students interested in careers at NASA is to show them firsthand what's involved. "They should find more ways to give high school kids internships at NASA, have students work with the space program," Baine said. "We need students more involved at a younger age."
And more attention must be focused on top students - the cream of the crop. "How do we nurture them? That's a big question. The school systems tend to teach to the middle," Baine said.
Forum leaders planned to compile the group's findings, issue a report, and remain in contact with participants to keep ideas flowing for ways to stimulate student interest in STEM.
--- XT: No Tech Spin Off
Not key to the economy – no profitable resources, and only a small impact of workforce
Mindell et. al, 08 – David A., Director of the Program in Science, and director of the Space, Policy, and Society Research Group at MIT (December 2008, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Future of Human Spaceflight,” )RK
Another argument frames human spaceflight as a jobs program, employing tens of thousands of people on the ground. The Shuttle program, for example, employs over 2,000 civil servants and 15,000 work year equivalents for contractors. But again, few argue that human spaceflight is the only, or even the optimal way to invest in a technically talented workforce.
There are presently no known natural resources in space that can be profitably exploited. Even were such resources and an efficient extraction scheme to be discovered, it is unlikely that human presence would be required. Human presence will always be more expensive than remote operations, so any genuine space-based extractive business is likely to be heavily based on remote presence. Therefore technology and economic development are secondary objectives of human spaceflight.
--- Can’t Solve / STEM Inevitable
New programs don’t generate interest and STEM is inevitable – debate proves
Spudis, 5/14/11 – Paul D., Senior Staff Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute (The Once and Future Moon Blog, Smithsonian Air and Space Blog, “Young Visitors Inspire Old Scientist,” )RK
A perennial hand-wringing topic among policy geeks is America’s decline in math and science proficiency. This sentiment has been expressed the entire 30 years I’ve worked on space science and exploration – new generations don’t care about space, can’t do math and science, can’t think properly and the country’s going to hell in a hand basket. Complaint about the decline in our ability is something passed from one generation to the next. Today’s youth are being corrupted by iPods, Facebook and hip-hop; when I was a kid, it was Frisbees, MAD magazine and the Beatles.
There is a continuous stream of doom-laden reports outlining the decline of American youth in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math (called STEM). In this country, most Ph.D.s in science and technology are now foreign-born (these reports don’t mention that most often, they stay here, adding to our technical knowledge base). Multiple factors are suggested as contributors to this decline, with the lack of an inspiring, exciting space program long believed to be important by many advocates. This meme, of long currency in space policy circles, has some flaws.
Origins of the association between space exploration and science education go back to the days of Sputnik –the “ping” that shocked and alarmed the country. This event prompted loud public cries for somebody to “do something” about the educational decline of America’s youth (corrupted then by ’57 Chevys, hula-hoops and Elvis). Congress responded in the usual manner – they threw money at the problem. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 (interesting wording that) created a huge infrastructure largely dependent upon federal funding that directly answered the Soviet challenge in space. The number of science graduates exploded over the next couple of decades, leading many to conclude that 1) the excitement generated by the Apollo program inspired these students to aspire to careers in science; 2) huge amounts of federal money can solve any problem.
Although Apollo is now a distant memory (or for many, a distant, historical event that they’ve only read about in third-hand accounts), the confluence of space and education is taken as a given by many in the business. NASA spends a designated fraction of their budget on a process called “EPO” (Education and Public Outreach), designed to inform and inspire the next generation of scientists and explorers. As you might expect, these efforts range from the interesting and innovative to the embarrassing (though well intentioned).
A perception has emerged that the problem lies not with the methodology, but with the product – because we are not doing anything in space that is “exciting,” we aren’t producing quality scientists and engineers. This may well account for what sensible students – with an eye toward putting food on the table after they graduate – choose to study. Then too, perhaps there are too many in the field already. But with effort, excellence will find productive work; self-esteem and entitlement will not cut it in the long run, no matter what your field of endeavor.
Recently, I had the opportunity to directly interact with students at two ends of the education pipeline and found the experience highly encouraging. In the first case, the father of a local second-grader asked if his son could visit and interview me. The boy had chosen to write a semester paper (in second grade??) about the Moon. The child was both well spoken and well informed. He asked relevant and very intelligent questions. What is the value of the Moon? What do we want to know about it and how do we find these things out? Can people live there?
I found his questions and understanding of the problems and benefits of exploring the Moon to be at a very high level (much higher than many adult reporters who call me). Then he asked me an unexpected question: How fast does the Moon travel through space? After initially drawing a complete blank, I suggested that we find out together and went on to calculate it on the spot. We concluded that the Moon flies around the Earth at over 2200 miles per hour (much faster than he traveled down the freeway to visit me). He was delighted by this episode of “science in action.” I was delighted to be challenged by his understanding and his interest in the topic.
Around the same time, a high school debate coach contacted me. He told me that next year’s debate question is “Should humans explore space?” and asked if I could assist his team, as they were collecting information for their briefing books. Once again, I was pleasantly surprised by their level of knowledge and their understanding of complex issues.
We reviewed the history of the space program, and why and how the current policy confusion has developed. These students were informed and sharp. They had already read and digested a great deal of information – drawing insight and conclusions about issues the space community is embroiled in. Their questions were both penetrating and logical, and sent a clear message of their desire to fully understand the technical and programmatic issues involved.
What did I conclude from my encounter with a sample of today’s youth? Mostly, that reports of the demise of our Republic are premature. These kids were smart and well informed. They could assimilate new information and apply it to other topics in clever ways. They had an enthusiasm for their subject that was both gratifying and surprising. And, they are interested in space, regardless of the current “uninspiring” nature of the program.
Inspiration is great, but it’s a highly personal factor and its impact and importance are difficult to measure. The current STEM/outreach process at NASA conflates excitement and inspiration, but they are two different things. The circus entertains us but we find inspiration elsewhere. We need to focus on building a stable space program that will give us long-term benefits – a step-wise, incremental program that gradually increases the extent of our reach into space. Compared to the current policy chaos, it just might be inspirational too.
AT: Leadership Adv --- NASA Internal Link
NASA is already making necessary reforms
Black, 10 (12/31/10, Robert, Orlando Sentinel, “SpaceX could hasten NASA's reform,” )RK
But there are signs that NASA realizes that it must do things differently.
Perhaps the greatest test case is the Orion spacecraft. Unlike Dragon, which cost SpaceX a few hundred million dollars to design, build and fly, Orion has so far cost $4.8 billion and is not likely to fly for at least another three years -- and an additional $1.2 billion.
Orion's prime contractor, Lockheed Martin Corp., has long complained that unnecessary levels of NASA oversight drive up costs and has pleaded with the agency to cut down on required paperwork.
Now, according to Mark Geyer, NASA's Orion program manager, the agency is relenting, scaling back layers of supervision and looking at other ways to cut costs.
And, rather than looking to build a fully loaded capsule -- capable for flying to the moon -- NASA will build it in stages to match the budget. Under the latest plan, NASA and Lockheed would produce an unmanned test vehicle by 2013, and then a simple capsule that could orbit astronauts in 2017. By 2018, Orion would be ready to go to the International Space Station and, hopefully by 2020, would be capable of going to points beyond the moon for extended stays.
"That's one way of still learning a lot, getting capability and getting in capability and functionality as the budget allows," Geyer said.
But, Geyer said, the real change has been cutting down on supervision of Lockheed "to really focus on the higher-risk items and not all the stuff Lockheed knows how to do.
"Lockheed had a lot of skill in building flight hardware. NASA doesn't have to watch that a lot," he said.
Geyer said scaling back on layers of supervision has allowed NASA to cut Orion's overhead budget by 70 percent and allowed Lockheed to cut some of its costs by as much as 47 percent.
AT: Mars Adv
Going to the Moon trades off with other space pursuits and is not key to Mars
Beattie 07 – former NASA manager, managed the National Science Foundation, Energy Research and Development Administration, and Department of Energy,(Donald A., 2/12/07, “Just how full of opportunity is the Moon?”, , DH)
In his recent article about the reasons for lunar exploration, Paul Spudis asserts that “…some complain that the reason for going to the Moon is still unclear.” (See “A Moon full of opportunity”, The Space Review, January 22, 2007) That is, unfortunately, an incorrect understanding of why there are objections to returning to the Moon with an emphasis on human settlement and exploration. To characterize as “whiners” those who have expressed concerns that NASA is pursuing the wrong goal does a great disservice to legitimate debate. These concerns are well founded based on disagreements about the benefit and attainability of the goal. Proposing a grand “Vision” to explore our solar system has value; however, what the pace and emphasis should be needs to be continually debated based on evolving national needs and the ability to find required resources. We can “…do everything else that we want to do in space” without detouring to the Moon. All indications are that such a detour will inhibit everything else we “should” do in space with the limited resources available. To provide a detailed analysis of why there are disagreements would require a lengthy response; the following discussion briefly presents the key points.
The six themes that are the foundation underlying the rationale to return humans and robots to the Moon: human settlement, preparation for Mars missions, science, economic expansion, international cooperation, and public engagement, were predicated on many false assumptions. The fact that NASA’s Lunar Architecture Team worked for many months considering recommendations from multiple sources is interesting but not necessarily significant. Using a relevant quote: “If a committee is allowed to discuss a bad idea long enough, it will eventually adopt it because of all the work they put into it.” (K. Kruikshank)
Proposing a grand “Vision” to explore our solar system has value; however, what the pace and emphasis should be needs to be continually debated based on evolving national needs and the ability to find required resources.
There is no question that it would be possible to build human settlements on the Moon. Such a program was proposed in the late 1960s when all of the infrastructure was in place and paid for, but it was denied by Congress and the Nixon administration. A Space Exploration Initiative that included returning to the Moon, similar to the program currently underway, was unveiled by President George H.W. Bush in 1989. It was also denied by Congress. There were no compelling reasons then, and there are none now, to spend a major fraction of the nation’s space budget to return humans or robots to the Moon. Some claim that the theme of human settlement will be important as it supports the goals of all the other themes. That may be true, but its importance is doubtful because it places a high value on very questionable objectives as discussed below.
Human missions to Mars, if and when they might occur, are so far in the future that lessons learned on the Moon will have little relevance. If humans eventually travel to Mars, technology that would be used will be far advanced over that which NASA would employ on the Moon in the next twenty years. The first humans who might travel to Mars will probably not have the immediate objective of establishing a settlement. Rather, they will go as explorers and spend only that amount of time required to meet initial objectives, with their staytime defined by orbital mechanics. Determining how to utilize lunar resources to supply a lunar base will not have applicability to a Mars base as the technology and processes needed to use Mars raw materials will be unique to Mars resources. Other surface conditions on Mars that human explorers will have to cope with will also be much different than those found on the Moon and will require specific technology to ensure safe operations. Costly and risky human exploration of Mars may never be needed. As robots become more capable, the major scientific and philosophical question that drives Mars exploration—does life exist or has it ever existed on Mars—may well be answered by robotic missions. The need to establish human settlements on Mars in the future is problematic. There is no question that it would be possible to build human settlements on the Moon. Such a program was proposed in the late 1960s when all of the infrastructure was in place and paid for, but it was denied by Congress and the Nixon administration. A Space Exploration Initiative that included returning to the Moon, similar to the program currently underway, was unveiled by President George H.W. Bush in 1989. It was also denied by Congress. There were no compelling reasons then, and there are none now, to spend a major fraction of the nation’s space budget to return humans or robots to the Moon. Some claim that the theme of human settlement will be important as it supports the goals of all the other themes. That may be true, but its importance is doubtful because it places a high value on very questionable objectives as discussed below.
Scientific investigations, discussed in the recent National Research Council (NRC) report “The Scientific Context for Exploration of the Moon” define an extensive exploration program. If pursued, the program would add additional information to our present knowledge of the Moon’s early history and current state. However, we already have an excellent understanding of the Moon’s history and composition compiled from data returned from Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, and Apollo missions. The more recent Clementine and Lunar Prospector missions also contributed to our understanding. Added detail is only of interest to those who have spent most or all of their professional lives studying the Moon. It is unlikely that any new information collected during detailed lunar exploration will resolve fundamental questions being asked regarding the origin and evolution of the solar system. Making this theme even more suspect in terms of its importance, a successful implementation of NRC program would require numerous robotic missions complimented by many human missions. The robotic missions would have to be more capable than the present Mars rover missions for, in addition to making detailed chemical and mineralogical measurements, many would require deep drilling and sample return from both the Moon’s near and far sides. To date, there have been no estimates of how much such an ambitious campaign would cost. NASA has dodged the question of cost for both robotic and human missions, including establishing human settlements, by hiding behind the slogan that returning to the Moon is based on an “open architecture.” Or in other words, to defuse the critics, it is whatever you want it to be. Not a very strong position on which to ask the Congress to commit to spending huge sums.
There are no lunar resources that, when processed, would have any economic value if utilized on the Moon or returned to Earth. Lunar in situ resource utilization has been shown by several analyses to not have a positive cost benefit. Enthusiasts who have made claims to the contrary have done so by using questionable and very optimistic projections of what would be required. They would be well advised to reopen their chemistry and physics textbooks and spend some time with real-world mining and drilling operations.
There are no lunar resources that, when processed, would have any economic value if utilized on the Moon or returned to Earth.
A case in point is the assumption that water ice will be found at the lunar poles and could be mined to supply a base and other activities. (See “Ice on the Moon”, The Space Review, November 6, 2006) Based on measurements of the Moon’s polar regions made during the Lunar Prospector mission, some believe that large quantities of water ice will be found in permanently shadowed lunar craters. It should be remembered that Lunar Prospector did not record the presence of water ice, only an indication of “excess” hydrogen that some infer means water ice. If water ice exists, large amounts of lunar soil would have to be processed in the shadow of rock-strewn crater walls in order to recover sufficient quantities of oxygen and hydrogen to be used for either fuel or life support. Recent studies (Campbell et al., Nature, October 19. 2006) using the Arecibo radar to examine the Moon’s south polar region at much higher resolution than Lunar Prospector (20 meters per pixel vs. 40 kilometers), cast doubt on the probability that large amounts of water ice exist in such craters. Also, analyses have been made of what would happen if a comet, traveling at high speed, hit the Moon. They indicate that it is unlikely that much, if any, water released by the impact of a comet at low lunar latitudes would be transported and trapped in polar locations; it would instead evaporate into space. Only impacts of water-rich comets at high lunar latitudes would provide a chance to deposit water ice in the lunar regolith of permanently shadowed polar craters. In view of the above, the presence of water ice and the amount that might be found as a percentage of the lunar soil in permanently shadowed craters remains highly speculative. To base a program to build a settlement at the Moon’s south pole on such scanty evidence, and the requirement to employ highly questionable resource recovery, should not be considered.
Colonization of Mars could take up to 30 more years
Giblett in 11 – Chief Innovation Officer, provides strategic coaching and consulting for new business leaders (January 23, 2011. “Is Colonization of Mars Possible Within Our Lifetime?” )
The colonisation of Mars is likely a long, long, long way off. Ultimately it could be possible by “terraforming” the planet, according to some scientists. They argue that humankind’s colonization of Mars is necessary because “cosmic events such as major asteroid and comet impacts, plus potential supernova explosions do pose a significant threat to life on Earth, especially to human life. The colonization of Mars is a matter of ‘when’, not ‘if’.
Mission plans, such as Robert Zubrin’s Mars Direct, show us the potential to utilise the Martian atmosphere in order to produce fuel, which could cut down dramatically the size and complexity of any mission, while actually increasing the safety and productiveness of the journey. Actually, the original Case for Mars mission concepts, published in a series of conference proceedings by the American Astronautical Society, dated as far back as 1981, while Zubrin and Baker’s Mars Direct dates to 1989 and 1990 respectively. Preliminary work for such missions has in-fact been undertaken since the 1950s, with planned missions intended to take place 10 to 30 years in the future. A manned mission to Mars could potentially be the greatest adventure in the history of the human race, and this writer would certainly love to be included. One proposed 2012 mission is rumoured to be “substantially funded”.
Believing therefore that the exploration and settlement of Mars is one of the greatest human endeavors possible in our time, the Mars Society, understand that even the very best ideas of human endeavour are not inevitable. As such they must be planned, and executed in order to be achieved. The exploration of Mars’ surface is necessary and existing expeditions have fallen short of their goals. As a note the Outer Space Treaty presents a major problem for the advocates of space colonization: it makes impossible the buying and selling land on other worlds of the Solar System. One novel about man’s first exploration of Mars describes a secret organization circumventing these treaties and colonising Mars as a part of a death grip on space.
Mars could spread pathogenic viruses to inhabitants
Gagnon 99 (April 30, 1999. “Mining the Moon and Mars” Earth First! Vol 19. Iss. 4 Pg. 92. LexisNexis)
NASA has found aluminum, titanium, iron, magnesium and helium 3 on the moon. On Mars they have found magnesium, cobalt, phosphorus and more. On asteroids, gold has been discovered.
NASA, the US weapons industry, the Department of Energy's weapons laboratories and academia are all working hard to convince the American people and Congress to provide greater research and development funding for this new exploitation of space while also minimizing regulation and control of such plans.
In the words of Declan O'Donnell, a director of the United Societies in Space, "We are the fifth force in nature. Our society turned loose in the universe will represent a new natural force. Our mansions can be built with a new source of financing, priming the pump for private enterprise."
The vision is to put mining colonies on the moon and Mars shortly after the turn of the century. The surface of the moon has already been entirely mapped by the Clemintine mission, a joint NASA/Pentagon mission used to test Star Wars sensors. Mars mapping and soil identification are now underway. Mining colonies would be powered by nuclear reactors now being developed by the Department of Energy's national labs and weapons contractors, the same folks that brought us the nuclear arms race.
According to Marshall Savage, the founder of the First Millennial Foundation, "We really can't mess up the moon, either by mining it or building nuclear powered plants. We can ruthlessly strip mine the surface of the moon for centuries, and it will be hard to tell we've even been there. There is no reason why we cannot build nuclear power plants on the moon's surface with impunity. Equipped with limitless nuclear, the lunar civilization will be capable of prodigious rates of economic growth."
As NASA prepares to send several more missions to Mars, it's also pondering another environmental dilemma--space bugs. When Columbus and the Spaniards began to explore the Americas, they brought the smallpox virus that killed thousands of indigenous peoples. If all goes as planned, NASA hopes to launch the Mars Sample Return Mission in 2003. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention worry that NASA currently has no process in place to protect Earth's inhabitants from "pathogenic viruses or bacteria" upon the return of the missions.
Exploitation of Mars resources fails-causes ecological destruction, epidemics, and conflict by violating important treaties
Gagnon 99 (April 30, 1999. “Mining the Moon and Mars” Earth First! Vol 19. Iss. 4 Pg. 92. )
One of the current obstacles to US corporate plans for economic exploitation of the moon and Mars is the existence of United Nations laws like the Moon Treaty. Much of the Moon Treaty reiterates earlier and internationally accepted "space law," particularly the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. In Article 11 of that treaty, the UN states that "the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind." Efforts are now underway to undermine and circumvent these existing treaties.
The Pentagon, through the Colorado-based US Space Command, is also working hard to ensure that the space corridor will remain open and free for these private corporate interests. Weapons systems such as nuclear powered lasers and anti-satellite weapons are now being funded, researched and tested. In the Space Command's document, Vision for 2020, it says, "The control of space will encompass protecting US military, civil and commercial investments in space."
We are now poised to take the bad seed of greed, environmental exploitation and war into space. Having shown such enormous disregard for our own planet, these so-called visionaries and explorers are now ready to rape and pillage the heavens. Countless launches of nuclear materials will seriously jeopardize life on Earth. Returning potentially bacteria-laden space materials back to Earth, without any real plans for containment and monitoring, could create new epidemics. And the possibility of an expanding nuclear-based arms race in space will certainly have serious ecological ramifications.
Now is the time for all activists to begin to learn more about these issues and organize to prevent this madness. An international debate must be started about just what we will carry as we explore space.
Mission to Mars fosters harmful contamination of Martian terrain
Levine and Schild in 10 – *Science Directorate, NASA Langley Research Center, AND ** Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics (2010. “Humans to Mars; The Greatest Adventure in Human History” )
Section VII. Planetary Protection and Infection Risks on Mars: Planetary protection is a major problem for a human mission to Mars and involves both forward and backward protection as discussed in 3 papers in this section. If humans are going to Mars to accelerate the pace of potential scientific discovery, to learn whether or not Mars is the abode of non-terrestrial life, then a human mission is beneficial only if the human explorers will not erase or obscure the data they are traveling to Mars to discover. For example, Earth microbes will have to be kept from those places on Mars (a.k.a., "special regions") where they might grow and thrive on their own, and if Mars has its own life then human explorers should only be exposed to Martian materials under controlled 5 conditions that ensure their safety—and their ability to return to Earth without endangering our home planet. For any such voyage, provisions against the contamination of Mars by Earth organisms ("forward contamination") and against the contamination of Earth by possible Martian organisms ("backward," or "back contamination") are important aspects of mission success. In the event that Mars is to become a home for a future branch of humanity, then provisions for managing the potential contamination of Martian habitable zones and particularly possible Martian aquifers will be especially important.
--- XT: Moon Not Key
The U.S. has to go deeper into space than just the Moon
Chow 1/13/ 11 – staff writer (Denise Chow, “The Case Against the Moon: Why We Shouldn't Go Straight Back”, , DH)
This story is part of a week-long series on what it would take for humanity to return to the moon to stay. Also coming on Friday on : Mining the moon.
On July 21, 1969, Neil Armstrong became the first person to set foot on the moon, and in an instant, the world changed.
Eleven other American astronauts would follow in Armstrong's footsteps over the course of NASA's Apollo program, which produced six moon landings in all. Yet in the 38 years since the sixth landing, humans have not ventured back to their closest cosmic neighbor.
And perhaps we should not. As NASA embarks on a new plan for space exploration amid political uncertainty and budgetary constraints, some experts are hoping the space agency will look beyond the moon for the future of human spaceflight, and instead push deeper into our solar system than ever before.
"We've done the moon – we understand it better than anything else," Buzz Aldrin, lunar module pilot on the Apollo 11 mission and second man to walk on the moon, told . "We've got to stop thinking of short-term hurrahs and start thinking of long-term investments."
With China and India aggressively moving forward with robotic and manned missions to the moon, some analysts envision a rehash of the 1960s moon race between the United States and the Soviet Union. And while some camps are calling for a return to the moon to expand lunar science and potentially construct moon bases, others are less thrilled at that prospect.
"As long as I've been involved in spaceflight, for about 20 years now, there has been this debate going on between the two groups," said Roger Launius, senior space history curator at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in Washington. "I refer to them as the Martians and the Lunatics – the people who want to go to Mars, and the people who want to go back to the moon. No one side has the clear-cut answer. There are positives and negatives for both."
Moon vs. mars
Launius said returning to the moon could address important scientific questions, such as the existence of water ice, but with the objective of traveling to Mars on the horizon, he wonders whether it would cause NASA to be "sidetracked with years upon years of lunar exploration."
"I'm less excited about a human mission back to the moon," Launius said. "I remember the first ones – they were cool. I'd love to see us go to Mars, but it's much more complex and difficult. And I really question whether we're going to be able to develop the expertise to take a task like that on."
Others agree Mars is a more exciting destination and that a return to the moon should come eventually but should not top the space agency's list of priorities.
“A return to the moon should not be NASA's primary goal or focus in this decade," said Robert Zubrin, president of the Mars Society. "Rather, the proper goal of NASA's human spaceflight program should be human missions to Mars. From a technological point of view, we are much closer today to being able to send humans to Mars than we were to sending men to the moon in 1961, and we were there eight years later."
Political climate
NASA's now-canceled Constellation program, established during the administration of President George W. Bush, aimed to return American astronauts to the moon by 2020. As part of the roughly $9 billion program, NASA was charged with developing new Ares rockets and a space capsule called Orion that would act as a replacement for the agency's retiring space shuttle fleet.
But President Obama's 2011 budget request effectively shut down the moon-oriented Constellation program and shifted the focus of future U.S. space exploration toward asteroids and Mars.
On Oct. 11, 2010, Obama signed a major NASA act that turned these lofty goals into law. The signing officially scrapped the Constellation program and set the stage for a manned mission to an asteroid by 2025, followed by a manned mission to Mars, currently envisioned for some time in the 2030s.
Moon missions won’t be successful --- not sufficient international cooperation or domestic support
Beattie 07 - former NASA manager, managed the National Science Foundation, Energy Research and Development Administration, and Department of Energy,(Donald A., 2/12/07, “Just how full of opportunity is the Moon?”, , DH)
Recent press releases seem to indicate that international interest in cooperating with NASA on returning humans to the Moon does not exist. Some, such as the British, have clearly indicated they have other plans. Based on statements made by NASA it would appear that in order for the initiative to return to the Moon to be successful, international cooperation will be required. A meeting has been announced in the spring to explore the interests of the international space community in joining the Vision. How many nations may sign up is problematic, with good reason, considering how the ISS international partners have been treated in the past. Meanwhile, some are leapfrogging ahead to send missions to Mars, the indisputable scientific prize. ESA’s ExoMars rover will be able to drill two meters into the Martian soil to look for signs of life and Russia is planning sample return from the moons of Mars. Some nations will undoubtedly send robotic missions to the Moon in the future. That will allow them to catch up, technologically, with the programs we successfully ran some forty years ago. However, it will be surprising if such missions will add significantly toward understanding our closest planetary neighbor.
Depending on the poll, and how the poll was conducted, support for NASA’s programs is usually high. However, most polls indicate that the “general public” knows few details about NASA’s programs and the size of its budgets that use their tax dollars. Interest among the young in our space program, in general, appears to be especially low, and when questioned about returning to the Moon show little enthusiasm about the program.
NASA’s 2005 authorization indicated that a majority in the 109th Congress supported the Vision. But the full impact on other NASA programs of that support had not been (and still has not been) fully defined and seems to be a moving target as NASA scrambles to fund contracted commitments. The 110th Congress will confront many problems, old and new, and has indicated that science programs will have to compete with other high-priority programs in future budgets. It will require many congresses and administrations to agree to fulfill the goals of the Vision. Further complicating this issue, Congress must decide how to prioritize all of the programs contained in NASA budgets to assure future benefits for the country from NASA research.
Should a large percentage of NASA’s budget be spent on a single objective—returning to the Moon—that has little scientific value and no real economic benefits other than job creation? The fear among critics is that the current goal to return to the Moon is not sustainable under projected budgets. In the meantime, to support this goal, traditional NASA programs are being canceled or severely cut back. A recent example, among many, is the reduction in funding for Earth observation programs. Grandiose promises, with little substance to back them up, must be carefully examined. The Vision that NASA is following has not undergone such a careful examination.
NASA should focus on Mars --- private companies can deal with LEO missions
Chow 1/13/ 11 – staff writer (Denise Chow, “ The Case Against the Moon: Why We Shouldn't Go Straight Back”, , DH)
The new space plan also opens the door for private spaceflight companies to create commercial vehicles to ferry astronauts into low-Earth orbit (LEO) while NASA sets its sights on targets deeper into the solar system.
One such commercial firm is Space Exploration Technologies, commonly called SpaceX. The Hawthorne, Calif., company's Dragon capsule is designed to transport cargo, and eventually humans, aboard the company's Falcon 9 rocket to the International Space Station.
"I think Mars, given that it holds the potential for making life multi-planetary, is much more important than the moon, and that should be the focus of future manned exploration," said Elon Musk, the chief executive of SpaceX. "However, if there turns out to be a market for traveling to the moon, SpaceX will support that just as we support LEO activity."
--- XT: Health Threats
Mars poses several problems – psychological and physiological dangers to humans, as well as contamination by harmful disease
Levine and Schild in 10 – *Science Directorate, NASA Langley Research Center, AND ** Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics (2010. “Humans to Mars; The Greatest Adventure in Human History” )
Section V. Psychology, Stress, Behavioral Health of Astronauts & Crew: The human mission to Mars involves human factors, behavioral health, psychosocial adaption, stress, psychological, and psychiatric issues as outlined in the 5 papers in this section. To support living and working in space we must seek robust, reliable and user-friendly environments; synergistic life support systems that provide extra margins of safety and comfort; well designed equipment and tools; the reasoned use of artificial intelligence and robotics; and outstanding supplies. We must also seek countermeasures to the performance-threatening effects of microgravity, insufficient sleep, disruption of biological rhythms, and excessive workloads. Research in group dynamics and teamwork offers useful recommendations in such areas as leadership, communication, group decision-making, and autonomy. Behavioral health refers to an absence of neuropsychiatric dysfunction and the presence of positive interactions with the physical and interpersonal environment, and we may expect a strong positive correlation between behavioral health and performance.
Mission to mars poses serious medical threats
Levine and Schild in 10 – *Science Directorate, NASA Langley Research Center, AND ** Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics (2010. “Humans to Mars; The Greatest Adventure in Human History” )
Section VI. Medical Health, Physiology, Biomedical Risks of a Journey to Mars: A human mission to Mars lasting more than 6 months each way presents a series of medical challenges involving microgravity, radiation, and the space environment as discussed in 8 papers in this section. This millennium marks a new era with the 40-year anniversary of the moon landing experience and over 50 years of human space exploration. Multinational crews of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Russian, Canadian, European Space Agency, and Japanese space programs have made major developments in space-related research both in low Earth orbit and onboard the International Space Station (ISS). Although the primary research and technology development for space exploration has been through the ISS, (and potentially moon exploration over the next decade), Mars represents a principal focus of space explorations. Mars is however much farther for astronauts to travel. Hence, this journey will depend on the time and place Mars is in its orbit around the sun. Mars is at its farthest from the Earth at 399 million km and closest at 56 million km, therefore a feasible launch date would be during this stage. Considering the distance involved and Mars orbit, with current propulsion systems, the time to reach Mars with an approximate 60-day surface stay will be approximately eighteen months. Landing a human crew on Mars will mark the first time in human history that we visit another planet, however the journey comes with great risks and challenges.
--- International Coop Key to Mars
International cooperation would allow for a more effective and technologically feasible journey to Mars
Ehlmann et al 2 (Bethany L. Ehlmann, Jeeshan Chowdhury, R. Eric Collins, Brandon DeKock, F. Douglas Grant, Michael Hannon, Stuart Ibsen, Jessica Kinnevan, Wendy Krauser, Julie Litzenberger, Timothy Marzullo, Rebekah Shepard *All authors contributed equally to this work 1. Department of Earth & Planetary Sciences, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130 (blehlman@artsci.wustl.edu). 2002. “Humans to Mars: The Political Initiative and Technical Expertise Needed
for Human Exploration of the Red Planet” )
2.3 International Cooperation on a Human Mars Mission Despite the incredible achievements of the Apollo program, the program did have some shortcomings. Chief among these failures was the near-sightedness of the mission goals. Cold War politics played a critical role in spurring on the Apollo program. The United States wanted to beat the Soviets to the moon—that was the primary (some say only) goal of the entire program. An international human mission to Mars has the potential to be a more sustained exploration effort because it will not be subject to the whims of a single nation. Other nations have expressed their desire for a human mission to Mars, including Russia (BBC, 2002), China (McElroy, 2002), and the European Space Agency in their Aurora program. While there are some inherent difficulties to international efforts—variable and uncertain funding, communication problems, and technical interfacing difficulties—these problems can and will be outweighed by the tremendous worldwide benefits associated with an international endeavor to Mars. We can benefit from the technical experience of other nations, e.g. the Canadians in large-scale robotics and the Russians in extended duration human space flight and heavy-lift rocketry. A United States commitment to leading a human Mars mission would also have substantial positive repercussions in international relations.
AT: Helium-3 Adv
Tritium from the Ontario Power Generation solves the crisis until replacement technologies are developed
Anderson, 10 (4/22/11, Tom, PRODUCT MANAGER, REUTER-STOKES RADIATION MEASUREMENT SOLUTIONS, GE ENERGY, “CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS”, )
DNDO and the Integrated Project Team have played a key role in responding to the helium-3 shortage. I believe DNDO is exploring the most practical options available to produce helium-3. Short of planning a trip to the moon, as was discussed this morning, to mine helium-3, the most promising near-term prospect is to accelerate work with the Canadian government to harvest the helium-3 from the tritium storage beds at Ontario Power Generation. Expeditious recovery and processing of this gas could be used to sustain helium-3 detectors for applications such as oil exploration and nuclear safeguards while replacement technologies are developed.
The status quo solves a Helium-3 deficit- diversification and alternative development
HSNW, 11 (2/28/11, Homeland Security News Wire, “Helium-3 shortage endangers nuclear detection capabilities”, )
Alternatives are currently in the early stages of development and researchers have found several promising leads including the use of boron trifluoride, lithium-loaded glass fibers, and boron-lined proportional counters as potential substitutes. Thomas R. Anderson, a representative of General Electric Energy, which manufactures radiation detectors, said, “Up to six different neutron-detection technologies may be required to replace helium-3 detectors” for its four main uses and “[a] drop-in replacement technology for helium-3 does not exist today.” When an acceptable alternative is found, current radiation detection equipment will have to be replaced with the new technology. In the meantime, industrial manufacturers of detection equipment have been diversifying their helium-3 sources and turning to recycling old helium-3 canisters.
Helium-3 recycling and accelerated development of alternative technologies solves a shortage (timeframe)
AAAS, 10 (4/22/10, American Association for the Advancement of Science, “AAAS Workshop Explores How to Meet Demand for Helium-3 in Medicine, Industry, and Security”, )AY
Helium-3 users have tried some obvious approaches to managing the supply, he said. The users have been notified of the diminished supply and asked to limit their use of the isotope. They’re considering a more random approach to positioning neutron detectors and trying to make the existing detectors more efficient. And some are working to recycle the gas. “But the main response is to accelerate the development and deployment of alternative technologies, especially for portal detectors which are the largest users to helium-3,” Fetter said. The 6 April workshop attracted 132 registrants from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and other countries. It was organized by the AAAS Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy at the request of OSTP and the U.S. National Security Council. “They realized that this was a problem that the government could not solve on its own,” said Benn Tannenbaum, a particle physicist and associate director of the AAAS center. “They need help getting the word out about the crisis and the new allocation methodology and identifying new technologies that will help to reduce demand and get these in the hands of the people who need them.”
There are existing, functional alternatives to He3
AAAS, 10 (4/22/10, American Association for the Advancement of Science, “AAAS Workshop Explores How to Meet Demand for Helium-3 in Medicine, Industry, and Security”, )AY
Some possible alternatives to helium-3 are detectors filled with boron trifluoride (BF3) or lined with boron, which are two “existing alternatives that can be deployed today,” Kouzes said. Plastic fibers coated with lithium-6 are another possible alternative. Kouzes has tested these alternatives and said that they potentially will work for deployment, but that they will require hardware and software modifications and integration testing.
He3 recycling solves a shortage
Woods, 10 (4/22/11, Jason C., United States Representative of North Carolina’s 13th District, “CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS”, )
Since helium is not soluble in the tissues of the body, it can be very highly recoverable, yet most research groups do not have systems currently in place to recapture and compress exhaled gas. The hyperpolarized helium research community has demonstrated in the past that inexpensive technologies can be assembled for easily solvable problems within the field, and the technology for recycling of 3He is straightforward. (For example, since 3He is a liquid at 4 K [4 degrees above absolute zero], all other gases, particulate and biological matter can be frozen out by passing through a liquid 4He bath at 4 K.) Both Washington University (Dr. Woods, et al.) and the University of Virginia (Dr. Miller, et al.) are currently collaborating with Walter Whitlock, of Conservation Design Services, Inc., in North Carolina, to develop commercially-viable recycling for wide use in the 3He MRI community. This recycling collaboration is not yet funded but is currently underway. I believe that the important and significant scientific research outlined in this testimony can be sustained and performed with around 2,000 total STP liters of 3He per year, after development of good recovery/recycling systems for 3He.
CANDU reactors solve helium 3 crisis
Lobsenz, 10 (7/1/10, George, editor of Energy Daily, “DOE Helium Shortage Hits Nuke Security, Oil and Gas Industry”, )
The most promising new source of helium-3, the witnesses said, is found at commercial nuclear plants that use the Canadian deuterium-uranium, or CANDU, reactors. A byproduct of those reactors is tritium, a radioactive gas that produces the helium-3 isotope as it naturally decays in radioactivity. The officials said a substantial reserve of tritium is at power reactors operated by Ontario Power Generation at its Darlington plant, and that the U.S. government already is working with the Canadian government to determine the feasibility of extracting helium-3 from that reserve.
Can’t solve until 2020
RCSP, not date cited (Rocket City Space Pioneers, “Lunar Helium 3”, )
Cosmochemist and geochemist Ouyang Ziyuan from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who is now in charge of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, has already stated on many occasions that one of the main goals of the program would be the mining of He-3. And in January 2006, the Russian space company RKK Energiya announced that it considers lunar He-3 a potential economic resource to be mined by 2020.(3)
--- AT: Nuclear Smuggling
Obama expanding tritium production to increase Helium-3 supplies
Hsu, 10 (4/19/10, Jeremy, Popular Science, “Congress to Address Helium-3 Shortage Hurting Scientific Research and Nuclear Security; Congress will scramble to address the isotope paucity this week,” , JMP)
A large Cold War supply of helium-3 has begun to rapidly run out, due to heavy demand from U.S. scientists who need the gas for neutron detectors and cryogenic experiments. Almost 60,000 liters of helium-3 were used in 2007 and 2008, compared to just 10,000 liters used annually about 10 years ago. A House subcommittee has been convened to search for a solution this week, New Scientist reports.
The U.S. formerly stockpiled helium-3 from the decay of tritium, the radioactive hydrogen isotope used to make nuclear weapons. That helium-3 supply stopped growing for the most part when the U.S. ceased making tritium in 1988. But in an ironic twist, the fast-growing use of neutron detectors in security systems designed to detect illegal plutonium and other nuclear materials has dramatically eaten into the helium-3 stockpile.
The shortage has slowed down the growth of quantum computing and other scientific fields which depend upon frigid conditions provided by helium-3 refrigeration. National laboratories have also been forced to develop less-sensitive neutron detectors which rely upon lithium and boron instead of helium-3.
Since the early freeze on tritium production, the U.S. did resume making bomb-grade tritium at one civilian nuclear plant in 2003. The AP notes that President Obama's 2010 budget includes funds for the Tennessee Valley Authority to expand tritium-production to a second nuclear plant, even if Obama has taken a recent stand against the development of new nuclear weapons. So fans of a quantum computing future need not give up hope just yet.
No nuclear terror attack
Schneidmiller 9 (Chris, Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism, 13 January 2009, , AMiles)
There is an "almost vanishingly small" likelihood that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim, which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen.
Alternative tech solves nuclear detection
NTI, 11 (5/13/11, “Nuclear Detection Effort Hobbled by DOE Miscues: GAO”, )
The Homeland Security Department has sunk $230 million into the development of nuclear detection systems that use Helium-3. That program has been curtailed, and U.S. firms and researchers are trying to find another source for the gas or prepare a new system for detecting nuclear materials. Homeland Security and Energy "built large, multibillion-dollar programs around an assumed endless supply" of Helium-3, states a staff report from the House Science Committee. House Science Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee ranking member Donna Edwards (D-Md.) described the lack of coordination as "gross mismanagement." "With so much riding on Helium-3, it is shocking to learn that the department’s forecast for demand is based simply on a telephone log tracking those who called asking about the availability of Helium-3," Edwards said. Energy Department officials said once they learned of the problem, they gave the department's science branch oversight for the Isotope Program. Department officials did, however, admit the bureaucratic misstep. Due to separated overight and an unforeseen requirement for Helium-3, "all of a sudden we realized we had this additional factor and had to come up with something different," Desputy Energy Undersecretary Steven Aoki said. Aoki said he was hopeful that additional detection systems that employ more common substances would be available in another year or two. Certain lawmakers question that schedule, according to the Times.
U.S nuclear detection fails
Wagner, 5 (August 2005, B.S degree in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge and deputy leader of the Biological and Quantum Physics Group at LANL, “Nuclear Detection to Prevent or Defeat Clandestine Nuclear Attack”, IEEE Xplore)
It is certainly true that even a perfect U.S.-based nuclear-detection system would not provide protection for all Americans. For example, imagine a system that could provide 100% probability of detection, with zero false alarms, and which covers every square inch of U.S. territory and every centimeter of our borders. Even with such a system in place, the adversary might detonate a nuclear device in a port before the cargo was inspected and, thus, wreak havoc in a U.S. city. It is important to recognize, therefore, that a detection system would only be one piece of an effective multilayered defense.
--- XT: Alternatives Solve
Alternative measures will replace He3
AAAS, 10 (4/22/10, American Association for the Advancement of Science, “AAAS Workshop Explores How to Meet Demand for Helium-3 in Medicine, Industry, and Security”, )AY
For some applications—like ultracold physics, missile research, and medical imaging of lungs—there are no known alternatives, said Ronald Cooper, detector team leader at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. In this role, he has installed more than 3000 security systems for detecting neutrons; 75% of those systems have used helium-3. But Cooper said that helium-3 needs in some fields, including national security, oil well logging and road construction, could be met by developing alternatives. The U.S. oil and gas industry, for instance, uses about 2% of U.S. supplies of helium-3. The gas is used in neutron detectors lowered into oil and gas wells to help determine the hydrocarbon content, which indicates the presence of oil and gas. Brad Roscoe, scientific advisor and nuclear program manager at Schlumberger-Doll Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, said that a replacement for helium-3 must be reliable in the high-temperature, high-vibration, and small-size environment of oil well logging.
--- XT: Nuclear Terrorism Ans
No motivation to use nukes
Moodie 2— headed the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and served as assistant director for multilateral affairs at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie, Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy, , AG)
The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--and much of the rest of the international community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.
No risk of country giving them a nuke
Mueller 7—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Reactions And Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession, 24 July 2007, , AMiles)
A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20). Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself). It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state--even a close ally, much less a terrorist group--a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxi). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down in 2004 (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72). In addition, al Qaeda--the chief demon group--is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. As Peter Bergen (2007, 19) has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along all that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban government (Burke 2003, 150, 164-65; Wright 2006, 230-1, 287-88; Cullison 2004).
Their evidence is based on rhetoric but ignores intentions
Mueller 8—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Terrorphobia our false sense of insecurity, May-June 2008, , AMiles)
All this may help to explain why there have been no al-Qaeda attacks in the United States for so many years, contrary to almost all anticipations. Perhaps the group’s goal is not to destroy the United States with explosions, but to have the Americans destroy themselves by wallowing in fear and by engaging in counterproductive policy overreaction. Thus, shortly after 9/11, Osama bin Laden happily crowed that “America is full of fear, from its north to its south, from its west to its east. Thank God for that.” And in 2004 he proclaimed his policy to be “bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy”, noting with consummate glee that, “It is easy for us to provoke and bait. . . . All that we have to do is . . . raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses.” The 9/11 attacks, he calculated, cost only $500,000 to carry out, “while the attack and its aftermath inflicted a cost of more than $500 billion on the United States.” There may be some danger that the fear and policy overreaction al-Qaeda finds so gratifying may actually have the perverse effect of tempting them into further efforts within the country. If it is so easy to make the Americans go crazy and harm themselves economically, and at such bargain basement prices, why not do more of it? American defenses may have improved since 9/11, but no one would maintain they are so effective as to prevent a persistent, devoted and clever group of conspirators from being able to accomplish limited feats. The ultimate nightmare of American scaremongers, setting off an atomic bomb, is well beyond al-Qaeda’s capacities and very likely always will be, but to be impressive, terrorism doesn’t have to be carried out at that level. Al-Qaeda or likeminded franchise affiliates need only infiltrate the country or locally recruit a handful of operatives to shoot up a few fast-food restaurants, set off a few forest fires, or explode a few small bombs in buses, shopping centers or highway overpasses. Look at what just two semi-sane “snipers” were able to do to the Washington, DC area in the summer of 2002. If al-Qaeda remains capable of carrying out attacks of at least that magnitude, it must be that its leaders lack the intent to do so. There may be a number of reasons for this, but one might be that they see little need to stir the pot further because fear levels remain high and because the United States, no matter which party is in the White House and despite the Iraq experience, can probably be counted upon to lash out counterproductively in any case. It was the “experienced” and judicious Hillary Clinton, after all, who last year declared that Iran must be prevented from getting a nuclear weapon “at all costs.” As Napoleon put it, “never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.” Accordingly, since Americans and their policymakers continue to fear and overreact so predictably, al-Qaeda may continue to confine its pot-stirring to ominous verbal threats—all of which are readily embraced with rapt seriousness by its distant enemy. If this perspective is correct, such cheap talk would constitute tactically useful lies, but bin Laden clearly has had no reticence about fictions in the service of terror. As America invaded Afghanistan in 2001, for example, he told a visiting Pakistani journalist that al-Qaeda possessed nuclear weapons, a claim that was either a blatant lie or a self-gratifying fantasy. He may have been indulging that same proclivity when he spouted in 2002 that “the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with terror”, or four years later that “operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished, God willing.” (On the other hand, maybe there have been no attacks simply because God has been unwilling.)
Terrorists fear reprisal—international and Muslim cooperation dissuades attacks
Mueller 6—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, September/October, Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?, , AG)
One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The FBI may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement. Although some Arabs and Muslims took pleasure in the suffering inflicted on 9/11 -- Schadenfreude in German, shamateh in Arabic -- the most common response among jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda's strategy and methods.
No loose nukes
Mueller 7—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Reactions And Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession, 24 July 2007, , AMiles)
There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia--weapons, "suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" (Badken 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they require continual maintenance (2002, 4, 12; see also Langewiesche 2007, 19). It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade. Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Langewiesche 2007, 19; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by al Qaeda, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material. It is conceivable that stolen bombs, even if no longer viable as weapons, would be useful for the fissile material that could be harvested from them. However, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, point out that even if a weapon is not completely destroyed when it is opened, its fissile material yield would not be adequate for a primitive design, and therefore several weapons would have to be stolen and then opened successfully (2005, 502).
Can’t make their own
Mueller 7—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Reactions And Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession, 24 July 2007, , AMiles)
Because of the dangers and difficulties of transporting and working with plutonium, a dedicated terrorist group, it is generally agreed, would choose to try to use highly enriched uranium (Keller 2002; Linzer 2004; Allison 2004, 96-97; Goldstein 2004, 131-32; Wirz and Egger 2005, 500; Langewiesche 2007, 21-23).6 The goal would be to get as much of this stuff as necessary (more than 100 pounds is required to reach critical mass) and then fashion it into an explosive.7 Most likely this would not be a bomb that can be dropped or hurled, but rather an "improvised nuclear device" (IND) that would be set off at the target by a suicidal detonation crew. The process is a daunting one, and it requires that a whole cascade of events click perfectly and in sequence. To begin with, stateless groups are simply incapable of manufacturing the required fissile material for a bomb since the process requires an enormous industrial process (Allison 2004; Langewiesche 2007, 20; Perry et al. 2007). Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb. Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase this crucial material. Although there is legitimate concern that some material, particularly in Russia, may be somewhat inadequately secured (though things have improved considerably), it is under lock and key, and even sleepy, drunken guards, notes Langewiesche, will react with hostility (and noise) to a raiding party. Thieves also need to know exactly what they want and where it is, and this presumably means trusting bribed, but not necessarily dependable, insiders. And to even begin to pull off such a heist, they need to develop a highly nuanced "sense for streets" in foreign lands filled with people who are often congenitally suspicious of strangers (2007, 33-48). Corruption in some areas may provide an opportunity to buy the relevant material, but purchasers of illicit goods and services would have to pay off a host of greedy confederates, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. The exchange could also prove to be part of a sting. Moreover, although there may be disgruntled and much underpaid scientists in places like Russia, they would have to consider the costs of detection. A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist was once a national hero for his lead work on his country's atomic bomb. But when he was brought down for selling atomic secrets to other governments, he was placed under severe house arrest, allowed no outside communication or contact, including telephone, newspapers, or internet, and is reportedly in declining health (Langewiesche 2007, 75-76). Renegade Russian scientists who happen not to be national heroes could expect a punishment that would be considerably more unpleasant. In the last ten years or so, there have been 10 known thefts of highly enriched uranium--in total less than 16 pounds or so, far less than required for an atomic explosion. Most arrestingly, notes Linzer, "the thieves--none of whom was connected to al Qaeda--had no buyers lined up, and nearly all were caught while trying to peddle their acquisitions" (2004). If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a critical mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces (Langewiesche 2007, 48-50). Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes and, for a considerable fee, opium traders (for example) might provide expert, and possibly even reliable, assistance. But the routes are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of a handful of criminal regulators who might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect reward money (Langewiesche 2007, 54-65). Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would have to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb. More than a decade ago Allison insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material (Allison et al. 1996, 12). However, the process would take months of very careful and dangerous labor by several highly skilled scientists, technicians, and machinists who would have to be assembled for the task while no consequential suspicions are generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits. Wirz and Egger point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they "would most certainly be forced to redesign" (2003, 499-500). This was also emphasized in an earlier report by five Los Alamos scientists: although schematic drawings showing the principles of bomb design in a qualitative way are widely available, the detailed design drawings and specifications that are essential before it is possible to plan the fabrication of actual parts are not available. The preparation of these drawings requires a large number of man-hours and the direct participation of individuals thoroughly informed in several quite distinct areas: the physical, chemical, and metallurgical properties of the various materials to be used, as well as the characteristics affecting heir fabrication; neutronic properties; radiation effects, both nuclear and biological; technology concerning high explosives and/or chemical propellants; some hydrodynamics; electrical circuitry; and others (Mark et al. 1987, 58). Moreover, stresses physicist David Albright, the process would also require "good managers and organization people" (Keller 2002). Wirz and Egger stress that the work, far from being "easy," is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the unfeasible." In distinct contrast with Allison, they conclude that "it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon" (2003, 501-2). The Los Alamos scientists certainly agree: the design and building would require a base or installation at which experiments could be carried out over many months, results could be assessed, and, as necessary, the effects of corrections or improvements could be observed in follow-on experiments. Similar considerations would apply with respect to the chemical, fabrication, and other aspects of the program (Mark et al. 1987, 64-65). Although they think the problems can be dealt with "provided adequate provisions have been made," they also stress that "there are a number of obvious potential hazards in any such operation, among them those arising in the handling of a high explosive; the possibility of inadvertently inducing a critical configuration of the fissile material at some stage in the procedure; and the chemical toxicity or radiological hazards inherent in the materials used. Failure to foresee all the needs on these points," they conclude laconically, "could bring the operation to a close" (Mark et al. 1987, 62, emphasis added). The work would have to be carried out in utter secret, of course, even while local and international security police are likely to be on the intense prowl. "In addition to all the usual intelligence methods," note the Los Alamos scientists, "the most sensitive technical detection equipment available would be at their disposal" and effective airborne detectors used to prospect for uranium have been around for decades and "great improvement in such equipment have been realized since" (Mark et al. 1987, 60). Moreover, points out Langewiesche, people in the area may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals (2007, 65-69).8 In addition, the bombmakers would not be able to test the product to be sure they were on the right track (Linzer 2004; Mark et al. 1987, 64). The process of manufacturing an IND requires, then, that people with great technical skills be assembled, that they stay utterly devoted to the cause, that corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, remain utterly reliable, that no curious outsider gets wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off, and that international and local security services are kept perpetually in the dark. The finished product could weigh a ton or more (Mark et al. 1987, 55, 60). Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, and smuggled into, the relevant country, where it would be received by a dedicated and technically-proficient group of collaborators infiltrated or organized locally for the purpose. The weapon would then have to be moved over local and unfamiliar roads to the target site in a manner that did not arouse suspicion. At the target site, the crew, presumably suicidal, would have to set off their improvised and untested nuclear device hoping, and fervently praying, that the machine shop work has been perfect, that there have been no significant shakeups in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing, after all this effort, won't prove to be a dud.
--- AT: Cryogenics
Cryogenics fail – Incomplete results
Mauritsen and Smithgall, 10(9/10/10, Montana Instruments Corporation, “The Challenges of Low Temperature Research”, )
The study of material science at cryogenic temperatures is full of challenges. The nature of work at near absolute zero requires a thorough understanding of the interactions of the room temperature environment on the experimental space. A researcher and colleague once said to me, “The only thing worse than a high vacuum experiment is a cryogenic high vacuum experiment; If a cryogenic experiment is anticipated to take 3 hours, it will take three days, if anticipated to take 3 days, it will take 3 weeks.” Most often, the pain of low temperature research results in lost time and lack of complete results. Both of which are vital to a researcher who wants to be first to publish great data. Although closed-cycle low temperature systems have progressed significantly over the years, many applications require much greater performance than what is commercially available on the market. The state of the art technology available for optical cryogenic research still lacks in performance capabilities and makes low temperature research difficult and time-consuming for the scientist. Many issues remain unsolved.
Alternative instruments solve cryogenics
HSNW, 10 (4/20/10, Homeland Security News Wire, “The U.S. faces severe helium-3 shortages; nuclear detection, science suffer”, )
Hecht writes that lithium and boron also can be used in neutron detectors, so Oak Ridge is developing a lithium-based instrument. It will be less sensitive, however, than one based on helium-3. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington, is also developing new types of boron-based detectors, one using tubes filled with boron trifluoride gas, the other tubes coated with boron. Neither is as sensitive as a helium-3 detector, says Daniel Stephens of the lab, but like helium-3 both are blind to gamma rays, which can confuse other neutron detectors.
--- AT: Oil & Gas Exploration
Alternative measures solve Oil and Gas Exploration
AAAS, 10 (4/22/10, American Association for the Advancement of Science, “AAAS Workshop Explores How to Meet Demand for Helium-3 in Medicine, Industry, and Security”, )AY
For some applications—like ultracold physics, missile research, and medical imaging of lungs—there are no known alternatives, said Ronald Cooper, detector team leader at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. In this role, he has installed more than 3000 security systems for detecting neutrons; 75% of those systems have used helium-3. But Cooper said that helium-3 needs in some fields, including national security, oil well logging and road construction, could be met by developing alternatives. The U.S. oil and gas industry, for instance, uses about 2% of U.S. supplies of helium-3. The gas is used in neutron detectors lowered into oil and gas wells to help determine the hydrocarbon content, which indicates the presence of oil and gas. Brad Roscoe, scientific advisor and nuclear program manager at Schlumberger-Doll Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, said that a replacement for helium-3 must be reliable in the high-temperature, high-vibration, and small-size environment of oil well logging.
Environment Turn
Mining will destroy the moon’s environment
Smith, author of Moondust: In Search of the Men Who Fell to Earth, 7 (10/27/07, Andrew, The Guardian, “Plundering the moon; The new space race isn't focused on science or discovery, but is about exploiting lunar minerals,” , JMP)
Whether it turns out to be He-3, solar energy, or some as yet unknown technology that draws humanity back to the moon, there's an irony here. In 1968, Apollo 8 brought back the first shimmering image of an "Earthrise" as seen from the moon. Four years later, Apollo 17 came home with the famous whole Earth picture. These new views of our fragile, heartbreakingly isolated planet are often credited with having helped to kickstart the environmental movement - even with having changed the way we see ourselves as a species.
At present, nations are forbidden under international treaty from making territorial claims to the moon, but the same has hitherto been true of Antarctica, of which the UK government is trying to claim a chunk. Earth's sister has played a role in teaching us to value our environment: how extraordinary to think that the next giant leap for the environmental movement might be a campaign to stop state-sponsored mining companies chomping her up in glorious privacy, a quarter of a million miles from our ravaged home.
Aff requires large scale strip mining of Helium-3 from the moon
Beljac 7 Ph.D. Monash University (Marko, “He-3 Nuclear Fusion and Moon Wars”, May 22, , MBIBAS)
But, alas, let’s put this into some perspective. Firstly, He-3 mining may well be uneconomical, …Indeed for now, the economics of extracting and transporting helium 3 from the moon are also problematic. Even if scientists solved the physics of helium 3 fusion, "it would be economically unfeasible," asserted Jim Benson, chairman of Space Dev in Poway, California, which strives to be one of the first commercial space-exploration companies. "Unless I'm mistaken, you'd have to strip-mine large surfaces of the moon." While it's true that to produce roughly 70 tons of helium 3, for example, a million tons of lunar soil would need to be heated to 1,470 degrees Fahrenheit (800 degrees Celsius) to liberate the gas, proponents say lunar strip mining is not the goal. "There's enough in the Mare Tranquillitatis alone to last for several hundred years," Schmitt said. The moon would be a stepping stone to other helium 3-rich sources, such as the atmospheres of Saturn and Uranus… Secondly, nuclear fusion as a practical source of energy, even based on first generation fusion reactions, is a long way off. He-3 is even harder, but possible in principle.
***DISADVANTAGES
Obama Good Link
The plan will be contentious given recent spending disagreements
Holmes, 11 (David, 4/26/11, NY Daily News, “To the Moon! Congress proposes a bill that would establish a base on the Moon, could face Obama veto,” , JMP)
Good news, spaceheads!
If Congress has its way, we could be back on the moon as soon as 2022 -- for keeps.
Four U.S. House members have sponsored a bill that would establish a long-term base on the moon. According to the proposal, this mission would promote "exploration, commerce, science and United States preeminence in space as a stepping stone for the future exploration of Mars and other destinations."
The last manned moon landing was Apollo 17 in 1972. On that mission, astronauts Eugene Cernan, Ronald Evans and Harrison Schmitt spent three days on the lunar surface taking photographs and collecting samples.
But don't strap on those moon shoes just yet. Last year, Obama called for an end to NASA's moon program, so even if the bill passes both the House and the Senate, it could still be vetoed by the President.
In an April 15, 2010, speech on space exploration, Obama said, "Now, I understand that some believe that we should attempt a return to the surface of the moon first, as previously planned. But I just have to say pretty bluntly here: We've been there before."
Meanwhile, John Timmer of the tech website Ars Technica is skeptical that the bill will even get to that point, considering the recent spending disagreements that nearly led to a government shutdown earlier this month.
Timmer writes, "Given how contentious budget issues have been in the current Congress, any attempt to turn it into something concrete would probably make it a nonstarter."
--- XT: Obama Good Link
Link outweighs the turn --- benefits not understood and long term at best
Som, 10 – planetary scientist (7/16/2010, Sanjoy, Space Policy, “An international symbol for the sustained exploration of space,” volume 26, issue 3, pg 140-142, mat)
1. Introduction
Space exploration strategies have evolved substantially since their beginnings in the late 1950s, when they were closely associated with military technological prowess. Yet today, some 20 years after the end of the Cold War, space development is still considered a strategic asset. Technological achievements by one nation are often viewed as threats by others, as expressed by satellite-destroying missile demonstrations [1,2]. If history is a witness, then a space race between nations will not benefit humanity in the long run. The most ambitious space program of all time, to place a man on the Moon in a decade, illustrates the amount of resources necessary for such a bold endeavor to succeed. In 1966, during the height of expenditures of the Apollo program, NASA’s budget peaked at 5.5% of the US federal budget, compared with 0.5% today. In 2004, despite a substantial reduction of budget over the years, the US president presented a vision for a human return to the moon and Mars, in addition to a shift in NASA funding for the development of humanrated spacecraft dedicated to exploring those worlds as precursors to human settlements. In 2009, the Augustine report commissioned by the following US administration indicated that this vision was unsustainable with the current budget of the agency. Likewise, the bold vision of the European Space Agency (ESA) for Mars exploration, ExoMars, has been a victim of budget cuts, and will be a scaled-down mission done in collaboration with NASA. Space exploration spending at cold-war levels is not sustainable in the present economic realities of our society. Particularly after the worldwide economic downturn of 2008e2009, mass spending is viewed with a more cautious eye. This underlines the fact that space exploration is a particularly vulnerable field, because the associated benefits are typically poorly understood by the general public, and it is an inherently expensive discipline with non-immediate returns on investment. This provides a challenging environment for business ventures because bold explorations such as human lunar landings will, for the foreseeable future, require substantial costs beyond those that a private company can provide, particularly because of international technology transfer restrictions. Consequently, such bold exploration-enabling spending will only be achievable through cooperation between spacefaring nations, as is increasingly occurring [3,4].
Plan unpopular – even if the public likes it, spending will kill support
Johnson-Freese, 04 - chair of the Naval War College’s National Security Decision Making Department (Spring 2004, Joan, Naval War College Review, “SPACE WEI QI: The Launch of Shenzhou V,” Vol. LVII, No. 2, pp. 121-145, )RK
Chinese officials often state that they will take an approach to space designed for long-term development and infrastructure, rather than one based on the Apollo model, which they characterize as visiting the moon and then abandoning the effort. Any new manned space program undertaken by the United States ought to be part of a continuing plan for development, not one with primarily short-term political goals. That being the case, the desire and ability to carry the economic burden alone must be considered. With a rising deficit, eighty-seven billion dollars as the first rebuilding bill in Iraq, an economy still in recovery, and the ongoing costs of the war on terrorism, that the American people would be willing to pay the entire bill for a manned space exploration program—no matter how much they conceptually liked it—is doubtful. As pointed out, manned space has been consistently viewed by the public as a good thing to do but low on the list of funding priorities.
No political support for Moon exploration --- politicians don’t perceive its benefits
Thompson 11 (Loren, Chief Financial Officer – Lexington Institute, “Human Spaceflight”, April, , Georgia Debate Institute)
This all makes sense from a budgetary and scientific perspective. What’s missing is a grasp of the rationale required to sustain political support across multiple administrations. While exploration of the Moon’s far side or nearby asteroids may have major scientific benefits, those benefits are unlikely to be appreciated by politicians struggling to reconcile record deficits. NASA’s current research plans do not connect well with the policy agendas of either major political party, and the flexible path will not change that. To justify investments of hundreds of billions of dollars in human spaceflight over the next 20 years while entitlements are being pared and taxes are increasing, NASA must offer a justification for its efforts commensurate with the sacrifices required. Mars is the only objective of sufficient interest or importance that can fill that role. Thus, the framework of missions undertaken pursuant to the flexible-path approach must always be linked to the ultimate goal of putting human beings on the Martian surface, and the investments made must be justified mainly on that basis. The American public can be convinced to support a costly series of steps leading to a worthwhile objective, but trips to the Moon and near-Earth objects aren’t likely to generate sustained political support during a period of severe fiscal stress.
Plan unpopular --- unfunded liabilities and lack of media interest
Schmidt, Chairman of the Interlune-Interarms Initiative Inc., 3 (11/6/3, Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, moon/schmitt110603.doc, JMP)
It is doubtful that the United States or any government will initiate or sustain a return of humans to the Moon absent a comparable set of circumstances as those facing the Congress and Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson in the late 1950s and throughout 1960s. Huge unfunded "entitlement" liabilities and a lack of sustained media and therefore public interest will prevent the long-term commitment of resources and attention that such an effort requires.
No support for lunar development- overcomes public
Benaroya, 1- prof of Aerospace Engineering at Rutgers (Winter 2001, Haym, Cross Section, “Making Lunar Development Possible,” , mat)
Much of Benaroya’s recent work on lunar development focuses on a series of proposals he hopes will help to realize the goal of lunar colonization in the face of inadequate governmental funding for such a venture. While public interest in NASA remains high, there is very little public or political support for funding ambitious long-term projects involving manned lunar bases. He argues that such a project could be funded by private investment, provided that development was centered on intermediate, “self-profitable” steps. Such a plan would focus on “dual-use technologies” including smart structures (structures that are able to repair themselves), robotic systems, low-gravity production, instrumentation, and nanotechnology (the creation of extremely small machines). Companies funded to conduct this research could sell products developed using these technologies to become profitable, while the technology itself furthers progress toward lunar development. Benaroya suggests that the funding body, which he refers to as a lunar development corporation, could operate as a venture capital firm, investing in these companies to do research, and retaining the technology to further the long-term goal of lunar colonization. The possibility exists that a lunar colony, once established, could cater to space tourism. In fact, the Hilton Corporation has contracted architects to produce conceptual sketches of the interior of a lunar hotel.
--- Flip-Flop Link
Flip-flops destroy Obama’s political capital
Goddard 9 (Taegan, Creator – Political Wire, (One of the Most Widely-Read and Influential Political Web Sites on the Internet), "Does Obama Practice a Different Kind of Politics?", CQ Politics, 3-19, liveonline/51/landing, Georgia Debate Institute)
# Dan from Philadelphia: How quickly is Obama burning through his political capital? Will he have anything left to actually keep some of his promises? With potential shifts from his campaign stances on the question of Gitmo, Iraq troop withdrawals and taxing employer healthcare benefits, it seems he is in for tough fights on all fronts.
# Taegan Goddard: That's a great question. I think Obama spends some of his political capital every time he makes an exception to his principles -- such as hiring a lobbyist to a key position or overlooking an appointee not paying their taxes. Policy reversals such as the ones you note burn through even more of this precious capital.
--- 2nc Link Uniqueness
Obama being passive now on space policy
Whittington, 11 --- author of Children of Apollo and The Last Moonwalker and has written on space subjects for a variety of periodicals (4/1/11, Mark, “Rep. Bill Posey Argues for More Funding for NASA Space Exploration,” , JMP)
In a recent hearing before the House Budget Committee in preparation for a 2012 budget, Rep. Bill Posey, Republican of Florida, made the case for more funding for NASA's human space flight programs.
Most of the arguments Posey used were familiar. They included the need not to fall behind Russia and China in space exploration, technological spin-offs, and the need to maintain an aerospace work force.
The main thrust of Posey's arguments were directed against President Barack Obama's space policy, which the congressman suggested had left NASA with no clear mission as well as the White House's continuing opposition to funding space exploration. This, more than the other arguments, is likely to have some resonance for House members, Republicans as well as Democrats.
Whether one believes that Russia and China might eventually colonize the Moon—and opinions vary on that—there is a consensus with Congress about the president's space policy. Obama's space policy, sprung on the nation without consultation with members of Congress or anyone else, is dysfunctional in its execution and in its substance.
Posey's emphasis on the Moon is an interesting data point. The Obama space plan, such as it is, bypasses the Moon specifically, focusing on Earth approaching asteroids. Posey appears to believe, as was the consensus behind the Constellation program, that the Moon remains the next necessary destination for human explorers. If Posey's view is widely shared in the Congress, some specific language to that effect may appear in the upcoming NASA authorization bill.
NASA and the Obama administration is already chaffing over the requirement to build a shuttle derived heavy lifter by 2016, along with the Orion space craft. If a requirement is added to build a lunar lander, thus putting in place all of the elements needed for a return to the Moon, NASA and the White House are likely to chaff even more.
The future of human space exploration is in flux. NASA, the White House, and the Congress are pulling in different directions over what if anything human astronauts do beyond low Earth orbit.
Posey's testimony before the House Budget Committee is obviously the opening shot in what will be a long war over the future of space exploration that will likely not end before a new president is sworn into office. The authorization committees will try to find a sensible direction. The appropriations committees will try to fund that direction. President Obama, so far at least, has assumed a role of total passivity now that the old program is gone and the new one is, at best, uncertain.
Spending Link
Plan will cost billions --- more than it will produce
Lasker, 6 (12/15/06, John, “Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel,” , JMP)
However, there are those who doubt helium-3 could become the next super fuel.
Jim Benson, founder of space contractor SpaceDev, which helped build SpaceShipOne's engine and is a subcontractor of the Missile Defense Agency, said mining the moon for helium-3 doesn't pass the "net energy analysis" test. It would require more energy to retrieve helium-3 and bring it back than it would yield.
Just, sending mining equipment to the moon, and then returning processed helium-3 back to earth, would cost billions in rocket fuel, said Benson.
"We just don't have a need for helium-3," he said. "It's not practical."
Lunar colonization is prohibitively expensive --- and has no benefits
Lewis, 5- prof of Planetary Sciences at the University of Arizona (1/3/2005, Dr. John S., SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, Proquest Congressional, mat)
On April 1, 2004, the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics held a hearing on the suitability of the Moon for long-term scientific and commercial activities. A long-term human presence on the Moon is a primary component of the President's Space Exploration Initiative, announced January 14, 2004. The initiative does not specify particular science or technology goals for the mission, however. The purpose of the hearing was to develop these specifics by analyzing the Moon's potential as a base for space science research, including radio, infrared and optical telescopes, and our ability to use in situ resources for further exploration.
Witnesses for the hearing were Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Staff Scientist at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and Visiting Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute; Dr. Daniel F. Lester, Research Scientist at the McDonald Observatory of the University of Texas at Austin; Dr. Donald Campbell, Professor of Astronomy and Associate Director of the National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center (NAIC) at Cornell University; Dr. John S. Lewis, Professor of Planetary Sciences and the Co-Director of the Space Engineering Research Center at the University of Arizona; and Dr. Timothy Swindle, Professor of Geosciences and Planetary Sciences at the University of Arizona.
Summary of Hearing
Witnesses agreed that more research is necessary to determine whether the Moon could produce enough water to support a long-term human presence. Witnesses recommended detailed mapping surveys to determine the location, volume, concentration and accessibility of ice and hydrogen (which could be combined with oxygen to produce water) on the Moon.
Though witnesses said the Moon may contain recoverable stores of elements like oxygen, silicon, titanium, aluminum and calcium, Dr. Lewis was pessimistic about the economy of such lunar mining, saying in his statement, ". . .the cost of retrieval of lunar materials is certain to be very high, rendering the return of almost any lunar-derived product to Earth prohibitively expensive."
The witnesses agreed that helium-3 is the most promising output of lunar mining. Present on Earth only in vanishingly small concentrations, helium-3 could be a fuel source for fusion reactors. Such reactors have been in development since the 1960's, however, and are not yet a viable technology. Witnesses agreed with Chairman Rohrabacher's assessment that ". . .helium-3 has no value now and we are only talking about something that has value. . .if we can perfect fusion energy."
Dr. Lewis was critical of the idea of using the Moon as a base of operations for Mars missions: " The use of lunar-derived propellants, whether oxygen extracted from iron-bearing minerals. . .or hydrogen and oxygen made from polar ice, to support expeditions to Mars makes no logistic sense. The Moon is not 'between' Earth and Mars; it is a different destination, poorly suited to function as a support base for travel to Mars." Dr. Lewis argued that the fuel saved by refueling a Mars-bound craft at fueling station in orbit around the Moon is negligible; a direct flight to Mars would use an equal amount of fuel.
Witnesses also stated that advances in space-based telescopes negate most of the advantages of hypothetical Moon-based instruments. Dr. Lester said, " T he opportunities for lunar-based astronomy offer much less value, compared to observatories in free space, than had been anticipated several decades ago."
Though witnesses were critical of the Moon's commercial value and its value as a base for telescopes or Mars-mission operations, they agreed that the Moon is a scientifically valuable object and that crewed or robotic expeditions to locations such as the Aikin Basin could make unique contributions to our understanding of the early solar system and the evolution of the Earth.
Plan is absurdly expensive—prospecting alone costs 20 billion
Kosich and Jamasmie 10 (Dorothy Kosich and Cecillia Jamasmie, “Mining the Moon is Closer than Ever”
Technology Section; Mining Magazine, January 2010, ZBurdette)
Lunar prospecting is highly costly —close to US $20 billion over a decade. Rovers would have to descend into the polar craters to sample the deposits and test for ice. Then they would have to move on to other spots to form an overall map, much as wildcatters do every day in oil fields.
Requires huge capital expenditure
Ouellette, 11 (2/21/11, Jennifer, “This Moon was Made for Mining (Helium-3)” , JMP)
Lunar Prospecting?
And there's more! In 2009, NASA bombed the moon -- part of its Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission -- and observed grains of water ice in the remnants of the resulting plume, as well as light metals such as sodium and mercury, and volatile compounds like methane, ammonia, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrogen. This implies that the moon is chemically active -- via a process called "cold grain chemistry" -- and also has a water cycle. Where you have water ice, you have a potential mother lode for lunar prospecting of hydrogen.
Of course, we're talking about huge capital expenditures just to set up a mining base camp on the moon, and the economies of scale might not be there. If the benefits don't outweigh the costs, we might never see bona fide lunar prospecting. But it's a possibility that the US -- not to mention China -- is taking very seriously.
Mining Helium-3 alone costs $7.5 billion.
Stewart 9 (5/22/09, Nick, Northern Ontario Business, “Mining the moon a real possibility: former astronaut”, )
* Schmitt is a former US astronaut and senator, and works at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
Other costs, however, are much more daunting. Schmitt estimates that merely demonstrating the commercial viability of helium-3 fusion would require $5 billion, with another $5 billion required to recreate the proper class of heavy-lift boosters.
Another $2.5 billion would be needed to develop habitats and processing facilities for lunar settlements capable of annually producing 100 kilograms of helium-3.
Semi-automated mining robots will likely need to be part of the solution, Schmitt adds, as they will be "critical" to keeping down operational costs. Humans will still be needed to oversee operations and maintenance, however, meaning that a small operation could use a moon-mining crew of four, with two groups alternating on two shifts per day.
With these kinds of costs, global governments will likely be left out of the equation. Indeed, few governments have expressed an interest in the potential of lunar helium-3 fusion, with the exception of China.
As such, the only way such a project could become a reality is through support from the private sector, he says.
--- DA Turns the Case
Funding reductions empirically undermine space projects
Cheetham & Pastuf, 8 – Research Associate at the Goddard Space Flight Center NASA Academy (Brad and Dan, students in Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Buffalo, “Lunar Resources and Development: A brief overview of the possibilities for lunar resource extraction and development,” , JMP)
Section 4. Near Term Utilization and Development of the Moon
The following steps comprise a potential path to the future utilization of the Moon with a focus on economic justification leading to a permanent lunar presence. The focus of this section is on private investment and development of the Moon. Government involvement will be undoubtedly important initially but as has been seen in the past there are very few cases of sustained government funding for such a massive and ambitious program. As seen with the International space station, programs that are not funded appropriately do not accomplish their set goals and are scaled back to match available funding (Wilson). This negates the benefits of the program and ends up being costly for associated programs in the long run.
Oil Disad Links
Helium-3 key to reduce dependence on foreign oil
Arsenault in 10 - U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
House Committee on Science and Technology (April 22, 2010. “Caught by Surprise: Causes and Consequences of the Helium-3 Supply Crisis” )
Oil and gas exploration within the U.S. is a vital part of our national security and lessens our dependence on foreign oil and gas. The shortage of Helium-3 is starting to impact our entire industry. As rig counts increase and the request for well logging increases it will require more tools to be in service ready to go. Large companies can take stock piles of tools not in service during the slowdown in the last 2 years and put them back in service. Smaller companies will have less of a stock pile of tools not in service to pull from. With small companies such as ThruBit trying to increase our market penetration it creates an extra hardship limiting our ability to grow and bring our new technology to the market place.
Fossil Fuel Good Disad Links
Helium-3 will serve as a replacement for fossil fuels
Lasker, 06 (12/15/06, John, Wired News, “Race to the moon for nuclear fuel”, )
planned moon base announced last week could pave the way for deeper space exploration to Mars, but one of the biggest beneficiaries may be the terrestrial energy industry. Nestled among the agency's 200-point mission goals is a proposal to mine the moon for fuel used in fusion reactors -- futuristic power plants that have been demonstrated in proof-of-concept but are likely decades away from commercial deployment. Helium-3 is considered a safe, environmentally friendly fuel candidate for these generators, and while it is scarce on Earth it is plentiful on the moon. As a result, scientists have begun to consider the practicality of mining lunar Helium-3 as a replacement for fossil fuels.
The moon contains enough Helium - 3 to power the entire world, and is plausible in the short term
Reynolds 10 (July 5, 2010, The Globe and Mail, “Many Moons to Go, the Promise of Lunar Mining,” Comment Column, Pg A13. LexisNexis)
We don't need to travel billions of kilometres, however, to find a lunar landscape with abundant energy resources. Our own moon is a mere 384,000 kilometres away, four days by shuttle - less time than it takes to truck grapes from California to Toronto. China, for one, now appears to understand the strategic importance of Earth's moon: Chinese geochemist Ouyang Ziyuan, director of China's Lunar Exploration Program, says that a principal goal of China's space program is the mining of Helium-3, a non-radioactive isotope scarce on Earth but relatively plentiful on the moon.
By some calculations (including China's), a four-ton shuttle load of lunar Helium-3 per week would theoretically provide enough safe nuclear-fusion energy to meet the needs of the entire world. (The only practical Earth source for Helium-3 is apparently obsolete nuclear warheads.) Russian scientists have advanced similar analysis - suggesting that lunar mining could be under way by 2020, provided governments invested $6-billion in up-front funding.
***COUNTERPLANS
CP Space District
CP jumpstarts the private sector and solves space conflict.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
The important question is: "What sort of regime is desirable and is that regime possible?" To answer this, it is appropriate to begin with what the regime must do. It must (1) appeal to international consensus ("all mankind"); and (2) encourage private commercial space enterprise. The regime could come in many different sorts varying in degree from the rhetorical to the material. On the rhetorical extreme, the regime could be a document - either a constitution or a detailed treaty - that establishes what sort of exploitation may be done by whom in which places according to what processes for establishing claims, profits, and equitable sharing. On the material extreme, the regime could be instituted by a living organization, composed of elected or appointed administrators, with the resources necessary to such governance at hand - chief and foremost, a judicial or arbitration facility.
Either sort of regime could be agreed upon by international consensus, and in fact in the past, both have been the subject of international consensus. The Moon Treaty itself is heavier on rhetoric, because it is totally absent of any administrative regime. The Liability Convention and Registration Convention, by contrast, are heavier on material, being accompanied by complete administrative regimes. Here, the material sort would better encourage private commercial space enterprise because the exploitation of outer space will require a flexible and responsive regime to accommodate the enterprises' developing needs. If a rhetorical regime were drafted, the Moon Treaty would perpetuate its own short comings. It would be unresponsive to developing needs and would require further amendment, elaboration, or interpretation to respond to private commercial space enterprise's needs as they come up.
In the hope of encouraging discussion about what kind of material regime would best consider international interests while freely encouraging private commercial exploitation of outer space resources, I now suggest a skeleton for a potential international regime. Rather than settling for drafting another principled document, the international community could establish a more concrete, material regime in the form of a physical space [*259] district. This space district would be independent of any particular State sovereignty, instead of being dependent on an international consensus. Because the implementation of such a space district would be completely novel and its implications potentially farranging, the mere idea of such an international regime is indeed delicate. n87 Notwithstanding those delicacies, an independent, international space district could potentially resolve the conflicts between developed space-faring States and undeveloped Earth-bound States and between public sovereigns and private enterprise.
A space district, to be of any use, would first have to appeal to the international community. Developed spacefaring States may resent the fact that the authority for exploiting outer space resources is subject to the discretions of undeveloped Earth-bound States, that their unique "right" to exploit, created and paid for by commitments to economic, scientific, and technological development, could be reduced to a "privilege" by those who have not made and paid for such commitments. Undeveloped Earth-bound States, on the other hand, may find it appealing that the developed spacefaring States are so restricted from unilaterally exploiting space to their own advantage. The key to making the space district appeal to all sides is to establish the space district in a manner of sovereign neutrality.
Sovereign neutrality may perhaps be accomplished by having an international administration independent of particular sovereigns' influence govern the space district. That administration could perhaps be composed of a governance board of representatives of which half is appointed by certain member States of the United Nations and half is elected by all the member States. Or perhaps neutrality could be ensured by distinguishing participation in the space district by a certain kind of citizenship. That citizenship could resemble a sort of first "international citizenship," which could be either inclusive (a citizenship that can be maintained in addition to one's own original citizenships) or exclusive (a citizenship that can be maintained only in alternative to one's own original citizenships). That citizenship need not be structured as "international" either, if such an extension of citizenship is too novel and dramatic for too many national sovereigns. Less dramatic, although still novel in its own respect, would be to construct the citizenship as an altogether new citizenship independent of any other. That is, the international community would not be creating an international entity, but instead a new national entity created by the international community. After all, no rule states that a new nation can only be created by rebellion and secession - why not the peaceful creation of a nation, whose creation benefits all mankind? I will term this sort of "nation" as neither international nor exactly national, but instead supra-
[*260] national.
CP creates more egalitarian model of space exploration.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
How a space district could benefit all mankind is an important issue to address too. After all, to comply with the principles inherent in the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty, this space district must "equitably share" whatever profits or benefits exploitation of outer space produces. Whether the space district is structured as international or supranational, it must maintain some sort of relationship with "all mankind." Particularly if the space district is structured as an international entity, the simplest way to relate the space district to the international community would be by taxes. The proceeds of a space-district-targeted tax would be subject to distribution in the international community with due regard for each sovereign's involvement in space exploitation and also the inability to be so involved.
If the space district is structured as a supra-national entity, the simplest way to relate the space district to the international community would be by corporate distributions. n88 That may be best affected by, in addition to offering a unique brand of citizenship, offering companies a unique brand of incorporation. The benefits and profits of exploiting outer space could be purposefully funneled through international space corporations authorized to operate in the space district. As long as shareholding status is freely open to all citizens of the world - or if only to citizens of the space district, as long as the space district's citizenship is open to all the world - the citizens of any country, developed or undeveloped, would be freely able to invest in the exploitation of space and equitably receive a share of the returns.
Enterprises would participate – only venue and possible tax incentives.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
In addition to being internationally appealing, a space district must also effectively encourage private commercial space enterprises to exploit outer space. Perhaps, most dramatically, the space district could be given exclusive rights to exploit the resources of outer space. Private commercial space enterprise would then necessarily flock to the space district to operate rather than in their national contexts, provided the space district regulated space enterprise as effectively as sovereign States.
A space district would also have benefits inherent in physical consolidation that could encourage private commercial space enterprise. Specifically, the infrastructure and governance of all aspects of the space industry could be consolidated. Satellites and space vehicles could be constructed, tested and evaluated, launched, tracked, and returned in the same location. And the governing regulatory authority could be there through the entire development, launch, and return process to ensure compliance.
But why would all space enterprise, private or otherwise, want to [*261] operate in a space district? Perhaps a very powerful reason would be tax incentives. If companies and individuals living and operating in the space district were tax-favored, perhaps even tax-free, the space district could essentially serve as a space industry incubator - it would be a creative extension of zoning laws to incentivize a certain sort of development.
CP International Organization
Creation of an international regulatory body would be popular and solve property problems
Gagnon, 9 (11/23/2009, Jim, The Space Review, “A good old-fashioned space rush,” , mat)
There’s a tremendous opportunity in space right now, a rare alignment of technology and interests that only comes once every couple of generations. What’s missing is something to push it over the edge and get it flying, to pique people’s and industry’s interests in such a way that it takes off and is sustainable. In the wake of the Augustine report, many articles have been written discussing where to go and what launchers to use, but the most important aspect—the political one—has gotten scant attention. The Obama Administration is facing a spectrum of problems, most with more political prominence than space exploration. In order for the space community to get the resources it thinks it deserves, it needs to change that.
We need a truly compelling reason to make the leap into space and stay there, one that resonates with Americans and all peoples of the world at a visceral level.
Politics in the modern world is a “chase the money” affair. The Augustine Committee recognized that, hence the effort it spent on exploring the creation of economies in space. If the business community has a stake in space exploration, then the politicians will follow. The problem here is that existing space business either exists to service the military or government, or is in the grand scheme of things small potatoes. Any of the proposed new economies (low Earth orbit transport, space refueling, etc.) strike even the space enthusiast as a bit forced and vulnerable to social whim. After all, if the public decides it wants to save some money and leave the International Space Station effort, it also ends up saving money because it doesn’t need these forced economies any more.
We need a truly compelling reason to make the leap into space and stay there, one that resonates with Americans and all peoples of the world at a visceral level. One that grabs a businessperson’s imagination, and that loosens the purse strings of investors. One that is a politically a slam dunk; that crosses the aisle and solves a host of problems for the Obama Administration and Congress. I can come up with only one thing that does all this:
A good old-fashioned land rush.
America exists because it offered people the land and ability to pursue their hopes and dreams. The power of the untamed frontier is immense in the human psyche; so great that even though most of the first pioneers who came the New World died even more kept coming. Those first few who were able to hang and survive have left lasting and indelible legacies for not only all of us but especially their descendants. Families who count the survivors of the Mayflower are among the richest and most influential in America. That’s a powerful motivator for anyone.
However, as it stands today, it’s not possible for an individual, a corporation, or a country to own land anywhere in space. The 1960s Outer Space Treaty (OST) prohibits that; in fact, its terms are so strict that, in an extreme case, even if someone found a resource worth mining on the Moon and brought it back to Earth, it could be confiscated as ill-gotten gain. That needs to change.
The international community must recognize that the OST did its job: it prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from turning space into another battleground. It’s time to continue that work while taking into account today’s realities. Such an effort to selectively relax this treaty is a major undertaking, and most of the world will point out that it will, at least initially, serve the interests of perhaps half a dozen countries. If the door is opened on a new OST, the effort will have to be similarly all encompassing so that all nations will have a reason to throw their support behind it.
The power of the untamed frontier is immense in the human psyche; so great that even though most of the first pioneers who came the New World died even more kept coming.
The 1960s was a magic era for space exploration, and the best explanation for why it occurred is that President Kennedy, in proposing to land a man on the Moon, really plucked a decade from the 21st century and dropped it into the now. Mankind can do the same thing again. A grand stroke that would excite and unite people would be to take a page from Star Trek and create the Federation of Space Faring Nations, a united federation devoted to the peaceful exploration and colonization of space.
Any member of the Federation would have to offer to sell their space technology to any other member. Member nations would have to agree to strict nonproliferation terms and other nonaggression clauses. Part of the creation of this Federation would be a legal mechanism to selectively and progressively allow private ownership of land outside of Earth. The Federation would choose where to allow private ownership in stages, starting with the Moon and Phobos. First person there gets their forty acres, you bring your own mule. Of course, the plot would have to be continuously manned for some length of time, say five years, and every member nation would have to establish at least one outpost.
Politically, it works on several levels for the Obama Administration. It allows the US to use its space technology as a lure to pull other nations into its designs for nonproliferation and technology transfer, while providing cover for Congress to financially support America’s space effort. Governments and corporations would give space serious consideration, as certain parts of the solar system could be worth quite a lot in the future and they wouldn’t want to be left out. America’s corporate aerospace industry would benefit handsomely as it begins to build machines that allow anyone to claim their parcel in space.
Finally, the profit motive would function fully in space, and we would be in awe of how quickly humanity would spread in the bodies opened up by the Federation. Hope would be handed to a new generation because a powerful new mechanism will be built to prevent global conflict while opening up a new frontier—not only in their imaginations but in reality as well.
CP International Coop
CP avoids spending – cost sharing is the only way to make the plan affordable
Moltz, 10 – Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies (12/6/10, James Clay, Astropolitics, “Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,” vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 113-136, )RK
Third, as noted above, financial resources will have to be found to fund any national space strategy. The United States spent an estimated $5.5 trillion from 1940 to 1996 on the nuclear weapons complex and related delivery systems.54 This was an enormous amount of money, but the allotments were rarely questioned due to the strength of the national consensus behind the strategy of deterrence. We spent some $100 billion going to the Moon.55 Again, these costs were not widely questioned. The current Iraq and Afghanistan Wars are estimated to have cost in excess of $1 trillion. These expenses have been borne by American taxpayers, even though some have questioned the causes of the Iraqi conflict. Yet today, there seems to be much less of a consensus regarding space activity.
The problems of providing adequate funding to NASA or, alternatively, getting support for space weapons, both point to the lack of strong congressional support and popular questioning of the purpose of these activities, and how they relate to our nation's well-being. One option for a future space strategy is making the most important projects international efforts. Yet, while cooperation can reduce individual costs, it generally raises absolute costs and requires reliable partners—something that is difficult to predict. Spreading costs generally worked for the ISS, and might work for future manned lunar missions, lunar outposts, as well as the exploration of Mars. However, such an effort would entail long-term commitments and linkages to other national space programs, thus blurring the traditional lines between them even further. Yet, this may well be the future. On the military side, such cost sharing conflicts with national security concerns regarding technology. However, if a decision is made to pursue even limited defenses stationed in space, architecture requirements would make cost sharing highly desirable. At present, there are few countries interested in pursuing such systems, and the United States is still uncertain of the value of such technologies. An alternative effort to create multinational networks of military reconnaissance, communications, and navigation spacecraft could be a different tact. But, again, such a network would mean forming long-term cooperative agreements in the military space field and extensive burden-sharing forms of defense collaboration that have not been attempted in space to date. These may be the only way such large-scale systems are affordable, however. The same may be true about enhanced, future verification systems for international treaty compliance and monitoring. If countries truly want collective security in space, they have to realize that it is going to be expensive, and they will all have to share in the costs. Failure to develop a collective framework, on the other hand, will require states to provide for their own security through traditional, domestic means. The deployment of multiple, redundant systems for space defense will be much more costly for the “space system” overall and worsen harmful debris and traffic-related externalities. However, they would have the advantage of national control. In the near-term, some combination of the two approaches is probably most likely, absent either a major worsening of relations among the major spacefaring countries or some new political rapprochement around cooperative space surveillance and/or possible “policing.”
Cooperative efforts solve best – avoids backlash and conflict
Moltz, 10 – Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies (12/6/10, James Clay, Astropolitics, “Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,” vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 113-136, )RK
The tremendous work involved in bringing to completion the Obama Administration's space policy after 17 months in office—amid the welter of bureaucratic in-fighting involved—highlights the even greater challenges of developing a workable U.S. space strategy. For strategy development, there would have to be a serious study of the challenges we face in space, the range of resources we possess—national, allied, and friendly—and the likely reaction of potential adversaries. It must also offer a vision capable of rallying national and international support behind a set of practical priorities, such as settlement of the Moon or Mars, developing energy sources from space, or creating a shared response plan for dangerous near Earth objects, as well as more general philosophical goals, like freedom of access, service to Earth as a priority, or creation of an ever-expanding league of cooperating spacefaring countries. Given the extra-territorial nature of space itself and the increasingly international complexion of space activity, with the exception of the military sector, an old-style national strategy seems to be an overly limited approach. It is also not likely to succeed. Crafting an international strategy, however, requires agreeing to certain constraints on national sovereignty with the assumption of greater individual and collective gains. To date, such agreements have been difficult—but not impossible—to establish. The next set of robotic and manned lunar mission might offer test cases of such comparative strategies. Whether the problems of tomorrow in space might actually require such cooperation is a question worth asking. In the military sector, the growth of international responses to disasters, and of at least, coalition-based responses to security threats suggest that multilateral approaches may become more acceptable and desirable in the future. Such trends and the underlying reasons for supporting them (if such a decision is made) would need to be incorporated into a future space strategy.
The prospect that such a unified strategy might eventually include all nations in a common approach to space is not realistic today. In the meantime, we need to start by developing new mechanisms to prevent space conflicts among ourselves, and particularly the kind of kinetic conflicts that might render Earth orbital space unusable. The costs of failure in this mission are very high. Unfortunately, developing cooperative mechanisms for mutual restraint in space is not going to be easy. Even without a space strategy, the United States managed to survive the Cold War in space with the Soviet Union intact, and derived great benefit from it through participation in mutual military restraint mechanisms, both tacit and explicit. Perhaps, such past, bilateral cooperation could become a model of sorts for the future in space. Yet creating such mechanisms in a multilateral context may be more difficult, particularly if the space strategies developed by individual countries are fundamentally competitive. Fortunately, the status of relations among major states today does not mirror U.S.-Soviet hostility of the Cold War, and the forces of globalization, transparency, and information sharing may help us overcome obstacles to cooperation. In the end, understanding and acting upon our common interests as human beings in space may be the most difficult and most important element of any future attempt at space strategy.
Obama setting tone for space cooperation now, concrete follow through is key to maintain it
Moltz, 10 – Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies (12/6/10, James Clay, Astropolitics, “Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,” vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 113-136, )RK
The Obama Administration's space policy, released on 28 June 2010, changed the parameters for U.S. government's approach to space by shifting the focus from primarily unilateral means to fundamentally cooperative ones.25 While not denying the inherent national right to self-defense, the new policy pointed out “irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all of us.”26 In terms of strategy, the new space policy comes closer, than in its predecessor, in clarifying why the United States should approach space in the ways it outlines and in specifying how space might be better organized to achieve U.S. aims and overall humankind objectives in space. In particular, it outlines a set of core principles that it says both the United States and other nations should “recognize and adhere to,” including responsible action in regard to debris, general policies of transparency in space operations, non-interference with other spacecraft, the right to free passage, and, if necessary, self-defense.27 The document outlines further a need for the United States to show “leadership in space-related fora” and in the “enhancement of security, stability, and responsible behavior in space.” Unlike previous policies, it more clearly lays out that U.S. space security should be conducted by “leveraging allied, foreign, and/or commercial space, and non-space capabilities.”28 Finally, it makes clear that international enforcement mechanisms in space are needed, noting a goal of working with “civil, commercial, and foreign partners, to identify, locate, and attribute sources of radio frequency interference.”29
The strength of the 2010 National Space Policy as a strategy is its clarity of concept in the notions of “strengthened international collaboration and reinvigorated U.S. leadership.” Ironically, it is weakest in specifying how this might be done in the civil space arena; it failed to mention any possible human missions to the Moon and provides only a vague idea of Mars orbital exploration. It fails to clarify why we should proceed in this manner—versus other possibilities—and offers no specific goals for this effort or vision of how international cooperation, which plays so strongly in the rest of the policy, could be brought to bear to support these missions. Finally, in space security, it is better on process than on outcomes and ultimate goals. In other words, it states how we should begin working together, but it is less clear as to what specific ends, such as building a coalition of spacefaring organizations; establishing cooperative “policing” of space; strengthening the legal framework for space activity to make it more like Earth and air law; or establishing international settlement of low Earth orbit, the Moon, and other celestial bodies. These are difficult questions, however, and it is not realistic to expect that a national space “policy” is the right venue for considering them and laying out such a plan, which could also be controversial politically. To date (September 2010), implementation of this new National Space Policy remains in its early phases, and well-intended goals for outreach, cooperation, and improved space management may yet fall to victim to bureaucratic conflict, problems of prioritization, and difficulties in getting “buy in” from other countries. Thus, one cannot determine, at this time, how successful the new document will be in terms of strategy.
The counterplan is the best way to establish a cooperative relationship with China
Lele, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 10 (November 2010, Ajey, Space Policy, “An Asian Moon race?” ScienceDirect, JMP)
On 28 June 2010 President Obama announced the latest national space policy for the USA, which contains no specific mention of US interest in the Moon. However, the document does state that by 2025 the USA should began crewed missions beyond the Moon and, by mid-2030, send humans to orbit Mars and return them safely to Earth [47]. The same policy also states that a goal should be expanding international cooperation on mutually beneficial space activities. Looking at US relations particularly with Japan and India, it seems likely that the USA could engage these two nations in an ambitious human deep space programme. For the USA the days of a ‘contest’ for space supremacy are over and it is unlikely to mix its military requirements with a deep space mission. Financially and technologically, in the current climate, it would be extremely difficult for the USA to undertake a ‘solo’ programme. Just as happened with the ISS it is likely to prefer to have an international programme for this purpose and India and Japan could be the obvious choices. Since Obama’s space policy also promises to “pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space”, it may also attempt to engage China. Doing so (and, if possible, isolating/containing Russia – which has issues with the missile defence programme) is very important to start the process of the development of a 21st century space regime. The deep space arena could be the best arena in which to start such cooperation, because it will take a minimum of two to three decades to judge exactly how mankind stands to reap benefits from these planets and develop human colonies on them.
--- XT: China Coop
Cooperation creates global stability
Ressler, 09 – Major, USAF (April 2009, Aaron R., AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, “ADVANCING SINO-U.S. SPACE COOPERATION,” , DH)
Another benefit mentioned earlier is cost savings, which would be attractive for both nations. For most countries, budgets for space are insufficient or limited to the point where they depend on international space cooperation to meet their goals.85 Exceptions to this in some degree are Russia, the U.S. and China, as all have achieved their own manned space programs. President Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration” announcement in 2004 called for “redirecting NASA’s human exploration program from low Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars, and worlds beyond.”86 The timeframe specified in this announcement for the return to the moon was between 2015-2020, carrying a price tag of $104 billion.87 China too has ambitions for manned missions to moon, so spreading the cost could prove beneficial to both nations. 87 China too has ambitions for manned missions to moon, so spreading the cost could prove beneficial to both nations.
Increasing U.S. options with regard to manned spacelift could be a benefit in U.S. cooperation with China and is something the U.S. should consider for increased safety and logistics. History has shown that the U.S. was fortunate to have the cooperative programs it had with Russia when the shuttle fleet was grounded following the Columbia accident of 2003. If China were to become both a U.S. and ISS partner, the U.S. would eventually (assuming continued Shenzhou success) have another option besides Russia as a backup to deliver astronauts and supplies to the ISS.
Global stability is another possible benefit stemming from U.S.-China space cooperation.89 “Both China and the USA are important countries in global politics, economics, and space activity.” 90 Maintaining a healthy relationship between these two countries has positive global impacts.
Cooperation will work and is necessary
Ressler, 09 – Major, USAF (April 2009, Aaron R., AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, “ADVANCING SINO-U.S. SPACE COOPERATION,” , DH)
Both nations have voiced their openness to international space cooperation in their respective policies and both nations would likely benefit. Benefits such as cost savings, a redundant lift capability, and increased capabilities have proven beneficial with current and past partnerships, as demonstrated in U.S-Russia efforts. Gaining a partner versus a competitor in space will help develop communication, transparency and understanding between the U.S. and China with regard to their space programs and intentions which could ultimately deter China from exercising destructive counterspace activities. While China’s motivation in the pursuit of counterspace technology is not entirely clear, it has already demonstrated the destructive capability of these weapons. Doing nothing will continue to widen the gap between U.S. and China space programs, increasing space cooperation will help bring them together.
This test, however, brought criticism: “The deliberate destruction of a satellite in a highly used orbit—creating mass quantities of space debris that will remain a global danger for decades—has deservedly been met with U.S. and international opprobrium.” Given the vulnerabilities of U.S. satellite systems, the U.S. must take actions to make ASAT operations less attractive for China. It is the intent of this research to suggest the idea of cooperation between China and the U.S with regard to space in order to deter Chinese ASAT operations. Before discussing space cooperation between these two nations, I will first discuss China’s counterspace programs, its motivations for developing and using these capabilities, and the respective space programs of China and the U.S.
Cooperation would stop an ASAT attack and save money
Ressler, 09 – Major, USAF (April 2009, Aaron R., AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, “ADVANCING SINO-U.S. SPACE COOPERATION,” , DH)
Both China and the U.S. are open to international space cooperation, as noted in their respective policy documents on space and current cooperative programs. History has shown that both China and U.S. have gained from space cooperation, which could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations. Benefits. While possibly deterring Chinese ASAT operations, this deterrence would be a secondary effect (or benefit for that matter) of successful U.S.-China space cooperation. In order for this cooperation to take place, the benefits will have to outweigh the challenges (some which will likely be viewed as risks) for both nations. The first benefit of cooperation would be improved transparency.
Secrecy of China’s space program has led to a suspicious outlook by many critics of this program. Space cooperation between the two countries could be based on regular meetings which “could help the two nations understand each other’s intentions more clearly.”
With China as a partner, the U.S. would have better visibility and communication with the CNSA concerning China’s space activities, and the same would hold true for China. Reviewing China’s White Paper on its space policy and trying to make sense of its counterspace capabilities after the fact is the wrong approach. “If NASA signed an agreement with CNSA and began joint space projects, they would more easily and directly understand China’s space activities and directions.”
Another benefit mentioned earlier is cost savings, which would be attractive for both nations. For most countries, budgets for space are insufficient or limited to the point where they depend on international space cooperation to meet their goals. Exceptions to this in some degree are Russia, the U.S. and China, as all have achieved their own manned space programs. President Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration” announcement in 2004 called for “redirecting NASA’s human exploration program from low Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars, and worlds beyond.” The timeframe specified in this announcement for the return to the moon was between 2015-2020, carrying a price tag of $104 billion.87 China too has ambitions for manned missions to moon, so spreading the cost could prove beneficial to both nations.
Increasing U.S. options with regard to manned spacelift could be a benefit in U.S. cooperation with China and is something the U.S. should consider for increased safety and logistics. History has shown that the U.S. was fortunate to have the cooperative programs it had with Russia when the shuttle fleet was grounded following the Columbia accident of 2003. If China were to become both a U.S. and ISS partner, the U.S. would eventually (assuming continued Shenzhou success) have another option besides Russia as a backup to deliver astronauts and supplies to the ISS.88
Space cooperation with China deters ASAT’s and reduces costs
Ressler, 09 – Major, USAF (April 2009, Aaron R., AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY, “ADVANCING SINO-U.S. SPACE COOPERATION,” , DH)
After reviewing Chinese counterspace capabilities and possible motivations, the question at hand, again, is how can the U.S. make ASAT operations less attractive for China? To not do anything is an option since China broke no laws or treaties. 24 But what if China were to pursue continued and even more aggressive ASAT testing? Then there is always the option of multilateral treaties that could be designed to prevent or limit the weaponization of space. While this may appear to be an attractive option, a treaty of this sort could go against the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy which states that the U.S. intends to maintain its freedom to act in space. 25 U.S.-China space cooperation could be the ideal answer to deter Chinese counterspace testing and operations without significantly tying the hands of the U.S. with regard to maintaining freedom of action in space. The idea here is gaining a partner versus a competitor. Despite improvement in diplomatic and economic relationships between the U.S. and China, there has been very little initiative from the U.S. in entering into cooperative efforts with China in space activities. In fact, it was reported by Michael Griffin, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) current administrator, that the Bush administration failed to approve an “overture to
China for a cooperative U.S.-China space mission” in late 2008.” 26
Opening the doors toward increased cooperation with China in the space endeavor could present some attractive benefits. First and foremost, communication would improve between the two countries on space matters which would be essential in ultimately preventing further uncoordinated direct-ascent ASAT type activities. Currently, there is essentially no dialogue between the U.S. and China regarding military space issues. Another advantage of space cooperation is cost. The U.S. and China share similar goals, like returning to the Moon and eventually pursuing a manned mission to Mars. Space is expensive, so why not share resources and capabilities in the pursuit of such activities?
xxx
CP Consult
International consultation is key to maintain peaceful space relationships
Moltz, 10 – Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies (12/6/10, James Clay, Astropolitics, “Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,” vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 113-136, )RK
Second, a space strategy would have to consider the likely reaction of other space actors. It is unfathomable that other countries in the future will not watch what the United States does in space. As the leading space power today, all countries are likely to compare their efforts to those of the United States and, for rivals, to try to meet what they consider emerging space threats. As Waltz argues, “great powers always counter the weapons of other great powers, usually by imitating those who have introduced new weapons.”51 This raises the risks of U.S., Chinese, Indian, or other efforts to field space weapons and attempts to obtain a “dominance” position through offensive and defensive military means. Instead, any serious space strategy must take into account this “demonstration effect” and try to minimize negative foreign reactions through communication. As Johnson-Freese observes: “Strategic communication is the intersection between rhetoric, policy, action, and politics. It is an inherently difficult and messy business.”52 Yet, she also notes that it is also very important and should include a “listening” component.53
CP Lunar Commerce
Expanding the Lunar Commerce Executive Roundtable solves the aff- serves as a model that stimulates investment in the commercial sphere.
Duke and Fort, 5 - Institute for Space Resources at the Colorado School of Mines and Center for Space Research at the University of Texas (M.B. and B.O., Space Resources Roundtable VII (2005), “ LUNAR RESOURCES CONSORTIUM: A PRIVATE/PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP IN SPACE RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT”, ) NYan
The semiconductor industry developed a consortium approach that has successfully impacted the industry through the formation of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) and later Sematech. These organizations were created to allow corporations working in semiconductor development and production, which is a high cost and high risk technology industry, to pool resources where advancing the technology could serve the entire industry, while preserving the individual participants’ proprietary competitive positions in the industry. Sematech now maintains a “global network of alliances with equipment and material suppliers, universities, research institutes, consortia, start-up companies, and government partners [1].”
Such an organization could serve the purpose of developing a space resources industry. The scope of the organization would include developing new processes, materials, and tools; studying the economic impacts of space resource development; providing assistance and information to entrepreneurs willing to invest in a long-term but potentially highly profitable new arena; and serving as a model and stimulator of public/private partnerships in space exploration and development.
A step in this direction has been the formation of the Lunar Commerce Executive Roundtable, a collaborator in this Space Resources Roundtable/LEAG Conference. Additional progress should be made in the coming year. It is important to do so because: (1) space resource utilization is becoming firmly implanted in the concepts for the NASA program of human space exploration; (2) early lunar resource utilization provides greater benefits than waiting until later; and (3) the incorporation of commercial development into NASA’s space exploration program could reduce some government cost burdens. The enterprise will still be commercially risky from the point of view of private investment, so a space resources consortium similar to Sematech can reduce the risk to individual companies and provide a means for NASA to leverage its funding in this area.
Specific goals for the next year include: (1) establishment of the basis for a Lunar Resources Consortium, inorder to determine whether the concept is viable and can be broadly supported; (2) development of a set of conceptual business plans that demonstrate the potential economic benefits of lunar resources, so that entrepreneurs from outside the typical group of aerospace industries can be informed about viable possibilities and their technical risks; (3) evaluating current lunar resource production research in terms of adequacy and potential dual use technologies, to strengthen near-term economic incentives; and (4) conducting a Lunar Entrepreneurs Program, a business school competition, to interest and excite entry-level business people in the potential of space development.
CP Property Rights
Pseudo-property rights are legal and solve
Dinkin, 4- PhD economist (4/10/2004, Sam, The Space Review, “Property right and space commercialization,” , mat)
It’s time to start thinking about commercialization and colonization of the Moon and Mars. Fifty years after the Wright Brothers, we had global airlines. Fifty years after the invention of the integrated circuit we have a trillion-dollar-a-year industry. Cell phones alone account for tens of billions of dollars of government auction revenue. We need to make the regulatory environment for 50 years after Apollo now. An American private property regime and capitalist economic system can encourage space commercialization and colonization. A utopian property regime and a communitarian economic system will keep out commercialization and leave colonization and exploration in the realm of governments.
Consider what the regulatory environment like when the New World, and later the American West, were colonized. Sovereign authorities granted property rights for would-be colonists. In some cases, these colonists paid a good deal of money for their property rights. While there was plenty of reason to doubt the legal force of many of the land grants, they were nevertheless successful in sparking waves of colonization that created a frontier culture that in many ways facilitated the development of the airplane and integrated circuit. Patent rights were, of course, another critical ingredient to develop these industries.
The current advocates of space commercialization have the mindset of rocket engineers. They primarily focus on technology and usually ignore the regulatory and legal environment.
The Federal Communications Commission has adopted an excellent private property rights regime for telecommunications spectrum. Bidders have tendered tens of billions of dollars for property rights, then spent tens of billions more to deploy systems. By assuring these companies exclusive rights to the spectrum bands, they had the incentive to develop these bands and have created a major new industry.
Consider also some examples of failed attempts at economic development. In the Eastern Bloc countries, private property rights were poor. This directly resulted in little incentive for economic development and ultimately failed economic systems and shrinking GDPs.
These results are intuitive. Who takes better care of a house, an owner or a renter? By having a strong property rights regime, owners will invest in their property and everyone benefits.
The current advocates of space commercialization have the mindset of rocket engineers. They primarily focus on technology and usually ignore the regulatory and legal environment. Imagine a rocket engineer who has an excellent design for an inexpensive Mars base that will use in situ resources such as local water deposits. The rocket engineer proposes to send scouts to look for that water. The rocket engineer puts this proposal into a business plan and goes to potential funders. The funders may say that the engineering is sound, but still no funding comes. Investors do not have sufficient assurance that water found in the scouting expedition will be available when the time comes to build the base. Other Mars missions may extract the water in the intervening time and not pay any compensation to the prospector. On Earth we protect mining claims by granting exclusive exploration and extraction rights. Sometimes these mineral rights fetch a good deal of money in government auctions.
“Pseudo” property rights
In order to facilitate commercialization and colonization, there needs to be a property rights regime established. There are some impediments to private property in space, but they may not be insurmountable. The Outer Space Treaty says some things that the US and other signatories cannot do. The US cannot stake a sovereign claim in outer space. This effectively limits the property rights that the US can grant to its citizens. The Treaty does, however, ask that the US and other signatories closely monitor non-governmental activities, “The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” The Outer Space Treaty demands that we do this. Depending on how we regulate activities of US entities, we can bootstrap a private property regime by only granting a single US entity the right to exploit a certain tract on Mars. We will be expanding an American way of doing business into space.
In the United States, we have always monitored and supervised activities using a capitalist system. Here on Earth, we have property rights regimes for real estate, intellectual property, mineral rights, water rights, spectrum rights and airport takeoff and landing slots among myriad property rights that are bought and sold. I propose that we extend that regime into the heavens. A property right is a right to exclude someone from doing something. By excluding US citizens and corporations from doing certain things, the US can create pseudo property rights in outer space for other US citizens and corporations that are not excluded from doing so. These pseudo property rights in outer space would be just like the rights afforded by patents in the US patent system. By filing a patent, a company can exclude all other rocket companies from using a certain novel process or technique. But an outer space pseudo property right is also just like the title deed to a house—the deed gives me the right to exclude others from using my house. Excluding others from using something is creating a right that is tangible and valuable even if it is not technically a property right.
By excluding US citizens and corporations from doing certain things, the US can create pseudo property rights in outer space for other US citizens and corporations that are not excluded from doing so.
While it is not really a property right—since those are forbidden—these pseudo property rights would have the same effect as one if only US entities were in space. If there are two US non-governmental entities that both want to use a particular plot of land or a particular slice of radio spectrum in space, they need to obtain authorization from the United States. If the US only authorizes one of the entities to do so, that authorization could create a transferable property right that could be bought and sold like a US spectrum license or a piece of real estate. That authorization would have the force of law.
Specifically, the US should recognize individual and corporate pseudo property rights. There are a couple of ways the property rights can work. One way is like title deeds that entitle the property holder to non-interference from the United States and all of its citizens in perpetuity. Another way is more like water rights, mineral rights or spectrum licenses that entitle the holder to lease for a specific use for a specific amount of time and require the licensee to undertake development of the lease within a set amount of time or lose the lease.
The US should begin to regulate these pseudo property rights. We should register them. We should hold hearings on them. We should auction them off in some cases where there is contention just like for spectrum licenses or government land. We should hold the money in trust until the international community decides who should get it. The President should establish a property rights regime by executive order that is later written into law by Congress.
The property rights might not be sufficient to spark investment. Having a piece of paper from the United States saying that no US entities may interfere with what you are doing does not necessarily give a US person or business the right to do something. There may be prior claims on the resources and there may be international actors that do not recognize US property rights. However, since there is no proven enforcement mechanism for prior claims, they are unlikely to deter investment if a new strong property rights regime were established.
Regarding international contention, the Outer Space Treaty gives the US the right to ask for a consultation before someone interferes with a US space activity. “A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.” While this is not as ominous as a complaint through the WTO or NAFTA, it is something. We would hope that the US would undertake to sign reciprocal bilateral agreements with countries willing to coordinate their space activities with us. That is, if we adopt a policy that allows a US business to have an exclusive and defined territory to scout for ice at the lunar South Pole and Australia is willing to do the same, then we can jointly manage the registry of who is authorized to do so. The US should take steps to expand property rights in space with a little of the vigor we use to extend copyright agreements, open skies policies and international telecommunications spectrum standards that we pursue on Earth.
One could interpret Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty to mean that damages might be due if another country’s spacecraft infringed the property of US “natural or jurisdictional persons”. “Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.” While this is not the main meaning of this Article which primarily protects people on the ground from debris, it could become the main meaning as in situ resource utilization gets going to support exploration.
If we do nothing, space will look a lot more like Antarctica than Alaska.
This might not be enough to assure entrepreneurs that their investments will be their property, but don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good. The US is the center of a good fraction of the global economy and the space economy and if the US leads, other like-minded nations will follow. On Earth, countries that honor property rights are in ascendance. One surmises they will ascend in space as well. If bilateral agreements and the Outer Space Treaty do not provide an adequate regulatory environment for commercialization and colonization, then perhaps the treaty should be amended or the US should withdraw.
Space property rights will probably not spark a space transportation boom that will rival the railroad boom, the airplane boom, or the automobile boom. But there will be no boom if there are no property rights. Leaving the regulatory regime the same is a recipe for continued sclerosis.
If we do nothing, space will look a lot more like Antarctica than Alaska. Without property rights there will not be adequate investment and space resources will be underutilized. Establishing property rights in space will cost millions, not billions, and can be done decades ahead of any commercialization or colonization. It’s time to set the stage to break out of the exploration mode of Columbus and get on with establishing the regulatory regime to lay the foundation for the next Plymouth Rock.
Offering lunar property rights is legal and solves development
Reynolds, 8- prof of law (June 2008, Glen Harland, Popular Mechanics, Vol. 185, Iss. 6, proquest, mat)
Could allowing lunar property rights lead to a "Moon rush"? Sure. but that's a good thing.
The moon has been in plain view for all of human history, but it's only within the past few decades that it's been possible to travel there. And for just about as long as the moon has been within reach, people have been arguing about lunar property rights: Can astronauts claim the moon for king and country, as in the Age of Discovery? Are corporations allowed to expropriate its natural resources, and individuals to own its real estate?
The first article on the subject, "High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty," was written by Princeton legal scholar John Cobb Cooper in 1951. Various theoretical discussions followed, with some scholars arguing that the moon had to be treated differently than earthbound properties and others claiming that property laws in space shouldn't differ from those on Earth.
With the space race in full flower, though, the real worry was national sovereignty. Both the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to reach the moon first but, in fact, each was more worried about what would happen if they arrived second. Fears that the competition might trigger World War III led to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which was eventually ratified by 62 countries. According to article II of the treaty, "Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."
So national appropriation was out, along with fortifications, weapons and military installations. But what about private property rights -- personal and corporate? Some scholars argue that property rights can exist only under a nation's dominion, but most believe that property rights and sovereignty can be distinct.
In something of an admission that this is the case, nations that thought the Outer Space Treaty didn't go far enough proposed a new agreement, the Moon Treaty, in 1979. It explicitly barred private property rights on the moon. It also provided that any development, extraction and management of resources would take place under the supervision of an international authority that would divert a share of the profits, if any, to developing countries.
The Carter administration liked the Moon Treaty, but space activists, fearful that the sharing requirement would subjugate American mineral claims to international partners, pressured the Senate, ensuring that the United States didn't ratify it. Although the Moon Treaty has entered into force among its 13 signatories, none of those nations is a space power.
So property rights on the moon are still the subject of international discussion. But would anyone buy lunar land? And what would it take to establish good title?
The answer to the first question is clearly "yes." Lots of people would buy lunar land -- and, in fact, lots of people have, sort of. Dennis Hope, owner of Lunar Embassy, says he's sold 500 million acres as "novelties." Each parcel is about the size of a football field and costs $16 to $20. Buyers choose the location -- except for the Sea of Tranquility and the Apollo landing sites, which Hope has placed off-limits.
To convey good title, Hope essentially wrote the U.N. to say he was going to begin selling lunar property. When the U.N. didn't respond with an objection, he asserted that this allowed him to proceed. Although I regard his claim to good title as dubious, his customers have created a constituency to recognize his position. If he sells enough lunar property, it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
So there's demand, even for iffy titles. But what would it take to establish title, rather than Dennis Hope's approximation? That's not so clear. In maritime salvage law, which also deals with property rights beyond national territory, actually being there is key: Those who reach a wreck first and secure the property are generally entitled to a percentage of what they recover. There's even some case law allowing that presence to be robotic rather than human. Traditionally, claims to unclaimed property require long-term presence, effective control and some degree of improvement. Those aren't bad rules for lunar property, either. But who would recognize such titles?
Individual nations might. In the 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, the United States recognized deep-sea mining rights outside its own territory without claiming sovereignty over the seabed. There's nothing to stop Congress from passing a similar law relating to the moon. For that matter, there's nothing to stop other nations from doing the same.
Ideally, title would be recognized by an international agreement that all nations would endorse. The 1979 Moon Treaty was a flop, but there's no reason the space powers couldn't agree on a new treaty that recognizes property rights and encourages investment. After all, the international climate has warmed to property rights and capitalism over the past 30 years.
I'd like to see something along these lines. Property rights attract private capital and, with government space programs stagnating, a lunar land rush may be just what we need to get things going again. I'll take a nice parcel near one of the lunar poles, please, with a peak high enough to get year-round sunlight and some crater bottoms deep enough to hold ice. Come visit me sometime!
University of Tennessee law professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds is the author (with Robert P. Merges) of Outer Space: Problems of Law and Policy.
CP Mine Asteroids
Cheaper and better resources
Jakhu & Buzdugan, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 8 (September 2008, Ram & Maria, Astropolitics, “DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS,” Volume 6, Number 3, JMP)
Scientists believe that asteroids contain rare elements and water as well.11 Some argue that mining the asteroids would involve lower costs than retrieving lunar resources and the quality of asteroidal material, such as free metal—iron-nickel—and volatiles— water, carbon, and others—is generally deemed superior to lunar material.12 The technology to be applied in mining and basic processing of asteroidal material may soon be available.
CP Mine Other Lunar Minerals
Irvine, 6 (12/18/06, Dean, “Mining the moon for a nuclear future,” , JMP)
Professor Manuel Grande of University of Aberystwyth led the British involvement of the European Space Agency's Smart-1 mission to observe the moon. He believes that focusing on mining self-sustaining minerals would be more beneficial than trying to harvest and then transport helium-3.
"It is dubious whether it will ever be economically viable even if nuclear fusion works commercially or if helium-3 is a better option than other elements available on earth," he told CNN.
"There are plenty of other minerals on the moon that would be easier to get at and help provide resources for a self-sustaining base. Oxygen could be derived from ilmanite reserves there and water could be extracted to make rocket fuel or sustain life on a base.
"Put it this way, I wouldn't buy shares in the moon for the economic return. Lunar tourism will be the first money maker there," Manuel Grande told CNN.
***Competitiveness Advantage COUNTERPLANS
1nc CP Competitiveness / Engineering
Text: The United States federal government should change its pay towards teachers by significantly raising the pay to math teachers over other subject areas
CP solves
Hedman 6 - chief technology officer of Logic Design Corporation (Eric, “A Fascinating Hour with Gerald Kulcinski”, January 16th, , MBIBAS)
**Kulcinski = University of Wisconsin. Kulcinski is the Associate Dean for Research, the Grainger Professor of Nuclear Engineering, and the Director of the Fusion Technology Institute
The big recent change is that China now graduates more engineers than the US and Europe combined. The students in China no longer have to come here to get a world-class education. Students that still come here from China and India are now being lured back home by the incredible opportunities in their rapidly-developing countries. According to Professor Kulcinski, universities in China are aggressively recruiting Chinese professors at American universities, with some success. Professor Kulcinski said this trend was good for China and India and probably the world as a whole, but not so good for our country and our competitive position.
We talked over different things that could be done to encourage more of our best and brightest students to go into engineering and the sciences. For me and many of my generation the biggest inspiration was watching Neil Armstrong set foot on lunar soil. Professor Kulcinski said for his generation it was Sputnik.
I recently received an email response to one of my articles from a teacher that was dead set against human spaceflight. He told me that he had never had a student tell him they were inspired by any of the manned spaceflights. He didn’t believe that inspiring children was a valid argument for the space program. When I related this to Professor Kulcinski he put it in context with what he is seeing among incoming students. Many of the nuclear engineering students have a clear vision of why they want to be nuclear engineers. Some of the students have a desire to help provide clean safe power. Others are interested in nuclear power systems for space applications, including propulsion. In nuclear engineering there are more students that want to be in the program than there are slots for them. By comparison, in mechanical and electrical engineering there are fewer qualified applicants than available slots. One of the ideas Professor Kulcinski thinks may work to bring more students into engineering and the sciences is to get better math teachers by paying them significantly more than teachers of other subjects. The best engineers I know are not motivated primarily by money, but by what they want to do with their lives. Nevertheless, they still do like money. I believe the same is true about teachers, so I don’t know if this would work. I haven’t as of yet heard of anything better to try.
1nc CP Education / Gropman
The United States federal government should implement the educational recommendations of Alan Gropman.
Solves education and competitiveness
Gropman, 8 – Distinguished professor of National Security Policy at the National Defense Institute (June 2008, Alan L., National Defense, “Waning Education Standards Threaten U.S. Competitiveness,” , mat)
The soft power knowledge gap is evidenced in the low international ranking of U.S. students in history and geography. The U.S. education system also lacks adequate capacity to offer courses in strategic languages and where language courses are offered, they are rarely mandatory.
As a result of these trends and the international threats to economic and technical superiority, the United States should consider the need for greater federal involvement in education, said the ICAF study. This involvement can be accomplished by leveraging federal budget authority and by encouraging appropriate state and local actions.
To address the inconsistency in state academic achievement standards, the reauthorized No Child Left Behind Act should include funding for the development and implementation of mandatory national assessment tests and associated minimum performance standards for all U.S. public school students.
In addition, the legislation should incorporate a national board certification that requires all public school teachers to meet minimum standards.
Congress should pass the American Competitiveness Initiative as part of the reauthorized No Child Left Behind Act. The ACI should improve math and science education essential for the continued global competitiveness of the United States.
The reauthorized NCLB Act should require secondary school teachers to have degrees in math and science in order to instruct these classes. With this requirement, the federal government must provide the resources and time necessary to facilitate appropriate retraining and certification.
In the area of international and foreign language education, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy. There are more than 30 international education programs administered by four federal agencies, and these efforts are not well coordinated, the ICAF study said.
The government also should boost funding and accelerate the implementation of the current National Security Language Initiative.
Governments at all levels should consider tax relief and exemptions to aid teacher recruiting and retention. Other potential tools at the state and local levels include compensation incentives such as signing bonuses, tuition reimbursement, loan forgiveness, insurance, day care and housing assistance. In addition, merit pay systems which reward certification, gains in student performance, and teaching in difficult to staff subject areas (math, science, language, and special education) are also effective incentives to increase retention.
Teachers do not leave college with all the skills necessary to excel in the classroom. Effective teaching demands keeping pace with new technology and techniques. Likewise, teaching requires sophisticated leadership skills both inside and outside the classroom. Therefore, local districts should create career development positions to help manage teacher continuing education, professional development and career progression. Effective education professional development programs must include leadership training at all levels.
Research shows that quality teaching is one of the most significant factors in improving student performance, and more importantly, closing the gap between the lowest and the highest performing students
Teacher quality has been extensively debated, is difficult to define beyond credentialing criteria and even harder to measure. There is no certification program today that is accepted by all states. Concerns over teacher shortages are growing, especially in the math and science fields. While experts disagree about the nature and extent of the problem, recruitment and retention of the right quality and quantity of teachers is critical. This urgency is compounded by increasing student enrollments, class size reduction initiatives, declining college enrollments in teaching programs, the aging of the current teacher workforce, continuing budgetary pressures, and the prevalence of alternate teacher certification to meet the growing demand.
The United States spends more money per secondary student than most other nations, yet the nation continues to demonstrate disappointing performance on international standardized tests. On a per-pupil basis and adjusted for inflation, public school funding has increased 24 percent from 1991 through 2002. State and local governments provide approximately 91 percent of the funding with the federal government contributing the remaining 9 percent. Local governments are under significant fiscal pressure since they provide more than 44 percent of the overall funding, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
In the area off higher education, funding and associated student costs are also of concern. The largest portion of revenues for the average four-year public college or university comes from state appropriations at nearly 36 percent. Sales, including educational activities, auxiliary enterprises, and hospitals run by the universities, provide revenue of approximately 22 percent. The federal government provides 11 percent of direct support; tuition accounts for 18 percent. This federal support consists of grants and contracts. However, these figures are understated since they do not account for federally subsidized student tuition.
1nc CP R&D Tax Credit
The United States federal government should offer a tax break worth twenty percent of research and development spending to research consortia consisting of three or more companies, collaborative research at federal research laboratories, and universities.
Increased R&D grants and tax breaks solve innovation
Segal, 11- PhD, Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and National Security Studies (6/6, Adam, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Innovation and Economic Recovery,” , mat)
R&D is the starting point for innovation--the discovery that, under the right conditions, can spark the creation of a whole new industry and drive economic growth. The government's role in funding basic research has become even more important as business has shifted away from funding "blue sky" projects with uncertain immediate commercial use but with the promise of big breakthroughs. Alcatel-Lucent, for example, announced in 2008 that Bell Labs--responsible for six Nobel Prizes as well as the invention of the transistor, the laser, and numerous other communication and computer technologies--would no longer conduct basic research in material physics and semiconductors, but instead would focus on networking, high-speed electronics, wireless, software, and other commercial applications.
The Obama administration has signaled its intention to try and fill this gap with federal funds. While the FY 2012 budget proposes $148.9 billion for federal research agencies, a slight decrease (0.3 percent) from FY 2010, its 10.6 percent increase ($66.9 billion) for basic and applied research will produce the largest federal research investment in real terms in history, according to the American Association for Advancement of Science (PDF). Federal investment in R&D, however, remains hostage to the larger political debate about how to reduce spending and the deficit.
No matter the final numbers, it is essential that the money funds high-risk, high-return R&D. Hard times make scientists more conservative, as they seek to secure grants by writing proposals that extend what they already know, not striving toward something new. To counteract the tendency to stay in comfortable territory, more money should be directed to early-career grants and to support well-designed failures--ideas that push the envelope of accepted paradigms.
To counteract the tendency to stay in comfortable territory, more money should be directed to early-career grants and to support well-designed failures--ideas that push the envelope of accepted paradigms.
The results of federally funded R&D are widely available and thus mobile. It is entirely possible that companies can develop the findings of basic research to create high-wage jobs outside of the United States. The R&D tax credit can be used to ground these results locally by forging ties among industry, universities, and government. Research consortia involving three companies or investments in collaborative research at a federal research laboratory or an American university could be offered a tax break equal to 20 percent of their R&D spending.
Basic scientific research remains essential to economic growth and to other American priorities, including military power and the reduction of the country's dependence on foreign oil. The point, however, is not just to fund more, but to ensure that it is cutting-edge and local.
The United States federal government should
- Extend R&D tax credits on a permanent basis
- Substantially reduce barriers to potential immigrants with experience in mathematics and science
- Increase federal investments in early-stage research and applications
Solves innovation
Nichols, 11- President and CEO Emeritus, New York Academy of Sciences (6/6, Rodney W., Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Innovation and Economic Recovery,” , mat)
Three clusters of essential actions are time-tested for spurring innovation. The first might be labeled "tried and true" principles. One such principle is to reduce regulatory hurdles for introducing new products, such as medical devices and new drugs through the FDA. Patient safety need not be compromised. Another is to refrain from adding environmental rules that block the expansion of energy production, such as in the search for new sources of oil and gas with modern technologies. Environmental risk need not be raised. A further step is to extend the R&D tax credit on a permanent basis so that firms can plan their commitments to science and technology with greater certainty. These steps reopen the tides of Schumpeter's "creative destruction" in the United States and strengthen America's inherent global advantage.
A second cluster, about human capital, is more long range. Foremost is K-12 education in science and math. Many leaders are demoralized about trying to fix the schools. Yet even in our decentralized system, the federal government can help by jawboning and pressing for more competition, experiments, and higher performance, i.e., deep reforms that stick. And, of course, let us also open our doors to immigrants who are talented professionals, and welcome more foreign investment in high-tech sectors.
Even in our decentralized [education] system, the federal government can help by jawboning and pressing for more competition, experiments, and higher performance, i.e., deep reforms that stick.
A third initiative is increasing the federal investments in fundamental research and in the early-stage applications by all of the mission-oriented agencies. This has become harder as our fiscal squeeze has become an almost unbearable vise. While it is a tough sell to make a public case for taxpayer-paid voyages of discovery when the unemployment rate is 9 percent, the only way to spark innovation is to push the frontiers. Federal spending on all of R&D is about $145 billion this year, and that is under intense budgetary pressure. Yet there is no way to achieve innovation on the cheap. So I recommend adding 10 percent this year and 5 percent for each of the next five years; that would send a powerful, confidence-raising signal to the American technological community, and to rest of the world, that the United States is coming raring back.
Goethe once said about science: "To one man it is the highest thing, a goddess; to another it is a productive cow who supplies them with butter." We must honor the goddess and feed the cow.
The United States federal government should condition research grants on universities giving their faculty freedom the license.
Mandating freedom of licensing solve incentives to innovate
Litan, 11- PhD in economics, Vice President, Research and Policy, Kauffman Foundation (6/6, Robert E., Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Innovation and Economic Recovery,” , mat)
Mention the need for the federal government to stimulate more innovation, and the typical response is to seek more money for R&D. Not only is this first impulse misplaced, it is now not likely to be satisfied in a future marked by greater budget austerity.
But do not despair. By fixing the rules that govern the commercialization of faculty-developed innovations, the federal government can encourage more ideas and help bring them to market more quickly without having to spend any more money.
The typical contract university scientists have with their universities has two important elements. One feature requires them to share any profits they may earn from royalties or other income generated by the commercialization of their ideas. The other key contract clause limits them to using their university's technology licensing office (TLO) to license their technologies, either to companies faculty may create or to other enterprises.
Although faculty would be further encouraged to come up with new ideas with commercial potential at a faster rate if they owned all of the intellectual property in their discoveries, universities can plausibly argue they deserve some of the gains from faculty-inspired successes because they pay their salaries and give them a place to work.
There is no legitimate rationale for universities having a monopoly on deciding how to commercialize innovations developed by their faculty. Universities don't act that way when it comes to faculty publications; why should they call all of the shots on the licensing of ideas?
If faculty inventors had the freedom to make their own licensing decisions, they would no longer be at the mercy of TLO bureaucracies. A true market in licensing services would develop, just as it has for other inventors.
The government can and should speed the development of such a market--and the accelerated commercially relevant innovation it would generate--by conditioning research grants on universities giving their faculty freedom to license. End this artificial monopoly on licensing and watch how the magic of the market can produce a win-win for all: benefiting universities with more licensing revenue and consumers with the more rapid availability of new products and services.
1nc CP Visa / Small Business
The United States federal government should
- Increase the number of H1B visas available and streamline the application process for high skill applicants
- Expand the Small Business Administration to smaller cities
- Allow a portion of early-stage investments to be written off against current income
Kick starts innovation
Dougherty, 11- Senior Fellow for Business and Foreign Policy at CFR (6/6, James P., Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Innovation and Economic Recovery,” , mat)
In a rapidly changing world, wrought by incessant technological advances and global dissemination of technology, America must respond to keep its seat at the head of the economic and innovation table. There are three straightforward actions that can be taken that would have large and immediate benefits.
Aggressively improve the H1B visa process
First, strategically simplify and speed up visas for the best and brightest from around the world. The United States may have already hit a negative tipping point, which we hope can be reversed, but we must move quickly. In 2008, all 65,000 H1B visas were gobbled up the first day of availability. In 2011, only 16,500 visas were applied for on the first day! This is a stunning turn of events that is harmful to U.S. interests.
The economic downturn and better options in home countries definitely have an impact. But the fact is that many very talented people with choices don't want to go through the hassle of the U.S. visa system. It is viewed as unfriendly, long, and unpredictable. Whether that impression is right or wrong, that's how it is often perceived. The Congress and the State Department should make it an urgent priority that these highly qualified individuals are always welcome in the United States, as they have been for most of our history.
The Small Business Administration should select a meaningful number of cities and set out to bring together local universities, existing businesses, and entrepreneurs to jumpstart local innovation organizations.
Enable and encourage entrepreneurship
Second, the Small Business Administration (SBA) should catalyze innovation organizations across the country. Such organizations as Y Combinator and TechStars are great examples that grew organically in places where concentrations of innovation already existed and are doing great work fostering entrepreneurship. What needs to happen is to spread this type of organization to smaller cities throughout the country.
SBA should select a meaningful number of cities and set out to bring together local universities, existing businesses, and entrepreneurs to jumpstart local innovation organizations. SBA could, in addition to providing seed money, offer access to facilities, best practices, and connections to other centers. But it must be done strategically and with the specific mission to replicate innovation organizations across America to empower entrepreneurs, the bedrock of our national economy.
Encourage risk capital
With technology advances allowing for lower costs and faster times to launch new companies, early-stage risk "angel" capital increases in strategic importance. To encourage risk capital, the government should allow some portion of early-stage investments to be written off against current income. Maintaining a low capital gains tax rate is crucial as well. The SBA could also augment the innovation centers just mentioned with organized angel investor activities. Growing the size of risk capital and the number of angel investors is more important than ever.
***Helium-3 Advantage Counterplans
1nc CP Tritium
Text: The United States Federal Government should:
1. Raise the approved level of Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rod per Light Water Nuclear Reactors per cycle to its capacity.
2. Approve the transfer of tritium from Canada Deuterium Uranium Heavy-Water Nuclear Reactors to the United States.
3. Extract Helium 3 from all of its natural gas reservoirs.
The counterplan solves- fuels Helium 3 production
Shea and Morgan, 10 (12/22/11, Dana A., Congressional Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Daniel, Congressional Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service, “The Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress”, )
Potential additional sources of helium-3 include increased production of tritium in light-water nuclear reactors (beyond the amount already produced for the weapons program); extraction of tritium produced as a byproduct in commercial heavy-water nuclear reactors; production of either tritium or helium-3 using particle accelerators; and extraction of naturally occurring helium-3 from natural gas or the atmosphere. Until recently, the ready supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program meant that these alternative sources were not considered economically attractive. With the current shortage, this consideration may change. Tritium from Light-Water Nuclear Reactors The production of additional tritium at the TVA reactors (or by similar means at other reactors) would increase helium-3 production correspondingly. The Watts Bar reactor currently irradiates 240 TPBARs per refueling cycle. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has generically approved the use of approximately 2,300 TPBARs per reactor per cycle. 22 If this capacity were fully utilized at Watts Bar and Sequoyah, annual helium-3 production from the resulting additional tritium could eventually increase by approximately 25,000 liters.
The counterplan solves net better- sustains the development of alternative technologies
Anderson, 10 (4/22/11, Tom, PRODUCT MANAGER, REUTER-STOKES RADIATION MEASUREMENT SOLUTIONS, GE ENERGY, “CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS”, )
DNDO and the Integrated Project Team have played a key role in responding to the helium-3 shortage. I believe DNDO is exploring the most practical options available to produce helium-3. Short of planning a trip to the moon, as was discussed this morning, to mine helium-3, the most promising near-term prospect is to accelerate work with the Canadian government to harvest the helium-3 from the tritium storage beds at Ontario Power Generation. Expeditious recovery and processing of this gas could be used to sustain helium-3 detectors for applications such as oil exploration and nuclear safeguards while replacement technologies are developed.
--- 2nc Solvency
The counterplan would yield significant amounts of helium, and it’s economically and technologically viable
Shea and Morgan, 10 (12/22/11, Dana A., Congressional Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Daniel, Congressional Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service, “The Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress”, )
Natural gas reservoirs typically contain impurities as well as the primary component of natural gas, methane. In some cases, these impurities include significant amounts of helium (up to several percent). Suppliers of natural gas often extract this helium in order to increase the energy content of their natural gas and improve its combustion. When a reservoir is relatively helium-rich, it can be economic to purify the extracted helium and sell it as a commodity. In fact, natural gas is the primary commercial source of helium. Domestic natural gas producers extract approximately 80 billion liters of helium each year. 32 Since 1960, the federal government has maintained a stockpile of raw (unpurified) helium at a facility near Amarillo, Texas. 33 The original purpose of the stockpile was to ensure the availability of helium for national security uses. In the Helium Privatization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-273), Congress mandated the sale of all but a small portion of the stockpile by 2015. At the end of FY2009, however, more than 500 billion liters of helium remained in the stockpile. 34 Helium extracted from natural gas, including helium stored in the national helium stockpile, consists mostly of helium-4 but also includes a small proportion of helium-3. The natural gas industry has not historically separated the helium-3 from the helium-4 because, until recently, the federal supply of helium-3 was perceived to be already greater than the likely demand. An important cost consideration is that some of the processes required to extract helium-3 from natural gas are already undertaken in the production of natural gas and commodity helium. Helium-containing natural gas is purified by liquefaction—cooling it to a temperature at which the natural gas becomes liquid but the helium remains a gas. The helium is separated and then purified by further liquefaction—cooling to a still lower temperature at which the impurities become liquid. The most likely processes for separating helium-3 from helium-4 take place at even lower temperatures, so the fact that helium produced from natural gas is already very cold becomes an important cost advantage. If separation of helium-3 from natural gas took place in conjunction with other natural gas processing, much of the energy required for cooling, and much of the cost of infrastructure and equipment for liquefaction and separation, would already be built into the cost of processing the natural gas.
Counterplan solves – tritium from CANDU reactors provide a large supply of He3 in the short term
Shea and Morgan, 10 (12/22/11, Dana A., Congressional Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Daniel, Congressional Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service, “The Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress”, )
Some nuclear reactors, primarily foreign reactors built on the Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) design, use heavy water as a moderating material. Over time, neutrons produced by these reactors convert some of the deuterium in the heavy water into tritium. Some reactor operators, concerned about radiation exposure, remove the tritium from the heavy water when it exceeds a certain concentration. There are currently no commercial heavy-water reactors in the United States, but some foreign facilities have tritium stockpiles that reflect multiple years of operation and separation. Because tritium decays into helium-3, these foreign tritium stockpiles are a potential source of helium-3. Separation of helium-3 from this tritium, while a known industrial procedure, would require specialized facilities and equipment, permits from appropriate government authorities, and perhaps operational changes. Most of the world’s CANDU reactors are located in Canada. Other countries with one or more such reactors include Argentina, China, India, Pakistan, Romania, and South Korea. 28 The international nature of the CANDU reactor operators may provide additional challenges to using them as a helium-3 source. Each government would likely need to approve the transfer of tritium, a dual-use material, to the United States. 29 Some of the tritium produced in past operation of heavy-water reactors has already decayed into helium-3 according to its 12.3-year half-life. That helium-3 has probably not yet been separated from the stored tritium, and it seems likely that some or all of it remains available. If so, that helium-3 could provide a larger supply in the near term than the annual production available in subsequent years from continuing decay of the stored tritium. According to one estimate, the tritium stored at Ontario Power Generation in Canada could produce 130,000 liters of helium-3 over ten years: 20,000 liters per year for the first three years and 10,000 liters per year for the next seven. 30 The amount potentially available from other heavy-water reactors is unknown. The cost of helium-3 from this source is unknown, because it would depend on the price charged for tritium by the foreign supplier. There would also be some costs for separating the helium-3 from the tritium and for storing the remaining tritium as it decayed. Tritium or Helium-3 from Particle Accelerators During the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program considered alternative approaches to producing tritium, especially irradiating lithium with a linear accelerator rather than in a nuclear reactor. In 1998, DOE decided not to proceed with accelerator production of tritium, except as a possible backup option, after concluding that it would be more costly and less flexible than producing tritium in a light-water reactor. Given that decision and the government’s subsequent investments in tritium production infrastructure, it seems unlikely that accelerator production of tritium could be an advantageous source of helium-3. In principle, helium-3 could also be produced directly in an accelerator process, without intermediate production of tritium. Preliminary estimates suggest, however, that this process is impractical on cost grounds. 31
***Rare Earth Element Advantage Counterplans
1nc CP Afghanistan
Text – the United States federal Government should mine Rare earth elements in Afghanistan
The counterplan lowers our dependency on china – this solves
Coppel 11 - research assistant at the American Security Project. Ms. Coppel graduated from Miami University in 2009 with a degree in International Studies and French. She is currently a graduate student at the George Washington University, working towards her Master’s degree in Security Policy Studies(2/14/11, Emily, “Potential Rare Earth Mines in Afghanistan” Potential Rare Earth Mines in Afghanistan,bs)
According to an Associated Press article, Afghanistan may have large deposits of rare earth metals, estimated by the Department of Defense to be worth $89 billion. There is, however, a problem:
[The rare earth deposits] are in one of the country’s most dangerous spots, on the south bank of the Helmand River in southern Afghanistan, where fighting rages in a traditional Taliban stronghold.
However, if the mines could be opened, it would prove beneficial to both the U.S. and Afghanistan:
“This deposit could represent a long-term opportunity for Helmand province, creating jobs and stabilizing the area,” a statement said.
Rare earth metals are used in a wide variety of products, including cell phones, hybrid car motors, and military equipment. In addition, the U.S. is almost entirely dependent on China for its supply of rare earth metals. As detailed in a previous ASP report, this dependency on one country for critical resources negatively affects our national security.
While these new mines in Afghanistan would allow the U.S. to diversify its rare earths supply chain, and would also help protect the U.S. from a Chinese embargo of rare earth metals, it will not improve the security of our supply chain.
This is why the U.S. must continue to look for new mining locations and expand its domestic mining capabilities. We cannot continue to rely on foreign mining and production capabilities. The reopening of the Mountain Pass, California mine is a good start.
--- 2nc Solvency
Mining Afghanistan solves China monopoly and cleantech
Mulliken 10 – Green energy news (6/15/2010, Bruce, THE PRESIDENT'S CLEAN ENERGY BREAKTHROUGH. )
Just as the possibility of an the early season tropical storm is announced, the New York Times runs a story on its website, “U.S. Identifies Vast Riches of Minerals in Afghanistan.” Reporter James Risen writes, “The previously unknown deposits – including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium – are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world, the United States officials believe.”
“An internal Pentagon memo, for example, states that Afghanistan could become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium,” a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and BlackBerrys,” Risen continues. He doesn’t mention batteries for electric cars and the president’s clean energy vision.
As those words are being read a chain reaction of discussion sets off in the business world. Because of Afghanistan’s new riches, estimated at $1 trillion, Obama gets his first clean energy breakthrough: plenty of lithium supplies in a partner nation where the US has a “presence” of 100,000 troops. Even if it takes years to develop Afghanistan’s resources, there’s confidence that there’s enough lithium on the planet to move ahead with battery electric car development.
Here the story thickens and turns to fiction. The president’s opposition begins asking questions. How long has he known about Afghanistan’s lithium? Did he know before he announced troop buildups? Was our commitment there more about a clean energy agenda than stabilizing a nation and ridding it of terrorism?
But with lithium for batteries secure for the future, the President gets his clean energy bill passed. With lithium supplies secure and costs dropping, there’s more investment in battery technology and electric cars. Jobs begin to grow.
As the story continues, the US economy improves with clean transportation at its core, especially when the two remaining breakthroughs for electric transportation are made: The technology to cheaply manufacture lithium-based batteries is perfected and the next generation of lithium battery chemistry emerges: lithium air. Lithium-air battery packs are developed that are no heavier than a tank of gasoline while holding the same energy content. Range on a full lithium-air battery pack is the same as a tank of petrol. Then lithium-air moves to new heights: electric powered aircraft.
Finally the thriller ends not in the Gulf but in Afghanistan twenty years in the future. Turbines churn in the reliable breezes funneling from mountain passes once the stomping ground for terrorists. Clean wind energy runs the mineral mining operations and the now wealthy economy as a whole. Once just a crossroad for trade in the days of Genghis Khan centuries ago, the nation becomes a destination. There are ski slopes in the infamous and deadly Khyber Pass.
Before this bright future can happen the Afghan government, and the Taliban, will need some convincing.
--- Afghanistan Will Say Yes
Afghanistan would say yes – mining offers great opportunities
Asia news, 11 (2/18/2011, “More than US$ 3 trillion in rare earths and precious metals under Taliban feet” $-3-trillion-in-rare-earths-and-precious-metals-under-Taliban-feet-20817.html, bs)
Mining offers Afghanistan great opportunities. In addition to revenues from selling mining rights, developing these resources would create jobs for miners in an undeveloped region of the country, as well as for chemists, physicists and engineers involved in exploration and development. They would also lead to infrastructural development in transportation and communication and stimulate trade.
1nc CP Critical Minerals Policy Act
Text: The United States federal government should pass the Critical Minerals Policy Act.
CP solves their rare earth advantage
Kosich 11 (“U.S. Senators introduce bipartisan Critical Minerals Policy Act”, 30th May 2011, , ZBurdette)
Seventeen U.S. Senators, representing both Republicans and Democrats, Thursday introduced the Critical Minerals Policy Act, which seeks to "revitalize the United States critical minerals supply chain and reduce the nation's growing dependence on foreign suppliers."
The legislation directs the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a list of minerals critical to the U.S. economy and provides a comprehensive set of policies to address each economic sector that relies upon critical minerals."
The measure's chief sponsor, Ranking Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee member Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, said, the act will modernize "our policies for production, processing, environmental protection, manufacturing and recycling. Through this act we will ensure more opportunities for domestic jobs, technological innovation, increased national security and greater competitiveness."
The act would establish an official process to assess and designate minerals as critical in terms of potential supply restrictions and importance to energy, defense and health-care applications. It would also establish an interagency working group on critical materials to facilitate greater exploration and development of domestic critical minerals. The legislation would also establish a critical minerals research and development program at the Department of Energy on recycling technology and possible alternative materials.
National Mining Association CEO Hal Quinn noted, "Our import dependence for key mineral commodities has doubled in the span of two decades. This is not a sustainable trend, particularly in a highly competitive world economy in which the demand for minerals continues to grow."
"The Critical Minerals Policy Act of 2011 and the National Strategic and Critical Minerals Policy Act of 2011 [introduced by Rep. Doug Lamborn of Colorado] set forth a constructive plan of action that will enable American businesses and innovators to develop and make the products and technologies that will propel our economy, allow us to compete globally and improve the quality of our lives," he added.
NEMA, the national association of electrical and medical imaging equipment manufacturers, also endorsed the legislation. CEO Evan R. Gaddis said, "The bill specifically recognizes the importance of critical materials for many NEMA industries, including but not limited to arc welding, lighting, electrical motors, superconducting wire, advanced batteries, and medical imaging."
Legislation co-sponsor Kay Hagan, D-North Carolina, said the measures also includes "my Powering America's Lithium Production Act, which increases domestic production of advanced lithium products that will power the cars and smart grid of the future."
Fellow co-sponsor Mike Enzi, R-Wyoming, said, "If we want to compete with China, the country that controls more than 90 percent of the world's known rare earth minerals, American companies need access to American rare earth minerals. Expanding the development of domestic sources will expand American businesses, help us compete internationally and is key to our economic growth."
"These elements have become increasingly important as global demand has soared," said co-sponsor Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Missouri. "Our ability to build fighter engines, missile guidance systems and space satellites will be jeopardized in the coming years if we don't encourage entrepreneurship and innovation. China's choke hold on world markets diminishes our national security and threatens our economy."
If enacted into law, the bill will require the U.S. Geological Survey to "develop a rigorous methodology for determining which minerals are critical, and then use that methodology to designate critical minerals."
It also requires the Secretary of Energy to conduct a R&D program to facilitate the more efficient use and recycling of critical minerals, as well as alternatives that can reduce the demand for them. The Secretaries of State and Energy are also directed to promote international cooperation on critical mineral supply chain issues and provides an avenue for technology and information transfer via diplomatic channels.
The Secretary of Interior is directed to complete a comprehensive national resources assessment within four years of the bill's enactment for each mineral designated as critical.
The measure also authorizes basic and applied research on novel uses for cobalt; adds helium projects as an eligible category for DOE guaranteed loans; and directs the Secretary of Energy to support research and development programs for lead, lithium, and low-btu gas.
The bill also requires the Secretary of Interior to update existing resource information for phosphate, potash, and REE.
The Secretary of Energy is also directed to conduct a study on the technical, economic, and policy issues associated with establishing a licensing pathway for the complete thorium nuclear fuel cycle.
To avoid duplication, the legislation repeals two previous congressional acts, the National Critical Minerals Act of 1984 and the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research, and Development Act of 1980.
Co-sponsors of the Critical Minerals Policy Act also include Sens. Ben Nelson, D-Nebraska, Jim Webb, D-Virginia, James Risch, R-Idaho, Roy Blunt, R-Missouri, John Barrasso, R-Wyoming, Kent Conrad, D-North Dakota, Thad Cochran, R-Mississippi, Mark Begich, D-Alaska, Dean Heller, R-Nevada, Debbie Stabenow, D-Michigan, John Hoeven, R-North Dakota, and Joe Machin, D-West Virginia.
--- 2nc Solvency
CP secures access to REEs, boosts the economy, and competitiveness
SM 6/6 (Scrap Monster, San Jose newspaper, “Green organizations support US Critical Minerals Policy Act”, , ZBurdette)
A few of environmental conscious organizations have come forward supporting the Critical Minerals Policy Act, a bipartisan bill introduced to the Senate last week and aimed at reducing the U.S.’s dependence upon unreliable foreign suppliers such as China for its rare earths and other critical minerals.
The Bill was introduced by 17 Senators, both Republicans and Democrats. The legislation directs the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a new list of minerals critical to the U.S. economy and provides a comprehensive set of policies designed to address each economic sector that relies upon critical minerals.
Rare earths and other critical minerals are essential to the manufacture of green technologies including wind turbine generators, advanced solar panels and electric car batteries. They are also used to produce modern military defense systems such as laser-guided missiles.
Currently, China supplies more than 95 percent of the world’s rare earths, creating serious economic and security vulnerabilities for the U.S. and its allies. In recent years, China has reduced export quotas, raised mineral taxes and restricted mining licenses in an effort to tighten its stranglehold over the critical elements.
“Improving access to these minerals will help keep American companies competitive, protect the U.S. economy and help create jobs,” said Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Neb.), one of the bill’s supporters. “They are found in every high-tech device and are critical for defense and aerospace technologies, necessary for the continued development of the renewable energy industry, and have many agricultural applications.
“This is an issue of making sure American companies have access to the resources they need to be successful,” he said.
Green Technology Solutions, Inc. a leading company offering clean mining solutions to the acquisition of rare earths, gold and other materials used in the latest green-tech innovations (OTCQB: GTSO) is working to help increase the availability of rare earths and other critical minerals in the U.S. through its efforts to develop new rare earth mines in Mongolia, the Republic of Congo, Botswana, Kenya and elsewhere.
The company is currently preparing to make its first shipment of rare earth ore from Mongolia to South Korea, a key military and economic ally of the U.S.
The next generation of green technology — electric car batteries, wind turbine generators, photovoltaic solar panels — is made possible by precious elements mined from the earth’s crust, and the world’s dependence on these substances is rising fast.
Today, these rare elements largely come from some of the most environmentally damaging mines in the world.
CP secures REE resources
Critical Minerals Policy Act of 2011 (“Background and Section-By-Section”, , ZBurdette)
Minerals are the building blocks of our nation’s economy. From rare earth elements to molybdenum, we rely on minerals for everything from the smallest computer chips to the tallest skyscrapers. Minerals make it possible for us to innovate and invent – and in the process shape our daily lives, our standard of living, and our ability to prosper. There is no question that an abundant and affordable supply of domestic minerals is critical to America’s future. And yet, despite that, our mineral-related capabilities have been slipping for decades. Rare earth elements garner most of the headlines, but according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the United States was 100 percent dependent on foreign suppliers for 18minerals in 2010 – and more than 50 percent dependent on foreign sources for some 25 more. To revitalize the domestic, critical mineral supply chain, Senator Lisa Murkowski and sixteen of her bipartisan colleagues introduced the “Critical Minerals Policy Act” on May 26, 2011. The bill provides clear programmatic direction to help keep the U.S. competitive and will ensure that the federal government’s mineral policies – some of which have not been updated since the1980s – are brought into the 21st century. The legislation starts by directing USGS to establish a list of minerals critical to the U.S. economy and, pursuant to those designations, outlines a comprehensive set of policies that will bolster critical mineral production, expand manufacturing, and promote recycling and alternatives – all while maintaining strong environmental protections.
SPONSORS
The Critical Minerals Policy Act is sponsored by Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and
co-sponsored by
Senators Ben Nelson (D-NE), Jim Webb (D-VA), James Risch (R-ID), Kay Hagan(D-NC), Roy Blunt (R-MO), John Barrasso (R-WY), Mike Enzi (R-WY), Kent Conrad (D-ND),Thad Cochran (R-MS), Mark Begich (D-AK), Dean Heller (R-NV), Mike Crapo (R-ID), DebbieStabenow (D-MI), John Hoeven (R-ND), Claire McCaskill (D-MO), and Joe Manchin (D-WV).
SECTION-BY-SECTIONSec.1. Short Title and Table of Contents –
Establishes the bill’s official title and lists the provisions included in each of its three titles.
Sec.2. Definitions –
Key terms for the bill include critical mineral, critical mineral manufacturing and rare earth element.
TITLE I—DESIGNATIONS AND POLICIESSec.101. Designations
– Requires USGS to develop a rigorous methodology for determining which minerals are critical, and then to use that methodology to designate critical minerals.
Sec.102. Policy
– Establishes that it is the policy of the United States to promote an adequate, reliable, domestic, and stable supply of critical minerals, produced in an environmentally responsible manner, to strengthen and sustain the nation’s economic security. Also requires the President to coordinate federal agencies’ actions in support of this policy.
Sec.103. Resource Assessment
– Directs the Secretary of the Interior to complete a comprehensive national resource assessment within four years of the bill’s enactment for each mineral designated as critical under Sec. 101. Authorizes field work for the assessment, as well as technical and financial assistance for States and Indian tribes.
Sec.104. Permitting
– Creates a high-level, interagency working group to optimize the efficiency of permitting in order to facilitate increased exploration and production of domestic critical minerals. Requires the working group to review requirements, quantify delays, recommend improvements, and develop a performance metric for evaluating progress.
Sec.105. Manufacturing
– Authorizes memoranda of agreement between States and the Federal government to optimize the efficiency of environmental reviews and permit applications for new critical mineral manufacturing facilities. Adds “critical mineral manufacturing related to the deployment of clean energy technologies” as an eligible category for the Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program.
Sec.106. Recycling and Alternatives
– Requires the Secretary of Energy to conduct a research and development program to facilitate the more efficient use and recycling of critical minerals, as well as alternatives that can reduce the demand for them.
Sec.107. Analysis and Forecasting
– Establishes a collaborative effort between USGS and EIAfor annual reviews of domestic mineral trends as well as forward-looking analyses of critical mineral production, consumption, and recycling patterns.
Sec.108. Education and Workforce
– Provides for workforce assessments, curriculum development, worker training, and associated grants to academic institutions.
Sec.109. International Cooperation
– Directs the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy to promote international cooperation on critical mineral supply chain issues and providesan avenue for technology and information transfer via diplomatic channels.
TITLE II—MINERAL-SPECIFIC ACTIONS Sec.201. Administration
– A savings clause to clarify that none of the minerals listed in Title IIpresuppose which minerals should be designated as critical under Sec. 101 of the Act.
Sec.202. Cobalt
– Authorizes basic and applied research focusing on novel uses (includingenergy technologies and super alloys) for cobalt.
Sec.203. Helium
– Adds “helium projects” as an eligible category for the Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program and requires the existing resource information for helium to beupdated..
Sec.204. Lead
– Directs the Secretary of Energy to support well-coordinated research on advanced lead manufacturing processes capable of reducing environmental impacts.
Sec.205. Lithium
– Directs the Secretary of Energy to provide grants for the research, development, demonstration, and commercial application of advanced lithium battery technologies.
Sec.206. Low-Btu Gas
– Directs the Secretary of Energy to support research, development,commercial application, and conservation programs that expand the domestic production of low-Btu gases, including programs related to membrane technology research, helium separationtechnologies, and industrial helium. Projects promoting low-Btu gas are added as an eligiblecategory for the Department’s loan guarantee program.
Sec.207. Phosphate
– Requires the existing resource information for phosphate to be updated.
Sec.208. Potash
– Requires the existing resource information for potash to be updated.
Sec.209. Rare Earth Elements
– Requires the existing resource information for rare earth elements to be updated.
Sec.210. Thorium
– Directs the Secretary of Energy to conduct a study on the technical,economic, and policy issues associated with the establishment of a licensing pathway for thecomplete thorium nuclear fuel cycle.
Sec.211. Updated Resource Assessments –
Requires the Secretary of the Interior to updateresource information for helium, phosphate, potash, and rare earth elements.
TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUSSec.301. Offsets
– To avoid the duplication of authorities related to critical minerals, twoprevious Acts of Congress are repealed, in whole or in part: the National Critical Minerals Act of 1984 and the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research, and Development Act of 1980.
Sec.302. Administration
– A savings clause to clarify that nothing in this Act displaces theauthorizations included under “Geological Survey” of the first section of the Organic Act of March 3, 1879.
Sec.303. Authorization of Appropriations
– Authorizes a total of $106 million for the variousactivities, programs, authorizations, and requirements of the Act.
1nc Advantage CP
The United States Federal Government should
- Stockpile rare earths
- Develop new domestic mines
- Increase international cooperation on issues regarding rare earth policies
- Develop Effective Substitutes for Rare Earth Metals
- Developing new technologies that increase the efficiency of rare earth metals and that allow for better recycling of rare earths
The counterplan solves for the short and long term
Coppel 11 - research assistant at the American Security Project. Ms. Coppel graduated from Miami University in 2009 with a degree in International Studies and French. She is currently a graduate student at the George Washington University, working towards her Master’s degree in Security Policy Studies. ( 2/1/2011, Emily, “Rare Earth Metals and U.S. National Security” )
Stockpile Rare Earths. While stockpiling rare earths is not a long-term solution (eventually stockpiles will run out), it is a good stop-gap measure until new technologies or mines are available. A few countries, such as Japan and South Korea, already have strategic stockpiles of rare earth metals. 12 China will begin stockpiling rare earths this year. 13 Even in the U.S., such stockpiles are not unprecedented. The U.S. currently stocks petroleum, helium, and medical supplies in case of an emergency. 14 In fact, at one point the U.S. did stock rare earth metals in its National Defense Stockpile, but these were all sold by 1998. 15
Develop New Mines. Experts estimate that it would take anywhere from 10-15 years to have a new mine up and running efficiently, assuming everything goes according to plan and there are no unforeseen setbacks. 16 There are several places where mining would be a worthwhile venture, including Thor Lake in Canada, which possibly contains one of the world’s largest deposits of rare earth metals. 17 The U.S. is currently working on reopening the mine at Mountain Pass, California, and expects it to be fully operational by the end of 2012. 18 Experts believe that North American mines alone could produce as much as 40,000 metric tons of rare earth metals per year, or double what the U.S. currently uses. 19 If the U.S. could fully develop these mines, it would have sufficient rare earths to supply its domestic needs, as well as enough to satisfy future growth in demand.
Increase International Cooperation. Increased international cooperation and dialogue should go a long way towards alleviating the shortage of rare earth metals. Countries can work together by jointly investing in new mines, signing a formal “rare earth treaty,” or even making informal agreements to reduce dependence on China. The Pentagon’s rare earth metals report discussed the benefits of international cooperation, recommending greater cooperation among those who use rare earth metals, notably governments, mine operators, and magnet producers. 20
File a World Trade Organization Dispute. Filing a case against China in the World Trade Organization (WTO) would be one way to prevent China from using illegal export quotas and manipulating the rare earths market. Unfortunately, filing a dispute with the WTO can take several years from start to finish, and therefore this recommendation would not solve the impending shortage. If the WTO rules in favor of the U.S, it would eliminate market distortions caused by Chinese policies and make it easier for others to enter the market.
Develop Effective Substitutes for Rare Earth Metals. The biggest difficulty concerning substitutes is that most of the rare earths used in defense systems are not able to be substituted without a loss in performance. This, of course, is unacceptable for national security reasons. Although U.S. scientists are working on a solution to this problem, much of the scientific and technical knowledge on rare earths is now in China. The Chinese government has spent millions on rare earth metal research and development. It currently has two state-owned laboratories dedicated solely for rare earth metal research and the only two scientific journals in the world that are devoted to rare earth metals. 21 Although the U.S. government is looking into giving small grants and loans for domestic firms, 22 the U.S. needs to invest more resources into R&D in order to catch up. Develop new technologies.
Developing new technologies that increase the efficiency of rare earth metals and that allow for better recycling of rare earths is another way for the U.S. to decrease its dependence on China. Again, this will be difficult since the bulk of the scientific and technical knowledge surrounding rare earths is in China. However, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is currently working on new recycling techniques for rare earths. According to DOE, recycling rare earth metals could “significantly lower world demand for newly extracted materials.” 23
--- 2nc Solvency
The counterplan solves best
Coppel 11 – research assistant at the American Security Project. Ms. Coppel graduated from Miami University in 2009 with a degree in International Studies and French. She is currently a graduate student at the George Washington University, working towards her Master’s degree in Security Policy Studies. ( 2/1/2011, Emily, “Rare Earth Metals and U.S. National Security” )
Although the United States has taken some steps to reduce its reliance on China for rare earth metals, it has not done enough to secure its supply chain from the shortage expected in the next couple of years The U.S. needs a coherent, long-term strategy to reduce its reliance on Chinese rare earth metals. The above recommendations should all be a part of this strategy. The U.S. will need to develop new technologies and invest in mining operations to solve the long-term supply problem. In the short-term, stockpiling rare earth metals is one of the best ways to prepare for a future shortage until these new mines and technologies become available. The first country (or defense company) that is able to develop an effective and reliable substitute for rare earths or that is able to develop new and more efficient technologies will gain a competitive advantage over its peers. This is one area where the U.S. has a significant advantage, having the most robust defense industry in the world. The U.S. needs to capitalize on this advantage and regain its position as a producer and supplier of rare earth metals.
Stock piling solves in the short term
Grasso, 11 – Specialist in Defense Acquisition (3/31/2011, Valerie, “Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress” , bs)
Congress could require a strategic rare earth elements stockpile. Stockpiles might possibly increase the security of the domestic U.S. supply for rare earths. Congress may consider compiling a “virtual” stockpile database, with commitments and contracts with suppliers to buy the items when needed. One trade association, USMMA, advocates for a limited strategic reserve of rare earth alloys, metals, and magnets. USMMA asserts that government action is needed to ensure that there is a downstream domestic manufacturing capability. This strategic stockpile would ensure our Department of Defense has ready access to those materials needed to ensure our national security and to incentivize the return of domestic manufacturing. With defense critical materials such as dysprosium being sourced solely from China, it is critical that the Department of Defense have access to rare earth oxides from reliable producers and manufacturers in the United States and ally nations to perform value added processes, such as metal, alloy and magnet manufacturing
International cooperation undermines china control
Grasso, 11 – Specialist in Defense Acquisition (3/31/2011, Valerie, “Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress” , bs)
Congress may encourage DOD to pursue joint ventures with other nations, as many other nations are seeking alternatives to a near total dependence on rare earths from China. These partnerships may take place at any stage of the supply chain. It is critical for DOD to consider the implications of sourcing utilized by these partner nations. For example, if DOD relies on a partner nation for rare earth metals, and that nation procures their oxides from China, this partnership may not provide the requisite security of supply.
1nc CP Directed Energy Weapons
The United States Federal Government should
- Fully fund directed – energy research and development programs
- Require cooperation between the Department of Defense and The Department of Homeland security to increase efficiency with the research and development of directed-energy weapons
- Conduct a national needs assessment of critical infrastructure
- Facilitate the sharing of directed- energy technology with U.S. allies
Counterplan solves better than the aff
Spencer and Carafano 4 - * Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security AND ** Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.( 8/2/2004, Jack and James “The Use of Directed-Energy Weapons to Protect Critical Infrastructure” )
America's critical infrastructure--e.g., power plants, transportation hubs, and telecommunications facilities--is becoming increasingly vulnerable to precision missile attacks. Guided missile technology and the missiles themselves have been available for years, but the emergence of global terror networks, sophisticated smuggling techniques, and the post-September 11 security environment have made the threat of precision missile attacks even more serious. While technology transfer legislation and international agree-ments may help to control the spread of some technologies, relying solely on these mechanisms is wholly insufficient, especially when proliferation has already occurred. Therefore, it is essential that the United States actively defend its most vital nodes of critical infrastructure. 1 To be effective against close-range missile attacks, such defenses must be cost efficient, safe, and swift.
Although the United States is not currently prepared to protect domestic targets against these threats, it does have the technology to do so with directed-energy weapons (DEWs), which include lasers, microwaves, electromagnetic pulses, and high intensity radio frequency waves. In 2000, for example, the Army used the Tactical High Energy Laser to shoot down a rocket carrying a live warhead--the first time a laser has destroyed a missile in flight.
To ensure that these promising technologies are effectively fielded in a timely manner:
Congress should fully fund directed-energy programs;
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should cooperate fully on their respective directed-energy efforts;1
DHS should conduct a national needs assessment of critical infrastructure; and
The United States should facilitate the sharing of directed-energy technology with its allies.
The Threat of Precision Strike Weapons
--- 2nc Solvency
Direct energy weapons prevent every impact
Spencer and Carafano 4 - * Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security AND ** Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.( 8/2/2004, Jack and James “The Use of Directed-Energy Weapons to Protect Critical Infrastructure” )
Unique Advantages of Directed-Energy Weapons. During the past two decades, directed-energy projects have advanced considerably in areas such as power, beam-control, and pointing and tracking techniques. This progress accounts for the U.S. government's growing interest in directed-energy technology. The unique features and advantages of DEWs may arguably revolutionize concepts of military operations, as well as greatly influence civilian protection.
Operating at the speed of light. DEWs' first significant advantage is that their destructive mechanisms (electromagnetic beams) travel at the speed of light. Naturally, this almost instantaneous impact across great distances simplifies the tracking and intercepting phases of missile defense and greatly diminishes the target's ability to evade interception. DEWs effectively eliminate many problems associated with fly-out time for existing weapons because virtually no time elapses between firing a DEW and its impact on target.
Gravitational immunity. Laser beams are unaffected by gravity or atmospheric drag. Simply, energy beams are essentially immune to gravity due to their lack of mass, which also frees them from the kinematic and aerodynamic constraints that limit more traditional weapons. Hence, the complex calculations required to determine ballistic trajectories and other flight characteristics of conventional munitions are irrelevant to directed-energy devices.7
Precise and adjustable targeting. DEWs offer extremely precise targeting, which allows for surgical strikes with no collateral damage or fratricidal effects on friendly forces. This would be particularly advantageous when operating near volatile workstations, such as nuclear and chemical plants. A related feature of DEW technology is the ability to customize the weapon by adjusting the amount of energy deposited upon targets. This allows for a wide range of results: lethal or non-lethal, destructive or disruptive.8 As Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogelman articulated, "DEWs are the opposite of weapons of mass destruction--they are the most promising precision non-lethal weapons we have."9
Affordable. Once fully deployed, DEWs will likely be able to intercept targets at a relatively low cost when compared to conventional munitions. Although the beam-generating system may be initially expensive to build and maintain, the price of engagements is minimal because the system expends only energy. In the case of missile defense, the threats are typically extremely cheap. On the other hand, interceptor missiles can cost millions of dollars, creating a tremendous cost imbalance that favors the attacker. With laser weapons, some missiles can be replaced with a DEW costing only a few thousand dollars per shot to achieve equivalent or superior probability of kill. For example, a THEL shot is estimated to cost about $8,000.10 In comparison, firing a PATRIOT (PAC-3) missile costs $3.8 million; an AIM-7 Sparrow missile costs approximately $125,000; and a Tomahawk cruise missile costs roughly $600,000.11 Firing a DEW is an extremely economical way to combat MANPADS and artillery, the current threats to U.S. critical infrastructures.
Repetitive engagements. DEWs have a capacity for repetitive engagements over protracted periods, constrained only by the availability of power and the need to vent the byproducts of beam generation (e.g., heat and chemicals). Conventional weapons, especially those firing precision-guided munitions, are typically constrained in the number of engagements by a limited supply of rounds. Even when the rounds are cheap expendables, space and weight limitations place a ceiling on how many engagements can occur without replenishment. DEWs are not entirely free of such considerations but they have the potential for much deeper magazines arising from the low-cost and high-energy potential of their power sources. Finally, a DEW provides the versatility of serving as a sensing device as well as a weapon. Lasers can be used not only to attack targets, but also to detect, image, track, and illuminate ("acquire") them. High-power microwaves operate in the same wavelengths as radars, giving them similar tracking potential in some applications.
Diverse. Directed-energy weapons could be based on a variety of platforms, and they come in a wide range of power levels. For local asset defense, comparatively small systems can quickly kill very short-range targets by focusing the laser's tremendous power precisely on a target's most vulnerable point. Larger systems could generate even high power levels, roughly equivalent to two sticks of dynamite, focused in a beam about the diameter of a basketball. Such a weapon can kill a target moving at one thousand miles per hour at a distance of up to several hundred miles, within a few seconds of acquiring the target.12
Here is a solvency advocate – this is the best way to solve the advantage
Spencer and Carafano 4 - * Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security AND ** Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.( 8/2/2004, Jack and James “The Use of Directed-Energy Weapons to Protect Critical Infrastructure” )
What Should Be Done
To take full advantage of directed-energy weapons for use in securing critical U.S. infrastructure, the Bush Administration and Congress should take the following actions:
Fully fund directed-energy research and development programs. While DEW research and development programs have been extremely successful during the past two decades, additional funding could provide an even greater revolution of both offensive and defensive weapons. Despite the numerous unique advantages of DEWs, the system has a few challenges or drawbacks. For example, as with all lasers operating in the lower atmosphere, dust, fog, smoke, and other battlefield obscurants can attenuate laser beam energy.13 Another challenge is combining all the components of a laser weapon into a functioning and reliable system--an integration-level challenge.14 With greater funding, research and development programs could overcome these difficulties.
Require cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. To facilitate greater efficiency in DEW research and development, the Administration should establish a cooperative program between the DOD and the DHS to ensure that directed-energy information and technology are freely exchanged between the two departments. Protecting commercial aircraft, major government facilities, nuclear and chemical power plants, and transportation nodes against precision missiles is a concern for both DHS and the U.S. military. By cooperating, these departments can accomplish more at an increased speed. It is imperative that they jointly develop both the means and the technologies necessary to meet the threat of missile attacks on critical infrastructure.15 Without such cooperation, the departments will almost certainly duplicate research and produce less (at greater cost) than they would by working together.
Conduct a national needs assessment of critical infrastructure. To ensure maximum efficacy, the DHS should conduct a national needs assessment of critical infrastructure, identifying and categorizing the potential security threats against specific structures. In the past, vulnerability assessments tended to focus on the threat of long-range weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, or close-in assaults, such as truck bombs. Regrettably, the variety of infrastructure targets has not been detailed, leaving significant uncertainty as to these structures' level of vulnerability. Researching this area of concern is imperative in order to deploy a DEW defense system effectively.
Facilitate the sharing of directed-energy technology with U.S. allies. The Administration should establish a homeland security equivalent of the Foreign Military Sales program that would allow the sharing of directed-energy technology with friends and allies for critical infrastructure defense. The United States has already had some successful bilateral technology sharing of counter-terrorism tools with individual countries, such as Israel. However, while the mechanism for developing and transferring defense technologies on a military-to-military basis is fairly mature, the United States lacks a sophisticated approach to sharing technologies and lessons learned for civilian homeland security needs.
Countries with sophisticated technology, such as the United States and India, should enter into a serious dialogue to determine what a future homeland security technology development regime might look like. Among other things, such a dialogue would require: (1) a technology clearinghouse so that the partners know which technologies are available for transfer; (2) a method of setting standards so that technologies are understandable; (3) interoperable and transferable means for industry-to-industry dialogue; (4) predictable export-control requirements; and (5) acquisition mechanisms, such as joint development programs, licensing agreements, and something comparable to the Foreign Military Sales program.
Conclusion
Although directed-energy weapons have been on the horizon for many years, never has their potential been so essential to homeland security. The United States needs to put the resources behind this promising technology now so that it can better protect its critical infrastructure in the near future.
--- 2nc Solves Terrorism
Directed energy weapons prevent terrorism
Carafano 5 - senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were prepared for delivery at a Middle East Police Exhibition Conference held at the Dubai World Trade Center. ( 6/6/2005, James, “ The Future of Anti-Terrorism Technologies” )
Directed-Energy Weapons. Active defenses such as directed-energy weapons could provide counterterrorism protection for critical infrastructure.[11] Directed-energy weapons include a host of technologies, including lasers and microwave radiation emitters. These weapons can inflict casualties and damage equipment by depositing energy on their intended target.
Compared with conventional weapons, which rely on the kinetic or chemical energy of a projectile, directed-energy weapons can hit a target with subatomic particles or electromagnetic waves that travel at speeds at or near the speed of light. They generate very high power beams and typically use a single optical system both to track a target and to focus the beam on the target in order to destroy it.[12]
Lasers-the most mature form of directed-energy weapon that can counter airborne threats-form intense beams of light that can be precisely aimed across many kilometers to disable a wide range of targets, from satellites to missiles and aircraft to ground vehicles.[13] Additionally, the laser beam can be redirected by mirrors to hit targets not visible from the source, all without compromising much of the beam's initial power.
Such systems could evolve to provide active defenses against a wide array of potential threats from artillery, rockets, mortars, missiles, and low-flying unmanned aerial vehicles to improvised explosive devices. For example, these weapons could be deployed at airports to defend planes from attacks by shoulder-fired missiles (and by makeshift rockets and missiles) during takeoff and landing-the times when aircraft are most vulnerable.
With most airports located in or near major urban centers, directed-energy weapons could help to address the near impossibility of providing adequate, credible security zones around airports. Furthermore, they could defend coastal airports from attacks launched from a commercial or private ship loitering offshore-a potentially ideal platform for launching precision strikes. Several countries, including the United States, already have these systems under development.[14]
***FREE Market CPs
1nc CP Private Actor
Private sector efforts can solve the case --- government funding isn’t necessary
Jain, 11 (4/20/11, Naveen, Founder:-Moon Express, Intelius, InfosSpace “Naveen Jain: Our Sputnik Moment: US Entrepreneurs Needed for the "Space Race" .../93401-naveen-jain-our-sputnik-moment-us-entrepreneurs-needed-for-space-race.htm, JMP)
Fifty years ago, Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space. It was an event that spurred on America to catch up and exceed Russia's achievement, as President John F. Kennedy outlined in 1962: "...this country of the United States was not built by those who waited and rested and wished to look behind them. This country was conquered by those who moved forward -- and so will space."
Moving forward to 2011, it looks like we're in a similar "catch-up" position. Russia is greatly expanding its space program and is considering investing $7 billion to build a base on the Moon as part of a plan to send a mission to Mars. China's Lunar Exploration Program has announced its intention to mine the Moon for the substance Helium-3, and the Russian government has made similar statements about its wish to harvest it.
While Kennedy exhorted Americans to throw their support behind the government's efforts to reach the Moon, President Obama has made it clear that this job now belongs to private enterprise. In his 2011 State of the Union speech, he referred to this generation's "Sputnik moment" -- that is, the realization that a foreign superpower could usurp our economic leadership position. The president has indicated that the private sector should take over the job of Moon exploration, so now's the time to use private enterprise know-how to tap into resources beyond those of the Earth.
There have been some steps in the right direction. NASA has committed $30 million to buy information that is gleaned from future missions to the Moon; the money has been contracted to six teams who are also competing for the Google Lunar X PRIZE, managed by the X PRIZE Foundation. That's a good beginning, but government and private enterprise need additional mechanisms to find funding, and make government expenditures for data worth the investment.
As Obama has logically said, NASA's mission should focus on exploring deep space, and private companies should take on the task of building ships to carry cargo and passengers to the International Space Station, and to the Moon. Rocket companies can get in on this market, as can mining companies. The time may be right to think about going to the Moon as a business rather than a hobby. That's the goal of Moon Express, a new company of which I am a cofounder. We're working on building vehicles that can deliver payloads to the Moon and search the lunar surface for precious materials.
Why does this discussion of space exploration matter now, especially at a time when so many problems demand our attention here on this planet? Are we trying to go back to the Moon just because we can or is there a benefit to the world in lunar exploration? The answer is the latter. Moon exploration promises to yield new energy sources that could finally break our hold on fossil fuel, and our overdependence on sometimes hostile nations that control its supply. But this time around, we don't need to rely on government funding to fuel Moon exploration -- we can encourage private entrepreneurs to take on this role.
The value in Moon exploration comes in part from the presence of valuable resources such as Helium-3, a source of energy that is rare on Earth but is abundant on the Moon. It can "generate vast amounts of electrical power without creating the troublesome radioactive byproducts produced in conventional nuclear reactors," a Popular Mechanics article explains. In addition, platinum is present on the Moon, and could be mined for use in energy applications, where it is a key catalyst for fuel-cell vehicles.
If China and Russia succeed in their goals to obtain Helium-3 and other rare resources for the development of energy, the U.S. could end up relying on these countries for its own energy needs. That's a tricky thing from a political standpoint: What happens if our relations with these countries turn sour? What happens if Russia and China decide to severely restrict the sale of Helium-3 to other countries, which will drive prices sky-high? We'll be in the same boat that we're in now, where we are beholden to oil-rich countries that are often in turmoil.
However, if we allow private enterprise to explore and take advantage of the Moon's resources, we may set ourselves on the road to energy independence.
To re-launch our space program, we need private enterprise to step into the void. Government funding only needs to take us to the point where the technology has been developed to get us to the Moon -- and we already have that. It's a model that's been used successfully in the past: the military first developed the Internet, and private enterprise then seized on its commercial potential; the same thing occurred with GPS technology.
Naturally, there are barriers to entrepreneurs leading the charge to the Moon. For one thing, ownership is always a point of discussion -- but the fact is that "everyone" and "no one" owns the Moon. Much like when mining resources from international waters (as in fishing), entrepreneurs would need to respect the rights of other business and government players. There is legal precedent for explorers finding and keeping resources that they have uncovered via private investment.
There's also the question of whether we can transport resources from the Moon in a cost-effective manner. Perhaps the cost of rocket launches -- by far the greatest expense for a Moon mission -- will come down as more entrepreneurs move into this market, or new technology will make them cheaper. It's even possible to create rocket fuel from resources on the Moon, which would slash return costs and even lower launch costs from Earth.
On the other hand, mining and transporting these resources back to the Earth could depress prices as supplies grow, making such ventures less appealing to entrepreneurs. As with all private market endeavors, many will want to take a wait-and-see approach to the Moon's market potential. But therein lies the opportunity for early movers who apply entrepreneurship to the opening of whole new markets, and in the case of the Moon, a whole new world.
2nc Competition / Solvency Cards
Private enterprise initiatives and public private partnerships are distinct policy option from government executed space activities
Jakhu & Buzdugan, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 8 (September 2008, Ram & Maria, Astropolitics, “DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS,” Volume 6, Number 3, JMP)
Scenarios for the Development of Natural Resources
As noted above, space activities were initially the exclusive domain of governments. Yet, the trend of increased involvement of the private sector in space applications has changed the economic and political landscape of space activities, and raises questions about the role that governments and commercial ventures could play in partnership in the exploration and use of space natural resources. The range of plausible scenarios include: governments should be exclusively responsible for executing space activities relating to the exploration and use of space natural resources; the private sector should be allowed to take over the area, with or without initial support from the government; or public private partnerships (PPPs) are established to balance the public obligation to provide safe services, and to find the most cost-effective means for achieving this objective.
Private sector efforts can operate independent of the government
Schmitt 6 - Apollo 17 Astronaut AND** former U.S. Senator and Professor of Engineering, (Harrison Schmitt, Lunar Settlements, ed. by Haym Benaroya, pg 6, DH.)
The initial financial threshold for a private sector initiative to return to the Moon is low: about $15 million. This investment would initiate the first fusion-based bridging business, that is, production of medical isotopes for point-of-use support of diagnostic procedures using positron-emission tomography (PET). In contrast, the funding threshold for the United States government would be significantly higher $800 million proposed for 2005 and building to an average annual addition of close to $1 billion. This latter estimate assumes both a repetitively willing Congress and Administration as well as a space agency capable of efficiently using this money. The Government, of course, would not benefit directly from the retained earnings of the fusion-based bridging businesses that area a natural consequence of the private sector approach although Americans would benefit from the new services and tax base that the private sector could provide.
Private sector can empirically play a role independent of the government
Jakhu & Buzdugan, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 8 (September 2008, Ram & Maria, Astropolitics, “DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS,” Volume 6, Number 3, JMP)
Changing Roles of the Main Players in the Space Industry
From the beginning of the space age, states have been the main players in the space arena. They heavily invested public funds in new capital-intensive ventures, and carried out, as state activities, space exploration and operations primarily for the purposes of national prestige as well as security and strategic competition with rival states. Such rationales and the role of states are still true to a large extent. During the 1970s and 1980s, the world also witnessed the emergence of new space players in the form of intergovernmental operational organizations, like Intelsat, Inmarsat, Intersputnik, European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), Eutelsat, and Arabsat. These bodies were established by states, under international treaties, and were granted their own international legal personalities for the purposes of carrying on specific space operations. These organizations were designed to exploit space technology, in a businesslike manner, for telecommunication purposes.
In the 1990s, the global space sector welcomed the entry of the third group of space actors, i.e., private enterprises. Even though private companies have been involved in the space arena from the dawn of the space age, their role was primarily to serve as contractors for government space activities. Concomitantly, the private sector played an independent role as it relates to the commercial exploitation of space applications. This transformation in the private sector’s role in the space field has been strongly influenced by global political and economic trends towards privatization, commercialization, deregulation, and globalization of almost all human activities. Most of the aforementioned intergovernmental organizations have already been privatized. Presently, private companies are carrying out, as their own operations, commercial services for telecommunications, Earth observation, launch of space payloads, and navigation.
2nc Private Action Solves Best
Private efforts solve best --- more predictable and sustained commitment
Schmidt, Chairman of the Interlune-Interarms Initiative Inc., 3 (11/6/3, Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, moon/schmitt110603.doc, JMP)
Most important for a new NASA or a new agency would be the guarantee of a sustained political (financial) commitment to see the job through and to not turn back once a deep space operational capability exists once again or accidents happen. At this point in history, we cannot count on the Government for such a sustained commitment. This includes not under-funding the effort - a huge problem still plaguing the Space Shuttle, the International Space Station, and other current and past programs. That is why I have been looking to a more predictable commitment from investors who have been given a credible business plan and a return on investment commensurable with the risk.
Attaining a level of sustaining operations for a core business in fusion power and lunar resources requires about 10-15 years and $10-15 billion of private investment capital as well as the successful interim marketing and profitable sales related to a variety of applied fusion technologies. The time required from start-up to the delivery of the first 100 kg years supply to the first operating 1000 megawatt fusion power plant on Earth will be a function of the rate at which capital is available, but probably no less than 10 years. This schedule also depends to some degree on the U.S. Government being actively supportive in matters involving taxes, regulations, and international law but no more so than is expected for other commercial endeavors. If the U.S. Government also provided an internal environment for research and development of important technologies, investors would be encouraged as well. As you are aware, the precursor to NASA, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), provided similar assistance and antitrust protection to aeronautics industry research during most of the 20th Century.
A business and investor based approach to a return to the Moon to stay represents a clear alternative to initiatives by the U.S. Government or by a coalition of other countries. Although not yet certain of success, a business-investor approach, supported by the potential of lunar Helium-3 fusion power, and derivative technologies and resources, offers the greatest likelihood of a predictable and sustained commitment to a return to deep space.
Private industry better --- willing to take risks
Stone, 9 – aerospace engineer and chairman of Shackleton Energy Co. (June 2009, IEEE Spectrum, “Mining the Moon”, ) NYan
Three elements are essential for the commercial success of our operation.
First, to save about $1 billion during the initial staging of the lunar mining base, the first human team will take only enough fuel to land and establish the base—not enough for a return trip to Earth. This may sound radical, but the human crew who will undertake this mission will do so knowing that their success and survival depend on in situ fuel generation for the return. Should they fail, theirs will be a one-way trip; the risk is theirs to take. For government-sponsored space agencies, such a concept is unthinkable; they cannot tolerate the political risk of failure. Yet it is the only viable business choice. Centuries of explorers made the same hard choice in pushing the limits on land, sea, and air. It’s time to carry it forward into space. This is not reckless bravado but calculated risk management to satisfy mission needs and affordability.
Private Sector solves best – your 1ac author
Schmitt 6 – an American geologist, a former NASA astronaut, University Professor and U.S. Senator for one term (Harrison H, “Return to the Moon”, page 4, MBIBAS)
Left unstated in the President's 2004 directions to NASA and requests to the Congress is an implicit challenge to the private sector of the United States to join in a reinvigorated migration into deep space. That sector of American life, particularly the entrepreneurial and investment risk-takers among us, should move forward in parallel with NASA's new efforts, protecting this unique economic foundation of American freedom. If private enterprise is to participate as more than useful and necessary contractors to NASA, then systematic business initiatives must be launched that will equal or exceed the technological and financial pace of publicly funded space efforts.
CP Solves best – NASAs approach fails
Schmitt 6 – an American geologist, a former NASA astronaut, University Professor and U.S. Senator for one term (Harrison H, “Return to the Moon”, page 6, MBIBAS)
A private, lunar resource-oriented enterprise will take a different technical path back to the Moon than the one designed by NASA (Chapters 4 and 7), and this dichotomy will be best for all concerned. More conceptional options will be explored, more engineering design approaches examined, and more opportunities for beneficial outcomes created. Indeed, successful commercial applications of fusion and space technologies to human needs and desires will underpin the private enterprise approach in contrast to the policy-driven foundation of the President's plan for NASA.
To provide competitive returns on investment in its lunar endeavors, the private sector will want heavier payload capability and lower cost in Earth-Moon launch systems than NASA appears to be planning. Private spacecraft will be specialized for the tasks of landing reliably and precisely at known resource-rich locations on the Moon rather than serving two or more masters such as the International Space Station and a Lunar Base. The private initiative will concentrate on lunar surface vehicles and facilities that provide reliable, low-cost resource recovery in addition to habitats for living. It also will require highly mobile and low-maintenance space suits that are less than half the weight and more than four times the mobility of Apollo suits, and have the glove dexterity of the human hand. All vehicles, facilities, and space suits will be designed for indefinite operational life, including embedded diagnostics, anticipatory component replacement, and ease of maintenance and refurbishment. Any required automated precursor missions to gather additional resource development information will use low-cost, data-specific approaches rather than attempt to meet broad, higher-cost scientific objectives. Research and development costs for launch and lunar operations equipment are estimated to be between $7 billion and $10 billion.
Management structures for a private initiative will follow proven corporate approaches and best business practices of comparable, high technology enterprises (Chapter 11). These structures would be modified, as appropriate, by the lessons learned from Apollo (Chapter 9) for work in the complex and unforgiving environment of deep space. The Board of Directors and senior management will deal with programmatic issues involving planning, investors, conceptual approach, financial control, marketing and sales, governmental interfaces, public affairs, and the spinoff of ancillary businesses. Under this protective umbrella, responsibility to meet technical objectives will be delegated to several centers of excellence. Senior management will be drawn from any of the many private, federal, and defense sources where the most experienced and successful men and women can be found. A system of independent technical oversight will exist to assess these centers' readiness to proceed past programmatic milestones.
Private actors solve best – large supply, high demand, investors, and open laws.
Wall 11 (1/13/011, Mike, , “Mining the Moon's Water: Q & A with Shackleton Energy's Bill Stone”, ) NYan
* Bill Stone is the founder of Shackleton Energy, a company investing in lunar mining
: You've been thinking seriously about mining the moon for nearly 20 years. Do you feel like this idea's time has finally come? If so, why? What has changed?
Yes, the timing is perfect. Here's why. Five important factors have converged to warrant a full-fledged industrial-prospecting mission to the moon, followed by mining and propellant sales. [10 Coolest New Moon Discoveries]
1. Supply: There is a high likelihood that huge quantities of freely available polar ice exist on the moon. Recent data from the LRO, LCROSS and Chandrayaan orbiters gives us high confidence that there are huge deposits (billions of tons as indicated by NASA) of ice in the cold trap craters of the lunar poles. If true, these ice fields represent extremely valuable mining opportunities.
2. Demand: Interest in going to space is expanding rapidly, especially for exploration, science, satellite servicing, orbital cleanup and tourism. Excessively high launch costs have limited business expansion. With much lower in-space propellant cost, business operations can expand and enable opening the NewSpace transportation highway system.
3. Wealth: Many individuals and companies have accumulated massive amounts of wealth that could be applied to this new space enterprise. Because this is a "green energy play," investors should welcome the new opportunity primarily for the ROI [return on investment] and, secondly, for the opportunities for environmental and other spin-off opportunities that will invariably evolve.
4. Team: Heretofore, government-led space programs have paid exorbitant risk premiums for success, especially with human-rated systems. Today, an industry-led team can manage this risk privately and move much more quickly in the global marketplace to accomplish the mission. We have the experience and know-how to make this happen efficiently and affordably at least an order of magnitude cheaper than any government or government collective program in history.
5. Policy/Law: Relevant international treaties and law permit private exploration and harvesting of lunar resources, giving us the green light for the mission.
Private sector solutions are superior --- avoid excess spending and unnecessary budget tradoffs
Jakhu & Buzdugan, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 8 (September 2008, Ram & Maria, Astropolitics, “DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS,” Volume 6, Number 3, JMP)
Scenarios for the Development of Natural Resources
As noted above, space activities were initially the exclusive domain of governments. Yet, the trend of increased involvement of the private sector in space applications has changed the economic and political landscape of space activities, and raises questions about the role that governments and commercial ventures could play in partnership in the exploration and use of space natural resources. The range of plausible scenarios include: governments should be exclusively responsible for executing space activities relating to the exploration and use of space natural resources; the private sector should be allowed to take over the area, with or without initial support from the government; or public private partnerships (PPPs) are established to balance the public obligation to provide safe services, and to find the most cost-effective means for achieving this objective.
Government’s Changing Involvement
Nowadays, due to significant budgetary constraints, governments seem to have difficulties making space exploration a spending priority. Even in the U.S., where the government recently made a strong case for efforts to return to the Moon and the Mars, the budgetary realities show the sacrifices required in order to allocate monies to such a project, i.e., it had to postpone or eliminate several projects deemed important by various sectors, such as robotic missions to the icy moons of Jupiter, in particular Europa, which is thought to contain a subsurface sea of liquid water making it a potential candidate for harboring alien life.36
In addition, it appears unlikely that taxpayers are in favor of funding a large-scale lunar or Mars mission that does not give direct economic payback.37 The need to spare taxpayer money from being spent for Moon and Mars missions was pointed out by Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW), a non-profit organization in the U.S.38 According to this group’s president, Tom Schatz,
Mankind’s future in space no longer depends on politicized bureaucracies and tax-funded boondoggles. The success of SpaceShipOne, startup space companies, and the advent of space tourism have opened the door to an exciting future of private enterprise in space. Such endeavors are economical, realistic, and more likely to yield tangible benefits for mankind and taxpayers.38
The group challenged the usefulness of a U.S. House of Representatives appropriation for NASA’s budget of $16.5 billion, including $3.1 billion for the Moon/Mars initiative. The CAGW pointed out that the International Space Station (ISS) is ‘‘expected to be finished in 2010, 16 years behind schedule, $92 billion over budget, with perhaps one-eighth of the capability that engineers had hoped.’’ This group found a worrisome trend of wasteful government spending in the space arena: ‘‘The ISS is a glaring link in a continuous chain of space projects that are either abandoned, end in disaster, or deliver far less than promised.’’ 39
In an era when governments are much more cost-conscious in order to reduce government deficits while not increasing taxes, more reliance on the private sector for funding new projects is the likely outcome. Moreover, there is an increasing worldwide towards trend relying on private investors rather than government for development in space.40
--- XT: Private Actors Solve
CP can spur space exploration --- will be democratic effort
Schmitt 6 - Apollo 17 Astronaut AND** former U.S. Senator and Professor of Engineering, (Harrison Schmitt, Lunar Settlements, ed. by Haym Benaroya, ps 6-7, DH.)
The entrepreneurial private sector has an obligation to support a Return to the Moon to stay, as articulated by President Bush. We also have an obligation to follow our own path to get there in order to be additive to the overall goals of settling the solar system and improving lives for those who remain on Earth. Traversing that path, with an ideally funded business plan, would require about $15 billion and 15 years.
Whenever and however a Return to the Moon occurs, one thing is certain: That return will be historically comparable to the movement of our species out of Africa about 50,000 years ago. Further, if led by an entity representing the democracies of the Earth, a Return to the Moon to stay will be politically comparable to the first permanent settlement of North America by European immigrants.
A business and investor based approach is comparatively best --- more predictable and sustainable
Schmidt, Chairman of the Interlune-Interarms Initiative Inc., 3 (11/6/3, Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, moon/schmitt110603.doc, JMP)
RETURN TO THE MOON
A return to the Moon to stay would be at least comparable to the first permanent settlement of America if not to the movement of our species out of Africa.
I am skeptical that the U.S. Government can be counted on to make such a "sustained commitment" absent unanticipated circumstances comparable to those of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Therefore, I have spent much of the last decade exploring what it would take for private investors to make such a commitment. At least it is clear that investors will stick with a project if presented to them with a credible business plan and a rate of return commensurate with the risk to invested capital. My colleagues at the Fusion Technology Institute of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Interlune-Intermars Initiative, Inc. believe that such a commercially viable project exists in lunar helium-3 used as a fuel for fusion electric power plants on Earth.
Lunar helium-3, arriving at the Moon as part of the solar wind, is imbedded as a trace, non-radioactive isotope in the lunar soils. There is a resource base of helium-3 about of 10,000 metric tonnes just in upper three meters of the titanium-rich soils of Mare Tranquillitatis. The energy equivalent value of Helium-3 delivered to operating fusion power plants on Earth would be about $4 billion per tonne relative to today's coal. Coal, of course, supplies about half of the approximately $40 billion domestic electrical power market.
A business and investor based approach to a return to the Moon to stay represents a clear alternative to initiatives by the U.S. Government or by a coalition of other countries. A business-investor approach, supported by the potential of lunar Helium-3 fusion power, and derivative technologies and resources, offers the greatest likelihood of a predictable and sustained commitment to a return to deep space.
--- Private Sector = Innovation
Private Investment is necessary to fuel innovation
Eckert 10 – PhD, international and commercial strategist (Paul Eckert, Lunar Settlements, ed. by Haym Benaroya, pg 80-81, DH)
A clear conclusion from the roundtables in late 2006 was, as noted previously, that private investment must be significantly increased in order to fuel entrepreneurial innovation with sufficient capital to help create and serve new markets. In a word, problems facing space commerce efforts are as much, if not more, financial than technical. The benefits of commerce- such as lower cost and increased choice of products and services- depend on attracting investment from investors willing to consider early-stage, high-risk, but also high-opportunity initiatives. “Angel” investors are often the most likely to take an interest in such opportunities. However such independent, wealthy individuals are quite difficult to attract, because they listen more to other investors, whom they already know, than to enthusiastic strangers from outside the investment community. Add to this that Angels often develop highly specialized interests and have many opportunities from which to choose, in addition to whatever space related ventures may cross their paths.
In any case, contacts with these and other types of investors have helped to clarify some of their most important considerations in making decisions about where to direct the capital the control.
Key risks they would like to limit include: insufficient market size, accessibility and flexibility of customer demand, insufficient salvageable value of assets if a project fails, dominance of a market by competitors, unreliability of sufficient financial investment, inadequate management skills, ineffective technical approaches, and constraining legal and regulatory factors.
2nc Private Action More Egalitarian
Private efforts are more egalitarian- allow smaller countries to develop space industries.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
Private commercial space enterprise is a more egalitarian model than [*248] national space agencies for exploring and developing space too. Private commerce has enabled undeveloped countries to compete with the major space-faring nations rather than depend on them. Also, while national space agencies serve the interests of their own citizenry, private commercial space enterprise can serve their shareholders, regardless of citizenry. Thus, an undeveloped nation may employ an international space enterprise whose shareholders are in part or in whole drawn from the citizenry of the nation.
For example, consider Chile, which established the Chilean Space Agency ("CSA") in 2001. As recently as 2007, the CSA began entertaining bids from international space companies regarding an Earth observation satellite project. n46 Normally, the CSA would have to politely request and dutifully pay a space-faring State like the United States or Russia to develop and launch a satellite into orbit. In addition to offending state independence and sovereignty, those payments go into the pockets of the taxpayers of the space-faring State. However, the CSA's use of an international space company to implement its own space activities highlights how a robust commercial regime could bolster participation in space independent of the most developed space-faring States. Chile need not request a space-faring State to implement their own space activities if it can turn to a space company, and the payments to the space company could ostensibly be enjoyed by Chilean citizens that are shareholders in the international space company.
Private industry more egalitarian- forced to assist “undeveloped States”
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
A. What Private Commercial Space Enterprise Can and Cannot Do
The current structure of space law establishes some of the ground rules for the participation of private commercial space enterprise. First, private commercial space enterprise cannot be entirely selfish and ignore the international community. International law clearly requires international cooperation and consideration, especially with respect to undeveloped States. This suggests that an international commercial space enterprise may be better suited for space exploration and exploitation than a United States, Russian, or other national commercial space enterprise. The only question is 6 whether the international activity envisioned by space law is public (i.e., a consortium of different national governments) or private (i.e., a consortium of different national individuals) or both.
Prizes Mechanism Solvency
CP solves – prizes lead to cheaper private industry stepping in.
Klotz 4 (7/19/04, Irene M., United Press International, “PRIVATE FIRMS STEP UP FOR LUNAR MISSIONS”, , eLibrary) NYan
*** David Gump, LunaCorp president and co-founder of LunaCorp
The lunar system could be used to precision-land robotic cargo ships, said Jim Bensen, president of SpaceDev, of Poway, Calif., which has several lunar projects on its drawing board. The company already built and operates a science research satellite in Earth orbit, called the Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer or CHIPSat.
"Our vision is that we need competitive commercial suppliers selling services to NASA as well as other customers," Gump said. "NASA should issue their top-level program goals then offer pay-on-delivery contracts and prizes to jumpstart the commercial sector."
For example, to develop technology to mine helium-3 from the moon robotically, NASA could offer a cash prize to the first team that brings back 10 grams of helium-3 by a certain date. If no one delivers, no one is paid.
"It puts the cost of the mission and the schedule burdens on the private sector," Gump said.
Shifting perceptions about the role of private enterprise in space is one of the goals laid out by a presidential commission, headed by former Air Force Secretary Edward "Pete" Aldridge, which issued its report on the future of the U.S. space program last month.
"We're at a new American space age," Rick Tumlinson, founder of the non-profit advocacy group Space Frontier Foundation, told participants at his group's Return to the Moon conference in Las Vegas this past weekend.
Leading the charge into the new frontier, which Tumlinson calls an "alternative space program," are privately developed efforts, such as SpaceShipOne, which last month became the first non-government, manned vehicle to reach space. The vessel was designed by Burt Rutan and his team at Scaled Composites, of Mojave, Calif., and financed by Microsoft co-founder and billionaire Paul Allen.
"NASA was so spectacularly successful with the Apollo program, no one ever questioned if the government should be doing space or not," Gump said. "It took until this year -- that many decades -- to actually raise the question: Should our path to space be done with Stalinist central planning or with the traditional American blueprint with innovative, enterprising companies?"
He added, "We have a few wealthy individuals and if the government program is created to bring in competition, we may even get some of the major aerospace companies to get the commercial spirit."
Gump called NASA's plan to build, in-house, the first lunar orbiter in the new exploration plan an "inauspicious" start. The agency instead could have issued a request to buy its data commercially and leave the ownership and operation of the hardware to the private sector, but he said he sees favorable signs the government is starting to change the way it does business.
"Having the government go back to the moon by itself means the government will pay more than it has to," said Gump, who has successfully raised money from Radio Shack and other corporate sponsors for lunar missions.
"The government could get its data back at much lower cost by sharing the mission," he said.
In addition to supporting the government program, the private sector is eager to reach the moon to see what it really can offer commercially.
"When I look at the moon, I see real estate," said Randa Milliron, co-founder of Interorbital Systems of Mojave, Calif., which is developing passenger launch vehicles as well as a lunar hotel.
"The thing is we really are in ignorance," Gump said. "We landed on the moon in six locations several decades back. We need to spend some time on the moon to see what it is good for. Right now, we just don't know."
Prizes solve – spur private industry action which empirically results in cheap products.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
The Soviet Union inaugurated the Space Age in 1957 with the launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, into the Earth's orbit. Human activity in space, once only a dream, had become reality. The hope for human advancement was immense. However, over the past five decades, the progress of the Space Age has not matched the measure of that hope. n1 National space agencies have slowly and inefficiently explored and developed the space frontier. But, the success of a recent private competition suggests a better channel for facilitating space exploration and development: private commercial enterprise.
In 1996, the X PRIZE Foundation teamed up with the Ansari family to sponsor a private prize competition. n2 The Ansari X PRIZE awarded $ 10 million to the first team to "build and launch a spacecraft capable of carrying three people to 100 kilometers above the earth's surface, twice [*242] within two weeks." n3 Twenty-six teams from seven different countries competed for the Ansari X PRIZE, spending more than $ 100 million combined. n4 On October 4, 2004, the 47th anniversary of the launch of Sputnik I, a team named Scaled Composites, led by aerospace designer Burt Rutan and financier Paul Allen, won the competition with their spacecraft, SpaceShipOne. n5 The accomplishment of this feat was even more impressive because of its relatively cheap price tag: the total financing required to develop the SpaceShipOne technology was a mere $ 20 million. n6
Incentives drive investment and ideas- empirically proven.
Klotz 4 (7/19/04, Irene M., United Press International, “PRIVATE FIRMS STEP UP FOR LUNAR MISSIONS”, , eLibrary) NYan
Gump is positioning LunaCorp to ride NASA's next wave of lunar exploration. He formed a coalition of small firms -- he will not say yet which companies are his partners -- that last week submitted its pitch for a $3 million study contract to design a moon mission for NASA. The agency plans to award five or six contracts, each of which would cover six months of work, with an optional extension for another six months and $3 million.
The proposal includes specific scientific, economic and security goals for lunar exploration, concepts of systems needed to support the mission and how NASA's proposed new crew exploration vehicle would fit in with the plan. NASA is expected to award the contracts next month.
Prizes solve – empirically proven by airlines.
The Economist 9 (9/10/9, The Economist Print Edition, “Flying High”, ) NYan
The past, despite the disclaimer often found on advertisements for financial products, often can be a guide to the future. In the early days of flight, the American government awarded a series of guaranteed contracts for carrying airmail. This stimulated the growth of air travel to the point where passengers could be transported affordably and reliably, and was the root of airlines such as United and American. Those who wish to travel into space argue that the government should now be doing a similar thing for spaceflight, with its aerospace agency, NASA, playing the role of the post office. This week, there are signs that it might be about to.
NASA providing incentives now – only limitation is funding.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “
Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
NASA has recognized the success of these commercial private space endeavors and joined the party, introducing its Centennial Challenges. n43 However, the challenges sponsored by NASA are relatively modest, generally featuring prizes under one million dollars. n44 The major limitation on the size of the prizes is government funding. n45
2nc Government Fails
Government driven efforts fail --- no sustained commitment
Schmidt, Chairman of the Interlune-Interarms Initiative Inc., 3 (11/6/3, Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, moon/schmitt110603.doc, JMP)
It is doubtful that the United States or any government will initiate or sustain a return of humans to the Moon absent a comparable set of circumstances as those facing the Congress and Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson in the late 1950s and throughout 1960s. Huge unfunded "entitlement" liabilities and a lack of sustained media and therefore public interest will prevent the long-term commitment of resources and attention that such an effort requires. Even if tax-based funding commitments could be guaranteed, it is not a foregone conclusion that the competent and disciplined management system necessary to work in deep space would be created and sustained.
Government can’t solve – will, funds, and correct models.
Wall 11 (1/13/011, Mike, , “Mining the Moon's Water: Q & A with Shackleton Energy's Bill Stone”, ) NYan
* Bill Stone is the founder of Shackleton Energy, a company investing in lunar mining
Why can't governments do this job instead? Governments alone do not have the mandate, the will, the collective funds, or the risk models to do this job affordably, efficiently or quickly. Therefore, industry must step in to lead and for others to follow as beneficiaries. SEC intends to provide this quality service at least a decade ahead of what governments are only contemplating today.
Although the demand for the propellants is currently not well-defined, the convergence of science, security and commercial interests (especially space tourism, orbital debris cleanup and satcom servicing/refueling) in space will accelerate that demand if low-cost propellants are available. Much like gold opened the West as a magnet to a better quality of life and opportunity for many people, we see the same happening with unlimited access to cheaper propellants in space. If successful, our venture will truly be the next Gold Rush (albeit a liquid one in space) that will bridge the gap by providing more affordable access to and operations in space.
NASA can’t solve --- requires major restructuring
Schmidt, Chairman of the Interlune-Interarms Initiative Inc., 3 (11/6/3, Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, moon/schmitt110603.doc, JMP)
If Government were to lead a return to deep space, the NASA of today is probably not the agency to undertake a significant new program to return humans to deep space, particularly the Moon and then to Mars. NASA today lacks the critical mass of youthful energy and imagination required for work in deep space. It also has become too bureaucratic and too risk-adverse. Either a new agency would need to be created to implement such a program or NASA would need to be totally restructured using the lessons of what has worked and has not worked since it was created 45 years ago. Of particular importance would be the need for most of the agency to be made up of engineers and technicians in their 20s and managers in their 30s, the re-institution of design engineering activities in parallel with those of contractors, and the streamlining of management responsibility. The existing NASA also would need to undergo a major restructuring and streamlining of its program management, risk management, and financial management structures. Such total restructuring would be necessary to re-create the competence and discipline necessary to operate successfully in the much higher risk and more complex deep space environment relative to that in near-earth orbit.
AT: Private Sector Won’t Invest
Private industry can afford lunar missions now – investment and planning in the status quo.
Klotz 4 (7/19/04, Irene M., United Press International, “PRIVATE FIRMS STEP UP FOR LUNAR MISSIONS”, , eLibrary) NYan
"There's been a change in the assumptions about space," David Gump, LunaCorp president and co-founder, told United Press International. "Fifteen years ago it was perceived that only the government can do space -- (that) it was just too expensive for any companies to do it on their own. That assumption has fallen by the wayside and now the question is how should NASA and the private sector interact."
LunaCorp is developing a spacecraft called SuperSat to relay high-resolution, digital video of its voyage from Earth to the moon and create maps of the lunar surface. The company also plans to land a mobile, tele-operated robot on the moon that can be operated by paying visitors at science centers, theme parks and museums.
Private sector empirical succeeds and attracts investors – SpaceX and Virgin Atlantic
The Economist 9 (9/10/9, The Economist Print Edition, “Flying High”, ) NYan
At the behest of the president, NASA has been undergoing an independent review of its human-spaceflight plans. On September 8th the review committee delivered a summary report. That the agency does not have enough money to return to the moon is no surprise. What is more surprising is that the Augustine report (named after the committee’s chairman, Norman Augustine) argues that NASA should stop travelling to the International Space Station in particular and to “low Earth orbit” in general. It should let the private sector do that instead, and focus its own efforts on more distant and difficult tasks.
Five years ago the idea that the private sector might have been capable of transporting cargo and people reliably into low Earth orbit was viewed as crazy. Much has happened since, and two things in particular. One was that Virgin Galactic, an upstart British firm, said it would develop a space-tourism business based around a craft that had cost only $25m to build. The other was that an equally upstart American entrepreneur called Elon Musk, flush from his sale of PayPal, created a company called SpaceX (whose Falcon rocket is pictured above, dropping its first stage on its way into orbit). He said he wanted to make it cheaper to launch people into space and wanted, ultimately, to send a mission to Mars—but that he would start by launching satellites.
It would be an understatement to say that both ventures were treated with scepticism. But they have now come far enough to be able to thumb their noses at the cynics. On September 3rd SpaceX signed a contract worth $50m with ORBCOMM, a satellite-communications firm. The deal is to launch 18 satellites for ORBCOMM’s network. Meanwhile, at the end of July, Aabar Investments, a sovereign-wealth fund based in Abu Dhabi, bought a 32% stake in Virgin Galactic for $280m. Aabar was not just interested in space tourism. It was also keen on a proposal to use Virgin’s White Knight launch system to put satellites into low Earth orbit. Will Whitehorn, Virgin Galactic’s president, said that one of the things which attracted Aabar was the fact that White Knight (an aircraft which lifts to high altitude a rocket that can then take either passengers or satellites onwards into space) could be flown from Abu Dhabi.
The private industry now has the funding to compete with government programs.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
Space has, however, offered the scientific, industrial, commercial and social benefits discussed in Part II.A since the inception of the Space Age five decades ago. The difference between then and now is that space activity was once prohibitively expensive, so much so that only sovereign superpowers could entertain such activities. NASA served well when the only possible financier was the U.S. government, but now, space activity is far more affordable, and innovative business models can be realistically financed. Simply put, private commercial space enterprise can get the job done just as well as national space agencies, but more efficiently. Private commercial space enterprise also offers a uniquely egalitarian system by which undeveloped nations may benefit from the exploration and use of outer space as much as developed nations. 3
Private industry has the funds now – demand and investors from private market have shifted the tide.
Meyer 10 (Winter, Zach, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Issue 30 Volume 1, “
Private Commercialization of Space in an International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District”, ) NYan
As discussed in Part I, private commercial space enterprise has recently demonstrated that it is as capable as and arguably cheaper than national space agencies when it comes to exploring and developing outer space. SpaceShipOne, constructed in pursuit of the Ansari X-Prize, blasted off into space with three people onboard and subsequently returned safely twice in two weeks. n32 Its financier, Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, financed the project with a mere $ 20 million - a far cry from the exorbitant costs of a NASA project. n33
After the success of SpaceShipOne, its designer, Burt Rutan, joined British billionaire entrepreneur Richard Branson to found Virgin Galactic, the world's first space liner company. n34 Virgin Galactic has already pre-sold seats onboard future space liners to tour space at the relatively meager sum of $ 200,000 per seat. n35 Customers are already lining up - Virgin Galactic has about 200 assured passengers, $ 30 million in deposits, and about 85,000 registered interested customers. n36 Impatient millionaires have instead taken up offers from the Russian government, and have paid $ 20 [*247] million to hitch rides on Russian Soyuz rockets on trips to the ISS. n37 These tourist enterprises are financing human space travel by tapping into the private market, a method never used by NASA. As Virgin Galactic and the Russian government have demonstrated, the private market is a willing financier for space enterprise if there is something to gain.
Private sector will invest- opportunity to gain monopoly on energy market worth $120 billion.
Schmitt 2 – last astronaut on the moon and former US senator (December, Harrison H., Our Worlds 2, “Return to the Moon”, ) NYan
The private sector, on the other hand, may find a business rationale for a return to the Moon, based on the economic value in the extraction of lunar helium-3 and its use as a fusion fuel on Earth, providing a future economic and environmental alternative to fossil fuels. This possibility has been studied extensively by my colleagues and me at the University of Wisconsin-Madison since 1985 and continues to appear to be a feasible approach to a return to the Moon and to providing clean terrestrial energy in the future. In addition, byproducts of helium-3 extraction from the pulverized lunar surface soils will include hydrogen, oxygen, and water - valuable materials needed for consumption by humans elsewhere in space. Thus, the next return to the Moon probably will approach work on the lunar surface very pragmatically, with humans in the roles of exploration geologist, mining geologist/engineer, heavy equipment operator/engineer, heavy equipment/robotic maintenance engineer, mine manager, and the like. To be successful, of course, a lunar resource and terrestrial fusion power business must be based on competitive rates of return to investors, innovative management of financial and technical risk, and reasonable regulatory and treaty oversight by government.
The long-term business case for private sector involvement in a return to the Moon most directly relates to terrestrial needs for clean energy. The global demand for energy will likely increase by a factor of eight or more by 2050. This will be due to a combination of needs reflecting the doubling of world population, new energy intensive technologies, demands to avoid the adverse consequences of climate change, and aspirations for improved standards of living in the less-developed world. Lunar helilun-3, with a resource base in the titanium-rich basaltic soils of Mare Tranquillitatis of at least 10,000 tonnes, represents one of several potential energy sources to meet this rapidly escalating demand. The results from the 1997-99 Lunar Prospector orbiting neutron spectrometer analyses suggest that helium-3 also may be concentrated at the lunar poles along with solar wind hydrogen. The energy equivalent value of helium-3 delivered to future fusion power plants on Earth would be about $3 billion per tonne relative to $21 per barrel crude oil. The domestic U.S. electrical power market is worth approximately $120 billion, annually. Some 40 tonnes of helium-3 contain enough energy to supply that market's needs for one year. These numbers illustrate the theoretical magnitude of the potential business opportunity in a return to the Moon. In addition, the technology and facilities required for success of a lunar commercial enterprise will make possible and reduce the cost of continued scientific investigations on and from the Moon, space station re-supply, exploration and settlement of Mars, asteroid interception and diversion to prevent impact on the Earth, and many other future space activities.
AT: Launch Costs
Private industry involvement solves launch costs.
Stewart 9 (5/22/09, Nick, Northern Ontario Business, “Mining the moon a real possibility: former astronaut”, )
* Schmitt is a former US astronaut and senator, and works at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
To make operations economically feasible, launch costs to return the material to Earth would have to be $3,000 per kilogram, a factor of 20 lower than the costs at the time of Apollo 17. While this number seems daunting, Schmitt says many technologies have become considerably cheaper since that time, and private-sector involvement should further reduce costs.
AT: Long Delays
Orbiting fueling stations can be up within the decade.
Wall 11 (1/13/011, Mike, , “Mining the Moon's Water: Q & A with Shackleton Energy's Bill Stone”, ) NYan
* Bill Stone is the founder of Shackleton Energy, a company investing in lunar mining
: What's a realistic timeline for when you could get orbital fueling stations up and running?
Stone: Within four years, we intend to launch two robotic lunar prospector (scouting) missions to both poles of the moon to selected, high probability, ice-laden craters.
Because of the extremely harsh operating environments, nuclear RTG [radioisotope thermoelectric generator]-powered rovers will perform prospecting operations for at least a year each in the ultra-cold, ultra-dark craters (we are talking of an area with a temperature of 40 degrees Kelvin [minus 387 degrees Fahrenheit, or minus 233 Celsius]). No other form of power can do the job effectively or affordably.
"Ore" maps will be developed to make follow-on business decisions. We will use NASA lessons learned and rover experience/technology as guides to developing our rovers.
If the prospecting is successful and financial decisions are favorable, we will then conduct a major systems engineering and risk reduction program leading to human mining missions on the moon in or near selected craters. In the risk reduction phase, we will deploy several orbiting work stations, wherein all the training, procedures and vehicle assembly will be conducted prior to human lunar insertion and landings.
Initially, a crew of 6-12 operators will be trained and deployed to the LEO stations to fine-tune all required operations. When risk reduction and training is complete, an initial crew of 6-8 will descend to the lunar surface mining area and set up camp. Subsequent missions will deliver all required equipment and consumables on a frequent basis in preparation for mining operations.
When the lunar camp is declared operational, human-tended industrial mining and processing operations will commence, leading to frequent transportation of water to our LEO processing stations. In these stations, the water will be converted, on demand, to propellants for point of sale. SEC will offer propellant sales worldwide to all spacefaring customers.
Initial operational sales are anticipated within the decade, given full funding is achieved on schedule. Customers will be scheduled for fueling operations according to internationally approved standard interfaces and practices.
We envision the first SEC fuel depot to be positioned close to the ISS [International Space Station] to make fuel access convenient. Later depots will be positioned at points co-located with evolving customer demands. Propellants and consumables will always be available for sale on the moon at our base camps.
AT: Space Treaties Block Private Efforts
Private sector efforts are legal under the Outer Space Treaty
Schmitt 6 - Apollo 17 Astronaut AND** former U.S. Senator and Professor of Engineering, (Harrison Schmitt, Lunar Settlements, ed. by Haym Benaroya, pg 6, DH.)
International law relative to outer space, specifically the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, permits properly licensed and regulated commercial endeavors. Under the treaty, lunar resources can be extracted and owned, but national sovereignty cannot be asserted over the resource area. History clearly shows that a system of internationally sanctioned private property, consistent with the treaty, would encourage lunar settlement and development far more than the establishment of a lunar “commons” as envisioned by the largely ungratified 1979 Moon Agreement. Legal systems encompassing the recognition of private property have provided far more benefit to the world than those that attempt to manage common ownership.
Existing agreements don’t block
Spudis, reviewing Schmitt’s book, 6 (Paul, Senior Staff Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute in Houston, “Mining the Moon”, , MBIBAS)
Next Schmitt outlines his recommendations for lining up investors in a commercial operation for mining helium-3 on the Moon. Schmitt believes that for his plan to be successful, it must attract considerable private-sector investment. Would such an endeavor be legal? Space law regarding lunar resources is unclear. Nonetheless, Schmitt is convinced that existing treaties permit lunar economic development, particularly if it is carried out not by national governments, but by a user-based international consortium like those developed to manage communication satellites.
The next-to-last chapter touches on the value of humans in space. The book then concludes with the thought that a private effort to mine the Moon for helium-3 could not only solve our energy problems but also open the door to human settlement of the solar system.
***International Legal Regime CP
1nc International Legal Regime CP (Bilder Version)
Text:
The United States federal government should ratify and accede to the 1979 Moon Agreement, under condition that an acceptable lunar resource regime is incorporated pursuant to articles 11(5) and 18 of that agreement.
The counterplan solves the case --- establishing a predictable legal regime will pave the way for national lunar mining initiatives without sparking disputes
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
CONCLUSION
The need for affordable, safe, and non-polluting energy to serve the Earth's growing population is increasingly evident and urgent. The development of lunar He-3-based fusion energy, while still uncertain of achievement, offers humanity a credible prospect of meeting that need for centuries to come. Thus, it is not surprising that the United States and other nations proposing the eventual establishment of lunar bases have expressed interest in the possible mining and exploitation of lunar He-3.
However, neither nations nor private commercial enterprises are likely to be willing to commit resources to an He-3-based fusion energy program absent a stable and predictable legal regime governing lunar resources that provides reasonable assurance that any such effort and investment will be rewarded and can be carried on without controversy or disruption. Yet, at present, international space law fails to establish any detailed rules governing the mining, ownership, and exploitation of He-3 and other lunar resources or to provide such assurance. [*298] Consequently, if the United States seriously contemplates the possible development of He-3-based fusion energy, it is in its national interest to take steps to establish what it would consider as an acceptable and agreed-upon international lunar resource regime - and to do so relatively soon.
There are a variety of ways, discussed above, in which the United States could seek to establish such an acceptable international lunar resource regime. Perhaps the simplest and most promising would be approaches involving collective accession by the United States and other major "space powers" to the Moon Agreement under conditions or arrangements that assure the incorporation of an acceptable lunar resource regime within the Moon Agreement pursuant to articles 11(5) and 18 of that agreement. An additional initiative, well worth exploring, is the possibility of the formation by the United States, other "space powers," and other interested nations of a user-based international organization or entity - open to all nations and perhaps private enterprises - to undertake the collective development and conduct of lunar He-3 and other resource mining activities, as well as perhaps at least some aspects of the development and management of terrestrial He-3-based fusion energy itself. Such a collective enterprise might be established on its own or perhaps incorporated within the framework of the Moon Agreement under article 18 of that agreement.
However problematic and seemingly remote, the question of the exploitation of He-3 and other lunar resources warrants the U.S. government's - and international lawyers' - present attention. While President Obama's recent proposal to eliminate funding for NASA's Moon-bound Constellation program raises doubts as to whether NASA will, at least in the immediate future, implement the previous administration's program, n182 it seems likely that the United States, and at least some other nations, will eventually establish bases on the Moon - and perhaps on Mars or other planets or their moons. Beginning now to think about and craft collective solutions to the issues which may well arise from such programs may not only facilitate such national activities but avoid difficulties and disputes in the future. Moreover, international cooperation in developing - and making available [*299] to all nations and people - a prospectively ideal and abundant source of affordable, safe, and nonpolluting energy could usher in a new and hopeful era for all humanity.
Only the counterplan can solve the case --- it creates a stable and legal and political environment for lunar mining
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
C. How Should the United States Seek to Achieve an Acceptable International Lunar Resource Regime?
What steps might the United States take to try to achieve an acceptable lunar resource regime? Should it ratify and accede to the Moon Agreement, possibly with reservations, and then move within the article 11 and 18 framework of that agreement to negotiate such a regime? Should it negotiate an acceptable regime beforehand as a condition precedent to its acceptance of the Moon Agreement - perhaps in the form of a proposed agreed amendment or protocol pursuant to article 18 of the agreement - only then joining the agreement with the assurance that the proposed agreed-upon regime will be incorporated within the Moon Agreement's framework? Should it instead seek a new amendment or protocol to the Outer Space Treaty, making clear the right of its parties to acquire and utilize lunar or other extraterrestrial resources? Or should it seek to negotiate, either on a broad or a narrow multilateral basis, an entirely new agreement, embodying the type of regime it considers acceptable, outside the framework of the present Moon Agreement or Outer Space Treaty? Finally, regardless of the way that the United States seeks to establish a lunar mining regime [*283] ensuring it access to lunar He-3, should it also seek to establish, together with other concerned countries and perhaps interested private enterprises, an international or quasi-international entity for the cooperative mining of lunar He-3, and possibly even for the terrestrial development of a global He-3-based fusion energy program?
1. Should the United States Accede to the Moon Agreement?
Ratifying the Moon Agreement, under conditions which assure that a lunar resource regime acceptable to the United States will eventually be established under articles 11 and 18 of the agreement may be the simplest way of achieving the U.S. objective of providing a stable legal and political environment in support of a long-term commitment to an He-3-based fusion energy program. The arguments in favor of reconsidering the past refusal of the United States to ratify the Moon Agreement are as follows.
First, the Moon Agreement is currently the principal "game in town" - the only international instrument specifically designed to deal with issues relating to the exploration of the Moon and the use of its resources. It represents the best efforts and embodies the carefully considered compromises and pragmatic accommodations of some seven years of negotiation by the United States and the principal space powers and other states most concerned. As indicated, the United States fully participated and achieved most of its objectives in this long, drawn-out negotiation. n144 With the arguable exception of article 11, the agreement provides a broadly sensible and non-controversial set of rules for the conduct of lunar activities already in place. n145 Indeed, the legal subcommittee of COPUOS, at both its most recent 2008 and 2009 meetings, devoted considerable time to a discussion of the reasons for low participation in the Moon Agreement, the benefits of adherence to the agreement, and the possibility of revision of the agreement [*284] so as to encourage broader participation. n146 Given this history, the United States could have difficulty persuading other states of the need to embark on a completely new negotiation.
Second, whatever their merits at the time, the arguments presented in 1980 in opposition to U.S. ratification of the agreement appear now even less persuasive. As discussed, suggestions that the Moon Agreement - and more particularly its "common heritage" language - establishes a moratorium on lunar mining, precludes a role for private enterprise, or prescribes any particular type of international regime applicable to lunar resource exploitation, particularly some kind of regime dominated by developing nations, find little support in either the language of the agreement or its negotiating history. n147 In particular, it seems clear that, while article 11 appears to require good faith efforts to negotiate an international regime at such time as resource exploitation becomes likely, it neither mandates that the regime take any particular form - particularly one mirroring the original (pre-1994 implementation agreement) LOSC seabed regime - nor requires state parties to accept any regime with which they are not satisfied. Moreover, the criteria set out in article 11(7) for any such regime appear generally consistent with U.S. objectives. n148 Finally, as indicated, the U.N. General Assembly's adoption of the 1994 implementation agreement modifying the provisions of part XI of the LOSC to which the United States strongly objected, suggests that the international community, particularly the technically advanced countries most concerned and likely to be involved in lunar exploration and development, can now be expected to be [*285] receptive to the kind of lunar resource regime the United States would find acceptable. n149
Third, while U.S. ratification of the Moon Agreement would not in itself provide a detailed lunar resource regime acceptable to the United States n150 the United States could, and should, condition or structure such ratification and accession in a way designed to ensure that, either before or after U.S. ratification and accession, an acceptable resource regime will in fact be adopted by the parties to the agreement. Some possibilities for seeking to ensure this result are discussed below.
Fourth, to the extent that concerns as to the meaning or ideological implications of the agreement continue to pose a political obstacle to U.S. ratification, such concerns could also be met through appropriate U.S. reservations, declarations, or understandings to its ratification of the agreement. For example, in 1982 the American Bar Association's House of Delegates approved a joint report of the American Bar Association sections on International Law and on Natural Resources Law recommending U.S. ratification accompanied by declarations consistent with the following principles:
(a) It is the position of the United States that no provision in this Agreement constrains the existing right of governmental or authorized non-governmental entities to explore and use the resources of the Moon or other celestial body, including the right to develop and use these resources for commercial or other purposes, and no such constraint is accepted by this ratification;
(b) It is the position of the United States that nothing in this Agreement in any way diminishes or alters the existing right of the United States to determine unilaterally how it shares the benefits derived from development and use by or under the authority of the United States of natural resources of the Moon or other celestial bodies;
(c) Natural resources extracted or used by or under the authority of a State Party to this Agreement are subject to the exclusive control of, and shall be the property of the State [*286] Party or other authorized entity responsible for their extraction or use. In this context, it is the position of the United States that Articles XII and XV of this Agreement preserve the existing right of States Parties to retain exclusive jurisdiction and control over their facilities, stations and installations on the Moon and other celestial bodies, and that other State Parties are obligated to avoid interference with normal operations of such facilities;
(d) Recognition by the United States that the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of all mankind is limited to recognition (i) that all States have equal rights to explore and use the Moon and its natural resources, and (ii) that no State or other entity has an exclusive right of ownership over the Moon, over any area of the surface or subsurface of the moon, or over its natural resources which have not been, or are not actually in the process of being, extracted or used by actual development activities on the Moon;
(e) It is the position of the United States that no moratorium on the commercial or other exploration, development and use of the natural resources of the Moon or other celestial body is intended or required by this Agreement. The United States recognizes that, in the development and use of natural resources on the Moon, States Parties to this Agreement are obligated to act in a manner compatible with the provisions of Article VI(2) and the purposes specified in Article XI(7), and the purposes specified in Article XI(7). However, the United States reserves to itself the right and authority to determine the standards for such compatibility unless and until the United States becomes a party to a future resources regime;
(f) Acceptance by the United States of the obligation to join in good faith negotiation for creation of a future resources regime in no way constitutes acceptance of any particular provisions or proposed provisions which may be included in an agreement creating and controlling such a regime; nor does it constitute any obligation or commitment to become a Party to such a regime regardless of the contents of any such agreement. n151
The counterplan’s framework for cooperation is also key to prevent space conflicts from spilling over to cause wars on Earth
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
The question of how the moon will be governed once humans return in about a decade and begin to establish permanent bases matters greatly to the future of international security. Already, a range of major powers have plans to participate in the moon’s further scientific exploration, commercial exploitation, and possible permanent settlement. If we count both manned and robotic activities, this list currently includes the United States, China, Russia, India, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Space Agency, Japan, and South Korea. Other countries are likely to join this list in the coming years.
Establishing a peaceful framework for lunar governance will be important, because hostile international relations on the moon are likely to lead to conflicts elsewhere in space and, possibly, on Earth. Such patterns regarding new frontiers have plagued the history of international relations for centuries. Indeed, despite frequent hopes for cooperation, most unclaimed territories historically have become sources of international conflict rather than serving as peaceful lebensraum. Typically, and consistent with realist predictions about international politics, states have had a built-in penchant to pursue relative gains over their rivals and therefore have sought to seize and defend new resources to their own advantage. On the other hand, successful formation of a stable, transnational governance system—a mechanism for sharing or otherwise peacefully allocating the moon’s resources—could open the possibility for mutually beneficial and self-sustaining lunar commerce and settlement, consistent with neo-liberal institutionalist predictions. Such a model could have positive spin-off effects on Earth and set a cooperative pattern for further human exploration and development of the rest of the solar system, spurring states to pool resources and engage in joint approaches to space’s many challenges. In such scenarios, hopes for “humankind” efforts in space—rather than state-driven rivalries—might be realized, something for which astronauts and cosmonauts who have visited space have often called. As Per Magnus Wijkman wrote on these issues in 1982, the “interdependence” of all actors in space provides “strong incentives” for the emergence of cooperative solutions.1
1nc International Legal Regime CP (Hatch Version)
Text: The United States federal government should negotiate a new international law framework for moon use that:
■ Repeals elements of the Outer Space Treaty that limit lunar development, including an explicit rejection of the Common Heritage Doctrine
■ Bans military activity on the moon
■ Establishes a lunar regime whereby states may use any lunar resources they can access
■ Punishes violations of other party’s operations by profit sharing penalties)
■ Establishes a “Lunar Forum” to implement a profit sharing mechanism whereby states keep all profit from operations until breakeven is reached and subsequent profits are distributed evenly among nations with a lunar presence, including a voting structure in which non-spacefaring states are able to observe and negotiate in proceedings but where votes are reserved to spacefaring sates and should guarantee membership to non-spacefaring states that become spacefaring in the future
The counterplan establishes a new space system that facilitates peaceful development and prevents resource conflicts
Hatch, 10 - Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review (2010, Benjamin, Emory International Law Review, “Dividing the Pie in the Sky: the Need for a New Lunar Resources Regime,” vol. 24, rev. 229, )RK
B. Proposal for a New Lunar Legal Regime
1. Overview
As noted previously, lunar law must be codified in a treaty, because there is not sufficient state practice to create customary international law. n378 States that seek to create a new treaty should learn from previous errors and create a specific, carefully worded document to avoid the problems of the OST (vague phrases that are not sufficiently clear to help guide state conduct or compliance) and the Moon Agreement (poor drafting that allows creative textual readings contradictory of the clear intentions of the drafters).
If states elect to create a new treaty that would fully supersede the OST, they should ensure that the new agreement incorporates those general principles of space law that are consistent with the values of international peace and economic efficiency. In other words, it should explicitly state in specific language that outer space and the Moon are not to be militarized, and it should directly incorporate all other uncontroversial sections of the current OST. Only those provisions that contradict international peace and economic [*288] efficiency require revision. As a result, the OST may not need to be fully repealed. The decision to fully replace (or partially replace) the OST should depend on the contents of the new agreement - if the new agreement consolidates most political power in the hands of only spacefaring states, a new treaty would probably be the best vehicle for implementation, as it is unlikely that developing states would be quick to ratify an agreement disempowering themselves. Otherwise, an agreement to provisionally modify the OST could work, as the Implementation Agreement for Part XI was used to amend the International Seabed Authority. The regime proposed in the following pages would likely have to be implemented by a new treaty, given that these recommendations would probably not be embraced by the developing world.
2. Property Rights
This Comment has argued that the Common Heritage Doctrine has, time and again, been the principal culprit for the reversed tragedy of the commons. Any lunar-resource regime seeking economically efficient exploitation of Moon minerals requires a categorical rejection of this doctrine. Instead, the new system should permit acquisition of title to be acquired to lunar mineral resources. Three models have been offered illustrating how proprietary rights may be acquired over a resource previously held in common.
PROP-A requires that prospective resource users agree in advance to a mechanism that vests limited property rights in users. Users unhappy with their allocation can buy the unused rights of other states. The limited nature of a PROP-A system's investiture of proprietary rights is an attractive feature, as it ensures that the entire resource will not be immediately consumed through over-harvesting. On the other hand, as the Kyoto Protocol showed, the allocation of property rights must be carefully planned, as states may be so dissatisfied by the way such rights are distributed that they refuse to participate in the resource management scheme. The problem is that because spacefaring states do not have equal financial or technical capacities to harvest lunar resources, countries will have differing objectives in how the resources are allocated: States that can extract more will want mining credits to reflect technical capabilities, while states that are not able to extract very many lunar resources will want mining credits to be equally distributed, so that they may sell their unused credits to states that want to exploit the Moon more vigorously. The political disputes that would inevitably emerge from such a conflict of economic interests are the kinds of problems that could easily defeat a new resources regime. While PROP-A suggests that limited rights can force [*289] responsible resource exploitation, the potential political harms of distributing mining credits suggest another system should be considered.
PROP-B requires that an international agency be established to act as a trustee for the resource. The agency must act in the interests of a defined group. As the common heritage scheme has already been explicitly rejected, an alternative group that the trustee could act for would be the interests of the spacefaring states. Consolidating the interests of states into one rights bearer (the trustee) creates two insurmountable political problems. First, spacefaring nations may be forced to submit their proposed extractions to the approval of other countries. As the trustee alone can ratify proposed mineral developments, and presumably the trustee's actions are governed by the other spacefaring states - potential economic rivals acquire a veto power over each other's economic proposals. This may create both political conflict and an uncertain political dynamic that would likely deter state or private investment. As a result, such a system could actually deter the financing necessary to efficiently develop the Moon. The only possible solution to this sort of political gamesmanship would be for the trustee to act as an independent, neutral operator of lunar-resource exploitation. This leads to the second problem: If the lunar trustee is governed in a non-political way, it may only be able to function if states assign the trustee both sovereign decision-making authority and the power to take technologies necessary to harvest lunar resources. This looks perilously close to the original Part XI of UNCLOS, which was rejected by every one of the spacefaring states - unless either Malta or Iceland's ratification is sufficient to count for Europe n379 - until the introduction of the Implementation Agreement. A PROP-B model could quickly have states more concerned with infringements upon their sovereignty than with lunar economic development. As a result, the trustee approach should be avoided if possible.
The general rejection of PROP-A and PROP-B on the basis of instability and the likelihood of creating conflict inherent in any multinational effort to balance the economic interests of the richest states only leaves PROP-C, where proprietary rights are vested directly in the resource users. In the lunar example, states would be able to claim a possessory interest over whatever resources each state was able to extract from the Moon's surface. This allows each country to pursue its own interests and removes the need for bureaucratic oversight to ensure compliance. By giving states property rights over the [*290] Moon's resources, countries will take the lunar environment and preservation of lunar resources more seriously, because they will be directly and financially affected by overuse of the Moon. Additionally, concerns about over-harvesting lunar resources will be unfounded because of the practical difficulties associated with travel between the Earth and the Moon. It is unlikely that states would be financially incentivized to create massive armadas of spaceships capable of bringing tons of moon rocks back to Earth based on both high fixed costs and the fact that if too many lunar resources enter the market simultaneously, the price of such resources will be driven down by the high volume of supply. As moon rocks are not renewable resources, spacefaring states will find that it is in their interests to preserve their newfound source of wealth. While PROP-C's notion of vesting rights in states seems superior to the logic of PROP-A or PROP-B, the analysis does not end based on a determination of the rights-bearer. In practice, spacefaring states will quickly learn that there is a need to link their lunar fortunes to one another as a disincentive against abusive behavior. As a result, the next section will discuss how states can work together through an international organization that will disincentivize bad behavior and allow a more expeditious review of multinational lunar policy.
3. The Lunar Forum
Because developing and financially exploiting lunar resources is both a difficult and expensive proposition, countries that invest in lunar development deserve to have their rights strongly and actively protected. Accordingly, this Comment further recommends that an organization be created - the Lunar Forum - which will be empowered to define and enforce the collective lunar policy of spacefaring states. The Forum could impose RIGHTWAY-type environmental requirements on future lunar developments as necessary or could act as a dispute settlement system, brokering a peaceful resolution over potentially contentious issues (such as determining which state is permitted to develop and harvest natural resources on a given site claimed by multiple parties). Learning from OPEC's example, however, the Lunar Forum should not attempt to engage in collusive activity or artificially impact the energy market. Instead, free market principles (and practical limitations) should govern the supply of lunar resources provided to global markets and allow the invisible hand to set prices, rather than backroom politics.
The main purpose of the Lunar Forum would be to ensure that one state does not interfere in the mineral operations of another state and to make lunar- [*291] resource exploitation mutually beneficial. To that end, the Lunar Forum should create and define a profit-sharing mechanism. This mechanism will operate according to two propositions. First, each spacefaring country will be permitted to retain proceeds of the sale of lunar resources until it is able to have fully paid the extraction and space flight costs associated with the sold resources. Second, revenues obtained in excess of the costs of extraction and space flight (i.e. the profits) will be shared by a formula determined by the Lunar Forum. By making all states financial beneficiaries of each lunarresource extraction (regardless of the operating state), countries will be unlikely to interfere in another state's resource excavation efforts. Additionally, by creating a profit-sharing venture, the Lunar Forum will be able to create effective punitive measures for party misconduct, namely imposing a reduction in the violator's percentage of profits from future sales of lunar resources. In the Lunar Forum, offering states financial incentives in membership and linking financial penalties to violations of other states' rights to be free from interference, spacefaring countries will have adequate incentives to join the Lunar Forum - namely an opportunity to profit and an assurance that their rights will be protected by strong disincentives for states that contemplate acting badly.
4. An Open or Closed Agreement? or Whatever Happened to Developing States?
While the discussion of possible solutions to the question of lunar property rights has provided a mechanism that should both prove profitable to member states and reduce interfering behavior by other spacefaring states, two crucial but linked issues remain unresolved: (1) How will the Lunar Forum be structured, i.e., what countries can participate in the Lunar Forum and how will its benefits be shared? and (2) How can developing countries be compensated for the lost protections of the Common Heritage Doctrine?
Both questions can be resolved by briefly examining the differences between open and closed agreements. Open agreements (like the OST, Kyoto Protocol, or UNCLOS) invite all states in the world to ratify the treaty in question and to receive full benefits as states parties. Open agreements generally utilize "one country, one vote" rules. By inviting all countries to participate in the decision-making process (thus increasing the marketplace of ideas) open agreements also invite problems. As developing countries significantly outnumber developed countries (let alone spacefaring countries), if each state party was given an equal vote, developing countries could [*292] effectively resurrect the Common Heritage Doctrine (and all the problems associated with it) by using their voting powers to apportion financial and economic benefits to themselves. As an example, lesser developed countries could vote that shared profits from lunar-resource sales must be equally divided among all countries in the world. Rather than solving the current economic inefficiencies in lunar law, an open agreement could easily perpetuate such inefficiencies.
In the closed agreement, in contrast to the open agreement, the treaty is not intended to represent the entire world, but rather certain segments of it - and, as a result, membership is not freely attainable. This form of agreement is exemplified by OPEC and to a lesser extent the Antarctic Treaty System, n380 both of which impose certain requirements that states must meet to become full members. Closed agreements allow states that have borne the costs necessary to develop certain resources to be the decision makers for the utilization of those resources. A closed agreement, which restricts membership to only those states that have contributed to the development of lunar resources, creates incentives for non-members dissatisfied with the distribution agreement to bear the costs necessary to exploit the resource, so as to gain membership. While this system might sound beneficial, as it would likely help promote investment in lunar development since the policymakers will be the states making the investments, it also has a serious problem. As OPEC's power plays have demonstrated, closed agreements governing resource distribution can cause serious harms to non-member states when parties engage in collusive behavior. The effect of the harms in the lunar example would be even more pronounced, as the spacefaring states are generally the richest and most powerful countries. Should a closed agreement comprised of spacefaring states be abused, lesser developed countries already confronted by numerous challenges might be placed in an even worse position.
To avoid this potential for abuse, either by free riders or by the spacefaring states, the new lunar regime should attempt to walk the middle ground between an open and closed agreement. While the open agreement would surely create sufficient uncertainty to reduce the likelihood of attracting the investments necessary to exploit the Moon, it is important that the voice of developing states be heard by the spacefaring states. Similarly, those who bear the high costs of development ought to be entitled to have their voices count for more in the disposition of the assets generated by their investments.
[*293] Either of two practical solutions could help strike the proper balance. First, the spacefaring states alone would be given voting privileges, while other states that ratify the agreement would be given a glorified observer status and permitted to participate in deliberations of the Lunar Forum. Accompanying this observer status would be a guarantee that should any non-spacefaring state party actually become spacefaring, such party would automatically assume full membership rights in the Forum. Alternatively, all states parties to the agreement could be guaranteed votes, but the votes of the spacefaring states would be weighted highly enough to significantly outweigh the votes of the non-spacefaring parties. In practice, this could work as a tie-breaking mechanism: If a decision of the spacefaring states was tied, the majority votes of the non-spacefaring parties could be decisive. A mixed approach that honors the financial commitments of spacefaring states and protects the developing world is the best way to prevent abuses on a structural level.
The plan guarantees militarization of the moon --- only the counterplan can prevent World War III
Hatch, 10 - Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review (2010, Benjamin, Emory International Law Review, “Dividing the Pie in the Sky: the Need for a New Lunar Resources Regime,” vol. 24, rev. 229, )RK
1. DO-NOTHING: The Wild West
DO-NOTHING systems impose no restrictions on commons users. n248 Rather, they permit free use (and abuse) of the system. A DO-NOTHING [*267] system would effectively be imposed on the Moon if the OST and Moon Agreement were repealed with no substituted agreement in their place. In combination with the natural KEEPOUT system governing the Moon, n249 the only factor preventing the Moon from being subjected to a tragedy of the commons would be the small number of actors dividing the vast expanse of the lunar surface. n250 On the other hand, with no legal regime for the Moon at all, the tragedy of the commons should be the least of humanity's worries. The total repeal of the OST and Moon Agreements would cause the Moon to cease being an object of international law, leaving it utterly free and open for the uses of the first claimants. Rather than create a regime to govern state interests over the Moon, this policy would cause the Moon to become the international equivalent of the Wild West. Rights to the Moon would be defined only to the degree that those rights could be protected.
The total repeal of the OST would almost certainly solve the Moon's economic problems generated by the tragedy of the commons. With no regulation or convoluted proprietary schemes and no legal mandate to provide for free riders, the disincentives that have suppressed lunar development would vanish. However, this total lack of lunar law would likely heighten the comparison to the Wild West - with no regulation, states would have an incentive to militarize the Moon and to engage in prolonged conflicts with other would-be users to gain monopolies and exclusive uses over valuable lunar resources. While a scheme rejecting all lunar regulation might lead to an era of free and open use of the Moon, it also may lead to World War III.
--- 2nc Solvency (Hatch Specific)
The CP boosts international cooperation, prevents war and spurs greater respect for international law
Hatch, 10 - Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review (2010, Benjamin, Emory International Law Review, “Dividing the Pie in the Sky: the Need for a New Lunar Resources Regime,” vol. 24, rev. 229, )RK
Conclusion
A return of humans to the Moon and a harnessing of lunar resources is becoming a reality. The current legal framework is both economically inefficient and insufficiently clear to guide spacefaring states in their interactions on the Moon. New institutions are needed, and given the timetable [*294] that the spacefaring states have provided for their return to the Moon, the world should turn its attention to this issue now. By proactively creating a new legal framework for the Moon, and outer space generally, potential economic opponents will be forced to reevaluate their own interests and to listen to the concerns of other states. Regardless of whether the solution created resembles the Lunar Forum, the Madrid Protocol, or some middle ground, it is of paramount importance that states begin and participate in a dialogue about the future of the Moon and its resources. This dialogue will lead to greater mutual understanding and reduce the chance of international conflict on the Moon. Even if Helium-3 fusion ultimately does not become a solution to the world's energy problems, states will be none-the-worse for having come together, discussed energy economics, and worked out a mutually agreeable solution. If, on the other hand, it does prove to be a successful energy source, the risks of allowing the OST and Moon Agreement to remain the official international law of lunar resources are too great. It is better to be safe and wind up with another common-space regime that exists only on paper than to be sorry and see the world reduced to conflict over Helium-3. Creating a new treaty through open dialogue will lead not only to a new trend in more efficient commons-resource management but also to greater respect for international law and other states as the world faces the challenges of the next century.
2nc Weaponization / Space Conflict NB
[Might be in 1nc depending on which version of the CP you read]
The plan guarantees militarization of the moon --- only the counterplan can prevent World War III
Hatch, 10 - Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review (2010, Benjamin, Emory International Law Review, “Dividing the Pie in the Sky: the Need for a New Lunar Resources Regime,” vol. 24, rev. 229, )RK
1. DO-NOTHING: The Wild West
DO-NOTHING systems impose no restrictions on commons users. n248 Rather, they permit free use (and abuse) of the system. A DO-NOTHING [*267] system would effectively be imposed on the Moon if the OST and Moon Agreement were repealed with no substituted agreement in their place. In combination with the natural KEEPOUT system governing the Moon, n249 the only factor preventing the Moon from being subjected to a tragedy of the commons would be the small number of actors dividing the vast expanse of the lunar surface. n250 On the other hand, with no legal regime for the Moon at all, the tragedy of the commons should be the least of humanity's worries. The total repeal of the OST and Moon Agreements would cause the Moon to cease being an object of international law, leaving it utterly free and open for the uses of the first claimants. Rather than create a regime to govern state interests over the Moon, this policy would cause the Moon to become the international equivalent of the Wild West. Rights to the Moon would be defined only to the degree that those rights could be protected.
The total repeal of the OST would almost certainly solve the Moon's economic problems generated by the tragedy of the commons. With no regulation or convoluted proprietary schemes and no legal mandate to provide for free riders, the disincentives that have suppressed lunar development would vanish. However, this total lack of lunar law would likely heighten the comparison to the Wild West - with no regulation, states would have an incentive to militarize the Moon and to engage in prolonged conflicts with other would-be users to gain monopolies and exclusive uses over valuable lunar resources. While a scheme rejecting all lunar regulation might lead to an era of free and open use of the Moon, it also may lead to World War III.
Economics make conflict over moon resources is inevitable – only an new international law regime solves
Hatch, 10 - Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review (2010, Benjamin, Emory International Law Review, “Dividing the Pie in the Sky: the Need for a New Lunar Resources Regime,” vol. 24, rev. 229, )RK
2. Avoiding Political Conflict
Noting the substantive problems presented by the text of both the OST and the Moon Agreement, this section will address the second of two major policy problems presented by an ineffective governance regime for the Moon: the danger that ineffective regulation will lead to neo-imperialist political and military conflict. In the imperialist era when the major Western powers and Japan were carving the rest of the world into colonies and spheres of influence, international law (in the state it existed at the time) recognized the validity of the title to such holdings on the theory of acquisition by discovery. For acquisition by discovery to be valid, the property being acquired must have been, at the instant prior to discovery, a res nullius, defined as "a thing or territory belonging to no one[], a "hitherto unknown territory ... .'" n195 Under this logic, indigenous inhabitants of such areas did not count - only civilized states could acquire through discovery. n196
The notion of res nullius comes originally from Roman law, where the term referred to "a heterogeneous category which included wild animals, abandoned [*259] property, and "divine' things." n197 Res nullius could be acquired through occupatio, the rule that "the first taker of ownerless property (res nullius) becomes its owner." n198
Today, unowned areas cannot be acquired through discovery or first use, n199 primarily because "developing nations became concerned that richer countries would dominate the resources that lay as yet unclaimed by any sovereign... . By the time the developing world gained the wherewithal to reach the resources of the ocean beds, outer space, and Antarctica, those resources would already be claimed." n200 By rejecting res nullius and its corresponding mode of acquisition through discovery, the alternative position of res communes became accepted in the law of international common spaces. Res communes is characterized by the notion that the real estate or object was "common to all men ... such things could not be owned ... ." n201 This notion gave rise to the Common Heritage Doctrine described above.
Yet, regardless of whether the language is res nullius or res communes, the existence of a vast, unowned, but claimable area of resource-rich land will inevitably spawn political conflict. n202 At first glance, this might appear to be counter-intuitive: the logic of res communes would seem to suggest that when a proprietary claim is disallowed, states would have no reason to have conflicts over an unownable entity. n203 One example of the success of res communes with respect to conflict resolution is in Antarctica. Prior to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the continent was the subject of a series of territorial claims, some dating back as far as the 1840s. n204 By the early part of the twentieth century, eight different countries had launched "scientific expeditions," some of which were as much about annexation as exploration. n205 By 1950, eight claims had been [*260] made on the continent, n206 and these eight would be the claims that would be locked in place during the 1959 Antarctica Treaty. n207 This treaty, along with supplementary agreements (altogether comprising the "Antarctic Treaty System") have managed to "avoid[] conflicts over sovereignty ... prevent[] the militarization of the continent ... [and] prevent[] an unregulated gold rush in Antarctica." n208 This success has, at least in part, been attributed to the application of the res communes doctrine to the Antarctic Treaty System. n209
There are two crucial points, however, that differentiate Antarctica from the Moon and that predict the failure of the OST regime once the Moon becomes a resource base that is readily accessible. First, Antarctica is not a true res communes. The Antarctic Treaty did not require states parties to disavow their territorial claims. n210 Rather, it only barred the modification of the claims that were in existence in 1959. n211 States not only still maintain their claims on Antarctic territory, n212 but some have gone as far as to issue postage stamps in the name of their Antarctic territories to reassert the vitality of those claims. n213 The impact of this perpetuation of territorial claims has been mitigated by other arrangements in the Antarctic Treaty System that severely limit the profitability of states exploiting their claims, such as the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, n214 which has barred extraction of Antarctic resources until 2048. n215 Additionally, Antarctica does not have the mineral or resource wealth of the Moon. n216 For these reasons, [*261] Antarctica has not been worth developing, much less fighting over. Contrast this with the current dispute over the resource-rich Arctic - where states are trying to maintain assertions of territorial control to horde the energy resources beneath the seabed n217 and it is clear that where resources and profits are accessible, conflict surely follows.
The historical conflicts over imperialist regimes and colonialism tend to suggest that when powerful states have an interest in amassing something that exists in large, previously un-owned quantities in one location, they will inevitably come into conflict with one another. States have a limited economic interest in the Antarctic, n218 and so they are unlikely to invest military assets and the necessary financing to vindicate or broaden their claim to something that is not generating them any wealth. In contrast, states seem to believe that they have potentially great economic interests in the Moon and, accordingly may have a correspondingly large motivation to have conflicts over it. n219
Exploration of the Moon will benefit humanity - on Earth, new technologies will be have to be developed to aid states in the new space race - and on the Moon, providing new opportunities for human growth and expansion. n220 Whatever name a regime wants to give to the Moon - res nullius [*262] or res communes - the Moon represents an unparalleled opportunity. Imagine a situation where one state was able to not only find large quantities of Helium-3 or some other valuable resource on the Moon but also succeeded in denying access to other states. That state would enjoy a tremendous economic advantage by cornering the market in some ultrarare, useful commodity. Resources by their nature breed conflict. n221 As demonstrated above, states will soon be converging on the Moon to reap the benefits that it may provide. Given the recent actions by the United States and China, and the spirit of conquest and competition that seems to be informing the current Moon rush, the vague and generic OST will not be able to sufficiently stop state conflict over the greatest economic opportunity in history.
III. A Survey of Resource Regulatory Schemes
Unfortunately, despite the recent surge in interest in humans returning to the Moon, the law of outer-space minerals generally remains governed by woefully inadequate devices that implicate the tragedy of the commons as well as violations of international peace.
In particular, mining the moon for helium-3 would cause Russia and China to weaponize space
Beljac 7 Ph.D. Monash University (Marko, “He-3 Nuclear Fusion and Moon Wars”, May 22, , MBIBAS)
But the interest in the Moon by Washington, Moscow and Beijing (perhaps also the EU) is very interesting and if He-3 fusion is driving the agenda then it certainly opens up the prospect of conflict on the Moon and creates a perverse logic behind moves to weaponise space. If the US achieves “space control” it would have the ability to deny Moscow and Beijing the use of near Earth orbit, let alone the Moon and other sources of energy in the Solar System. If we are to take our quarrels into the Solar System then just what kind of a pathetic species are we?
--- XT: Conflict Net Benefit
Lunar mining causes space conflict with china absent the CP
Brearley 6—University of Southampton research student (Andrew, “Mining the Moon: Owning the Night Sky?”, Astropolitics, 4:43-67, OCRed, ZBurdette)
The treaties that comprise international space law are simply not designed to answer detailed questions, they only establish prin-ciples upon which the human exploration of space occurs. This is highlighted by the differing approaches to the CHM within the Moon Agreement and UNCLOS III; the Moon Agreement simply defines the Moon as the CHM, while UNCLOS III provides all the information necessary for the establishment of the ISA.
Given the relative power that the US can exercise in space in comparison to other states, it is conceivable that it could make the decision to simply ignore legal questions concerning the rights to use lunar resources. As the US has not signed nor ratified the Moon Agreement, there is no legal restraint preventing it from ignoring that particular treaty. Given the preponderance of power that the US possesses, it could choose as well not to be bound by the provisions of the OST. Alternatively, if the Chinese program proceeds rapidly, China could attempt to utilize the Moon without reference to other states. Clearly, these scenarios lead to a conflict in space, which the space treaties intended to avoid. If it is assumed that the space powers continue in their wish to avoid the potential of such conflict, then resolving the legal uncertainties becomes an important policy objective.
--- CP Prevents Resource Conflicts
CP solves space resource wars
Brearley 6—University of Southampton research student (Andrew, “Mining the Moon: Owning the Night Sky?”, Astropolitics, 4:43-67, OCRed, ZBurdette)
Just as the OST was required to define the status of the Moon before the first lunar landings, a clear legal framework is now desirable to govern the future exploitation of the Moon’s resources. Since space activities today are largely conducted in a cooperative manner, far removed from the space race of the Cold War, a clear legal structure is needed to lessen the possibilities of conflict concerning access to non-terrestrial resources. One minimum requirement in such a clarification is a definition of the difference between exploitation and appropriation.
At present, the legal status of the Moon is open to debate and various interpretations. The principal matter in need of resolution is which treaty defines the legal status of the Moon, Moon Agreement or the OST? The answer to this question resolves the legal status of the Moon, either it is the CHM or a commons. If the Moon Agreement comes to be the accepted international view, then the meaning of the CHM needs to be resolved. However, precisely because of the CHM commitments of the treaty it is very unlikely that it will be able to draw support from the spacefaring powers. It is more probable that the Moon Agreement will become obsolete, yet this does not resolve the Moon’s legal status. The OST does not provide sufficient detail, in its own right, to form a regime, and through its ban upon national appropriation it creates a legal problem. The Moon Agreement, through the notion of the CHM, presents a possible means of resolving this difficulty. There is a clear continuity between the two treaties; the OST creates complexity through its ban upon territorial sovereignty, and the Moon Agreement responds by presenting a model of common sovereignty.
CP solves the aff without triggering instability
Brearley 6—University of Southampton research student (Andrew, “Mining the Moon: Owning the Night Sky?”, Astropolitics, 4:43-67, OCRed, ZBurdette)
Legal Scenarios for Lunar Exploitation
When Gerard O’Neill presented his vision in The High Frontier, for the exploitation of space resources, he projected a novel legal framework, detached from normal terrestrial economic and legal structures. O’Neill conceived of economic orbital activity under the jurisdiction of the ‘Energy Satellites Corporation (ENSAT)’, a profit-making corporation regulated by UN treaties.62 Despite the many developments concerning the practical and scientific aspects of space resources, since then, the imperative to establish a legal framework or regime is not yet considered pressing. When considering the utilization and governance of a commons area like space, the need for a clear and explicit regime is vitally important. The provisions of UNCLOS III create stability, and exploitation of the seabed can be conducted with the security that investment made in prospecting a certain location will be not wasted due to others encroaching upon the area.63 The future utilization of the Moon’s resources creates a similar need for stability.
The current status of space law presents four possible means by which lunar resources could be exploited. The first two derive from the scenario stated earlier, whereby the Moon Agreement is ratified by space powers and then further codified with regard to the international regime idea. The Moon being considered CHM leads to the establishment of a Lunar Resource Authority (LRA). The Moon remains the property of humanity as a whole, and the LRA governs and undertakes exploitation of resources in accordance with the CHM principle. The utilization of lunar resources is conducted entirely by the LRA, as the ISA conducts all activities on the seabed; therefore, state agencies and private enterprise are excluded from directly using the Moon’s resources.
The second possibility within this scenario is built upon a dif-ferent form of LRA with a mandate to govern the resources of the Moon by allowing other agencies to exploit lunar resources under license. This creates pseudo property rights, with the LRA distri-buting those rights. Although not a government for the Moon, the LRA is regulatory, being empowered to make the final decision concerning the exploitation of lunar resources. The revenues gen¬erated through the sale of rights to lunar resources allow the LRA to realize the CHM principle of financial benefits to be distributed among all states, and in terms of UNCLOS III and OST with parti¬cular consideration towards developing states.
--- CP Prevents Militarization
Collective moon regime is key to prevent militarization of space that spills over to conflict on Earth
Gundun 10 – political scientist and counterinsurgency analyst based in Washington D.C. (James, “America and Chinas Hegemony War: Lunar Warfare”, January 9th, , MBIBAS)
To inaugurate the 2010's, Octopus Mountain will be examining America and China's burgeoning hegemony war over the coming year. As the end of this decade will develop into a Moon race, we felt there was no better place to launch. Avatar’s meteoric rise as 2009’s most controversial movie can has one natural outcome: box-office record breaker. Millions of people continue stuffing theaters to join the debate, then turn towards the sky wondering what it all means for up there and down here. You can philosophize about the future of space exploration and exploitation, but you can also gaze at the moon and watch it unfold now. Or as now as the near-future can seem. The term “space warfare” is somewhat of a misnomer. “Outer space warfare" or "extraterrestrial warfare” is more accurate if debating the future of war outside the Earth, in outer space. “Space warfare” is exactly that - war over space, a given area of existence. Parking spaces, lawns, football, and West Asia are examples of space warfare. We don’t want to challenge the term too far though; the two terms shouldn’t be separated completely. We only point out that humanity’s “outer space warfare” is technically “space warfare.” Humans are imaginative, curious - and running out of space and resources on Earth. We may be destined to fight over everything beyond our planet once we’ve tapped it dry, so potential lunar warfare could very well begin the same as many terrestrial wars. “Outer-space warfare” as commonly dreamed - space ships, lasers, and foreign planets - may be centuries away, but “space warfare” on the moon is right around the corner. Nor is it much of a secret. Ouyang Ziyuan is extremely fond of informing anyone within earshot about the amazing properties of helium 3, a light, non-radioactive isotope believed ideal for nuclear fusion. Among other things, the chief scientist of China's Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP), a component of its manned Moon missions, boasted that, “each year three space shuttle missions could bring enough fuel for all human beings across the world.” Though Ziyuan is often accused of hyperbole and scientists have yet to agree on helium-3’s overall viability as a second generation power source, wide consensus remains that the element will be pursued vigorously by all space powers to replace depleting carbon fuels. Wired ran a story in 2006 titled Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel that failed to connect the dots, possibly intentionally to save its insight. As China’s lunar fever starting to pick up and catch on, the time to connect America and China’s battle for global hegemony and lunar warfare has come. In fact the war has already begun. Wired quotes Ziyuan as saying back in 2006, “We will provide the most reliable report on helium-3 to mankind. Whoever first conquers the moon will benefit first." Those aren’t the words of a space “race.” At this point we can jettison helium-3 much like a spacecraft rids itself of spent rockets. Helium-3 is just the surface of what could be vast stores of iron and other minerals desirable to governments back on Earth. The Moon Agreement was supposed to protect lunar reserves from being harvested by the few states with outer space capabilities, but since neither America, Russia, India, or China ratified the document, only one conclusion remains. “NASA plans to have a permanent moon base by 2024, but America is not the only nation with plans for a moon base. China, India, the European Space Agency, and at least one Russian corporation, Energia, have visions of building manned lunar bases post-2020,” reports Wired. Every one of those states is interested in helium-3 and whatever else lies beneath the Moon’s crust. While these bases will be founded under the banner of research and exploration, they will quickly morph to resource exploration and extraction. Competition will start gradually before developing into a free for all as the 21st century passes, barring international legislation. And realist opinion on international organizations is common knowledge. The presence of multiple governments and companies should prompt the need for security on the Moon. As time passes military bases on the Moon would be the next logical step to secure a growing network of roads, mines, labs, and residences. More advanced weapons could then be positioned in space to protect lunar infrastructure, spawning new threats to the dream of a united humanity. Back on Earth a lunar divide between developed and developing countries will threaten terrestrial stability, as non-space governments will band together and oppose the world's super-mining powers. Their efforts, however, may be futile; no global power will voluntarily allow itself to fall behind in the Moon Rush. China isn’t to blame if this movie turns to reality. Responsibility falls on the collective of America, the EU, Russia, India, and China, who are all vying to operate the first lunar base, harvest the first lunar energy and water, and blast off to Mars. Who digs into the Moon first is a mere formality because the others will be close behind. 2020 isn’t that far away.
2nc Unilateral Mining Bad
Unilateral mining will spark legal challenges --- causing uncertainty that jacks solvency
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
What, then, is the effect of the Moon Agreement on the law applicable to the exploitation of lunar resources and, in particular, the mining and exploitation of He-3? As indicated, the agreement is not in itself legally binding on the United States, nor indeed on other major space powers, or most other states, since they are not parties. n99 Arguably, the agreement should be given little weight as evidence of developing customary law, since, in contrast to other "space law" agreements that have achieved widespread ratification, the Moon Agreement has, over a considerable period, gained few adherents, none of which are significant space powers.
But this conclusion may be too cavalier. First, as indicated, the Moon Agreement arguably constitutes a reinforcement, spelling-out, or agreed interpretation by the space powers and many other concerned states participating in the COPUOS negotiations of a number of principles and obligations already contained or implicit in the Outer Space Treaty - which is already legally binding on parties to that treaty. n100 Second, the agreement reflects a long and careful process of negotiation and accommodation in COPUOS between the states primarily concerned with outer space and lunar activities as to the most sensible and viable rules for the conduct of activities on the Moon. In particular, the agreement's uncontroversial provisions, such as those regarding the establishment of stations, n101 conduct [*270] of scientific research, n102 concern for environmental protection, n103 obligations of noninterference, n104 notice and consultation, n105 and so forth can be argued to evidence, at least as to these matters, an emerging body of customary lunar law. Thus, the Moon Agreement will almost certainly play some role and have to be taken into account in any further discussions concerning the development of a lunar mining regime.
The effect of article 11 on lunar resource exploitation or mining is, of course, more problematic. The agreement's prohibition on exclusive national or private claims to portions of the surface or subsurface of the Moon - and perhaps to resources in place - n106simply reaffirms similar prohibitions already binding on the United States and other states under the Outer Space Treaty. n107 However, apart from any contested interpretation of the "common heritage" provision in article 11(1) as itself implying a moratorium on lunar mining until some kind of LOSC part XI international regime is established, there would appear to be nothing in article 11 or any other part of the agreement that prohibits states or private enterprises from mining and acquiring ownership of He-3 or other lunar resources pending the possible establishment of any international regime. Indeed, there is substantial support in the language of the agreement and its negotiating history for the legitimacy of such activities. n108 During the 1980 Congressional [*271] hearings in the U.S. Senate on the agreement, then Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department, Roberts Owen, concluded on this point, "pending a Moon Conference in 15 or 30 years - and whether or not the United States becomes a party to the Moon Treaty - American companies will have a continuing legal right to exploit the Moon's resources." n109 This conclusion has generally [*272] been supported by leading experts, n110 in the deliberations and report of the Space Law Committee of the International Law Association at its 1982 Montreal meeting, n111 and, notably, by the current parties to the Moon Agreement in a Joint Statement submitted to the most recent 2009 meeting of the legal subcommittee of COPUOS. n112
In sum, while the Outer Space Treaty, perhaps as supplemented by the Moon Agreement, establishes a useful framework for many prospective activities on the Moon and clearly prohibits staking exclusive national or private claims to particular areas of the lunar surface, neither the treaty nor the agreement appears to preclude the mining and acquisition of property rights in lunar He-3 by national, international, or private enterprises, subject to certain broad "common heritage" obligations, such as the obligation to share to some unclear [*273] extent the benefits or proceeds of such activities. However, whatever the merits of this conclusion, it will clearly remain open to at least vigorous political as well as legal challenges - particularly by developing or other states currently unable to participate in lunar mining or other activities. Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement, and international law more generally, leave many other significant questions concerning the potential exploitation of He-3 or other lunar resources unresolved. Consequently, if the United States or other space powers that intend to establish stations on the Moon plan to proceed with mining lunar He-3 in connection with their potential development of an He-3-based fusion power program, they will be doing so under conditions of substantial legal and political - not to mention technological and economic - uncertainty. The question, then, is whether the United States should do something to remedy this situation and, if so, what?
--- XT: Plan Spurs Legal Disputes
The plan will spur legal disputes over ownership of resources
Boyle, 11 (1/19/11, Rebecca, “Who Owns the Moon's Water? Future Moon Mining Missions May Face Legal Disputes,” , JMP)
Would-be moon miners will need good lawyers if they want to keep the lunar resources they’re harvesting, according to space policy experts. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 appears to permit extraction of lunar water and other resources, but it’s not clear who would own the materials once they’re extracted.
Not long after NASA confirmed the moon has plenty of water, scientists and entrepreneurs started hatching plans to harvest it, either for lunar colonists or for rocket fuel. There are plenty of ways to do it — you could microwave the lunar soil to turn the ice into water vapor, you could use robots to harvest frozen chunks of ice, and so on.
talked to space law experts who said determining ownership of those resources may be a more complicated matter.
The Moon Treaty of 1979 was intended to govern how the moon’s resources would be used, reports. But none of the spacefaring nations has signed it, rendering it moot. This leaves countries to rely on the Outer Space Treaty, and because it doesn’t explicitly ban resource extraction, it can probably be interpreted to mean it’s allowed. Still, this doesn’t address who owns the title to the materials. On this planet, when you mine for precious resources, you’d want to make sure you own them after you take them out of the ground, because then you can sell them.
Figuring this out will probably require legislation or international agreements, according to . And a nice payday for space lawyers. Hey, what do you call 5,000 lawyers sent to the moon? A good start!
2nc Solvency ***
Only a broadly accepted international framework can solve --- key to legal and political predictability for fusion energy programs and continued international space cooperation
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
III. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SEEK INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON A LUNAR RESOURCE REGIME?
As indicated, there does not at present appear to be any legal barrier to the United States engaging in lunar mining, save for the very general limitations imposed by the Outer Space Treaty and broader international law. n113 Moreover, as a practical matter, no other nation is likely in the near future to be in a position to prevent the United States from establishing a lunar base and conducting activities on the Moon as it wishes. n114 Consequently, the United States could presumably proceed with an He-3-based fusion energy program on the assumption that it could mine and bring to Earth lunar He-3 without any need for seeking further international approval. Under this approach, the United States could develop an appropriate legal regime of its own, consistent with its own needs and principles, rather than having to reach compromises with other countries. There is precedent for unilateral U.S. action of this kind - the 1980 [*274] United States Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, n115 which, following U.S. rejection of the 1982 LOSC, continues to govern the commercial recovery of deep seabed minerals by U.S. companies. n116 Subsequent to its enactment, the United States concluded international agreements with several other states in 1982 and 1984 (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to resolve overlapping claims with respect to mining areas for polymetallic nodules of the deep seabed. n117
However, even if the United States could "go it alone" in this way, there are reasons why it may not wish to do so. First, neither the U.S. government nor U.S. private enterprise is likely to be willing to risk the very substantial investment and long-term effort necessarily involved in seeking to develop He-3-based fusion energy without some assurance that - assuming the very difficult technical and engineering obstacles to developing efficient fusion reactors and establishing permanent moon bases can be overcome - the requisite supply of lunar He-3 can continue to be obtained without encountering significant legal or political difficulties. Whatever may be the most legally persuasive interpretation of existing international law, other nations or people on Earth may challenge the unilateral appropriation of lunar resources by the United States, especially of a potentially uniquely valuable resource such as He-3. This, certainly, was the international experience in the 1960's when developing nations vigorously protested the prospect that a few technologically-advanced countries and their private enterprises might alone appropriate what was at the time assumed to be the mineral riches of the deep seabed. That perception ultimately led to the enunciation of the "common heritage" doctrine, the convening of UNCLOS-3, and the adoption of part XI of the 1982 LOSC. n118 Only a broadly accepted international agreement is likely to offer [*275] the continued legal and political predictability that is essential if a long-term He-3-based fusion energy program is to be undertaken and sustained. n119
Second, current commitments already obligate the United States to a certain level of international cooperation in space activities. While the Outer Space Treaty and present international law do not expressly bar the unilateral appropriation of lunar resources, they nevertheless impose an obligation on nations to cooperate in outer space activities and to avoid conduct that might give rise to disputes. n120 The United States is also committed to international cooperation in outer space activities under the Outer Space Treaty, the multinational framework for coordination in space exploration entitled "The Global Exploration Strategy," n121 and other agreements, such as the International Space Station Agreement, n122 and has similarly [*276] committed itself to international cooperation in developing fusion energy through its participation in the recently concluded ITER agreement. n123 U.S. insistence on a right to unilaterally appropriate lunar He-3, without further international agreement, could be controversial and regarded as inconsistent with these precedents.
Finally, if countries other than the United States also engage in activities on the Moon, as now appears highly likely, it will be in the interest of each of them to have at least some understandings to provide for cooperation on common problems and keep them from interfering with each other's activities. As the Moon Agreement anticipates, n124 if some kind of lunar agreement is in their common interests, it will be difficult for such an agreement to not address the salient and thus far unresolved issue of lunar resources exploitation.
Consequently, if the United States determines that it is serious about seeking to develop an He-3-based fusion energy program, it would seem sensible for it to also seek international agreement on a lunar resource regime designed to provide the long-term legal and political stability that such a program will most likely require.
International legal framework is key --- prevents conflict from lunar mining and secures necessary investment
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
However, the growing interest in lunar He-3 poses its own problems. As yet, there is no international consensus on whether, or how, any nation or private entity can exploit or acquire title to lunar resources. The U.N.-developed 1967 Outer Space Treaty n7 does not specifically address this question. The related U.N.-sponsored 1979 Moon Agreement n8 purports to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a regime for the exploitation of lunar resources, but that agreement has thus far been ratified by only a very few countries - not including the United States and none of which are currently leading space [*248] powers. n9 Absent an agreed international legal framework, attempts by the United States or any other nation or private entity to acquire and bring to Earth significant quantities of He-3 could give rise to controversy and conflict. Indeed, without the security of an established legal regime, nations or private entities might well be reluctant to commit the very substantial money, effort, and resources necessary to mine, process, and transport back to Earth the amounts of lunar He-3 sufficient to support the broad-scale terrestrial use of He-3-based fusion energy.
2nc CP Solves Development / Competitiveness
Legal reforms are key to advancing space commerce – the current regime prevents development and limits US competitiveness
Hays, 11 – Senior Scientist for the Science Applications International Corporation supporting the Plans and Programs Division of the National Security Space Office (Peter L. Hays, Toward a Theory of Spacepower, Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, “Chapter 28: Space Law and the Advancement of Spacepower,” ed. Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays, )RK
Most fundamentally, however, the current lack of clarity within space law about property rights and commercial interests is the result of both space law and space technology being underdeveloped and immature. Of course, there is also a "chicken-and-egg" factor at work since actors are discouraged from undertaking the test cases needed to develop and mature the regime because of the immaturity of the regime and their unwillingness to develop and employ improved technologies and processes as guinea pigs in whatever legal processes would be used to resolve property rights and reward structures. The most effective way to move past this significant hurdle would be to create more clear mechanisms for establishing property rights and processes by which all actors, especially commercial actors, could receive rewards commensurate with the risks they undertake. In addition, any comprehensive reevaluation of space property rights and liability concerns should also consider how these factors are addressed in analogous regimes such as the Seabed Authority in the Law of the Sea Treaty. Unfortunately, however, there are also several problems with attempting to draw from these precedents. First, several of the analogous regimes like the Law of the Sea build from CMH premises in several ways and it is not clear this approach is entirely applicable or helpful when attempting to sort through how the OST should apply to issues like property rights and reward structures. Second, while these analogous regimes are undoubtedly better developed than the OST and have a significant potential role in providing precedents, today they are still somewhat underdeveloped and immature with respect to their application in difficult areas such as property rights and reward structures, again limiting the current utility of attempting to draw from these precedents.
Provisions of the OST regime are probably the most important factors in shaping commercial space activity, but they are clearly not the only noteworthy legal and policy factors at work influencing developments within this sector. Legacy legal and policy structures developed during the Cold War were probably adequate for the amount of commercial space activity during that period, but it is far from clear they will be sufficient to address the significant and sustained increase in such activity since that time. In the 1960s, the United States was the first to begin developing space services such as communications, remote sensing, and launch capabilities but did so within the government sector. This approach began to change in the 1980s, first with the November 1984 Presidential Determination to allow some commercial communication services to compete with Intelsat and continuing with subsequent policies designed to foster development of a commercial space sector. By the late 1990s, commercial space activity worldwide had outpaced government activity, and although government space investments remain very important, they are likely to become increasingly overshadowed by commercial activity. It would be helpful if governments, and the U.S. Government in particular, could more explicitly develop and consistently implement legal structures and long-term policies that would better define and delineate between those space activities that ought to be pursued by the private and public sectors as well as more intentionally and consistently develop the desired degree of international cooperation in pursuing these objectives.
Other clear commercial and economic distinctions with the Cold War era have even more significant implications for the future of space-power: whereas the Soviet Union was only a military superpower, China is a major U.S. trading partner and an economic superpower that recently passed Germany to became the world's third largest economy, is poised to pass Japan soon, and is on a path to become larger than the U.S. economy, perhaps within only about 10 years. Because of its economic muscle, China can afford to devote commensurately more resources to its military capabilities and will play a more significant role in structuring the global economic system. For example, China holds an estimated $1.4 trillion in foreign assets (mainly U.S. treasury notes), an amount that gives it great leverage in the structure of the system.19
The United States and other major spacefaring actors lack, but undoubtedly need, much more open and comprehensive visions for how to develop spacepower. This study is one attempt to foster more dialogue about these issues, but the process should continue, become more intentional and formalized, and be supported by an enduring organizational structure that includes the most important stakeholders in the future of spacepower. Legal structures should be a foundational part of creating and implementing the vision to develop spacepower, but a broader approach should be:
focused on opening space as a medium for the full spectrum of human activity and commercial enterprise, and those actions which government can take to promote and enable it, through surveys, infrastructure development, pre-competitive technology, and encouraging incentive structures (prizes, anchor-customer contracts, and property/exclusivity rights), regulatory regimes (port authorities, spacecraft licensing, publicprivate partnerships) and supporting services (open interface standards, RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] facilities, rescue, etc.).20
In addition, consideration should be given to using other innovative mechanisms and nontraditional routes to space development, including a much wider range of Federal Government organizations and the growing number of state spaceport authorities and other organizations developing needed infrastructure. Finally, the United States should make comprehensive and careful exploration of the potential of space-based solar power its leading pathfinder in creating a vision for developing spacepower. Working toward harvesting this unlimited power source in economically viable ways will require development of appropriate supporting legal structures, particularly with respect to indemnification and potential public-private partnerships.
Global licensing and export controls for space technology have often been developed and implemented in inconsistent and counterproductive ways. It is understandable that many states view space technology as a key strategic resource and are very concerned about developing, protecting, and preventing the proliferation of this technology, but the international community, and the United States in particular, needs to find better legal mechanisms to balance and advance objectives in this area. Many current problems with U.S. export controls began after Hughes and Loral worked with insurance companies to analyze Chinese launch failures in January 1995 and February 1996. A congressional review completed in 1998 (Cox Report) determined these analyses violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by communicating technical information to the Chinese. The 1999 National Defense Authorization Act transferred export controls for all satellites and related items from the Commerce Department to the Munitions List administered by the State Department.21 The stringent Munitions List controls contributed to a severe downturn in U.S. satellite exports.22 To avoid these restrictions, foreign satellite manufacturers, beginning in 2002 with Alcatel Space (now Thales) and followed by European Aeronautic Defense and Space, Surrey Satellite Company, and others replaced all U.S.-built components on their satellites to make them "ITAR-free."23
There are two key reasons why the United States should move away from the priorities in its current space export control regime. First, an overly broad approach that tries to guard too many things dilutes monitoring resources and actually results in less protection for "crown jewels" than does a focused approach, and second, a more open approach is more likely to foster innovation, spur development of sectors of comparative advantage, and improve efficiency and overall economic growth. Congress and the Obama administration should make it a priority to reevaluate current U.S. export controls and adjust laws and policies accordingly. Excellent starting points are the recently released recommendations for rebalancing overall U.S. export control priorities in the congressionally mandated National Academies of Science study.24 In addition, the United States should implement key recommendations from the Center for Strategic and International Studies study on the space industrial base such as removing from the Munitions List commercial communications satellite systems, dedicated subsystems, and components specifically designed for commercial use.25
2nc CP Boosts Space Treaties / ILaw
CP is key to the legitimacy of space treaties
Brearley 6—University of Southampton research student (Andrew, “Mining the Moon: Owning the Night Sky?”, Astropolitics, 4:43-67, OCRed, ZBurdette)
Ultimately, the principal restriction upon any state, with a large technical and military capacity, acting as it wishes in space, or elsewhere, is the reaction of other states. In order to preserve the principles upon which the space treaties are founded, there is a requirement from all spacefaring states to act in a manner compliant with those principles. An additional difficulty with the Moon Agreement, and any other attempt at resolving questions con¬cerning ownership of non-terrestrial resources, is the response of those states that are not spacefaring. It is possible to conceptualize a situation wherein those states that have access to space divide the resources available between themselves, in a similar fashion to the colonial Europeans forming empires. Contrary to such a notion, the precedent of UNCLOS III suggests that in the pursuit of a com¬mon international agreement, powerful states are willing to make concessions to the developing world.
Solvency Mechanism --- Lunar Resource Regime Will Include
Lunar resource regime will include role for private enterprise, remain consistent with international law, encourage international cooperation and remain flexible
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
B. What Kind of Lunar Resource Regime Should the United States Try to Obtain?
Consistent with its past positions regarding the mineral resource provisions of both the Moon Agreement n136 and the LOSC, n137 the United States will presumably wish to seek a lunar resource regime having at least the following characteristics:
Provisions permitting and facilitating the exploration and development of lunar resources by the United States or its private companies. To begin, the regime should permit the United States or its private companies to conduct, without burdensome regulation or interference, any and all of the activities reasonably necessary to prospect for, explore, mine, process, and either use or transport to Earth lunar resources, in particular He-3. The regime must clearly provide for acquiring property rights in minerals or other substances removed from the Moon's surface or subsoil, the effective operation of and control over necessary stations or facilities, jurisdiction over necessary personnel, some measure of exclusivity over areas subject to resource activities, and some measure of privacy over proprietary information. The regime should also provide or permit a national or international management structure for He-3 production, marketing, and sales that permits timely decisions, within general guidelines, on all aspects of operational management. In particular, the regime should ensure the retention by the United States or its private companies of reasonable proceeds or profits commensurate with the effort involved and sufficient to encourage and warrant the level of investment involved.
A role for private enterprise. The regime should expressly allow and encourage private enterprise to play a significant role in the [*281] exploration and use of lunar resources, subject to appropriate and reasonable regulation. This means that private enterprise must have assurance of security of tenure during the life of mining operations and the right to earn and retain reasonable profits. Environmental regulations should be designed and used solely to minimize the impact of mining operations on the environment, to a degree consistent with economic viability of the operations. Any permitting process should be simple, direct, and prompt.
Consistency with international law. The regime should be consistent with existing U.S. obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, U.N. Charter, other international instruments, and customary international law. This recognition would include the obligations not to claim title to territory on the Moon, n138 to respect the right of other states to conduct activities there, n139 and to conduct any activities with due respect for environmental concerns. n140
Recognition of broader international community concerns. The regime should recognize that the international community as a whole has legitimate interests in the exploration and use of the Moon and its resources. All states should have the right to conduct activities on the Moon without discrimination. n141 The regime should recognize that the international community is entitled to share the benefits of lunar exploitation. n142 However, any form of benefit sharing must be consistent with the right of the states and private enterprises primarily involved and in mineral or other resource activities to a principal role in decisions relating to the conduct of such activities and to a fair profit and return for their investment and effort. The regime should also require that all states conducting activities on the Moon must meet their obligations to the broader international community and to future generations by ensuring that their activities do not cause significant environmental or other damage. n143
[*282] Encouragement of international cooperation. The regime should encourage cooperation rather than competition among states conducting activities on the Moon, such as open access and reasonable exchanges of information, mutual assistance in situations of need, and joint activities where appropriate.
Dispute-avoidance and settlement procedures. The regime should contain provisions for the avoidance and peaceful resolution of disputes, including obligations requiring prior notification of actions likely to affect other states and consultation if problems, difficulties, or controversies arise.
Flexibility. The regime should include provisions permitting and facilitating its prompt revision and development as lunar activities proceed and the need for additional or different regulatory measures or arrangements becomes apparent. Again, the regime should recognize the right of states and enterprises primarily involved, and actually planning or engaged in resource activities to a prominent role in decisions relating to changes in or development of the regime.
Solvency Mechanism --- International Organization
U.S. can establish an international organization to ensure the cooperative development of Helium-3 mining
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
3. Should the United States Seek to Establish an International Organization or Enterprise for the Cooperative Development of Lunar He-3 Mining and Perhaps, More Broadly, of Terrestrial He-3-Based Fusion Energy?
The United States could take the initiative in seeking to establish a user-based international organization or enterprise designed to cooperatively develop and manage the mining and distribution of lunar He-3 along with other lunar resources and, perhaps more broadly, at least certain aspects of the development, production, and distribution of He-3-based fusion energy on Earth. n165 The organization could be comprised of, first, the principal space powers and other nations willing to actively participate in creating the necessary capabilities; second, other nations and entities who are users or beneficiaries of such capabilities; and, perhaps, third, private companies, consortia, or investors interested and capable of investing and participation in the enterprise as a whole. n166 The organization could be based on a recognition that the Moon and its resources constitute a common heritage of humankind, that the enormous potential of He-3-based fusion energy deserves to be shared by all of the Earth's nations and peoples, and that this promise might best be [*294] achieved by a cooperative, rather than individualistic or confrontational, approach to the development and management of such a complex, challenging, costly, and potentially history-changing source of energy. The world's leading technologically advanced nations have already taken significant steps in this direction in their cooperative approach to the development and operation of the International Space Station n167 and the formation of ITER. n168 The potential inclusion of private companies and consortia in such an organization would recognize the growing interest and the important and exciting possibilities of participation by private enterprise in the commercial development of spaceflight and space resources. n169
Such a cooperative international organization could take a variety of forms. As several commentators have suggested, n170 it might, for example, be modeled on the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization ("INTELSAT"), the innovative user-based intergovernmental commercial consortium which, pursuant to a U.S. initiative, was established by a number of government and operating entities, initially on an interim basis in 1964 and then by permanent agreement in 1973, to own and manage a constellation of communications satellites providing international broadcast services to all areas of the [*295] world. n171 Membership in INTELSAT was open to any state that was a member of the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), but access to the system was available to every nation. n172 Under the INTELSAT agreement, shares and votes in INTELSAT were reallocated periodically in proportion to each member's contribution to and use of the system. n173 That is, members that contributed more investment through substantial use, such as the United States, had more shares and voting weight in substantive decisions of the organization. The organization's primary source of revenue was from satellite usage fees, which, after deducting operating costs, were redistributed to INTELSAT members in proportion to their shares. n174 As indicated, satellite services were available to any nation, whether or not a member of INTELSAT and all users paid the same rates. n175 This nondiscriminatory pricing structure in effect subsidized lesser use by developing countries with heavier use by more developed nations, thus providing some sharing of the benefits of space communications technology. INTELSAT was tied to the U.N. through its recognition of the regulatory functions of the ITU. n176
In 2001, INTELSAT, which by that time had over one-hundred members, was privatized and renamed Intelsat, Ltd. n177 It is now the world's largest provider of satellite services, operating [*296] a fleet of over fifty communication satellites and providing service to over 600 Earth stations in more than 149 countries and territories. n178 INTELSAT offers not only a successful example of international cooperation with respect to the profitable commercial development of a common space resource but also suggests the possibility of transitioning an initially intergovernmental commercial consortium to participation or management by private enterprise.
Whatever form such a cooperative international institutional arrangement took, it would be designed and serve to provide access and influence to all nations, participants, investors, and customers in the development and use of He-3-based fusion power, alleviate conflict and discontent over which nation or nations should control lunar resources or resource-related operations on the Moon, and assure that the benefits of He-3-based fusion energy would be widely shared by all nations and peoples. Among the more important objectives of such an organization or enterprise would be: (1) raising the necessary capital to sustain the development of a technologically and economically viable He-3-based fusion energy system; (2) developing the necessary fusion and lunar He-3 recovery technology; (3) assuring effective and environmentally-sound operation of terrestrial and lunar fusion-energy related facilities and services; (4) assuring reliable supplies of He-3 and other resources to terrestrial customers; (5) maintaining reasonable and uniform rate structures to all users; (6) assuring access to proprietary technologies, and resources and profits related to a fair valuation of members' participation and contribution; and (7) resolving disputes among members concerning their participation in such an enterprise.
Such an organization or enterprise might conceivably be established independent of any separate international agreement regarding a lunar mining regime. Presumably, if this organization embraced a sufficiently broad and significant membership, including all of the leading space powers, it could in itself constitute such a regime, although it would, of course, have to conform to the broad principles set forth in the Outer [*297] Space Treaty and those provisions of the Moon Agreement which can be considered to now reflect customary international law. n179 Alternatively, such an organization or enterprise could be designed to supplement and be compatible with the Moon Agreement or other international agreement which might be negotiated to deal with lunar resources. Indeed, article 16 of the Moon Agreement specifically provides that an international organization whose membership is comprised of a majority of state parties may conduct activities under the agreement if it accepts the agreement's obligations. n180 Finally, such an organization or enterprise could be established under the Moon Agreement by the parties to that agreement as, in itself, a part of the "international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon" that the parties undertake to establish under article 11(5) and 18 of that agreement. n181
INTELSAT can be used as a model to establish a collaborative administrative system to develop lunar resources
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
But as other countries sought to prevent what appeared to be a threat of the moon’s exclusive future settlement by the two superpowers, the United Nations hosted an effort to craft a moon treaty in the 1970s. The eventual draft document called for international control over lunar resources and the formation of an international organization to allocate profits, similar to efforts at the time in regard to the seabed. The draft also emphasized that the moon’s resources could not be “claimed” by any nation and that they constituted instead the “common heritage of mankind.” The Moon Treaty’s signing by several states in 1979 and its entry into force in 1984 (despite lack of support from either superpower) caused scholars and analysts to begin to examine possible international governance models for the moon in the context of the new treaty.
Recognizing the presence of the Moon Treaty, but seeking to avoid possible obstacles to development posed by its “common heritage of mankind” clause and requirement for the formation of an international authority to govern commercial operations, Christopher C. Joyner and former astronaut Harrison H. Schmitt sought an interpretation of the agreement that could nevertheless promote successful economic development of the moon. In this effort, they looked not to the experience of the UNCLOS, but instead to the more space-relevant example of INTELSAT, the US-led organization that had helped foster the satellite communications industry while sharing the benefits of this technology with non-space-faring nations. Their concept, which they dubbed INTERLUNE, aimed at creating a “feasible administrative system and a peaceful management environment” to facilitate the moon’s settlement and development without conflicts.24 The idea behind INTERLUNE was inherently collaborative but, like the Antarctic system, would be based on governance according to participation in settlement activities. It went further, however, in calling for shares and voting within the organization to be determined by a country’s level of investment. Such a structure, according to Joyner and Schmitt, would avoid the problem of nonspace actors trying to “dictate” to space pioneers while both allowing profits to be had from the moon’s settlement and creating a viable international governance structure that would be peacefully oriented, legally transparent, and open to new members. At the same time, INTERLUNE would avoid the problems of unilateral settlement schemes and the almost inevitable conflicts such models would likely entail. Interestingly, the current literature on lunar governance seems to have forgotten this innovative suggestion. But the idea remains relevant, particularly as states and nonstate actors seek to move from initial return flights to more permanent lunar settlements.
An international management organization modeled after UNCLOS to ensure lunar resource development
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
In a provocative recent article, space analyst Andrew Brearley argues for the OST’s continued relevance, albeit with possible future modifications or clarifications. He makes the point that “even though the OST prevents states from owning the moon, it does not prevent them from exploiting it.”37 Brearley compares the future lunar legal environment to that associated with the seabed, a similar “global commons.”38 He makes the case that an international management organization modeled on the UNCLOS arrangement could serve as an effective governance tool for the moon. Pointing specifically to follow-on implementation agreements in 1996 associated with the UNCLOS to make it more palatable to major states that might become engaged in seabed mining, Brearley argues that similar implement agreements might be reached regarding the Moon Treaty, if agreed to by major space-faring states.39 He proposes what he calls a Lunar Resource Authority to govern applications for and management of mining operations by states or commercial consortia. This agreement would allow profit making, but without transferring actual ownership of sections of the moon to specific countries or enterprises, thus remaining consistent with the OST. One option would be through a licensing system, which would create the “pseudo property rights” that Brearley believes are needed to allow successful commercial operations to be pursued.40
Solvency Mechanism --- Conference of States
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
A competing, institutionalist approach developed by Amanda Lee Moore offered the model of the International Telecommunications Union’s regulation of radio frequencies and geostationary orbital slots as a possible example for successful lunar governance.28 She proposed that a conference of states might address contentious issues, such as the Moon Treaty’s “common heritage of mankind” clause, and simply lay out an interpretation of this vague phrase that would rule out national sovereignty over lunar real estate but accept notions of profit and economic development. In general, Moore posited that muddling through in an ad hoc manner via bilateral agreements among states active in moon exploration, while possible, would lead to far from optimal solutions to the lunar governance dilemma compared to formal, international efforts to lay out clear rules to govern state behavior.
Solvency Mechanism --- Lunar Regime Outside of Moon Agreement
The U.S. can establish a lunar resource regime outside of the Moon Agreement --- makes the counterplan politically palatable
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
Consequently, if ratification of the Moon Agreement proves either undesirable or politically unachievable, the United States could seek to establish a lunar resource regime wholly apart from the Moon Agreement. As discussed, some precedent for this approach exists in the U.S. rejection of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, n161 and subsequent conclusion of bilateral agreements between the United States and several other countries resolving overlapping claims regarding seabed-mining areas. n162 The possibilities open to the United States in this respect include the following:
. The United States, as a party to the Outer Space Treaty, could propose an amendment or protocol to that treaty that would clearly protect and provide for the right of any state or private enterprise to mine, acquire property rights in, and exploit lunar or other outer space resources and to retain a reasonable share of the profits.
[*292] . The United States could propose to other "space powers" and other interested countries the negotiation, on a global basis, of an entirely new Moon Agreement intended to replace the present agreement, and containing different and more detailed provisions reflecting U.S. preferences. The new agreement might incorporate and be generally consistent with the tenor and provisions of the Moon Agreement apart from its provisions regarding the establishment of an acceptable lunar resource regime. Such a negotiation could conceivably occur either within COPUOS or outside the U.N. framework.
. The United States could take the same approach it adopted under the 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Act with respect to the issue of deep seabed mining, n163 and negotiate a lunar resource agreement only with like-minded states actually engaged in space activities and showing a potential capacity to engage in lunar mining activities, such as China, the European Union India, Japan, and Russia. Such an agreement might not attempt to deal with lunar activities as a whole, which are already broadly covered in the Outer Space Treaty and in provisions of the Moon Agreement that may arguably be binding as customary law, n164 but could deal only with the provision of rules relating more directly to the exploitation of lunar resources.
. Finally, if objections are raised that it is premature to try to agree now on a detailed lunar resource regime, since the exploitation of such resources is unlikely for many years, the United States might propose that the space powers and other nations potentially involved in lunar exploration and development, and possibly other countries concerned, enter into at least a broad "lunar resource principles" framework agreement, expressing a firm commitment to the basic character of a regime which would be acceptable to the United States.
[*293] However, each of these possibilities has drawbacks. Each bypasses and ignores the existing Moon Agreement and may, on that basis alone, fail to win broad international support. Moreover, the last three approaches may fail to provide the kind of broader legal and political assurance that long-term state and private investment in He-3-based fusion energy development is likely to require.
AT: Permutation *** / AT: Other Countries Won’t Cooperate
Now is they time to negotiate an international lunar resource regime --- the plan and permutation will preempt and undermine its establishment
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
Second, the international climate is arguably now relatively favorable to achieving international agreement on the kind of [*278] international lunar resource regime the United States hopes to achieve. Other major players, such as China, the European Union, India, Japan, and Russia, which currently appear to have the capability to participate in the potential exploitation of lunar resources, may well now share an interest with the United States in a more open-access regime and market-based mechanisms. n128 The U.N. General Assembly's adoption of the 1994 implementation agreement nullifying the provisions of part XI of the LOSC to which the United States objected clearly reflects a broader international acceptance of a U.S.-favored approach to the exploitation of deep seabed "common heritage" resources more favorable to the participation of free enterprise, which serves as persuasive precedent for the similar treatment of lunar resources. n129 Indeed, there is now growing support in the United States for U.S. ratification of the LOSC and accession currently seems increasingly likely. n130 In addition, international [*279] cooperation among the major technologically-advanced countries in both space and fusion power development is already ongoing under the International Space Station and ITER agreements n131 and the Obama administration appears to look favorably on cooperative multilateral rather than unilateral approaches to dealing with broad international issues. n132 Moreover, the recent spike in oil prices n133 and heightened international concern about global warming n134 reinforce the pressing need of the global economy to find ways to meet the world's growing appetite for energy while still decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus to renewed international interest in the development of alternative energy sources such as nuclear fission and fusion.
Third, for a variety of reasons, the current influence and "bargaining power" of the United States both as a leader in space and nuclear technology, and more generally as an actor on the world stage, is arguably declining relative to that of China, the European Union, India, Russia, and other countries. n135 If this is so, the ability of the United States to negotiate the kind of lunar resource regime it wants may well be greater now than later.
[*280] Finally, it may be easier to establish the type of lunar resource regime that the United States would prefer while the feasibility of He-3 exploitation and fusion power - and, indeed, the possibility that we may eventually find valuable resources elsewhere in the solar system - is still uncertain and before potentially concerned states have developed important stakes in particular outcomes.
U.S. should work establish an international legal regime before lunar mining commences --- key to ensure sustainable investment
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
IV. POLICY OPTIONS FOR A FUTURE LUNAR RESOURCE REGIME
A. Should the United States Try to Establish an Acceptable International Regime Even Before Lunar Mining and He-3-Based Fusion Power Are Feasible?
There are clearly arguments that, given the current uncertainty as to the feasibility of both establishing a permanent U.S. lunar base capable of carrying on He-3 mining activities and developing fusion reactors that economically warrant investment in the creation of a major He-3-based fusion power program, it would be premature at this time for the United States to negotiate a lunar mining regime with other countries. n125 Other countries are unlikely to see a need for such negotiations at this time and, in any event, it is certainly arguable that the countries concerned simply do not now know enough to do a sensible job in this respect. Indeed, it was for this reason that COPUOS, in drafting article 11 of the Moon Agreement, expressly deferred the negotiation of such a regime to such time "as such exploitation is about to become feasible." n126
There are, however, several reasons suggesting that the U.S. should seek to reach international agreement on such a regime quite soon and even before the possibility and practicality of a permanent moon base and an He-3-based fusion power program are clearly established. First, as discussed, states and enterprises are unlikely to be willing to undertake the substantial effort and investment involved in developing lunar He-3 mining and He-3-based fusion power without the assurance of political and legal stability that only a broadly accepted international agreement can provide. n127 Given the long lead time which will be required if the United States wishes to achieve a viable He-3-based fusion power program in the relatively near future - perhaps within the next half-century or so - it seems sensible for it to begin to take steps to put the necessary legal infrastructure in place fairly soon.
The counterplan has to precede the plan --- only way to avoid conflicts and counterbalancing that undercuts solvency
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
The debate on the issue of commercial development of the moon’s resources is an important and still unresolved one. As Brearley notes, it would be highly desirable for states to settle these issues before the next humans set foot on the moon. Once humans begin landing and staying on the moon, complex issues will quickly arise. Key variables in the process of international discussion and possible negotiation include (1) the nature of the leading space actors and their interrelations at the time of the moon’s settlement, ( 2) the status of existing space-related treaties and restraint-based norms, (3) the prospects for lucrative contracts (which could promote either competition or cooperation), (4) the extent of the resources and locations available (more likely to promote competition), and (5) the availability of cost-effective technology for their exploitation.
Of all these factors, the first two—the status of international relations among participants and their willingness to comply with existing space treaties and norms—may be the most important, even above resource scarcity or the availability of technology. It almost goes without saying that friendly relations and cooperative exploratory projects on the moon and in the solar system will greatly increase the chances of successful management of moon conflicts. This suggests that realist factors alone are not likely to dictate a break-up of the OST or the existing consensus on cooperative restraint on the exercise of military power. Of course, hostile relations (such as between the United States and China) cannot be ruled out and could lead to unilateral efforts to seize locations and establish nationally oriented keep-out and governance regimes, whether or not resources are scarce. However, violation of the OST in this manner could have other repercussions on space security and would have to be considered carefully by any state undertaking such policies. Hostile or self-serving actions on the moon could harm a country’s interests in other areas of space or on Earth, leading to rival coalitions against it and efforts to undercut its attempted unilateral gains—possibly through military means.
AT: Permutation / AT: Cooperation Inevitable ***
The counterplan has to precede the plan --- cooperative efforts are possible but not inevitable and preventive diplomacy is key to avoid disputes
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
Historical Governance Models and Their Associated Outcomes
In reviewing the findings of this study, we can observe that there is no predetermined outcome in regard to the moon. At the same time, there are certain tendencies that will affect lunar governance and shape the factors likely to play an important role in determining the specific regime formed. In terms of policy recommendations for avoiding hostile outcomes on the moon, several specific measures should be considered by states—and, preferably, soon.
First, if conflict is to be avoided, countries planning to go to the moon would be well advised to begin discussions in advance of the actual missions to develop protocols for peaceful interaction. Fortunately, some of these measures are tentatively being developed in the context of the International Lunar Network, a collective effort by national space agencies and universities to develop a common set of scientific standards and communicative mechanisms to ensure international ability to cooperate and benefit from one another’s data in upcoming lunar missions.
Second, national governments would be wise to clarify existing ambiguities in the OST regime. This might require a formal review of the treaty to discuss definitions and develop an implementing agreement for multilateral understandings on how to interpret the OST in regard to specific lunar activities (particularly, regarding permitted and prohibited settlement practices). A similar review of clauses in the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space would be beneficial to clarify possible provisions that may foster mutual assistance during moon operations.
Third, countries planning human or robotic commerce on the moon would be well served to begin discussions toward development of a code of “lunar commercial conduct,” particularly in terms of compliance with the OST. As stated above, the OST is vague on these provisions, and considerable leeway is available to states collectively to determine how they wish to divide resources, benefits, and claims to specific areas. Such a commercial code could substitute for the dearth of support for the Moon Treaty’s provisions and yet still provide meaningful guidelines and help prevent conflict. It could also help create a workable formula (or mechanism) for sharing the moon’s “benefits” internationally, in compliance with Article I of the OST that calls for all space exploration to be conducted “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.” Such efforts will have to be constructed in such a manner that they are not unduly burdensome for the individual commercial aims of states on the moon or such states (and their companies) may decide to break out of such accords.
Fourth, states, companies, universities, and other entities planning activities on the moon might usefully establish a formal consultative council for the settlement of any problems that might emerge among scientists, tourists, or commercial operators on the moon. This body could simply be a standing committee that would meet only to address specific disputes raised before it, or it could serve as a clearinghouse for emerging problems that are best dealt with in a preventive manner.
Fifth, political relations affecting the moon’s settlement would benefit if all of the parties planning to become involved in lunar exploration would publicly reiterate their support for Article IV of the OST on nonmilitarization of the moon. Similarly, the voluntary development of practical protocols and transparency mechanisms to facilitate mutual inspections of lunar facilities—as in the Antarctic—would also promote trust and cooperation and work in the service of conflict prevention.
While pressures for “enclosure” of the moon and the privatization of its resources are likely to increase in the coming decades—at least until more specific management structures are developed and implemented—there are reasonable grounds for believing that cooperative efforts may eventually succeed. The combined effects of economic globalization, modern communications, increasing lunar mission transparency, and the recent internationalization of large space activities (such as the International Space Station), should help facilitate these trends. Broader international trends toward the adoption of rule-based behavior (such as in the World Trade Organization) and negotiated approaches to conflict resolution support institutionally based outcomes on the moon. Thus, while history’s “lessons” in regard to international cooperation on the moon may be pessimistic, specific differences in the factors surrounding lunar settlement offer reasons to believe that the negative experience on certain past frontiers may be avoided. The remaining question seems to be the willingness of current and future leaders to recognize the remaining risks and challenges that exist regarding successful lunar governance and to begin talks to address possible disputes through preventive diplomacy and existing international agreements and organizational structures. These developments are far from inevitable, but such possibilities—in the context of the relevant history of similar environments and the implications of direct military conflict today—seem to have the force of mutual self-interest behind them.
Plan and permutation still risk “enclosure” --- prevents framework for peaceful governance
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
Yet predictions from the literature on collective goods suggest that governing the “global commons” of space and the moon is likely to become increasingly difficult when finite resources face claims by multiple, self-interested actors. Such trends historically have led to processes of “enclosure” rather than successful collective management.2 Thus, the question facing lunar settlement is: Can such conflicts be avoided and, if so, how?
In seeking to weigh possible alternative scenarios on the moon, this article analyzes historical cases of human settlement of remote regions and attempts to chart and categorize similarities and differences that might provide useful guidance for forecasting lunar governance—and, specifically, with the aim of avoiding international conflict. This study begins by comparing space to the international experience in three prior regions: settling the Americas in the 1500s, establishing permanent bases on the Antarctic continent in the late twentieth century, and managing the deep seabed since the 1980s. It then turns to the moon, starting with a historical survey of predictions about its settlement since the 1950s and relevant developments in the realm of international treaties affecting lunar activity. The article concludes by applying lessons drawn from the historical cases—and differences—to forecast likely directions on the moon. It argues that the current restraints imposed by moon-related treaties and the nonmilitary nature of the likely participants are likely to favor cooperation. But it cautions that such forces will have to be balanced against the likely presence of highly competitive national motivations. This mixed set of influences suggests a less cooperative outcome than on the Antarctic continent but a far more cooperative result than emerged in the struggle over governance and sovereignty issues in the New World of the Americas.
--- XT: Perm Ans
CP has to precede the plan
Brearley 6—University of Southampton research student (Andrew, “Mining the Moon: Owning the Night Sky?”, Astropolitics, 4:43-67, OCRed, ZBurdette)
In the near-term, most activity on the Moon will probably be conducted for scientific purposes as is permitted by current inter-national space law, both the OST and the Moon Agreement. In the long-term, activities on the Moon will have commercial aspects, or one state will be using a sufficiently large amount of lunar resources that others will question whether this will diminish their rights of access. It is of mutual benefit for the legal status of lunar resources to be resolved proactively, before vested interests in lunar activities become more developed. The preferential time period to address the legal questions is before humanity returns to the Moon, just as it was deemed necessary for the OST to be completed before the first crewed lunar landing.
AT: Does Not Solve Space Leadership / Heg
Only international cooperation can boost US space power – the aff relies on outdated models and misinformed analysis
Moltz, 10 – Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies (12/6/10, James Clay, Astropolitics, “Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,” vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 113-136, )RK
A key point that this essay develops is the notion that, given emerging international trends in space, adopting a purely national strategy will become increasingly difficult and counterproductive. Specifically, with the growing importance of international cooperation in space for reducing costs and dealing with shared problems in this highly interdependent environment, alliances, networks, and transnational ties may become the true test of a state's “power” in space, rather than, as in the past, only its own national assets. In this sense, effective leadership in space coalition building and compatibility with other countries' goals may become critical to the success of any future national strategy. Finally, serious thinking about cause-and-effect relationships and action-reaction dynamics cannot be ignored. Too often, purported strategists make the mistake of adopting simplistic assumptions of “decisive” U.S. moves and static foreign reactions. Such thinking is unrealistic, and it will cause us to fail in anticipating the actual future of space activity. Indeed, given the global spread of space technology, the complex dynamics of international interactions are likely to become even more important as we move further from the bipolar U.S.-Russian context and into a new multipolar space structure, influenced by additional actors, such as China, the European Space Agency and European Union, Japan, India, and others.
With these caveats in mind, the first task herein is to review briefly what the concept of strategy means. Next, this paper undertakes a comparative review of some of the “lessons” we might draw from nuclear strategy during the Cold War (1945-1991), where we have relatively greater experience, and the benefit of declassified information about the thinking of both sides. The third section of this study reviews the practice of space policy and attempts at strategy since 1958 to the present, as well as more recent suggestions regarding space strategy from the academic literature. As will be shown, the period of the Moon race from 1961 to 1969 is arguably as close as the United States has ever come to a space strategy, however, our eventual success revealed this strategy's ultimate limitations. Finally, the article considers how we might formulate a space strategy in the future, and what pitfalls we should seek to avoid in doing so. The main point is that forward-leaning approaches that recognize the unique characteristics of space dynamics and the increasing influence of economic globalization are likely to be more successful than backward-looking strategies attempting to mimic or adapt military principles that worked in other environments in other times. In addition, contrary to much current thinking, a successful strategy in space may have more to do with mustering the funding and organizational skills that it took to build the inter-state highway system than in organizing the military forces needed to storm the beaches of Normandy during World War II.
AT: Existing Treaties Solve
Existing space treaties don’t provide effective legal regime for lunar mining
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION
The most salient place to look for international rules governing the mining of He-3 or other lunar resources is the growing body of "space law," in particular, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and 1979 Moon Agreement. However, while each of these sets out general principles relevant to the exploitation of lunar mining, neither provides a detailed legal regime for the conduct of such activities.
AT: Accession to Moon Agreement Undermines U.S. Interests / AT: Other States Won’t Cooperate
There are a variety of steps the U.S. can take to ensure that accession doesn’t undermine its interests --- other states will likely agree to changes in exchange for U.S. ratification and accession
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
[*287] It is true, of course, that U.S. accession to the Moon Agreement would involve risks, such as those raised in the 1980 Senate hearings, based on a pessimistic prediction of the likely outcome of any eventual article 11 and 18 negotiations. n152 Thus, U.S. accession might well encourage wider participation in the agreement by many non-space powers and developing states - countries that might have a different ideology and approach to the exploitation of lunar resources from that of the United States. Conceivably, if these nations constituted a majority of parties to the agreement, they might succeed in imposing a resource regime unacceptable to the United States in any future article 11 and 18 negotiations. In this event, U.S. accession to the Moon Agreement could result in embedding and legitimating a lunar resource regime embodying principles contrary to U.S. interests. Moreover, U.S. accession might, in this case, effectively preclude its pursuit of alternative, more hopeful strategies. While it is true that under the agreement the U.S. is not legally obliged to agree to any eventual international regime that it does not like, it might by that time be impractical for the United States to either "go it alone" or seek some other agreement.
However, there are various approaches the United States could employ to alleviate these concerns. For example:
. The United States could indicate to the current parties to the Moon Agreement that it was prepared to ratify and accede to the agreement, conditional on their first acting under article 11 and 18 to adopt a lunar resource regime reflecting principles acceptable to the United States. Conceivably, the present parties might value U.S. adherence sufficiently to adopt such a regime. However, since none of the current parties are now, or likely in the future to be, involved in lunar resource activities, they might not be best suited to fashioning the kind of resource regime the United States would hope to have established.
[*288] . The United States could negotiate an agreement with like-minded countries having a present or potential spacefaring capability and concern with the effective development of lunar resources, such as China, the European Union, India, Japan, and Russia, for the proposed simultaneous accession by each of them to the Moon Agreement, coupled with a joint declaration indicating their intent, upon their accession, to move under article 18 to establish an acceptable resource regime meeting U.S. requirements. The combined influence of these major powers would presumably be sufficient to ensure the adoption by all of the parties to the agreement of such a regime.
. Perhaps preferably, the United States could, more broadly, negotiate with both the current parties to the agreement, the other principal space powers, and other interested states for specific terms of an acceptable proposed lunar resource regime, with the understanding or express agreement that, if the United States and other non-party states then joined the agreement, both the old and new parties would then promptly agree to call an article 18 conference to formally adopt this previously agreed upon lunar resource regime.
. Alternatively, while the United States could not propose amendment of the Moon Agreement since it is not a current party, it could, as a member of COPUOS, propose the negotiation in COPUOS, and perhaps adoption by the U.N. General Assembly, of a protocol or additional instrument supplementing the Moon Agreement providing for a lunar resource regime acceptable to the United States, with the understanding that it would ratify the agreement and protocol or additional instrument only if the protocol or additional instrument received sufficient acceptance, including acceptance by the other principal space powers, so as to enter into force as binding upon all parties. This approach would, of course, be similar to that followed by the U.N. General Assembly in its adoption of an implementation agreement in 1994 effectively nullifying the provisions of part XI of the LOSC [*289] to which the United States and some other states objected. n153
As already mentioned, the current parties to the agreement might be willing to agree to one of these possible arrangements in order to encourage and facilitate participation by the United States and other space powers in the agreement. n154 Discussions in recent meetings of the Legal Committee of COPUOS suggest that the parties to the Moon Agreement, as well as other states, are actively exploring the possibility of revisions, arrangements, or other accommodations that might persuade the United States and other countries to ratify and accede to the agreement. n155 Once again, international experience with the analogous situation involving seabed minerals is suggestive, where a majority of states in the U.N. General Assembly were prepared to negotiate and adopt the 1994 implementation agreement modifying the mineral resource regime set out in part XI of the LOSC in the hope of encouraging the United States and other important states to join the LOSC. n156
AT: Countries Will Cheat
International regimes shape government behavior --- broken commitments will undermine states’ reputations
Moltz, 9 – associate professor in the Department of National Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (James Clay, Fall 2009, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon? Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective,” , JMP)
As Robert Keohane argues on the impact of regimes in shaping the behavior of states:
International regimes alter the information available to governments and the opportunities open to them; commitments made to support such institutions can only be broken at a cost to reputation. International regimes therefore change the calculations of advantage that governments make.44
The challenge in space will be whether legal and political developments that emerged in the late twentieth century can mitigate possible twentyfirst-century hostilities while also allowing the moon (and other celestial bodies) to be both explored scientifically and developed commercially under likely conditions of future multipolarity in the international system.
AT: No Ratification
It would be ratified – perceivable benefits to all states
Hatch, 10 - Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review (2010, Benjamin, Emory International Law Review, “Dividing the Pie in the Sky: the Need for a New Lunar Resources Regime,” vol. 24, rev. 229, )RK
The Lunar Forum, structured in such a way so as to respect the investments and risks of spacefaring countries while also providing a voice to developing states, should be able to attract sufficient political support so as to enter into force. Spacefaring states receive not only a clear majority of decisional authority within the Forum but also get to benefit financially through the profit-sharing mechanism. Developing states will receive a voice in the process and will gain the external benefit of a drastic reduction in prices in energy and other resource markets as developed states turn their attention to lunar resources and away from traditional fossil fuels or other terrestrial minerals. This participation should expedite lesser developed countries' quests to become industrialized and, as a result, should lead to more foreign investment and wealth for poorer nations. These benefits more than compensate developing states for the loss of the Common Heritage Doctrine, which only functioned to delay the development of commons resources indefinitely. The prospect of lesser developed states gaining real wealth now clearly exceeds the future speculative benefits associated with the Common Heritage Doctrine. The Lunar Forum model presented here would be net-beneficial for all states by promoting the values of international peace and economic efficiency.
AT: Links to Politics
Reservations and declarations can help mute the political obstacles to the counterplan
Bilder, Prof of Law at University of Wisconsin, 10 (January 2010, Richard B., Fordham International Law Journal, “A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS,” 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 243, JMP)
Fourth, to the extent that concerns as to the meaning or ideological implications of the agreement continue to pose a political obstacle to U.S. ratification, such concerns could also be met through appropriate U.S. reservations, declarations, or understandings to its ratification of the agreement. For example, in 1982 the American Bar Association's House of Delegates approved a joint report of the American Bar Association sections on International Law and on Natural Resources Law recommending U.S. ratification accompanied by declarations consistent with the following principles:
(a) It is the position of the United States that no provision in this Agreement constrains the existing right of governmental or authorized non-governmental entities to explore and use the resources of the Moon or other celestial body, including the right to develop and use these resources for commercial or other purposes, and no such constraint is accepted by this ratification;
(b) It is the position of the United States that nothing in this Agreement in any way diminishes or alters the existing right of the United States to determine unilaterally how it shares the benefits derived from development and use by or under the authority of the United States of natural resources of the Moon or other celestial bodies;
(c) Natural resources extracted or used by or under the authority of a State Party to this Agreement are subject to the exclusive control of, and shall be the property of the State [*286] Party or other authorized entity responsible for their extraction or use. In this context, it is the position of the United States that Articles XII and XV of this Agreement preserve the existing right of States Parties to retain exclusive jurisdiction and control over their facilities, stations and installations on the Moon and other celestial bodies, and that other State Parties are obligated to avoid interference with normal operations of such facilities;
(d) Recognition by the United States that the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of all mankind is limited to recognition (i) that all States have equal rights to explore and use the Moon and its natural resources, and (ii) that no State or other entity has an exclusive right of ownership over the Moon, over any area of the surface or subsurface of the moon, or over its natural resources which have not been, or are not actually in the process of being, extracted or used by actual development activities on the Moon;
(e) It is the position of the United States that no moratorium on the commercial or other exploration, development and use of the natural resources of the Moon or other celestial body is intended or required by this Agreement. The United States recognizes that, in the development and use of natural resources on the Moon, States Parties to this Agreement are obligated to act in a manner compatible with the provisions of Article VI(2) and the purposes specified in Article XI(7), and the purposes specified in Article XI(7). However, the United States reserves to itself the right and authority to determine the standards for such compatibility unless and until the United States becomes a party to a future resources regime;
(f) Acceptance by the United States of the obligation to join in good faith negotiation for creation of a future resources regime in no way constitutes acceptance of any particular provisions or proposed provisions which may be included in an agreement creating and controlling such a regime; nor does it constitute any obligation or commitment to become a Party to such a regime regardless of the contents of any such agreement. n151
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