Philosophy of Language 4320012 Reading List, Part II

Philosophy of Language 4320012 Reading List, Part II

Causal-Historical Theories of Names Note that there are various different causal-historical theories. Kripke's is the original version, but Sainsbury has presented his own view which differs from Kripke's in a number of regards -- not only with regard to its treatment of baptism, but also in what is required for continuation. (Evans is not a causal-historical theorist, though his view on name-reference does have some causal elements.)

Introductory and Overview Readings Lycan, 2000/2008 See Ch. 4 for a quick and punchy overview of causal-historical

theories. Miller 1998 See Chapter 2, Section 13. McCulloch 1989 See Chapter 8. This is a much more advanced overview.

Challenges to Kripke's Account I: Empty Names Sainsbury 2005 See Ch. 3, Sect. 1 (Ch. 3 is reprinted in full in the study pack). Here

Sainsbury makes a case for the claim that there are intelligible (meaningful) empty names. Sainsbury goes on to present a history-of-practice account of a broadly similar kind to Kripke's, but with modifications intended to allow it to cope with empty names. See below for more on alternative views on empty names.

Challenges to Kripke's Account II: `Change of Reference' and the `Madagascar' Case Berger 2002 Includes an attempt to deal with the `Madagascar' problem in a

Kripkean framework. See pp. 3?8 and Ch. 2, esp. sections 1 and 2. Devitt 1981 See p. 150. Lycan 2000/2008 On pp. 56?8 Lycan gives quick, clear treatments of objections to

C-H theories. Evans 1973 This contains the classic statement of the `Madagascar' problem (p. 11

in the 1985 reprint), and the baby-switch case. (Retrospective addition to study pack.) Sainsbury 2005 See all of Ch. 3 (reprinted in study pack), but esp. Sect. 3.6. Sainsbury presents an account of name-using practices which is intended to deal with `Madagascar'-style problem cases. On his account we don't get change of reference within practices, but unwitting initiation of new practices. (This is, I think, just a sensible bit of book-keeping: the real work comes in the accounts of the elements of practices.) Sainsbury presents a sophisticated account of initiation in 3.6.1. Initiation into a particular name using practice requires

Philosophy of Language 4320012, Consolidated Reading List, Part II

1

exposure to competent use, and an intention to keep faith with the current reference (if reference there is), but also requires that the novice speaker's use goes on to be such that speaker's reference coincides with semantic (word) reference (see pp. 113?16). In 3.6.2, Sainsbury gives an account of continuation--when uses of a name-word after initiation count as part of a particular practice. Where in initiation an ordinary speaker could reasonably seen as having keeping-faith intentions in relation to particular name-uses she was experiencing, it's implausible that such speakers should have intentions with regard to whole practices--the notion of a practice is a technical one, and speakers can engage in practices without having the notion--and typically they won't be able to recall the relevant initiation. So the question arises what sense we can make of the idea of a speaker having an intention to go on with a particular practice. Sainsbury's answer is that a use is continuing if it is `sensitive to' information expressed prior uses--associated with that information. (`Information' here can be misinformation--not actually correct information on the referent.) The basic idea is that a use is continuing only if it's associated by the subject with information from prior uses. (See p. 117.) This doesn't give a full account, however, because it can give the wrong results in some cases (e.g. the Tim and Jim case, p. 118). Sainsbury invokes a speaker's/semantic reference condition like that applied in the case of initiation, and says that this has to be applied `in the light of how to make best sense of a speaker' (p. 118). (Here we can see, perhaps, why Kripke said that any theory-- systematic, `mechanical' account--of names was going to turn out false.)

Challenges to Kripke's Account III: Understanding and `Knowing Which' Evans 1982 See esp. Chs 3 and 4. Evans tries to develop a view on which

understanding (grasping the meaning of) a name requires knowing which object is its referent in a substantive sense. See esp. ?4.1 for a sketch of knowing which in relation to understanding statements about particular things. Note that Evans's own opening remarks indicate some of the problems which face this kind of view. Problem Scenario 2 in the lecture PowerPoints is a rough-and- ready application of a version of an example presented on p. 90. (In Ch. 11, Evans gives his own account of the functioning of proper names.)

Evans 1973. Problem Scenario 1 in the lecture PowerPoints is a version of an example found on pp. 6?7.

Sainsbury 2005 See pp. 31?2 for Sainsbury's discussion of the `Feynman' example. See Sect. 7.2.3 (pp. 226?9) for an example of Sainsbury's criticisms of Evans's claims concerning knowing which.

Sainsbury 1985 An examination of Evans's view. This is a difficult paper, but ?2.3 gives an indication of the sorts of objections that can be raised against Evans.

Philosophy of Language 4320012, Consolidated Reading List, Part II

2

Empty Names Again Note: Some of the following relate to treatments of TSNESs other than Sainsbury's. These are marked *.

Sainsbury 2005 Ch. 3 (Study pack), and Ch. 2, Sect. 3 gives a nice presentation of Negative Free Logic. The logic is called free because it is free of existence assumptions: it's not assumed that singular terms have referents. It's called negative because simple sentences containing empty singular terms come out false. There are other forms of free logic which differ in terms of how things turn out with the truth values of sentences containing empty names.

Burge 1974 This presents the Negative Free Logic which Sainsbury uses in his 2005.

*Evans 1982 In Ch. 10, Evans tries to show how we can account for true singular negative existential claims involving proper names while holding on to the idea that proper names have to have a referent in order to be (properly) meaningful. This is interesting. Evans exploits the idea of make-believe. Sainsbury subjects Evans's account to forceful criticism in his 1999. (I have an old handout on this debate, if you're interested.)

*Wiggins, D. 1995: `The Kant?Frege?Russell View of Existence: Towards the Rehabilitation of the Second Level View'. In Sinnott-Armstrong, Raffman and Asher, eds, Modality, Morality and Belief (Cambridge).

*Wiggins, D. 1999: `Names, Fictional Names and `Really', II'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 73.

Bibliographical Details for References for Causal-Historical Theories of Names Berger, A. 2002: Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric. Cambridge, MA:

MIT. Burge, T. 1974: `Truth and Singular Terms'. No?s, 8, pp. 309-25. Devitt, M. 1981: Designation. New York: Columbia University Press. Evans, G. 1973: `The Causal Theory of Proper Names', Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, Supplementary Volume 47, pp. 187?208. Reprinted in his Collected Papers (1985), pp. 1?24, and in Moore 1993 and Martinich 1996. (Retrospective addition to study pack.) Evans, Gareth 1982: The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press/OUP. Lycan, W. G. 2000 (2nd edn. 2008): Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge. Miller, A. 1998: Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge. McCulloch, G. 1989: The Game of the Name: Introducing Logic, Language and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon. Sainsbury, R. M. 1985: `Evans on Reference'. Originally published as `Critical Notice: The Varieties of Reference by Gareth Evans', in I, 94, pp. 120?42 (available only through the library's e-journal service). Reprinted in Sainsbury 2002.

Philosophy of Language 4320012, Consolidated Reading List, Part II

3

Sainsbury, R. M. 1999: `Names, Fictional Names and "Really"'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 73, pp. 243?69.

Sainsbury, R. M. 2002: Departing from Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge.

Sainsbury, R. M. 2005: Reference without Referents. Oxford: Clarendon/OUP.

Quine on the Alleged Indeterminacy of Meaning

Miller, A. 1998: Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge). See Chapter 4, sections 6 to 10, for an interesting and useful introductory/intermediate-level account of Quine's arguments and some responses to them.

Hookway, C. 1988: Quine (Oxford: Polity/Blackwell). A very good introduction to Quine. See Part III (chapters 8 to 10). Chapters 4 and 12 are also relevant, concerning Quine's views on scientific methodology and when we should accept a theory. In chapter 9, Hookway looks at Evans's attack on Quine, and questions its effectiveness.

Wright, C. 1997: `The Indeterminacy of Translation', in Hale and Wright. (In study pack.) Originally in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds) 1997: A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell). Some of the material on Evans's strategy is difficult, but section 5 is very useful on objections to and developments of Evans's approach. The material on the relation of semantics to a plausible psychology of speakers is important (pp. 410?13).

Okasha, S. 2002: Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (OUP). See Ch. 4, section on the general underdetermination argument in the philosophy of science. Another quick introduction to the idea of underdetermination of theory by data (as deployed in the `argument from above') can be found in the entry on `Scientific Realism' in the Stanford (online) Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See section 2 of the entry: .

Quine, W. V. O. 1960: Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ch. 2. This is Quine's classic investigation of radical translation. It's big, but very much worth reading. Quine shows how one might try to reconstruct (something like) meaning on a basis of behavioural evidence (patterns of assent to and dissent from sentences given particular sensory stimulus). Quine claims that the results will be radically indeterminate. It's interesting and useful to note the differences and similarities between Quine's account of radical translation and Davidson's account of radical interpretation.

Chomsky, Noam 1969: `Quine's Empirical Assumptions'. In Donald Davidson and Jaako Hintikka (eds), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, pp. 55?68. (In study pack.)

Quine, W. V. O. 1969: `[Reply] to Chomsky'. In Donald Davidson and Jaako Hintikka (eds), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, pp. 302?11. (In study pack.)

Philosophy of Language 4320012, Consolidated Reading List, Part II

4

Quine, W. V. O. 1970: `On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation'. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 178?83. (In study pack.) This short paper presents the `argument from above'.

Quine, W.V.O. 1979: `Facts of the Matter', in R.W. Shahan and C.V. Swoyer (eds), Essays on the Philosophy of W.V. Quine (Hassocks: Harvester, 1979).

Evans, G. 1975: `Identity and Predication', Journal of Philosophy 72. Reprinted in his Collected Papers (OUP, 1985). This is the original presentation of Evans's arguments against Quine, particularly with regard to the `argument from below'. It is a difficult paper. Many of the main points are presented in a more accessible way in more recent work on the issue, such as Wright 1997.

Gibson, Roger F. 1986: `Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter'. In Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (Library of Living Philosophers, vol. XVIII). Ch. 5, with reply by Quine. (In study pack.)

Kirk, Robert 1986: Translation Determined. Oxford: Clarendon Press/OUP. Ch. 6 ? `Pressing from Above'. (In study pack.)

Kirk, Robert 2004: `Indeterminacy of Translation'. In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 150?80. (In study pack.)

Soames, Scott 1999: `The Indeterminacy of Translation and the Inscrutability of Reference'. In Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29, pp. 321?57. Extracts, excluding section IV, are reprinted in Richard 2003. (Richard, M. (ed.) 2003: Meaning. Oxford: Blackwell.)

Miller, A. 1997: `Tacit Knowledge'. In Hale and Wright 1997. (B. Hale and C. Wright (eds) 1997: A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell).) This is listed for background information only -- some responses to Quine advert to the notion of tacit knowledge. Miller's piece is an account and investigation of the idea that there can be a sense in which we can know a theory `tacitly'--that is, without being able to articulate it explicitly. In this sense it might be claimed that we know a semantics for our own language, for instance, even though we cannot simply state that semantics explicitly. This might seem like a crazy idea, but a case can be made for it. The basic idea is that it makes sense to see someone as knowing a theory tacitly when their relevant skill or capacity can be seen as being structured in a way analogous to the way in which the theory is articulated.

Davidson on Theories of Truth and Theories of Meaning

Introductory note: Davidson hopes to give an illuminating account of meaning by saying what we could know that would suffice for interpretation, and how we could come to know that thing on the basis of evidence available prior to interpretation. To be able to interpret a speaker one must be able to go from a description of her utterances not framed in terms of meaning to a description which interprets them as saying particular things. The successful interpreter can say, for any of the

Philosophy of Language 4320012, Consolidated Reading List, Part II

5

 ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download