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Running head: Physical Security

Physical Security Week 4 Assignment

Michael R. Vest

Paul Baker

Physical Security SMGT 315

September 11, 2009

Abstract

We examine five questions that will discuss the different detection capabilities of sensor devices, common environmental conditions that affect sensors, various strengths and weaknesses of alarm assessment verse video surveillance, why detection requires alarm assessment, and procedures used to bypass a system and how to minimize the effort and at what cost.

Physical Security Week 4 Assignment

Chapter 7:

“7. What are some of the differences in the detection capabilities of infrared, microwave, and ultrasonic sensors?” (Garcia, 2008)

When designing the interior security design, a designer must take into account the type of sensors needed and also the application of the sensors. The classes of sensors include “1.) Passive or active, 2.) Covert or visible, 3.) Volumetric or line detection, and 4.) Application” (Garcia, 2008). When considering the application of the sensors, a designer must determine the class of application for the sensor use. The three application classes include 1.) Boundary-penetration sensors, 2.) Interior motion sensors, and 3.) Proximity sensors (Garcia, 2008). Let’s look at some of the capabilities of three different sensors. The sensors we will concentrate on are infrared, microwave, and ultrasonic sensors.

Infrared sensors operate both in active or passive mode. While in active mode, they are more susceptible for intrusion bypass; whereas in passive mode, they are more difficult to identify and increase the chances of an adversary being detected and apprehended. Infrared systems use four characteristics of infrared radiation that are used in infrared detection. The characteristics are 1.) All objects emit infrared radiation, 2.) Infrared energy is transmitted without physical contact, 3.) Infrared warms the receiving surface and allows for detection due to temperature changes, and 4.) Infrared is invisible to the human eye (Garcia, 2008). When a designer chooses to use infrared in active mode, they will need to determine either to use a single-pass beam system or a multi-pass beam system (Fennelly, 2004). A multi-pass system reduces the chances of an adversary from diverting the beam and defeating the system. Two systems should be installed to complement each other to make infrared sensors effective.

When installing infrared systems, environmental factors need to be considered. These factors include smoke, fog, dust, etc. Each of these can trigger the infrared beam to disperse and trigger alarms. Other factors that require factoring include not positioning detectors in areas that are susceptible to heat localization is with glass and Plexiglas (Garcia, 2008). Infrared sensors should be set up in a way that an adversary must cross the path perpendicular to the detection pattern for best results. Once all of these factors are considered, infrared sensors establish well defined detection zones and produce relatively few nuisance alarms. Another interior device that is available is the microwave sensor.

“Microwave sensors are active, visible, volumetric sensors” (Garcia, 2008). Most microwave sensors are built in a monostatic configuration and operate within the 10GHz frequency range. It uses a Doppler mode for detection. Microwave sensors are best utilized when a adversary is required to move forward and backwards from a target. Microwave sensors produce invisible and inaudible detection patterns, require relatively low maintenance-cost, and have a high-probability of detection (Garcia, 2008). Microwave sensors should be placed n high locations and pointed towards target detection areas. Although microwave sensors pride decent detection coverage, they do have several areas that a designer must account for by using other sensor types to complement microwave sensors.

Multiple microwave sensors must be set to different frequencies to prevent interference with each other. Building construction must be considered when using microwave sensors. Since microwaves can transmit through most building materials, locations of microwave sensors must be surveyed to identify potential conditions that will cause nuisance alarms. These conditions include wildlife, fluorescent lighting, and poor mounting of microwave hardware. Microwave sensors are susceptible to slow-moving targets, refection of the wave, and field of view blockage. The next type of sensor that is available is the ultrasonic sensor.

“Ultrasonic sensors are active, visible, volumetric sensors” (Garcia, 2008). These sensors use the sound frequencies of 19 and 40 kHz to detect movement and are sometimes used in monostatic mode (Garcia, 2008). Ultrasonic sensors operate off of the same technology as a microwave sensor using the Doppler Effect. These sensors monitor for motion, noise, and radio or electromagnetic interference (Fennelly, 2004). The system does required correct grounding and shielding to decrease nuisance alarms and increase the effectiveness of the system (Fennelly, 2004). Because ultrasonic sensors sense sound and can fill large areas with detection, the chance for an adversary to being detected is high. Another advantage over microwave sensors is ultrasonic sensors do not penetrate beyond their defined area. This eliminates alarms from outside of the area. Ultrasonic sensors are affected by acoustical sounds and temperature. Acoustical sound can be from air conditioning systems, hissing noises, and bells. Temperature is a factor because as humidity changes, modifies the sensors ability to detect. Humidity can actually make the sensor too sensitive and increase nuisance alarms (Garcia, 2008).

Ultrasonic, infrared, and microwave sensors are all tools that can be used to detect intrusions. Each of these systems has their own unique strengths and weaknesses. Alone, most sensors can be easily defeat; but if used on conjunction with other sensors that account for one sensors weakness with its strengths, the chances for a valid detection increase and decrease the motivation of an adversary to attempt to acquire their target.

“8. What kind of environmental conditions can affect interior sensors?” (Garcia, 2008)

When considering placement, purchase, and implementation of sensors, environmental conditions need to be addressed in the design plan. Environmental conditions exist everywhere and cannot be one hundred percent controlled or eliminated. They can be accounted and adjusted for when designing interior sensor design layout. Environmental factors that a security designer might encounter include “1.) Electromagnetic, 2.) Nuclear Radiation, 3.) Acoustic, 4.) Thermal, 5.) Optical, 6.)Seismic, and 7.) Meteorological” (Garcia, 2008).

Each of these environmental conditions can modify, change, or cause security sensors to generate false alarms, work intermittently, or not at all. Electromagnetic environments include lightning, telephone lines, power lines, computers, etc. Each of these items emits their own unique frequencies that can affect a sensor. For example, ultrasonic sensors are susceptible to certain radio frequencies. The best way to account for electromagnetic interference is to shield the equipment or install sensors that are not affected by electromagnetic conditions. This could be done by something as simply providing a solid ground for equipment. Another condition is nuclear radiation.

Nuclear radiation is not only dangerous to humans in high does or long exposures, it is also dangerous to electronic equipment. Nuclear radiation can attack and destroy semiconductors within equipment (Garcia, 2008). Currently, there is no sensor is completely impervious to radiation, but damage to sensors due to radiation depends upon dosage. As radiation can degrade sensors, acoustic environments can pose new threats.

Acoustic environments included the use of sound to affect a sensor. Acoustic environments exist in everyday surroundings. You will never completely stop sound. Examples of devices that can cause acoustic interference include air conditioning systems, radiators, radios, wildlife, and people. When selecting sensors, a designer should have an acoustic survey done for the target area and areas around the target to identify sources of potential acoustical signals that will generate alarms. Another condition that cannot be completely eliminated is thermal conditions.

Thermal conditions occur when temperature changes occur. This can be as simple as the air conditioning unit regulating room temperature to a person passing a sensor with a one hundred and three temperature. Chemicals can cause thermal reactions by themselves or in conjunction with other chemicals. Weather can change the temperature signature of a building. As the weather cools or heats the exterior of the building, the temperature within the structure will change. Sometimes something that creates a temperature change can create another environmental condition. This is the optical condition.

Optical effects can be created chemically or from other sources light lights, reflective surfaces, and infrared (Garcia, 2008). Each of these sources generates different wavelengths that need to be considered when designing a system for interior use. A good designer will use various sensors that counter each other weakness to enhance security. Even though infrared is invisible to the naked eye, with the proper equipment, a person can easily identify infrared beams in a security system. A simple Halloween fog machine can allow infrared to be seen by the naked eye. Sometimes when a security sensor relies on a highly reflective surface to return the signal, it can be set off easily by something as simple as a moth landing on the surface. From optic environments, we move to seismic and meteorological environmental effects.

Even though seismic and meteorological environments are separate, they share a lot of the same characteristics. Seismic sensors detect vibrations. Meteorological environments include many events that generate vibrations. These include thunder, wind, rain, hail, and tremors. Some other seismic events include traffic movement, equipment operations, and commercial industry. Because the constant vibrations caused by today’s environment and commercial industry, seismic and meteorological environments are difficult to contain and control. Thunderstorms cannot be controlled and traffic cannot be stopped. With all of the different conditions that exist in the environment, it is a challenge for the security system designer.

When designing systems, a designer should would with local bio-environmental, weather, acoustic agencies to arrange surveys of target area and surrounding areas to define potential environments that will affect the sensors and also help the designer to select the best sensors to purchase and distribute. A security system works at its best when all conditions are identified and security measures complement each other to reduce the amount of alarms caused by environmental conditions.

Chapter 8:

“2. Compare video alarm assessment and video surveillance. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these methods?” (Garcia, 2008)

With the advent of cheaper technology video camera security systems are becoming increasingly popular. Video camera systems of today can do more than systems of five years ago and for a fraction of the cost. When purchasing a video surveillance system, the client and security designer need to identify the purpose of the system. Video surveillance can be divided into two primary uses. These are video alarm assessment or video alarm surveillance. “Assessment refers to immediate image capture of a sensor detection zone at the time of an intrusion alarm” (Garcia, 2008). The term “surveillance” refers to a system that captures information for recovery of the assets at a later time. There are benefits and disadvantages to each system.

When using a video system an assessment tool, it provides real-time or near real-time video of the target area. As one can recall, all alarms must be assessed by security to verify if the alarm is a false, nuisance, or intrusion alarm (Fennelly, 2004). Assessment video is used by security to review alarms for validity. This allows security personnel to better assess the situation and determine the level of response that is needed. Typically assessment cameras are fixed and are controlled by a control room upon activation. This allows for tighter control over a detection zone and quicker response than surveillance video.

An assessment video system is preferable to a surveillance system when loss of the asset cannot be tolerated. A prime example would be in a gambling casino. Asset video systems are used to monitor and review tables to prevent cheating by both patrons and employees. These systems allow for immediate response upon confirmation of a verified event, the theft of money. Assessment systems are meant to supplement sensors that are installed to protect assets. When a sensor activates, the system automatically begins to record the target are for a specific time or until terminated by security. Cameras that are used for assessment tend to be of higher caliber than surveillance cameras. This is because higher resolution is needed to quickly validate the alarm. Another advantage of the assessment systems is the human factor.

Because a person can respond to an alarm manually using cameras, response is faster and potentially more accurate. While humans offer and advantage to an assessment system, they also offer one of the disadvantages. Some companies relying on video cameras and security to catch all events visually. According to evidence collected through experiments, human attention span degrades after thirty minutes and is unreliable after one hour (Garcia, 2008). This means that as long as the event occurs within the first thirty minutes of duty, chances are high the alarm will be identified and assessed. Another disadvantage is in the selection of the size and quantity of monitors that security personnel are required to observe. Research has identified that monitor size, distance of incident form camera, duration of the incident, and other distractions can reduce operator effectiveness (Garcia, 2008). Another disadvantage of an assessment system is the manning required to operate and monitor the equipment. While assessment video allows real-time to near real-time surveillance, it may not be cost effective. Another method that is more cost effective is the use of video surveillance.

Video surveillance primarily records the area, does not respond to alarms, and does nothing to prevent the adversary from completing the mission. Surveillance is used in areas were assets lost do not have a detrimental impact to the mission. An advantage of surveillance video is that it records a bigger area over longer periods of time. Typically surveillance use pan-tilt zoom cameras (PTZ) (Garcia, 2008). These type of camera are less expensive than assessment cameras and do not typically require a human force to monitor them. This allows for cost reduction in manning. Surveillance systems allow for the collection of information that can be used at a later time to track down and prosecute adversaries that attack the facility. While surveillance does offer advantages, there are disadvantages.

Although PTZ cameras offer a wider range of field, they do not necessarily catch an event when it is outside of its range. They must also have a light source that moves with the camera. Surveillance video is only used to detect an event, it does not allow for assessment of the event until after the crime. For example, a PTZ is easily circumvented by moving behind the camera if that is the only detection sensor. A PTZ can also be circumvented by a simple panoramic picture with a photo stand. PTZ cameras also tend to be of lower resolution quality which can make identifying viable information difficult to non-existent.

Assets within a target area drive the determination of either assessment or surveillance video systems. If the loss is human life, than an assessment system combined with multiple sensors is your best solution. If the loss is only property, such as in a storage facility, surveillance may be sufficient. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages and one is not better than the other. As a security designer, your job is to help the client chose the system that meets the needs while protecting the client with the correct amount of countermeasures.

“4. Why do we say detection is not complete until the alarm has been assessed?” (Garcia, 2008)

“Detection is the notification that a possible security event is occurring; assessment is the act of determining whether the event is an attack or a nuisance alarm” (Garcia, 2008). Detection is accomplished my many methods. Various sensors like and pressure plate provide the detection inputs that are required to trigger alarms. Other systems that are used as detection monitors are video surveillance cameras. These cameras can be either used in assessment mode or in surveillance mode.

Human beings are ineffective at detecting alarms due to human nature. In recent research studies using sixteen monitors and volunteers, researchers found that after sixty minutes the volunteers started to miss detecting suspicious events significantly (Garcia, 2008). A prime example of this was in the new recently with the firing of two security guards that fell asleep while on duty. These two guards were supposed to be the human detection factor for a bridge that is on the government terrorist hit list. This means that during the time they were asleep, any suspicious events that occurred and not caught by other detection sensors went undetected and could not be assessed. As one can see, detection is just one part of the detection process. It is not successful on its own. For detection to be effective, it must have the assessment.

Assessment is the second stage in the detection process. Once a detection device triggers an alarm, it must be assessed to verify the validity of the intrusion. This intrusion could be a false alarm or a nuisance alarm. It could also be something as simple as a moth setting off an infrared detector. While devices make the best detectors, humans make the best assessors. Assessment requires the verification of the event. This can be done by dispatching a security guard to the event location or using current surveillance camera systems to manually scan and review the event area to determine the validity of the alarm. If the event is determined to be an actual intruder alarm, humans have the ability to process all information and direct the correct response to the event.

Surveillance systems can also be used to verify the threats. For example, if an alarm goes off in a chemical plant, security can either dispatch personnel or use a surveillance system to verify the threat. This could be the identification of personnel lying on the ground during a chemical alarm. The bodies lying on the ground is the verification of the event. This allows the security team to relay critical information to responding teams so that they are prepared when they arrived on scene. In a recent article by Matthew Harwood, he wrote about nuclear power plants centralizing their fire alarm and validation system to a computer based system (Harwood, 2009). By centralizing the fire alarm detectors into a computer based system, the computer can eliminate many nuisance alarms and to trigger real alarms. By using the computer system to filter errors within the detection systems, the need for human response teams was decreased. The unique comparison within the article is that even though the detection process has been computerized, the assessment process is still accomplished without endangering the life of the response team. It also saves time when assessing the alarm because of the use of computer technology and surveillance systems (Harwood, 2009).

Detection and assessment go hand-in-hand with each other. One relies on the other. If one fails than they both fail. It does not matter how many detection devices a corporation has to protect its assets. If the assessment phase is not carried out, corporations have wasted thousands to millions of dollars for nothing.

“5. How could an intruder avoid being assessed in a system? How much could this be minimized, an how much more would it cost?” (Garcia, 2008)

All detection systems can be defeated by an adversary (Garcia, 2008). With the advent of the internet and other resources, finding the weaknesses in any detection systems is easily found and in many situations the methods to defeat the sensors are listed. Infrared systems can be bypassed with a special pair of glasses, Halloween fog machine, or a mirror. If it is a single beam system, the beams can be bypassed by going over, under, or between the beams (Garcia, 2008). A seismic device could be bypassed by creating seismic vibrations that will trigger continuous nuisance alarms. Eventually these alarms will be ignored by the security personnel and the adversary can complete their mission. Video surveillance systems can be bypassed by splicing into the video feed, using mirrors to reflect back the same image, hacking into the surveillance system storage device and changing time stamps, and by placing panoramic picture in front of a pan-tilt zoom camera.

If an intruder researches the environmental factors of the known detection equipment, they can use those elements to defeat the system. One of the most common weaknesses of interior sensors is that of wildlife. Wildlife includes birds, deer, moths, crickets, etc. One can easily by crickets at a local Wal-Mart and used to trigger detection devices. Other methods include using ladders to lie across a wall to gain access and bypassing the detectors.

Even though detection sensors can be defeated, there are ways to minimize their weaknesses and improve the chances for an adversary to become detected and assessed. The easiest way for a corporation to minimize the changes of intrusion is to use multiple sensors that complement each other. For example, if an infrared sensor is used, than adding pressure sensitive sensors to the same area provides two sensors that complement each other. This allows for detection even if one is defeated by an adversary. Another way to complement an interior system is to use covert surveillance cameras. These work well because the camera is undetected and can be triggered when one of the other sensors activated. This allows for the detection and response to occur without the adversary knowing.

When considering an interior design, one should consider adding all necessary sensors at the initial building of the facility. Installation costs are considerably cheaper when done in the initial stages. Cost will rise dramatically when sensors and systems need to be installed at a later time. When considering the cost of installing sensors and surveillance systems, testing needs to be considered. Testing of the systems should occur to ensure the area is protected and that response time is adequate. Testing also identifies weaknesses in a currently designed system and allows the designer to adjust cost for equipment. Because adversaries change on a daily basis, security must follow the same when it comes to the systems and detectors. Good adversaries stay informed on the newest sensor technologies and so should security designers.

The overall cost to prevent adversaries must be driven by the asset that needs protecting. With the recent court cases that are appearing in the news, businesses that do not apply the perceived proper security measures are being held accountable. Hotels are a prime example. There have been lawsuits won by individuals who sued the motel because they were assaulted in the parking garage. The motels lack of proper security sensors and surveillance cost the motels millions in damages (Fischer, Halibozek, & Green, 2008). With people expecting businesses to protect them, the perception of security is changing and it is falling upon the business to ensure they provide the best security detection and assessment systems they can afford. Cost in security is not alone, but also entails factors as company reputation and human lives. Cost can only be decided by what the client has determined to be protected and what means they are willing to put into place to protect those assets.

References

Fennelly, L. J. (2004). Effective Physical Secuirty (3rd ed.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.

Fischer, R. J., Halibozek, E., & Green, G. (2008). Introduction to Security (8th ed.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.

Garcia, M. L. (2008). The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems (2nd ed.). Burlington. MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.

Harwood, M. (2009, August 26). Nuclear Power Plants Move to Software Based Risk Assesments to Fend Off Fire. Retrieved September 5, 2009, from Securitymanagement:

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