University of California, San Diego



EVALUATING WINNERS AND LOSERS IN DEMOCRACY:

THE CASE OF RACE, PARTY, AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY

Abstract

When gauging winners and losers in America’s democracy, existing studies generally focus on the interim stages of the democratic process: who votes, who wins election, and who gets their preferred policies passed. These studies, while useful, generally ignore the end product and arguably the most important aspect of democracy – its impact on the well-being of different groups. We highlight a simple but rarely used strategy for measuring winners and losers that can be employed for any kind of demographic or political group under almost any circumstances in any nation. Using this method to assess the links between party and race in America, we find that blacks and Hispanic have made substantial gains on whites in terms of income, employment, and poverty under Democratic presidents while suffering losses under Republicans. Had Democrats been in power over the entire period we examine, racial disparities in America today may be far less pronounced.

Much of what political scientists do is assess winners and losers in democracy (e.g. APSA 2004). We currently have lots of ways of gauging winners and losers. We count up votes – by race, class, gender, or some other relevant characteristic – to determine if members of one group are more likely to be excluded from the polity than members of other groups (Verba et al. 1995). We assess who gets their preferred candidates elected (Casellas 2011, Davidson and Grofman 1994, Hajnal 2010). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we try to determine who gets their favored policies passed (Bartels 2008, Gilens 2012, Griffin and Newman 2008, Hacker and Pierson 2011, Hacker and Pierson 2006, Hero 1998, Jacobs and Page 2004, Page 1983).

All of these tests are important outcomes in democracy but all are also, in some sense, of second-order concern. They generally overlook the outcome that citizens are likely to care most about – their well-being. They do not address the most fundamental question: which regimes make people better or worse off?

In this article, we take the next and arguably the most critical step of assessing the effects of different governing regimes on group well-being. Whose quality of life improves and whose quality of life declines? We offer a concrete measurement strategy that, despite its simplicity, has largely been neglected (but see Bartels 2008). We identify core demographic groups in a society, trace their well-being using objective, empirical measures, and then compare the relative progress of these demographic groups under different regimes. In the article we offer one example focused on party and race – arguably the two biggest factors driving American democracy. Specifically, we test to see whether African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities fare better on basic indicators of well-being like income, poverty, and unemployment when Democrats control the presidency or whether they do better under Republican administrations. We find that blacks and Hispanic have made major gains on whites under Democrats and have fallen further behind under Republicans. Quite possibly, if Democrats had been in power over the entire period we examine, much of America’s racial inequality may have been erased.

The American case is important, but it is equally important to note that this kind of measurement strategy can be employed for any kind of demographic or political group under almost any circumstances in almost any nation. By objectively evaluating outcomes and demonstrating the relative gains and losses of different groups under different regimes, scholars can make major contributions to assessments of governmental responsiveness and political representation.

Assessing Winners and Losers

When political scientists assess the responsiveness of a democracy or a governing regime, they typically do one of three things. First, they focus on who gets to vote. Are members of minority groups are able to participate equally and fully in the electoral arena (Verba et al. 1995, Wolfinger and Rosestone 1980)? Second, they assess the outcome of the vote. Do minorities or other core groups regularly end up on the losing side of the vote (Hajnal 2010, Parker 1994)? Similarly, are women or other demographic groups well represented among those elected to govern (Casellas 2011, Mansbridge 1999)? Finally, and most importantly, they focus on whose policies are passed.[1] Are disadvantaged groups or other interests more or less likely than others to get their favored policies enacted (Bartels 2008, Gilens 2012, Griffin and Newman 2008, Jacobs and Page 2004, Page 1983)?

All of these tests are critically important and tell us about the responsiveness of a democracy or regime to different interests. But we maintain that they are incomplete and therefore potentially misleading. They focus on the process of democracy rather than its consequences. It matters who votes, who wins office, and what policies are passed, but what ultimately matters for the governed is the impact of those policies. The end product of democracy is not the passage of policy but the effects of those policies on the short- and long-term well-being of citizens.[2]

The Measure

The measurement strategy that we propose is neither complex nor new (Bartels 2008, Hibbs and Dennis 1988). We are simply reintroducing a basic tool that has largely been neglected and highlighting its potential importance in the arena of democratic responsiveness. The strategy entails 1) identifying core demographic groups in society, 2) tracing their well-being using objective, empirical measures, and then 3) comparing the relative progress of these demographic groups under different regimes.[3] The real strength of this kind of measurement strategy is that it can be done for almost any group or set of groups in any democracy (though, to help minimize the confounding influence of other non-political factors, it is critical to incorporate a large sample of years and substantial variation in governing regimes).

In assessing well-being, one could focus on any number of different indicators. Basic measures of economic well-being might logically come first but any other measures of outcomes that are of interest to groups could be examined. Showing that different types of outcomes all point in the same direction would certainly help increase confidence in conclusions about the relative impact of different governing regimes.

The Case: Party, Race, and American Presidential Politics

We propose and implement a test case in American politics. Specifically, we assess the relative impact of Democratic and Republican presidents on the well-being of racial and ethnic minorities. Party and race represent two of the most central factors in American politics. Our focus on the two major parties requires little explanation. In America, the two major parties represent the two chief alternatives for individual voters. Determining which one better serves their interests is the core task facing almost every American voter.

The importance of race in American life and politics is also hard to dispute. Race sharply divides Americans in terms of well-being. Blacks and Hispanics earn only two-thirds of what whites earn, they are twice as likely as whites to be poor, twice as likely to be unemployed, and between three and five times more likely to be arrested, and they accumulate less than one-tenth of the wealth that whites acquire (Blank 2001, US Census Bureau 2012). Race is also regularly and strongly reflected in the candidates we choose. Racial and ethnic minorities favor – often overwhelmingly – Democratic candidates, while the majority of white voters typically end up on the Republican side. In 2010, for example, 89 percent of Blacks, 60 percent of Latinos, and 58 percent of Asian Americans supported Democratic candidates while a clear majority of whites (63 percent) favored Republicans. Critically, racial divides often dwarf divisions by almost any other demographic including income, education, employment, gender, age, sexuality, and religion (Hajnal 2009).[4] Moreover, both racial policy views and racial attitudes are often central in the political calculations of individual Americans (Carmines and Stimson 1989, Dawson 1994, Kinder and Sanders 1994 but see Abramowitz 1994).

The Democrats as the Party of Racial and Ethnic Minorities

Many in America believe that the Democratic Party serves the interests of racial and ethnic minorities and that the Republican Party does not. Minorities themselves make this claim. Over 70 percent of African Americans contend that the Democratic Party “works hard on issues black people care about” (Dawson 1994). Latinos and Asian Americans are only a little less pro-Democratic (Dade 2011). Even among white Americans, the majority view is that the Democratic Party is the party of minorities.[5] The logic behind these views is simple. For decades the leadership of the Democratic Party has favored more liberal policies on race, welfare, education, crime, and a host of other social issues. The assumption is that all of these policies, when passed, have led to better outcomes for minorities (King and Smith 2011, Lieberman 1998).

But do minorities really gain when Democrats reign? Although the consequences of shifting partisan control for minority well-being may have been crystal clear at different points in American history, just how much the policy agendas of each of America’s two major parties currently benefit minorities is less certain.[6] Both parties make strong claims about how their own agenda helps the minority population. Republican leaders contend that greater efficiencies associated with more conservative policies and smaller government ultimately lead to more growth and higher incomes for all. They also argue that the absence of policies targeting minorities reduces race-based stigmatization and results in a more just, color-blind society. Democrats counter that a program of greater redistribution, increased affirmative action, and tougher anti-discrimination measures does more for blacks and other minorities. The two parties offer different paths but both can clearly and logically claim to aid racial and ethnic minorities.

Scholars, too, have entered the debate. Many argue that a core set of liberal policies advanced by the Democratic Party are critical for minority success (e.g. Wilson 1999). But others maintain that the Democratic Party’s color-conscious policies have done little over the past five decades to improve the well-being of minorities and that the more color-blind agenda espoused by the Republicans would benefit minorities more (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1991). And still others contend that neither party actively engages the interests of minorities (Fraga et al. 2004, Frymer 1999).

Critically, these claims have had precious little empirical validation on a broad scale. We know a little about how descriptive representation impacts the well-being of different racial groups. Studies have demonstrated a link between minority representation in cities and minority employment (Browning et al. 1984 Browning et al. 1984, Kerr and Mladenka 1994), minority educational outcomes (Fraga et al. 1997, Meier and England 1987), and minority relations with the police (Headley 1985). Similar work has also looked at how partisan control impacts economic inequality (Bartels 2003, Hibbs and Dennis 1988).[7] But we do not know a lot about which racial groups win and which lose when Democrats (or Republicans) reign.[8]

Why the President?

We focus on the President because that office stands at the top of American democracy. The President can veto any piece of legislation passed by Congress. As such he may have the institutional power to sway the direction of policy (Cameron 2001). As the only leader elected by all of the people, the President may also have the bully pulpit and hence the ability to push American government in one direction or another (Kernell 1997, Neustadt 1960). Nevertheless, scholars have long debated just how much power the president has (Edwards 2003, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985). The Framers of the Constitution sought to ensure that the president’s power was checked by Congress and the judiciary. Presidents generally cannot unilaterally pass policy. Thus, the extent of presidential power is an open question. In this article we hope to address this question and to contribute to the broader literature on presidential power by offering a concrete test of what presidents can do. Can they effect real change in the relative well-being of different groups in society?

Given their prominent roles in the Constitution and in the ongoing politics of the nation, we cannot ignore Congress or the courts. As the primary law-making body in the polity, it is possible that Congress has greater influence over the well-being of different groups in society than does the president. Therefore, in the analysis that follows we consider the partisan makeup of the House and Senate. Some argue that the courts, too, are critical shapers of American public policy, especially with regard to racial and ethnic minority rights and well-being (Parker 1994). Landmark decisions by the courts have arguably altered the economic and social trajectory of African Americans and other minorities (Parker 1994). But here as well there are those who dispute the efficacy of these kinds of court decisions (Rosenberg 1991). As such, a secondary goal will be to try to assess the relative contributions of these three institutions to policymaking and outcomes for the American public.

Assumptions and Alternatives

A measure of change in group well-being under different governing regimes captures a lot about the responsiveness of governing institutions and parties, but it falls far short of presenting a complete picture of a democracy. Several assumptions should be highlighted and several alternatives raised before proceeding.

An implicit assumption behind this method is that individual citizens ultimately care less about the passage of policies than about their effects. Voters might, however, care more that their representatives follow a particular ideological agenda when passing policies than whether those policies ultimately generate concrete benefits. Some (e.g. Friedman 2011) have ascribed such a prizing of ideology over consequences to the Tea Party in its steadfast opposition to any increases in taxes and the debt ceiling. Voters might also be more concerned about the character of the candidates they elect than about the outcomes those candidates are associated with. There is ample evidence that both ideology and candidate character play an important role in the calculus of voters (McCurley and Mondak 1995, Miller and Shanks 1996).

However, the fact that citizens vote for particular candidates because they trust those candidates to do what is right or because they believe those candidates are particularly liberal/conservative does not necessarily mean that they care more about character and ideology than about the impact those candidates have on the well-being of different members of society. Voters focus on candidate characteristics or ideology because they can be useful heuristics that help generate better outcomes (Popkin 1991). Fiscal conservatives, for example, generally favor conservative candidates not because they enjoy conservatism for its own sake but instead because conservatism is a means to an end – greater economic growth. Likewise, voters choose intelligent candidates not because they care about intelligence per se but because they believe intelligence will lead to better outcomes for themselves and others. In both cases, voters ultimately care about results.

Another concern with focusing on well-being is that politicians might not have enough power to substantially alter the basic well-being of their constituents. The extent of governmental control over the economy is an oft-debated issue. Some contend that politicians have little ability to manufacture growth and raise the welfare of all (Hayek and Hamowy 2011). If true, it may be unfair to evaluate parties or presidential administrations on their impact on basic indicators like income, poverty, or unemployment. There are, however, others who maintain government actions can strongly influence a range of economic outcomes (Keynes 1936). Moreover, one could argue that even if politicians can’t manufacture growth, they do have the ability to redistribute existing government revenues (Hacker and Pierson 2006, Page and Simmons 2000, Page 1983). Indeed, where elected officials choose to distribute that money is often at the heart of political conflict. Politicians may not be able to change the size of the pie, but they may be able to alter the split of that pie by giving some groups more and other groups less. In addition, funding decisions may vary in their effectiveness. Even if both parties earmarked an identical amount to benefit certain groups, one of them might choose a more effective avenue for such funds, ultimately resulting in better group outcomes. Whether those kinds of decisions about policy and redistribution are enough to affect basic indicators of well-being in substantial or noticeable ways is very much an open question that our analysis seeks to answer.

Also, by focusing on group-level outcomes, we implicitly assume that individual citizens care more about their own particular group than about the overall welfare of the nation.[9] It is certainly worth questioning whether the core concerns of individuals relate to their group or to the larger society. Existing analyses of the vote in the American case do demonstrate close ties between the national economy and the vote. The fortunes of the incumbent party typically rise and fall with the national economy (Ferejohn 1986). However, at least for racial and ethnic minorities, there is also strong evidence that a group-based calculus is often primary.[10] As Dawson (1994) and others have shown, black linked fate stands at the core of the political calculus of many African Americans. The data suggest that individual blacks make electoral decisions based largely on what they think will best serve the interests of the black community. This group-conscious calculation is generally viewed as the source of African Americans’ allegiance to the Democratic Party in recent decades (Dawson 1994, Tate 1994). Although linked fate and group consciousness are certainly weaker within the Latino and Asian American population (de la Garza et al. 1992), there is nevertheless evidence that members of each of America’s racial and ethnic minority groups pay close attention to the well-being of their own group (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996, Lien et al. 2004). Group-based considerations may or may not predominate, but they are certainly relevant.

One could also question the particular outcomes we focus on in this article. Economic indicators like income, employment, and poverty and social outcomes like criminal justice might be less important to voters than moral, environmental, or foreign policy concerns. Many voters certainly express strong views about homosexuality, abortion, and other social morality issues (Layman and Carmines 1997), with an increasing percentage self-identifying as “single-issue” voters (Conover et al. 1982). There is also evidence that international events and actions can affect the electoral calculus of voters (Kernell 1978). We do not claim that the outcomes that we observe here are or should be the only ones citizens care about. Future studies could certainly benefit from incorporating outcomes in these other areas. There is, however, little doubt that the outcomes we observe are core elements of life and therefore important for voters to consider.

Ultimately, the argument here is not that group well-being in general or the specific outcomes we look at are the only elements of politics that individuals can or should use to gauge responsiveness. A range of different factors can and should play a role in evaluating governance. The argument is simply that group economic and social well-being is a potentially important variable in the representation equation, and as such should be evaluated objectively and accurately.

Data

We contrast changes in well-being for different racial and ethnic groups under Democratic and Republican presidents. Our dependent variables are core economic and social outcomes. Specifically, in terms of economic indicators we look at income, unemployment, and poverty. We measure income primarily as median family income in constant 2008 dollars. As robustness tests, we repeat the analysis focusing on mean family income and mean and median household income. For poverty we focus on the overall poverty rate for families in each racial and ethnic group. Unemployment is the adult unemployment rate for each group.

In alternate tests we also focus on non-economic indicators like criminal justice, education and health. They are chosen because all are among the primary markers of basic well-being. In particular, given the prominent role that the criminal justice system plays in the minority community – one in five adult black men is in prison, on parole, or on probation – it is an especially critical measure to examine. We also focus on these variables because they allow us to differentiate between areas where we would expect presidential partisanship to have an effect (criminal justice) and those in which the president’s party should not matter (education and health). For criminal justice, we examine the overall arrest rate for all adults, the adult homicide arrest rate, and the juvenile homicide arrest rate (all per 1000 residents). The FBI provides these figures through the annual Uniform Crime Reports. To assess educational outcomes we concentrate on two measures: the percentage of adults with a four-year college degree and the percentage of adults with a high school education. Our health indicators are life expectancy (measured in years) and the infant mortality rate (per 1000 births). The education and health data are from the Bureau of the Census and are specifically derived from the Current Population Survey.

For all of these different outcomes, we assess change in two ways. First, we look at each racial and ethnic minority group’s progress from year to year in isolation. Specifically, we subtract the group’s previous year outcome from the group’s current year outcome to get our first measure of year-to-year change. Second, we measure changes in the gap between each minority group and whites to see if minorities are falling behind or catching up. For example, we would subtract the black unemployment rate from the white unemployment rate in the previous year, then subtract black unemployment from white unemployment in the current year, and finally subtract the gap in the current year from the previous year to see if the gap is closing or increasing. Finally, in alternate tests, we also look at changes in the ratio of white to non-white outcomes. All of the different measures of change lead to the same pattern of results.

In our analysis we begin by assessing outcomes for African Americans. We do so for two reasons – one practical and one theoretical. The practical reason is that we have many more years of data for blacks than we do for Latinos or Asian Americans.[11] The Census reports outcomes for Asian Americans for half (or fewer) of the years and it reports outcomes for Latinos for about two-thirds of the years. With fewer years and thus less variation in political leadership for Latinos and Asian Americans our conclusions about these two groups will have to be much more tentative. For African Americans, the data extend as far back as 1948 and are available as recently as 2010. For Latinos the data extend back to 1970. For Asian Americans available data only go back to 1988.[12]

We also focus primarily on blacks because of the uniquely central position of African Americans in the racial history and racial politics of the United States. In the past blacks have been the primary targets of much of the nation’s discriminatory practices. Likewise, when the nation has discussed or passed measures to address racial inequality, the African American population has often been the main focus of those initiatives. The disadvantaged status of the African American population today – poverty and unemployment rates twice those of the national average – also justifies the close attention we pay to black outcomes.

The main independent variable, presidential partisanship, is coded 1 for all years with a Democratic administration in office and 0 for all years with a Republican administration. Because it is unlikely that a president’s effect on the economy begins immediately during his first year in office, we lagged our measure of presidential control by one year. For example, changes in black poverty in 2009 are credited to George W. Bush and Republican control rather than to Barack Obama and Democratic control. Alternate lags of two or three years produce slightly less consistent results. In alternate tests, we also assess presidential ideology – as measured by different scholars’ ideal point estimates (Bailey 2007, Poole et al. 2012).

The president is obviously not the only political actor that could impact the well-being of different groups in society. As such, we also consider the role that the other two branches of federal government – Congress and the courts – play in shaping racial outcomes.[13] Specifically, in our main regression models, we include controls for whether or not the Democrats are the majority in the Senate and the House. In alternate tests we also assess the proportion of Democrats in each legislative body as well as the median ideological score in each body (Poole et al. 2012). Our tests of Congress and the presidency also consider the role of divided government (Fiorina 1996, Mayhew 1991) and partisan polarization (Poole et al. 2012). Finally, to test the role of the courts, we examine several measures of court ideology and partisanship. Specifically, in alternate tests we add estimates of the median ideology of the Supreme Court produced by Bailey (2007) and Martin and Quinn (2002) and Epstein et al. (2007). In order to gauge the impact of other federal courts, we incorporate a measure of the percentage of all active judges who preside on the U.S. Court of Appeals who were nominated by a Democratic president. All court and Congress variables are lagged one year.

We also have to consider a variety of non-political factors. It is certainly possible that one political party has been luckier than the other and has occupied the White House when external economic forces were driving growth in the well-being of one racial group more than the well-being of other racial groups. Since oil is one of the most volatile and economically critical commodities and is generally viewed as largely beyond the control of American political actors, we control for changes in the real price of oil. Given that changes in family income and other aspects of well-being that we focus on may be sensitive to changes in workforce participation, we also include a control for changes in the proportion of adults in the labor force.[14] Likewise, to account for other basic economic forces, we add controls for lagged median income and the current rate of inflation.

In addition, there are a number of broader changes occurring over time that may be impacting relative group well-being. For example, educational outcomes have risen steadily over time. So too have divorce rates. And as divorce has become more common, and Americans are increasingly having children later in life or not at all, the average size of families has consistently declined. One could also cite the increasing impact of globalization on American economic fortunes. Fortunately, since these factors are changing slowly and relatively constantly over time, they are unlikely to be confounded with the numerous alterations in partisan control of the presidency that we have seen over the past five decades.[15] Nevertheless, we can go some way to controlling for these broader trends by including a linear trend term in the analysis.[16]

The Presidency and Black Well-Being

Can politics – and in particular, presidents – influence the well-being of different groups in society? Or are basic outcomes like income, poverty, and employment beyond the grasp of even the nation’s most prominent politician? We begin to answer these questions by comparing gains in black well-being under Democratic and Republican presidents. Table 1 presents the average annual change in black well-being for income, poverty, and unemployment. The first three columns look at annual change for blacks alone. The last three columns present figures for blacks relative to whites.

The pattern of results is clear. African Americans tend to experience substantial gains under Democratic presidents whereas they tend to incur significant losses or remain stagnant under Republicans. On every basic economic indicator t-tests show that gains under Democrats were significantly greater than gains under Republicans. In terms of income, black families gained on average $895 annually under Democrats but only managed $142 in annual income growth under Republicans. The difference in income growth of $754 is not only highly significant (p ................
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