TACTICS IN THE FRANCO.PRUSSIAN WAR

32

TACTICSIN THEFRANCO.PRUSSIWANAR

FROMOPENINGSHOTSTOTIIE BATTTEOFSEDAN

By Mikelohnson

INTRODUCTION

3. French"shell"wasonlyeffectivaet certainpre-sertanges.

Although an inreasingnumber of books are comingforward regarding the ampaignsand battles of the Franco-Prussian War, andtherearenow someexcellenst etsof rulescoverins

4.

TheFrenchMitrailleusewasnot aslethalasexpected ueto thesarcitoyf mentrainedto operateandservicetheweapon andits very narrow coneof fire.

thisfascinarincgonflicr.whoseduthorsclearlyhavean insighi Iwould alsoliketo makeafew pointsonthediagramws hich into thisperiod,I find thatneithersourceof informationseems youwill findin thesearticlesl

to dealconciselywith tacticsusedandformarionsadoptedby bothsides.

In my opinionthis is why the period, althoughenjoying popularitya few yearsago fuelled by the releaseof some

1 nT" chl eu tdt ieargemd tmh esmmuapi n" lwydi tehpciacvtianlfrayannt rdytfooor mmaatni oyanrstI.i lhl earvyuenniot sr astheroleoftheselatterarmsisbestexplainedin thetextas a supplementot thediagrams.

astoundinrgangesof figuresnotablyin 15and25mm(andnow iPne1r0iomdn's")b,higaslenaegveurere"wahlliycbhrioskdeonminitnoathteedbNyinNeatepeonletohCneincastunrdy

2. The essentiailnfantryfightingunit on borh sideswasthe battalion.In realitymanymorebattalionswouldparticipare in theeflgagementht anthediagramswouldsuggestb,ut as

ACW. All the other ingredientsare there spectacular wargamingis all aboutrecreatinghistoryin miniatwe- in

uniforms,battleswith momentsof dramaandpivotaltension, organisationaalswell asvisualscale- by deployingyour

andweaponsodfauntinglethalityW. ithoutanunderstandingof tacticsand formationsthoselovinglypaintedarmiesare all dorreesdsgeedeuveprwniethanroewrtohethreeto"Fgoo,rSaanldele"cftotloulmannogfutihsihsomntahseaszhienlef . ln theseaniclesI hopeto changeall rhatl

w15ilml maoprt2u5remthmeb"aftetaelli"oonfsatshdeespeidceresdpinertahtebdaiattglrasimn sytohue Imperialphaseof thewar.Ifyou fightin 6or 2mm(yegods!) youcanpourin morebattalionsb, utstillfollowthebatralion leveltactics.

Suffice it to say that researchedrules will reflect the developmentisn weapontechnologyin thisperiod,thesalient o n e so f w h i c hc a nb e s u m m a r i s eadsf o l l o w s :

"PYruosuswiail"al nsde"ePthruast isniathnes"tTe.hxitsaisnbdeincathuesdtehiaegwaamriss,DI oreDfeurlatorlv

l The FrenchChasseportifle in the mainoutrangedthoseof

theirGermancounterpa(s.

2.

The German effectivethan

KFrreunpcphsaarrttiilllleerryy,omuatirnalnygdeudearnodthweas"smhoerlle"

rounds being fitted with percussionfuses, leading to

knownlrnthi\countDat leasra) stheFranco-Prus:Wraanr.In fact, as a quick perusalof any Order oI Battle will show,a considemblenumberof troopsfrom Prussia'Gs ermanAllies (forexanpleBavaria)foughtalongsiderhePrussianasndtheir oPrrguasnsiiasra.etaiodnc"Phireufslysfioaallnodwheedrbcey rtmheaPnrAulsiessia".npattem.So, for

explosionon impactat allranges.

Enoughof thepreliminariesto, battle. . .

PART1:FRENCHTACTICALDOCTRINE

1. INFANTRYTACTICS

circumstanceosf battledid not warant a "furiafranceses"ryle

ot attack.rhenorherradicswouldbe implemenlead\ ihe

Until 1869Frenchinfantrytacticshadbeensteepedin thevatue Commanderthoughtf'r. ideally(o crearethe circumsrances

of offensiveaction,relyingheavilyon French6lan and the

icnaemseistotibbleemkonmowennrausm"ofuf itahefrbaanyceosnee' tc(hFarerngce-h

tacticswhich Fury). These

werethe tacticswhichhad beenadoptedin the Crimeaand

where such an attack would meet with successI.n shorr, dynamismandvenatility.

And thencamethe 1869Drillbook. In 1867(in the lishrof Pru\siac\ rulhingdeteaot t Ausrnaina mere6 seek\rh; year

morerecentlyin AustriaandItaly.Refarringto DiagrarnA1, an attackwould commencewith a probe by a thin screenof skirnishers(typicallyChasseurasPidif theywereavailablei,f not Zouavesor Tirailleu^ Algeriens- the dreadedTurcos)

bree-feovraelu) Catoetmhemtaitcteticessowfe"fruetieasftraanbcliesshee".dbmyeyNahp^dolreooenxIaIImitnoe justhowsuccessfusul chtacticswouldbewhenpittedaAainsat modern(andrecenrlyvicroriousat rmyequippad*irh breech-

designedto draw fire on themselveasnd protectrhe massed loadingartilleryandbrcechloadingrifles.The reportsofthese

tbrmationsmovingup behindthem.Theseskirmishenwereto c-ommitteews ere not unanimousin their recommendations.

thin out the enemyranks,and wefecertainlynot to beome boggeddown.in long rangefiring. Forwardmotionwasall. Behind them the battalionswould be advancingdeployed,

Although the t^ctics of futia tancese" still enjoyed nuch suppon(especiallyin the rank and file andjunior NCO'Sof France'slmperial amy, as well as among those in high

wherethegound permitted,altematelyin Iineandin column. command)therewasa movement owardsadoptinga more

Whenthecolumnswerewithinchargingdistance(seeDiagram defensiveposture.It hasto be saidthat rhe resultof all the

A2) the skirmishline wouldpart like a curtain,allowint the reports,counter-reportasndobseNationws asinconclusivelt.

column,lo chargeforqard. supporredb) rhevo eysof rheir wasnot until 1869that a newinfantryDrillbookappearedI.t

comradesin line who would rhen advanceeeneraltvto consohdartehe gainedground.The columns.tayonets6iea andsometimeisn echelon,wouldsweepall beforethem.The

w"fuarsialhetawnocerssteo"f,

all worlds,neitherreinstatingthe nor comprehensively adopting

racticsof the new

defensivteactics.Inhindsightj,ustwhenFranceneededa clear

tactrwasnot universallysuccessfubt,ut wasideallysuitedto statemenotf tacticadl octrinet,herewasconfusionT.hedamase

t h ef r e n c hl e m p e r a m e n t

wdsdone,and Francewenrro war qirh herconfidencein rie

Another hallmarkof Frenchtacticaldoctdneprior to the bayonect hargeseverelyshaken.

oulbrealo[ lhe Franco-Pru!:idWnar wd, fiexibitiryI.t rhe The operingengagemenotf the War- theFrenchatrackat

Flg,"At ": Fu.laFrance8e t Dirscuonol FrsnchAltack

I

t t a t a l l , tt

-l-l-l-

ffi KEEPWARGAMIN

ffi

Fffie

ffiE&

ffiffi

PaulandTereBsaailey

TheKep

L"eM*a'1rch:ain'B#tarlr'a:cik;Ls!o, "nddon.R1uoa!'dl,3A'J

W.3h.ll b.r th.lollowing 3|jos in rlr. ndrftnlE:

-

Leionary,kmourh E nourhCollre,GiDrylan.

10th/1ilhSDlomb.r C.lou6,n@dins

l3r2ndocrohsrF&f,tfr!ii'0.*n,0,*.o,

Asomblv Rom.

stMnh frober

Shmlsh, Chippnhan

16rhOclobr SElwG,cwd.l P3l., London w..c n& edino HasM ol.d'c rcr4.trorrnh tuiim'i Mfthbd, ^llfir; 8d.ll e Plo@ n@ d-h*. nddardod E*ilroim ou' 'rnodsrodifiidhiGin obt iFins

Flg,"A2": FurlaFranc6e

Hrcuon.otaflendtthMwrwnorviciou'.hoDo' u*odma'lotd.'sdiotOur dixri ao ano.qdrh mocqtmDBhonli6 'n rh. bu.ih* Fq tulld@ilt $ndtn

s-A"E.or2Fc5@rho!bdr.dd'4ddins,ilFosiblayout'aorhffi

It Tt i

u.'*.*,n"*, ^,'r'##Hoi

H.rch3 & F@FiouG t Rund*.y

?5mm6na6&P8arnha

Mi.iaM6 - r[ nouE 6ns6

Dixon!Minirto6-All 15mm&25FFEns6.MLR-!.rd.d E^gd

Tdton,D*6- sldod Enq6. N.fu

t'h.tc|(nt Mll.hborshid6; Aitf! nd.ll; tujimi f, Hee!.wr'

Vrdc Wr DalmeiL'i6: w!r F.atuB Filmtlq

cdrdG.ntRulTurnReaEhsytuh{Dftidnouohlel.l Enshihc6mpdrw.tlahe.

s;r.af,ub

waElm6 R.*rch GouD: Trbl@o G!m6: Nsbury 3ul.r: (}6D';M.ndramq Elia;V.^su.td&Gnp6i0ns.riE: Fa'ftr;

olua$lededrid6lromm.nydh.rDubli$e6.

Saarbrucken- saw the French using the favoured "ilna

Tdln & Mod.lalndhF K&MT@: Hddclcinlj M!inlvMilibrylcinl, rn.Drum(6i^): HrddorD6ionl@'dl:D6ts'Modalcll5mm tpol@nicardb{ildinss)

fiatcese" tacti6, but ftankly as the French attacked in such overwhelmingnumbers, almost any tactical formation *ould still haveresultedin a Frenchvictory. However,thesubsequent en, where time allowed the French infanfy adopted the batdesof thosefateful daysof August 1870and the Battle of defensivetactics (notably at Spicheren and Froeschwiler), Sedanat the beginningof Septmberbore witnessto the fact though when hard-pressedthey simply had to cope with the

tmlailtitatrhyethdienflednnsgi,vaentadchtaicdsbheacdombee"ctohme eofpfirccimalinlineeo"t.in French Fig. "Bl " rFrench "Defemlve"

So let us tak a loserlook at thesedefensivetactics.They

EnmyAilack

stressedtbe desirability of solid defensivepositionsgiving a

good field of fire for the French Chassepotrifles. Such "positio6 magnifiques" t}?ic.aly comprised ridges, hills and prominent spuis, upon the top and facing slopesof which the French infantry would be lessdenselydploydthan before,

\Z

e ltyreinngchperos(nmeeirnclylin"secrfaopmea$t'i)oann. d

Where time allowed, shelter other rudimentaryearthworks

were prepard. Vilages and walled farms were swiftly trans-

..laaaa5ri.

formed into loopholedbastionsto form strongholdsin the line

of defence.Woods and vineyardstoo would be defended.As

canbe seenfrom Diagram81, behindthis solid line andon the

reversslopethe rserveswould beformedup in closcolumn.

Howver,in front of this seeminglyimpregnableline would be Key:

sTwuracrom6s,bouf tsiknirgnricsahteerrsn(uamgbaeinr,sCthhaansthseeu'JrfsaulP,aiefddn,cZrosua" vtaecstaicnsd) usingcover whereverpossibleand picking off enemygunners

fiifiEiffi*nnirety

Fig."82": French"Delenslve"

and infantry The whole idea wasthat the enemywould break

itself by attempting to storm such a position, and would then

(seeDiagam 82) be ddven off by a counter-attackcomprised

of open oder formations screenedby skirmishersor, i{ the

enemy werc sufficiently dmoralised, by deep columns (as

+ Diagram82 shows).To the detrimentof theFrcnch,in practice

suchcountr-attacksweretoo localisedandtoo ftontal for their

succssto besustainedanddeveloped,asthereappeaNto have

beenlittle wil left in thosein high commandto launchflank or

gaebnaenrdaolcnothuenitreor-wantta'?cok,srotirofnosr

neighbouringfiiendly forcesto magnifiques" and marchto the

soundof the guns.

In summary,apart from their openinggambit at Saarbruck-

SOUTH EAST LONDON WARGAMES GROUP PRESENT

S U N D A Y1 6 t h . O C T O B E R- 1 O

AT

to5

CRYSTALPALACE

\,

N A T I O N A LS P O R T SC E N T R E ,

ANERLEYH|LL,LONDONS, .E.t9. '.r".

45tradersand 30 gameson show, pluslhefamousSELWGBdng& Buy, PainlingCompetiliownfi 21classes,

:+:".:

Painlers/ ModellerPc roblsrfiCs linic,

Bar and Butfet,

carpa*ingandgoodpubliclransponlo vsnue,

A D M I S S I O Nf 2 . 5 0 ( v i s i t o r su n d e r1 4 o n l y f l ) . F o rt u r t h eIrN F o BA T t o N3 e n d .s . A , ET, o : - c . o t t H . n n . v . 3 1C r o r n L . . , B r o m l e y , X . . t , B F 2 9 P G ,

posilion asit presenteditself. The battle of Sedanis a stunning theory) at a respectfuldistance.In this waythe Frenchinfantry

example,astheFrenchamongstorden, counter-ordersandthe would still enjoy artillery support, thereby bolstering their

resultant disorder, held on for as long as possible, partially

relievedby localisedcounter-attacks,until pelted inro submis- A point which should not be missedwas that the French

sion by the Prussian artillery wbich had dominated the artillery hadto limber up andwith&aw to thereartins(usualy

surounding hills.

becominginqeasinglycongested)in order to beresupplied.

It wasmadeabsolutelyclearto batterycommandenthat their

2. FRENCHARTILLERY TACTICS

prime target wasthe enemyinfantry, Counter-batteryfire was only to take placeto supportFrenchinfantry attacks,or if the

The French Mitrailleuses rrere attached to the anillerv battery commanderwas aware that the enemy baftery in

balteriesa. ltboughon a fe* occasiontsheyweredetacbedand question was beginning to break his immediate infantry

used foNard with the infantry, sometimeswith remarkable support. It is readily apparentthat the burden of silencingthe success.There seemsto have been very little attempt to enemy artillery was to fall on th French infantry and camouflageor concealthem.Wherevertheywerelocated,onc skirmishers. the Prussiangunnen had found their range,they were swiftly

silenced. As to the artillery proper, the mainstaywasthe canonde4.

3. FRENCHCAVALRYTACTICS

Tlte canon.le12batteies werc held backin the Corpsartillery In a word, French cavalryreconnaissancewasappalling. The

rcsefle and wereonly to be usdto fiI gapsor support najor tendency was for reconnaissanceto be undertaken by a

fforts. Theresultwasthat thereserveartilery oftencloggedup

theroadsto therear, andarrivedon thescenetoo late- if at all -

taondpl"a1y2a" ndyeoindfltueeswnetiaiglhrtoolef .shInoctiidnekniltoagllay,mths,e

referenceto not pounds.

"4"

combined arms forc (say a squadron or two of cavalry, a battalion of Tucos or Cbasseursa Piedanda troop of anillery) which had the effect of reshicting its movementio the roads, andreducingits speedandranee.

From historical accountsit appean that there was little On the actual battlefield, the c.avalrybrigadeswere often

concertedactionasbattery commandentendedto go into and placdunderaninfantry commander.

out of action very much as they pleased,whether to confuse Again and aeainin the early battles,they wereformed up in

Prussianrangefindersor to minimiseany risk of thegunsbeing closeoder, and usedfor shock action in desperatecounter-

lost to enemyinfantry or cavalryaftacks.lndeed aJterthe first "frontier battles", experiencedbattery commandersw, ho werc

attacks even against unshaken infantry and over unrcconnoitred ground, These magnificent regiments were almost

painJuly aware of the potency of the Prussianeuns, would invariablycutto piecesbythehail of artillery fire andsmallarms deliberately deploy on a revene slope and have their guns fire into which they rushedheadlong,andwerethen ddven off

hand-pushed forwad to dliver canister to approaching by fiesh Prussiancavalry. It seemsthal there was never any

Prussianinfantry. Another tactic would be to have the guns rcalistic prospectof their heroismalld sacrificebuyingvictory,

positionedhigher than and behind the Frcnch infantry, whos rather theyboughttime for hard-pressedFrcnchinJantryto fall

Chassepotrifles would keep the Prussiangunners(at least in backandre-gloup.

TACTICISNTHEFRANCO.PRUSSWIAANR

FROMOPENINGSHOTSTOTHEBATTTEOFSEDAN PART2:PRUSSIANTACTICALDOCTRINE

By Mikelohrcon

(As mentioned before in these articles, the Statesalied to Prussiawould havecloselyfollowed thePrussiansystem,either throughsimilaritiesin trainingor throughbeingsubordinatedto Prussiancommand-)

1. INT'ANTRYTACTICS

Fig."Cl": PrusslanPosldonaSl tage1

t

I

v

I

Prussian infantry, supported by their artillery, were used aggressively,at times recklessly. Their main function was

Due to their numerical superiority in most of the initial

battlesa, ndto theirsuperiorcommandandcontrol,theywould

pintheenemyfrontallywhilstexpandinegitheror bothof their

ownflanksin order to find theextrmitiesof theenemy'sflank. That flank would then bepoundedmercilesslyby their artillery

Flg."C2":Pruai.nPositionaSl ta962

beforethePrussianinfantry wassentin-Thesesimpleprinciples

@

werenotalwaysfollowed-mostnotablyinthecaseof theattack

p.3:.+.-. bythe PrussianGuardat St.Privat,to whichI wil referagainat

fte endofthissection. In diagramCs 1andC2I haveattemptedto showthegradual

build-up of Prussianforces prior to the attack. It will be seen

that the Prussianswould first sendout a sqeen of skirmishers

\.". .i,

6o d

u. _r.s

(Jaeger, Schutzenor Fusilier battalions), behind which the

mainforcewould be movingforward in line formation, in close

ordei. The battalionson the extremeflanks would be moving outwards,with theskirmisherscreenexaendingin front of them, Fig."C3":PrusslanAltackStaEe1

wcohliulsmt nthfoermrcasetioflensanwdotuhlednbcehafonlgloinwgitnoglinueptboeohcicnudp, yinthiteia"lglyapin"

@

createdin thecentrebythe outwardmovementof theflanks.In diagan Cl, one of the reservebattalionshas rernainedin columnasit hasreceivedordersthat it will soonbe reouired olher rhanat rhecenlre!Accordingly.thepictureemergesof

the main tacticbeinga seriesof infantry battalionsin line, with

s k i m i s h e r s t ot h e f r o n t , a n da r e l a t i v e l y w e a kr e s e r v e b e h i n d .

es""\","-'-"' "/ " , y

ln diagramC2, the French right flank hasbeenfound, and alreadythe Prussianinfantry is beginningto nvelopeit. The

Flg."Ol": PrusslanAttack

reservebattalion hasbeenrapidly movedin columnto support

the impending attack. The remainder of the Prussianforce

would occupythe Frenchto their front, either by spidted

in{antry attacksin their ownright, or bysmallarmsfire from the skirmishercor the lines behind, in both casessupportedby a delugeof Prussianartillery fire.

Thesefomationswouldreadilyadaptto thedefences, ayin the faceof a Frenchcouoter-attack.The skirmisherswould be

" """", z, ,,-;rt'

pulledin to alow thePrussianbattalionsin linetoparalysethe circumstances,in particular the degree of rcsistancebeing

French attack by voley fire, whilst the tu(hermost Prussian offered by the French, the columnswould be of full battalion

battalionswould movein on tle flanks of the Frenchthrust. streneth (4 companiet, half battalion sfength or a seriesof

DiagramsC3andC4ilustrate thecoupdeBruce, thePrussiatr companystrength (about 250 men) columns,the latter being assaulton the French right flank. For thoseof uswho havea refened to in variousaccountsascompanycolumns.Flexibility

limited sizetable, or only sayan hour or two availablebefore isthekey. If therewasaconsidembleamountof Frcnchanillery

beingcalledoff to other duties,thetabletopencountermaywell andrifle fire to contendwiah,thenthePrussiancommandermay

commenceat this Doint.

have opted for any particular battalion to attack by say 2

ln DiagramsCJ and C4, precededand then accompaniedby companies in separate single company columns, lvith the

an artillery barrage on the French lines, the skimish screen remaining 2 companiesof the battalion thrcwn forward in

movesforward with the main attackingbattalionsbehind Gee skirmishorder. This would increasehis mobility and lessenthe Diagram C3). These battalions would either remain in close sizeof the target they presentedto any enemywith sufricient

order line or, if the French were judged to be suficiently energyleft to rcsist.On the other hand,the impactof each

broken. would advancein column, There is someconfusionas columnof only 250men wasfar lessthan a columnmadeup of to how thesecolumnswere constituted.Dependingon the theentirebattalion(1000men).

In Diagam C4, the Frcnch flank beginsto disintegrateand the Prussianattack goesin. First the skirmisherswithdraw, to allo* the main punch to be delivered, in this case by two battalionsin column and one in line. In practic, pocketsof

enemyresistancewould often force attackingPrussiancolumns

to brcak down; they would then be urgedto rnoveforward in

openorder andusingcoverwhereavailable.Prussianweightof numben would normally eDsurethat the momentum of the attack wasmaintained.As the French flank breaksunder the onslaught,the rest of the Prussianfront in that sectormoves foNard andthe processof rolling up the Frenchline begins.

And lvhat of the PrussianGuard at St. Privat? Due to the impatienceoftheir commander,theywereodered to attackthe village of that name, acrossopen ground with a slight uphill gradient, in closeorder line (someformationswereinitially in half-battalioncolumns,but changedto closeorder line asthe attack progessed), but without any significant skirmisher scren and, most importantly of all, without prcliminary anillery bombardmentof the enemy,who were essentiallyin had coverin the village. The FrenchChasseportifles cut them to ribbons.The Prussianattack faltered and they were pinned do*n andwereonlyableto resumetheir attackoncethebelated artilery bombardmenthad done its work on the French lines andoncetheFrenchwerein dangerof beingtotally outflanked by anattack,in this casby Saxons,comingin from the far side of the villase.

]HIII,IMACUCLOAN'I\ITMION

a g!,aay B-,h t11.nb.r1994, rtrb5pn_

t'eCinatrlinlonGaneCsnr uefi,jtnl

ChelseaOld Town HaI, Kings Road Chebea-LondoD-SW3

klat tA uth. d^r,tl clnaeia$anAtadzte

ua'@ae.bfuEPb.fu6|@. @'bgfud,..b',u*aw*

^4, ttu i F u.n *a c,oaat'a a

wxen.ndn-te,;'*.i

e@) 'd eto. .

Ma4 t *'er'.yA

4v6 h.r1@.

Fe zdzu rtb6'd fr.Js irta.si * E u trtror1.-r'o, .vtN,?a aa15, r}'4a4 5!r.!, Kfzrn.

o.4B' a7.5t'1ott6td. r,!'dtb Etli! En

2. PRUSSIANARTILLERY TACTICS

Therc is absolutelyno doubt at all that the Prussiansusedtheir artillery asaninfantry supponweapon.It wasalwaysdeployed asrapidly aspossibleand pushedwel forward with the main infantry line.

Whetherin attakor defence,its first priority wouldnormally be to silence enemy battedes and Mitrailleuse positions. It would thnpoundthe enemyinfantry.

Unlike their French counterparts,Prussianbattedeswould invariablybegroupedaogetherandwould actin concrt.

It is worth noting that the resupplycaissonscameup closeto the batteriesto replenishtheir ammunition, thereby ensuring continuityof fire - lherewasnoneedIor thebatteriesto retire to the rear for that purpose.

Furthermore,if batterieswereto limber upto movercloserto the enemy lines, it was usual for say haff of the battries to move,wiahthe remaindermaintainingtheil fire. Oncethe fiIst batterieswere in their new position and firing, the rmainder would fo ow.

The Prussiansrecognisedveryearlyonthat thepowerof their artillry wasneededto counter the fire superiority of French inJantry.When that power wasnot used,the Prussianinfantry suffercdheavily- asthe PrussianGuard found to its costat St. Privat.

WARRIORMINIATURES

14 Tlverton Av., Glasgow G32 9NX Scotland.

New catalosue f1.50 plus a stahped addrelrd envelope. Pl@ stateintrertsfor .mdq 24hou dseetphone, mobil

T.l, 04l-7743125

Wea@etvle. A..4 Matt r@dd. lsmABiIIESo y i9.95 + 11,50 pot Cn@ nm, Fench d Brfti5h N.po|furn6, nohds, ECWRolalistd Padimabn.n. ACWNodhad

Sdlh. 181hCIfiny, C.lonial zur6 6d BritiCLFe!..y Go.d d EvlL Mhmm of 100pi6 in 6ch .ny p&lc crc,t Value

25bD NAPOIIOMC AAIiIES o.b fi6.95 + 12.75 D6t rm pi66, BftGh, Fren.h. PiBid, RKiu, Au.iia SMiEIL

25@ AnMtES onlr at9,50 + 13.00 rct Grek, Ro@ P6i.r, ThFcid, Mac.donie, Ninme, Smu!.t, MasoL, bnd.LN.hr3,

MduL dc Fullddailr ot.ll frguc ln d 6uF ntu dralogle 25m ngttEfrob 25p, l6bmnod 10D,A!nad nomiopqlal y.nd9Nd20@ SpDr.b Cl! wr, vternu ed tloda USA, l5@ EqrlDoat 256d J..obltc.35D a.n,

3. PRUSSIANCAVALRYTACTICS

It hasto b saidthat Prussiancavalrywasoccasionallyusdin bold atrdaggressivereconnaissancpeatrols,but thepracticewas not widespread,andoften theopposingarmieswould beonly a shortdistanceapan, without knowing.

Similarly,there appearsto havebeena limited useof cavalry Ior what shouldhavebeena relendesspursuit of a beatenfoe. Notably after Froeschwi er, MacMahon's mauled almy was allowedto slip awayandthe Prussiansactuallylost track of it.

As with the Frenchcavalry,the main preserveof the cavalry wboaostsinholicnkeafoclrimona,tiionnv.oVlvoinngBmrcadsoswe'dsc"aDveaalrtyhcRhiadreg"i,nignbvooolvtintog PrussianCuirassielsand lnncels, was a suc.essful(if costly)

tc rnti .jti-u.,

>Painted15nmAmies > knaissanceandFantasy

castrngs

sendS.A.Efo. rintormatioan dsample ligure- !1.00forpaintesdample/s l3:leEusloRn oadi,lor6cemhaL,anas T 6 l :{ 0 5 2 { ) { 1 3 1 2 {

chargebreakiDgtheFrenchgunline, principally dueto its useof the lie of the land, circumventingwoodsandusingundulations to block the French line of sight. Without these factors the chargewouldundoubtedlyhavefailed atevenmoresevercost.

Bt IlikeJoltrtson

I n t h i ! i r r t i c l e .I $ i \ h t o h i g h l i g h r$ n r . o t r h e \ a t i c . r I i o i n r s s k t r m l s hf o r m a t i o nt b e n s c ] \ c st o m o i c r h r o u g hr h e p i n n c d

. . I \ . . r . r . , . .' r . l e . I ,

s k i r m i s h e\rc r . . n ) o r i f r h c i r n o r a l e b r c r k \ a n d r h c ) d i s p . r s .

hos thc\ ml\ berelLct.d in\ouf rulcs. I r m r l s u n r i n .Ish . r t\ o u \ i l l r l r e . r d \h r \ c i r c c e s \ r o x r r c l s t o r e

( l c ! \ i n g l o r c \ r m t l e d e n \ c c o l L r m nbsc h i n dr o r h c m e r c \ o r l a c t o f l I o l c n c m \ m a s s c dr i l l e t t r c ) .I n d e f e n c er.k i r m i s h c r s

d i t h c h r l l d o z e no . ! o r u l e b o o k \f o r t h i s p e r i o d $ h i c h $ r t l \ h o u l da l a i n b c u \ e da sI \ c r c e nr o p t u r c c rt h e l o r c c !p o s i r i o n c d

x m p L \c o \ e r I o r m x t i o n ! .l i r e p o $ e r .m o . a l ! Ln n d c o m m ! n d S . r h . h i n d . t o s . i p c r t e n . m \ g u n n c r s .i ) b r e . r t u p n l r . r c k i . g

shxt f ''rrps

t r l l o $ si ro gi\.

s m !dd

l l ] c rx n r i r i o n d lf l

ddir !\ou

i o n a lh r rc \o

\ u

c r

r ol bat

opio tl.\. l

a

a l . u L c .t.i n d n h f u tt o t h e

r r c r ' c s! c t u a L l \c n r p l o \ . d .

2. lrenchInrrtia

F o rr r \ p a n I u s c1 1 1 6D ; . r l F o f C 1 o , 1r u l . s( T D F G ) a d a p r c d n ) r u s e $ r r h 1 5 m m l i g L r r e s s o l h r r t h . { r o u n dj \sdcoaul cb l . d u t

Y o u r r u l e ss h o u l dr c l l e c lr h . r c t u c l a n coc t F r e n c hc u r r d u n i t s . a n d a n \ F r e n c h i n f a . r r \u n i r s $ h i c ha . e . n t r e n c h e do r o c c u p \a

Io l' to 15r:rrd\

. , i : . . h r l . r o p m. r o r e. . , n r 1 r, p r . I t . r r . , r . . r . , . , , ,

f r i c n d l !L r n ni n t r o u b l c .I s u s l c s rr h r r t h e \ $ i l l o n l \ m a k c\ u c hr

1. The Skirnrilh Scrren

mo\. ri! lor.rlon r D6i\ lhu\n Ihru$p.rrete\antuniipcr

\\'hcthcrFrcnchor f.us\ir.. uselighr infxntr! (Cha\scurs.

Z o u . r \ . \ . T u r l o s . J a e g c r .S c h L { z e nltb r r h c r o t e \ h i c h t h e \

s e r e d c s s . . d t o p l , r \ .T h . \ \ c r c d e s i g n r dL op r o b e .l o b . a n

i r r n a n t .r o s h i c l dr h ef o r c c sn r o \ i n ! u p b e h i . d t h c ma n dl o d r a \ r

t i r e l $ : r \ t r o m r h o l ei o r c c s .I n r f i t f t i r c l .o r c o u n r e r - r t r a c ka.t

Ihe o ''c\xr

p u

nmu rlrc

m . r

monte o rllo\\

nl rh. rh. ii

\ r

r

$crc c e sb e

ro fart h i n dt h e

like mt u

a c moi

u c

narn. to for$ard

l. .lrtiller) In Supporl / \ d d + i I o r . i n h r r t f \ u n i r s m o r r l . i f i r i e n d h ! i 1 1 e . \i ! F I R I N G N r l h i n c a f s h L nr h l r n r o \ e . E a A h o i t I s u g g r \ ts i l h i n 1 0 0\ i r f d s( 8 . a l I ' t o 1 5! a r d s )i o r h er . x r o r o n r i r h c rl t a n t .

1. Ntitrailleuseln Support

t o f u f i l t h e a r t . r c kT i m i n gi s a l l . I n t ! r t i c u l a r . r h . c n r i r ea r l a c k A d d + l t o F . c n c hi n f a n r r \u n i t s n l o r e l ci f F r e n c hU i t r a i l t c u ! .

s i l l b e c o m cd i ! l o c e d i l r h o s cs k i n n i s h e rasr cp i n n e dd o $ . f o '

.. t.,,

f . . e . . e \ _ , , r . r . _ r r , , ,r r o \ .i a r,

b a t t e r i c \a r . F l l i l \ ( l \ \ i l h i r e r ^ h o t r h a r m o \ . E a r \ h o rf o r \ i r l r a i l l e u s . lI s L r s s e$ni t b i n 1 5 ( Ir x r d s( 6 . a t l t o 1 5 \ . a . d s ) t o

1i3

therearoron eitherflank.Thisisin additiontoanyincrement thesetendedonlyto beusedwhenmovingup to thefront line

undr3. above.

outof rangeor outof sightfrom theenemy,or in a finalassault

5. PosiaionbgofFrench Mitraileu$ Batteris Beforbattlecommencersoll a D6 perMitrailleusebattery'A roll of l meansthatthebatterycanbeplacedasanindependent battery,for examplewellforwardwiththeinfantry.A roll of 2-6 meansthat it must be assignedto a specific artillery battery

againspt oor or brokentroops.In TDFG the lowestPrussian infantryunitisabattalionof20figuresrepresentin1g000menin

thefield.However,Iwouldmakethisruleflexibleto allowalso for half-battalioncolumns(10figures)or companycolumns(5 figures)w, iththefollowingrules:

throughouthegameandwill bepositionedandwill movewith 10.1 Haf-Battalion Columns:

it at all times, and furthermore must fire on the sametarget

minus1onfirstmoveofmelee

unlesspreventedbyreasonof range.

but savingthrows for artillery casualtiesonly (a 6 on a

6. Fbing FrcnchArlillcry ard MitrailleuseBatteries

D6, throwpercasualty).

As mentionedt,heprioritytargetwasinfantry,andtherehadto 10.2CorhpanCy olunns:

bea compellingreasonforbatteriesto actin concerat ndaimat

- minus1on firstmoveofmelee

thesametarget.Acordingly:

- butsavingthrowsfor artillerycasualtie(sa5 ora6on a

6.1 Wherethe htnded terget is enemyartillerJ batteries,this will only be permitted: - to support French in{antry or artillery attacks on the target battery; OR - iI the targetbattery is causingmorale checksto inlantry

D6, throwpercasualtya) ndrifle fire casualtie(sa 6 on a D6, throwpercasualty).

10-3 WhetherHalf-Battalionor CompanyColumnssr usd: - whenin attackthe remainingfiguresof the battalion whichare not themselveisn columnformationmustbe

or cavalrywithin 200yards(8"at 1"to 25yards)to thefront

thrownforwardin skinnishorderwithin12"(300yardsat

oronaflank.

l":25yards)of thefrontof thecolumns.

6.2 Whretheintendedlargetisnemycavrlry' thiswil only be

permrtEd: - if thecavalryisactuallythreateningthatbattery;OR - iJ the cavalry is threateninga friendlyunit within 200

- ifcompanycolumnsareused,theremustbeaminimum oftwoperbattalionT. hispreventsthewilyPrussiapnlayer from putting three-quartersof his line infantry into skinnishformation!

yards(8"asabovet)o thefrontorona flank.

ll. Frcnchor PrussianColumns- whntheatrackis Haltd

6.3

Where 2 or more batteries are requird to fire on same tsrget, this is always REQUIRED in the case of a Mitrailleusebattery(subjecto range)whichis wishingto fireonthesametargetastheartillerybatterytowhiciht has beenassignedIn. thecaseof separateartillerybatteiesor aDindependenMt itrailleusebatterywishingto fire on the sametarget,thisisonlypermitted: - if thetargetunitthreatensbothbatteriesO; R

Wlere a columnhasbeenpinned(in TDFG thismeansit has beenforcedto gopronehavingreeivedatleast4casualtiesthat tum tuomrifle or Mitrailleusefire) then- if it is orderedto

resumeforwardmovenent-a D6 mustberolled.Iftheresulth lowerthantheTOTAL numberofcasualtiesfor thatunit (not iusttheonesreceivedin thattum) theunitcanresumeforward movemenitn whichevefrormationischosenw. hethercolumn orotherwiseI.fthe resultishigher,theunitMUST resunethe

- to suppo( French infantry or cavalry attack on the

targetunit; OR

12. Frnchor PrussirnCavalryChargs

- arollof6on aD6 (to reflectcoincidencle) AND IN ALL 12.1 Recaling a Charge.Onceorde$ are actedon for cavalry

CASES: - therelevantestsin 6.1and6.2arsatisfied.

to charget,heycannoet asilyberecalledA. ccordinglythe chargewill continueuntil:

7. Firing PrussianArtillery

T h eo b j e c t i v ei s a t t a i n e d ; o r

ThereareNO RESTRICTIONSon thetypeof targelor on a

The cavalrywins .he nexr rnelee(for examplewhre the

numberof batteriesselectingthe sametarget-As a matterof

cavalry has been counter-chargedbefore it reachesits

practice,to ensuresurvivaland to maintainthe upPerhand,

objective)o; r

Prussian gunners usually silenced the enemy anillery and

The cavalry is forced to retire in any event due to failing

Mi[ailleuse batteries fi]st, afld then tumed on the enemy

moraleor losinga melee,

inJantry(or cavalryif it presenteidtselo.

12.2 Chargingorer unreconnoitrcdgrcund. Eachchargemove,

8. ResupplyingArtilry andMitraileoses

roll two D6. In TDFG thercaretwo operationspertum,

8.1 Frenchartilery andMitrailleusebatteriesmustlimberup,

soif cavalryis chargingin both operationsthenthedice

withdraw off-table and remain off'table Ior a full move to

will haveto berolled for eachoperation.lf a double4, 5or

rcsuppry.

6 is thrownyourcavalryhasproblemsasit indicatesthat

8.2 Prussianartillery batteries must limber up and withdraw

the groundover which thy are hargingis seriously

onemoyeonly.It thentakesafull nove to beresupplied.

pitted,for examplewith unseendrainageditches,rabbit

8.3 Whilstbatteriesarebeingresuppliedtheycannotfire, and

warrensandsoon.Youwill nowneedto roll a furtherD6

onceresuppliedrememberthattheyaretirnbereduP.

withthefollowingconsequencfeosr yourcavalry:

9. TheFrench- Furia Franceseor Dfnsive? For the openingbattles,the generalrule shouldbe for the French to 6ght using the defensivetactics, occupyingridges, hillsandfarmhouse-sandusualyoutnumberebdy 3:2at least. However,why not add somevarietyby allowingthe army commandeorr oneofthe divisionaol r brigadeconmandersto go "Furia Francese"(through an excessof cognacand

nostalgial)?

A m of I or 2: Irse 1 figure asa casualty(in TDFG 1 fisure= s0nen)

A roll of3 or 4: Lose I figure asa casualtyand 1 figule m o v e sa t h a l f s p e e da n dl a g sb e h i n d

A roll ofs or 6: Whathappensheredependson whether the chargemoveis the one whichbringsyour cavalryinto contacwt iththeenemy:

10. Prulsian Infrntry Columns Whetherfull battalion,half'battalionor companycolumns,

If the move in question IS the one which brings your charging cavalry into contact with the enemy, the

19

TABLETOP GAMES

29 BERESFORADVENUE.SKEGNESS,

LINCOLNSHIREP,E253JF.

lcEac Raas' uK l0%(Mir 30pJ

(tM

15% (Su'fa) 60% (Ai.)

Crcdit Card Ord6 : (0?5J) ?677?9

SENDS.A.E,FORNEW

PIa$ norc rh.t wc r mw a ORDERrim d y bur*. *iU siill b. .ncniling dr sh.ws 6 nm.l.

W.R.G RULES & BOOKS

ACTION TJNDER

SAIL {h sdttion

NapoleonicNavalRules

By steveBemie f3.75

IN TTIE GRAND MANNER

Peter Gildes Napoleonic tuls for 25m, figues by ReiSate

wdsansGrcup f2.50

R.vis.d l95c20l)l) Rules

w.R.G.BOOI$

Rules for Naporons crmp6igE in EulG bv A w.hon {3.75

t2_25 t3.95

fll.95

arsicds

t3.75

CHALLf,NGER 2(|OO Rcvis.{Nt tod.nRrl6 14.25

WE NOW STOCK H & ROS WWN TANKS& EQUIPMENT

WARGAMESRULESFROMTTC

MODERNPERIOD

NAPOLFONIC& 18IhCENTIJRY

ChillMg.r 20{0 El.s

at6

f3.15

D!.s .l (Etrop:nLGG) f2.95

43.15

Die6r 5 (Re$ or wo.ld Liss) orb

Iirdd.h Equipmdr hnk

.,/p

!3.75

Mod.D Aimn Hddbek 3.5

!3.75

Baul.an6(Sftmnos)

e2.15 Adion Under Sail .&n Ed.

13.75

C.Ar Comand.r

t3.95 Md l3rh C.nbry d!.s

12.95

An & sd (an avallMdhg

l3dr c.nbry Any Lnb

e7.15

42,95 t3.75

t2.?5

Bddyomt (vicham skidhh) 2.95

Pnhsuh (Mod sub cmbrr) f3.50

ANCIENT PERIOD

sIEcE (Ar. & Med siegs)

7 YEARSWAR GUIDES

Nol ThcBrirlsh 8795

Swod & Shicld(Skimish) f2.15 Rudis (Cldi2bB & OwioG) t7j5

MEDIEVAL PERIOD

No2 TheFtrch No3 TheAusdi,rs No.l D'.ftusims No5 nE Swc.,.s

E!.25 12.95 t3.75 82.15

RENAISSANCE PERIOI)

t7_95

No6 Thellarcvenms 43.25

No7 TheSdom

12.15

Swod & Pisbl (Skimhh)

t2.15 f2.95

Fftfly { l/Jt}Ih sc{lc)

!3.95

Cdnhinedtum I 1,3lJ0Scale)l!.95

wwll LhG & Or3.nisltids [3.95

WwlI Baarams (S.trriot ll.?5

Tacric.lComm{d.r (Sttm) '2.95

KoAs Col)rlrtrdr (Div Scalc)!3.95

TEnrh (wwl TEnchwarhrc) 12.25

K6icftosh (w\M Skimish) t3.50

Dogfigh over F|and.6 (An) $.25

t2)5 f3.a

Rry w"E llndhn FiCbdng)

A.C.W.aATTLE CUIDESt195 d,

c.tlysburg

S{ond aul Run

Stoffi Riv.. Antibn

Fird BullRun WilsonCE.l

c.d.rMountain FEdoi.k$urg

VO FLAGS

The full 6nge of Revo Flags dd TE sfe6 also sl@ked

sends a.E. (2 IRCS)fd r opy W NEW I99'I CATALOCUE

ditch/rabbit warens are deemedto be within a few yards fuchard Holmes.Secondly,the writings of StepbenShannvrho

of the target unjt and will lhereforecausemaxinum cenainly hasa graspfor the period. Thirdly, asan insight for

disruption. Accordingly, your unit will lose 1 figure asa what it meantto the everydayFrenchLine inlantryman in this

casualtyand 1 figure movesat half speedand lagsbehind pei,od, The Debacleby Emile Zola, an English translationis

AND 30% of the charginefigures making contactsuffer -l in theresultanmt elee.

availablein the PenguinClassicseries.It is worth readingfor the descriptionof the battle of Sedanandthe graphicportmyal

If themovein questionIS NOT the onewhichbringsyour of the Bavariaoattackon Bazeilles.

chargingcavalryinto contactwith the enemy,then your

cavalryhasmanagedto negodarethetenain difficulty and thereis no efJecton its pedormance.

sO,MO+SECONDIIANDWARGAMESFIGIJRES Alwaysin stockA. II scalesM. ostmanufacturrs.

CONCLUSIONANDSO{JRCES

SAEstatingintercstfsor lbtsto: A.J. Dumelow,

53StantonRoad,Stapenhill,

I hopethesearticlesprove to be useful and will help to give a framework for youl Franco-Prussianbatdes,and in particular

Burton-on-Trert,StalIsDEIS9RP, Telephone(:02t3)530556.

witi iUustrartehepowerslrugglewhichwaswagedberweenrhe

FrenchChasseportifle andthe PrussianKruppsbreech-loading

artillery.

Thereisno doubt aboutit, tbe Frnchhaveanuphill struggle

SCHEMATICSAOFTWARE

to beat their more numerousPrussianadversaries.but siven gooduseofterfainanddeploynenroflighr infantrytheF;nch arewell ableto keepthe Prussianartillry at bay and to stunif not repelthe Prussianinfantry.

Which bringsmeon to awiderissue whywwargameat all. For me the enjolment is not in actually wiDning (fairly rare occasionsan'way!) but in rccreating the style of warfare in miniature and recapturing the "feel" of a Franco-Pnssian battle, in recognitionof the hardshipsbome by the soldiersof the day a]ndthe esptit de cotps andcamaruileriewh]'chWriIJlg from that commonexprience.

As to sources,I would just like to pay tribute to three in particular. Firsdy, me Ro,'.l to Sedan, a marv[ous book published for the Royal Historical Society, the author being

Ruleosn DiskforlheAtari,Amiga& IBM/rc

NRVDr5X5M, W mrr,l^Ts fORTHrrtrTui,rN.^ NrWStrrn Of 0r5r5t$NCtNCrOU

ECmNCr sLfrO?ACnONAr,$rOrD Bttmc6,

Nlrouo\r( - ^rrrFb oJN,pokn( wrrr, (sed 6 ,sI b, paid ra rndr

vrrcr]^r w ff rI-

q

n

c

{

,

^

q

i

i

:

F4

f"dr yh'*' J, .|ri

I 4

F

'

J

n

ipor|y n6rro

foo \cl

( tL

|

*

i

d

'

o

B

5!hbelor:ry *ioi rcmPru$nn b hdianwrB o y f19.99

rrc ANo$Or - CNiis rheGE6ni.e ton Lib Medielrd,,.trlborcqi roll*ii8 ri

ri* ad dmiQ ot i\e riG, Kpde fie rnlrr or fi. Rmiere ror fl9-95

$^$ tt r! ^NotM nvts rln +1ts nr^ ro rl. 4rly $dFdl piod ' o.".

d"prdtu.irddim 4 {m 1r'mF Al de.bow.r,on!l-'! Iry kF

md n b

i o

4,h dq L

s&port hl r n d4 n h .

m, tl

r

6p ,6

\F . r

]

l

r c

r

9

$

,,to M,hbb CrO$ ACnONleiro, e$ll, M|crO rN$ ^rvribdry @nbarvr00, !r1 1

NAVtf nr sY,nMrfror,nrrldRp$.ddrdhl,ilrDrrv rff9,irsH,uNlvtrt{ s||tr,{$R, nrlL cle rdion I r iihbh tor:ry peidd La youd!.idewa@n.iFbiiiE,

C lt{GN WOttD coE a coidr ror)oo hbdoo baik . Uoro 20.osbi6, im mry

ldrs b n t2.95 o' tl4 95'it 016m d&!or.hoke^l irhe6rhi d !r9.9r Pnri

indu{k U.K.pdF, t!mE +10*, REtol i\e wo'ld + l5*. lBrirc o'de^.bt diel.izerd

$e loo{bh or Hisi oeisiry).chq6 dc. ro

3,no( 5?&{N$orro[ H^DnnDru,

 ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download