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Dropping the Atomic Bomb Document Based QuestionsSource : Admiral William D. Leahy, President Truman?s Chief of Staff, in his memoir ,I Was There. (Whittlesey, 1950) “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons…My own feeling was that being the first to use [the atomic bomb], we adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make wars in that fashion, and that wars cannot be won by destroying women and children” Source: Henry L. Stimson, The Decision to Use the Bomb. Harpers. February, 1947. The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace. Japan, in July 1945, has been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. . .There was as yet no indication of Japan to accept unconditional surrender. If she should persist in her fight to the end, she has still a great military force. In the middle of July 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in the home islands, slightly over 2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000. The total strength of the Japanese army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men. Two great nations were approaching contact in a fight to a finish, which would begin on November 1, 1945. Our enemy, Japan, commanded forces of somewhat over 5,000,000 armed men. As long as the Japanese Government refused to surrender, we should be forced to take and hold the ground. In order to end the war in the shortest possible time and to avoid the enormous losses of human life, I felt that we must use the Emperor as our instrument to command and compel his people to cease fighting. The bomb seemed to me to furnish a unique instrument for that purpose. My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. The face of war is the face of death; death is an inevitable past of every order that a wartime leader gives. The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raid and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a class of great land armies. . .Source: Harry S Truman, Memoirs of Harry S Truman, Doubleday, 1955. My own knowledge of these [atomic] developments had come about only after I became President, when Secretary [of War] Stimson had given me the full story. He had told me at that time that the project was nearing completion, and that a bomb could be expected within another four months . . . It was [the committee’s] recommendation that the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done. They recommended further that it should be used without specific warning, and against a target that would clearly show its devastating strength. I had realized, of course, that an atomic bomb explosion would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination. . . The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon, and never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill, he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war. In deciding to use this bomb I wanted to make sure that it would be used as a weapon of war in the manner prescribed by the laws of war. And I wanted it dropped on a military target. Source: Memoirs of General H.H. Arnold, Commander of the American Army Air Force in the Second World War (1949) The surrender of Japan was not entirely the result of the two atomic bombs. We had hit some 60 Japanese cities with our regular H.E. (High Explosive) and incendiary bombs and, as a result of our raids, about 241,000 people had been killed, 313,000 wounded, and about 2,333,000 homes destroyed. Our B-29’s had destroyed most of the Japanese industries and, with the laying of mines, which prevented the arrival of incoming cargoes of critical items, had made it impossible for Japan to carry on a large-scale war . . . Accordingly, it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse. Source: Herbert Feis. The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1961) Some of those men who concurred in the decision to use the bomb discerned other advantages and justifications. It may be also, but this is only conjecture, that Churchill and Truman and some of their colleagues conceived that besides bringing the war to a quick end, it would improve the chances of arranging a satisfactory peace. For would not the same dramatic proof of western power that shocked Japan into surrender impress the Russians also? Might it not influence them to be more restrained? Might it not make more effective the resistance of the western allies to excessive Soviet pretensions and ventures, such as the Soviet bids for a military base in the Black Sea Straits, and a part of the occupation and control of Japan akin to that which it had in Germany? If these conjectures have any basis in actuality, they would provide another justification for using the bomb as a military weapon. We were not only subduing Japanese aggressors; we were perhaps monitoring the emergent Russian aggression. Recognition of this tendency must not be distorted into an accusation that the American government engaged in what Soviet propagandists and historians have called "atomic blackmail." To the contrary, the American government remained intently desirous of preserving the friendly connection with the Soviet Union. It had rejected Churchill's proposal to face down the Soviet government in some climactic confrontation over the outward thrust of Soviet power. It showed throughout the Conference at Potsdam, which preceded the use of the bomb, a patient disposition to arrive at compromises with the Soviet government. In brief, the purposes of the men who determined American policy were directed toward achieving a stable international order by peaceful ways, not swayed by excited thought or wish of imposing our will on the rest of the world by keeping atomic bombs poised over their lives. Source: Nippon Times (Tokyo, Japan), August 10th, 1945 How can a human being with any claim to a sense of moral responsibility deliberately let loose an instrument of destruction which can at one stroke annihilate an appalling segment of mankind? This is not war; this is not even murder; this is pure nihilism. This is a crime against God and humanity which strikes at the very basis of moral existence. What meaning is there in any international law, in any rule of human conduct, in any concept of right and wrong, if the very foundations of morality are to be overthrown as the use of this instrument of total destruction threatens to do? The crime of the Americans stands out in ghastly repulsiveness all the more for the ironic contradiction it affords to their lying pretensions. But where its own actions are concerned, the United States seems to see no inconsistency in committing on an unimaginably vast scale the very same crime it had falsely accused others of committing. This hypocritical character of the Americans had already been amply demonstrated in the previous bombings of Japanese cities. Strewing explosives and fire bombs indiscriminately over an extensive area, hitting large cities and small towns without distinction, wiping out vast districts which could not be mistaken as being anything but strictly residential in character...the American raiders had already shown how completely they violate in their actual deeds the principles of humanity which they mouth in conspicuous pretense. But now, beside the latest technique of total destruction which the Americans have adopted, their earliest crimes pale into relative insignificance. . . What more barbarous atrocity can there be than to wipe out at one stoke the population of a whole city without distinction - men, women, and children; the aged, the weak, the infirm; those in positions of authority, and those with no power at all; all snuffed out without being given a chance of lifting even a finger in either defense or defiance! The United States may claim, in a lame attempt to raise a pretext in justification of its latest action, that a policy of utter annihilation is necessitated by Japan's failure to heed the recent demand for unconditional surrender. For this American outrage against the fundamental moral sense of mankind, Japan must proclaim to the world its protest against the United States, which has made itself the arch-enemy of humanity. Source: Scientists’ Petition to FDR Regarding the Atomic Bomb- July 17, 1945 We, the undersigned scientists, have been working in the field of atomic power. Until recently we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled to say what follows:The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not until the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender.If such public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender our nation might then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved.The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.If after the war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation. All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Its prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the United States—singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power.The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings with it the obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position would be weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes. It would then be more difficult for us to live up to our responsibility of bringing the unloosened forces of destruction under control.In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of the consideration presented in this petition as well as all the other moral responsibilities which are involved."?Source: Grayford C. Payne, Bataan Death March survivor - Quoted in the September 26, 1994, Washington PostIn the latter part of June 1945, a note was posted in our camp. It was signed by Hideki Tojo. And it said, 'The moment the first American soldier sets foot on the Japanese mainland, all prisoners of war will be shot.' And they meant it. I hadn't been a prisoner for fifteen minutes before they bayoneted a fifteen-year-old Filipino kid right next to me - a kid so innocent he scraped together this little dirt dam with his last bit of energy so he wouldn't bleed on my uniform while he died. That is why all of us who were prisoners in Japan, or were headed for it to probably die in the invasion, revere the Enola Gay. It saved our lives. Source: Minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945 Psychological Factors in Target Selection A. It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released. B. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a size and with possible focusing from nearby mountains that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor's palace in Tokyo has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic value.Source: Martin J. Sherwin, Dartmouth College, Oxford Companion to World War II Until they were used, until the power of the atomic bomb had been demonstrated, the nuclear option precluded all other options - modifying unconditional surrender - because it promised dividends. The shock of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not only be felt in Tokyo, American leaders calculated, they also would be noted in Moscow. The military use of atomic weapons was expected not only to end the war; it was assumed it would help to organize an American peace. While these expectations and decisions may be understandable in the context of four years of scientific secrecy and brutal war, they were not inevitable. They were avoidable. In the end, that is the most important lesson of Hiroshima for the nuclear age.Memorandum from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to Secretary of War, September 30, 1944, Top SecretSalient Points Concerning Future International Handling of Subject of Atomic Bombs2. Future Military Potentialities- We are dealing with an expanding art and it is difficult to predict the future. At present we are planning atomic bombs utilizing the energy involved in the fission of the uranium atom. It is believed that such energy can be used as a detonator for setting off the energy which would be involved in the transformation of heavy hydrogen atoms into helium. If this can be done, a factor of a thousand or more would be introduced into the amount of energy released. This means that one such super -super bomb would be equivalent in blast damage to 1,000 raids of 1,000 B29 Fortresses delivering their load of high explosive on one target. . . When one considers these possibilities we see that very great devastation could be caused immediately after the outbreak of hostilities to civilian and industrial centers by an enemy prepared with a relatively few such bombs. That such a situation present a new challenge to the world is evident.3. Present Advantage of the United States and Great Britain Temporary- Unless it develops that Germany is much further along than is now believed it is probably that the present develops in the United States undertaken in cooperation with Great Britain put us in a temporary position of great ascendency. It would be possible, however, for any nation with good technical and scientific resources to reach our present position in three or four years. Therefore it would be the height of folly for the United States and Great Britain to assume that they will always continue to be superior in this new weapon. Once the distance between ourselves and those who have not yet develop this art is eliminated the accident of research could give another country a temporary advantage as great as the one we now enjoy.5. Dangers of partial secrecy and international armament race- It is our contention that it would be extremely dangerous for the United States and Great Britain to attempt to carry on in complete secrecy further developments of the military applications of this art. If this were done Russia would undoubtedly proceed in secret along the same lines and so too might certain other countries, including our defeated enemies. We do not believe that over a period of a decade the control of the supply could be counted on to prevent such developments in other countries. This is particularly true if the super- super bomb were developed for the supply of heavy hydrogen is essentially unlimited and the rarer materials such as uranium and thorium would be used only as detonators. If a country other than Great Britain and the United States developed the super super- bomb first we should be in a terrifying situation if hostilities should occur. The effect on public reason of the uncertainties in regard to an unknown threat of this new nature would be very great. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume 1, 1939/1946 (1972).Site/ProjectThen-year DollarsConstant 1996 DollarsOAK RIDGE (Total)$1,188,352,000$13,565,662,000—K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant$512,166,000$5,846,644,000—Y-12 Electromagnetic Plant$477,631,000$5,452,409,000—Clinton Engineer Works, HQ and central utilities$155,951,000$1,780,263,000—Clinton Laboratories$26,932,000$307,443,000—S-50 Thermal Diffusion Plant$15,672,000$178,904,000HANFORD ENGINEER WORKS$390,124,000$4,453,470,000SPECIAL OPERATING MATERIALS$103,369,000$1,180,011,000LOS ALAMOS PROJECT$74,055,000$845,377,000RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT$69,681,000$795,445,000GOVERNMENT OVERHEAD$37,255,000$425,285,000HEAVY WATER PLANTS$26,768,000$305,571,000???Grand Total$1,889,604,000$21,570,821,000After reading through each document carefully, decide whether or not you think the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified. Using the documents and your knowledge of history, write a 2-3 page paper explaining whether or not the United States should have used atomic weapons to end World War II. You must use at least 5 documents in your essay, as well as present the opposing view point and then counter that view point. You must NOT use any other sources besides the ones provided and your textbook. You must use citations (proper MLA format) and create a work cited page (proper MLA format).You should consider the opinions and views of the documents and discuss how that has shaped your understanding of the argument. ................
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