Russia: Applying the Low Cost, High ... - Air University

Russia: Applying the Low Cost, High Return Syrian Strategy to Africa By

Captain Benjamin Pearson Squadron Officer School 21C

07 April 2021

"Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency."

ABSTRACT Russia's intervention in Syria was able to achieve high returns at a relatively low cost. Through the use of private military and security contractors and advanced arms deals, Russia was able to project power without incurring high military casualties while keeping a plausible deniability of interference. By reinforcing a regional autocrat in Syria, Russia became a political force in the Middle East, challenging the United States regional hegemony. Russia is adapting its Syrian strategy in Africa. In Libya and the rest of the continent, Russia's use of private security contractors and arms exports provides support to African states in exchange for exclusive access to natural resources, and influence in the region. Russia's idea of combating Western dominance through a multipolar world order means Russia does not need to become the leading political force in Africa, just offer an alternative partnership. Due to the Syrian strategy's dependance on low cost for high returns, raising the cost to Russia will hinder its efforts with Africa. Through engagement with African nations, lowering Russia's international prestige by exposing regionally destabilizing activity, and effecting the political and economic calculus of local African leaders working with Russia, the United States can prevent Russia from gaining its desired power in Africa.

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When Russia began conducting airstrikes in Syria in September 2015, its return to the Middle East since the dissolution of the Soviet Union was met with skepticism. Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, a key political ally to Russia, appeared to be close to defeat in the ongoing civil war. At the time, United States President Barack Obama assessed Russia's attempt to keep Assad in power was, "just going to get them stuck in a quagmire. And it won't [sic] work. And they will be there for a while if they don't [sic] take a different course."1 Four years later, the United States was withdrawing its last remaining military personnel from northern Syria while Russia had established a military presence in Syria and emerged as a political force in the region. Through the use of private military and security contractors (PMSCs) and military arms exports, Russia was able to challenge the United States' hegemony in the Middle East. With its Syrian success as a roadmap, Russia is laying similar low cost, high return groundwork in Africa as it aims to reassert itself as a global power.

Prior to its intervention in Syria, the last time the Russian military was heavily involved in the Middle East was its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. That conflict lasted a decade, resulted in tens of thousands of Russian casualties, and exposed the limits of the Soviet's power projection.2 With that history in mind a similar venture into Syria seemed foolish, but Russia's approach was markedly different. Modeled after the successes of asymmetric warfare in Ukraine, Russia was able to conduct a cheaper, more limited operation.3 Seeking to limit military casualties and avoid an official ground presence in Syria, Russia turned to PMSCs whom successfully operated in Ukrainian conflict zones while providing plausible deniability of Russian interference. The ambiguous domestic legality of Russia PMSCs allows it to commit ground forces and absorb casualties without any public acknowledgement. An estimated over two thousand Russian PMSCs were operating in combat capacities throughout Syria, and the

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battlefield experience from the conflict can be applied elsewhere around the globe.4 But Russian PMSCs alone did not tip the Syrian Civil War towards Assad's favor; advanced Russian military arms also prevented Assad from being ousted. At the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Russia had an estimated US$4 billion worth of outstanding arms contracts with the Assad regime. These sales of military hardware not only reinforced Russia's alliance with Assad but provided advanced weapons and training creating a prohibitive environment for the kind of Western no-fly zone that was utilized to oust Libya's Muammar Gaddafi.5 When the Russian military formally intervened in Syria four years later, its success utilizing sophisticated weapon systems, such as fourth generation aircraft and cruise missiles, displayed the capability of Russian military equipment and dispelled the perception its equipment was unreliable.6 Syria proved to be an advantageous display of force, not just for Russian military hardware, but also for Russia's ability to be an alternative power in the region.

What was initially seen as a risky endeavor resulted in high returns for Russia at a relatively small cost. With Assad firmly in control and an established military presence in Syria, Russia is now a power-broker in the Middle East and has challenged the United States' hegemony in the region. Middle Eastern rulers now have a partner that is less concerned with human rights or democratic ideals.7 Additionally, Russia's newfound political capital has benefited its economic interests, providing access to lucrative Syrian oil fields.8 Just as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan displayed the limits of Russian military might, success in Syria has provided a warning of Russia's future global ventures.

Bolstered by its low cost, high return strategy in Syria, Russia is adapting its playbook of PMSCs and arms exports to gain a foothold in Africa. The most visible example of Russia utilizing this strategy is in Libya, another oil-rich country on the strategically important

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Mediterranean Sea. Russian PMSCs, particularly the company Wager Group active in both Ukraine and Syria, are fighting alongside the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the East against the United Nations-recognized Government of National Accords GNA) headquartered in the West. Along with these PMSCs comes advanced Russian military equipment, including fourth generation fighter jets and modern surface to air missile systems.9 This familiar strategy is not unnoticed, USAFRICOM Commander General Stephen Townsend remarked in a press release, "Russia is clearly trying to tip the scales in its favor in Libya. Just like I saw them doing in Syria, they are expanding their military footprint in Africa using government-supported mercenary groups."10 But unlike Syria, Russia's deniability of PMSCs and its distance from the LNA provides an advantage regardless of the ultimate victor in Libya. In fact, the current stalemate unfolding provides Russian President Vladimir Putin an opportunity to play peacemaker, establishing credibility in a continent often embroiled in conflict.11 Libya provides a stark example of Russia utilizing the same strategy from Syria to gain regional relevancy.

Russian actions in Africa are not exclusively resigned to outright armed conflict as seen in Libya. Russian PMSCs and arms deals provide Russia with a cost-effective way to influence the entire continent. In the Central African Republic (CAR), Russian PMSCs are used as a security provider to assist with training local forces and guarding government officials. In exchange, Russian mining companies secured rights to gold and diamond deposits. Russia is posturing to be CAR's primary international partner, challenging France's traditional regional power.12 Russian arms sales also provide another avenue to expand its sphere of influence. Russia is the largest exporter of arms to Africa, accounting for 39% of total arms imported by the continent between 2013-2017.13 As Western sanctions against Russia apply financial pressure and the price of oil, Russia's largest export, continues to decline, the defense industry will grow

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