Engagement CP: Russia - …



Engagement CP: Russia TOC \o "1-3" \u Engagement CP: Russia PAGEREF _Toc48384543 \h 1***1NC SHELL’S*** PAGEREF _Toc48384544 \h 1Relations: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48384545 \h 1***SOLVENCY*** PAGEREF _Toc48384546 \h 1Generic PAGEREF _Toc48384547 \h 1Relations PAGEREF _Toc48384548 \h 1Nuclear War/Climate Change PAGEREF _Toc48384549 \h 1Accidental War/Proliferation PAGEREF _Toc48384550 \h 1Strategic Stability PAGEREF _Toc48384551 \h 1Russia Says Yes PAGEREF _Toc48384552 \h 1***NET BENEFITS*** PAGEREF _Toc48384553 \h 1Deterrence DA: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48384554 \h 1Deterrence DA: Extensions PAGEREF _Toc48384555 \h 1Elections DA: 1NC PAGEREF _Toc48384556 \h 1***Answers To*** PAGEREF _Toc48384557 \h 1Turn: Engagement Signals Weakness PAGEREF _Toc48384558 \h 1Turn: Conditions Bad PAGEREF _Toc48384559 \h 1Permutation: Do Both PAGEREF _Toc48384560 \h 1Permutation: Plan is the CP (Plan is a Grand Bargain) PAGEREF _Toc48384561 \h 1Permutation: Unilateral Concessions = Grand Bargain PAGEREF _Toc48384562 \h 1Permutation: Plan is a Pre-Requisite to the CP PAGEREF _Toc48384563 \h 1Permutation: Do the Plan, Then the CP PAGEREF _Toc48384564 \h 1Permutation: Do the CP, Then the Plan PAGEREF _Toc48384565 \h 1International Fiat Bad PAGEREF _Toc48384566 \h 1***1NC SHELL’S***Relations: 1NC The United States Federal Government should offer the Russian Federation an agreement wherein the United States agrees to reduce military exercises in Europe, increase information sharing on advance notification of military exercises, and increase information sharing on terrorists threats in exchange for the Russian Federation agreeing to reduce its military exercises in Europe, increase information sharing on advance notification of military exercises, and increase information sharing on terrorists threats. US-Russian agreements on military exercises and military to military dialogue stabilize relations and create the space to solve tougher issues Vershbow, former US ambassador to Russia, South Korea, and NATO, 6-22-18(Alexander, “Trump’s ‘grand bargain’ with Russia is an illusion,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFNWhat sorts of measures could be agreed upon? To lower the risk of accidental military conflict, we could seek an understanding with Moscow to reduce the size of military exercises in Europe and to strengthen existing agreements on advance notification and observation of exercises. We could suggest deepening the military-to-military dialogue between NATO and Russia, and expand information sharing on terrorist threats. We could propose visits to U.S. and Russian military facilities for on-site inspections that could resolve each side's concerns about noncompliance with the INF Treaty before that historic agreement collapses. We could even call for a mutual stand-down in cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and election machinery — though without expecting Russia to admit what it did in interfering in the 2016 elections. Agreement on such steps won't transform the relationship. But they could halt the downward spiral and create space for tackling more difficult issues, such as Russian withdrawal from eastern Ukraine. It may go against Trump's instincts to rigorously prepare for a summit in this way, but the results would be far more substantial than what was achieved in Singapore.***SOLVENCY***GenericIncreased diplomatic engagement with Russia increases relations, defuses tensions, unlocks better relations with China, and small measures snowball into bigger victoriesGottemoeller, Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, 8-5-20(Rose, “It’s Time to Rethink Our Russia Policy,” accessed 8-10-20, ) JFNWe go into this open-eyed. Russia complicates, even thwarts, our actions, especially along its extended periphery in Europe and Asia. It has seized territory in Ukraine and Georgia. It challenges our role as a global leader and the world order we helped build. It interferes in our domestic politics to exacerbate divisions and tarnish our democratic reputation. At best, our relations will remain a mix of competition and cooperation. The policy challenge will be to strike the most beneficial and safest balance between the two. To this end, we offer six broad prescriptions for U.S. policy. ? We must first find a way to deal effectively with Russian interference in U.S. elections and, most important, block any effort to corrupt the voting process. Hardening our electoral infrastructure, sanctioning Russians who weaponize stolen information and countering Russia’s capacity to hack our systems are all necessary measures. So is exposing Russian disinformation. We must, however, also engage Russia through negotiations out of the public glare, focused on each side’s capabilities to do great damage to the other side’s critical infrastructure. It makes no sense for two countries with the power to destroy each other and, in 30 minutes, to end civilization as we know it to lack fully functioning diplomatic relations. In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, key governmental contacts were severed, consulates shuttered and embassy staff drastically reduced. Too often we wrongly consider diplomatic contacts as a reward for good behavior, but they are about promoting our interests and delivering tough messages. We need them as a matter of essential security to minimize the misperceptions and miscalculations that can lead to unwanted war. Restoring normal diplomatic contacts should be a top priority for the White House and supported by the Congress. ? Our strategic posture should be that which served us well during the Cold War: a balanced commitment to deterrence and détente. Thus, while maintaining our defense, we should also engage Russia in a serious and sustained strategic dialogue that addresses the deeper sources of mistrust and hostility and at the same time focuses on the large and urgent security challenges facing both countries: ? The imperative to restore U.S.-Russian leadership in managing a nuclear world made more dangerous by destabilizing technologies, shifting attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons, discarded nuclear agreements and new tension-filled nuclear relationships. That means extending the New START Treaty and swiftly moving to a next phase of arms control to strengthen nuclear stability, carefully adjusted to a world of multiple nuclear actors. The imperative to make safer and more stable the military standoff that cuts across Europe’s most unstable regions, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, working vigorously to preserve existing constraints, such as the Open Skies Treaty—now under challenge—and the Vienna Document 2011, and creating new confidence-building measures. ? The success of U.S.-China policy will in no small measure depend on whether the state of U.S.-Russia relations permits three-way cooperation on critical issues. Our current policies reinforce Russia’s readiness to align with the least constructive aspects of China’s U.S. policy. Moving the needle in the opposite direction will not be easy, but should be our objective. ? On salient issues where U.S. and Russian interests are in genuine conflict, such as Ukraine and Syria, the U.S. should remain firm on principles shared with our allies and critical to a fair outcome. More attention, however, should be paid to the cumulative effect that measured and phased steps forward can have on the overall relationship, and in turn the opportunity an improving relationship creates for further steps forward. ? While sanctions should be a part of our Russia policy, they should be judiciously targeted and used in conjunction with other elements of national power, especially diplomacy. The steady accumulation of congressionally mandated sanctions as punishment for Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the poisoning in Salisbury, violations of the INF treaty and election meddling reduces any incentive Moscow might have to change course since it considers those sanctions permanent. We need to restore flexibility to our sanctions regime, focusing on targeted sanctions that can be eased quickly in exchange for Russian steps that advance negotiations toward acceptable resolutions of outstanding conflicts, including a demonstrable Russian effort to cease interference in our electoral process. Doing so will require political will on the part of both the White House and the Congress. Ultimately, the reality is that Russia, under Vladimir Putin, operates within a strategic framework deeply rooted in nationalist traditions that resonate with elites and the public alike. An eventual successor, even one more democratically inclined, will likely operate within this same framework. Premising U.S. policy on the assumption that we can and must change that framework is misguided. Likewise, we would be unwise to think that we have no choice but to stick with current policy. We must deal with Russia as it is, not as we wish it to be, fully utilizing our strengths but open to diplomacy. So focused, we can both cope with the challenge that Russia poses and strive to put the relationship on a more constructive path. Failure to do so carries too high a price.RelationsThe counterplan’s more restrained approach to engagement is key to improving US-Russian relations Rumer and Sokolsky, Carnegie Senior Fellow and Nonresident senior fellow, 6-20-19(Eugene and Richard, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?,” accessed 8-15-20, ) JFN Several other patterns in U.S. policy toward Russia account for the failures over the past three decades. Overreach has been a persistent feature of U.S. Russia policy, reflected in commitments to ambitious goals without the means to accomplish them. U.S. policymakers have repeatedly exaggerated America’s ability to affect developments in Russia and their influence over the Kremlin. They have defined American interests in the most expansive terms, failing to distinguish between core and peripheral concerns or to prioritize them. When Moscow pushed back, Washington reasserted its right and responsibility to teach Russia and its neighbors how to manage their affairs rather than take account of Russian objections. It is hard to escape the conclusion that a more restrained U.S. approach to dealing with Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union could have resulted in a more productive U.S.-Russian relationship.The counterplan’s gradual approach to improving relations is the best approach for engaging Russia Rumer and Sokolsky, Carnegie Senior Fellow and Nonresident senior fellow, 6-20-19(Eugene and Richard, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?,” accessed 8-15-20, ) JFN Russia is an important actor on the world stage with far-reaching ambitions and significant capabilities; its withdrawal in the 1990s was an aberration rather than the norm. It will insist on occupying a seat at the table in dealing with most global crises and regional conflicts. The United States therefore has a vital interest in establishing a stable, sustainable relationship with Russia. Washington can neither afford to ignore Russia nor embrace a confrontational posture that would increase tensions and risk conflict. It is a relationship that has to be managed at the highest levels of U.S. policymaking, with personal involvement by the president. Developing a more cooperative and less antagonistic U.S.-Russian relationship will require a gradual, step-by-step process of rebuilding a measure of trust and practicing mutual restraint in dealing not only with bilateral problems, but also a broader range of issues where U.S. and Russian interests intersect. It would be unrealistic to expect the U.S.-Russian relationship to be free of competition and tensions, but even if major differences cannot be resolved, they can be more effectively managed. Advancing U.S. interests will require realism, restraint, and active engagement with Russia, and give-and-take and compromises rather than ultimatums.Improved US-Russian relations are key to addressing numerous existential threats Rumer and Sokolsky, Carnegie Senior Fellow and Nonresident senior fellow, 6-20-19(Eugene and Richard, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?,” accessed 8-15-20, ) JFN Over the past decade, Russia has returned as both a major European and, increasingly, global power.1 Its relationship with the United States, antagonistic or cooperative, is consequential for U.S. interests. Specifically, Russia: remains a nuclear superpower, and is the only country that poses an existential threat to the United States and its major treaty allies; is endowed with vast natural resources and has weaponized this asset to achieve its political objectives in Europe;2 has veto power on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which it has frequently used to thwart U.S.-supported initiatives toward Syria, Venezuela, and North Korea, to name a few; is capable of projecting military power well beyond its borders in pursuit of a competing vision of global order and its own great power aspirations;4 and pursues geopolitical ambitions inimical to U.S. interests—notably, the creation of an exclusive sphere of influence in the former Soviet space and opposition to a unified transatlantic community, as well as American efforts to maintain a liberal international order.5 A military confrontation between the two countries could have profoundly destabilizing and even catastrophic effects on global order and security. In contrast, a more cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship could yield progress on threats to U.S. national security and prosperity—challenges that the United States cannot tackle effectively alone. Preventing further nuclear proliferation, including the complex problem of securing nuclear materials and other components of weapons of mass destruction, will require not only greater U.S.-Russia collaboration but also preserving at least some elements of the remaining arms control framework and inspection regimes. Efforts to combat transnational threats, from terrorist movements to criminal organizations and illicit trafficking, would also benefit from U.S.-Russian cooperation. Likewise, it will not be possible to resolve long-standing regional conflicts, for example on the Korean Peninsula and in Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, without U.S. and Russian cooperation and willingness to negotiate. Finally, the United States and Russia will need to find practical ways to avoid escalation of tensions in cyberspace and outer space, and restrain the growth of Chinese influence.Nuclear War/Climate Change Improved US-Russia relations are key to solve existential threats like nuclear war and climate change Gottemoeller, Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, 8-5-20(Rose, “It’s Time to Rethink Our Russia Policy,” accessed 8-10-20, ) JFNU.S.-Russia relations are at a dangerous dead end that threatens the U.S. national interest. The risk of a military confrontation that could go nuclear is again real. We are drifting toward a fraught nuclear arms race, with our foreign-policy arsenal reduced mainly to reactions, sanctions, public shaming and congressional resolutions. The global Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting serious worldwide economic decline, rather than fostering cooperation, have only reinforced the current downward trajectory. Meanwhile, the great challenges to peace and our well-being that demand U.S.-Russia cooperation, including the existential threats of nuclear war and climate change, go unattended. Because the stakes are so high, both in the dangers they entail and the costs they contain, we believe that a careful, dispassionate analysis and change of our current course are imperative.Accidental War/ProliferationSmall agreements solve for accidental war and proliferationBurns, Former US Deputy Secretary of state, 17(William, “Russia without illusions,” accessed 8-7-20, ) JFN At the same time, we should also work to preserve the remaining guardrails that help forestall conflict between the world’s largest nuclear powers. Preserving direct lines of communications, especially between our militaries, is vital for reducing the risk of inadvertent collisions in places like Syria, where our forces operate in tight quarters on a fluid battlefield. We still have shared interests in preventing wider nuclear proliferation, and both sides would be well-served if we can prevent domestic politics in Washington and Moscow from shredding what remains of the bilateral arms-control architecture. These are modest yet difficult goals, but navigating this type of great-power rivalry is what diplomacy is all about — maneuvering in the gray area between peace and war, demonstrating a grasp of the limits of the possible, building leverage, exploring common ground where we can find it, and pushing back persistently where we can’t.Strategic Stability Increased bilateral dialogue is key to solve for strategic stability and military escalation Rumer and Sokolsky, Carnegie Senior Fellow and Nonresident senior fellow, 6-20-19(Eugene and Richard, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?,” accessed 8-15-20, ) JFN Since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the quality, frequency, and productivity of U.S.-Russian high-level dialogue have all suffered. These consultations need to be resuscitated and regularized. The issues that require immediate attention include maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Russian arms control framework, deterrence, and strategic stability; developing rules for managing U.S.-Russian competition in cyberspace, space, and regional conflicts; and reducing the risks of unintended military escalation between NATO and Russian forces.Russia Says YesRussia supports the idea of linkage diplomacyNotte, Univ. of Oxford PhD Candidate, 17(Hanna, “Russian-American Cooperation in the Middle East – An Analysis of Moscow’s Interests, Leverage, and Strategies of Linkage,” December 2017, accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN The infrequency of explicit linkage diplomacy in Russian-US cooperation reflects principled policy on both sides, and American perceptions of the meaningfulness and costliness of Russia’s cooperation. Unlike what is implied in the cooperation literature, the concrete institutional form of cooperation has little explanatory value for the infrequent evidence of linkage. That said, a Russian expectation of what is termed diffuse reciprocity is always a contextual driver of cooperation, especially when Russian-US relations are on an upward trajectory. Moscow routinely hopes that its cooperation will make an atmospheric contribution to its bilateral relationship with Washington, which can then be used to seek accommodation over other bilateral issues.Russia is willing to make agreements with the US to counterbalance Chinese influence Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, 1-31-19(Douglas, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN Despite the geopolitical tensions of recent years, Russia is also a logical candidate for the United States to court for the purpose of balancing against aggressive Chinese behavior. Beijing and Moscow have a long common border, past antagonism, and lingering suspicions about each other. Russia’s underpopulated and mineral-rich eastern territory sits uneasily alongside overpopulated and resource-poor parts of China. During interviews in Moscow prior to the inauguration of the Trump administration, Russian officials emphasized the opportunities they see for greater cooperation with Beijing, but every conversation had an undertone of nervousness about Chinese ambitions and revealed hopes of repairing relations with the West.101 These reservations are likely to persist, even if they are now offset by new issues with the United States.Russia empirically supports linkage diplomacyNotte, Univ. of Oxford PhD Candidate, 17(Hanna, “Russian-American Cooperation in the Middle East – An Analysis of Moscow’s Interests, Leverage, and Strategies of Linkage,” December 2017, accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN While explicit linkage in Russian-US cooperation could not be confirmed, the empirical analysis has highlighted the need for a more nuanced vocabulary, which adequately reflects the reality that Russian officials have expectations of cooperation that are less clearly specified than the canon on linkage suggests. Keohane’s concept of ‘diffuse reciprocity’ helps to capture this idea. Across all case studies examined, Russian cooperation, precipitated by regional interests, also pursued either a continued upward trajectory in the bilateral relationship with the US (chapters 2 and 4), or was designed to prevent it from unravelling further (chapters 3 and 5). In the case studies on Iraq and Iran, the Russian government hoped that there would be an accretion of US goodwill with Russia over time. Following the 2003 Iraq invasion, for instance, the Putin government remained interested in pragmatic cooperation with the West, still: “wanted to test how far cooperation could go.” 5 In the Lebanese and Syrian case studies, situations which entailed Russia’s cooperation amid tension with the US, diffuse reciprocity was conceived of in terms of Moscow forestalling the further unravelling of the bilateral relationship. Supporting the 2005 Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon, for instance, Russian officials expected that cooperation might “buy some space” for it on other issues and appeared eager to: “put the relationship back on track.”***NET BENEFITS***Deterrence DA: 1NCUnilateral US concessions increase Russian aggression Haddad and Polyakova, Brookings Institute, 3-5-18(Benjamin and Alina, “Don’t rehabilitate Obama on Russia,” accessed 8-10-20, ) JFN Obama’s much-ballyhooed “Reset” with Russia, launched in 2009, was in keeping with optimistic attempts by every post-Cold War American administration to improve relations with Moscow out of the gate. Seizing on the supposed change of leadership in Russia, with Dmitry Medvedev temporarily taking over the presidency from Vladimir Putin, Obama’s team quickly turned a blind eye to Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, which in retrospect was Putin’s opening move in destabilizing the European order. Like George W. Bush before him, Obama vastly overestimated the extent to which a personal relationship with a Russian leader could affect the bilateral relationship. U.S.-Russia disagreements were not the result of misunderstandings, but rather the product of long-festering grievances. Russia saw itself as a great power that deserved equal standing with the U.S. What Obama saw as gestures of good will—such as the 2009 decision to scrap missile defense plans for Poland and the Czech Republic—Russia interpreted as a U.S. retreat from the European continent. Moscow pocketed the concessions and increasingly inserted itself in European affairs. The Kremlin was both exploiting an easy opportunity and reasserting what it thought was its historic prerogative.Deterrence DA: Extensions Unilateral concessions are perceived as weakness by China and RussiaSchoff and Bin, senior fellow’s in the Carnegie Asia Program, 11-7-17(James and Li, “A Precarious Triangle: U.S.-China Strategic Stability and Japan,” accessed 8-14-20, ) JFN One U.S. workshop participant described “two schools of mutual vulnerability in the United States.” One accepts it is a fact of life, while the second rejects it publicly out of sensitivity to allies. Within the second group there are some who seek active efforts to minimize U.S. vulnerability for U.S. advantage and to reassure allies. Another argued that there is a third school of thought (at least in the Obama era), that was not willing to challenge mutual vulnerability. “We did not develop a posture to negate China’s nuclear force, but we were also not willing to deliver explicit reassurances . . . not because of Tokyo [i.e., for reassurance of Japan] but because of Beijing’s view.” The scholar explained that early efforts by the administration of president Barack Obama to signal reassurance to Beijing seemed to be received (by both China and Russia) as a sign of weakness and appeasement, prompting the Obama team to end that approach.Elections DA: 1NCUnilateral US concessions to Russia are politically unpopular Ven Bruusgaard, assistant professor of political science at University of Oslo, 7-19-18(Kristin, “Putin’s wish list does not include destroying Trump,” accessed 8-10-20, ) JFN Many will claim that dialogue with Russia now comes at a price that is too high. Even if Trump were able to force his subordinates to sit down and talk to the Russians, any US concessions without reciprocity would produce a major US backlash. The Helsinki summit may have infused the Russian leadership with renewed confidence and a certain level of smugness, given the manner in which Trump sided with Russia. If the Russians were previously uncertain whether the American president could be manipulated, they have to be more convinced now.***Answers To***Turn: Engagement Signals Weakness The plan’s wavering of US commitments to NATO is a comparatively bigger source of US weakness, as perceived by Russia Rumer and Sokolsky, Carnegie Senior Fellow and Nonresident senior fellow, 6-20-19(Eugene and Richard, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?,” accessed 8-15-20, ) JFN Maintaining an unwavering U.S. commitment to its NATO allies should be the third-highest priority. Under no circumstances should Russian leaders doubt the alliance’s strength and the principle of collective security underlying Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.80 Preserving the credibility of NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrents is the most effective way for the United States to minimize the risk of war in Europe.Turn: Conditions BadNo Link: this isn’t a conditions counterplan. The CP reaches a mutual agreement with Russia and is implemented simultaneously. The counterplan doesn’t place conditions on the implementation of the agreement. Permutation: Do BothDoing both links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Unilateral concessions spark Russian aggression Rumer, Sokolsky, and Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2-13-17(Eugene, Richard, and Andrew, “Trump and Russia: The Right Way to Manage Relations,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFN The challenge facing the Trump administration is to skillfully manage, rather than permanently resolve, these tensions with Moscow. Trying to appease Putin, perhaps by making unilateral concessions, would only convince him that he is winning and encourage him to continue wrong-footing the United States and the West. But a more confrontational approach would risk generating a provocative and dangerous response from Russia. So Washington will need to chart a middle path. That means both seeking ways to cooperate with Moscow and pushing back against it without sleepwalking into a collision. Of course, that advice presupposes a U.S. administration that views Russia the same way previous ones have: as a problematic yet important partner on discrete issues that also poses a significant national security threat. U.S. President Donald Trump, however, appears eager to jettison established bipartisan approaches to dealing with Moscow. As he wrote on Twitter in January, “Having a good relationship with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing. Only ‘stupid’ people, or fools, would think that it is bad!” And for months, he mocked the U.S. intelligence community’s warnings about Russian cyberattacks aimed at interfering with the U.S. democratic process and repeatedly praised Putin’s leadership. Such antics suggest that Trump may attempt an abrupt reconciliation with Russia that would dramatically reverse the policies of President Barack Obama. It is hard to overstate the lasting damage that such a move would do to the U.S. relationship with Europe, to the security of the continent, and to an already fraying international order.Permutation links to the deterrence DA because any doubt in Putin’s mind about US commitment to defend the territory of allies sparks great wars Heinrichs, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 7-16-18(Rebeccah, “No Grand Bargain in Helsinki,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN One, the United States will not recognize Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine and will continue to send aid to assist the Ukrainians in fighting for their sovereignty. The president doesn’t need to say more or less on this point. If Trump leaves any doubt in Putin’s mind about his intolerance for invasions and annexations of territory belonging to U.S. allies, Russia will be encouraged to do it again elsewhere. Small wars lead to great wars, and great wars are best avoided when the small wars are nipped early. For a president like Trump, willing to use military force but very reluctant to keep U.S. deployments or add to them, this is something to keep in mind.Putin pockets unilateral US concessionsWall Street Journal, 7-13-18(“What Putin Wants From Trump,” accessed 8-10-20, p. Factiva) JFN Donald Trump meets Vladimir Putin Monday in Helsinki, and if the U.S. President has an agenda beyond dominating the headlines and taunting his domestic opponents, it isn't apparent. That won't be the case with Mr. Putin, who has spent 18 months sizing up the American President and will be looking to get the most out of a weak Russian hand. In 18 years running Russia, Mr. Putin has outfoxed two previous U.S. Presidents who sought better relations. The Russian makes promises to win concessions but then typically reneges or moves to exploit what he perceives as U.S. weakness. George W. Bush at least negotiated the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that stifled missile defenses, but Mr. Putin rolled over Barack Obama like T-14 tanks in a Ukrainian corn field. So let's assess the summit in advance by what Mr. Putin wants now from Mr. Trump. The U.S. President considers himself a shrewd negotiator, so we can measure the results by how much of the Putin agenda the former KGB operative gets Mr. Trump to concede. -- Prestige. Mr. Putin's top priority at all times is shoring up his political standing at home, where he lacks democratic legitimacy. This means striding the world stage as if Russia is again a global power, and Mr. Trump is helping Mr. Putin on this score merely by meeting him on equal terms. The Russian will also want Mr. Trump to endorse Mr. Putin's denials about meddling in the 2016 election -- which he will advertise as official absolution. Mr. Putin has been persona non grata in Europe since he invaded Crimea in 2014, and he wants Mr. Trump's help with rehabilitation. Expect Mr. Putin to flatter Mr. Trump for his willingness to disrupt global norms. He'll also want Mr. Trump to repeat his recent comments that Mr. Putin should rejoin the G-7. -- Syria. Mr. Putin has accomplished what he sought when he barged into Syria in 2015. He's saved Bashar Assad, fortified long-term military bases, and replaced the U.S. as chief power broker in the region. He wants Mr. Trump to validate these gains and withdraw U.S. troops from eastern Syria. In return Mr. Putin may promise to help the U.S. contain Iran's presence in Syria, though there's no guarantee he can do so, given Iran's investment in Mr. Assad. The Russian knows Mr. Trump is eager to bring U.S. troops home and might rely on assurances on Iran the way he did on the "de-escalation" zone in southwestern Syria. Mr. Putin has helped Mr. Assad bomb the opposition in that part of Syria despite the Russian's assurances. -- Ukraine. Mr. Putin wants Mr. Trump to accept his Crimea annexation, perhaps in return for recommitting to the Minsk negotiation process for eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces started another illegal war. Mr. Trump has already blamed Barack Obama for losing Crimea, essentially a unilateral concession that Mr. Putin will pocket. The Russian will also try to get Mr. Trump to stop providing Kiev with lethal weapons.Grand bargains are inherently bilateral and involve two countries making multiple concessions at the same timeGlaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. The preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives; to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States. Permutation: Plan is the CP (Plan is a Grand Bargain)The permutation still links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. The plan is not a grand bargain because it’s not implemented bilaterally, simultaneously, and doesn’t’ involve multiple issues Glaser, George Washington Univ. International Affairs Prof., 15(Charles, “A US-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Spring 2015, accessed 8-6-20, p. EBSCO) JFN Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. The preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives; to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Permutation links to the deterrence DA because any doubt in Putin’s mind about US commitment to defend the territory of allies sparks great wars Heinrichs, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 7-16-18(Rebeccah, “No Grand Bargain in Helsinki,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN One, the United States will not recognize Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine and will continue to send aid to assist the Ukrainians in fighting for their sovereignty. The president doesn’t need to say more or less on this point. If Trump leaves any doubt in Putin’s mind about his intolerance for invasions and annexations of territory belonging to U.S. allies, Russia will be encouraged to do it again elsewhere. Small wars lead to great wars, and great wars are best avoided when the small wars are nipped early. For a president like Trump, willing to use military force but very reluctant to keep U.S. deployments or add to them, this is something to keep in mind.Unilateral concessions spark Russian aggression Rumer, Sokolsky, and Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2-13-17(Eugene, Richard, and Andrew, “Trump and Russia: The Right Way to Manage Relations,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFN The challenge facing the Trump administration is to skillfully manage, rather than permanently resolve, these tensions with Moscow. Trying to appease Putin, perhaps by making unilateral concessions, would only convince him that he is winning and encourage him to continue wrong-footing the United States and the West. But a more confrontational approach would risk generating a provocative and dangerous response from Russia. So Washington will need to chart a middle path. That means both seeking ways to cooperate with Moscow and pushing back against it without sleepwalking into a collision. Of course, that advice presupposes a U.S. administration that views Russia the same way previous ones have: as a problematic yet important partner on discrete issues that also poses a significant national security threat. U.S. President Donald Trump, however, appears eager to jettison established bipartisan approaches to dealing with Moscow. As he wrote on Twitter in January, “Having a good relationship with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing. Only ‘stupid’ people, or fools, would think that it is bad!” And for months, he mocked the U.S. intelligence community’s warnings about Russian cyberattacks aimed at interfering with the U.S. democratic process and repeatedly praised Putin’s leadership. Such antics suggest that Trump may attempt an abrupt reconciliation with Russia that would dramatically reverse the policies of President Barack Obama. It is hard to overstate the lasting damage that such a move would do to the U.S. relationship with Europe, to the security of the continent, and to an already fraying international order.Permutation: Unilateral Concessions = Grand Bargain The permutation links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Unilateral concessions spark Russian aggression Rumer, Sokolsky, and Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2-13-17(Eugene, Richard, and Andrew, “Trump and Russia: The Right Way to Manage Relations,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFN The challenge facing the Trump administration is to skillfully manage, rather than permanently resolve, these tensions with Moscow. Trying to appease Putin, perhaps by making unilateral concessions, would only convince him that he is winning and encourage him to continue wrong-footing the United States and the West. But a more confrontational approach would risk generating a provocative and dangerous response from Russia. So Washington will need to chart a middle path. That means both seeking ways to cooperate with Moscow and pushing back against it without sleepwalking into a collision. Of course, that advice presupposes a U.S. administration that views Russia the same way previous ones have: as a problematic yet important partner on discrete issues that also poses a significant national security threat. U.S. President Donald Trump, however, appears eager to jettison established bipartisan approaches to dealing with Moscow. As he wrote on Twitter in January, “Having a good relationship with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing. Only ‘stupid’ people, or fools, would think that it is bad!” And for months, he mocked the U.S. intelligence community’s warnings about Russian cyberattacks aimed at interfering with the U.S. democratic process and repeatedly praised Putin’s leadership. Such antics suggest that Trump may attempt an abrupt reconciliation with Russia that would dramatically reverse the policies of President Barack Obama. It is hard to overstate the lasting damage that such a move would do to the U.S. relationship with Europe, to the security of the continent, and to an already fraying international order.Putin pockets unilateral US concessionsWall Street Journal, 7-13-18(“What Putin Wants From Trump,” accessed 8-10-20, p. Factiva) JFN Donald Trump meets Vladimir Putin Monday in Helsinki, and if the U.S. President has an agenda beyond dominating the headlines and taunting his domestic opponents, it isn't apparent. That won't be the case with Mr. Putin, who has spent 18 months sizing up the American President and will be looking to get the most out of a weak Russian hand. In 18 years running Russia, Mr. Putin has outfoxed two previous U.S. Presidents who sought better relations. The Russian makes promises to win concessions but then typically reneges or moves to exploit what he perceives as U.S. weakness. George W. Bush at least negotiated the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that stifled missile defenses, but Mr. Putin rolled over Barack Obama like T-14 tanks in a Ukrainian corn field. So let's assess the summit in advance by what Mr. Putin wants now from Mr. Trump. The U.S. President considers himself a shrewd negotiator, so we can measure the results by how much of the Putin agenda the former KGB operative gets Mr. Trump to concede. -- Prestige. Mr. Putin's top priority at all times is shoring up his political standing at home, where he lacks democratic legitimacy. This means striding the world stage as if Russia is again a global power, and Mr. Trump is helping Mr. Putin on this score merely by meeting him on equal terms. The Russian will also want Mr. Trump to endorse Mr. Putin's denials about meddling in the 2016 election -- which he will advertise as official absolution. Mr. Putin has been persona non grata in Europe since he invaded Crimea in 2014, and he wants Mr. Trump's help with rehabilitation. Expect Mr. Putin to flatter Mr. Trump for his willingness to disrupt global norms. He'll also want Mr. Trump to repeat his recent comments that Mr. Putin should rejoin the G-7. -- Syria. Mr. Putin has accomplished what he sought when he barged into Syria in 2015. He's saved Bashar Assad, fortified long-term military bases, and replaced the U.S. as chief power broker in the region. He wants Mr. Trump to validate these gains and withdraw U.S. troops from eastern Syria. In return Mr. Putin may promise to help the U.S. contain Iran's presence in Syria, though there's no guarantee he can do so, given Iran's investment in Mr. Assad. The Russian knows Mr. Trump is eager to bring U.S. troops home and might rely on assurances on Iran the way he did on the "de-escalation" zone in southwestern Syria. Mr. Putin has helped Mr. Assad bomb the opposition in that part of Syria despite the Russian's assurances. -- Ukraine. Mr. Putin wants Mr. Trump to accept his Crimea annexation, perhaps in return for recommitting to the Minsk negotiation process for eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces started another illegal war. Mr. Trump has already blamed Barack Obama for losing Crimea, essentially a unilateral concession that Mr. Putin will pocket. The Russian will also try to get Mr. Trump to stop providing Kiev with lethal weapons.Permutation: Plan is a Pre-Requisite to the CP Doing both links to the disadvantages because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Even if Russia likes the plan it doesn’t preclude the reality that they’ll pocket unilateral US concessions and perceive US concessions as weakness. The 1NC counterplan solvency evidence indicates Russia is willing to make deals with the US not involving the plan. The plan is not actually a pre-requisite to a grand bargain. Permutation links because plan action is immediateThe Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).Unilateral concessions spark Russian aggression Rumer, Sokolsky, and Weiss, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2-13-17(Eugene, Richard, and Andrew, “Trump and Russia: The Right Way to Manage Relations,” accessed 8-6-20, ) JFN The challenge facing the Trump administration is to skillfully manage, rather than permanently resolve, these tensions with Moscow. Trying to appease Putin, perhaps by making unilateral concessions, would only convince him that he is winning and encourage him to continue wrong-footing the United States and the West. But a more confrontational approach would risk generating a provocative and dangerous response from Russia. So Washington will need to chart a middle path. That means both seeking ways to cooperate with Moscow and pushing back against it without sleepwalking into a collision. Of course, that advice presupposes a U.S. administration that views Russia the same way previous ones have: as a problematic yet important partner on discrete issues that also poses a significant national security threat. U.S. President Donald Trump, however, appears eager to jettison established bipartisan approaches to dealing with Moscow. As he wrote on Twitter in January, “Having a good relationship with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing. Only ‘stupid’ people, or fools, would think that it is bad!” And for months, he mocked the U.S. intelligence community’s warnings about Russian cyberattacks aimed at interfering with the U.S. democratic process and repeatedly praised Putin’s leadership. Such antics suggest that Trump may attempt an abrupt reconciliation with Russia that would dramatically reverse the policies of President Barack Obama. It is hard to overstate the lasting damage that such a move would do to the U.S. relationship with Europe, to the security of the continent, and to an already fraying international order.Permutation links to the deterrence DA because any doubt in Putin’s mind about US commitment to defend the territory of allies sparks great wars Heinrichs, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 7-16-18(Rebeccah, “No Grand Bargain in Helsinki,” accessed 8-11-20, ) JFN One, the United States will not recognize Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine and will continue to send aid to assist the Ukrainians in fighting for their sovereignty. The president doesn’t need to say more or less on this point. If Trump leaves any doubt in Putin’s mind about his intolerance for invasions and annexations of territory belonging to U.S. allies, Russia will be encouraged to do it again elsewhere. Small wars lead to great wars, and great wars are best avoided when the small wars are nipped early. For a president like Trump, willing to use military force but very reluctant to keep U.S. deployments or add to them, this is something to keep in mind.Permutation: Do the Plan, Then the CP Doing the plan first links to the net benefits because the plan still limits the conditions of an allied defense pact. Only the counterplan avoids the links to the DA’s. Permutation: Do the CP, Then the Plan The permutation is severance because plan action is immediate and it’s a voting issue because severance permutations make the 2AC a moving target and make effective negative strategies impossible The Free Dictionary, no date (“resolved,” accessed 8-12-20, ) JFN re·solve (r?-z?lv′) v. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide. b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached. c. To cause (a person) to reach a decision: "He was resolved to enjoy the success he had earned" (F. Scott Fitzgerald).If doing the counterplan is the best policy option in the round, then you should vote negative because we’re the side that initially introduced the CP. It proves that there is no need for the plan. You can’t vote affirmative if the plan has proven to be a bad idea. International Fiat Bad No Link: the plan doesn’t fiat Russian action. We read Russia says yes to the CP evidence. ................
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