The role of perspective taking in negating juror biases:
Running Head: PERSPECTIVE TAKING, RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS, AND JURY BIASES
Balancing Judgment:
The Role of Perspective Taking in Reducing Juror Biases and the Effects of Religious Symbols
Eve F. E. Turow
Submitted to the Department of Psychology of Amherst College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of the Arts with honors.
Friday, April 24, 2009.
Faculty Advisor: Allen J. Hart
Thank you to my friends and family who supported me throughout this process. Thank you for keeping me sane, entertaining me and motivating me. Thank you to Professors Foels and Schulkind for your statistical help and to the rest of the psychology professors I had here at Amherst. Thank you to Dean Hart for your constant encouragement and guidance. I had a great time completing this project with you and learned a great deal throughout.
Table of Contents
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………6
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..7
Religion in the United States……………………………………………………...8
The History of Religion in the United States..………………………….....9
Religion and Adjudication……………………………………………………….11
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….13
Chapter One: The Psychological Effects of Religion on Decision-Making……………..15
The Complexities of Religion.…………………………………………………...15
Morality………………………………………………………………….16
Prejudice…………………………………………………………………18
Effects of Religion on Rational and Experiential Thinking……………………...21
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST)………….…………………22
Heuristic System Model (HSM)…………………………...…………….23
Schemas in Social Perception: Ingroup/Outgroup Attitudes…………………….28
Outgroup Punitiveness…………………………………………………...29
Similarity-Leniency Hypothesis…………………………………………32
Black Sheep Effect……………………………………………………….35
The Intricacies of Religious Groups………….……………………………….....39
Measuring Religious Prejudice…………………………….…………………….42
Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Orientation……………………………………43 Quest (Q) scale…………………………………………………………...45
Fundamentalism………………………………………………………….46
Chapter Summary………………………………………………………………..51
Chapter Two: The Role of Perspective Taking in Reducing Juror Biases and the Effects of Religious Symbols…………………………………………………………………….53
Methods…...……………………………………………………………………...54
Participants………………………………………………………………54
Materials…………………………………………………………………54
Procedure………………………………………………………………...60
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………….60
Perspective Taking……………………………………………………….60
Religious Conditions…………………………………………………......61
Results……………………………………………………………………………62
General…………………………………………………………………...62
Comprehension Check…………………………………………………...63
Effects of Perspective Taking……………………………………………64
Effects of Religious Conditions………………………………………….74
Gender……………………………………………………………………81
Discussion………………………………………………………………………..82
Perspective Taking: Conclusions………………………………………...84
Religious Conditions: Conclusions………………………………………86
Limitations……………………………………………………………………….89
Suggestions for Future Research………………………………………………...91
Implications for the Future…………………………………………………….....91
Chapter Three: Regulating Religion & Implications…………………………………….94
Durkheim: Emphasizing Citizenship…………………………………………….96
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...100
Further Conclusions…………………………………………………….103
Appendices
Appendix A: Trial Summary…………………………………………………………...105
Appendix B: Dependant Measures Survey……………………………………………..107
Appendix C: Vignettes………………………………………………………………….109
Appendix D: Correlations Chart………………………………………………………..110
Appendix E: Correlations without Atheist Participants………………………………...111
Appendix F: Regulating Religion……………………………………………………....112
Religion Clauses………………………………………………………………..112
Faith-Based Rehabilitation……………………………………………………..118
Innate Ties between Religion and Law………………………………….……...121
References………………………………………………………………………………126
List of Illustrations
Figures
Figure 1: Recommended Sentences with & without Perspective Taking instructions for all participants.…………………………………………………………….………..66
Figure 2: Recommended Sentences from Christian participants with & without Perspective Taking instructions………………………………………………………..68
Figure 3: Religious Identification of all participants with & without Perspective Taking instructions……………………………………………………………………..73
Figure 4: Devotionalism of all participants with & without Perspective Taking instructions……………………………………………………………………………...73
Figure 5a. Reported Religious Identification of all participants…..………………...77
Figure 5b. Reported Religious Identification of Christian participants...……….….78
Figure 6a. Reported Devotionalism of all participants……………..………………...80
Figure 6b. Reported Devotionalism of Christian participants…………….………...80
Tables
Table 1. Sum of Perspective Taking with & without Perspective Taking instructions……………………………………………………………………………...64
Table 2. Sum of Perspective Taking with & without Perspective Taking instructions for all Christian participants…………...……………………….……………………..64
Table 3: Percent of guilty verdicts for aggravated sexual abuse in conditions with & without Perspective Taking…………………………………………………………….66
Table 4: Percent of guilty verdicts for aggravated sexual abuse in conditions with & without Perspective Taking; Only Christian participants…………………...............67
Table 5a: CEST Vignettes, Heuristic Means data of only Christian participants….70
Table 5b. CEST Vignettes, Logical Means data of only Christian participants……70
Table 6: Gender Data…………………………………………………………………..82
Abstract
Through a review of literature relevant to the issues of perspective taking, religion, and jury biases, we provide an overview of decision-making processes, ingroup and outgroup biases as well as religious biases and their role in courtrooms today. A study investigated the role of perspective taking and religious symbols on jury biases and decision-making by manipulating perspective taking instructions and religious content in a 3x2 factorial design. By including or excluding perspective taking instructions as well as changing the religion of a defendant within a case summary (control, Christian or Sikh), we were able to observe changes in participants’ judgments and thought processes. Measures of perspective taking as well as experiential and rational thinking were administered, utilizing Davis’ (1980/1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index along with Epstein’s (1996) Rational-Experiential Inventory and Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory vignettes, originally theorized by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). It was hypothesized that perspective taking instructions would reduce the expression of juror biases and increase rational thinking while the presence of religious symbols was expected to increase levels of juror bias and experiential thinking. Evidence supported the first of these hypotheses, with lowered sentences and higher rationality reported with perspective taking instructions, while mixed results were collected regarding the effect of religious symbols. Correlations between religious symbols, experiential thinking, Devotionalism, as well as Religious Identification shifted between the Christian and Sikh conditions. Findings led to the conclusion that perspective taking acts to inhibit the expression of juror biases and increase rationality while the inclusion of religious symbols dulls the effect of perspective taking by altering the ways in which participants view themselves as well as the defendant. In the end, it is concluded that perspective taking instructions be added to Judge’s instructions and that religious symbols be expelled from the courts.
Introduction
The arenas of law and religion are often mixed in American culture. With the country’s underpinnings set in Judeo-Christian thought, many see it as inevitable for religion to work into the seams of United States policy and traditions. From the use of a holy book for swearing in witnesses, to the formidable placement of the Judge upon the pulpit, and jurors referring to the Bible to help reach their verdicts,[1] religious undercurrents are felt in courtrooms throughout the country. And while many accept these undercurrents as inescapable and often an assumed part of the legal realm, several studies have begun to show the biasing effects of religious salience within the courts (e.g., Howard & Redfering, 1983; Egland, 2004; Herek, 1987; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Kerr et al., 1995; Miller, 2008).
These studies beg one to question the biases present within jurors around the country and the role of religious content in further instigating the expression of religious biases. Further, one must question how religious references affect a juror’s decision-making processes and adjudication. By investigating the influence of perspective taking on juror biases and the effects of religion on rational and experiential thinking, I aim to show that: 1) jurors hold inherent biases 2) the use of perspective taking (asking one to take the perspective of another) can reduce expression of inherent biases 3) the presence of religious symbols creates religious salience and instigates the expression of ingroup/outgroup biases, effecting the ways in which we view ourselves and others, 4) that the salience of religion also hinders one’s ability to think rationally, causing one to rely on personal feelings over judge’s instructions and evidence provided within the case, and finally 5) perspective taking reduces these tendencies. Through this investigation, I hope to demonstrate the significant biases present within jurors and the effects of religion in the United States court system, and furthermore the importance of perspective taking instructions in reducing juror biases and the need to extract any and all religious references from the courtroom environment.
Religion in the United States
For many U.S. citizens, religion acts as an additional set of laws, instructing believers in ethics and supplying a moral code for framing their lives. “All men desire to know,” wrote Aristotle, [2] and religion lets us do just that; it opens the door to the intrigues of life and death, the meaning of life,[3] and the rules to follow for everyday laments. [4] Furthermore, religion plays an integral part in self-definition and positive self-evaluations, often depicting one’s upbringing and daily actions (Kentworthy, 2003). [5] People say that today, few topics are taken more seriously than religion (Spilka et al., 2003). We have created a society in which religion is constantly invoked, whether through celebrations of marriage or birth or for ceremonies for those we have lost. Particularly in the United States, religion is omnipresent, and consistently influences our political system, laws, and education.[6]
Many fail to recognize the overwhelming number of religious Americans. A 2007 Gallup Poll found that 56 percent of Americans say religion is “very important” in their own lives and 61 percent of Americans are members of a church or synagogue.[7] For the past 60 years, the percentage of individuals reporting that they believe in God has exceeded 90 percent (Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Kentworthy, 2003); according to the 2001 Census, 79.8% of Americans label themselves Christians, 1.4% Jewish, and 0.6% Muslim. These statistics explain why Judeo-Christian traditions are an integral part of our society, indicating that most Americans believe in the Old Testament as well as the concept of one God, and nearly 80% believe in the teachings of the New Testament.
The history of religion in the United States. It is essential to understand the difficulty in addressing religion and the long-lasting role religion has played in the formation of the United States. Thomas Jefferson stated that the First Amendment clearly indicates a separation of church and state.[8] Even so, the lines between the two continue to be blurred. Whereas several laws have been put into place to limit the government’s role in religious matters, splitting these two issues has proven to be nearly impossible. From confusion regarding the Religion Clauses, to the blatant presence of religion within American culture, religion has maneuvered its way into our courtrooms.[9] Furthermore, Judeo-Christian beliefs influenced the founding of the United States, and thus played an inevitable role in the creation of our laws as well as traditions.
Examples of Christian roots are present in several common-place American traditions. [10] In fact, the precursors to the current Maryland Sunday closing laws are undeniably religious. The first Maryland statute regarding Sunday activities, enacted in 1649, was titled “An Act concerning Religion.” It made it illegal to “profane the Sabbath or Lords day called Sunday by frequent swearing, drunkenness or by any uncivil or disorderly recreation, or by working on that day.”[11] A later statute in 1962, entitled “An Act for the Service of Almighty God and the Establishment of the Protestant Religion within this province,” emphasized the importance of keeping the Sabbath and later called for a Sunday labor prohibition. By 1973, the Sabbath-breaking section of the Maryland statutes assumed its present form by omitting the specific prohibition against swearing and the religiously significant title. [12] In recent years the religious motivations of Sunday closings have been de-emphasized, with the focus shifted to a common wellbeing rather than religious expectations, but Sunday closings remain today nonetheless. This is just one example of Christian-based laws, plentiful in the legal history of the United States, acting as the founding for laws in place today.
While religion acts as an assumed and natural part of American society, few recognize its warping effects on one’s rationality, making the issue of religion’s role in the legal world necessary to address. Because of the moral and emotional significance of religion, its presence acts to inhibit the proper functioning of our judicial system. Religion initiates experiential thinking, biases, and often reliance on one’s religious morals above the law, and in this manner prejudices juries and judges alike (Miller & Bornstein, 2006; Miller & Bornstein, 2005). Whereas the ties between religion and the law are difficult to address, the effects of religious beliefs on one’s psychological state are enormous and therefore must be further researched.
Religion and Adjudication
It is unmistakable that jurors of all faiths feel pressure to adhere to their beliefs while in court, depending upon religious teachings to guide them in adjudications. In the past, jurors have met to “pray for divine assistance” during deliberations and have openly admitted to researching Biblical passages in search of guidance (Howard & Redfering, 1983; Egland, 2004).[13] Even political figures such as George W. Bush have openly relied on religious morals when making legal judgments. While considering the death penalty case against Karla Faye Tucker, then Governor Bush admitted that he had “sought guidance through prayer” and decided to place the responsibility of judging another on a “higher authority” instead of himself (Egland, 2004). Situations such as this highlight the importance of religion to many jurors throughout the U.S. And not only does religion provide an alternative book of guidance, but it influences the decision-making process.
Religious salience can affect the decision-making process in several ways, one of which is eliciting experiential thinking. The topic of religion often evokes juror’s emotions, instigating a purely experiential decision rather than a rational one, following the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST). During experiential processing, jurors are more likely to rely on religious teachings and biases to help them reach a verdict. Experiential processing is oriented around feelings of pleasure and pain and encourages people to make decisions based on what feels best to them at the given moment, in a very immediate manner. Therefore, many prosecutors and attorneys exploit the religious beliefs of citizens by incorporating Biblical statements into their arguments, attempting to sway the jury for or against a defendant.[14] By doing so, they encourage jurors to make emotional evaluations. As such, the topic of religion greatly jeopardizes one’s ability to think rationally about a case before them.
Additionally, as was the case with former President Bush, religious beliefs often act as mental shortcuts that relieve the evaluator of responsibility in accordance with the Heuristic Systems Model (HSM). Heuristics allow an individual to process information in a cursory manner, often resulting in experiential decisions, reflecting any prejudice or biases a person may hold. Additionally, by attributing one’s decision to his/her religious teachings, he/she defers the responsibility of the decision from himself/herself to a higher authority. As shown in several studies (e.g., Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Miller & Bornstein, 2006; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 1992), the topic of religion often elicits heuristic thinking due to its emotional and personal relevance. Heuristic thinking greatly hinders one’s ability to make a rational and effortful decision, compromising the validity and honesty of a potential juror.
Furthermore, beyond the mental processes involved in decision-making, ingroup/outgroup biases are also a factor when it comes judging others, especially when the religion of the defendant is known. Religion connects people; it socializes behavior and creates a common community. As stated by Lumsden and Wilson (1983), religion is a “powerful device by which people are absorbed into a tribe and psychically strengthened.”[15] Emile Durkheim considers religion to be a collective action that engages and fuses people together, legitimizing and reinforcing society’s values and creating groups with common goals and idealization. According to Durkheim, one finds collective effervescence within religious groups, unifying communities around a common belief. [16] Due to the strong bonds between those of a similar religious group, ingroup and outgroup biases are often triggered when the religious affiliation of the defendant is known. Such biases manipulate thought processes through the similarity-leniency hypothesis as well as the black sheep effect, both of which will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.
Conclusion
Some topics of discussion within this piece will include morality and prejudice, inherent juror biases and the role of perspective taking in controlling for these biases, the various psychological effects of religious material on decision-making and the difficulty of addressing religious beliefs. Additionally, current research and the implications of such research will be discussed. While studies have been conducted to address outgroup religious biases (e.g., Van Pooigen & Lam, 2007; Kerr et al., 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Daudistel et al., 1999) and the effects of religious defense and prosecutorial arguments in courts (e.g., Miller & Bornstein 2005; Miller & Bornstein, 2006), no study has looked into the possibility of an innate presence of religion in courtrooms, triggered by the use of a holy book for swearing in and possible religious symbols present on the defendant (such as a necklace or tattoo), and the effects of such religious presence on juror decision-making. Therefore, in an effort to better understand the role of religion in courts today, this study examines the role of perspective taking in reducing levels of bias and altering court verdicts as well as assesses the impact of religious symbols on a juror’s ability to think rationally and the effect it may have upon sentencing decisions. Furthermore, it examines the effects of perspective taking instructions and religious material on evaluations of the self and others. Upon completion of the study, evidence was found to indicate that instructions of perspective taking resulted in higher levels of rational thinking and decreased reliance on religious convictions. Additionally, there was significant evidence that the presence of a religious book and religious symbol within the courtroom effected jurors’ sentencing decisions, reliance on experiential thinking, as well as how jurors viewed themselves. A complete review of the findings will follow in Chapter Two.
Chapter One:
The Psychological Effects of Religion on Decision-Making.
“The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice…Some people say the only cure for prejudice is more religion, some say the only cure is to abolish religion.” –Allport (1954)
“The nature of the man himself is the element that determines the juror’s bias for or against his fellowman. Assuming that a juror is not a half-wit, his intellect can always furnish fairly good reasons for following his instincts and emotions. Many irrelevant issues in choosing jurors are not so silly as they seem. Matters that apparently have nothing to do with the discussion of a case often are of the greatest significance.”
-Darrow (1940, p.488)
The Complexities of Religion
Evidence has shown that religion both exacerbates and reduces levels of prejudice (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Herek; 1987; Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988; Perrin, 2000). For some, religion encourages kind behavior and acceptance. For others, religion excuses destructive and discriminatory acts and provides a means by which they develop feelings of supremacy. Religion is tightly bound to both morality and prejudice, feeding both fires with its rhetoric and group cohesion. For this reason, the impact of religious beliefs on one’s behavior is complex and not well understood. Yet, many continue to judge others based on religious affiliation and devotion, often associating one’s level of religiosity with kindness and honesty (e.g., Perrin, 2000; Krause & Ingersoll-Dayton, 2001; Commonwealth v. Daniels, 1994). This, one may argue, is an improper way to judge one’s morality because religious devotion may be an indicator of several contradictory characteristics (e.g., acceptance vs. discrimination). Religion has served as a means to heal as well as destruct, but how and why one uses religion for one purpose or the other is still unclear.
Morality. Many consider religion and morality to be inseparable concepts. Some of the most public leaders and beneficiaries have had strongly religious backgrounds, such as Mother Teresa and Martin Luther King Jr. Churches, synagogues and mosques around the world support social services and recreational activities, expressing the need for acceptance and equality, and as such, many deem religion and morality to be one and the same. As taught in Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, and many other faiths, religion provides an ethical system that, if applied, could benefit us all. In fact, many religious groups wish to legislate morality, making it a concrete structure in America’s political system.[17] Evidently, many believe that integrating religious morality would benefit our government and society today, providing a stronger moral backbone for the nation.
Because of the connections between morality and religion, religiousness is often associated with being a good person, with increased levels of honesty, trust and forgiveness. In an effort to legitimize the claim that religion correlates with increased levels of honesty, Perrin (2000) fashioned a study to evaluate honesty and religious values of Christian students at a United States college. The study began with Christian students completing a survey on religiosity, answering questions regarding their frequency of church attendance, belief in the afterlife, and several other similar topics. Afterwards, there was a simple test of honesty: after a weekly quiz, the student participants’ teacher intentionally graded the exams incorrectly, giving each student an additional point. Students were then told that there may have been a grading error and were asked to re-grade their own quizzes. Afterwards, the students were instructed to write either, “I owe you a point,” “Quiz graded correctly,” or “You owe me a point,” at the top of the page. Of the 130 students who participated in the experiment, only 32% honestly admitted to receiving an extra point on the quiz, while 52% claimed the quiz was graded correctly and 16% actually tried to get an extra point in addition to the one incorrectly received in the beginning. But, when crossing the religion score with the level of honesty, it was found that 45% of those who reported weekly church attendance honestly reported the 1-point error, while only 13% of those who attended church once a year honestly reported the error. Perrin took these results to indicate higher levels of honesty in those who attend church more frequently, supporting the claim that morality and religion are correlated. In fact, several other studies have mirrored her claim, correlating religion with lower levels of social deviance (e.g., Tittle & Welch 1983; Welch et al., 1991).
In contrast, many argue that religion is not an indicator of one’s morality, and that the two concepts are wholly independent. In fact, Kohlberg argued that religion does not directly contribute to one’s morality in any way.[18] Supporting Kohlberg, conflicting evidence has been found regarding the relationship between trust and forgiveness with religiosity. Gorsuch and Hao (1993) demonstrated a positive correlation between religious devotion and the desire to forgive, while McCullough and Worthington (1999) observed weak ties between religion and forgiveness. Schoenfeld (1978) related church attendance to increased trust in people (citing the effect of people’s extended trust in God), but this correlation was not found by Ostow (1990) when looking at fundamentalist, extremely conservative, and Pentecostal groups. Spilka et al. (2003) write that this finding is due to these groups’ general belief that people are primarily sinners, hindering their ability to trust. Even so, it directly challenges the assumption that morality is innately tied to religious convictions. By finding evidence to support both sides of the argument, endorsement of religion’s correspondence to morality is nullified. This contradictory evidence makes the link between morality and religion debatable. And because of the confusion surrounding religion and morality, one cannot assume that because one is religious he/she has high morals.[19]
Prejudice. Adding to the complex connections between morality and religion is the presence of prejudice, a topic in direct opposition to morality, but also often associated with religion. Several studies have connected the strength of one’s religious beliefs to one’s level of prejudice through measures of intrinsic and extrinsic, fundamental, and quest beliefs (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Herek, 1987; Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988). Looking further into predicting discriminatory behavior, McFarland (1989) developed a study to examine religious orientation and several possible prejudices. McFarland (1989) distributed a questionnaire to several students at a United States university, entitled “Religious and Social Attitudes,” that measured religious orientation and attitudes towards African-Americans, women, homosexuals, and communists. After data collection, McFarland (1989) found (in correlations between religious orientations and the discriminatory attitude scales) that all of the orientations tested for within the questionnaire (fundamentalism, extrinsic, intrinsic, and quest religious orientations) indicated a “general tendency to discriminate,” with residual scales revealing differing discriminatory attitudes for each group (p.1). This indicates that while these varying religious orientations held differing levels of prejudice affiliated with each racial/gender/political group, all reported significant levels of discrimination. This is just one of many studies that points to a connection between religion and discriminatory beliefs, supporting the conjecture that religion has natural ties to prejudicial viewpoints.
While often a predictor for discriminatory attitudes, religion is frequently deemed a catalyst for discrimination. These claims are made with the assumption that religion can provide justification for many prejudicial beliefs (e.g., Whitehead, 1962; Juergensmeyer, 2000). [20] Religious prejudice is apparent around the world, whether it is in the ongoing battle between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East, violence against Christians in Iraq,[21] Catholics battling Protestants in Northern Ireland, or the constant fighting between Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims in India. History has shown over and again the power of religious convictions and the negative attitudes they can create and often condone. One illustration of religious support for discriminatory attitudes can be observed in the issue of homosexuality and the Christian church. Hunsberger et al. (2005) discuss that many Christians point to their religiously-based moral position against homosexuality to justify their negative feelings towards homosexuality and homosexuals, claiming that their feelings are not prejudiced, but religious (e.g., Fulton et al., 1999). Yet, Hunsberger et al. (2005) found that this moral position acts as a predictor of discrimination, legitimizing a believer’s intolerant viewpoint. In this way, prejudicial beliefs are often rationalized through ones religious teachings, reasoning that one’s convictions are supported by the religion. Christians’ attitudes about homosexuality are not the only example of prejudice supported by one’s religious teachings. For example, it has been found that Christianity directly contributes to feelings of anti-Semitism (e.g., Glock and Stark, 1966; Eisinga, Konig, & Sheepers, 1995), [22] today members of Al-Qaeda’s jihad claim to be following their Muslim faith when they attack innocents in the Middle East and abroad, and many Zionists believe that the Torah gives Jews the right to Israel, often validating their violent treatment of Palestinians. Religious teachings and morals are used to uphold prejudicial attitudes around the world, in several religious groups and nations.
Prejudice is ignited in several ways, including ingroup/outgroup prejudice, stereotypes, emotional responses, and symbolic beliefs. In fact, a review by Batson et al. (1993) found that 37 of 47 research findings on this topic conducted between 1940 and 1990 showed a positive relationship between levels of religiousness and prejudice. Furthermore, only two studies showed a negative relationship. Hunsberger et al. (2005) showed that perceived religious competition can increase prejudice, along with levels of fundamentalism and intrinsic versus extrinsic orientations, concurring with the findings in McFarland (1989). Several studies support the assertion that fundamentalism correlates with increased prejudice (e.g., Jackson et al., 1997; Herek, 1987; Griffen et al., 1987; Unger, 2002; Hunsberger et al., 1999; McFarland, 1989), and many others argue that religious orientation (extrinsic vs. intrinsic) predicts prejudice. In short, the evidence supporting religious ingroup/outgroup biases is substantial.
Religion is often seen as a reflection of one’s moral fiber. Today, testimony regarding a defendant’s religiosity is generally accepted because it is considered evidence of the defendant’s character (Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Miller & Hayward, 2007)[23]. But, as discussed, religion can be a predictor of one’s moral code as well as one’s prejudicial beliefs. Simply because people are religious does not mean that they are honest and trustworthy, nor does it mean they are discriminatory or prejudiced. Religion is a complex matter that affects individuals in profound and extraordinarily different manners. This conundrum leaves us with several questions to be answered: What do religious beliefs indicate? How do they affect our thinking about ourselves and others? Do most individuals maintain religious biases? These questions will act as a guideline moving forward, challenging the common legal assumption that one’s character can be better understood by one’s level of religiousness and/or religious affiliation (Commonwealth v. Daniels, 1994). [24]
Effects of Religion on Rational and Experiential Thinking
It has been found that the salience of religious beliefs can lead to instinctual and heuristic decisions (e.g., Miller, 2008; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002; Miller & Bornstein, 2006). Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and the Heuristic System Model (HSM) are the two leading theories explaining the use of heuristics and experiential thinking. According to these models, when emotional content is salient, individuals are often unable to make rational decisions and instead rely on biases and mental shortcuts to make quick, instinctual, and outcome-oriented decisions. In doing so, heuristics often utilize thoughts that lie outside conscious awareness, such as subconscious prejudicial believes. Many claim that the presence of religious material in court sparks such personal biases and heuristics, interfering with rational thought processes necessary when making critical judgments (Miller & Bornstein, 2006); emotional content can jeopardize logical assessments by compromising one’s rationality.
Cognitive experiential self-theory (CEST). The threat to logical thinking is best explained by Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory. CEST creates a distinction between two modes of thinking: experiential and rational. Rational thinking is a conscious, effortful system that functions according to a person’s established rules of logic and evidence. While thinking rationally, one employs an analytic and detail-orientated mind frame. Rational thinking requires significant cognitive activity and can be, at times, quite time consuming.
Because of the cognitive capacity and time required for rational thinking, experiential thinking provides an alternative way to quickly sift through information. Unlike rational thinking, the experiential system is a preconscious, automatic system that relies on emotional cues for processing information (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Miller & Bornstein, 2005). When using the experiential system, generalizations and heuristics simplify and speed up the decision-making process. While this system of thinking has its evolutionary benefits, experiential thinking can result in illogical and rapid judgments, often based on one’s emotions, making it ill-suited for solving problems that require logical analysis (Epstein et al., 1996), highlighting the concern of jury members employing heuristics.
As stated earlier, individuals are likely to respond experientially instead of rationally during emotionally significant events (Miller & Bornstein, 2006). This effect was observed in a study by Bright & Goodman-Delahunty (2006), which inspected the effects of jarring images on jurors’ emotional states, demonstrating jurors’ reactions to gruesome photographs. Results indicated that jurors who saw the photographs had significantly higher mean ratings of the weight of inculpatory prosecution evidence than those who did not view the photographs. Furthermore, results indicated that mock jurors’ anger towards the defendant was significantly higher in the condition with gruesome photographs and enhanced the weight of inculpatory evidence. This study showed that emotional reactions can inhibit logical and rational decision processes and impair jurors’ abilities to deliver a verdict based only on the value of evidence in a case. Instead of looking solely at the evidence at hand, mock jurors were emotionally affected by the photographs, developing high levels of anger towards the defendant and weighing inculpatory evidence very strongly. Several other studies have been conducted that have collected similar results (e.g., Oliver & Griffitt, 1976; Douglas, Lyon & Ogloff, 1997; Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004), again emphasizing the distorting effects of emotional content on one’s judgments and thought processes.
Heuristic system model (HSM). These emotionally-driven snap judgments are a symptom of the heuristic system. While rational thinking utilizes systematic processing, an in-depth and analytic approach, experiential thinking uses heuristic processing, a structure that relies on “knowledge structures” created by past experiences (Chen et al., 1999). The role of heuristics is best explained by the Heuristic System Model (HSM). HSM states that people process information in two distinct ways: cursory and effortful (Miller & Bornstein, 2005). While rational-systematic processes require significant cognitive efforts, experiential-heuristic thinking allows for quick, cursory evaluations. Judgments made through heuristic shortcuts often reflect cue information (e.g., memories, biases, past experiences) rather than information particular to the current situation, excluding a thorough analysis of the situation, and instead forcing one to rely on personal biases, subconscious thoughts and prejudiced beliefs (Chen et al., 1999). These heuristics may explain the anger developed by mock jurors in the study by Bright & Goodman-Delahunty (2006). Seeing gruesome photographs could have triggered past memories that biased and influenced the jury members’ decisions. Also, heuristic shortcuts regularly lead to errors in judgment and prevent sufficient comprehension due to its minimal cognitive demands, one more explanation as to why experiential thinking often results in illogical decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
It is well documented that heuristics and experiential thinking are often activated when religious content is salient (e.g., Miller & Bornstein, 2006; Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Howard & Redfering, 1983; Epstein et al., 1996; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Johnson, 1984; Pfeifer, 1999). This evidence is of particular consequence in courtrooms when religious material and/or symbols are present. In an effort to better understand the role of religion in the courtroom, Miller and Bornstein (2006) designed an experiment to evaluate the effects of religious appeals on jurors’ sentencing verdicts and their ability to properly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. The experimenters had participants read a mock trial that varied in the number of mitigators and aggravators, whether or not the prosecutor used a Biblical appeal, and the way the defense incorporated religion (either the defense attorney used a Biblical appeal, the defendant testified that he had always been a Christian, the defendant testified that he recently converted to Christianity, or no religion was mentioned). After reading the scenario, participants issued one of two sentences: life in prison without parole or the death penalty.
Miller and Bornstein’s (2006) findings reflect their hypothesis: that the use of religion by the defense would lead to fewer death sentences and interfere in jurors’ abilities to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors. While the prosecution appeals did not affect verdict decisions, it was found that those in the “Always Christian” group could not weigh aggravators and mitigators properly or accurately. Additionally, mock jurors were least punitive toward the defendant who had converted to Christianity, rather than the control group or the defendant who had always been a Christian, revealing juror biases. [25] (The differing treatments of the defendant relate to several ingroup/outgroup biases that will be discussed in further detail later). These biases may have been elicited by heuristic-experiential thinking, implying the significant impact of religious information. These results support the claim that heuristics are used when religious material is present; the experiment suggested that religious content interfered with jurors’ abilities to think rationally and correctly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, as they relied on biases and acted leniently to the more religious defendant.
Evidence from Miller and Bornstein (2006) also displayed the impact of defense appeals on juror members. In fact, Epstein (1994) has suggested that religious messages may be especially influential because they connect well with the experiential system. This theory explains why religious appeals are often effective in swaying juries.[26] Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) write, “As techniques are used that are designed to bypass people’s need to present themselves as rational or that strongly engage their experiential system, people increasingly behave in a way that conforms to the principles of the experiential system” (p. 543). As discussed, these behaviors include reliance on biases, quick and instinctual decisions, outcome-oriented decisions, and thoughts that lie outside conscious awareness (Epstein, 1990). As such, defense attorneys as well as prosecuting attorneys often utilize the emotional effects of religious appeals.
An additional consequence of experiential and heuristic shortcuts is the removal of responsibility from oneself. Miller and Bornstein (2005) write, “Jurors experiencing religious appeals are likely to use the appeal as a mental shortcut because…their highly emotional state leaves them unwilling or unable to accept responsibility” (p. 53). By relying on one’s religious beliefs, an individual defers responsibility for their decision to their religious group or God, avoiding any personal negative feelings associated with the decision. This rejection of responsibility not only hinders the decision-making process, but is illegal if used in a death-penalty trial. If a juror defers responsibility due to a religious appeal or symbol in a death penalty case, that statement or symbol will have violated the Caldwell rule. As cited in Miller and Bornstein (2005), this rule states that it is, “constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness for the defendant’s death rests elsewhere”(p. 53).[27] Therefore, deferring responsibility for one’s opinion violates the law and challenges the logical evaluation abilities necessary to make life and death decisions. Many would argue that those deferring responsibility or making the decision through the use of heuristics is unfit for jury duty (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). And, as discussed, heuristics are more likely to be used when religion is salient. In short, this implies that religious material should be kept out of courts, avoiding the deference of responsibility and encouraging a complete understanding of the gravity of one’s decisions and verdicts.
In brief, the evidence reviewed implies that emotional content, including religious material and/or symbols, can greatly affect the mental processes employed by individuals. Evidence denotes that jurors who feel religious salience are likely to use experiential thinking when delivering a sentence, make less rational decisions, and feel less personal responsibility for their decisions. While studies such as Bright and Goodman-Delahunty (2006) show the experiential effects of emotional content, Miller and Bornstein (2006) illustrate that experiential processing is also activated when jurors hear religious appeals from lawyers in court, inhibiting one’s ability to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in court. This evidence demonstrates the hampering effects of religious content on the proper function of jury decisions and court structure. If religious material, such as defense attorney arguments, effectively sways juries and harms jurors’ abilities to think through trial evidence rationally and logically, then religious material actively compromises the just functioning of the United States jury system. Additionally, a juror's decreased feeling of responsibility for his/her verdict jeopardizes the jury pool and sentencing of the accused.
Schemas in Social Perception: Ingroup/Outgroup Attitudes
While several biases may be elicited through one’s use of heuristics and experiential processes, a different set of biases are ignited when the religious affiliation of a defendant is known. Studies by Van Pooijen & Lam (2007) as well as Kerr et al. (1995) suggest that social categorizations play a significant role in jury decision-making, stating that if the religion of the defendant is known to jurors, ingroup/outgroup biases may be activated. These biases can alter the way in which jurors judge a defendant’s character and behavior, resulting in harsher or more lenient punishments depending on whether or not the defendant is of the same religious group as the juror. These biases may cause outgroup punitiveness, similarity-leniency, or the black sheep effect. These three theories state that people often punish the outgroup, favor the ingroup, and/or punish the deviant ingroup. These theoretical tendencies are caused by personal prejudices and compromise one’s ability to judge other people and situations impartially.
Frequently, these biases are utilized when fashioning a jury. The jury pool selection process, voir dire, provides attorneys with the opportunity to pick lenient jurors for their defendant. In the past, controversies have been ignited due to discrimination of jurors based on race, gender, and religious affiliation.[28] These discriminations take place due to the power and efficacy of ingroup/outgroup biases and the way in which they shape individual’s attitudes and behaviors towards others.
Outgroup punitiveness. Outgroup punitiveness is one of the most common ingroup/outgroup biases perceived. According to the Social Identity Theory, people who identify with a group often show more favorable attitudes towards ingroup than outgroup members. This favoring enhances group members’ self esteem (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and maintains a positive group image. But, at the same time, ingroup favoritism acts as an impetus for severe negative outgroup stereotypes, creating a feeling that one’s ingroup is unique and/or superior (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Sidanius, 1993) and leads to outgroup hate and hostility (Brewer, 1999). In fact, both the Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT)[29] and Social Identity Theory (SIT)[30] claim that members of all groups (e.g., religious, racial, team, etc.) are susceptible to prejudice against outgroup members. Frequently, outgroup hostility is magnified when a group feels threatened, increasing the need to maintain a positive image, often by acting against the outgroup. This can occur in court if a defendant’s actions are somehow perceived as upsetting or disrespectful to a juror’s culture or race. Superiority, fear and distrust of others, and social comparisons all lead to ingroup favoritism and outgroup punitiveness.
Additionally, instead of direct hate or distrust towards outgroup members, ingroup favoritism may develop through a lack of admiration and sympathy for outgroup members. Previous research has shown that outgroup members are, “less likely to be helped in certain ambiguous circumstances (Frey & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Johnson, 1982), more likely to be seen as provoking aggression (Baron, 1979, Roger & Prentice-Dunn, 1981), [and] less likely to receive the benefit of the doubt in attribution for negative behaviors (Weber, 1994)” (Brewer, 1999, pp. 438). Each of these studies indicate the detrimental effect of being in an outgroup. These disadvantages are particularly important when an outgroup member is in a place of judgment. It is clear that whenever a defendant is of an outgroup to members of the jury panel, they are at a natural and often unavoidable disadvantage.[31]
Several studies have indicated that outgroup prejudice is ignited by ingroup threat and/or a lack of sympathy for others (e.g., Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Taylor & Hosch, 2004; Hunsberger, 1995; Griffen et al., 1987; Kerr et al., 1995). One example can be seen in a study conducted by Daudistel et al. (1999). Daudistel et al. (1999) examined noncapital felony cases in Texas to assess possible relations between ethnicity, conviction rates, and sentences. Regardless of the crime type, Daudistel et al. (1999) found that defendants’ ethnicities were correlated with the length of sentences rendered by juries. Sentences for Anglo defendants were approximately twice as long as Hispanic defendants’ sentences, with the sentences for Anglos rising as more Hispanics were added to the jury. [32] The correlation between rising Anglo sentences and the number of Hispanic jury members points directly to outgroup biases.
The Realistic Group Conflict and Social Identity theories apply to religious affiliation as well. Religion often roots individuals to an ingroup, creating group identification, that is, a tendency to make one’s group affiliation part of one’s identity (Deaux, 1996).[33] As such, maintaining the belief that one’s religion teaches the absolute truth and represents the ideal morality, religion may contribute to ingroup preference and generate prejudicial beliefs towards the outgroup. In many cases, one may feel as though his/her religious morals are being challenged by a defendant’s poor behavior and react with greater hostility towards the defendant. Or, one may feel a personal bond with the accused and want to support and protect them, as they share the same traditions and faith. The plethora of data on the effects of ingroup/outgroup attitudes directly highlights the dangers in revealing the religious affiliation of a defendant, as it is one more way in which one may affiliate themselves with an ingroup or outgroup.
A study by Pfeifer (1999) illustrated this dilemma. By creating a mock trial where the defendant was either allegedly or admittedly participating in a satanic cult or no mention of religion was made, Pfeifer (1999) found that the ratings of guilt were significantly affected by the mention of cult involvement, with convictions increasing with the mention of the minority religion. [34] Pfeifer (1999) claims these results indicate a prejudicial reaction against minority religions, demonstrating the impact of negative perceptions on jury decision-making. These biases are clearly of issue within courtrooms when a defendant’s religious affiliation is known to the jury, as this information may elicit outgroup biases, resulting in longer sentences and harsher perceptions of the defendant’s behavior and character.
Similarity-leniency hypothesis. Biases towards the outgroup are not the only significant prejudices in play. As stated by Brewer (1999), “discrimination can be motivated solely by ingroup preference, in the absence of any negative affect or hostile intent toward outgroups” (p. 431). As outlined by the Social Identity Theory, ingroup biases are extremely influential and powerful. SIT states that individuals wish to be viewed in a positive light. Positive perception can be gained in two ways: by behaving more favorably towards the ingroup or by behaving negatively towards deviant ingroup members. Leniency towards the ingroup is known as the similarity-leniency hypothesis, while negativity towards the ingroup is coined the black sheep effect. In the context of jury trials, this could indicate longer or shorter sentences for ingroup members, altering the way in which the defendant is perceived and judged.
The similarity-leniency hypothesis states that individuals favor those who are similar to themselves, or “the more similar a juror and the defendant are, the more lenient the juror is likely to be” (Kerr et al., 1995, p. 546). All research on the similarity-leniency hypothesis draws analogous conclusions, whether it is through similarities of language (Stephan & Stephan, 1986), political beliefs (Amato, 1979; Griffitt & Jackson, 1973), or lifestyle (Griffitt & Jackson 1973).[35] In each case, the jurors are less punitive when the defendants are more similar.
Brewer (1999) suggests that ingroup favoritism is the result of human group-living evolution, which she categorizes as the fundamental survival strategy that characterizes humans. The result is the development of obligator interdependence, indicating that we must rely on others for information, help, and resources, and must be willing to share with others (Brewer, 1997; Caporael, 1997). This creates a system of benefits, costs, and mutual cooperation (Brewer, 1999). Creating clear ingroup boundaries provides a mechanism through which one can achieve benefits without substantial costs. By limiting help to those in one’s ingroup, risks of nonreciprocation are greatly reduced. Additionally, it creates communities of mutual trust and altruistic behavior. In short, those within the ingroup expect to be treated well by other ingroup members, eliciting and expecting altruistic behavior. As she states:
To the extent that all groups discriminate between intragroup social behavior and intergroup behavior, it is in a sense universally true that ‘we’ are more peaceful, trustworthy, friendly, and honest than ‘they.’ This is reinforced by a general preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar. Social interactions within the ingroup are more predictable and understood than intergroup interactions (p. 435).
An expectation for contingent altruistic behavior is what promotes attraction towards one’s ingroup, creating a cycle of ingroup favoritism.
Due to the altruistic origins of ingroup behaviors, similarity-leniency has been observed in several court cases. Many attorneys utilize this hypothesis by picking jurors similar to the defendant in hopes that they will be more lenient in their sentencing. Gorbert and Jorden (1985) suggest that one should select jurors similar to the defendant because they will have had similar life experiences and are more likely to understand the actions of defendant, possibly excusing their behavior. [36] This same reasoning can be applied to religious affiliation; if the religion of the juror and defendant are the same, and the defendant’s religion is known, similarity-leniency may be used by jurors. In these situations, ingroup members directly benefit from ingroup altruism.
In an effort to test the similarity-leniency hypothesis, Kerr et al. (1995) designed a study in which the participant’s religion was crossed with the defendant’s religion as well as the strength of evidence against the defendant. Kerr et al. (1995) hypothesized that juror-defendant similarity would produce greater leniency toward the accused when the evidence was weak, but greater harshness when evidence was strong. This relationship reversal was expected due to the black sheep effect, anticipating harsh treatment of deviant ingroup members. Experimenters recruited 66 all male Christian and Jewish participants, recommended as strongly religious persons by colleagues and peers. Each participant considered four case summaries: two with strong prosecution, two with weak prosecution, two involved Christian defendants, and two involved Jewish defendants, recommending a verdict and ancillary judgments for each case. [37] Results followed a consistent pattern with the similarity-leniency hypothesis: Jewish mock jurors were less likely to convict Jewish defendants than Christian defendants, whereas the opposite was true for Christian participants. This effect was not altered by the strength of evidence against the defendant.[38] These results perfectly parallel the similarity-leniency hypothesis, showing favorable verdicts for those of a similar ingroup. Several other studies have mimicked these findings, such as a study done by Jackson & Hunsberger (1999) where religious individuals measured positive attitudes towards religious others and negative attitudes towards non-religious others. Inspection of the mean attitude levels revealed that attitudes towards Christians and believers were well above the scale midpoint, whereas attitudes towards atheists and non-believers were below the midpoint.
Each of these studies highlights the positive effects of ingroup favoritism as well as the negative effects of outgroup punitiveness. Kerr et al. (1995) depict the benefits of ingroup altruism and ingroup leniencies, while also showing signs of outgroup punitiveness. Similarly, Jackson & Hunsberger (1999) clearly portray one’s liking of similar others and dislike for those in a religious outgroup. Yet, simply being in one’s ingroup does not ensure lenient evaluations. If an ingroup member is perceived negatively by threatening the ingroup image, they may suffer from the black sheep effect.
Black sheep effect. As stated earlier, ingroup favoritism is maintained through a positive group image; individuals identify themselves through their respective communities, and therefore strive to maintain its integrity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). So what happens if an ingroup member threatens this vision? In situations such as these, the black sheep effect comes into play. First coined by Marques and Yzerbyt (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, 1990), the black sheep effect suggests that deviant ingroup members will be punished more harshly than those in the outgroup who commit the same crime.[39] If the defendant is of the same religious affiliation, but the juror does not feel as though they are upholding the core values of the religion, the juror is likely to negatively evaluate the defendant (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, and Billings 1999; Wilder, Simon and Faith, 1996).[40] Consequently, those in the ingroup may receive harsher punishment.
The black sheep effect may be caused by ingroup member’s familiarity as well as one’s awareness of their ingroup affiliation. It is suggested that those who are similar serve as the best self-comparisons, driving the desire to dissociate oneself from the deviant actor (Taylor & Mette, 1971). Additionally, research shows that negative ingroup behavior is more significant to other ingroup members. In fact, research indicates that criminals may be perceived as dishonoring their entire ingroup (Lauderdale et al., 1984; Marques, 1990). This issue may be particularly relevant with religious ingroups/outgroups due to the moral issues at hand in court. As such, deviant ingroup members are often seen as a threat to the betterment of the ingroup’s status and beliefs.
In order to further investigate the role of the black sheep effect in the courtroom, Johnson (1984) ran a study to test the relevance and effect of a criminal’s religion as well as religious defense statements. During the study, groups of participants (up to seven people) watched a child abuse trial and were asked to judge the accused as guilty or not guilty. For half of the participants, one line was added to the defense attorney’s argument: “Donne’s minister said that Donne is a fine Christian man who follows the word of God as stated in the Bible in conducting all of his family affairs and, thus, must be a good father” (p. 215). For the remainder of the participants, no mention of religion was made. After the video, participants were given transcripts of the tape and had 10 minutes to review and reach a common verdict, which they reported on a questionnaire. Results indicated that participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty in the religious-defense condition than in the non-religious defense condition. In parallel, those in the religious-defense condition recommended longer sentences than those in the control condition. The degree of recommended sentence was found to be significantly related to Christian-right orientation, church attendance, and the sex of the participants. Christians Rightists were more severe in their recommended sentences to fellow Christians, but only when religion was used as a defense. Johnson (1984) suggests that this is due to Christians’ expectations and demands that people who claim to be part of their religious community conduct themselves in a respectable way. These results mirror the expectations of the black sheep effect, showing that devoted members of an ingroup will negatively and harshly evaluate deviant members of their ingroup. The black sheep effect can be observed in many other cases as well, including a study by Belli (1963) in which Jewish jurors assigned harsher verdicts to fellow Jews than non-Jews.
Additionally, similar studies also show that as strength of evidence increases, so does ingroup punitivenss. One example is the second 1995 study by Kerr et al. where black mock jurors and white mock jurors suggested harsher verdicts for those of the same race when the evidence against the defendant was strong. As such, the presence of strong evidence acted as a catalyst for the black sheep effect, showing that jurors will judge ingroup members harshly under certain conditions. Strong evidence increases the need to maintain a positive ingroup image and increases the evidence of deviance within the ingroup, calling for harsher punishment.
In summary, ingroup/outgroup biases can often alter how a defendant is judged. Religious biases may interfere when the religious affiliation of the offender is known. These prejudicial attitudes may be expressed in outgroup punitiveness, similarity-leniency, and the black sheep effect. Each of these theories and hypotheses correlate with the Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory, which claim that members of groups are susceptible to prejudice against outgroup members in an effort to uphold positive ingroup perception and self-esteem. Conclusively, the impact of a juror’s religious affiliation on jury perception and decision-making is immense. Simply being aware of one’s religion can greatly alter a juror’s perception of the case, the necessary punishment for the accused, as well as the character of the defendant. These biases can thwart proper decision-making, resulting in prejudiced and personal evaluations, rather than rational and judicial decisions. This concept will be discussed further in the subsequent chapter. Today, evidence of a defendant’s religion is often accepted as evidence of his/her character, and while this is troublesome for several reasons, this evidence may further bias the jury due to their own religious beliefs and preconceived notions regarding religious persons, resulting in improper and partial sentencing (Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Miller & Hayward, 2007).
The Intricacies of Religious Groups
Considering the highly influential effects of ingroup and outgroup biases along with experiential thinking and the use of heuristics, researchers have attempted to decipher what religious groups and individuals are most susceptible to prejudicial beliefs. But, more often than not, researchers have found that religion is far too complex to systematically divide by religion, and that gathering an understanding of what an individual believes by looking at one’s religious teachings is nearly impossible. With consideration given to religious interpretation as well as the influence of one’s religious community and personal relationships within that community, it has been determined that understanding an individual’s beliefs by the label of one’s religion is impossible.
Religion is a matter of interpretation for many believers, analyzing and reading into the meanings of holy texts. Interpretation is highly influential in death penalty court cases, as most religious texts address the topics of murder, crime, life and death. As Egland (2004) writes:
Although religious texts are not amendable, they are subject to interpretation by any number of ministers, rabbis, and imams, each of whom potentially could advocate a different interpretation. Indeed, 12 Christian jurors could have 12 different interpretations of a particular Biblical passage or rely on any number of different passages to find support for, or opposition to, the death penalty. The same critique applies to the Qur’an (p. 341).
Young (1992) concurs, pointing out Biblical evidence that could both support and condemn use of the death penalty. In the legal world, prosecutors often employ quotes from the Bible to assert support for retribution (using quotes such as “an eye for an eye,”[41] suggesting equal punishment for the strength of the crime, along with a similar quote, “[h]e that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall surely be put to death,”[42] in clear espousal of the death penalty) while defense attorneys quote the Bible to promote mercy (often directly contradicting a prosecutor’s use of “an eye for an eye” by quoting, “You have heard that it [has been] said ‘[an] [e]ye for an eye and [a] tooth for [a] tooth.’ But I tell you…[i]f someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn…the other also”[43]). While both prosecutors and attorneys use the Bible to persuade jurors, both are able to find conflicting opinions within the text. There are conflicting arguments presented in the Bible and several other religious texts. Evidently, one cannot assume that individuals in the same religious group share the same outlook on the death penalty, or any other moral matter. Many religions support both sides of the argument, indicating that one’s outlook on moral issues may be shaped by, but not determined, by one’s religion.
Moreover, it has been suggested that one’s religious beliefs are as affected by the religion itself as the environment in which the beliefs are taught. Bjarnason and Welch (2004) tested the strength of Catholic parishioners’ attitudes towards capital punishment on congregants, looking into the formation of moral judgments in a religious congregation. Seeing as the Catholic Church has become a vocal opponent of the death penalty, Bjarnason and Welch (2004) expected to observe greater disdain for the death penalty within congregants who maintain an active and positive relationship with the parish, regardless of the attitude perceived through the Biblical text, and when the parish has strong feelings against capital punishment. Results of the study indicated that the effect of the moral message of the church depends upon the salience, direction, and content of an individual’s religious beliefs. Results also directly reflected the expected results: it was found that congregant’s support of the death penalty correlated with the personal opposition by the priest, and their personal relationship to the priest.
Yet, the correlation is not so simple, as there are a multitude of factors that may affect one’s relationship to a church and priest. Factors listed by the experimenters that may influence this relationship are one’s gender, race, class, the characteristics of the parish, the region in the United States, involvement of the priest with the parish community, the parish priests’ personal opinions, and strength of one’s personal relationship with God. Clearly, the relationship one maintains to one’s religious group is complex and personal, and currently impossible to accurately evaluate or test. For this reason, Bjarnason and Welch (2004) note that their data does not fully account for differences in death penalty attitudes across parishes, citing that seemingly contextual effects (such as a congregation’s geographical location, racial composition, and the involvement and attitude of the priest) can be a consequence of individual differences between parishes. Still, this study helps demonstrate the overwhelming number of factors that contribute to the intricate assemblage of one’s religious, political, and moral attitudes and prejudices.
These studies portray the complexities of religious thought, and the multitude of opinions present within each religious group (e.g., Egland, 2004; Young, 1992; Bjarnason & Welch, 2004). Egland (2004) argues that the flexible nature of religious thought and “religious legal interpretation makes it unsuitable for application in the modern American justice system,” as it is still unclear how to decipher what individuals believe (Egland, 2004, p.341). Today, many consider it unacceptable to remove persons from jury duty because of their religious affiliation,[44] and according to the research discussed in this chapter, that action would clearly be ineffective due to the multitude of beliefs held by members within each religion. Yet, discovering a way to inhibit the expression of prejudicial beliefs and biases in jury pools is still of utmost importance. If possible, outgroup and ingroup biases as well as the use of heuristic and experiential thinking must be discouraged. One additional way in which to address this issue is through measurements of one’s religious orientation: extrinsic, intrinsic, quest, or fundamental.
Measuring Religious Prejudice
Frustrated by the inability to understand prejudice by religious affiliation, several scales have been designed, including the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Orientation scale and Baton’s Quest scale, in attempts to solve psychologists’ questions regarding what characteristics make one prejudice, and from where the prejudice evolves. Most scales have significant conflicting evidence and have continued to be molded in an effort to create an accurate measurement; while one researcher finds supporting evidence of the scale’s validity and accuracy, another researcher reports conflicting findings. By examining the history of these religion-prejudice scales, one is able to observe the immense difficulty and complexity in measure one’s beliefs.
Extrinsic versus intrinsic orientation. In an attempt to better understand the link between religion and prejudice and formalize the concern surrounding several oversimplified measures of religion and prejudice (example: “how often do you go to church?”), Allport and Ross (1967) created the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Orientation Scales. By distinguishing between two religious orientations, extrinsic (E) as well as intrinsic (I), Allport and Ross (1967) created scales by which to measure these concepts. Extrinsic orientation acts as a self-serving approach that conforms to social conventions, often utilizing “security, comfort, status, or social support.” In opposition, intrinsic orientation uses religion as a framework through which life is understood (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 441; Herek, 1987); “persons with this orientation find their master motive in religion” (p. Allport & Ross, 1967, 434). Allport and Ross (1967) summarized these concepts by saying, “the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion” (p. 434).
Initial findings by Allport and Ross (1967) concluded that more intrinsic persons were less prejudiced than extrinsic persons. They claimed that the lack of prejudice found in intrinsic persons lies in their use of religion in everyday interactions, leaving “no place for rejection, contempt, or condescension” towards others, while extrinsic persons use religion as means for social acceptance and assimilation (p. 441). In short, Allport and Ross (1967) believed that prejudice is part of one’s personality structure, intertwined with one’s religious orientation.[45] A few years later, a study by Donahue (1985) found similar results (along with studies by Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974 and Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988), concluding that extrinsic orientation was indeed positively correlated with prejudice and dogmatism, whereas intrinsic orientation was not.
Yet, in a similar study by Donahue’s (1985), findings were not nearly as strong as Allport and Ross (1967), and pointed out several internal inconsistencies within the E scale, as well as no correlation between the I scale and prejudice (rather than a negative correlation as suggested by Allport and Ross (1967)). Moreover, several studies directly contradicted the findings of Allport and Ross (1967) with results showing a positive correlation between the I scale and prejudice against gays and lesbians (e.g., Batson and Burris, 1994; Hunsberger, 1995; Herek, 1987) and persons of religious outgroups (e.g., Griffen, Gorsuch, and Davis, 1987; McFarland, 1989). One study that investigated the role of intrinsic and extrinsic beliefs on attitudes towards gays, run by Herek (1987), hypothesized that “attitudes towards outgroups serve different psychological functions for persons with extrinsic and intrinsic orientations” (p. 34). In short, Herek, as well as several others (e.g., Donahue, 1985; Hunsberger, 1995), came to the conclusion that the I and E scales did not sufficiently measure one’s prejudicial attitudes due to the intricacies of prejudice and discrimination. In fact, Altemeyer (1996) stated that the I and E scales, “plainly failed to measure what they were supposed to measure…[and] they plainly failed to show what they were supposed to show” (p. 154). In brief, the question of what characterizes prejudicial beliefs was left unanswered.
Quest (Q) scale. In response, attempts have been made to reinterpret the I and E scales. For example, Batson (1993) argued that the element of social desirability may have interfered in the measurements, confusing the relationship between prejudice and I-E religiosity. Intrinsic persons may appear to be less prejudiced simply because they are concerned with their social standing (Spilka et al., 2003).[46] Upon further investigation, Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) found that when one controls for social desirability, a positive correlation between intrinsic religion and prejudice is found. Moreover, they reported a link between I scores and social desirability.[47] In response, Batson (1993) created a three factor model, known as the Quest (Q) Scale, building upon the I-E scales put forth by Allport and Ross (1967). The additional quest scale incorporates an open and flexible approach to religious issues, fulfilling the need to address open-mindedness. Batson has argued that higher scores on the Q scale are negatively correlated to prejudice. This claim was further proven through additional studies by Batson (Batson et al., 1978; Batson et al. 1986). Additionally, research has found an association between the Q scale and increased complexity of thought (Batson & Raynor-Prince, 1983) and openness to different perspectives (McFarland & Warren, 1992).
But again, as with Allport and Ross’ I-E scale, conflicting evidence has been found concerning the Q scale. Ponton and Gorsuch (1988) were unable to replicate the findings of a negative correlation with prejudice and Altemeyer (1996) challenged the scale on psychometric grounds. Due to the conflicting evidence, several Q scales have been formed, with additional questions tweaked in an effort to gain more accurate results. Even so, a concrete and trustworthy Q scale is yet to be created, with several versions of the measurements being used by researchers today.
Certainly, it is easy to see that the measurements of religiosity and prejudice are contradictory and weak. Several of the models created by researchers have been challenged by later studies, and confusion persists regarding what the best characteristics are to focus on. Should one focus on extrinsic and intrinsic orientations or on one’s religious group and religious leader? Unfortunately, these questions remain unanswered. The one scale that has produced convincing and frequently replicated results, is the fundamentalism scale.
Fundamentalism. Over the years, several studies have pointed to the connection between fundamentalist beliefs and higher levels of prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). The term “religious fundamentalism” (RF) has often been used to express an idea of dogmatism, orthodoxy, and a traditional way of thought. However, the definition of fundamentalism is obtuse, and can be defined in several ways. For the specific use of religious prejudicial studies, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) created a definition of RF that is theoretically separate from other aspects of religion, characterizing it as:
The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity (p. 118).
This definition of fundamentalism applies to current research and is applicable to almost all world religions (Spilka et al., 2003). Additionally, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) created a RF scale to measure their concept of fundamentalism, which has been applied in several subsequent studies, providing an individual participant level of fundamental religious beliefs.
Many explain fundamentalist prejudice by its correlation to right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992; Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe et al., 2002). This correlation has been found among members of varying religious backgrounds, including Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Hindus (Hunsberger, 1996), as well as several cultures.[48] Altemeyer (1996) has defined RWA as a composite of three attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. High scores in RF and RWA indicate several forms of prejudice, including egocentrism and prejudice towards homosexuals, all associated with negative outgroup feelings (e.g., Laythe et al., 2002; Altemeyer, 1996; Hunsberger, 1996). Additionally, subsequent research has revealed a negative correlation between Altemeyer’s (1996) authoritarian conditions and relativism (one’s ability to look at situations from several points of view).[49] As such, it is frequently argued that right-wing authoritarian attitudes promote animosity towards outgroups, indicating an inability to look at a situation from another person’s point of view (Altemeyer, 1996; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995).
Seen as a personality characteristic, authoritarianism and fundamentalism share an unquestioning nature. It has been suggested that those high in RF cling to existing stereotypes and are unable or unwilling to change their current schemas in accordance with new information (Spilka et al, 2003). Research has indicated that fundamentalists do not have complex thoughts regarding religion, and instead stick to the information they have been taught. Many psychologists assert that the mindset of fundamentalism creates a substantial distinction between ingroups and outgroups. “[Fundamentalist] beliefs make it easier…to divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’,” writes Unger (2002, p. 43). The black and white, teachings of fundamentalism foster ingroup tendencies and greater outgroup discrimination. As discussed earlier, outgroup prejudice is also influenced by strong ingroup identification, especially within religious groups. As such, those who score higher on RF scales have stronger ingroup identification, and therefore a higher chance of maintaining negative attitudes towards an outgroup (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).[50]
As mentioned briefly before, Jackson and Hunsberger (1999) created a study to examine the link between religiosity and attitudes towards religious and non-religious others. The study analyzed prejudicial beliefs held by devout Christians (those who scored high numbers on the RF scale or Christian orthodoxy scale). Participants completed a questionnaire assessing religiosity as well as group identification. Results of the study revealed that religious group identification was significantly correlated with RF and Christian orthodoxy. Furthermore, both RF and Christian orthodoxy were positively correlated with positive attitudes towards Christians and believers, and negatively correlated with atheists and non-believers. This, writes Jackson and Hunsberger (1999) is especially indicative of fundamentalism’s association with outgroup derogation and group identification ties to ingroup favoritism.[51] These results mirror the hypothesis that fundamentalism is often associated with prejudicial beliefs due to its strength of ingroup identification, verifying the claim by Unger (2002) that fundamentalism greatly defines ingroups from outgroups, “us” versus “them”.[52]
The biased attitudes often associated with fundamentalism are ever-present in court decisions today, especially in death penalty trials. Young (1992) and Miller and Hayward (2007) suggest that fundamentalist beliefs are in direct correlation with support for the death penalty, with fundamentalist individuals experiencing less cognitive dissonance about the appropriateness of such a punishment. “Fundamentalists tend to deny the possibility of moral relativity,” writes Young (1992). “Such absolutism, whether a cause or a consequence of fundamental beliefs, is likely to be associated with the perception of considerable evil in the world, for the morality of human action is not to be judged relative to social context” (p.78). Here, Young addresses the problem of absolutism in fundamental beliefs, the rigid context in which life is often evaluated, and one’s inability to separate the sin from the sinner.[53] Sayyid Qutb, the creator of fundamental Islam, preached the traditional reading of the Qur’an, banning any form of interpretation. Islam just is, he says. (Euben, 1999). This closed-minded attitude associated with fundamental beliefs can greatly alter how crimes are perceived. If everything in the world is seen as black and white, good or bad, it seems sensible that fundamentalists would more easily convict others for crimes, and feel less internal conflict about sentencing someone to death.
The plethora of research regarding fundamentalist beliefs and thought processes poses an interesting problem to the United States court system and jury selection. According to these studies, individuals who score high on RF have innate ingroup preferences and outgroup discrimination. Moreover, and most importantly, those with high RF are unable to change their opinions and ideas, incorporating new information into pre-set religious schemas instead of accommodating religious doubts or new information (Spilka et al., 2003). This poses a direct threat to the functioning of a fair jury hearing, seeing as fundamentalist jurors would likely be unable to impartially consider a court case. Another argument to be made is that fundamentalists would likely put their religious morals above the law, seeing as fundamentalism is often viewed as a set of laws in itself. This would inhibit jurors from properly following judge’s instructions and other legal protocol.
Chapter Summary
To conclude this chapter, evidence indicates that religion is frequently correlated with both morality and prejudice, creating a web of complexity around the issues of religious biases. Furthermore, experiential and heuristic systems are activated by religious content, inhibiting effortful thought processes and logical assessments of information. As seen in Miller and Bornstein (2006), this cursory system jeopardizes rational decision making within courtrooms when religion is salient to jurors, specifically when religious material is used as a defense. Furthermore, knowledge of a defendant’s religion can spark ingroup/outgroup biases including outgroup punitiveness, similarity-leniency, as well as the black sheep effect. These biases can directly help or hinder the outcome for the accused, regardless of the evidence presented or arguments made within the trial.
Moreover, identifying individual’s religious biases is a complex process. It is impossible to know one’s beliefs based on his/her religious title. Additionally, several religious orientation scales, such as the intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest scales, have failed to create consistent correlation evidence between orientations and prejudicial attitudes. The one scale that has produced consistent evidence is the religious fundamentalism scale, which has repeatedly shown a connection between fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism, support for the death penalty and prejudice against several racial, political, and religious outgroups.
This evidence demonstrates the implications of juror biases and the likely presence of biases within jury pools today. Regulating the presence and expression of personal prejudices is essential to fair and impartial trials. Furthermore, findings discussed in this chapter highlight the possibility of religious salience increasing the expression of religious biases in court. While psychologists have gained a considerable understanding of how religious material affects fundamentalists, the effect on non-fundamentalists remains unclear. Seeing as religious content can elicit emotions and biases, one may argue that it is necessary to rid of religious content from within courtrooms in the United States. In the following study, perspective taking will be utilized in an effort to reduce juror biases as well determine whether bias exists within the jury pool. Additionally, juror reactions to religious symbols are evaluated to see if the presence of religion alters sentencing, the decision-making process, and expression of biases.
Chapter Two:
The Role of Perspective Taking in Reducing Juror Biases and the Effects of Religious Symbols
“The life of almost any unfortunate, if rightly understood, can be readjusted to some plan of order and system, instead of left to drift on to ruin, the victim of ignorance, hatred and chance”-Darrow (1940, p.494).
This chapter will outline a study designed to investigate the effects of religious symbols and perspective taking in courtrooms. This study aims to assess whether religious symbols and instructions to take the perspective of the defendant will alter participant’s levels of rational and experiential processing and in turn, how participants come to their sentencing decisions. Furthermore, this study aims to determine whether perspective taking can inhibit the expression of biases and experiential thoughts. Additionally it investigates individual differences, such as one’s religious identification, religious affiliation and reported devotionalism, which may affect verdicts and interact with rational and experiential thought processes.
Specifically this research aims to answer the following questions: 1) Do participants hold inherent religious biases? 2) Are sentences reduced when perspective taking is present? Do directives of perspective taking reduce any religious biases present? 3) Are ingroup/outgroup biases provoked by knowledge of the religion of the defendant, altering verdicts? 4) Does the presence of a holy book and religious symbols increase experiential thinking as seen through REI measures? 5) Do directives to take the perspective of the defendant increase rational thinking in jurors? 6) How does thinking experientially versus rationally affect the verdict and how people come to their decisions? Do jurors depend on instincts over facts when thinking experientially? And finally, 7) do the religious conditions affect the way participants view themselves, as seen through measures of Religious Identification and Devotionalism? If so, how does this effect decision-making? Through experimental manipulation, this study will inform the courts about the effects of religious symbols in the courtroom and the role of perspective taking in inhibiting heuristic thinking and biased actions.
METHOD
Participants
133 participants (50 men and 83 women) were recruited from Amherst College and a local Amherst coffee shop. People participated in the study in exchange for course credit or $5 compensation. Only six participants from the coffee shop were included, and therefore separate tests were not run between the Amherst College and Amherst community participant groups.
Materials
Participants received one of six packets containing general instructions, a case summary, judge’s instructions, and a brief questionnaire. The questionnaire was constructed to measure the participants’ levels of religious devotion and affiliation to their respective religious group, ingroup and outgroup biases, levels of rational or experiential thinking, and their use or nonuse of perspective taking during the trial. All groups were given the same judge’s instructions and questionnaire. Half of the groups were instructed to take the perspective of the defendant through an additional paragraph, while the other half was not. Additionally, 1/3rd of the participants received a trial summary with a Christian defendant, 1/3rd received a Sikh defendant, and the last 1/3rd received a control defendant where no religious affiliation or symbols were mentioned.
Trial summary. The written trial summary described the penalty phase of a man convicted on charges of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree assault. The summary was approximately 560 words long. It was based loosely on the case against Jose Santos who was sentenced 10 to 20 years in prison on December 20, 1995 for beating and raping his estranged wife.[54] The crime was manipulated through the inclusion of alleged spying by the husband, with mention of the husband’s tattoo. It was also altered by the name and religion of the defendant as well as the swearing in procedure.
In a third of the packets, the trial highlighted a defendant of Christian beliefs. The trial began with the defendant swearing in on a Bible, reciting, “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.” Additionally, mention of the defendant’s tattoo of a Cross was present in the case summary. This defendant’s name was Paul Matthews. Another third highlighted a defendant of Sikh beliefs. The trial began with the defendant swearing in on the Guru Granth Sahib reciting, “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.” Additionally, mention of the defendant’s tattoo of an Ek-Onkar was present in the case summary. The defendant’s name was Talib Rajpal. Lastly, the final third was the control condition. The defendant swore in by putting his hand over his heart, reciting, “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” A tattoo was mentioned without specification of its content or image. The defendant’s name was Robert Johnson.
In half of these conditions, participants were instructed to take the perspective of the defendant by including a paragraph that read, “Knowing the importance of understanding others, go through the trial as if you were the defendant, walking through the world in his shoes and looking at the world through his eyes. Know that there are two sides to every question; try to look at them both. Try to imagine how you would feel if you were in the defendant’s place.”
Instructions and verdict form. Participants were instructed to indicate a verdict of guilty or not guilty for an additional charge of aggravated sexual abuse and to give a recommended sentence for the defendant. The guidelines for the conviction of aggravated sexual abuse were supplied from “Report to Congress: Analysis of Penalties for Federal Rape Cases,” (1993) and was integrated into the judge’s instructions. Participants were informed that if found guilty, the defendant was eligible for up to a maximum of life sentence. Participants were also informed that the crimes the defendant had already been convicted of were eligible for a minimum of 4 ½ to 9 years and a maximum of 12 ½ to 25 years in prison. Participants were then told to determine the appropriate sentence for the defendant, supplying a minimum and maximum sentence along with a recommended sentence for the defendant.
Dependant and independant measures survey. The dependent measure survey contained measures of the participant’s sentencing decision, confidence in one’s decision, what influenced the participant’s decision, a participant’s level of religious identification, a devotionalism measure, the Rational-Experiential Inventory, a perspective taking measure (Interpersonal Reactivity Index), and CEST measures. For more details please see Appendix B.
Interpersonal reactivity index (IRI). Perspective taking was utilized in the following study to curtail stereotypes and biases, in hopes that those who employed perspective taking would report higher levels of rational processing and evaluate the defendant in an unbiased and logical manner. In order to accurately measure perspective taking, this study employed a section of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980; 1983), a scale that consists of 4 components: the perspective taking scale, the empathetic concern scale, personal distress, and the fantasy scale. Only questions regarding perspective taking were scored. The questions measured a particpant’s tendency to adopt the psychological point of view of others in everyday life, with statements such as, "I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective." Participants rated each question on a 5-point scale from does not describe me well to describes me very well. This scale was used to measure if and how much the participant tried to take the perspective of the defendant.
The use of perspective taking, the active imagination of how an individual feels or is affected by his/her situation, frequently produces an empathetic arousal that leads to altruistic behavior (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Batson, 1991).[55] Perspective taking affects the attribution and evaluation of others, as perspective takers evaluate a situation as if they themselves were in it (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). It has been shown that perspective taking leads to the merging of the self and the other and an increased cognitive accessibility of the self-concept (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Just as the positive self-evaluation is related to the ingroup, the increased self-other overlap caused by perspective taking could lead to more positive evaluations of the outgroup target (e.g., a defendant), diminishing the accessibility and application of stereotypes (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In fact, a study by Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) found that perspective taking reduced evidence of ingroup bias by increasing evaluations of the outgroup. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) suggested perspective taking as an effective strategy for debiasing social thought.[56]
Rational-experiential inventory (REI). The Rational-Experiential Inventory was administered to investigate the role of thought processes (rational versus experiential) in relation to perspective taking instructions and religious symbols. Based on Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST), as discussed in the previous chapter, REI was constructed to measure two independent processing modes: analytic-rational and intuitive-experiential. The REI consists of two parts: the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC)[57] and Faith in Intuition (FI) Scale,[58] which were created to measure personality, adjustment, achievement and interpersonal relations through thinking processes and intuition levels (Epstein et al., 1996).[59] A 5-item NFC scale was used in this study, which reports the extent to which individuals enjoy and engage in, or dislike and avoid, cognitive activities (Epstein et al., 1996). Providing the assessment of intuitive-experiential thinking, Epstein et al. (1996) developed the Faith in Intuition scale, measuring engagement and confidence in one’s intuitive abilities. A 5-item FI scale was used in this study, which refers to having confidence in one’s feelings and immediate impressions as a basis for decisions and actions (Epstein et al., 1996).[60] Respondents rated all items of the NFC and FI scales on a 5-point scale ranging from completely false to completely true.
CEST Vignettes. In addition to the self-report scales, Epstein et al. (1996) created heuristic vignettes to provide an alternate index of individual differences in rational and experiential thinking. These vignettes act as a non-self-report measure from which responses can be scored objectively as heuristic or rational. The vignettes depict situations that require judgments about the degree of distress following arbitrary outcomes or cost-benefit effects. On the basis of CEST, Epstein et al. (1996) correlated heuristic responses with intuitive-experiential processing (as heuristics are the natural mode of the experiential system). In conducting the vignettes, respondents are asked how they themselves would respond (self perspective) and how a completely rational person would respond (logical perspective) in the situations provided.[61] These responses allow participants to express their understanding of the rational response, even if they do not believe it reflects common behaviors, and to demonstrate their awareness of the two modes of thinking. If participants are aware of both modes (rational and experiential), it is believed they can alter responses appropriately when asked to make judgments from the different mode of thinking (Epstein et al., 1996), mirroring a judge asking a juror to think logically and impartially. This also allows one to determine whether a participant is generally experiential or if they are thinking experientially due to the case before them.[62] In the following study, participants were scored by their answers regarding how a rational person would respond to the given vignettes, as it indicates a participant’s ability to think rationally and awareness of the rational response. One point was given for each vignette, either to one’s experiential or rational score. Therefore, participants were rated either 3:0, 2:1 rational or 1:2, 0:3 experiential. (For vignettes, see Appendix C).
Procedure
After participants read and signed an informed consent form, they were reminded that they could terminate the experiment at any time. The experimenter then explained the procedure, informed participants that they were to act as mock jurors at a trial, read through all of the information carefully, and answer each question. After handing in the packet, participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and then dismissed.
HYPOTHESES
Perspective Taking
Due to the debiasing effects of perspective taking, it was hypothesized that perspective taking instructions would lower sentences in all three conditions. It was expected that sentences would drop most significantly in the Sikh condition due to decrease in outgroup bias (as no Sikhs are expected to be in the participant pool). It was also hypothesized that those in perspective taking conditions would report higher levels of rational thinking and lower experiential thinking due to a decrease in ingroup/outgroup biases. A such, it was expected that perspective taking would lower the expression of biases in all three conditions, though more substantially in the religious conditions due to increased levels of bias caused by religious symbols. Contrarily, those who did not receive perspective taking instructions were expected to report higher experiential thinking and rely more heavily on personal biases, basing decisions on feelings about the case and defendant as well as their instincts about the case. Furthermore, perspective taking was expected to positively correlate not only with rational thinking, but also how participants came to their respective decisions. Reliance on one’s religious beliefs, instincts, and feelings were considered experiential factors. Reliance on judge’s instructions, logic and reason and evidence provided in the case were viewed as rational factors.
Religious Condition
Sentences and conviction rates were expected to be higher in the Sikh condition due to ingroup/outgroup biases. Because of ingroup/outgroup biases and the larger number of ingroup members expected in the Christian condition than the Sikh condition, it was hypothesized that the Christian defendant would receive lower sentences than the Sikh or control defendants. This expectation was based on the similarity-leniency hypothesis. Additionally, it was expected that lower ingroup sentences would be most pronounced when only looking at Christian participants, as it isolates the ingroup.
Additionally, participants in the Christian and Sikh conditions were expected to process more experientially than participants in the control condition due to the presence of religious symbols and the salience of religion. These participants were also expected to rely more heavily on intuitive-experiential factors rather than analytical-rational factors when making sentencing decisions. Due to previous findings that emotional content (including religious material) sparks experiential thinking, it was also anticipated that those who rated themselves with high Religious Identification and Devotionalism would be more likely to utilize experiential thinking when making sentencing decisions, especially when religion was salient.
RESULTS
General
The overall sample size included 133 participants (38% males) with ages ranging from 18 to 64 (with a mean age of 20.9 years old). Participants who did not provide a recommended sentence, or who provided a range for recommended sentence, were not used in sentencing data but were included in the overall data (N=5). One participant who suggested life was entered at 70 years to match the next highest sentence recommendation. 59 participants (44%) were Christians, 14 (10.5%) were Jewish, one (0.7%) was Hindu, four (3%) were Buddhist, one (0.7%) was Muslim, 16 (12%) were Atheists, 16 (12%) were Agnostics, 14 (10.5%) indicated that they believed in God but had no particular faith, and two (1.5%) indicated that their faith was “other” than those listed (one Quaker and one Celtic Pagan). Each cell had an average of 22.16 participants, with cell sizes ranging from 22 to 23 participants. Results were also examined in a sample of Christian-only participants (N=59). Two participants in this group failed to provide valid sentence recommendations, putting the sample size at 57 for tests regarding sentences. Each cell had an average of 9.8 participants, will cell sizes ranging from 6 to 13 participants.
Comprehension Check
One false option was added to questionnaires to ensure participants’ close attention to the case summary. When participants were asked to rate what influenced their sentencing decisions, the false option read: “Evidence that the husband tried to break his wife’s arm.” No such evidence was provided in the case summary, yet 68 participants (51%) marked that this evidence influenced their decision. Only 15 (11%) participants marked that this did not influence them at all. These data may indicate low levels of thorough comprehension and attention in the participant pool during the conduction of this study, though ample significant data was found.
Effects of Perspective Taking
Perspective taking instructions. It was found that perspective taking (PT) instructions were effective in all three conditions (F (1,127) =4.81, p.05), not giving support to hypothesis 2. Similarly, the CEST measures did not indicate any effect of perspective taking on heuristic (F (1,127) =1.45, p>.05) or logical thinking (F (1,127) =1.45, p>.05).
Likewise, in the all-Christian participant group, perspective taking did not have a significant effect on analytical-rational (F (1, 53) =.019, p>.05) or intuitive-experiential (F (1, 53) =.004, p>.05) processes as measured by the REI scale. But, when measured by the CEST vignettes, data indicated that perspective taking significantly increased logical thinking (F (1, 53) =3.14, p ................
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